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“Aristotelian Groundings of the Social Principle of Subsidiarity”

Justin M. Anderson, Ph.D.

Immaculate Conception Seminary/School of Theology

Seton Hall University

ABSTRACT: The social principle of subsidiarity, both regarding the federalism debate in North

America and the principle’s role in the formation of the European Union, has garnished increased

attention in recent years. In this paper I will argue that if one looks for the historical seed of the

principle of subsidiarity in Aristotle -- as many authors do -- then attention should fall more

properly on his analysis of practical reasoning in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics than on

Book I of the Politics. The treatment of practical reasoning more aptly explains the need for the

principle of subsidiarity and, indeed, averring that it is based on an Aristotelian sense of

autonomy is misplaced at best and dangerous at worst.

1. Introduction

In the attempt to locate the historical genesis of the principle of subsidiarity, it is not uncommon to begin

with reference to Aristotle. The assumption that the best place to look is Aristotle’s Politics would be

partially correct, but it does not provide the complete story. In this article I argue that in looking to

Aristotle for a historical and philosophical grounding of subsidiarity, one can only adequately establish

that notion in Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning in the Nicomachean Ethics. It is not enough to

rest this claim on references to self-sufficiency in the Politics. On my way to this judgment, I will be

forced to draw the conclusion that one of the leading exponents of the principle of subsidiarity, the

French political philosopher Chantal Delsol, has miscalculated the degree to which Aristotle can be

helpful. Her approach risks misconstruing the social principle. Such contemporary attempts are

disheveled at best, and at worst even dangerous for the very existence of the principle of subsidiarity

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Because Delsol’s work on subsidiarity won much attention in recent years, I will devote the

second section to discussing her Aristotelian thesis while underscoring the necessity of the points she

draws out. The third section, however, will contend that to rest the principle of subsidiarity on the

Aristotelian foundation that Delsol offers is radically insufficient and, in the end, dangerous. It is

dangerous both for subsidiarity itself and for society rightly ordered. After demonstrating the

shortcomings of a subsidiarity worked out only from the purview of the Politics, the fourth section argues

for a more holistic Aristotelian grounding of subsidiarity in the account of practical reasoning presented

in the Nicomachean Ethics. The fifth section draws out the various benefits enjoyed by the acceptance of

this Aristotelian inspired view, while the sixth section seeks to anticipate possible objections to the

thesis.

It is not easy to determine the scope of such an essay. While it may seem more natural for an

Aristotelian (or at least a potential Aristotelian) to be interested in the conclusions drawn here, Aristotle

is one of those figures whom it profits one to study regardless of one’s final agreement or disagreement

to his proposals. Nor is there a clear divide in range between philosophers and theologians. While the

principle of subsidiarity was historically first fully articulated in a Catholic encyclical, it has become a

standard topic of discussion among political philosophers of all stripes. I limit myself here to the

discussion of Aristotle and do not take up how figures such as Thomas Aquinas or one of the popes has

understood either the principle of subsidiarity or Aristotle’s position regarding this principle. Nor do I

feel obligated to broach the topic of how the principle of subsidiarity is understood in relation to either

contemporary civil society (e.g., the European Union’s understanding of subsidiarity in relation to

member states following the Maastricht Treaty of 1992), or how the principle is discussed in relation to

the various institutional organs (e.g., between higher and lower levels of any particular church

governance).1 Nevertheless, it is presumed that insofar as the thesis is a philosophical one, the points

drawn out here can have and ought to have direct bearing on those discussions.2

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For several reasons -- historical, philosophical, political, theological, etc. -- the principle of

subsidiarity is an important issue. For those working in the history of ideas, understanding clearly what

may be directly inferred by an author like Aristotle will say much of how the tradition that followed him

did or did not take up various facets of his thought. Questions regarding later thinkers’ innovations,

developments, and accuracy of interpretation also hang on the issue of whether one has properly

understood the sources. For those working in political philosophy and public policy, the importance of

understanding those more rudimentary principles of our society is of no small account. Those working in

a theological tradition like Catholic social teaching also ought not to think an argument for a

philosophical grounding of this principle unimportant, even if what they intend is a specifically

confessional understanding of that principle. For example, Joseph Koterski, S.J., has argued persuasively

for the need for clarity on the philosophical foundations of the principles of Catholic social teaching.3 If

Christians are to live in a pluralistic society, then it behooves them to present the principles of their own

social teaching in a way that is available to all from the light of reason alone.4 Indeed, a philosophical

understanding of the genesis of these principles is especially important for those more theologically

minded. In the modern pluralistic arena, those adhering to a credal justification for social principles will

have to forego any appeal to theological corrective influences. Consequently, for these adherents the

purely philosophical form of such principles succumbs to a greater risk of corruption.5

The same danger also accompanies those constitutive elements of the various social principles.

Martha Nussbaum speaks to this point well in her discussion of the importance of understanding

Aristotle’s perception of particulars in his overall conception of practical reasoning:

But whether we are in the end persuaded by [Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning] or not,

the need to study it is urgent. Even more in our time than in his, the power of “scientific” pictures

of practical rationality affects almost every area of human social life, through the influence of the

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social sciences and the more science-based parts of ethical theory on the formation of public

policy.... If we do not finally accept Aristotle’s conception, at least we will have found out more

about ourselves.”6

It is part of my thesis to argue, regardless of one’s field of interest, that the contemporary philosophical

account of the principle of subsidiarity suffers from an inadequate grounding.

2. The Politics as an Aristotelian Grounding of Subsidiarity

There is in existence a good deal of literature on the historical foundations of the principle that argues

from the first book of Aristotle’s Politics.7 Perhaps no other author has had a hand in crafting such an

interpretation more than the French political scientist Chantal Delsol.8 Certainly, no other author in

contemporary times is as conspicuous and as deliberate in arguing for such a philosophical grounding.

Nor should Delsol’s importance be underestimated. The concurrence of her work with the 1992

Treaty of Maastricht, which helped establish the European Union, could only help to solidify her as an

authority on subsidiarity. And rightly so. Her work is to be admired. It contributed much to our

understanding of the principle of subsidiarity and its functional potential in the modern state. First in her

1992 book, L’Etat subsidiaire,9 then in her manuscript Le principe de subsidiarité,10 Delsol argued that

the historical roots of the idea of subsidiarity can first be traced back to Aristotle. Many others, writing in

various fields, have followed Delsol in her philosophical-historical conclusions.11 I will first take a closer

look at Delsol’s reading of Aristotle before offering a critique in the next section of those Aristotelian

roots.

