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DRAFT VERSION

Anti-American Feeling in Portugal during the Vietnam War

In the 1960s the United States and Portugal were both becoming mired in similar

foreign conflicts. Despite the similarity of the two wars, the Portuguese media was

allowed to cover the American conflict in Vietnam, while news about Portuguese Africa

was heavily regulated. This paper seeks to provide a view of Portuguese Anti-American

sentiments within the context of Portuguese-American relations during this time. Its

research is based on the analysis of historical documents relating to the United States’

foreign affairs, as well as translations of Portuguese newspaper archives.

The American-Vietnam War was a defining conflict of the Cold War. The United

States failed to halt the tide of communism, and in doing so lost the faith of its own

people, as well as that of many others across the world. At the time, Portugal was in the

last throes of a middling dictatorship, and a war of its own in Africa that bore striking

similarities to the American conflict. While official relations between the two countries

would remain relatively polite, progressive elements in each respective country attacked

the continuation of both wars. This paper seeks to provide an overview of

Portuguese-American relations during this time, based on the studies of contemporary

historians, as well as through the analysis of historical documents relating to the United

States’ foreign affairs. This paper also uses translations of articles appearing in

Portuguese media to illustrate Portuguese sentiment on the war in Vietnam.

Portugal and the United States

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Portugal under the Estado Novo often had combative relations with the

international community, usually over the issue of her African possessions. Technically,

the western democracies and Portugal were allies, through membership in NATO, in the

fight against communism. However, this had always been an uneasy alliance, driven by

expediency more than any actual relations of goodwill between the countries. World

War I had seen Portugal fight on the side of the Allied Powers, if only out of a fear of

losing her colonies if she stayed neutral. During World War II, despite Portugal being a

semi-fascist state, Salazar held a pragmatic course and kept Portugal neutral, and had

aligned himself with the victorious Western Allies by the war’s end. He ceded the

Americans a strategic military base in the Azores, which would become an important

bargaining chip in later years.

For many foreign observers, there was the sense that the Portuguese were

engaged in a futile struggle against the tide of history in their attempts to bring a

fifthteenth century empire through the twentieth century. The Portuguese, for their

part, vehemently believed that Westerners and the United Nations failed to understand

what was believed to be a unique relationship between Portugal and her colonies, as well

as how integral the idea of the Portuguese Empire was to Portuguese identity, and thus

were inherently biased in their arguments that favored self-determinism. Among the

Portuguese there historically had been the belief that the other Western powers were

somehow conspiring to deprive her of her colonies. In the twentieth century, as the old 1

european powers faded, this bugbear was replaced with the United Nations, with its bloc

1 William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Third Portuguese Empire: A Study in Economic Imperialism, 1825-197 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 140.

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of newly independent Afro-Asian countries, and the Soviet Union.

These opposing beliefs came to a head at several points during the lifespan of the

Estado Novo. Following the end of the war, relations between the United States and

Portugal were characterized by tensions over the status of the Portuguese African

possessions. United States President Kennedy, in his attempts to become the champion

of African nationalism, made it part of his official policy to press the self-determinist

message on the Portuguese. In the post-war world, the old European colonial powers 2

were clearly on the wane, and “international observers routinely denounced the

Portuguese presence in Africa.” However, the Americans, whatever anti-colonialist 3

credentials they might have gained, had always been marked by their hypocrisy in

action, supporting nationalist movements when it suited them, and at other times 4

sponsoring coups. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion, as an example, took place in 1961.

The colonies’ distances from Portugal always meant that there was large gap

between the beliefs that drove policy back in Lisbon, and the reality on the ground in

Africa. This was true for international observers as well, who between the reports of

their own correspondents, who were prone to exaggeration and hyperbole , and the 5

self-censoring reports of the Portuguese, did not have an accurate view of events as they

transpired. Unlike the later war in Vietnam, the conflict between the Portuguese and the

native Africans was not well televised. This would cultivate a culture of mistrust between

2“National Security Action Memorandum No. 60”, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963 VOLUME XIII, WESTERN EUROPE AND CANADA, DOCUMENT 327, From Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. Secret. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d327 3 Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1970). 243. 4 William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 94. 5 The Portuguese in particular mistrusted American news correspondents who they believed were the most prone to exaggeration.

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Portugal and their partners in the United Nations.

