Aristotle's Criticism of Soul-DivisionAuthor(s): P. A. Vander WaerdtSource: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 108, No. 4 (Winter, 1987), pp. 627-643Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/294783 .Accessed: 30/01/2011 19:17

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ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL-DIVISION

At the beginning of his account of locomotion in De Anima 3.9, Aristotle raises the question of whether it is a separate soul-part or the whole soul which causes a living animal to move in space; and, if a sepa- rate part, whether or not it is one of the commonly recognized ones. At once, however, he is faced with a more general problem: in what sense

may one speak of p6plQ Ticq IJuXrlq and how many of these are there? In the following lines (432a24-b7), Aristotle introduces and criticizes two common soul-divisions before returning to the problem of locomotion.1 The passage reads as follows:2

Tp6Orov yap TLvaC aneilpa (aGLVST, Kal ou p6vov a TLves 432a25 AsyouOa 6btoplOVTeq, AOyIOTLK6V Kai OUpILK6V K Ki al tOurlPT-

KOV, Oi 65 TO A6yov exoV Kai TO aXoyov' KCaO yap TqS

bta(opcpdq bt' a ToaUT XwpiSoucl, Kai dAAa (cavSiTai p6pta piTW(o 5ltoTaoiv eXovTa TOUTWOV, nrpi (v Kal vuv Si-

pTai T, Tr Te OpErTK6V , 0 KQi TOiq 4UTOTC Una6PXeL KQa 30 n-toaC TOICS COtI, Kai TO oaO0qTIKOV, 6 OUT S wq aAoyov OUTS

(q o6yov QXOV v el T pg5 trcioq. STI 65 TO 6QavTaoTiKOV, 432b 6 T)& iev eival ndivTov eTepOV, TIVI 65 TOUTCOV TGauToV r eTre-

pov eXIe rtoAArv nrtopiav, si Tiq 6iac KEXWOplOa 6Va p6-

'Aristotle accepts from his predecessors the view, in which they were virtually unanimous, that the chief distinguishing marks of soul are KivrlOti and aioerlo0t (403b25-31, 404a21-5, 407b34-408al, 409bl9-25, 410bl6-8)--later he adds incorpor- reality (405bl 1-2, 409b19-21)--and he devotes much of Book 1 to criticism of his prede- cessors' views on the relation between KivTioqt and soul; the most important passages are 403b25-404b8, 404b27-405b12, 405b31-406b25, 408a30-b18, 408b30-409b18 (cf. Top. 140b2-7, 120b3-5, 123all11-4, 23-6) and the fundamental discussion remains that of H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Baltimore 1935) 289-93, 295-303, 308-10. In contrast to all of his predecessors who held that the soul as motive is

self-moved, Aristotle argues that soul cannot itself be moved except accidentally (405b31-406b15, 408a30-4, 408b30-2; cf. Physics 256a4-258b9) but that as motive soul is responsible, e.g., for movement in space by living animals (411a29-30). (For Aristotle's reformulations of the Platonic theory of KivlqOq, see F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the

Physical World [Ithaca 1960] 174-221.) His refutation of earlier views provides the theo- retical basis for his thematic account of locomotion in De Anima 3.9-11, of which our

passage is a digression, and in De Motu Animalium 6-11, for his criticism is intended to demonstrate that it is impossible to account for all soul apart from his own scala naturae

(cf. infra, n. 21), which provides the framework for his account of locomotion in 3.9-11. On the function of the digression at 432a24-b7 in this account see infra, p. 642.

2This is Ross' text; MSS variants do not affect the interpretation. American Journal of Philology 108 (1987) 627 643 Q) 1987 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

pia Tflcq UXflq. npoq 6 TOUTOOI TO OPSKTLKOV, 0 KOa ACycP Kai 6UVdiCeL eTSOV av fV 66osv eLvaQ nIvTWov. Kai QTonrov 6i

5 TO TOUTO 6Laoiav' eV TE Tz) AOOyOTLKO3 yap rl pouAicqo yiveTaCL, Kai ?V TO) aA6(oy i ertieupia Kai 6 up6q' sei 65 Tpia ir Ipuxr, ev SKaoTW CoTaL OpESicq.

The provenance and character of Aristotle's criticism in 432a24- b7 have never in my view been satisfactorily explained, and conse-

quently the reasons for his departure from earlier doctrine on soul-divi- sion have not been properly understood.3 Against whom does Aristotle direct his criticism and what is its philosophical motivation? Aristotle himself ascribes the two divisions only to TLveq (a25). The tripartite divi- sion into AoyLOTlKOV, OUILKOV and nrteUprlTiK6V of course is well- known from numerous passages in Plato,4 and the bipartite division into

aAoyov and Aoyov eXov is Aristotle's own familiar soul-division.5 To understand the provenance of Aristotle's criticism here, however, one must recognize that at least one other version of tripartition and several other versions of bipartition were current in the early Academy and are

possible targets for Aristotle's criticism.6 Failure to take into account the varieties of Academic soul-division frequently has vitiated interpreta- tion of this passage, for its philosophical motivation cannot be under- stood apart from the target of its criticism.7

3For the Academic debate on soul-division see D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," JHS 77 (1957) 112-18; and I. During and G. Owen, eds., "Theo- ries of the Soul in the Early Aristotle," in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, (Symposium Aristotelicum I = Goteborg 1960) 191-200; P. Moraux "From the Protrep- ticus to the Dialogue OnJustice" in ibid., 113-32; and, for the later tradition, see P. A. Vander Waerdt, "The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology," GRBS 26 (1985) 283-302 and "Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius and Middle Pla- tonic Moral Psychology," GRBS 26 (1985) 373-94.

41n addition to the canonical exposition of Republic 4 and 9, see 10.602c-606d; Laws 1.644e-645c, 9.863c-e; Timaeus 42a-44c, 69b-72d; Phaedrus 246a-249d, 253c- 254e, 255e-256d.

5Cf. EN 1102a28-1103a3, 1138b6-13, 1138b35-1139a17, 1143b14-7, 1166al- b29; EE 1219b26-1220a14, 1221b27-34, 1246a26-b36; Pol. 1254a38-blO, 1260a5-17, 1287a10-33, 1333a17-30, 1334b7-28.

6Versions of bipartition: Topics 128b37-9, 129a10-6; Xenocrates, frags. 206 and 211 Isnardi Parente; Protrepticus, frags. b23-b24, b59-b70 During and the evidence for the DeJustitia assembled by P. Moraux, Le dialogue sur lajustice (Paris 1957). For the tripartition of Topics 126a6-14 cf. infra, p. 642.