Delsol’s point of reference is the beginning of the Politics, where Aristotle gives a description of

the naturalness of the human community. When Aristotle indicates how it is that the family, village, and

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city organically develop, Delsol rightly points out how the concepts of sufficiency and insufficiency

guide and push Aristotle’s analysis along.12 Although the family is a natural unit, it is insufficient on its

own. So, it forms the next larger organized body, the village.13 The same problem plagues the village,

and so it joins with other villages to comprise the city-state.14 Delsol rightly highlights the driving ideas

of sufficiency and insufficiency in Aristotle’s description. She then proceeds to discern a rapport between

the guiding idea of self-sufficiency of a body politic and that unit’s group autonomy from the higher, exo-

level bodies, for “the tasks of the different groups do not overlap: they superimpose themselves on each

other. Each group works to respond to the unsatisfied needs of the sphere immediately inferior in

importance.”15 Aristotle, notes Delsol, argues that the proper ruler makes decisions for his dependents

because those dependents will be happier if those decisions are made for them. After this the reader is

treated to a brief investigation of various facets of social realities and how they were viewed by the

Occidental ancient world, using Aristotle as its mouthpiece.16

Although Delsol does much to draw out the consequences of her reading of Aristotle’s positions,

we are left with little comment on the strength of the notion of group autonomy to philosophically ground

the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, because each level of society, to the degree that it is self-sufficient,

requires its own proper group autonomy, Delsol concludes that Aristotle’s Politics contains the seminal

idea of subsidiarity.17 On Delsol’s account, the principle rests on the emphasis given to group autonomy

insofar as it is self-sufficient. Delsol is careful to offer a dual qualification to this conclusion. First, she

stresses that this autonomy is not that of an individual but that of the group.18 Second, this group

autonomy does not result in a liberty to choose among final ends, but only a liberty for action and

administration.19

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3. The Justification Problem

While Delsol’s view seems to be an accurate description of the principle of subsidiarity as it might

appear in Aristotle’s Politics, upon closer analysis there is at least one problematic issue arising from her

suggested locus classicus: it is, in itself, insufficient to ground this principle.

Delsol’s grounding of it in Aristotle suffers insofar as it fails to recognize that while a meso-level

body’s autonomy is a necessary condition for the principle, it is insufficient to count as the raison d’être

of the principle of subsidiarity itself. Delsol seems aware of this issue, and on her account, so, too, was

Aristotle:

The need to preserve these autonomies, themselves restrained, is justified by an irrepressible

desire for freedom.... But the compelling character of this need is not explained. Why are people

so constituted that they do not admit of despotic power? ... Aristotle posed the question and there

responds...: the Greeks are free by nature.... The argument from “nature” quiets the thought and

puts an end to subsequent questions, even though it offers a less than satisfying outcome.20

Delsol seems to think Aristotle is poorly equipped to offer a more robust defense of one’s irrepressible

desire for freedom.

Practically, this problematic is made especially conspicuous when, in a conflict situation between

an interventionist exo-level body and a resistant meso-level body, the latter wishes to justify the reason

for its autonomy in the face of a potential act of intervention by an exo-level body. If Delsol is correct,

then the only Aristotelian grounding to which one could appeal is that such an exo-level intervention

would be an interruption of the meso-level group’s autonomy, which is naturally its own. The problem

with this response is that it indicates that which is typically already acknowledged by the exo-level body.

Yet, the exo-level body also typically discerns an insufficiency in the meso-level body’s capacity and so

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judges itself warranted to intervene in order to attain some greater social good. Consequently, any meso-

level body in such a situation wishing to remain autonomous faces a serious need to justify the need for

that autonomy beyond the response that Delsol identifies. In short, neither group autonomy nor the

liberty that springs from it seems capable of justifying itself. If the meso-level body fails to offer a

satisfactory ground for its own proper group autonomy, then to that degree will the same body be the

continual victim of an overactive interventionist exo-level body of governance. This “justification

problem,” as I will call it, is the single greatest weakness of the current Aristotelian philosophic

grounding of the principle of subsidiarity. If we stand solely on the shoulders of Delsol’s Aristotelian

Politics for a philosophical understanding of this principle, we run the risk of crushing him under our

own weight.

Some might wish to avoid the justification problem by arguing that subsidiarity is not what must

be justified, but the exo-level government’s interventionist disposition. Such authors wield the principle

as a means of dislodging an overbearing conception of the exo-level body’s government. But this strategy

is of little help. Even left to itself, an idea of subsidiarity built on the sole foundation of autonomy would

crumble without outside pressure. To base the principle solely on the claim to group (or individual)

autonomy cannot justify itself to itself, regardless of one’s conception of the nature of the exo-level

body’s role of governance.

Consequently, the justification problem reveals that one who accepts group or individual

autonomy as the justification for the principle is left appealing to the very thing against which the exo-

level body is acting, presumably because of a perceived need to do so. In such a case, the meso-level

body’s cries for subsidiarity are bound to be lost. This loss of the principle in individual moments when it

most needs to be guarded is the weakness of Delsol’s Aristotelian grounding. It is not that the principle

would ever be removed from the books of political science or public policy. It would remain, but become

utterly impotent. This is the single greatest danger for subsidiarity.

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4. An Alternative Aristotelian Inspiration for Subsidiarity

A fuller account of an Aristotelian-inspired principle of subsidiarity should be able to offer some

justification for the need and right of the meso-level body’s independence of judgment and execution

other than appealing to that right and need. Failure to do so ought to lead us to conclude that either (a)

our Aristotelian account is incomplete, or (b) Aristotle’s thought is ill-suited for such a task. In this

section I will pursue the former path. I begin with a detailed, though certainly selective, treatment of

Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning as laid out in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. I conclude

the section by linking each of these eight selected facets to the principle of subsidiarity. By so doing I

aim to demonstrate why his account of practical reason is the far better interpretive key for unlocking an

Aristotelian-inspired philosophical defense of this principle in face of the justification problem.

4.a. Facets of the Aristotelian Account of Practical Reasoning

(1) In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle seeks to discern the different powers of the

human intellect and how each power can be said to have its own particular excellence. Because ethics is

about the human good that can be attained by human action, the capacity to think rightly about things to

be done (i.e., practical reason) especially interests the Starigite. More precisely, because such action

deals with the here and now, one’s concrete circumstances, practical reason must above all else turn its

attention to what Aristotle calls particulars (kath’ekasta). Action is movement in the realm of the

contingent, not the necessary. If action were about the necessary, then reason would study that which is

universal. Nevertheless, precisely because practical reason is right thinking about some action to be done,

it must concern itself with particulars rather than universals.

