Intentions in the Light of Goals (extended draft)
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Intentions in the Light of Goals Cristiano Castelfranchi Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL) - ISTC CNR Abstract: We will present a systematic analysis of the various steps of the goal-processing and intention creation, as the final outcome of goal-driven action generation. Intention theory has to be founded on goal theory; intentions require means-end reasoning and planning, conflict resolution, coherence. The process of intention formation and intentional action execution is strictly based on specific sets of beliefs (predictions, evaluations, calculation of costs, responsibility beliefs, competence, .... ). The origin of an intention is not necessarily a "desire" (which just is a kind of goal). Intention is a two layers goal- structure: the intended action(s) to be executed; the intended outcome motivating that action; with two kinds of "failure". We will also examine - in this belief-goal perspective - the double stage of intentions and the relations and differences between intention in "agenda" (Future directed) and intention under execution (Intention in action). We will argue that "will" is much more than the intention driving an intentional action. We will argue that Intentions are not there just for "motivating & regulating" intentional actions (not only at the motor, executive, level) but they play several important roles. 1. Premise 1
Transcript of Intentions in the Light of Goals (extended draft)
Intentions in the Light of Goals
Cristiano CastelfranchiGoal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL) - ISTC CNR
Abstract: We will present a systematic analysis of the various steps ofthe goal-processing and intention creation, as the final outcome ofgoal-driven action generation. Intention theory has to be founded on goaltheory; intentions require means-end reasoning and planning, conflictresolution, coherence. The process of intention formation and intentionalaction execution is strictly based on specific sets of beliefs(predictions, evaluations, calculation of costs, responsibility beliefs,competence, .... ). The origin of an intention is not necessarily a"desire" (which just is a kind of goal). Intention is a two layers goal-structure: the intended action(s) to be executed; the intended outcomemotivating that action; with two kinds of "failure". We will also examine- in this belief-goal perspective - the double stage of intentions andthe relations and differences between intention in "agenda" (Futuredirected) and intention under execution (Intention in action). We willargue that "will" is much more than the intention driving an intentionalaction. We will argue that Intentions are not there just for "motivating& regulating" intentional actions (not only at the motor, executive,level) but they play several important roles.
1. Premise
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In Cognitive Psychology we know everything about ‘knowledge’: itsacquisition, elaboration, use,.. Step by step.1 We know nothingabout the vicissitudes of goals in our mental activity: about the steps of Goal-processing, from the activation of a givengoal to its pursuing (if it the case) and about its relation withknowledge processing.Actually mind is based on two kinds of representational functions!And on their relations. What is in fact ‘knowledge’ for? Knowledgeis just a resource, instrumental to goal achievement. The realcenter of cognition are goals: the motivational representationsguiding the behavior. Knowledge acquisition and use is for that;emotions too are centered on goals and functional for them. Intention theory has to be founded on goal theory; with theirBeliefs ground.Intentions – like goals in general - require in fact means-endreasoning and planning, conflict resolution, value, expectations,possible success/frustration, ….. (§5).
2. Goal-theory2
2.1 What a “Goal” is NOT: main misuses
A) A goal is not something external to be reached (e.g., a place,an object, a target). It is a “representation” in the mind of theagent.
B) A goal is not a special kind of representation, different froma doxastic representation (e.g., a belief); it is instead a mentalrepresentation with a specific “use”, “function”, “role”,“application”. Beliefs and goals are just one and the same kind ofrepresentations, simply employed in two different ways. In factthey must be comparable and matchable.
C) A goal is not necessarily pursued; a representation does notacquire the status of a goal only if and when it is being pursued.
1 See the Chapters of any handbook of Cognitive Psychology. For us it is unbelievablethat we have noting similar about motivational representations; their processing andkinds. We just have a confuse area assembling together “Motivation & Emotion”, and aquite good “decision theory” literature. Paradoxically Goal theory has been moredeveloped in Social and Organizational Psychology. 2 For a more extended and systematic theory of "goals" and their ontology (like avoidancevs. promotion, gradable vs. yes/no, psedo-goals, ...), see (Castelfranchi, 2012)
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It is a goal (i.e., it plays the role of a goal) also in otherstages of the control cycle, thus satisfying other sub-functions:
i) when it is compared with the world (perception, beliefs) andused to evaluate the world as conforming or not to what theagent desires (see Paglieri & Castelfranchi 2008);
ii) it is still a goal when it is already realized and there isnothing more to do; we are happy precisely because our goalis fulfilled (even without having to do anything);
iii) it is still a goal when it is not realized and yet there isnothing we can do about it: it cannot be pursued because welack the means, pre-conditions, or skills for that; that iswhy in such circumstances we can be frustrated similarly towhen we act and fail;
iv) it even is a goal if and when it is not preferred to othergoals, and thus is not chosen to guide our actions; that iswhy even what we choose not to do can be perceived as a moreor less costly sacrifice, and thus elicit some regret orsuffering;
v) and it is still a goal when we have nothing to do, notbecause we lack the power to purse the goal, but because wejust have to wait for its realization, possibly relying onother agents’ behavior or on other events that do not requireour direct intervention. Just wishing or hoping or trusting.Or because I decide of “not” do anything. Also “inaction” canbe an “intentional” action.3
In sum, a goal is a goal even before or without being pursued:satisfaction or happiness are due to goal-realization, anddissatisfaction or suffering are due to goal frustration (Miceli &Cast), but not necessarily to our active successes or failures; weare sad because our mother has died, or happy because she gave usa kiss, even if we did not ask for it, nor do or expected anythingfrom her.
D) Goal is not a synonym of “desire”.4
Desires are just one kind of goals and one possible origin ofintentions. First, they are “endogenous” goals (see § 4.2). Second, whenrealized, they give pleasure, whereas not all goals provide uswith a hedonistic experience once achieved (e.g., turning off thelight can be a very important goal in certain circumstances, e.g.
3 Of different kinds, since it can be due to consenting, accepting, passively doingnothing, or to an active inibition, to abstain from, to refraining.4 This is a very seious limit of the important BDI approach.
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during a burglary, but doing so does not give us any particularpleasure). 5 They are goals that we can “feel”, because whileprospecting and anticipating their achievement we experiencepleasant sensations or emotions. We do not “feel” all kinds of goals (see §4.3); we just "have", "formulate", an “intention”, a “project”, a“purpose”, a “plan”, etc. Instead, we “feel” desires and needs,and this is not by accident; they in fact imply active sensory-motor representations (either “imagined”, evoked from memory, orcurrent proprioceptive signals).
E) Goals (and then Intentions) do not born all as Desires orWishes,4 they do not derive all from internal motives. There aregoals of different kind and origin, like “duties”, “obligations”(and in general what I “have to do”, which may be very unpleasantimplying fear, disgust, ...); or from Goal “imported” fromoutside, like requests, orders, norms, roles, etc.
A social agent is actually able to "receive" goals from outside:from other agents, from the group. If it is really autonomous hedecides (of course, on the basis of his own – selfish or non-selfish - motives) whether to adopt or not the incoming goal. Ourcognitive-motivational architecture is intrinsically "social".
F) Not all goals are “motivations” or “motivating”. Many goals arejust “means”, instrumental to higher goals/results, and for givenfinal ends and aims (non-instrumental to other higher-levelgoals). However, not even all the terminal expected positive outcomes of anaction, that is, its end-goals, are really “motivating” theaction. Some of them might just be additional, non necessary,gratifications. Intentions as decisions to act (spend resources,invest) are necessarily "in view" of a motivating goal (§ 7).
G) Not all goals are “conscious” even when pursued; the same forIntentions and for some kind of “decision”/choice (see Bargh'sresearches).
H) Goals proper should not be confused with other anticipatoryrepresentations, which probably are akin to goals and forerunners ofreal goal-driven actions, like so-called “anticipatory
5 Except you define "pleasure" as "goal satisfaction" and your claim that goal achivemententails "pleasure" is just a tautology. By "pleasure" we mean a very specific andqualitative felt, phenomenic, experience.
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classifiers” with their “expectation” (on the differences andsimilarities with goals, see Pezzulo & Castelfranchi 2009). Herebehavior does not start from the goal and its mismatch with theworld, and the search for goal-appropriate actions. 6
Not all “choices” are “deliberations”: based on beliefs,arguments, evaluations, .. .