7It is necessary to insist upon this point against, e.g., M. Nussbaum who, in her latest discussion of this passage (P. Moraux and J. Wiesner, eds., "The Common Expla- nation of Animal Motion," in Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum, [Symposium Aris-

628

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

At least since Simplicius (CIAG 11.287.26-9; 289.7-17) and Phi-

loponus (CIAG 15.571.18-574.2) it seems to have been universally as- sumed that the version of tripartition introduced at a25 and criticized at b6-7 is that of Republic 4, although no commentator has explained how Aristotle's specific criticism here can apply to Plato.8 It also has been widely assumed since antiquity (cf. Simpl., CIAG 11.289.7-17;

Philop., CIAG 15.574.1-2) that his objections against bipartition repre- sent a self-criticism and recantation of the psychology of the Protrepti- cus and the later writings on noAlTlKri.9 This second assumption has been challenged by W. W. Fortenbaugh who, in the most detailed mod- ern discussion,?1 denies that 432a24-b7 is in any way a self-criticism; but this interpretation, as we shall see, is not borne out by the evidence. In my view this passage needs reconsideration. Certainly it has never received a satisfactory exegesis, despite its importance for the Academic debate on soul-division, Aristotle's contribution to that debate, and the relation between his moral psychology and the theoretical psychology of the De Anima.

My purpose here is to show that Aristotle's criticism of tripartition (b6-7) is directed not against Plato, but against the anonymous Aca- demic psychologists whose version of tripartition, recorded at Topics 126a6-14, differs significantly from Plato's, and that his criticism of bi-

partition (a26-b6), contrary to what Fortenbaugh argued, is a self-criti- cism of his own division into aloyov and A6yov 8eov. Aristotle's inten- tion, however, is not to recant earlier doctrine but rather to clarify the relation between the bipartite moral psychology of his ethical and politi- cal writings and the scala naturae of the theoretical psychology elabo-

totelicum 9 = Berlin 1983] 132-33), goes so far as to label both divisions "Platonic" (without adducing any evidence) and so wholly confuses the philosophical issues at stake here.

8Since all commentators known to me refer Aristotle's criticism to Plato it is need- less to give more than a few examples: see the editions of G. Rodier (Paris 1900) 2.528- 32; R. D. Hicks (Cambridge 1907) 551; W. D. Ross (Oxford 1961) 316; C. Lefevre, G. Lloyd and G. Owen, eds., "Sur le statut de l'ame dans le De Anima et les Parva Natura- lia," in Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, (Symposium Aristotelicum 7 = Cambridge 1978) 30-31 andJ. B. Skemp, "6pseit in De anima III 10," in ibid., 185-86.

9For an inventory of scholars who hold this view cf. GRBS 11 (1970) 242, n. 14 (where the reference to Philop. 547.1 is an error for 574.1).

'?"On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology," GRBS 11 (1970) 233- 50, reprinted without correction in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II, J. P. Anton and A. Preus, eds., (Albany, N.Y. 1983) 303-20 (I cite the original publication).

629

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

rated in the De Anima. " The basis for Aristotle's criticism of soul-divi- sion at 432a24-b7 lies in his attempt to bring human psychology within the framework of his scala naturae, an attempt which he represents as a fundamental advance over the approach of his predecessors (cf. 402bl- 8 and infra, pp. 632-633). This line of interpretation, although it dif- fers in detail, does not differ in principle from that of Simplicius, who

clearly recognizes that Aristotle's division into 6QAoyov and Aoyov EXov is not intended to account for the "whole soul" but rather only for those

aspects of it directly relevant to the elucidation of human conduct.12

Consequently Aristotle's moral psychology cannot account for such fun- damental 6uv6dpetq of the soul as nutrition, sensation or imagination. His purpose at 432a24-b7 is to clarify the limited scope of moral psy- chology by showing that its familiar soul-divisions cannot account for fundamental 6uv6dpeLq of the scala naturae which man possesses qua living being but which are irrelevant to the elucidation of human con- duct.13

Before considering the philosophical motivation for Aristotle's self-criticism, we must first set straight Fortenbaugh's misconstruction of 432a24-b7. The basis for his contention that this passage does not refer to Aristotle's own division at all is that the objection to splitting up the OpEKTLKOV (b3-6) is inapplicable to his own bipartite psychology, for

1 On the scala naturae see F. Solmsen's "Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," AJP 76 (1955) 148-64. No doubt Solmsen is right to detect (160-62) a Platonic antecedent to the scala naturae at Timaeus 76e-77c (cf. J. B. Skemp, CQ 41

[1947] 53-60) and 90e-92c (cf. 42b-d, 76d-e), but neither of these passages involves the

integration of moral psychology into the scala naturae which was one of Aristotle's fun- damental contributions to philosophical psychology.

'Of Aristotle he says KQKeTVOc OUV Eiq Aoyov Kai OpsEIV (PaivEsat d5atpv oJO TTiv

6oAv IlJuXrlv dAA6 Tilv npaKTIKlV Kai r91tKrV (CIAG 11.289.14-6). 13The fact that Aristotle criticizes his own bipartite division in no way implies that

he has abandoned it in his thinking on roAITlKrl, as most commentators (cf. supra, n. 9) assume, for from first to last his presentation of psychological doctrine is intended to provide the vopoeTrnq with the knowledge of the human soul necessary to understand human eubatpovia and therewith to make the citizens &yaeoi and obedient to the laws

(cf. EN 1102a5-26). For this purpose the statesman has no need of the principles of theo- retical psychology, of the 6uvdpeist of the soul irrelevant to human virtue; and, while Aristotle sometimes does introduce tenets from his theoretical psychology, such as the scala naturae (cf. infra, n. 27) or "separable vouc" (cf. 1177a12-1178a23, 1179a22-32, 1166a16-23, 1168b29-1169a3 with e.g., J. M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle [Cambridge, MA 1975] 155-77), he does so in each case solely to elucidate hu- man esuJatovia. So it hardly is surprising that Aristotle's moral psychology does not account for such fundamental 6uvdpeic as nutrition, sensation, imagination and loco- motion and that he was prepared to point out this fact.

630

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

Aristotle himself, according to Fortenbaugh, groups the three species of

6pstic (f3ouAroia, eup6q and snritupia) into a single pspoq which he calls the rNTeIUprlTtK6V KCai 6oAh OPESKTKOV (EN 1102b30).'4 To escape this difficulty, Fortenbaugh maintains that Aristotle's criticism at b3-6 refers instead to an Academic version of bipartition, closely related to Platonic tripartition, in which the AoyaoTlK6O is opposed to the OUplK6v and rrt1uPIrlTlK6V in a bipartite dichotomy (Top. 129a10-6; cf.

