An Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean in the Mencius?

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DaoA Journal of Comparative Philosophy ISSN 1540-3009Volume 11Number 1 Dao (2012) 11:53-62DOI 10.1007/s11712-011-9257-7

An Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean in theMencius?

Howard J. Curzer

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An Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean in the Mencius?

Howard J. Curzer

Published online: 17 January 2012# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract Contrary to appearances, Mencius does not deploy anything like theAristotelian doctrine of the mean to describe Boyi, YI Yin, and LIU Xiahui. WhileConfucius’ actions are intermediate between the actions of these three sages, thesages’ character traits do not bracket Confucius’ character traits. Instead, the failingsof the three sages are skew to each other. Boyi lacks righteousness; YI Yin lacksbenevolence; and LIU Xiahui lacks wisdom. The comparison of the sages centers onthe question of when to resign an advisory position. According to Mencius, oneshould resign only if one’s advice will not be heeded, or if declining to resign wouldsomehow lead to wrongdoing. Associating with wrongdoers and benefiting from thewrongdoing of others might lead to wrongdoing. Wrong motives might distort one’sadvice. Insults from the advisee might be evidence of the futility of giving advice. Butin themselves, fastidiousness, non-benevolent motives, and mistreatment by theadvisee are not legitimate reasons to resign.

Keywords Mencius . Doctrine of the mean . Virtues . Three sages . Resigning

Finding parallels between the Confucian tradition and Aristotelian virtue ethics iscurrently fashionable (Sim 2007, Van Norden 2007, Yu 2007). But one must becautious. Mencius appears to deploy an Aristotelian doctrine of the mean in hisdescriptions of three sages. Mencius describes their character traits by contrastingtheir attitudes about when to resign (or decline to accept) advisory positions to rulerswith the attitude of Confucius. Confucius’ attitude is moderate and correct, but Boyi伯夷, YI Yin 伊尹, and LIU Xiahui 柳下惠 seem to have extreme attitudes bracketing thevirtue of Confucius by vices of deficiency and excess. However, I shall argue that Menciusdoes not deploy anything like Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean in his discussion of the threesages (although he does not explicitly reject Aristotle’s doctrine, either). I begin with a fewpreliminary remarks about resignation, then sketch the attitudes of the three sages, and

Dao (2012) 11:53–62DOI 10.1007/s11712-011-9257-7

Howard J. Curzer (*)Philosophy Department, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409-3092, USAe-mail: [email protected]

Author's personal copy

finally argue that the resemblance to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is only superficial. Afringe benefit of my investigation is that it will clarify Mencius’ views about whenadvisors should resign, an important issue in its own right. As an expert on advisors,Mencius may have some good advice for us.

1 Preliminaries

In government, in business, in academia, and elsewhere people wonder whether toretain advisory positions or to resign them. I suspect that many people today haverather vague ideas about such decisions. They have an inchoate sense that one hassome sort of responsibility to accept an offer to serve in an advisory capacity to agovernor, a CEO, a dean, etc., but that one also has a duty to resign an advisoryposition under certain circumstances. The question of when to resign such a positionwas important in the ancient world too. When he explicitly takes up this question,Mencius lists two conditions under which a gentleman in antiquity would relinquishan advisory position: “[W]hen his advice was not put into practice [the gentleman]would leave…. [Similarly] he would leave when the courtesies are not meticulouslyobserved” (Mencius 6B14).1 An advisor whose advice is not taken is wasting histime.2 So the first reason for resigning is futility. Wounded dignity seems to beMencius’ second reason for resigning, but I shall argue for an alternativeinterpretation.

Mencius emphasizes the second reason by reporting that he, himself, resignedfrom the service of the king merely because the king sent for him rather than going tosee him (Mencius 2B2). Now this touchiness seems initially puzzling. Advisors are ina position to influence policy and thus improve the lives of many. Why shouldn’tMencius be willing to undergo significant degradation in order to help others?Presumably, one should risk and suffer much in order to help others (Mencius 4B7,3A5). But if so, why shouldn’t one risk and suffer the loss of respect? Part of theanswer is that Mencius values respect very highly. He thinks that beggars can bechoosers: they can choose death over disrespect (Mencius 6A10). But that cannot bethe whole story, for surely Mencius values benevolence to others over respect tooneself. Shun, for example, endures disrespect and worse from his parents out ofbenevolence.