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For Aristotle, the object of study is likewise determinative of the kind of knowledge that one is

able to attain. If one studies universals, then one attains to knowledge (épistēmē) in its proper sense.

Conversely, if one makes particulars the aim of one’s study, then one at best attains to opinion (dóxa).21

(2) While practical reasoning is especially concerned with particulars and universals, it is not the

case that universals play no role whatsoever in coming to a practical judgment. For the deliberative

process of practical reason to go well, there must be an incorporation of scientific knowledge already

possessed. This is evident from the ways practical reason can fail:

Moreover, the error may be about the universal in deliberation or about the particular; either [in

supposing] that all heavy types of water are bad or that this particular one is heavy.22

To this deliberative process, practical reason makes its own unique contribution: the particular premise of

the practical syllogism (e.g., that this particular water weighs heavy). Crucial to deliberation, then, is the

particular obtained by perception (aisthēsis). But both of these terms of reference (particulars and

perception) are fraught with interpretive difficulties. Because understanding both terms is essential to

making my argument both are explored below.

(3) Aristotle’s statements regarding our knowledge of particulars are plagued by lack of clarity.

Does he mean knowledge about particular types (e.g., that bird meat differs from other kinds of meat), or

(b) that knowledge about particular instances of those types (e.g., that this meat is bird meat)?23 Terence

Irwin concludes from the examples strewn throughout this portion of Book VI that Aristotle was

referring to both ways of understanding particulars. Irwin explains that the knowledge demanded by

particular types24 and by particular instances25 both make a significant difference in how practical

reasoning proceeds:

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If particulars are determinate types, identification of particulars is part of good deliberation. If

they are particular instances, they are not themselves discovered by deliberation, but perception

of them is required for successful deliberation, so that good deliberation must include good

perception.26

In either particular types or particular instances, then, experience (empeiría) will aid one who is

deliberating in the task of sorting through such identifications.27

(4) Yet, commentators today go further still in wondering what Aristotle meant by “particulars.”

The single most extensive debate that this issue touches on concerns means-ends limitations of practical

reason. When one deliberates, is that deliberation about the particulars of the means to some end or does

deliberation also include the particulars of an end? Aristotle seems to limit practical reason to

deliberation of the means in several places.28

David Wiggins has famously pointed out that the lengthy history of this topic was no doubt

burdened by mistranslations rendering Aristotle’s tōn pros to telos as “means to an end” rather than as

the more accurate “what is towards the end.”29 But, as scholars like Terence Irwin and David Reeve have

argued, there are other ways to know that such a mistranslation would not be an authentic reading of

Aristotle.30 Irwin argues that if one understands Aristotle’s conception of the human good to be

something of a composite of good human activities, then one could reasonably arrive at the same

understanding as Wiggins, even despite any infelicities in translation.31 Reeve agrees that to speak of

means-ends concerning Aristotle’s limiting of practical reason is unhelpful. He fingers several different

objects of deliberation.32

(5) The inquiries into what kind of particulars (type or instance) and into whether the particulars

are of means or of ends help us identify what sorts of particulars the successful practical reasoner will

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need to attend to. Yet, Aristotle’s analysis has another prominent facet. Authentic practical reasoning not

only comes to a practical conclusion but terminates in a command for action. That is, practical reasoning

also has a prescriptive capacity (epitaktiké) that distinguishes it from merely sound judgment (eusunesia)

of some third-party observer.33

(6) Equally important for grounding the principle of subsidiarity on an Aristotelian account of

practical reasoning is the way in which one comes to know these particulars, namely, through

perception.34 But, again, questions loom.35

Throughout Artistotle’s comments on the nature of deliberative perception, it is not clear what

part of the person is performing this.36 Does he have in mind a perception that is wholly intellectual or

one that uses imagination (phantasia) to arrive at its grasp of particulars? If one accepts the former

interpretation, then we are more likely to associate practical reason’s perception with the rational part of

the soul. If, on the other hand, one accepts the latter interpretation, then deliberative perception will

belong to the sensitive part of the soul and, consequently, will be more constitutively sensitive. While

Reeve’s reading tends towards the more intellectual side, other scholars like Martha Nussbaum have

argued that deliberative perception does not belong to the rational part of the soul, though it is certainly

touched by reason.37 This difference is inconsequential. For both Reeve and Nussbaum, one’s appetites,

feelings, and emotions precede the deliberative perception in such a way that these factors do shape our

experience about which one will deliberate.38

(7) If one does accept Nussbaum’s case that deliberative perception is constitutively made up by

imagination, then one’s understanding of the role of Aristotelian imagination is also increased. For

Aristotle, argues Nussbaum, imagination is “the faculty in virtue of which the animal sees his object as

an object of a certain sort.”39 Imagination in Nussbaum’s interpretation becomes the determining feature

of perception. The object that is perceived “as an assortment of various perceptible characteristics” is

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formed by imagination “as a unitary object under some description.”40 Yet, these two functions of

perception and imagination are interdependent acts of the same faculty. This imagination is bound up

with one’s past, with prejudices, and with one’s needs. This means, of course, that a perceived object is

understood as a particular kind of object (e.g., X as X) in light of the person’s past experiences and

future goals. This involvement of the whole person in the formation of the description under which the

perceived object is received is an enriching sense of deliberative perception.

(8) Nevertheless, even if we accept the intellectualist view of deliberative perception, appetites,

feelings, and emotions will all play an influential role in such perception.41 These are, in the very least,

some of the most prominent features of the deliberator’s experience that provide the context in which the

deliberative process is carried out, even if they are, unlike Nussbaum’s interpretation, understood to be

something extrinsic to deliberative perception itself.

Incorporation of the emotions will immediately involve talk of what role the moral virtues play in

the deliberative process. Emotions are not to be seen as potential hindrances to one’s practical reasoning

but as integral aspects of it. Indeed, as was previously argued by Michael Stocker outside of the sphere of

Aristotelian interpretation, Nussbaum points out that it is not only one’s inability properly to know and

respond with the right emotions that is the problem. In fact, there are some experiences that elude the

person without the capacity to understand and respond via the emotions42 and other experiences in which

the particular could altogether elude us if not grasped with this “desire-infused perception.”43 Nussbaum

writes:

The agent who discerns intellectually that a friend is in need or that a loved one has died, but

who fails to respond to these facts with appropriate sympathy or grief, clearly lacks a part of

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Aristotelian virtue. It seems right to say, in addition, that a part of discernment or perception is

lacking.44

Deliberative perception is never just an emotion, but “our emotions are modes of practical perception.”45

4.b. Aristotle’s Account of Practical Reasoning Understood in Terms of the Principle of Subsidiarity

Each of the points highlighted above (1–8) exhibit distinctive features of the Aristotelian description of

practical reasoning. They can serve as cords that point to the necessity of preserving the principle of

subsidiarity in a more robust way than an appeal to autonomy alone. Next, I want to trace how these

cords can help secure a philosophically robust defense of this principle.