128b37-9) and 3o0uArloti is located in the AOYIoCYTK6V (Top. 126a14). Now although the latter passage states that rTiaoa pouArloq e'V TO) Ao-

YLOTLKCO, which De Anima 432b5 advances as an objectionable conse-

quence of bipartition, there is no suggestion at 126a6-14 that the ?rutOu-

pqTLKOV and eUplK6V are subdivisions of the ahoyov in contradistinc- tion to the AoyLaTlK6v, and consequently no evidence at all to support Fortenbaugh's interpretation.15 In fact, 126a6-14 exemplifies Aristo- tle's objection against tripartition (b6-7), that it divides up the

OpEKTIKOV into three, not his objection against bipartition for dividing it up into two.16 Moreover, it is clear that Fortenbaugh has seriously misrepresented the Greek of 432a24-b7.

In order to deny that Aristotle's objections to the division into dAo- yov and A6yov EXov represent a self-criticism, Fortenbaugh has to as- sume that a26-b6 refers to an "Academic version of bipartition" in which the rteiOUPirTflKOV and OUplKOV are collapsed into a bipartite di-

chotomy in opposition to the AoyLCiTIK6V. Yet the syntax and terminol-

ogy of this passage obviously rule out such an interpretation. That TauTa (a27) refers to Tb A6yov SXov Kai TO ahoyov in a26 (where it is

distinguished from tripartition) is shown by a30-31 (ouTS dwq iAoyov OUT& Cw hAoyov EXov), to which TviL 65 TOUTLOV in b2 refers; and that the

4In support of this view Fortenbaugh ([supra, n. 10] 249, n. 32) also cites 1139al 7-b5 and Pol. 1334B20, but he overlooks other passages which do assign 6ppeLtq to the A6yov exov; cf. infra, pp. 636-637.

'5Fortenbaugh assumes that the tripartite division of 126a6-14 must be construed as a bipartite dichotomy as at 129a10-6, but many of Aristotle's examples in the Topics are anonymous Academic 56dat, recorded solely for dialectical purposes (cf. 101a30-4), and consequently, as Cherniss demonstrated in great detail (Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy 1 [Baltimore 1944] 1-81), one cannot assume that isolated passages on the same subject record a related body of doctrine. Indeed, often in the Topics mutually exclusive definitions of the puxfi are advanced, or a definition advanced in one passage is rejected elsewhere or rejected on different grounds (consider the definition of soul as ouoia TorrTlpqq 56EKTIKf [151bl-2; cf. 140a35-8], or Xenocrates' definition of soul as apitepo QUaTO6 aQUT6 KlVOV [140b2-7; cf. 120b3-5, 123a11-4, 23-6], on which cf. Cherniss, op. cit. 10-9).

16Cf. infra, pp. 642.

631

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

criticism of bipartition continues through b5-6 is shown by ev Te TxO

AOylOTIKO ... ?V TO) aAo6y and by the ei 65 Tpia in b6, which clearly marks off b6-7 from what precedes and shows that the criticism turns to

tripartition only here. So Aristotle's criticism at a26-b6 must be di- rected against the division into 6Aoyov and Aoyov 0Xov. Now this con- struction of the Greek alone would suffice to refute Fortenbaugh's con- tention that Aristotle's criticism against splitting up the OpSKTLKOV at b3-6 is directed against the bipartite version of tripartition recorded in the Topics. For the Academic psychologists in question were working with the conceptions and terminology of tripartition, even if one wants to find in them an antecedent to Aristotle's own bipartite moral psychol- ogy, and there is no reason at all to think that they employed the termi-

nology of aAoyov and Aoyov sXov (first attested for the Protrepticus); rather, when Aristotle reports their views in the Topics, he always uses the terminology of tripartition. It is inconceivable, in a passage in which he has carefully distinguished bipartition from tripartition, that he

would use the terminology of aAoyov and Aoyov exov to report a tri-

partite division.17 So Fortenbaugh's interpretation is plainly ruled out

by the syntax and terminology of 432a24-b7, by his misrepresentation of Topics 126a6-14 and by his failure to explain either the criticism at

a26-b3 or the philosophical motivation for the passage as a whole.18

That our passage is a self-criticism is clear from the fact that it is the

bipartite division consistently employed in Aristotle's ethical and politi- cal writings that is under consideration at a26-b6. What does need to be

explained is the philosophical motivation for this self-criticism: how

does the bipartite division into aAoyov and Aoyov eXov relate to the

scala naturae of his theoretical psychology? To grasp the philosophical motivation for Aristotle's self-criticism

one must understand the place of investigation into human psychology in the intention and plan of the De Anima. It has been truly and suc-

cinctly put that "Aristotle's De Anima is not a treatise on the human

17Fortenbaugh (supra, n. 10) 245 finds "confusion" in the use of AOYIOTLKOV at 432b5-6 and thinks Aristotle should have used A6yov sxov; but in fact hoylOTlK6V here refers to the lower subdivision of the A6yov exov (cf. 1139a13-6), which is where pou6- Anotq would be located if not in the OpSKTiK6V.

'8Fortenbaugh pays no attention at all to Aristotle's criticisms concerning the

pesnTlKOV (a29-30) and the QavTaOTlK6V (bl-3); and his notion (246-8) that the criti-

cism concerning the aiosrlttK6v is directed against a group who were unable to handle sensation because they followed Plato's account in the Timaeus requires no refutation, since this group is not attested by any evidence, nor is there reason to connect the psy- chology of the Timaeus with Topics 129a10-6.

632

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

soul,"'9 and brief reflection on his programmatic remarks will explain why this is so. In discussing the proper pe0o6oc for his investigation Aristotle says

402b OKSE1T6OV 56 KQa ei iepLofrl i IgI?prpc, Kai n6TOpov 6Posti6iq anaoa tpuxin f o6' i ?8 pi1 6posei6lc, nO6TSOV El6?5et 6tapouaa fQ yYvse. vuv p6v yap oi A:yovTlq KQi C1q- TOUVTEc nepi Juxrfl nepi Tfrl avepCorvnq p6vrqq COiKaQOV Cmt-

5 OKoTrrlv' eSUapr3T?Ov 5' 6rnTq pil Aaave6vi nr6TEpov eis Ao yo auTifq oaTI, Kaensep (coou, fi KQe' sK6aOTrlV STSpoc, OlOV irrnou, KUVOC, 6vep6nou, eso0, TavO p OV T6 Kae6Xou,V TOl OU- 0?v aTLV IV VOTEpOV

It is implied here that previous accounts of the divisability of the soul were vitiated by failure to consider the relation between the human soul and the scala naturae or theoretical psychology of which it forms one

component, for otherwise Aristotle's predecessors would not have ig- nored the central question of whether there is a single tpuXfq Ao6yoC or whether KaO' CKaOTTv [sc. tiUXlv] :TSpoq (402b5-8).20 That in fact

they did ignore this question Aristotle undertakes to demonstrate in the

doxography which concludes Book 1, where he shows that their meth- ods of defining the soul fail to cover all soul (410bl6-41 b30).21 In con-

9This is the opening sentence of S. Benardete's article on 3.3-5 (Rev. Met. 28 [1975] 611-22).