I suggest that Mencius is not endorsing touchiness but rather wisdom. He thinksthat one cannot be an effective advisor when one’s advice is rejected. He also thinksthat rulers who insult their advisors will not take advice from their advisors. Thus,remaining an advisor to such a ruler is futile. Wise people know that advice is futilewhen rulers are disrespectful, so they resign such advisory positions. As Menciussays, “I have heard that one who holds an office will resign it if he is unable todischarge his duties, and one whose responsibility is to give advice will resign if he is

1 In Mencius 6B14, Mencius also mentions that a gentleman who no longer needs a problematic positionwould resign, but such a position presumably would not have been an advisory position. See Mencius 5B4and 5B5.2 Actually, this is hardly obvious. As a member of an advisory team, a person may be designated as anadvocate for a certain point of view. The decision maker may value an understanding of this perspective forvarious reasons, yet not act upon it.

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unable to give it” (Mencius 2B5). Mencius explains why impropriety is cause forresignation by describing an incident in Confucius’ life:

Confucius was the police commissioner of Lu, but his advice was not followed.He took part in a sacrifice, but, afterwards, was not given a share of the meat ofthe sacrificial animal. He left the state without waiting to take off his ceremonialcap. Those who did not understand him thought he acted in this way because ofthe meat, but those who understood him realized that he left because Lu failedto observe the proper rites. (Mencius 6B6)

When Confucius was insulted, he resigned his position. Those who did not under-stand him thought that Confucius resigned because he was insulted, but actually heresigned because he recognized that continued advice would be futile. Thus, thesecond reason for resigning is not wounded dignity, but rather futility. It is the sameas the first reason.3

2 The Three Sages

Mencius also systematically takes up the question of when to resign in severalpassages which describe the behavior and motivation of the three sages (Mencius2A2, 2A9, 5B1, 5A6, 5A7, 6B6, 7A31, 7B15). Mencius begins with the obviouspoint that the sages are not mercenary wrongdoers: “Had it been necessary toperpetrate one wrongful deed or to kill one innocent man in order to gain the Empire,none of them would have consented to it” (Mencius 2A2). Presumably, if retainingthe position of advisor to a ruler would require wrongdoing, then they would resign.Thus, a good reason to resign is to avoid wrongdoing.4 Beyond this point, however,things get complicated.

Boyi expresses extreme intentions. He is willing to serve only when the ruler andthe people are virtuous, and the government is working well:

Boyi would neither look at improper sights with his eyes nor listen to impropersounds with his ears. He would only serve the right prince and rule over theright people. He would take office when order prevailed, and relinquish it whenthere was disorder. He could not bear to remain in a place where the govern-ment took outrageous measures and unruly people were to be found. To be incompany with a fellow-villager was, for him, just like sitting in mud or pitchwhile wearing a court cap and gown. (Mencius 5B1)

The first sentence in this passage explains the rest. Boyi is unwilling to serve in animperfect regime because he is unwilling to associate with people who act wrongly. IfBoyi was merely worried that by associating with corrupt people or regimes he,himself, would somehow be led to act wrongly, his worry would be completelylegitimate. Sages are not wrongdoers, as we have just seen. However, wrongdoing is

3 Another good reason for resigning an advisory position is the discovery that someone who would make amuch better advisor is waiting in the wings, ready and willing to take over the job. Mencius says nothingabout this reason, perhaps because it is too straightforward to bother about. I too shall not discuss it.4 This does not rule out dirty hands acts but only self-interested, immoral acts.