(1) The first point made above was that one can never produce an authentic science about the

kinds of things that practical reasoning addresses. This already provides a negative way of solving the

justification problem facing Delsol’s account. Her account fails to justify itself in light of an overzealous

exo-level body because it relies on a claim that itself is in question. But if the principle were understood

to issue from a concern about practical reason and not only a right to autonomy grounded in itself, then

one might easily justify the meso-level body’s primary prerogative in decision-making on the basis of the

Aristotelian claim that no exo-level body could possess the kind of knowledge necessary to respond

adequately to the situation at hand. Such is the case precisely because the things that practical reason

addresses are particulars of some concrete situation and not a prefabricated body of knowledge that is

sufficient for the contingencies of life. If the principle were understood on the basis of an Aristotelian

account of practical reason, then an exo-level body’s subsidization will never be sufficient on its own.

(2) The second point considered was that while practical reason is not wholly about knowledge

from universals, still it must take account of the scientific knowledge that universals enable. While it may

be tempting to see the relationship between universals and particulars as analogous to the relationship

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between exo-level and meso-level bodies, no such analogy of proportion can be accepted. Universals may

just as easily be known by those who comprise the meso-level body of governance as it is by those who

comprise its exo-level counterpart. Note, however, that the reverse is not true. The meso-level body will

generally have better perception of the particulars at hand. Of course, this is only a generalization and

cannot be asserted in every case. Yet, one is justified in prejudicing oneself in favor of the meso-level

body in this manner, unless something impedes the meso-level from perceiving the proper particulars as

salient particulars.

But is this true? One might object that if experience is of such critical value in recognizing

particulars in the case at hand, then might it not be the case that the exo-level body can have more

experience at identifying such particulars? The objection raises a good point, and one that can only be

answered after addressing what is meant by particulars and perception. Thus, I will return to answer this

objection in the sixth section.

(3) The next feature we unearthed regarded a twofold insight of the nature of Aristotelian

particulars. First, we noted with Irwin that Aristotle seems to speak of both particular types and particular

instances. While it may seem perfectly possible that Aristotelian practical reason would support the idea

that some exo-level body could have a better grasp of particular types, the same cannot be said of

particular instances. This is especially the case when the particular instances are flesh-and-blood people

who possess their own imagination, memory, and narratives and who are better known to the meso-level

body. Understanding this distinction again avoids the confusion that particulars can be had equally on all

levels of oversight.

(4) We also raised the well-documented question of what these particulars might be about: means

only, or the end and the means? Following scholars like Wiggins, Irwin, and Reeve, we saw that

Aristotle’s account can be read to support the idea that deliberation can be about a great many things as

well as the end. This is a point especially poignant for the principle of subsidiarity. The leader of a

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family, association, or community must certainly deliberate, not only about the instrumental means that

bring about a right order and happiness in the body being governed. That same leader must also be able

to inquire into those intermediate ends that are constitutive of the larger end: on what criterion ought

right order to be determined and in what does happiness consist? In sum, the successful leader must

deliberate about those particulars that will constitute the full flourishing of the family, association, or

community: the common good. Again, here is a point worth returning to below.

(5) In passing, mention was made of practical reason’s deliberative process as terminating not

only in a conclusion, but one that involves a command to take action. Thus far, I have principally noted

issues of competency of knowledge, but Aristotle’s account can provide us with more. If the principle of

subsidiarity finds its philosophical home in the account I have suggested, then this account can also

accommodate questions regarding the competency of execution.

(6) The question about what part of the person is at work in deliberative perception does little in

itself to ground the principle of subsidiarity: both readings allocate to this perception a strong connection

to the desires and emotions. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that deliberate perception does serve as

a confirmation of a very practical instance of subsidiarity. On both accounts deliberation is not a purely

intellectual process, and so there needs to be a proper affective response in order for practical reason to

go well. For the principle of subsidiarity, this means being properly disposed. There are obviously times

when the one affectively closest to the people and things in question will be the leader who is closest to

the citizens in both time and space. But there are times when precisely in light of this affectivity leaders

cannot perform their duties adequately. In such times, the only proper choice can be seeking help from

another one who is in some way removed from the situation. Thus, while the affectivity involved in

practical reasoning does not ground the principle of subsidiarity, it does manifest the principle’s

dynamic.

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(7) If one does side with Nussbaum’s interpretation of deliberative perception being

predominately constituted by imagination (phantasia), then the deliberator’s perception is not something

only affected by the person but also constituted by it. How one comes to recognize action X under any

given description is strongly shaped by all those facets of the agent that constitute imagination. Among

others, we can note especially the role of memory for unifying a series of perceptions. Memory provides

a way of knowing particulars of the past and how they may shape the here and now as well as the future.

Memories help shape the narrative that a people have of themselves. It is, indeed, part of the rationale

behind having those who make up the local government be from the local community. If memory does

serve such a vital role in practical deliberation, then this again would be further reason to justify the

claim of subsidiarity. Good governance depends on the decision-making body not only to perceive the

situation now but also to know how this particular situation relates to the past events and issues that have

been raised in and by these particular subjects. This seems yet another reason an exo-level body not only

should not attempt to govern where a meso-level body is capable of governing but also one in which it

actually could not govern as well as that meso-level body. While having right memory is not sufficient

for someone to count as an adequately experienced practical reasoner, it is a necessary condition of it.

(8.a) Coupled with the role that imagination plays in Aristotelian practical reasoning is the role

that he allows the emotions in perception. We have already seen that perception of particulars hangs on

the deliberator’s ability to respond adequately -- not only intellectual understanding but also emotional

in take. This point even deepens the importance of decision-making being carried out on the lowest level

possible. Once decisions are unnecessarily assumed by the higher, exo-level body, then even if the

particular elements could be intellectually grasped, one would still risk inadequately grasping the

particulars in a misguided way. For Aristotle, one’s emotional responsiveness does not simply come into

play only after one has coldly understood the situation. It actually forms the context in which one

properly understands.