20The target of Aristotle's criticism at 402b3-5 is disputed. Simplicius (CIAG 11.12.31-6) and Alexander (CIAG 15.36.13-5) refer it to the Timaeus, despite the fact that Plato there maintains that trees, plants and seeds (77a-c), as well as lower animals (91d-92c), possess souls; Philoponus (CIAG 15.36.16-9), on the other hand, refers it to Democritus and the other )UOLKOl who would say, he claims, that ev Ti. avepnorseia uxri nfoa I)UXLKfi u6VQaIpt eO)pEiTa. In fact Aristotle's criticism would appear to apply gen- erally to all of his predecessors who evaded the question of whether a single puxfCq A6yo suffices for all soul (see next note); and he would include Plato in this criticism because the scale implicit in the Timaeus "is ethical rather than biological in inspiration" (Solm- sen [supra, n. 11] 162 )-i.e., Aristotle would argue that Plato's assignation of the irteu- pnITKOV to plant-life as the third Iluxrq sEi6o (77b, referring back to 70d-e) merely rep- resents an application of human psychology to non-human life without consideration of whether the soul-functions of the latter are comprehended by the former (the objection of 402b3-8). In contrast, Aristotle himself integrates human psychology into his scala naturae and develops a biological psychology to account for the soul-functions of plants.

2Aristotle here rejects the conceptions of soul both as composed of the elements on account of its cognitive and sensitive capacities and as the chief cause of motion because neither view accounts for all soul: the latter neglects the fact that not all sentient animals share in locomotion (cf. 413b2-4, 415a6-7, 432b19-21, 434b2; examples at HA 487b6-9, 588b12, 621b3; PA 681b33-5, 683b4-10), and the former that plants seem to live although

633

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

trast, Aristotle in his definitions of the soul attempts to provide the KOl-

v6TaToq A6yoq (412a6; cf. 414b20-8, 415a13-4).22 Since in living be-

ings, as in figures, that which is prior always exists potentially in what follows in order (e.g., the aiCorlG lKov presupposes the OpsrTLKOV), Aris- totle conceives it as his task to investigate what the soul of each thing is and why it is so arranged in order of succession: '()aT KCl' KaQOTOV

q1-iTrnqov , Tiq SKGKOTOU JUXr, oiov TiC (q)UTO Kai TiCq avOprnou 11

enpiou (414b32-415al). This procedure through use of the scala natu- rae elaborated in 2.3 enables Aristotle to relate the familiar divisions of human psychology to the variety of soul-functions which man possesses qua living being but which are not relevant to the elucidation of human conduct and thus to avoid his predecessors' errors of restricting their

investigation to the human soul or of failing in their definitions to ac- count for all soul. The question at once arises of to what extent the fa- miliar divisions of moral psychology account for the various 6uvdaPtIC with which theoretical psychology is concerned. If the former cannot account for functions of reproduction, nourishment, sensation, imagi- nation and so forth, they obviously are useful only for the elucidation of human conduct and cannot be taken to account for the human soul as a

whole, much less for soul simply. When considering the divisability of the soul,23 therefore, Aristotle must consider the status of human psy-

chology within the scala naturae, and he does so in 3.9 by subjecting two

well-known divisions to criticism from the perspective of his theoretical

psychology.

they do not share in locomotion or perception and that most animals have no capacity for discursive reason (cf. Cheriss [supra, n. 1] 308-9). Implicit in this criticism is the principle that the various 6uv6pectq of various living beings can only be accounted for by the scala

naturae which enables Aristotle to subsume all the characteristics of soul (413a20-5; cf.

413bll-3) under a single common definition (414b20-415a13). 22 Some of the perplexities in Aristotle's definitions of the soul have recently been

discussed by R. Bolton, Phronesis 23 (1978) 258-78; see also J. Owens in Philomathes R. B. Palmer, ed. (The Hague 1971) 125-45.

23The question raised at 402bl-3 of whether the soul is divisable or not is consid- ered at 402b9-16, 411b5-30, 413a4-10, 413b11-414a3, 429al-2, 432a19-b7, 433bl-4. Aristotle's doctrine is that, apart from separable vouq, T 6e AoLtrn p6ptda Tlq JIuxlq

(aQVp6v 8K TOUjTOV O6T OUK oITL XWPLCOT, KQanetp TlvSq (paoIv' TO 6 Aoyp o6Tt ETspa,

q>avep6v (413b27-30); and this is his answer to those mentioned at 411b5-7 (A6youot 6r

Tltveq PsepLiTV aulTfv, Kai aAAX pViv voeiv aAAX 65e teBupeiv), where Plato presumably is meant (cf. Hicks [supra, n. 8] 300, 327). See the evidence from the ancient commenta- tors assembled by Hicks, op. cit., 183.

634

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

We now demonstrate that the purpose of Aristotle's self-criticism at 432a26-b6 is to clarify the relation between his moral and theoretical

psychologies by showing that the former is unable to account for several of the fundamental 6uvapsLtq of the latter. His immediate purpose in this passage is to show that "in a sense" the soul-parts are "infinite"

(432a24), not restricted to the bipartite and tripartite divisions some

postulate,24 and accordingly he mentions four 6uv6apslq which cannot

easily be accomodated in either of these divisions and which readily ex-

emplify our contention that his intention here is to show that the 6uv6-

PeLs of his scala naturae cannot be assimilated to his division into 6Ao-

yov and Aoyov Exov. 1. Aristotle's first example of a soul-part which exhibits greater

differences than those of which he has just spoken is TO Ts epETTlKOV6, 6 Kai TOiq (qUTOLq undapXeL Kai nTaoL TOLC 4)oCLq (a29-30; cf. 411b27-9), and which elsewhere is called )UTLK6v (EN 1102a33; EE 1219b37) or

au[rqTlKoV (EE 1219b39).25 Now this example might puzzle at first, for Aristotle makes the OpSTTLKOV the lower subdivision of the aAoyov at EN 1102a32-bl2, and its inclusion as the fourth part of his division into 6Xoyov and Aoyov eXov is confirmed by TOu 56 TSTePTOU piopiou Trq LJUXrlq. . .TOU EpPETLKOU (1144a9-10). So it might be thought that the

EpsrnTKOV, being part of this division, hardly can be said to exhibit

greater differences than that between bipartition and tripartition. But in fact Aristotle introduces the psnTTLKOV into his bipartite moral psy- chology only to dismiss it as irrelevant to 6vep0rtivrl dpTri since it is not

peculiar to man, being shared by plants and animals, and does not par- ticipate in the essential dichotomy between 6peLqC and h6yoC upon which his moral psychology is based (cf. 1102b2-3, 11-2, 1144a9-11; EE 1219b21-6, 36-9; [Ps.-Ar.] MM 1185a14-36; Plutarch, De Virt.