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tricky. Accomplices as well as instigators are wrongdoers. Moreover, when someoneperforms a wrong act, associates can easily be sucked into related wrongdoing even ifthey do not participate in the initial wrong act. It would be wrong to endorse wrongacts, for example, so advisors should sometimes resign in protest rather than lendcredibility to corrupt, incorrigible regimes. Moreover, it would be wrong to decline toprevent wrong acts, so advisors should resign when doing so might deter or mitigate aterrible act (and other, less drastic measures such as remonstration have or wouldfail).5 But Boyi’s reaction to commoners shows that he is not just worried aboutparticipating in, endorsing, or tolerating wrongdoing. He is also motivated by fastid-iousness. That is, he is worried about merely associating with or benefiting fromwrongdoers. He fears that he will incur some pollution from the wrongdoing, even ifhe himself does nothing wrong.6

YI Yin expresses intentions that are equally extreme, yet opposite to Boyi’s. He isindiscriminate, willing to serve any ruler of any people under any circumstances. Henever resigns advisory positions except when remaining would require wrongdoing.

YI Yin said, “I serve any prince; I rule over any people. I take office whetherorder prevails or not…. Heaven has given … to those who are the first toawaken the duty of awakening those who are slow to awaken. I am amongst thefirst of Heaven’s people to awaken. I shall awaken this people by means of thisway.” When he saw a common man or woman who did not enjoy the benefit ofthe rule of Yao and Shun, YI Yin felt as if he had pushed him or her into thegutter. This is the extent to which he considered the Empire his responsibility.(Mencius 5B1)

The first sentence in this passage is explained by the rest. YI Yin is willing to serveany ruler because, as one of the rare people with understanding, he feels responsiblefor all of the ills produced by imperfect government. YI Yin’s reaction to commonersshows him to be motivated by guilt. His encounters with commoners prompt episodesof self-criticism.

LIU Xiahui expresses the same extreme intentions as YI Yin, but his motive israther different.

LIU Xiahui was not ashamed of a prince with a tarnished reputation, neither washe disdainful of a modest post…. When he was passed over he harbored nogrudge…. When he was with a fellow-villager he simply could not tear himself

5 Arguably, such situations are vanishingly rare. It is not unreasonable for Mencius to ignore them.6 Benefiting from the wrongdoing of others often also involves participating in, endorsing, or toleratingwrong acts, so it is often conflated with them. Perhaps this is why some people think that benefiting fromthe wrongdoing of others is wrong. Yet boycotts show the difference. It makes sense to boycott products ofexploitation when buying these products would constitute participating in, endorsing, or tolerating a wrongact. But a great many great things have come into being through grossly immoral acts. Yet common sensedoes not shy away from using and enjoying these things if the exploitation took place so long ago that usingthese products would not constitute participating in, endorsing, or tolerating a wrong act. For example,although the railroads in the USA were largely built by exploited Chinese laborers, no one boycotts therailroads for that reason. Consequentialism arguably agrees. After all, as long as the benefit is clearlyseparated from wrongdoing, it is just a benefit. Even Kantian deontology arguably agrees. Merely acceptingthe benefits of someone else’s immoral act does not violate anyone’s autonomy and is perfectly universal-izable. There is nothing contradictory or self-defeating about a world in which anyone may accept suchbenefits.

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away. “You are you, and I am I. Even if you were to be stark naked by my sidehow could you defile me?” (Mencius 5B1)

Mencius does not state LIU Xiahui’s motive; presumably it is benevolence. WhatMencius does say is that he lacks two common barriers to benevolence. First, he isnot offended by anything, not even by being inappropriately passed-over for promo-tion. Second, his reaction to commoners shows that LIU Xiahui is not afraid of anysort of guilt-by-association.

All three sages are contrasted with each other and with Confucius.7 Confucius iswilling to serve neither almost-never nor almost-always; rather, he is willing to servesome of the time: “Confucius was such that he would take office, or would remain ina state, would delay his departure or hasten it, all according to circumstances”(Mencius 2A2). None of the three sages is the equal of Confucius (Mencius 2A2).Presumably, at least part of the reason is their respective stances toward advisorypositions.8

3 Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean?

Confucius’ actions are clearly in a mean between the acts of the other three sages.Boyi refrains from too many acts. He refrains not only from acts which would beshameful, such as cooperating with (and thus lending prestige to) incorrigible,immoral regimes, but also from morally required acts such as striving to improveimperfect, but improvable regimes. YI Yin and LIU Xiahui refrain from too few acts.They are willing to cooperate with all regimes, including incorrigibly immoral ones.Mencius contrasts the behavior of two of these three sages toward resignations andtoward commoners: “Boyi was too straight-laced; LIU Xiahui was not dignifiedenough. A gentleman would follow neither extreme” (Mencius 2A9).