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(8.b) Another advantage to note in passing is that by utilizing this account of practical reason as

the philosophical underpinning of the principle of subsidiarity, the connection to the moral virtues is all

the more apparent. This is true not only for “morally good” governance, but simply for good, rational

governance.46

In sum, by bringing Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning to bear on the principle of

subsidiarity, one can see how it is capable of providing a philosophical grounding for subsidiarity in a

more suitable way than Delsol’s reliance on merely group autonomy can offer. Each of the facets

explored above and all of them together offer a philosophical foundation for the idea that an exo-level

body ought not to attempt to perform what a meso-level body is capable of doing on its own. Moreover,

this philosophical grounding avoids the justification quandary from which Delsol’s account suffers: it

gives substantial reasons, apart from self-referential claims of autonomy, to why that autonomy is

critical.

I have obviously been stressing the problem of justification and my preferred locus of inspiration

for the principle of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I did not, in the same breath, clearly

state what has been my thesis from the beginning: Delsol’s point of group autonomy in the Politics

stands as the sine qua non for exercising subsidiarity. Hence, while Aristotle’s account of practical

reasoning solves the justification problem, Delsol is completely correct in everything that she proffers.

The ultimate problem with her account lies not in what she sees in Aristotle’s account in the Politics, but

in what she does not mention about his thought -- in my view, something that it is capable of contributing

to a philosophically robust notion of subsidiarity. The misfortune with her account’s appeal to group

autonomy alone -- and, by association, the problem of all who follow her in this appeal -- is not a matter

of commission but one of omission.

Perhaps, however, this omission is understandable on the part of Delsol. Her work on

subsidiarity largely takes aim at a notion of the person that is radically individualistic. Her historical

18

account draws from multiple sources of the ancient world to emphasize its difference from our own

modern, and sometimes contradictory, individualistic demands in light of the principle of subsidiarity.

Consequently, her aim never seems to have as its target an exhaustive treatment of Aristotle’s capacity to

construct the philosophical underpinnings for the totality of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, it is an omission

important to correct, and one that has vitiated the treatments of many of the authors who have followed

Delsol’s work.

Thus far, I have sought to draw out facets from within Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning

that support the principle. In the section that follows, I indicate facets outside the gambit of the

Aristotelian account for such a grounding.

5. Some Benefits of Justifying Subsidiarity by Aristotelian Practical Reasoning

Happily, obviation of the justification quandary is not the only advantage to grounding the principle of

subsidiarity in the manner that I have suggested. This grounding also allows us a more holistic way of

articulating the various qualities of subsidiarity.

First, the grounding of the principle in an Aristotelian account of practical reason (henceforth,

the phronēsis grounding) in no way destroys the claim to autonomy of either individuals or groups.

Instead, this same autonomy is situated in a context which permits a raison d’être besides an appeal to

that autonomy itself. Autonomy is important, only now the reason for its importance is made explicit.

Second, this phronēsis grounding restores to subsidiarity the character of indicating when an exo-

level body may or may not intervene in the usual prerogative of a meso-level body. This grounding also

enables the principle to offer some guidance into how this intervention ought to take place when

necessary. Under this reading, the principle of subsidiarity is no longer a principle merely for justifying

intervention. It also becomes a principle that guides how such an intervention ought to transpire. With the

emphasis on particulars, and especially of particular instances, this grounding establishes that the exo-

19

level body ought not to simply take control of the situation in a way that practically abolishes the meso-

level body during its intervention. The exo-level body, instead, must work in collaboration with the

meso-level body. This collaborative effort ought not to be as the relation of a superior to an inferior, but

as being disposed to the meso-level body as a worthy contributor to the dialogue of how to find a

solution. The second benefit, then, is its ability to guide a complete process of subsidiarity, not simply to

dictate when it is, in fact, the exo-level body’s competency to aid the meso-level. This is so precisely

because the meso-level body still has a privileged position regarding the particulars of the situation as

well as the memory and narrative of the community, even if, for whatever reason, that meso-level body is

rendered incapable of serving in its normal role for a time.

The British economist E.F. Schumacher, author of the influential book Small is Beautiful, has

stated that the principle of subsidiarity has a dual function: first, as an organizational principle, and

second as a norm of social and economic justice.47 On Delsol’s Aristotelian account, this dual

functionality remains something extrinsic to the idea of subsidiarity. Conversely, grounding the principle

in an Aristotelian account of right practical reasoning means that Schumacher’s dual functionality is seen

as a function of the form (already a more Aristotelian thought). For if the principle of subsidiarity is an

organizational principle, then it essentially means that the ruler must be a prudent ruler, a person (or a

body politic) of right practical reasoning with attention to the particularities of the organization. If the

principle is to be a norm of social and economic justice, this entails determining what is due to another in

each particular situation. If one accepts Schumacher’s dual functionality as a functionality of right

practical reasoning, then that dual functionality is seen as something intrinsic to the principle itself.

Not only is the functionality seen as part and parcel of subsidiarity, but a reciprocal rapport

between these two functionalities is highlighted. The organizational function aims at the common good

and, therefore, requires the normative function as a necessary condition to bring about that common

good. Conversely, the organizational function is seen as one part of what it means to render to another

20

what is due. Thus, it is futile to debate whether subsidiarity is a matter of civic prudence or a matter of

distributive and commutative justice: it is both, and its fate is caught up with the unity of the virtues.

Exposing this dual functionality as intrinsic to the form of subsidiarity is the third benefit of this

phronēsis grounding.

John J. Schrems notes that the principle has a dual tonality -- a negative tone where emphasis is

laid on the rights of the meso-level body not to be intruded upon by an exo-level body, and a positive

tone where emphasis is laid on the importance of participation. He bemoans the fact that the more

positive tone is often drowned out.48 The Aristotelian phronēsis grounding restores that more positive

tone insofar as it points to the positive purpose of greater and more effective participation in the civic

community. By highlighting the link between the principles of subsidiarity and participation, the

phronēsis grounding avoids reducing the principle to rights talk, or worse yet, to rights insufficiently

ordered to their proper telos, the human good.

This last point brings out another. The phronēsis grounding restores what Delsol’s suggested

grounding lacks: a reference to the good, and more specifically a reference to the human good. While

Delsol’s Aristotelian grounding secures that which is due to some meso-level group, it gives that right no

reference to the good.49 By widening the principle’s Aristotelian grounding to include the account on

right practical reason, one not only recovers a sense of what one’s autonomy is for, but also underscores

the anthropological connection between subsidiarity and the human person. The principle can no longer

be misinterpreted as only a social principle, somehow disconnected from the person herself. It is a social

principle because it is a human principle.