24The criticism that those who divide the soul get a great many parts and that these differ more from one another than the appetitive and spirited part do is repeated at 433bl-4.

25 The principal passages in the De Anima concerning the 0psnTlK6V, its functions and its place within the scala naturae are 411b27-9, 413a25-blO, 415al-3, 415a22- 415b2, 415b28-416b31 (cf. Cherniss [supra, n. 1] 310-12) and 434a22-6; these should be studied in conjunction with the various elaborations in the Parva Naturalia (cf. De Somno 454a12-4; DeJuventute 468a1-13 and 21-b4, 469a24-bl; De Respiratione 474b10-3; De Spiritu 481a9-b30) and in the biological writings (esp. De Partibus Ani- malium 2.3 and 7). At De Anima 416a30-1 and De Somno 456b6 Aristotle refers to a treatise on Tpoqfl not extant.

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P. A. VANDER WAERDT

Mor. 442b).26 He includes the Op8nTKO6V as the fourth soul-part of his division into aAoyov and Aoyov SXov not in order to elucidate human

conduct, but rather to relate bipartition to the scala naturae of his theo- retical psychology and thus to contrast human psychology with that of other forms of life, just as in seeking the i6lOv epyov of man in 1.7 he

employs the scala naturae in order to isolate the practical life of reason,

dismissing epErrTLKr Kai auO1TTLKrl cp(r as well as aioerlTlKKl (1097b24- 1098a17).27 This interpretation is confirmed elsewhere: 6qj)'prlTi 65 Kai Si TL iaAAo COT'i pepoq uuxfq, oiov TO ()UTLKOV. 6vOprnivnq yap Puxfrq Ta iprlppva I p6pila ia, 6io o(5' ai apsTTai ai ToO EpsCTITKOU KaC

au_' rTLKOu 6vepc)rrou' (EE 1219b36-9; cf. 21-6, 31-2).28 Plainly, therefore, Aristotle's division into aAoyov and 6Ayov

;Xov, which is intended to elucidate 6vEpcoTivrl dpeTrl, must be distin-

guished from the scala naturae of the theoretical psychology in which that human psychology may be anchored by inclusion of the OpsnTLKOV as its fourth soul-part; and Aristotle intends to establish this point at a29-30 by his statement that the GpSTrTLKOV, belonging also as it does to

plants and all animals, exhibits a greater difference than that between

bipartition and tripartition, both of which are intended solely to eluci- date human conduct.

2. Aristotle next mentions TO aiOerlitK6v, 6o OUTE wq Aoyov OUTS

cbq A6yov SXOV 0el(i v TLcq pqioq (a30-1). It is plain from passages in the ethical writings that the theoretical faculty of i'aoOrlocL cannot be identified with any of the soul-parts of Aristotle's moral psychology. Contrary to what sometimes is asserted, the aiorqTILK6v cannot be iden- tified with the 6OpKTLKOV or assigned a central role in his moral psychol-

26The incongruity of including the BpsrTltK6V in Aristotle's bipartite division is well brought out in the defense of its inclusion by the early Peripatetic author of the MM at 1185a14-23; cf. Vander Waerdt (supra, n. 3) 292-93. Apparently the early Peripatet- ics who objected to inclusion of the epsernTK6V because it contributes nothing to the eluci- dation of human conduct did not understand that this enables Aristotle to anchor his moral psychology in the scala naturae.

27 Arguments which explicitly refer -to or implicitly presuppose the scala naturae are common in the ethical and political writings (cf. EN 1099b32-1104a4, 1117b28- 1118b8, 1139a17-20, 1145a15-35, 1178a24-31; EE 1215b31-1216a8, 1217a18-29; Pol.

1253a2-18) and it is quite clear that Aristotle's bipartite moral psychology, so far from

representing a rejection of the principles of theoretical psychology, actually is tied to the scala naturae the theoretical justification for which is provided in the De Anima.

2 On the textual difficulty at 1219b38-9, see M. Woods' commentary (Oxford 1982) 104.

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ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

ogy.29 When discussing the three elements in the soul which control rnpatlq and ATrOieta, Aristotle says TOUTo0V 6' rl aioOorloq OU6eIpaq QPX l npadse

' 5rAov 6 O T'6) d rpia a'oa aOqotv plv Sev V rnpadlseo 65

pnl KOIVOVElV (1139a18-20). This statement rests upon an implicit ap- peal to the scala naturae: sensation is not a peculiarly human trait which marks man off from the animals and therefore is not relevant to the elucidation of human conduct, and so animals, which lack Aoyoq, may possess it without sharing in rnpatiq.30 Just as the OpsTTlKO6V has no share in human ipETfl, so Qaicer0 iq has no share in human npaitq. Consequently it cannot be identified with the 6OpKTLKOV of Aristotle's moral psychology: the dpxil rtpateoq is npoaipeosq, which may be de- fined as OpSKTLKOq VOUq or o6psCq 6LavorOTLK' (1139b5-7), and it is o6psct which makes possible the activity of practical l6tvota since, as Aristotle says, l6tvoia by itself moves nothing (1139a36). Hence the OpEKTLKOV clearly cannot be identified with the aior0qlTK6v: the latter is

explicitly denied a role in the explanation of human action, whereas the former is its source.31 Moreover, while a'iaorloit plays an essential role in the apprehension of particulars by vouc (1142a26-31, 1143a35-b6), its place in the scala naturae proves that it cannot be identified with either of the subdivisions of the Aoyov 'XOV, for the airOtclTK6V presup- poses the OepnTlTK6V, but does not by itself imply any of the higher 6uvpesq (414bb5-9, 415a1-13). So, as Aristotle says at a30-1, one can- not easily assign the aIcerJlTK6v either to the 6Aoyov or to the Aoyov &XOV of his bipartite psychology.