Mencius seems to be deploying something like Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean.But a state of character is not merely a disposition to behave in certain ways; it is alsoa disposition to feel in certain ways.9 Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean says not onlythat virtuous actions are medial, but also that virtuous passions are medial. When heclaims that each virtue is bracketed by two vices, part of what Aristotle means is that a

7 By “Confucius” I mean the character described in theMencius rather than, say, the historical Confucius orthe Confucius of the Analects.8 An interesting aspect of this comparison is that Boyi, YI Yin, and LIU Xiahui are both commended andcriticized for their stance toward service (Mencius 2A9, 5A7, 5B1, 6B6). One possibility is that these textsare simply inconsistent. But Mencius has good reason both to praise and to blame the three sages. On theone hand, Mencius considers all three to be sages. Indeed, they are not just generally worthy of emulation;the stance of each toward service, the very thing for which they are criticized, is an inspiration to otherpeople (Mencius 5B1, 7B15). Each has something admirable about his stance toward resigning. On theother hand, Mencius cannot easily reject the claim that their stances are blameworthy. Unlike Confucius,they are not “timely.” They do not take account of circumstances in their actions. They do not makeappropriate exceptions to their general principles. Rather than discarding either the praise or the criticism asa glitch in the text or the result of Mencius having a bad day, I attribute to Mencius the compound claim thateach of the three sages is both praiseworthy and blameworthy. Their stances toward service are both fineand vicious. I am not accusing Mencius of contradicting himself, but rather I am attributing to Mencius theview that the three sages are admirably immoral.9 A state of character also includes a disposition to perceive, judge, and reason in certain ways.



vicious person’s passions are extreme versions of a virtuous person’s passions.Rash, cowardly, and courageous people are distinguished not merely by the factthat they take too many, too few, and the right number of risks, but also by thefact that their motivating passions differ similarly. They fear too many, too few,and the right number of things. They fear too little, too much, and the rightamount. And so on.10

Now if Confucius’ acts flow from a virtue lying in a mean between the vices of theother three sages, then what is that virtue? Of the four cardinal Mencian virtues, theobvious candidate is righteousness or propriety (yi 義).11 Are the actions and passionsof Boyi overly righteous? Are YI Yin’s and LIU Xiahui’s actions and passions insuffi-ciently righteous?

For Mencius, the passion governed by righteousness is shame (xiu wu 羞惡). Therighteous person feels shame to the right degree, at the right times, about the right things, etc.Shame is complicated. For both Mencius and Aristotle, shame has a prospective sense aswell as a retrospective sense. Righteous people feel retrospective shame upon performingimmoral acts, and prospective shame at the thought of performing immoral acts. Retro-spective shame is a reaction to having lowered oneself in one’s own eyes, to believingoneself to have acted as an immoral person would act. We might call it guilt. Prospectiveshame is a negative reaction to imagining oneself acting as an immoral person would act.We might call it disdain. Mencius is also aware that people sometimes feel shame whendisgraceful things happen to them, but he deems this abuse shame to be inappropriate. Weshould feel shame only for our own past or future actions or omissions. Righteous peoplefeel shame only when they act shamefully, consider acting shamefully, or allow them-selves to be shamefully treated (Mencius 6A10) (Shun 1997: 56-63; Van Norden 2007:257-270). Thus, Mencius treats abuse shame as a special case of retrospective shame.

In order to attribute the doctrine of the mean to Mencius, one must maintain thatConfucius’ decisions are motivated by intermediate levels of prospective shame.However, we are not told that Confucius’ feelings toward resigning lie betweenexcessive and deficient shame, but only that he is “timely.” Confucius is sensitiveto the relevant nuances within each situation, but the character trait that reliably leadshim to resign rightly remains unspecified.