2.2 What a “Goal” is
In psychology and cognitive sciences it is definitely better toadopt the cybernetic notion and model of goals, based onRosenbleuth, Wiener and Bigelow’s (1943) notion of “purposivebehavior”. It provides psychology with a clear and operationalconcept, in which nothing is left to metaphysics or mereintuition, and which is not at all derived from common sense (folkpsychology) given the foundational constructs of circularcausality, loop, feedback, ....
The operational definition of “goal” and “goal-directed/driven”behavior is:“Goal” is an internal, mental representation, • usually – or at least operationally – anticipatory, about
how the world is not (or better, it is assumed not to be),• of any possible format (sensory-motor; abstract and symbolic;
propositional or linguistic; procedural; etc.),• employed as a set-point in a control-system, in the cybernetic
cycle driving the external behavior (that becomes an “action”)of the agent for modifying the world.
The cybernetic model of "purposive" or “goal-directed” behaviordriven by internal anticipatory representations has beenformulated in pychological terms as the TOTE model by Miller,Galanter and Pribram (Miller et al. 1960).
6 Probably the reverse use of an “anticipatory classifier”, starting from the activatedexpectation and “searching for” action and conditions, is the origin of a true/full goal-driven behavior.
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Figure 1: TOTE cycle
Of course this basic operational notion and model has severallimits when applied to human behavior/mind. It lacks some veryrelevant aspects. The main limit is that, in this minimal model,we do not have several and competing active goals and we do notneed a "choice" or "decision"; thus “goals” have no “value” and we donot need it. The notion of goal itself should on the contrary beaffected by the notion and theory of decision, and vice versa.Moreover we do not have just one single action (operation) for agiven goal, and we have to choose among different possible plansand action, and make some "planning": sub-goals, alternative orcooperating actions, etc..
2.3 "Goals" and "Decisions"
That a theory of goals be a prerequisite for a principled theoryof decision-making might look obvious and already wellacknowledged in the literature (Stijn et al. 2005; Kruglansky2000), but it is not so: the state of our ontology and theory ofgoals for an adequate description of decision-making is reallyinadequate: a lot of distinctions and of clear process models arestill needed (see for example § 4.3, § 7). Kruglansky (one of the major scholars about goals; see his 1996,2002) characterizes goals as “knowledge structures” (thus subjectto the same cognitive processes of any other piece of knowledge),actually identifying “cognitive representations” and “knowledge”.Moreover, in his view goals are special only because theyrepresent states that can be attained by action, thus ignoring that goalscan also be impossible or mere passive wishes. To ascribe to goalstructures the same properties of knowledge structures is animportant and productive move; and also integrating the knowledgestructure with goals is fundamental. However:
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(i) A more subtle and explicit theory of the relationshipsbetween goals (called “concepts in memory”) and data or beliefswould be necessary. On the on side, explaining how goalactivation, evaluation, choice, intention formulation, planning,pursuing, abandoning, etc. is based on a specific belief-structure. To specify the role of beliefs is crucial for modelingthe real and specific dynamics of goal (“goal processing”), andfor having a clear theory of “intentions”, and so on. On the otherside, one should provide a goal-based theory of the relevance ofdata and beliefs, and of some biases in believing due to ourgoals.
(ii) One should not miss the specific and original propertiesof “goals”, first of all their “value” and their “providing value”to the world; their motivational force. These cannot be reduced to“activation” or other properties of knowledge structures7. Theyderive from the “cybernetic” (regulative, motivating, control)function and nature of goals, and from goal specific structure:means-end hierarchy, etc.
Also the important attempt of Fishbein’s group (see forinstance Fishbein & Ajzen 1975) is not enough systematic andmodel-driven; a less ‘psychological’ and more cognitive-scienceoriented view is necessary.8
3. The Beliefs-Goals Relation
As we said, mind is founded on two basic representations (orattitudes): "goals" and "knowledge"9: motivational vs. doxastic(use of) representations. Mental activity consists of a continuoustrade between goals and knowledge. They live for (off) each other.And more complex mental states (like "expectations"
7 Or the “degree of certainty” the “strength” of the beliefs.8 It is unclear why the main contributions on goal theory have been developed not ingeneral and cognitive psychology but more in personality and social psychology,marketing, management and organization studies, clinical psychology, etc. I will notfully discuss here this literature (Kruglansky, Fishbein, Moskowitz, etc.), or the richliterature on the theory of decision-making. For some additional discussion see §3.2 and8.2.9 Here understood in terms of doxastic representations: beliefs, assumptions, etc.; whatwe take to be true, possibly with doubts and reservations, whether or not it is in facttrue.
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(Castelfranchixx), "emotions", "evaluations", ...) are due to thecomposition of this basic constituents (Miceli & Castel).
3.1 Why the Belief-Goal Bridge is So Important
A Cognitive Agent is an agent who founds his decisions,intentions, and actions on his Beliefs.
(1) "Postulate of Cognitive Regulation of Action"In a cognitive agent Goals should be supported and justified by the Agent's Beliefs(Reasons). We can’t activate, maintain, decide about, prefer, plan for, pursue, Goals thatare not grounded on pertinent Beliefs.
There is a specific structure of Beliefs (with their relativestructure of justification and support) necessary to maintain andjustify a given goal
Figure 2: Supported beliefs support goals
Beliefs support Goals (Reasons) but also determine Goal processingand dynamics, determine Goal Value and characterize Goal species.
(2) In each phase of their processing, Goals are supported by specific Beliefs, thatdetermine the new "quality" of the Goal (e.g. from Wishes toIntentions).
Without such Beliefs the supported Goal would be invalidated andremoved from its current state (not necessarily discarded; seebelow); it will change its nature and status.
> To maintain a Goal you should maintain its supporting Beliefs.> Revising these Beliefs involves revising their supported Goal.
Since process and flow depend on Beliefs and Beliefs aremodifiable by the other agents through communication orperception, at the social level from (2) it follows that:
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(3) At any level of the Goal Processing, during any phase, the autonomous agent isexposed to some external (or internal) influencing action aimed at changing hisGoals.
(4) All Intentions are defeasible, retractable, because are strictly belief-based (§ 5.2).
Not all Goals are defeasible, retractable: first, this onlyconcern Reason-based Goals; more specifically, it doesn't concernTop-level Goals, End-Goals, Values, Meta-Goals, that is, Goals that are notinstrumental to a higher Goal. They can be "sleeping", can be in-active or de-activated, but they remain goals (concerns,values, ...). It doesn't concern Reflexes and Impulsive goals. Youcannot "justify" a reflex or an impulse; you can just rationallyexplain them post-hoc.
3.2 Goal-Processing
The presence or the absence of a specific Belief will determinethe Goal flow (the moving of the Goal from one step to thefollowing one):
Figure 3: Steps in goal-processing
This flow includes:• several Goal states (Sleeping; Active; Fired; Chosen; Planned;Pursued/Executed; Waiting; Died) and • several transformations (Activation; De-activation; Dropping; Decision;Planning; Pursuing/Executing).The beliefs are test conditions and filters in this flow.
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G G G G
Figure 4 - Beliefs in Goal-Processing10
In order a Goal to arrive to the last stage (pursuing/ execution),all the supporting Beliefs are necessary.11 All the Beliefs of theprevious stages have to remain true.
10 From Paglieri & Castelfranchi 2008. 11 Except of course for non reasoned and deliberated goals, but more automatic (impulsiveor habitual) responses where there might also be a true activated goal (not just andanticipatory classifier with its "expectation"; § 2.1(H)), but without so manypreliminary evaluations, for example about reasons for preference, conditions forsuccess, etc.
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If a Beliefs that determined the progression of a Goal to the nextstage, is invalidated, the Goal is removed from that stage. Itdoes not necessary disappear (Died Goals): it can go back in theprocess, can be putted in some waiting room, or be postponed, cansleep again, or be completely abandoned.
Examples of Beliefs supporting Goals
• Satisfaction Belief: I have the Goal that p at time j, and at time j (or >j), Iassume that p is or was true at time j. To proceed I have tobelieve that p is not realized.
• Impossibility Belief: it is impossible that p at time j, or p is never possible.
• Preference Belief I believe that Goal 1 is better to me (preferable) than Goal212
• Compatibility Belief:I believe that Goal 1 is compatible with Goal 2; or thatthere is a conflict.