3. The interpretation of (avTaoia in Aristotle is much-disputed,32 but we can explain his statement (432bl-3) that the (pavTaOTlKOV is

2"Pace e.g., J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (London 1900) 66-69, who is unable to adduce a single passage supporting his identification of the OpEKTLKOV and the theoret- ical faculty of sensation.

30Aristotle does say that animals' possession of rl aiaOrlOtKOv implies TO OpSKTLKOV

(414a29-b19); but, as Themistius argued (CIAG 5.47.12-6), Aristotle's proof here ap- plies only to ertupiia. While animals may possess two of the three species of 6psecq, Oup6c and errteupia (cf. 413b20-4, 414b3-6, 11-2, 434a1-14; EN 1111a24-6, b6-13, 1116b23-1117a5, 1118a16-26; HA 488b21; De Sensu436a8-11; Plato, Rep. 441a7-b3), man alone has the capacity for thought (Pol. 1253a2-18; cf. De Anima 414b18-9, 415a7-11, 427b6-14; De Memoria 450a15-9), and consequently alone possesses po6- Arlot (cf. 433a22-6, 434a5-10; EE 1225b26-8).

31Cf. 431a9-14. 32 Among recent work see particularly Benardete (supra, n. 19) 611-14 and, inde-

pendently, G. Watson, CQ N.S. 32 (1982) 100-13, whose discussion lays to rest the in-

637

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

different from all of the other parts in essence (Tx sivat) and very diffi- cult to identify with or distinguish from any one of them by pointing to the essential role of (avTac oa in linking a'oOTrloiS with v6oticq.33 In his account of the operations of the practical intellect in 3.7, Aristotle ex-

plains that vo6oiCq is impossible without qavTaCoia: Tii 5 6 L bavorTlKi. ijuxir TaO )avTaopQaTa olov aioeripaTa uTIaPXeS. oTav 65 6yaOov fl KaKOv prilO rl a6rro(r)on, (l)euY?L : 6td)KS?. 6L6 OU6enIOT VOel aive pavTaoGaTpOc rl iuxii (431a14-7; cf. 431b2-5 [n.b. Ta plv oUV TO

VOniTLKOV eV VTOl aq (avTacopa voyo, KTA.], 432a2-14; De Memoria

449b31-450al); and this conception of the intelligible forms which are the objects of thought as residing in (qavTaoCpaTa34 provides the basis for Aristotle's account in 3.8 of vouc as the 16oq which employs el6r1:

rsei 65 ou6? npaypa oue0v SaTI

rnapa Ta pIsy6Ye, Sq b60K?, Tl a CiOq6Ta,KEXWpIOp?VOV , eV

TOIL E:l6Ot Toiq aiLOT9lTOli TO VOTiT ?OaTI, Td TS? V 4alt- paEos Ahy6Opva Kai 6oa Twv aio'r0lTov EseiL Kai nIdrn. Kai 56d TOUTO OUTS p i' aio9av6pevoq pTeGv oUeOv av pdOoi ou65 ~uveiq, oTQv T1 Oewopi, QvdyKql iPQa dvTQaopd TI Oesopev' Td yap tQavTaopaTa Worop aioaelpaTd ?OTI, rrnlv 6vsu uAhq.

432a3-10

This passage and several others show that ()avTaaia is the bond of the soul whereby the aesthetic is converted into an object of thought for the noetic.35 Thus the 4)avTQaTIKOv, although different in essence from

dictment for incoherence brought by some scholars against Aristotle's doctrine of ()aVTa- cia (in addition to the account in the De Anima, cf. De Motu Animalium 6-8 and De Memoria 1). Some ancient views are discussed by H. J. Blumenthal, "Neoplatonic Inter-

pretations of Aristotle on (avTaoia," Rev. Met. 31 (1977) 248-57. 33Cf. Benardete (supra, n. 19) 612. 34In holding that v6rlonl cannot take place apart from (QaVTQia, Aristotle de-

parts from the view of Plato according to which dialectical thinking transcends cPavTQaia and all the senses (Rep. 510b, 511c, 532a); the reason for this departure is explained by R. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory (London 1972) 6.

5 See particularly the account of pviprl i- which belongs to the same soul-part as ()avTQoia (450a22-5)-in De Memoria 1, where Aristotle begins by citing the De Anima for the doctrine that thinking is impossible without (pav6opcaTa (449b30-2), and then

explains that, while T6 (vavTaoaP TrlS KOlVrq aioaOeoScq nrtEoq SOTiv, memory even of

objects of thought is impossible without XavLTao paTa, and consequently it TOu 6tovoou-

Cpvou (Bywaters' correction for the vooup6vou of the MSS) KOTO u0pepr3 K6qS eil, Kae' QUTO 65 TOU tnp(Tou aio0qlTlKOU (450a9-14); cf. Sorabji (supra, n. 34) 74-7. The subse-

quent discussion of memory both as an object of contemplation in itself and as a mental

638

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

the aio9rlTlK6V and the VOriTLKOV, nonetheless is difficult to distinguish from either of them, since (pavTaoia both is indispensible in the opera- tion of vonlotq without being identical with it (432a12-4) and also pro- vides the bond between aloerlqoi and vouC which makes the latter pos- sible.36 Aristotle's statement at 432bl-3 is perfectly intelligible when one recognizes that q>avTaoia bonds aesthetic to noetic soul.37

4. Aristotle next criticizes bipartition and tripartition on the

grounds that each necessitates an unreasonable division of OpesLcl (b3- 7). Earlier we refuted the view that this cannot be a self-criticism, but it remains to show how exactly it applies to Aristotle's own division. It is

certainly mistaken to claim that Aristotle "never refers 6psetq to the

logical soul."38 It is true that all three species of Opsetq are assigned to the aAoyov at Pol. 1334b6-28, where Aristotle in considering whether men ought first to be educated by habits or reason states that the aAo- yov is prior in development to the Aoyov 8Xov, as the body is to the soul: OUxTW Kai TO aAoyov TOU hyov o XOvTOq. (Pavspov 65 Kai TOUTO

Eupo6 yap Kai pouAFrloL, eTl 6U 8rtteupiQ Kai yevollvo toq e)OuqC UTInpXeL Tol(q tnalQ oiq, 6 6b Aoytio6q Kai 6 vou npoioulv SyyiyV&- o6al ne()UKsV (1334b22-5).39 This passage does suggest that all three

species of opseLCt are assigned to the 6Aioyov, which is to be educated before the development of XoytapoJq. But 13o6uArqo differs from the other two species of Opsetq in that it presupposes the controlling influ- ence of reason;40 consequently it is properly AoyLoTlKfl `peSiq and

picture shows quite plainly the role of pavTaoia in linking Ta OVTQ which are aioerlTd with those which are vorlTd.