This omission is troubling, but the positive evidence against attribution is damn-ing. In order to attribute Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean to Mencius, one must forcethe character flaws of the three sages into the Mencian righteousness category, butthis yields confusion rather than clarification. Boyi feels shame about too manythings. In particular, he feels prospective shame about associating with imperfectpeople, and this leads him to reject advisory positions that he should accept. YI Yinalso feels ashamed of too many things. In particular, he feels retrospective shameabout things that were not his fault, and this leads him to retain advisory positions thathe should resign. So while Boyi’s excessive shame leads to excessive resignation, YI

Yin’s excessive shame leads to insufficient resignation. Disaster! Now unlike Boyi

10 And/or they are deficient, excessive, or appropriate with respect to confidence.11 Shun characterizes the difference between Confucius and the other three sages in terms of wisdom (zhi 智).He observes that Confucius’ timeliness expresses the virtue of wisdom, but the three sages lack timeliness,and thus wisdom. I agree with Shun that the three sages have false beliefs, but I think that his account isincomplete. The motivational differences among the sages are passional as well as intellectual (Shun 1997:66-69).

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and YI Yin, LIU Xiahui feels shame at too few things. In particular, he feels no abuseshame at being insulted by the rulers he serves, and this leads him to retain advisorypositions that he should resign. However, while YI Yin and LIU Xiahui end up withthe same insufficient resignations, YI Yin’s resignations are motivated by excessiveshame while LIU Xiahui’s resignations are motivated by insufficient shame. Anotherdisaster!

What has gone wrong? Let us examine the three sages more closely. Boyi avoidsassociating with, and benefiting fromwrongdoers. Now LIU Xiahui is absolutely right tosay that a person cannot be defiled just by associating with someone, no matter how evilthe other is. Unlike chicken pox, vice is not catching. True, a bad person can graduallyerode the character of another if they spend a lot of time together. But that is hardlyinevitable, and anyway it is very different from tainting another by mere proximity.

So much for association with wrongdoers; what of benefiting from wrongdoing?Mencius explicitly addresses the question of whether a person who merely benefitsfrom some wrongdoing is therefore complicit in that wrongdoing: “When a superiorhonors one with a gift, to accept it only after one has asked the question, ‘Did he ordid he not come by it through moral means?’ is to show a lack of respect. This is whyone does not refuse” (Mencius 5B4).12 Indeed, Mencius mocks the very idea that oneshould refuse to benefit from wrongdoing.

Chung-tzu…considered his brother’s income ill-gotten and refused to benefitfrom it.… [When he discovered that he had eaten a goose provided by hisbrother] he went out and vomited it all out.… Did he think that he hadsucceeded in pushing his principle to the utmost limits? Forced to the utmostlimits, his way of life would only be possible if he were an earthworm.(Mencius 3B10)13

Even the draconian measures of Chung-tzu fail to inoculate him against benefitingfrom the wrongdoing of others. One could succeed in avoiding such benefits only byliving as an earthworm. Thus, the idea of trying to avoid benefiting from thewrongdoing of others is silly. Mencius’ argument might be phrased thus: Oughtimplies can. People cannot avoid benefiting from wrongdoing. Therefore, peoplehave no duty to try to avoid benefiting from wrongdoing (so long as benefiting doesnot also involve wrongdoing of some other sort such as endorsing or declining toprevent wrongdoing).

Thus, Boyi’s belief that proximity to or benefiting from immorality can pollute aperson is mistaken. His shame at such things is inappropriate. Boyi’s fastidiousness is

12 Mencius goes on to say that one should not knowingly accept stolen goods from a robber who tries tobefriend one, but the reason is that one should punish robbers rather than befriending and trying to reformthem. Mencius is not claiming that one should not knowingly accept stolen goods.13 Mencius does say that, “when an innocent Gentleman is put to death, a Counselor is justified in leaving”(Mencius 4B4). This could be read as implying that a person is justified in resigning from the position ofadvisor in order to avoid complicity in the death of an innocent Gentleman, but it need not be read this way.Presumably, the advisor would have advised the ruler not to execute the innocent Gentleman. If the ruler isthe sort of person who executes innocent people, even when advised not to do so, the advisor mightconclude that the ruler is beyond hope. Thus, the advisor’s reason for resigning might be that continuing toserve as an advisor to this ruler would be futile.