• Cost Belief I believe that the cost of a given action or plan is suchand such (I know how much I should spend to pursue G1)
• Value Belief I believe that the Value of G1 is such and such
• Knowhow Beliefs I believe that I know how to reach the Goal (some plan thatachieves it)
• Cando Beliefs I believe that I have in my action repertoire the actionsand skills appropriate to reach the Goal (given my knowhowrelative to how the Goal can be reached)
• Condition Belief I believe that external conditions and resources necessaryfor the successful execution of the actions, hold
For example, we do not really have the Intention if we do notassume that we will actually do (expectations about the IA and theaction) and that it will produce the expected result, and that wewill be able and in condition to do, etc. (see also O'Brien). Wecan "try to" and "intend to try" when some of those subjective
12 But of course the formation of the Preference belief presupposes beliefs about thevalue of the goals, and also (below) about the possible plans and costs.
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conditions, beliefs, are lacking or weak: the assumptions aboutthe internal and external powers and causal relations, and eventhe belief that I will actually perform the action (for examplewhen I have a neural problem and I "try" to, I want to see if Ican move my hart). But not about my will to do; if I have decidedto do, I'm quite sure that then I will have the Int to do. 13
This process (Fig. 4) corresponds enough to some of the four“phases” of the “course of goal pursuit” of Heckausen andGollwitzer (see for an extended illustration and literature deepdiscussion Gollwitzer, 1993): 14
The Predicisional phase where one sets the priorities about wishesand desires, producing the decision (our activation andsuspension processes are not explicitly modeled) correspond toActive and Candidate Goals steps. The Postedicisional but Preactional phase is characterized byplanning, identification of relevant actions (and of internaland external conditions).The Actional phase is the executive one after the initiation,focused on monitoring, adjusting, etc. and is not explicitlymodeled in our figure. As for his fourth phase (the PostactionalEvaluative one) about the comparison between the goal and theresults, it is in the basic model of the cycle of goals (fig.1).
4. Goals Ontology and Value
There are several families of goals with different properties; weneed a systematic ontology of goals but also an explicit modelingof the “Cognitive Anatomy” of them, included Intentions. And we need not only a static approach: Intentions theory has to be built interms of “processing” not just in terms of kinds (also becauserepresentations kinds can be processing based).
13 Except in case I'm precisely not sure of my persistence and future Int and I'm just"trying" to decide, to commit myself, exactly in order to see whether I will really beable to intend to do that when the moment will arrive. The checking is on my mind not onthe external world.14 However, notice that here “goals” are related to "pursuing" (§ 2.1), and that at theorigin of the course there are just “wishes” and “desires”. It is also unclear if – likein Aizen’s model - “obligations, norms” and “duties” can just constrain, modify thedecision and intention but not “motivate” them; be the origin of some goal, which is notpleasant at all.
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4.1 Process-related notions and goal-kinds
A part from basic (but also rather obvious and well-known)distinctions like "Instrumental goals or means" vs. "Higher-goals"(see goal hierarchy, figure 8), "Terminal goals or ends","Starting or motivating goals" (‘motives’), "Conflicting goals oralternatives"……….. let's go a bit more deep in the analysis of"motivating" goals (that will be very relevant later § 7.1), whichcannot be identified with the activated goal we start from or itsend: some additional - even motivating - goals arise during the process of evaluation ofpossible outcome for choosing. This is a top-down but also bottom-upprocess: from ends to means and from means to additional ends.In fact the system has both: to be sure to realize a given goal, and, to be sureto have a satisfying ‘economic’ balance15; that is, to examine (and evaluatingagainst previously slipping goals) the possible outcomes of theconsidered alternatives.
Figure 5 - Emerge of new goals during the evaluation for decision
"Motivating Goals" are those goals that are necessary andsufficient foreseen/expected outcomes for deciding and forpursuing (see § 7.1 also for examples).Thus, there are two kinds and origin of motivating goals:
(i) the starting ones, the “motives”, which activates and“moves” us in search of how to realize them.
15 In fact, also a (specific-goal)-directed system can eventually renounce, give up itsmoving goal; but it real “goal” is not just maximizing utility in any possible way,independently from the given objectives. Different from the Economic rationality view.
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(ii) the "settling" additional ones: one wouldn’t chose that(sub)goal, wouldn’t do that action without also theperspective to realize that non-original goal.
4.2. Desires and Needs
As we said, not all our goals are 'felt', also because not all ofthem are defined in a sensory-motor format.
Desires The first notion understands desire in broad sense, as denoting amotivational representation; more precisely, a “motive”, a terminal goal,which is not instrumental to higher goals. However, as we said, this notionof desire does not cover all the set of our final “motives”. Itonly refers to the endogenous ones, it does not refer to pureduties, obligations, orders, something that I adopt from othersand pursue for others. In natural language “desires” are typicallyopposed to other motives.16 It is common sense to say that wesacrifice our “desires” (what we like to do because of personal,internal inclinations) for our “duties” (what we want to dobecause we adhere to external goals and/or pressures). Moreimportantly, the notion of “desire” does not specify if the goalis pursued or not, if it has been chosen or not, etc. Quite thereverse, it is frequently used for referring to goals which are notyet chosen and pursued; and perhaps have been suspended or evenabandoned, given up.17 They can be incoherent, unstable, etc. The second notion of desire we use understands it in the narrow senseof a specific mental state/activity and feeling. This desire isnecessarily “felt” (implying sensations), whereas (as already remarked)not all goals are “felt”; even not all the motivating goals arenecessarily affectively charged and pleasant and attractive (atleast in principle, in a general theory of purposive behavior).Desires in this strict sense are goals that when/if realized give16 E.g. “I do not desire at all to go there; but I have to; I am obliged to go”.17 This is why “desire” is used in contrast with the notion of “intention” inphilosophical, psychological, and AI models. For example, BDI models (basically inspiredby Bratman's analysis; see his 1987) use “desire” as a general notion for “motives”,“ends” or “goals” before any decision. However, for these models the goals pursued by anindividual, his intentions, can only derive from the inside and be instrumental to andonly justified by personal motives. They do not have an explicit model of goals adoptedfrom outside. To call these goals “desires” is somewhat strange and misleading. Ofcourse, there may be personal desires motivating our goal adoption (imitation, help,obedience, norm respect, etc.), but this should not be confused with the path ofintention generation: it is goal G1 - adopted from outside, from the will of anotheragent - which produces my intention and will guide my action! Not the possible desire forwhich I have adopted the goal of the other.
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pleasure. “Desiring” (in Italian: star desiderando) strictly speakingmeans anticipating in one’s imagination the realization of thegoal-state. The goal is represented in a sensory-motor code, thusimplying the subject’s experience of some sensations or feelingsassociated with the goal’s realization. The subject is actuallyre-activating and imagining these pleasant sensations andexperiencing some hallucination, some anticipatory pleasure; andthis is why we can “intensely” wish something: we are“foretasteing" it. This can even imply not only the activation ofsomatic markers (the central neural trace of previous somaticexperiences), but the actual activation of bodily reactions, likesalivation, erection, etc. Another felt kind of goals are “needs”. Not all "needs" are felt,there are needs that we just "have" or "believe/know to have"; afelt need is due to a bodily unpleasant sensation (current or evokedstimulus).
NeedsThere is no room her for a systematic theory of “needs”,18 not evenif restricted only to felt needs. We just mention three reasonsthat justify their importance:
1. the sensation-based nature of these special goals changes thegeneral theory of goal “value” (see below).
2. the sensations implied by felt needs – differently fromdesires – are negative, unpleasant, unbearable, activatingavoidance-goals, in a “prevention focus”. Also for thisreason we experience them as ‘necessities’, ‘forcing’ us todo or not to do something; they are more binding than otherkinds of goals.
3. we conceptualize and conceive a “need” (either felt or not)as the lack of something, which is conceived not just asuseful but as necessary; it is a necessary means, as the onlypossible means for achieving our goal: not only if I have O(what I need for G)19 I can realize G, but if I do not have OI cannot and will not realize G. This gives a sense ofnecessity, of no choice, to the general notion of “need”,which – in felt needs – is reinforced by the unpleasant
18 For a general theory of “needs” (“having an objective need” vs. “subjective needs” vs.“felt needs”), see Castelfranchi 1998c; Castelfranchi & Miceli 2004.19 Notice that (differently from “desires”) “needs” are intrinsically “instrumental”goals. I need something for something else: either for achieving a practical goal(practical need: I need the key for opening the door), or for stopping or preventing anunpleasant sensation. The "necessity" perspective also make needs more binding: I see noalternative.