36Pace oi apxaiot who identified perceiving and thinking (427a21-9); cf. Cherniss (supra, n. 1) 313-14.

37 Theophrastus' perplexity concerning the assignation of QavTaoci is a welcome confirmation of 432bl-3: fiv [sc. (avTaoiav] Kai o )6 Os6paaTocq v TOIq idiotC q UaKOtS 6nopei, nr6Tspov AoylKifv fi Aoyov OCT0OV (Simpl. CIAG 11.286.31-32); for his views on (QavTaoia see Priscianus Lydus' Metaphrasis in Supplementum Aristotelicum 1.2, I. By- water, ed., (Berlin 1886) 23.1-25.26.

38Fortenbaugh (supra, n. 10) 249. 39For reasons of sense I should prefer to read, with a transposition, yap Kal

snrteupia [STL s & o3UArcig]: it is plain that children would possess 0up6q and inltupia at birth, but not at all clear how they could possess po6uATJoq, since Aoylap6q arises later.

40Cf. R. A. Gauthier andJ. Jolif, L'Ethique a Nicomaque 2 (Paris 1959) 193-94, and Alexander's comment (I. Bruns, ed., Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1, [Berlin 1887] 74.6-13): ir 6s ye TOv ayaeov 6peCtq ytvopiivr peTr KpioGqEC' TS Kai pouAriC p3O6- Arliot KaAClTal, rTltC V aveptnrtoti YiveTaL Cp6voLq. ri yap pouAXrotc OpeCtq AOytK[i. Ao- YIK1 b6e oUX Uc Trfi AoytKrfi ouoa tuxfiiq iv&pysla, aAA (q)c irTi Taic KKEiVqqC vepYsialt

639

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

hence inseparable from reason: 6oa 6s 6' aUTOU'q, Kai )V aulTO aLTLOL, Ta piv 6L' e0oc0 T 6 e 6L OpeStv, Ta pI,v 6La AOylOTLIKIV OpeSLv Ta 6e 6i' aAoyov' COTLV 6' ri p1Ev pouATorlcq 6yaOoO opselq (oue6siq yap 1ouAeTaL 6AA' ri TQV oav oir0 eivat ayao6v), iAoyoL 6' 6pteeic opyn Kai sErtLu- Pia' (Rhet. 1368b37-1369a4; cf. Top. 146b5-6). In contradistinction to the aXoyot O'Peeiq, i3ouArloLqL presupposes reason: when, e.g., move- ment accords with AoyloJ6Cq, it also accords with 3ou0Anrlo (De Anima

433a22-6); so, even if formally assigned to the A6oyov, pouAAorlS still re- mains AoyLoTIKTl 6petLcq, and this difference from the other 6p??Leq un- derlies Aristotle's statement that ev Te TO) AOYLOTLKO) yapP P3ouATJrlo yivsTQL (432b5-6). Other passages also refer 6Op?iq to the logical soul. In discussing the "participation" of Opetcl in Aoyoq, Aristotle says OTI 6e rnei?OTai rToc uITo A6you Tob QAoyov, prlvU?iJ Kai Ir vouE)?TrTOtl Kai

rnaaoa ;ntTiTrloqC TS Kai rrapaKAOiLq. ei 68 XP'l Kai TOUTO (advai AOyov

EXStV. 6tTT6V ,OTal Kal To Aoyov exov, Tb peV KupiLoS Kal Ev aCUT(p, TO 6' (oTnp TOU rnaTpoq aKOUOTLKOV TL (1102b33-1103a3). Now TOUTO in a2 refers to aAoyov in b34, which in turn refers to To eTIn0UpLrTLK6V Kal

o6Axo 6p?KTlK6V in b30; so Aristotle here as in EE 1219b27-31 refers to a division of the Aoyov sXOV into T6O P?V KUplWo Kal eV auTO) and TO 6'

(SoTanp TOU rnaTpo aKOUOTlKOV TI, the former representing reason

proper and the latter 6psElS obedient to it.41 Similarly, in a resume of an argument from the DeJustitia, he clearly divides up 6pe^Lq between the aAoyov and Aoyov ,XOV: Ev TouTOiq yap TOlq AXOyOLq 6LeoTTKe TO AO6yov eXOV pS ipoq Tfl auoov' siq a 61i 3Anrrouot Kai 6OKSt elVal a6LKia nrpbO aUT6v, OTI eV TOUTOLq COTL rtQGosLV TI rTapa

Taq eauT()v OpeesIq' (anTep OUV apXOVTL Kal apXoPi:vco Elvat lrpbO 6AAArla 6iKaL6v Tl Kai TOUTOLt (1138b8-13). Here eauTWCv refers to the

bipartite division through TOUTOLq (blO), so there can be no doubt that both the alogical and logical parts have Opesetq which may conflict and that there may be said metaphorically or analogically to be a kind of

justice between them when the proper relation of rule and subordina- tion obtains.42

ytvopivrl. TO yap OpSKTIKOV T6 urtoaTdooseo6aL T ) AOY() 6uvaoeal Kai rteieeoeaL, OTav

6opyTiTal TNV uro6 Tou Aoyou KpLE)CVTOV, i TOLd6E OpELtq aQUTOU o poujAIoCY KQaAEiTQ. 1 yap pouA6rqolt; lSTq PouAnq, Ti 65 POouAn Kai T6O pouAeuSaEoa Tou A6yov iXOVTOq.

41 Since EN 1.13 is Aristotle's fullest statement of the status of 6peStq within the

soul, his willingness to classify the OpSKTIK6V as (in a sense) rational shows plainly that it is a mistake to insist, as Fortenbaugh does, upon a hard-and-fast distinction between the desiderative and rational parts.

42Cf. Moraux (supra, n. 6) 137-40.

640

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

This evidence shows clearly that Aristotle was prepared to refer Opselq to the logical part of the soul. In view of the difference between the species of opeLqt outlined at Rhet. 1369al-4 it is clear that it is the AOYLo1TIKil opeLt, p3ouArlotq, which may be said to land in the Aoylo- TLKOV, the lower subdivision of the Aoyov eXov concerned with matters of action and deliberation (1139b6-14). This is precisely the objection of b3-6: to the extent that pohuArloc (even if formally assigned to the

6aoyov) presupposes the controlling influence of AoyLcop6q, it involves an unreasonable division of the OpSKTLKOV.