6. Some Potential Objections to the Grounding in Practical Reasoning

If objections were to be raised to this proposition, what might they be? The first objection is one that we

raised in the fourth section. If perception of particulars were what an Aristotelian account of practical

21

reasoning demands, then why shouldn’t that perception be possessed just as adequately, if not even

better, by the exo-level body? This is especially poignant when the exo-level body has more governing

experience. Why should there exist a prejudice for the meso-level body’s perception of such particulars?

This point could only be addressed after we studied more in depth Aristotle’s account of both

particulars and perception. Regarding the particulars, the general prejudice for the meso-level body’s

perception of the particulars is justified by noting Irwin’s distinction between particular types and

particular instances. While it is possible that an exo-level body possesses a firmer grasp of particular

types, the judgment of particular instances generally falls outside its purview. The Food and Drug

Administration can tell us that chicken (as a type) is healthy meat. But it falls outside the purview of this

government body to indicate whether what is on my countertop is chicken or not.

Concerning perception, the general prejudice for the meso-level body’s perception is justified

when we understand the constitutive role (on Nussbaum’s reading) or the strong role (on the

intellectualist reading) played by imagination and emotion on perception. Deliberative perception

without these facets would be another form of perception. It was argued above that for affective reasons

too the principle was justified in preferring the meso-level’s affectivity in perception. Nevertheless, as

represented by the principle of subsidiarity itself, at times this same affectivity can become an obstacle to

correct perception. When it does, there is need of aid from the exo-level body.

Besides the textual arguments, does not conceiving of the principle as based on Aristotle’s

account of practical reasoning risk missing the question of subsidiarity altogether? That is, the crucial

question, for the principle of subsidiarity seems not to be the issue of what is correctly or incorrectly

understood about the particularities, but about what can or cannot be accomplished regarding those

particularities. The principle is primarily concerned with what the meso-level body can or cannot do. We

might dub this demurral the “missing the question” charge.

22

The objection brings to light an important distinction among competencies needed for action. In

order to respond to the objection, one might list such competencies and then see how well the proposed

account can satisfy each. In order to act, one needs to satisfy several kinds of competencies, both on the

part of cognition and on the part of execution to carry out one’s deliberate choice. On the part of

cognition, one must understand the practicalities and particularities of the given situation. This ought to

include not only an understanding of the current situation but also an understanding of the history or

narrative of the persons, peoples, and things involved. Coupled with this living memory of the past is the

importance of the ability to understand the overarching effects of potential action regarding these

particular persons, peoples, and things. As already noted, Aristotle’s view of phronēsis would remind us,

however, that it is not only about understanding particulars. The right practical reasoner will also possess

an understanding of the overarching principles involved.

Besides the requisite intellectual competencies, there exists an entire set of what might be called

volitional capacities. Among these one might recognize the ability to exercise authority over a specific

issue and to exercise authority over the entire scope of the issue. Both are necessary as it may happen that

while one can understand and exercise authority over a specific issue, that same leader may not be able to

take into hand all of those directly whose suffer the impact of any such decision.

If the above is a modest beginning towards a list of requisite competencies, then it seems that a

principle of subsidiarity built on Aristotle’s conception of practical wisdom is, in fact, not missing the

question at all. Insofar as there are cognitional demands made upon the leader, the phronēsis grounding

seems to all the more require a sturdy understanding of the importance of practical reasoning. Indeed,

even to correctly measure up one’s abilities, either cognitive or volitional, to adequately respond to any

given situation seems to presuppose even a more basic act of practical reasoning. This later act would be

more basic in so far as it demands not only correct cognitive awareness of the particularities of the

situation, but correct cognitive self-awareness as a potentially successful leader in such a situation.

23

Practical reasoning itself may not directly answer whether some meso-level body is a competent guide in

a given situation, but it does indirectly address those concerns. Therefore, to argue, as the objection does,

that the principle is more about volitional capacities than cognitive capacities is to fail to recognize the

importance of cognitive capacities in the principle itself as well as to take adequate account of how

leaders evaluate their own volitional capacities in any given situation. At best, the objection is blind, at

worst homunculan.

The last few objections that might be presented to the phronēsis grounding all have a similar line

of thought: Does this philosophical grounding of the principle of subsidiarity prove too much? One such

argument could contend that the proposed Aristotelian foundation for the principle would simultaneously

eliminate the meso-level body’s ability freely to surrender its autonomy to an exo-level body of

government for some social advantage or greater good.

Yet, by moving the Aristotelian philosophical foundation for the principle to the notion of the

centrality of practical reason, one has done nothing to disrupt the necessity of a group’s autonomy or

liberty. It is hard to see how the two groundings would necessarily be in competition. The phronēsis

grounding only gives a further reason to support the necessity of legitimate group autonomy. Thus, it is

completely understandable that some meso-level body of governance would, upon recognizing the

situation at hand, rationally surrender its autonomy for some greater good. In fact, the appeal to practical

reason only highlights that capacity by which one might come to such a conclusion, namely, practical

reason itself.

Moreover, the proposed grounding would also demonstrate the logic of the proxy. In light of

Aristotelian practical reasoning, the proxy is no longer seen as one who simply has the legal right to

speak on behalf of the principal when the principal has lost her autonomy. On the proposed account, the

proxy is someone assigned to that role precisely because the once-autonomous principal recognized the

proxy to both understand her interests and to be disposed to act in accordance with those interests. As a

24

further demonstration of my thesis, notice that a proxy’s benevolence to act in accord with the principal’s

interests is not sufficient to constitute a good proxy. The good proxy must also be thought to be, among

other things, a good practical reasoner. The good proxy must not be able to merely wish with the

principal, but also to think with the principal.

A last objection might also argue the phronēsis grounding of the principle would prove too much

by isolating the meso-level body from any intervention of an exo-level, even those where the situation

requires it. The phronēsis grounding, so reasons this final objection, would characterize subsidiarity in

such a way that it could only act as a decentralizing principle of social organization and never as a

principle that expresses reciprocity between exo-level and meso-level bodies of government.

It does not follow from locating the principle’s authentic grounding in practical reasoning that an

exo-level body cannot intervene when either unsolicited or solicited by the meso-level body.