The year of 1961 was pivotal, and began with the circulation of rumors of the

massacres of thousands of Africans by the Portuguese. These rumors were certainly

exaggerated, but did nothing to help the Portuguese in the eyes of foreigners. The result

would be both the Soviet Union and the United States, in a surprising show of solidarity,

demanding an investigation by the United Nations. This failed, and the Portuguese 6

responded by allowing only one foreign correspondent entrance to Angola during the

mid-year. The resolution also provoked a wave of anti-Americanism, including a

demonstration of 15,000 to 20,000 outside the United States embassy. The same year, 7

the International Labor Organization of the U.N. began to investigate claims of forced

labor in Angola and Mozambique, which would document cases of abuses in certain

areas. These events would constitute a turning point in United States-Portuguese

relations, as the Portuguese government had lost faith in the United Nations as an

institution, and were frustrated by the American failure to recognize that African

self-determinism was equated with the spread of communism, and their belief that if

Portugal lost its colonies it would be “succeeded by a Castro-like government.” To the 8

Portuguese it seemed that the United States was drifting to the side of the Soviets and

Afro-Asian bloc. This drop-off in relations came at an inopportune time for the United

6 Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, 223. 7 “Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State”, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963 VOLUME XIII, DOCUMENT 326, Department of State Central Files, 753.022/6–861. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d326 8 “Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State”, Ibid, DOCUMENT 325, Department of State Central Files, 753.022/5–861. Secret. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d325#fn-source

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States as their agreement over the Americans’ peacetime use of the military base in the

Azores was up for renewal. Thus the United States began to consider taking a more

moderate course. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean

Rusk acknowledged that the Portuguese government would attempt to extract

concessions in return for the continued use of the base, but also reiterated the

importance of the base there and that every effort should be made to retain “optimum

use of the Azores facility.” 9

This lucid kind of sangfroid would come to characterize dealings between the

United States and Portugal, with the United States looking to take the “moral” path, but

only as long as it did not conflict with greater military objectives. However, this sort of

strategy simply failed to achieve real results on the international stage, as the Americans

were not willing to put full effort to bring real change to Portuguese Africa. Proponents

of the “moral” path gave warnings that would prove prophetic to the Portuguese, such as

U.S. Ambassador George W. Anderson in his meeting with President Kennedy on

September 12 of 1963,

“unless the Portuguese do take action leading to self-determination, the

inevitability of brutal conflict in Africa which will lead not only to the destruction of

property but the loss of many lives of Portuguese people.” 10

9 “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy”, Ibid, DOCUMENT 342, Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Portugal. Secret. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d342 10 “Memorandum of Conversation”, Ibid, DOCUMENT 359, Department of State, Central Files, Pol Port-US. Confidential. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d359

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Anderson’s comments were also relevant in the context of Vietnam, as the United

States was beginning to escalate its involvement in Vietnam. During this time, both

Portugal and Portuguese Africa were to some degree neglected by American foreign

policy, most especially during the later parts of the Nixon years . However, to be fair to 11

the Americans, very little had been gained from talks with the Portuguese on the subject

of self-determination for the African colonies, and by the mid-1960s they had mostly

given up on the prospect of serious change. In a telegram dated from 1965, from the

Department of State to the American Embassy in Portugal, Dean Rusk admits that there

is “nothing to be gained from additional talks at this time,” with the Portuguese. 12

American policy eventually degraded to just repeatedly pushing the African

self-determinist cause on the Portuguese, to the point that the Foreign Minister of

Portugal would just skip over the topic during meetings to avoid hearing the same

argument again and again. The Portuguese, for their part, were exasperated by the 13

hypocrisy between American anti-colonialist rhetoric, and neo-imperialist policy, with

Salazar himself seeming to believe that the United States was a young, upstart country

that had lost touch with its European roots. In the end, self-determinism in the African 14

possessions would be brought about only by the Portuguese regime’s collapse,

something the Americans could take little credit in.

Even during the early parts of the Carnation Revolution, Portugal would remain a

11 Nixon had many distractions near the end of his presidency. 12 “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal”, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968 VOLUME XII, WESTERN EUROPE, DOCUMENT 161, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66,POL PORT-US. Confidential. 13 “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal”, Ibid. DOCUMENT 168, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,NATO 3 LUX. Secret; Limdis. 14 Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, 427. 

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low priority in American policy. The United States had adopted a neo-isolationist stance

in the wake of the Watergate Scandal, which was accompanied by a surge of support for

the Anti-War movement, and thus was wary of taking sides while the revolution was still

divided. As the situation developed, some on the American side voiced their fears of a 15

communist takeover. The Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for one, even considered

the invasion of Portugal if a communist government attempted to keep Portugal in

NATO. He believed that if communism took a hold in the government of a nation of 16

Western Europe, it would inevitably spread to others. However, this hard-line stance

was not shared by many of his contemporaries, including the American ambassador to

Portugal, Frank Carlucci. Carlucci’s strategy was to support the Portuguese moderates in

the democratic elections, a view that eventually won out over Kissinger’s.