not a legitimate concern, but rather a moral purity fetish.14 He lacks righteousness. YI

Yin is indiscriminate about advisory positions because he feels great retrospectiveshame. He feels as if he has wronged every single person. But of course he has notpushed everyone, or even anyone, into the gutter. This raises an interesting question.Why is YI Yin so ashamed? If his character flaw was really a failure of righteousness,then he would be wrong about shame. He would be ashamed about too many things.But his error would be no minor miscalculation! He would be wildly wrong; his guiltwould be overwhelmingly inappropriate, for he is not even remotely responsible foreveryone’s problems. Such guilt would be a symptom of clinical, delusional depres-sion. However, the principle of charity urges us to avoid calling a sage crazy.

My alternative explanation is that YI Yin’s shame is a symptom of a differentcharacter flaw. Notice that when YI Yin thinks of commoner’s problems, he does notfeel pity or empathy for the commoner. He doesn’t think about the commoner at all.Instead, he thinks about himself. Thus, YI Yin is moved to serve as an advisor by thewrong passion. One should not serve as advisor to a ruler from a desire to compensatepeople for wrongdoing, even if one has done them wrong. For Mencius, the rightmotive for serving is not guilt, but love or care (ai 愛). Guilt is all about one’s need to makeup for one’s own failings, but even well-intentioned, self-focused advisors advise badly. Bycontrast, care’s object is satisfying the needs of others, and this is where an advisor’s focusshould be. Thus, I suggest that YI Yin’s flaw is not an excess of shame, but rather a deficiencyof care. He does not wrong each commoner, but rather he fails to care for each commoner.Recognizing this failure, he feels guilty. He is appropriately ashamed of his selfish failure tocare. Thus, YI Yin does not lack righteousness; he lacks benevolence.

LIU Xiahui is also indiscriminate, but why? If his flaw was a failure of righteous-ness, he would be erring with respect to shame. Now as I said earlier, there is nothingwrong with his willingness to fraternize with everyone. Does his error lie in histolerance of insult? He feels no abuse shame when passed over for promotion. Is thathis flaw? No, for people should not feel shame for what happens to them, but only forwhat they themselves choose. Shame is appropriate when people do wrong, but notwhen they are wronged. It is not LIU Xiahui’s fault that he is passed over, so he isright to feel no shame. Thus, his character flaw is not a lack of righteousness at all.

My alternative explanation is this. As I mentioned earlier, according toMencius, in anadvisory position one should not tolerate any insult because insults foreshadow failureas an advisor. Rulers will not take advice from people whom they do not respect wellenough to treat well. Thus, LIU Xiahui engages in a futile activity, namely the activityof advising rulers who will not take his advice. It is a lack of wisdom rather than alack of righteousness that leads LIU Xiahui to waste his talents.15

14 Less pejoratively, Boyi emphasizes the purity/sanctity module of morality (Haidt & Graham 2007: 105-106).15 Mencius says that the three sages have character flaws, but also that Boyi and LIU Xiahui serve as rolemodels (Mencius 5A1, 7B15). My account of the flaws of the three sages not only explains how flawedpeople can be role models; it also provides a neat account of the particular things that people learn fromBoyi and LIU Xiahui. From Boyi’s example, unperceptive people (like LIU Xiahui) become discrete, andweak people (like YI Yin?) become resolute. This makes sense because Boyi excels at perceivingwrongdoing and reacting to it even when doing so is costly. His flaw is unrelated to these excellences.From LIU Xiahui’s example, mean people (like YI Yin) become generous, and narrow-minded people (likeBoyi) become tolerant. This makes sense because LIU Xiahui excels at generosity and tolerance. His flaw isunrelated to these excellences.