At b6-7, Aristotle turns to criticism of the tripartite division intro- duced at a25 and charges it with dividing up ObpesL into three. This criticism has always been assumed to refer to Plato's exposition in Re-

public 4, but I believe that Aristotle has another target in mind here. The central role of OpesLc in Aristotelian moral psychology tends to ob- scure the fact that it is his own coinage; Plato never uses the term, and

interpretation of Platonic tripartition in terms of Aristotle's doctrine of Opeslt necessarily involves a fundamental misrepresentation.43 It is un- likely that Aristotle is guilty of such misrepresentation here. He sup- poses that each of the three species of 6peLct will land in a separate soul-

part, with 3pohuAXrlo in the AoyLOclKOV as at b5. Plato, however, never

assigns pouAnoqlq to the AoyLOTIK6V; to the contrary, at Laws 863b he

explicitly assignes it to ilbovil (and implicitly to Oup6cq) and at 904b-c connects it with rtmeupiQa. The claim that "Academic psychologies as- sign P3o6uAohrl to the AoyLCOTlK6"44 is supported only by a reference to Topics 126a13; and, while it is true that each of the three soul-parts in the Republic has its own rtleupCiaL (580d; 583a), this fact if relevant to the assignation of p13ouAohrq-as Fortenbaugh evidently thinks it is- implies that each of the three parts has it own 3po06Ahoiq, which contra- dicts rather than supports the rnaoa yap PouAxhqaq ev T(O AoyOTLKcK of 126a13. In fact, each of the three Platonic soul-parts has its own desid- erative and cognitive elements, and there is no evidence in Plato for a systematic distribution of the species of 6peStq among the soul-parts

43Cf. Vander Waerdt (supra, n. 3) 283-302. Prior to Aristotle, the term 6psetq appears only in three fragments of Democritus (B72, 219, 284 DK), whose authenticity is dubious (cf. W. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy 2 [Cambridge 1965] 489-92), although they are assumed to be genuine in the most recent discussion, C. H. Kahn, "Democritus and the Origins of Moral Psychology," AJP 106 (1985) 1-31. Even if Demo- critus used the term 6pegtq, however, it does not appear that Aristotle's doctrine owes anything to him.

44Fortenbaugh (supra, n. 10) 249.

641

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

such as Aristotle's criticism here presupposes.45 This consideration suf- fices to rule out Plato as Aristotle's target.

Such systematization does appear, however, in the views of an

anonymous group of Academic psychologists which are recorded in the

Topics, and it is against them that Aristotle's criticism appears to be directed. These psychologists undertake to assign various rn60r and

Op6eiq: to the three soul-parts: aioaXvrl and rnaca ctpo3 rlaic to the

AoyIOTIKOV, )60Boq and OpyrI to the Oupouo&6eq, and Aurtrl and ri6ovr| to the rEtn0UplTKO6V (Topics 126a6-14). The naoa pouihrlaq of a13 shows the species of Opse:Lt are not common to all soul-parts as in Plato but rather are divided up among them, and it is against this latter view that Aristotle's criticism at b6-7, which assumes that rtaoa 3ouA6hrla

goes into the AoyLoTIK6v is specifically directed. It remains to explain the role of the digression at 432a24-b7 in the

argument of 3.9. This chapter is intended to prepare the thematic ac- count of locomotion in 3.10 by showing that none of the commonly rec-

ognized soul-parts of moral psychology nor any of the 6uvdpuesi of the scala naturae by itself is responsible for movement in space. The soul of

living animals is distinguished by two functions, judgment and locomo-

tion; and since the former is comprised by sensation and intellect, these functions together with that of nutrition exhaust all the characteristics of living animals (cf. 413a23-5, 427a17-9).46 Now the first question concerning locomotion to be settled is whether it is explained by a part separable from the soul or by the whole soul,47 and, if the former, whether it is one of the commonly recognized ones or another beyond them. The purpose of the digression at 432a24-b7 which immediately follows is to prove that the familiar soul-parts of moral psychology can- not account for various fundamental 6uvdpulq which characterize man as a living being and, consequently, that division of the soul by function

inevitably produces a great many or even infinite parts (cf. 433bl-5). This demonstration of the limited scope of moral psychology, as we have

seen, is the necessary consequence of Aristotle's attempt to bring study

45That each of Plato's tripartite soul-parts possesses both desiderative and cogni- tive elements is argued by Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (London 1975) 32-37. The

question of the soul's division, as E. Brann remarks, is "the pre-dialectical exercise" in the Republic ("The Music of the Republic," AGON 1 [1967] 45-46), and the numerous

suggestions that a longer and fuller way would be necessary to give an accurate account of the soul (e.g., 435d, 504b, 534a, 612a) shows that the account there offered is provi- sional and that a full investigation might reveal more parts.

46Cf. supra, n. 1. 47Cf. supra, n. 23.

642

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL DIVISION

of the human soul within the framework of his scala naturae. Since moral psychology is intended solely to elucidate human conduct, it can- not possibly explain the fundamental 6uvd6Upet which man shares with other living animals. In the remainder of 3.9 Aristotle demonstrates that locomotion cannot be explained even by any of the 6uv6pest of the scala naturae: he dismisses the nutritive faculty because locomotion al- ways is directed toward an object, so requiring (avCaoia or 6pectq, and because plants lack the instrument for locomotion (432bl4-9); the sen- sitive faculty because there are many living stationary animals (432b 19- 26; cf. supra, n. 21); the intellect because by itself it moves nothing (4-32b26-433a6); and even 6petcq, for in the case of the syKparQTi it is restrained by vouc (433a6-8). Aristotle's demonstration that none of the soul-parts of moral psychology nor any of the buv6pI tq of the scala naturae is responsible for locomotion clears the way for his constructive account of locomotion in 3.10, where he argues that 6peStq and npaKTLKr 6blvola together excite movement in space.48

Aristotle's criticism of the familiar divisions of moral psychology is not intended as a recantation of earlier doctrine or abandonment of the approach to the analysis of human conduct familiar from his ethical and political writings. His demonstration of the limited scope of moral

psychology is rather the result of his attempt to bring study of the hu- man soul within the framework of his scala naturae, an attempt which represents a fundamental departure from the approach of his predeces- sors and a new advance in philosophical psychology.49

P. A. VANDER WAERDT

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

4' For Aristotle's thinking on locomotion, see D. J. Furley, "Self-Movers," in Lloyd and Owen (supra, n. 8) 166-79 and Skemp (supra, n. 8) 181-89.

1'I am grateful to Harold Cherniss and Friedrich Solmsen for stimulating discus- sion and friendly criticism.

643