Nevertheless, the phronēsis foundation would stipulate how an exo-level body ought to proceed when

intervening. The exo-level body ought to act, in a sense, as judge and not only as lawgiver. This is the

case because the judge is one who applies the law with attention to the particular circumstances, and not

in reference to the whole. The phronēsis grounding of the principle does not mean changing the notion of

subsidiarity into merely a decentralizing social principle. It does, however, mean recognizing that there

are norms guiding the relationship during that intervention.

7. Conclusion.

I have sought to indicate how the principle of subsidiarity can be given too limited a philosophical

support when one remains content with Aristotle’s Politics. While authors like Delsol have done the

literature a great service regarding the historical development of the principle, there remain regrettable

omissions in a philosophical account derived from her reading of Aristotle. These omissions put the

authentic meaning of subsidiarity at risk. The justification problem that arises when one attempts to

25

ground subsidiarity on the basis of group (or personal) autonomy is evidence of this privation. This right

to autonomy is precisely what is denied when an exo-level body intervenes in the life of a meso-level

body. Liberty and autonomy are not absolute and few political philosophers would claim such.

Nevertheless, some scholars seem all too ready to accept the philosophical grounding of the principle

offered by a world overly engrossed with such concepts. Consequently, the ultimate justification of the

principle cannot be autonomy itself. If such a grounding is embraced, then one is bound to lose sight of

the raison d’être for the principle and ultimately risk giving complete sway to an interventionist form of

rule from the exo-level body. If we seek a philosophical grounding for the principle that will not cave in

under the weight of self-justification, the ultimate grounding must be concerned with human action

addressing the particular situation at hand so as to most thoroughly bring about the human good. Such a

grounding is uniquely worked out in an Aristotelian account of right practical reason. “Hence, it seems

that treatment in particular cases is more exactly right when each person gets special attention, since he

then more often gets the suitable treatment.”50

END NOTES

1 The Treaty of Maastricht (“Treaty on the European Union”) was drafted in December 1991 by the

European Community, signed on February 7, 1992, and came into effect on November 1, 1993. Although

amended by later treaties of Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003), and most recently Lisbon (2009), the

Maastricht Treaty, together with the Rome Treaty (1958), forms one of the founding documents of the

European Union. 2 Cf. N. W. Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity,” European Law Journal 11 (2005): 308-25. 3 Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., “The Use of Philosophical Principles in Catholic Social Teaching: The Case

of Gaudium et Spes,” Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 45 (2007): 277-92. 4 Ibid., p. 280. 5 Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and

Public Rationality” in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York NY: Oxford

Univ. Press, 1990), p. 70; originally published in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient

Philosophy 2 (1986): 151-201.

26

6 Ibid., p. 55. 7 See Ken Endo, “The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors,” Hokkaido

Law Review 44 (1994): 652-53. See also Domenec Mele, “Exploring the Principle of Subsidiarity in

Organizational Forms,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005): 293-305; Alexandra Ionescu, Le Bien

commun et ses doubles: Deux rencontres roumaines entre morale et politique (Bucharest: Editura

Universitătii din Bucuresti, 2001); Julien Barroche, Etat, libéralisme et christianisme (Paris: Dalloz,

2012), wherein Barroche argues that the popular appeal to history regarding the principle of subsidiarity

is misplaced and unhelpful. 8 Paolo G. Carozza writes, “Chantal Delsol, whose study of subsidiarity is one of the most

comprehensive available and one of the first standard sources for any study of the concept, traces its

origins as far back as classical Greece.” See Paolo G. Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of

International Human Rights Law,” The American Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 38-79 at pp.

40-41. 9 Chantal Delsol, L’État subsidiaire: ingérence et non-ingérence de l'État: le principe de subsidiarité aux

fondements de l'histoire européenne (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992). 10 Chantal Delsol, Le principe de subsidiarité (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1993). 11 Of those authors who do cite sources for this claim I have found no other source than Delsol’s works

cited above. Cf. Endo, “The Principle of Subsidiarity,” pp. 632, 646. Mele, “Exploring the Principle of

Subsidiarity,” p. 301. While Mele does not directly cite Delsol, he embraces all the same ideas even

anchored in the Politics in an earlier version of the paper. 12 See Delsol, L’État subsidiaire, pp. 15-16; Le principe de subsidiarité, pp. 9-10. 13 Aristotle, Politics I.2.1225b10-19. 14 Aristotle, Politics I.2.1225b27-1253a3. 15 “[L]es tâches des différents groupes ne se recoupent pas: elles se superposent. Chaque groupe travaille

à répondre aux besoins insatisfaits de la sphère immédiatement inférieure en importance.” Delsol, L’État

subsidiaire, p. 16; see pp. 20-22; see also Le principe de subsidiarité, p. 11. 16 Delsol’s work in L’État subsidiaire at this point is mainly historical. She argues that the human person,

freedom, private property, participation, usefulness, and power were all facets of life that should be

understood inside the proper context of the community, rather than from the Lockean point of view of

radical individualism. Aristotle is not so much the inspiration of her insights, but more the mouthpiece by

which her points are justified. She also employs Homer, Greek and Roman history, and notions taken

from rival conceptions like Plato and Xenophon. Delsol, L’État subsidiaire, pp. 20-26. 17 “[C]elui-ci gouverne non parce qu’il détient la force, non parce qu’il représente la divinité, mais parce

que nous avons besoin de son autorité, et dans la mesure où nous en avons besoin. Nul doute que nous

pouvons repérer ici la racine du principe de subsidiarité: l'idée de non-ingérence signifie une ingérence

limitée à l'utilité circonscrite par les insuffisances sociales.” Delsol, L’État subsidiaire, p. 24.

27

18 Delsol, L’État subsidiaire, p. 55; Le principe de subsidiarité, p. 13. 19 Delsol, L’État subsidiaire, p. 55; Le principe de subsidiarité, p. 13. 20 “La nécessité de préserver ces autonomies, même restreintes, trouve sa justification dans un

irrépressible besoin de liberté.... Mais le caractère impérieux de ce besoin ne trouve pas encore

d’explication. Pourquoi les hommes sont-ils ainsi faits qu’ils n’admettent pas le pouvoir despotique? ...