Although Carlucci would later be well regarded for his efforts to blunt the actions

of Portuguese extremists during the Revolution, when he arrived many Portuguese

regarded the American Embassy with suspicion. The United States’ Central Intelligence

Agency was known to be working in the country, and there was widespread belief that

the Americans were colluding with right-wingers to effect a counterrevolution.

Following a failed right-wing coup on March 11 1975, 1,500 demonstrators protested

outside the American embassy. 17

Censorship during the Estado Novo

15 Bernardinho Gomes and Tiago Moreira de Sa, Carlucci versus Kissinger, (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011) 8-9, 23. 16 Ibid., 105-6. 17 Ibid., 90.

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Censorship had a long, distinguished history in Portugal, extending beyond Dr.

Salazar’s rise to power. Salazar, in fact, was himself a victim of censorship during his

time as an academic. However, despite this, during Salazar’s time in power press laws

would become more restrictive and dissident voices were not expressed in the media. A

group of intellectual attempted in 1963 to pass a more open press law, but the bill was

defeated without even being brought to a vote. As part of his generally paternalistic 18

view of the Portuguese populace, Salazar justified this by arguing it was the only way the

susceptible population could be protected from dangerous Marxist ideas. He likened

censorship to traffic signals in describing the scope of its effect on public freedom. As 19

such, domestic strikes and conflicts were only vaguely addressed in official publications,

and any articles depicting such themes were usually cut. Foreign events were covered, 20

unless they depicted civil unrest or anything else that could potentially inflame the

Portuguese masses. For example, the riots at the 1968 Democratic Party convention in

Chicago were not mentioned in the Diario de Lisboa, which usually covered major

foreign events. To get around such constrictive rules, journalists learned to use subtle

hints and implications to get around censors.

In the period following the establishment of the Estado Novo, official propaganda

and censorship had primarily been concerned with creating a new cultural identity and

promoting an imperial narrative of the past. With the onset of foreign conflicts 21

18 Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, 391. 19 Ibid., 75. 20 Alberto A. de Carvalho and A. Monteiro Cardoso, “Press Censorship in Spain & Portugal”, Index on Censorship 2 (1972): 53-64. 21 David Corkill and José Carlos Pina Almeida, ”Commemoration and Propaganda in Salazar's Portugal: The ‘Mundo Português’ Exposition of 1940”, Journal of Contemporary History 44 (2009): 381-99.

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challenging the hegemony of other imperial powers, the Portuguese government became

primarily concerned with preserving the control of its regime.

The African colonies were seen as domestic issues, and thus accurate news

reports concerning their violent conflicts were generally absent from Portuguese

newspapers. For most of the regime’s lifespan, the Estado Novo believed it was building

a unique society in Africa; a non-colonialist, multi-racial community of Portuguese

speakers. This brand of luso-tropicalism was used to justify Portuguese efforts to keep

its empire well after those of the British and French had broken apart. This vision was

not entirely a myth, but the Portuguese possessions resembled typical underdeveloped

imperial colonies more than anything else. However, some international observers even

in 1970 still believed the viability of a multi-ethnic Portuguese community, which at

least gives credence to the power of Portuguese propaganda.

In this context, the Vietnam war posed an interesting challenge to both

Portuguese journalists and censors. The United States of America was attempting to

suppress the nationalistic aspirations of a former colony in the name of

anti-communism, through the dint of superior firepower and resources. The parallels

between Vietnam and Portuguese Africa were obvious, as was the contrast in American

policy between the two. While the explicit coverage of Portuguese newspapers, allowed

by censors during the Estado Novo regime, of the Vietnam War might have seemed

paradoxical considering the similarities between the two wars, it wass only as

paradoxical as American foreign policy was during these years. Even if the United States

had tapered off on its support of African nationalist movements in the post-Kennedy

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administrations, from the Portuguese perspective American foreign policy remained

highly contradictory.

Anti-American feeling in Portugal also was not out of line with regards to the

Salazar regime, thus it was tolerated to some degree. Socialist writers, such as Raul

Rego, were even allowed to publish articles, albeit subject to great scrutiny. 22

The Diário de Lisboa’s coverage of the Tet Offensive is notable for its almost

sympathetic tilt towards the Vietcong attackers. Its account is exaggerated, and it quotes

verbatim from sources of Vietcong propaganda, however it offers a profound analysis of

the Vietnamese situation,

“Identical developments occurred during the wars in French Indochina and in Algeria.