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sensation.Thus, if x needs q, she is not only motivated by the goal that p,but also by the goal to avoid the uneasiness/suffering/troubleassociated with that need.
4.3 The ‘Value’ of Goals
The reasoned value of GoalsAlso the goal “value” (subjective utility) is belief-based. It is dueto the expected outcomes, predictions, means-end reasoning, … Thisis the “reason-based” value of goals due to goal hierarchies andvalue inheritance (see figure 8); supported by beliefs aboutinstrumental and consequential relations: pros & cons. That’s whyit is “arguable”20, and changeable via persuasion.The basic principle is that: the value of means derives from thevalue of their ends.More precisely it derives from a pros & cons evaluation, that is,from the value of the expected outcomes, either frustrating goalsor realizing goals. There are “positive” motivating results orjust additional results (§ 4.1), and “negative” results: thepossible costs, renounces, harms, risks.
The felt value of GoalsIn a lot of “decisions” preferences are not reason-based. The value ofthe goals, their weight in the decision, in fact, does not alwaysdepends only on beliefs. Their preferability is no longer “arguable”; I cannot give youpros and cons (additional unforseen outcomes), rational reasonsfor changing their value and your choice ("The heart has itsreasons of which Reason knows nothing" Pascal).. The value of thegoals (and their success in decision) can in fact also be theresult of different mechanisms; not of cognitive evaluation but ofthe intensity of bodily sensation, evocated sensations, ‘somaticmarkers’,… on current or anticipated emotions. Evocated attractiveor repulsive, pleasant/unpleasant “sensations” or current ones -for example physiological needs, current felt emotions - candetermine the value and priority of a goal 21 (‘impulses’). The more
20 It is also affected by the Belief ‘strength’: the degree of certainty. Not only Ipredict a valuable outcome (bad or good), but how much am I sure of that prediction? Itis just hope or worry or certainty? Actually decision is not simply between goals butbetween “expectations” (a structure of goals & beliefs) (§ 11) (Castelfr). 21 See Damasio’ somatic markers; Bargh’s post hoc evaluations; Slovic’ Affect heuristics;Lisetti e Gmytrasiewicz.
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intense the sensation (the need, or the emotion) the more important the activated goal(Brehm, )
Not only goal-value is no longer based on beliefs and arguments,but even beliefs mechanisms are altered by “feelings”, by theimpact of body on mind. So we also have new dimensions of beliefcertainty, based not on ‘reasons’, data and evidences, but onfeeling, intensity of bodily sensation, evocated sensations,‘somatic markers’,… 22
5. What is an “Intention”Intentions are those goals that actually drive our voluntary actions or areready/prepared to drive them. Intentions are not another “primitive”(like in Bratman’s school23): they are just a kind of Goal.Since ‘intentions’ are just Goals packed in a special way, this explainswhy they have so many crucial common properties. Notice that theclassical BDI approach, where Intention is a new primitive, cannotaccount for this or explain why; it can just postulate this ad hoc.
• Intentions like goals (as goals!) can be ‘realized’ or‘frustrated’, can have ‘success’ or ‘failure’. Like for goalswe can be happy or sorry for them; we can feel hope or worry.
• Like for goals we plan for them, on the basis of “means-end(goal!)” relations and reasoning.
• Like for goal we can pursue them or abandon them (on thebasis of the same beliefs), although, they also have theirspecific and additional beliefs and are more persistent anddefended against competitors.
• Intentions are (like goals) challenged by other goals (notnecessarily and yet ‘intention’) activated and incompatible.How it would be possible a ‘conflict’ between an alreadyformulated intention and a new active goal (desire), if theywere two heterogeneous mental entities? And so on...
22 The usual cognitive structure of fear – for example – is as a consequence of a“cognitive appraisal” of the situation, that is beliefs about possible dangers(prediction) which trigger, elicit fear. But we also have in human mind the reverseroute: from a feeling to a give belief and its degree of subjective certainty. I feelfear and on such a base (CITAZIONE) I come to believe that there is a threat, a possibledanger (prediction).23 The creation of two distinct “primitives”, basic independent notions/objects(“desires” vs. “intentions”) is in part due to the wrong choice of adopting (also inaccordance with common sense) “desires” as the basic motivational category and source. Wehave already criticized this reductive move, and introduced a more general and basic (andnot fully common sense) teleonomic notion. This notion also favors a better unificationof goal kinds and a better theory of their structural and dynamic relationships.
17
Ints - like in general Goals - may be either a propositional,abstract representation and content or a sensory-motor one, withperceptual contents and the possibility of “imagination” in strictsense.However, there is a necessary difference between Distal or Future-directed or Intentions in Agenda (IA) vs. Intentions in Action orExecutive (EI) 24(see § 8).
5.1 Intentions: the final stage of Goal-Processing
As it was made clear by the previous analysis of goal processing,in our view an intention is a goal in special conditions, after aspecific elaboration, supported by a particular frame of beliefs.Intention are the form assumed by the goals in the last stages(see Figure 3); but it also implies the introduction of new goalsadded to the original one (motive): - sub-goals (that is, planning) about the specific actions to beexecuted (given skills, conditions, ...) (§ 6. twostages/layers of Int) ;- additional higher-goals added for the evaluation and decision,diriment, "settling" goals (§ 4.1 and 7.)
Conversely, some active goal becomes an intention after passing aseries of screening tests, in which specific beliefs act asfilters.
24 There is a rich terminology. See other contributions of the issue. I will use my ownterms. It is not completely clear if the terms really coincide, if they are justdifferent names for the same entity or if they identify (partially) different objects;see for example in § 8 the comparison with Gollwitzer’s “goal-intentions” and“implementation intentions”.
18
Figure 6 - Packing Intentions from Goals
This is just a different representation of the processing ofFigure 4, where an ‘intention’ is a goal that I have decided topursue, to see it that. Or better (Paglieri & Castelfranchi 2008):it is a goal such that:
- Has been active (activated) and now either is underpursuit (I’m specifying and executing some part of the planfor realizing it) or is in a special “memory of the future”(the ‘agenda’) waiting for the right time for its pursuit.- I assume that it can be realized (there is some possibleaction/plan which achieves it). - I assume that it is not self-realizing (thanks to other –natural or social – agents) or already realized, but I have toact; it depends on me (in my perspective and decision); - I obviously can have Ints only on my own actions. I cannot“intend” the action of another guy, I should have control overhis behavior.25 Producing that outcome must be up-to me: "I haveno brother, I never had a brother, and I don't intend to have a brother!" (O.Wilde).
25 If I say "My intention is that John goes to Naples" what I mean is: "I have theintention to induce John to go to Naples, to send him there, to do something in orderhe..."
19
- I assume that I will probably be able and in condition ofachieving it, since I have or can acquire the needed know how,skills, and resources.- It has been preferred and chosen against other active goals(at least: the expected value is greater than the expectedcosts); not necessarily between two actions.- I’m committed to realize it; and it is (after the decision)more stable and persistence against possible competitors; andconstraints next preferences and commitments;- I have decided to bring it about that it is realized, thatis, to do something, the appropriate action for achieving it(although the specific action or plan can remain unspecifiedand potential since the execution phase).
A goal packed in such a way and after all this elaboration hasbecome an ‘intention’ and will generate an intentional action.
5.3 Why we drop an Intention
It is not enough to say (Cohen & Levesque, ) that either a) the Intention has been already achieved, (or it will berealized without the intervention of the agent); orb) the agent now believes that it is unattainable, unachievable;orc) it is no longer "motivated " by its conditions or higher Goals.
As we have seen these circumstances are mixed up (for example“motivation” and “conditions”) and incomplete.In fact the “reasons” for changing preferences and choices are nottaken into account. The agent could for example have (or think tohave) better alternatives. Also the dimension of Urgency (which isindependent from value or importance but can determine“precedence” in decision and action) is not considered. The main confusion is that conditions (b) and (c) cover too manyand diverse situations (various supporting beliefs in differentsteps) which are very different from each other; for example:
- the abandonment due to our ignorance on "how" to achieve theIntention;- the abandonment due to our lack of ability (CANDO);- the abandonment due to lacking conditions or resources,including the abilities of other agents;- the abandonment due to a judgment of absolute, intrinsicimpossibility.