Aristote a posé la question, et y répond....: les Hellènes sont libres de nature.... L’argument de la ‘nature’

permet le repos de la pensée, et met fin aux interrogations successives, même s’il propose un

aboutissement peu satisfaisant.” Delsol, L’État subsidiaire, p. 35. 21 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.33.89a2-3; Nicomachean Ethics VI.5.1140b26-30. Or, in the words

of Martha Nussbaum, “It is not just that ethics has not yet attained the precision of science; it should not

even try for such precision.” Nussbaum, p. 70. 22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.8.1142a20-23. Unless otherwise indicated, all English quotations of

the Nicomachean Ethics are taken from David Reeve, Aristotle on Practical Wisdom: Nicomachean

Ethics VI (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2013). 23 On this question, see also John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Indianapolis IN:

Hackett, 1975): pp. 33-41; David Reeve, Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford

UK: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 69. 24 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.7.1141b15-21. 25 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.8.1142a22-25. 26 Here Irwin is commenting on 1141a15-23 in Aristotle’s text, but he justifies this dual inclusion of both

types and instances by looking at Aristotle’s own examples of particular types at 1141b15 and his

examples of particular instances at 1142a22-25. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated with

introduction, notes, and glossary by Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1999), p. 245. 27 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.8.1142a12-19. 28 Wiggins cites simply from Nicomachean Ethics III.1111b26, 1112b11-12, 1112b34-35, 1113a14-15,

and 1113b3-4. 29 Cf. David Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” Proceedings from the Aristotelian Society 76

(1976): 29-51. 30 For a history of the debate and his own thesis, see also the influential article by D. J. Allan,

“Aristotle’s Account of the Origins of Moral Principles,” Actes du Xie Congrès International de

Philosophie 12 (1953): 120-27; reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2: Ethics and Politics, ed. Jonathan

Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, Richard Sorabji (London UK: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 72-78. Allan discerns a

distinction between knowing what the end is and what qualities make it the end (a part of practical

reason’s task) and posting the end (something belonging only to desire).

28

31 Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical Critical Study, vol. 1: From Socrates to the

Reformation (New York NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 171-72. See especially p. 171 n42 for

further references to the discussion. For further discussion of the composite view, see J. L. Acrill,

“Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” Proceedings of the British Academy 60 (1974): 339-59; reprinted in Essays

on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Los Angeles CA: University of California Press,

1980), pp. 15-34. 32 Reeve enlarges the list of things about which one might meaningfully deliberate when he lists, like

Wiggins and Irwin, not only ends that are constitutive of final ends but also instrumental means and

relative ends where that last phrase is taken to indicate ends that are ends but need not be ultimate ends.

This leaves, according to Reeve, only two things outside the scope of Aristotelian deliberation: the final

end in an unqualified sense as well as the end set by any craft when the agent is acting as a craftsman of

that craft. Here the craft sets the end by its essence. See David Reeve, “Aristotle’s Virtues of Thought” in

The Blackwell’s Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Malden MA: Blackwell,

2006), pp. 198-217. 33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.10.1143a8-9; VII.9.1152a8-9. See Reeve, “Virtues of Thought,” p.

203. 34 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.9.1109b22-23; III.3.1112b34-1113a2; IV.5.1126b3-4; VI.8.1142a23-

30; VI.11.1143a32-b6; VII.3.1147a25-6; X.9.1180b7-13. 35 Reeve, “Virtues of Thought”, p. 208: “With practical perception, then, we come to the very heart of

deliberation. But what exactly is it?” 36 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.8.1142a23-30. 37 Cf. The acclaimed work of George Peter Klubertanz, S.J., as he traced developments in this

psychological question from Aristotle’s corpus to the medieval view of the vis cogitiva or discursive

power. George Peter Kubertanz, S.J., Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa

according to St. Thomas Aquinas (St. Louis MO: The Modern Schoolman, 1952). Klubertanz argues that

this issue is not fully formulated in Aristotle, but that there is room for the development that eventually

became the medieval discursive power of the sensitive part in contact with the rational part. Thus,

Klubertanz does not see the Aristotelian psychology perhaps as fully worked out as Nussbaum.

Nevertheless, for Aristotelian-minded commentators like Aquinas, what became the discursive power

was part of the sensible soul. Klubertanz emphasizes the critical connection that it holds with the rational

soul in Aquinas’s account as being that quality that differentiates it from the “estimative power” that non-

rational animals possess. Thus, standing behind Nussbaum’s interpretation is a larger body of medievals

who arrived at the same conclusion through examining and reflecting on centuries of Aristotelian

commentaries. 38 The difference in interpretation is the question of how constitutive these faculties of the soul are for

deliberative perception. See Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” p. 77. See also Reeve,

Practices of Reason, pp. 67-73.

29

39 Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’s Explanation of Action” in Aristotle’s De

Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays (Princeton NJ: Princeton

Univ. Press, 1978), p. 259. 40 Ibid. 41 Reeve, “Virtues of Thought”, 208-09: “However, the relevant sort of perception is not perception of

colors, shapes, or sounds (special objects). That is not, as we would say, theory-laden enough. Instead, it

is the desire-infused perception, appropriate to the sphere of luck, which the virtues of character make

correct.” See too his Practices of Reason, pp. 70-72 where he gives a greater role to the emotions in

bringing something to the attention of reason. Still this is not as an emotionally imbued a notion as

Nussbaum’s. 42 Cf. Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy

(1976): 453-66; “Emotional Identification, Closeness, and Size: Some Contributions to Virtue Ethics” in

Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel Statman (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1997),

pp. 118-27; “How Emotions Reveal Value and Help Cure the Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”

in How Should One Live: Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford UK: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998),

pp. 173-90. 43 Cf. Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” pp. 78-79. Such insight is reminiscent of

Wittgenstein’s own adage, “Don’t think, but look!” in his Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans.

Elizabeth Anscombe (Oxford UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986) §66. 44 Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” p. 79. 45 Reeve, “Practices of Reason,” p. 71. 46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.12.1144a35: “And this [best good] is apparent only to the good

person; for vice perverts us and produces false views about the principles of actions. Evidently, then, we

cannot be prudent without being good.” For contemporary scholarship that challenges the standard notion

of the “moral” altogether, see G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 1-

19; Bernard Williams, “Morality, a Peculiar Institution” in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy

(Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 174-96. 47 Ernest Friedrich Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered, 2nd ed. (New

York NY: Harper Perennial, 1989), pp. 260-61. 48 Delsol notes the same dynamic of the principle of subsidiarity and sees it mirrored in Aristotle’s notion

of sufficiency and insufficieny. Cf. Delsol, L’État Subsidiaire, p. 16. 49 Cf. Arthur-Fridolin Utz, Sozialethik: Teil 1, Die Prinzipien der Gesellschaftslehre, vol. 10 of

Sammlung Politeia, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1964), pp. 286-88. 50 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.9.1180b13-14 (Irwin’s translation). Cf. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics,

p. 169.