However, whenever one recalls the French experiences in Southeast Asia and Northern

Africa, North Americans delight in stating: ‘But the United States is not France! The power

of the two countries does not permit comparisons!’ However, the recent developments in

Vietnam and the actual realities of the fighting contradict these assertions. Despite

[America] being the largest power in the world, it is the operations of partisans that have

taken the initiative, citizens of a poor nation, marked by misery and stagnation, which in the

past was the victim of foreign greed and exploitation.” 23

A similar article about the war in Africa would have little chance of making it to

print, especially in the tense atmosphere of 1968. Similar to across the world, Portugal

saw liberal students angry over what they saw as unjust and unnecessary wars being

22 “Raul Rego 1913-2002 Jornalista”, Camara Municipal de Lisboa, (2005). http://hemerotecadigital.cm-lisboa.pt/ArquivoNewsletter/2013/NEspRaulrego/raulrego_jornalista.pdf 23 “Iniciativa e surpresa”, Diario de Lisboa, February 1st 1968, 14.

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fought across the world. 1968 saw student demonstrations in Lisbon and Porto, where

protesters protested against both wars underneath one banner. 24

However, it would the few years that followed afterwards, 1969-71 that would

stand out as an outlier for Portuguese media. The new head of state Caetano’s

temporary relaxation of censorship measures resulted in a short era of openness.

Newspapers were able to cover foreign demonstrations and revolts, and even the

controversial self-immolations that symbolized protest during the period. The media 25

was allowed to “speak out indirectly, with long analyses of elections in Chile or West

Germany, for example, when everyone understood the real topic was the absence of free

elections in Portugal.” This period would only last for three years, before the 26

government cracked down once again as it headed into its final years.

Conclusion

Throughout the Vietnam War, American-Portuguese relations were handicapped

by two factors: the intransigence of the Portuguese regime on the subject of its African

possessions, and the hypocrisy inherent in American foreign policy during the 1960s

and early 1970s. The Portuguese government had staked its survival on retention of the

remnants of its colonial empire, and the Americans were unable to reconcile its support

of African nationalism with its neo-imperialist policies elsewhere. During the war as

24 “Fundação Mário Soares”, http://www.fmsoares.pt/aeb/crono/id?id=036958. 25 “Mais duas imolações pelo fogo”, Diario de Lisboa, January 24th 1969, 1. 26 Solsten, Eric. 1994. Portugal: a country study. Washington, D.C.: For sale by the Supt. of Docs. , U.S. G.P.O.

 

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well, Anti-American sentiment was an outlet through which the Portuguese opposition

could channel its voice while still being tolerated by the regime, indirectly criticizing the

Portuguese government’s actions in Africa while directly criticizing American policy.

Feb 1, 1973. A hardly intelligible photo, but nonetheless an important image of the war in Vietnam is published in the Portuguese press. The caption reads,

“South-Vietnamese children, the most innocent victims of a war that despite the cease-fire still continues, wait behind barbed-wire for their lives to return to normal. Twelve years of American intervention and of intense bombing has created millions of refugees. These children are indelibly marked, but will be responsible for constructing a more happy future

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on top of the wreckage of a destroyed and divided country.”

In 1975, after fourteen years of fighting, Angola gained independence from Portugal. Then, while various groups attempted to gain power, the economic situation collapsed, and seventeen years of civil war began. Mozambique, which also gained its independence in 1975 would also suffer fifteen years of civil war.

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Works Consulted Bernardinho Gomes and Tiago Moreira de Sa, Carlucci versus Kissinger, (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011). de Carvalho, Alberto A. and A. Monteiro Cardoso, “Press Censorship in Spain & Portugal”, Index on Censorship 2 (1972): 53-64. Chilcote, Ronald H., “Portuguese Africa”, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). Clarence-Smith, William Gervase, Third Portuguese Empire: A Study in Economic Imperialism, 1825-197 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 140. Corkill, David and José Carlos Pina Almeida, ”Commemoration and Propaganda in Salazar's Portugal: The ‘Mundo Português’ Exposition of 1940”, Journal of Contemporary History 44 (2009): 381-99. Diario de Lisboa, 1961-1974. Duffy, James, “Portuguese Africa”, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963 VOLUME XIII, WESTERN EUROPE AND CANADA, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968 VOLUME XII, WESTERN EUROPE, Kay, Hugh, Salazar and Modern Portugal (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1970). “Raul Rego 1913-2002 Jornalista”, Camara Municipal de Lisboa, (2005). Solsten, Eric. 1994. Portugal: a country study. Washington, D.C.: For sale by the Supt. of Docs. , U.S. G.P.O.