20
Hierarchical Invalidation and droppingOne should specify a theory of Intention/Commitment abandoningfirst of all on the basis of the general theory of Goalsinvalidation and dropping, based on Goals hierarchy. Given a hierarchy of Goals (means-end chains), there are inprinciple three reasons for dropping a Goal, or (in more activeview) three strategies to demolish an already chosen Intention:
• Bottom-up invalidation: lack of possibilitiesIf we destroy the "means" (the instrumentals Goals and plans for an higher Goal, orthe conditions for their execution, or your beliefs in your skills or know-how)ANDif you do not see alternative plans/means for that Goal,
then, the Goal is invalidated and will be put aside.
• Top-down invalidation: lost motivationIf we destroy the (relative) "end" (the higher Goal), or the belief about theinstrumental connection and utility of the sub-goal or action
then, the instrumental Goals are meaningless, invalidated and will beabandoned.
• Same level invalidation: antagonists GoalsIf a new goal is activated and it is in conflict with the chosen intention and has greatervalue, or if consider additional costs of our choice or additional positive outcomes of apreviously discarded alternative,
then we will change our preference and choice, abandoning previousintention in favor of the new one.
5.3 The Intention Abstraction
Current neural and experimental studies are reasonably focused(also because of the current impact of the “embodied” view ofmind) on motor actions control, and on “concrete” goals (sensory-motor representations),26 but we have not to forget that “action”is not equal to “motor action”, and “goals” are not equal to“perceptual goals”.
26 See also in general the theory of "intentional action" Joshua M. Knobe Intentionalaction, Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind, 2008 -http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/intentionalaction.html
21
An action can be “abstract”; it can just be “to bring it about that ...”, “tosee it that ....” without specifying “how”, that is, its motorimplementation, its vehicle sub-actions. For example, to offend isan action: did we write or say something offensive to that guy, orjust show a particular finger, or simply intentionally ignore him,etc.? 27
Thus also Ints can be "abstract"; I can intend to offend Paul, towin some competition, to be noticed by Mary (by my dressing? mybehavior? my letter? my gift?, ..). Obviously, finally, whenconditions are there and we have to arrive to Int in Action, thatis, to the performance, to the "execution" of the needed actions,the Int have to be fully and contextually specified and situated inmotor, perceptive, and proprioceptive terms (§ 8).
5.3 The Social Presupposition of Intentions in Social AgentsGiven our analysis of belief-based goal processing and intentionformulation it follows that any “intention” implicitly or explicitly presupposes asocial positioning of the subject.In fact, among the beliefs needed for an intention formulation(like: “the goal is not already realized”, “the goal-state isincluded in the predicted result of this action”, “this goal ispreferable to me to the other active conflicting goals”, “thecondition for a successful execution of that action are/will bethere”, etc.) there is a very crucial one, really fundamental forthe decision to “intend” to do something for achieving that goal. Notonly I have to believe (or implicitly assume) that my goal is notalready realized, but I have to assume that it is not self-realizing,that is, it will not be realized without my active intervention.In this case, I had to do nothing; just waiting. In a social word this though does not only refer to naturalprocesses and events (on which I have no power and can just hopeand wait, like sun or rain; or on which I might have some power,like watering the garden or exploiting the forecasted rain), butit covers also social ‘interference’: the actions of the otherliving agents in a common word. Have I to act in order to achievemy goal, or it will be realized by another agent’s expectedactivity?Any intention is an intention “to do”, to act: in view of mymotivating goal/result I adopt the sub-goal to perform a givenaction A. As we said, I cannot intend the action of another agent27 A goal can be abstract, like “to make money”, “to win some competition". Abstractgoals raise an important problem: how to control whether they have been achieved or not?Against which belief/perception/evidence? They have to be “translated” into more concretecues and signals of their realization.
22
(“I intend that Bill goes away” means “I intend to do something inorder Bill goes away”); this is also why I cannot intend that itrains: it does not depends on me, I can do nothing at all for this.If I “decide” to personally and directly act for achieving Gtrough an action of mine, if I formulate an “intention”, thismeans that I believe that I do not depend on others for that: on the one side,I’m personally able and in condition to act and to produce mydesired result; on the other side, I believe that I cannot justexploit the others’ behavior, ‘delegate’ the task to them, andcount on them. Or at least I do noit believe that I dependf onothers for that (I haven't actually considered the others andtheir possible interference).This (explicit or implicit) social framework and consideration ispresupposed in any intention and decision to personally act formodifying the word (which actually is a ‘common’ word).Not only I do not predict/expect positive interference to beexploited, but I do not expect ‘negative’ interferences too. I donot expect (or consider) effective obstacles, opposition, missingconditions, vanificazione? of the result, by the others. OtherwiseI would waste my effort and resources: why acting at all if Ipredict that the result will not be achieved or will be destroyedbecause of the others’ interference? If I decide to act and spendmy resources for achieving G, this implies that I do not expect aneffectively adverse social word. Ot else I'm just intending to"try", "attempt", not "to do".In sum, the ideas that the goal is (for me) achievable, and thatis not self-realizing and is up-to-me, necessarily - in a socialword, for a social agent - presupposes the idea of other agents, neitherreplacing me nor preventing me in/from doing A or achieving G.
6. The Intentions Structure
Let's explain, strictly on the bases of goal theory, the goalstructure of a single intention, and of a complex intended planand behavior.
6.1 The two-layers Structure of IntentionsIf I have an intention I do necessarily intend (or have to arriveto intend) to act, to do something. This is the first layer of theInt structure:
> X intends TO DO, to perform a given action/plan A (X hasdecided and planned).
23
But this is in view of a result, in order to "bring it about that"P. The second layer is in fact:
> X intends to realize his higher moving goal THAT P (that hebelieves to depend on him, to be preferable, achievable,etc.):
Figure 7 - The means-end layers of Ints
When one "intends", is willing, to do a given action A, necessarilyhe wants at least one of the predicted results of A (at leasthaving performed A). This structure explains the two kinds of "failure" that are possible whileperforming an Intentional action: I could not achieve the goal of“doing A” (lack of skills, will, conditions, ..) or I do actuallyperform A but it does not achieve P: either the plan was wrong(false beliefs about the causal effects) or there whereinterferences or lacking conditions not for the execution of the Abut for its effects.
6.2 The Planning Structure of Intentions
Intentions (also the abstract ones, not yet specifying concretemotor actions) can converge in a unique plan: a complex intentional"action", realized by several intentional sub-actions (or sub-plans);in a recursive structure. When do our intentional actions be part of one and the same intentional plan and whenthey (although being of the same subject with unity of time and place) are independentintentional actions? Which is the "organization" of intentionalbehavior?
a) If in my planned/intended and motivating outcome I expect aconjunction of (part of) the outcome of A1 (p) and (part of)the outcome of A2 (q): if my motivating goal (my INT THAT) is
24
Int that (p & q), A1 and A2 are cooperating and sub-part of oneand the same plan.
b) If A1 outcome p is a planned and thus intended "condition" forthe successful execution of A2 and realization of q; A1 and A2are part of the same plan.
This is plan intra-coherence. If, on the contrary, X Intends to do A1 and X Intends to do A2 fortwo independent motives, although in the "same" time and context28
at most X has to care about avoiding negative interferences (thatthe effects of A1 prevent the execution or success of A2; and viceversa) then, they are two independent (although "coherent")intentions and intentional actions.29 This is inter-coherence between plans. It is also possible to combine the two situations and to haveambiguous actions, since an action can also serve to divergentgoals and thus be part of two independent plans: one of itsoutcomes is part of, planned for, a given plan; but the otherdesired and even motivating outcomes are for other independentends. We can recognize here the basic and general Goal-structures:
Figure 8 - Goals hierarchical structures
7. Do Intentions "motivate" our actions?
28 "Same" means: with possible interferences.29 But not of creating ad hoc conditions or planning A1 in order to execute A2.
25
Action
Action
Action
Action
Action
GOAL
GOAL GOALGOAL GOAL
GOALGOAL
What does it mean that a behavior is “motivated”? Any non-mechanical "behavior" is teleological, functional, but only goal-directed behaviors ("Actions") are "motivated"; that is,internally controlled in a cybernetic sense:The mental goal “motivates” the action. That is:
- the action wouldn’t be performed if not in view of thatresult; the goal was necessary for choosing and performing thataction;- the behavior is stopped if there is no such an expectation,either because the expected result is already realized, orbecause it is considered impossible;- the goal gives “value” to the action; the action (incompetition with other possible actions) receives “value” fromits goals: we choose between goals (outcomes) not betweenactions;- the goal is the cause, or better the explanation, the “reason”of a given action; its “motive”.