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4 Conclusion

Mencius maintains that although Confucius’ actions with respect to advisory posi-tions are intermediate between the excessive actions of YI Yin and LIU Xiahui and thedeficient actions of Boyi, the passions of Confucius do not rest in a mean between thepassions of the three sages. Their passions do not differ by degree, but rather in kind.Unlike rashness, cowardice, and courage, fastidiousness, self-centeredness, and fool-ishness are not in the same category. Although the vices of the three sages initiallyseem to bracket the virtue of Confucius, the three vices are actually skew to eachother. Boyi lacks righteousness. He feels shame about too many things, and this leadshim to reject advisory positions that he should accept. YI Yin lacks benevolence. Heshould be motivated by love rather than shame. Benevolence would prompt him toresign positions in which he could help no one. Lacking this motive, he fails to resignsuch positions. Finally, LIU Xiahui lacks wisdom. He does not realize that rulers whoinsult their advisors are unlikely to accept advice from their advisors, and this leadshim to retain futile advisory positions.

Now Mencius is not explicitly rejecting Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. For all Ihave said, Mencius might believe that Confucius’ virtue of righteousness is in a meanbetween Boyi’s vice of fastidiousness at one extreme, and another extreme which isnot represented in the text; similarly for YI Yin and LIU Xiahui.16 My claim is thatMencius is not deploying the doctrine of the mean in his discussion of the three sages.Mencius could theoretically maintain that Boyi accepts too few positions from lack ofrighteousness; YI Yin accepts too many positions from lack of benevolence, and LIU

Xiahui accepts too many positions from lack of wisdom while also holding that eachvirtue has only one opposite. Although the discussion of the three sages does notpreclude the attribution of an Aristotelian doctrine of the mean to Mencius, it does notprovide any evidence for that attribution, either. One pillar that might seem to supportthe view that Mencius has an Aristotelian virtue ethics turns out to be cardboard.

By the way, what is Mencius’ advice about advisors? His criticism of Boyi showsthat Mencius does not believe that people should refrain from service merely becauseof a fear of guilt-by-association or benefit-from-wrongdoing. One should not resignout of fastidiousness at all. I think that Mencius is right about this. Everyonenowadays recognizes that there is no such thing as guilt-by-association. Peoplecannot be tainted by the proximity of a wrongdoer. Everyone should similarlyrecognize that people cannot be tainted by benefiting from another’s wrongdoing.His criticism of YI Yin shows that Mencius believes that people should not serve fromguilt, but rather from benevolence. I think that Mencius is wrong about this. Just asdoctors need not care about patients in order to be good doctors, so advisors need notcare about the people to be good advisors.17 Various different motives will leadadvisors to give good advice. Commitment to doing a good job, loyalty to a goodprinciple, and even desire for fame and money can produce excellent advising. Hiscriticism of LIU Xiahui shows that Mencius does not believe that people shouldremain in a position when insulted. I do not think that we in the modern world shouldagree with Mencius that just any insult from above indicates that a person cannot be

16 This possibility was suggested by a referee for Dao.17 Indeed, care may be an obstacle rather than a plus (Curzer 1993: 51-69).



effective in an advisory position. These days some people are both rude and open-minded toward their subordinates. But we should agree with Mencius’ general claimsthat (a) the way in which advisors are treated constitutes evidence about theirpotential effectiveness, and (b) advisors should resign if they cannot be effective.Insults are not reasons to resign in themselves, but they are reasons to resign insofaras they are harbingers of ineffectiveness.

Ultimately, Mencius offers a simple, plausible answer to the question of when toresign an advisory position. The sole legitimate reasons are futility and wrongdoing.According to Mencius, one should resign if one’s advice will not be taken or ifserving in the position would somehow lead one to act wrongly. Otherwise peopleshould retain advisory positions.

Acknowledgment I would like to thank S. Angle, H. Giebel, B. Huff, D. Mower, S. Rushing, A.Terjesen, and S. Walsh, for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

References

Curzer, Howard. 1993. “Is Care a Virtue for Health Care Professionals?” Journal of Medicine andPhilosophy 18: 51-69.

Haidt, Jonathan and Graham, Jesse. 2007. “When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives have MoralIntuitions that Liberals may not Recognize.” Social Justice Research 20: 98-116.

Mencius. 1970. trans. by D. C. Lau. Harmondsworth, New York: Penguin Books.Shun, Kwong-Loi. 1997. Mencius and Early Chinese Thought. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Sim, May. 2007. Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.Van Norden, Brian. 2007. Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Yu, Jiyuan. 2007. The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue. New York: Routledge.

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An Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean in the Mencius?

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