More precisely what motivate an action is its Int (which makes it"intentional") and the higher-goals motivating the Int it self,and the final "motives" or motivations: non instrumental to higherinternal goals.But: are all the expected outcomes motivating the intended action or plan?
7.1 A correct view of intentional action and its effects andmotives
Not only the original active motives, the goals we start from in atop-down fashion to join to formulate our intention, are"motivating" that action. Also goals that we activate or formulatelater, during the process, for the evaluation of additionalpossible outcomes, and for the value of the alternatives and thechoice (§ 4.1), are "motivating" the choice and the chosen action.One can intentionally act while not intending all the effects (and
then possible functions) of his/her action. Let’s clarify how thisis possible in a cognitive view of intentional actions.
26
Figure 9 - Motivating expected result as a sub-set of expectations
Any performed action has results (R); un intentional action has"expected" results (ER). Part of the expected R (and of the R) are"negative" (goal frustrating; like costs, pain, ..); part of theexpected R (and of the R) are "positive" (goal satisfying). Butnot all of them are "motivating" the action, the reasons of ourchoice and decision (§ 2.1 (F)).
One does really ‘intended’ only those results for which, in view of which, in order toachieve which one is acting. They are motivating the action: that is, the agent chooses andperforms A iff and until s/he believes that A will produce thatspecific R.
It is also important to consider that deliberate inaction, omission,decision of not doing something, is an action. On the basis of ER andinaction we can introduce the useful notions of Passive intentionsand Side intentions.We have a Passive intention when I could prevent something fromhappening, but (because I like it or because preventing it wouldbe expensive) I decide to let it happen by itself. I do not‘produce’ that effect in the world: it is the effect (intended ornot) of another agent or of another action. I do not specificallyact in order to achieve q; I could just prevent it.Side intentions are a special kind of Passive intention; they occurwhen the expected non-motivating result (good or bad) is the side-effect of my own intentional action. In this case I could preventit only by renouncing my action for my goal. It is ‘passive’ inthe sense that it is not actively pursued; I just let it happen(as a consequence of my own action).Beyond the IR (motivating anticipated results) intentional actionshave known and unknown, expected and unexpected, positive andnegative results. All of them can produce complex emerging effectsand support functions. The agents can even understand and be awareof emerging or functional effects of their actions. But even ifthose effects were ‘positive’, they would not become ‘intentions’
27
just for this30 (§ 12.3). Vice versa, functions must notnecessarily be positive for some agent’s goals. (Castelfranchi,2001).
8. Main Differences between Int in Agenda (IA) & Int inAction or Executive (EI) Main differences are in their roles and functions and in theprocessing stage, and thus in the features allowing thesefunctions. > IA have the function of committing resources (time, money, ...),putting aside, resources for the future; they are "investment" anddo not “spend” that resources; EI are spending of resources,entail consumption; resources are not (longer) allocated for thefuture, but allocated now (see § 10). This is why at least some ofthose resources must be explicitly considered and evaluated beforethe decision.
> IA give coherence to our goals; while goals can be in conflict,IA must be coherent, non contradictory (neither logically nor asfor resources); they put order in our motivation dynamics. EImaintain this feature because they are just IA in next elaborationstage. EI can add features, specify features but not change orcontradict the features of the source Intention (see § 10).
> Int in Action or under Execution (EI) are implemented in motor(executive) terms and their feedbacks. These are usually notspecified in the Int in Agenda (IA), I think even if/when IA arespecified and represented in sensory-motor images (see alsoPacherie's Ch. on voluntary action). IA are never fully specified inmotor, perceptual, and situated terms; not only because they canbe merely "propositional" and verbal representations; but becausethey have to be "situated", opportunistically adjusted during theexecution.Of course, finally (when conditions are there and we have toarrive to Int in Action that is to the performance, to the"execution" of the actions), the EI must be fully and contextually30 Tis is a criticism to Elster's position against social "functions", which eliminatesthem since our behavior already is finalistic. For a more systematic argument seeCastelfranchi, 2001, § 8.2.
28
specified, adjusted and situated in motor, perceptive, and proprioceptiveterms.However, in our view, the lower executive motor layer, the finalcomponent "actions" of the intentional action are not really"intentional": they are more rule-based automatic behaviors. EIare implemented in production-rules, (anticipatory) classifiers,reflexes, ....
8.1 From deliberative processes and intentional decision to“compiled”, specialized behaviors
In our view there are tow levels in intentional executive actions:– High level: practical reasoning, planning, goal oriented
behavior (BDI like)– Low Level: routine behaviors (anticipatory classifiers)
Low level behaviors just "inherit" its goal-orientedness. Betweenthe two layers there is a functional continuum:
29
30
Figure 10 - Implementing Intentions in sensory-motor processes
The top portion is more similar to BDI (Rao and Georgeff, 1995);the lower portion is more similar to Behavior Networks (Maes,1989) and uses anticipatory classifiers (Butz, 2000) (Pezzulo &Castelfranchi 2009).31
8.2 Goal-Intentions and Implementation Intentions
This is also quite close or partially overlapping with Gollwizer’simportant distinction – while modeling the phases and functions ofintentions – between “goal-intentions” (intending to achievesomething x) and “implementation intentions” (intending to initiatethe goal-directed behavior x when the appropriate situation isencountered) (Gollwizer, 1993; p. 142). However, there issomething not so clear and something lacking. One the one side, is this x one and the same x? Is x an outcome oran action? In fact, the “goal-intention” should be about a givenoutcome, the result of the action; while the “implementationintentions” should be about a (more o less) specified action forthat result, an Int to Do an action. Is this the distinction?On the other side, for us, both the Int That and the Int to Do(more or less specified) can still be “in Agenda” or in a waitingroom32, waiting either (the IntThat) for information or time forplanning and specification, or (the IntToDo) for necessary conditionsfor the execution. The Int to Do is fully specified only immediatelybefore the firing of the action (is this the moment of the“Implementation intention”?) or even during its performance(adjustement). However, also the IntThat remains there during the execution; itis at an over-ordinate layer; and the Int-toDo (our Int in Actionor Executive) is also there for monitoring the feedbacks of themovements and the effects on the world. So it is not clear howmuch those distinctions capture our phases and vice versa.The main difference (a part the remark in note 14) however is thatwe make much more explicit the specific and crucial assumptions that31 Obviously, to model the voluntary acts, driven by intentions, doesn’t means to excludegoal-oriented acts fully based on reactive and executive mechanisms, like anticipatoryclassifiers, productions rules, S-R, reflexes, and emotional impulses bypassing truedeliberation; or habits and automatized behaviors originally built as intentions, likestopping at the red light when driving a car.32 Are these Int in Action “implementation intention”?
31
regulate each phase transition. Also in Aizen’s Theory of Reasoned Action in fact the “reasons”(specific beliefs) in the “reasoning” are quite unsystematic andimplicit. Also a clear distinction between beliefs or assumptionsvs. goals (of various kinds) is lacking. For example, the goals,the original motives and aims driving the process are out of thediagram of the model; the process starts just from beliefs (notvery well specified families of beliefs, like “behavioral beliefs”and “normative beliefs”) that activate “attitudes” (?) towards thebehavior, “Subjective Norms” .. And notice that Norms are not withthe other motives (which are not explicit in the diagram). Why thedeontic beliefs (about norms of any kind: moral, social,legal, ..; and commitments, duties, orders,..) do not introducenormative “goals” imposed by and imported from the norm, andproduce a decision/intention to violate or to conform?.....
Figure 11 - Ajzen's model
In fact, lacking this clear distinction between doxastic vs.motivational representations, also the critics of the model, whileproposing some integration like personal moral obligations, self-identity concerns, anticipated feelings, perceived control,competence, ... do not feel obliged to distinguish between lackingbeliefs vs. missed motives to be added in the decision and intentionformulation. This is because this area of psychology build“models” just in term of inductive “correlations” betweenpsychological "factors" or previous constructs like personalitytraits, self-perception, self-prediction, self-efficacy, locus ofcontrol, and so on. Not a good approach for theoretical work andreal models of the “mechanisms”, of the proximate causalprocesses.
10. Some functions of ‘intentions’
32
As we said Ints are important not only for explainingintentional/voluntary actions (concrete but also abstract) andtheir regulation33. Intentions must also be modeled and studies asspecific mental representations and states with their variousroles, where driving actions in their execution is just one ofthem. Let's see other crucial functions of Ints.
10.1 Coherence
Ints introduce coherence and non-contradiction in 3 ways:(i) Here & now among our pursued Goals and thus in our currentbehavior; Activated Goals can be in fact contradictory(conflicts), but not the chosen goals after the "decision”.
(ii) Now with the Future. Short term vs. long term objectives;coherence in time and persistence;
(iii) Coherence with my Self, my preferences, and choice; actionsas signs and demonstration of coherence.
Introducing coherence is the main role of "decision making" andthus of the production of an Int. Potential beliefs and data canbe contradictory in our mind (CIT), but, after the "decision" tobelieve something, there must be non-contradiction in that beliefcontext/domain between the accepted beliefs. This is the doxasticcoherence: another adaptive precondition for coherence in our behavior andgoal attainment. Analogously, our activated goal can becontradictory (impulses against reasoned preferences, desiresagainst desires or against worries; desires or needs againstduties; projects, ambitions incompatible with each other, etc.),but eventually - while driving our conduct - they must try to becoherent, in order do not waste our efforts and realize some goalof us.
Epis
temi
cre
presen
tation
s
DATA
INTENTIONS
DESIRES
commitm ent
BELIEFS coherenceneeded & sought
inconsistencytolerated & exploited
Motivationalrepresentation
s
33 This for sure is fundamental; see other important contributions in this issue.
33
Figure 11. The mind as a coherence-seekingdevice
(i) Coherence in Goals and PlansActivated goals need not to be coherent, they are contradictory orpractically incompatible (scarce resources); that's why weexperience conflicts and have to decide/choice and to renounce. Aswe said (§ 5.4) Ints processing and formulation not only is aimedat introducing "coherence" among our active goals (this is onefunction of the "decision" process: to eliminate conflicts, do notpursue incompatible goals due to logical contradictions, limitedresources needed for both goals, interfering conditions for theactions), it also needed for making intra-coherent and inter-coherent ouractions and plans. If I intend a complex action, a plan, the intentional sub-actionare practically compatible: they do create the conditions for theperformance of other actions or for their outcome; if they aremotivationally independent but with possible interferences theymust be adjusted in order do not interfere with each other.
(ii) Coherence with the FutureIA are mortgage on future decisions and behaviors; they enter the(future) decision-making process; they are in the "Agenda" (what Ihave planned to do). I can reconsider them, but it is a nottrivial process: there is a cost for the Int reconsideration,abandon. It requires a special evaluation and reallocation work,implies the violation of a commitment (and even guilt feelings),can impact on our self-confidence and image; it is in fact a caseof non-stability, non-persistence, unpredictability.Why this mortgage on the future is a necessary mechanism?Human beings are the only agents endowed with long term objectives;not only in the sense of the need for waiting and delaying thedesired realization, but in the much more demanding sense ofplanning many (thousand) actions for a long period of time (mountsand even decades). A very risky activity (especially withall/nothing goals that you realize only with the final action34),since you invest, invest, invest and you risk to waste all yourefforts and resources if you do not persist and change your34 Some goals can be achieved gradually (very much, quite a lot, not so much,...), orpartially: 80%, 50%, 30%. (for example, “to be rich”, “to eat all this chicken”). Othergoals on the contrary are Yes or No, all or nothing (for example, “to marry Paul”, “totake a degree”). The psychology of those goals is very different.
34
objective. For this kind of typical and fundamental human behaviora lot of inter-temporal coherence is needed. Our mind has a lot oftrick for the temporal stabilization of goal-coherence. Ints asmortgage are one of them (Bratman); but there are several otherslike: promises and pacts, temporal discount, "sunk costs" bias,pleasure anticipation in desiring, Festinger's dissonanceadjustment, the value of the goal affected by the investment andpersistence, the will and its "power over" ourselves, (§ 11), etc.
(iii) Coherence with my SelfSince I’m guiding my behavior through my intentions I’m alsoreading it in those terms; it is also a way of understanding meand be coherent with myself, not only with my plans: to be myself. One should not underestimate the centrality of the“representation” of the Self in our mental life, and in particularin goal generation and evaluation, as well as in making choices(see for instance the so called "Image theory"; Beach 1990). Notonly the coherence with the self-image is a priority criteria for goalsselection35, but “being” in that way and constructing/maintaining agiven image are goals per se, and very important ones. I want tobe loyal and faithful to “the person who I am”. My behavior is also self-signaling (as well as staging of myself infront of the others).Moreover, a determined intention with its strong expectation (andinvolving also self-confidence, risk taking, ...) is on the oneside influencing the probability of the success, and be a self-fulfilling prophecy36, on the other side Int exposes to internalattribution of the failure or of the risk tacking, makes usresponsible37, thus expose to shame, guilt, self-blame, low selfesteem.
10.2 Stopping Decision process and costs
Another important function (and sometime intention) of theformulation of the intention by a choice and/or planning is tostop decision uncertainty and suspension and - more important -the process of searching for possible alternatives or for possibleadditional outcomes or costs or risks etc. Search which inprinciple might be infinite and uncomputable but in any case is
35 Especially in important decisions: "Does this suit me?" " Is this worthy of me?".36 Int to do (not just “to attempt/try”) implies some “optimism”.37 Since it presupposes a decision and thus that “we might have decided and behave in a differentway”, the counterfactual think that make us fully responsible.
35
very demanding in term of time, mental resources, risk for theprocrastination, etc. Given a satisfacing - not "optimal" -solution (Simon) we stop that activity by formulating ourintention and then by stabilizing our mind, action, and decision bypost-hoc adjusting the weights and values of the alternativesagainst "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger). As Jones & Gerard(1967)38 say, the “decision” about the goal to pursue has also theeffect and function of stopping the “babble of competing innervoices”39 and makes coherent, “unequivocal”, the orientation of theconduct.
11. Intentions, Volition, and Will A "voluntary" action is an "intention-driven" action, but is“Will” just having the “Intention” and actuating or revising it?“Will” (with its “strength”) is much more than Int; it is theskill (power) to "move to deeds", to put in place the decision andthe intended action, the ability to enforce ourselves to act or donot act, to spend, to risk.Having the Intention is not enough and Will is not reducible justto “voluntary” action: Will can be the Goal of influencingourselves, of inducing ourselves to do/choose or not to do/choosesomething by manipulating our beliefs (Vierkant: self-control vs.external control). It can be a reflexive social action (Castel,Paglieri??).
More precisely, there are different Will-phases and strengths. There at least two faces of the “volitional strength” and of“Will”: 40
one is the degree and strength of the commitment, determination inan already taken action, during its execution. There might bedifficulties or complex plans requiring persistence and focus.Will, volition here consist in do not give up, do not renounce andbalk, mettercela tutta, be tough, while facing fatigue, badcontingencies, damages, losses, or discouragement.38 Cited in Gollwitzer, 1993.39 Also the will power before the decision try to repress and stop Jones & Gerard (1967)the “decision” the “babble of competing inner voices” by argumentation or importance ofduties, etc. . 40 One might distinguish between Predecisional Will impacting on the activation and decisionprocess, and the Postdecisional, but distinguishing between persistence in commitment beforeexecution, in Agenda (Preactional in Gollwitzer’s terminology), and Actional: persistence anddetermination during the execution, coping with obstacles.
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In this form/stage of willingness the measure of the volitionalstrength is given by the value/cost of the "obstacles" to beovercome, both current, predicted and unpredicted.
> The strength of the intention as volition in action is given by obstacles, costs,efforts during the achievement.
The other form is “Willpower” as the power we have (or lack) overourselves, for influencing our selves by imposing some goal or thepersistence of previous choices, resisting to new goals,opportunities, and temptations. The will is not only in aformulated intention (volition, commitment, determination, ..) butalso before the decision and the intention; in the phase ofenvisaging and evaluating outcomes and goals, of choosing. Herewill is the capacity to make a give goal prevail on another onemore attractive or imperative alternative, of imposing a givenchoice, by persuasion or threats. “Will Power” is Weber’s social“Power” over ourselves: without possible resistance there is not needfor will..Thus the strength of the will on the future is different; is themeasure of the manipulation power we enjoy over our selves: so itis a measure of this internalized authoritarianism. That's why I need a good map of myself: to predict my self and mymind and possible behavior. And the goal of "being me" is helpfulfor the Will influencing purpose; one of the means for long-termcoherence and persistence (§ 10.1 (iii) ).
> The strength of our Willpower, of the volition/commitment on Int in Agenda isgiven not only by the expected costs/investment (resources, efforts), but also by therenounces, the alternative goals one has to sacrifice in any choice.
Some parameters are common; for example, the greater the value ofthe goal/intention more is difficult/unlikely that one drops it,in both phases; the more I have spent and invested (in thedecision process or in the performance) the more I will maintainmy commitment. Other parameters are different, as we have justseen. Obviously, if we drop the IA the EI will not be there atall, or I will drop it before it accomplishment because I havechange my mind, I’m no longer motivated to do that action. If westop and abandon our EI the entire intention is dropped, but notnecessarily the original goal/motive and the preference: if we seeother possible way we may reformulate an Intention with the saygoal but a different plan.
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12. Some Additional Issues in Intention TheoryLet us shortly discuss a few of the open issues for a systematictheory of Ints.
12.1 Intentions Ascription
An important possible distinction to be introduced (at least for acrucial analytical discussion) is between the goal of the action,inherent to the action as its “function”, its recognizable anddefining end, and the ascription of such an “intention”, of the mentalrepresentation, to its agent, necessarily implying some understanding ofother minds (mind reading).Actions are and/or become “tools”, artifacts, with theircharacterizing “function”, the intrinsic finality that classifiesthem; like for a hammer or a table or a chair or a pencil.Inserting the key in the lock, or grabbing the handle of a closeddoor, or opening a box of matches, or just walking, or stickingsome food with the fork,41 etc. Thus, it is not so obvious,whenever someone “recognizes” or “mirrors” the goal of an observedbehavior, whether s/he is really ascribing an intention to the observedagent, or simply viewing the action in a finalistic frame, as goal-directed (that is, an “action”), thus recognizing its teleonomy, itsgoal; by just evoking and expecting the functional and definingoutcome.The goal of the action and the intention of the agent are not just one andthe same thing. Usually the agent uses a given action in order toexploit its goal;42 she searches for it and intends it for puttinginto effect that goal; and – on the other side – actions areclassified and stored in a goals perspective to be retrieved andused for their goal (exactly like a tool; action repertoire is atoolbox). However, we can recognize the action-goal (the action asaction) without recognizing (ascribing) the goal guiding theaction to the mind of its agent. Is this always a necessary andpreliminary step? Or is it a more advanced and complete step? Doreally mirror neurons respond to the other ascribed mental stateor just to the evocation of the “end” of that behavior? Aninteresting open issue that deserves a discussion, whichpresupposes subtle finalistic notions. (Sinigaglia)
41 No difference between the action, the object, the instrument; all of them are "tools":the "food", the "fork", and the eating behavior with a fork. 42 However, sometimes it is in order to exploit other outcomes, like turning on the ovennot to cook but for heating the kitchen.
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12.2 A Paradox of Intentionality: akrasia
How is it possible that we “choose” and pursue some goal that wewould like not to pursue, that we do not consider our bestinterest? (“Akrasia” CIT) Is there a real choice, a real conflictbetween two candidate intentions (one perhaps unconscious)? Is therean unconscious “rational” choice of our best preference, withcalculation of “secondary advantages”? Or is it a fight betweenour intentional control system and other more impulsive, automatic,systems, which, though unintentional, may control our purposivebehavior? 43
12.3 A bridge between cognition and emergence
A social system works thanks to the behaviors of its members, andthen through their goals and their capacity of pursuing them onthe basis of their beliefs: intentional actions. What is the relationship existing between the social system’s goals and the goals internalto its members, which directly and actually regulate the latters’ actions? Are the members able to understand and represent explicitly intheir minds the social system's goals? Or are the goals of thesocial system simply a projection or promotion of the goals of(some of) its members? Or, do the members’ goals and plans happilycoincide with those of the social system? In other terms: do weintends all the purposes/goals we pursue? Functions install and maintain themselves thanks to and through agents' mentalrepresentations but not as mental representations: i.e. without being known or at leastintended.What's the relation between our intentions and the finalities of ourbehaviors/actions? Adam Smith’s original formulation of this problem is very deep andclear, provided that we take it seriously and literally. Thefamous problem of the ‘invisible hand’ is in fact not simply theproblem of the emergence of some equilibrium, or of the emergenceof compound, unpredictable, unintentional effects. The hard
43 See also the “dual processing” literature; although in our view this approach iscorrect but limited. What we need is a model not just of two parallel and competingsystems, but of how the unconscious, impulsive, felt, activations and evaluations enterwithin the reasoned and deliberative processes, altering the active goals, but also thegoal Value (due not longer to arguments but to the intensity of the sensation), and thebeliefs and their strength; and how we are able of taking decision pondering together thevery heterogeneous felt values and the reasoned ones (pros and cons), and we even haveexplicit meta-strategies for managing this coexistence: “Reason in the cold! Don’t due asusual just following your impulses; you decide to belly!”; “Don’t reason and reflect asusual! Go where your heart takes you”.
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question is how:"<the individual> generally, indeed, neither intends to promotethe public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it... heintends only his own gain... and he is led by an invisible hand to promote anend which was not part of his intention" (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, IV,ii, 9).As one can see, this view implies that: (1) there are intentions and intentional behavior; (2) some unintended and unknown (long term or complex) effect emerges from this behavior; (3)but it is not just an effect, it is an end we ‘promote’, i.e. its orients and controls -in some way- our behavior: we "necessarily operate for" that result (Smith, ibid.). In my view this is the right formulation of the problem. And it is a problem because it is not clear:
- how is it possible that we pursue something that is not a (conscious or unconscious) intention of ours; that the behaviorof an intentional and planning agent could be goal-oriented, teleological, without being intentional; and- in which sense the unintentional effect of our behavior is an‘end’.
The real challenge is relating and unifying ‘mental’ and ‘non-mental’ goals, the internal and the external teleology ofbehavior; and also how intentional behavior may be -at a higherlevel- just goal-oriented (McFarland, 1983) (Castelf 2001)
The problem is that this impinges not only on our habits andautomatic or ritual behaviors, but on our deliberated andintentional actions.A simplistic solution is charging only the non-intentional, non-deliberate but merely routine behaviors with those functionalaspects: according to such a view, role- playing would just beimplemented in ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Thus, when asocial actor is consciously deliberating and planning, he wouldnot play a social role, he would be ‘free’. I disagree with such asolution. Social actors play social roles and satisfy their socialfunctions also through their deliberate, intentional actions,however not deliberately. Exactly: this requires a sophisticatedmodel of intentions.
13. Concluding Remarks
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Intention theory has to be embedded in goal theory; intentionsrequire means-end reasoning and planning, conflict resolution, andentail value, expectations, possible success/frustration,disappointment, happiness, …We have presented a model of the various steps of the goal-processing and intention creation as the final outcome of goal-driven action generation. The process of intention formation andintentional action execution is strictly based on specific sets ofbeliefs (predictions, evaluations, calculation of costs,responsibility beliefs, competence, .... ). The origin of anintention is not necessarily a "desire" (which just is a kind ofgoal). Intentions have a two layers goal-structure: the intendedaction(s) to be executed; the intended outcome motivating thataction; with two kinds of "failure". There are also intentionalcomplex actions, plan, where sub-intention do cooperate on commongoals. We have also examined - in this belief-goal perspective -the double stage of intentions and the relations and differencesbetween Intentions in "agenda" (Future directed) and Intentionsunder execution (Intention in action). We have argued that Intentions are not there just for "motivating& regulating" voluntary actions (not just at the motor, executive,level) but they play several important functions, like coherencein current and long-term behavior, like stopping the decisionprocess. We have tried to explain how "will" - with its "strength"- is much more than the intention driving a voluntary action.
One of the aims of this contribution was to show that there isroom for some sort of ‘theoretical psychology’ where ananalytical and formal modeling (AI, ALife, Robotics, Logicsinspired) is supposed to provide important insights andpredictions, and produces indications for and interpretations ofempirical research.
AcknowledgmentsI wish to acknowledge the contribution of my colleagues of the Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL) (http://www.istc.cnr.it/group/goal): several timeI discussed these issues with them, with very relevant suggestions andfeedbacks, and we also wrote common papers. I wish also to thank theparticipants to the Topoi conference (Nov 2012 Roma) event, were we had avery stimulating discussion; although I was not able in this work toharbor and to deal with so many ideas and approaches from philosophy toneuroscience.
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