Nuclear Energy in Lithuania and Bulgaria: theImpact of EU Accession

Presenters:Inga FreimanePaolo Sorbello

Assessing Accession in sphere of Nuclear EnergyEU Perspective Country’s Perspective

Viewed as EU learning process Economic and political re-structuring

Focus on EU competence in NuclearEnergy prior to and post-enlargement

Consequences for country’s energysector

More specifically Analysis of negotiation process:starting point as compared to theend result

EU body of legislation after 2004and 2007

Primary energy consumption by fuel 2000– 2011

General overview of Bulgaria’s andLithuania’s energy sector

Why comparison? Different ‘package deals’ that Lithuania and Bulgaria received from EU:•Countries’ position during negotiations•Share that INPP or KNPP played in energy production•No standardized approach and reliance on experts

Nuclear Safety Regulations prior to 2004 Enlargement

Catalyst: 1986 Chernobyl Accident – question of nuclear safety in Central andEastern Europe

•1992 Munich G7 meeting – responsibility of nuclear plants exploitation attributedto post-Soviet states, International NPP Decommissioning Fund (INPPDF)established within EBRD•Nuclear Safety Account Agreement signed with Bulgaria 1993, and with Lithuania1994 – fuel channels cannot be recharged•1997 - Agenda 2000 – EU reference to nuclear safety•1999 Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) Report –classification of reactors into safe/ unsafe

Overall: nuclear safety on the agenda of international community, but no coherentand consistent body of legislation. No acquis on nuclear safety within EU,expertise and responsibility of Member Countries.

Background information: Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant• Designed late 1970’s and early 1980’s• Brought into construction mid 1970’s, Unit 1 started operating 1983, Unit 2 - 1987• 2 Unit RBMK -1500 reactor, second generation• 1991 Lithuanian Independence, INPP was producing 60% Lithuania’s electricity

• 1999 Lithuanian Parliament – Seimas – adopted National Energy Strategy, and decided to close Unit 1 by 2005• 2002 new National Energy strategy and decision to close Unit 2 by 2009• 2004 Unit 1 closed• 2009 Unit 2 closed

2004 Enlargement: Lithuania – EU negotiations over INPP1997 EU opinion on Lithuania: Lithuania has to adhere to NSAA and not change fuel channels,meaning closing INPP after expiry date of fuel channels, 15 years life-span

Stage 1: 1997 - 2000Defining subject of negotiations and agreeing on it:issue of safety anddates of decommissioning

5 October 1999 Seimas approved NES, agreement to close Unit 1 of INPP by 2005December 1999 Helsinki European Council, Member states invite Lithuania to start negotiations8 May 2000 – Law on decommissioning of Unit 1 of State Enterprise INPP adopted by Seimas

Stage 2: 2000 - 2002Referring issue of INPP back to political agenda and finally resolving it31 negotiation chapters, INPP considered under ‘Energy’ – started 23 May 2001Renewed working group of LT and EC to assess:•economic, social, and environmental consequences;•costs of decommissioning;•creation of alternative power generating capacities•Possible financing; etc.

2004 Enlargement: Lithuania – EU negotiations over INPP

Stage 3: beginning 2002 – end 2002Main negotiations on volume, duration, and modality of EU assistance

Renewed working group - ‘categories of consequences’Lithuania already had a clear position formed by ‘categories of consequences’, first officiallypresented to EU 23 May 2002

Ignalina as unique case, so, it required special assistance:‘separate line’ in addition to structural funds and separate from IINPPDFlong-term EU assistance

11 June 2002 at ministerial level of EU Member States and Lithuania signed a Declaration andcompleted ‘Energy’ chapter. Lithuania exerting pressure on EU to draw up guidelines for finalagreement.

November 2002 – raising issue in other chapters of negotiation, agreement that a specialprogramme should be created to facilitate funding for 5 specific categories – IgnalinaProgramme

Protocol 4 of the Accession Treaty, signed 16 April 2003 in Athens

Outcomes of 2004 Lithuania – EU negotiations

Final outcome reflected asymmetry of power between EU and Lithuania. However, Lithuania’sachievement of Protocol 4 in Accession Treaty, ‘package agreement’, allocated throughIgnalina Programme, in exchange of commitment to close INPP and dates established by EU,nevertheless is extraordinary.

How was it achieved?

•Lithuania’s argument that INPP is unique: only RBMK reactor outside Russian borders•Successfully mobilized political resources and ascribing priority to the issue: proving it’simportance for EU at large, and, requiring solidarity of Member States•Argument that solidarity should be supported by financial assistance•Financial assistance as a long-term process determined by legal (not political) instruments

Why did the EU agree?

•EU power weakened due to lack of legitimacy in sphere of nuclear safety: no legal basis•Political reasons: if Lithuania would ‘fall out’, EU would loose credibility in enlargement•Change of subject of negotiations and final outcome reflects role of different actors•Renewing energy sector, not just decommissioning INPP - justification

Consequences of accession to EU for Lithuania’s Energy Sector

( ² according to BP Statistical Reports 2002 – 2013, due to discrepancies in data number for X year was taken from (X+2) Report, i.e. data for year 2000, for example, taken from year 2002 Report )

Lithuania’s Energy Mix 2000 - 2011(in Mtoe)²

NEGATIVEEnergy dependency on exports – ‘energy islands’Lost ‘nuclear country’ status, so project on building new NPP

POSITIVEModernization of energy sector, expertise in decommissioningMotivation for increased Baltic regional co-operation2009 Better connection to Europe – Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan(BEMIP)

BEMIP map

Background information: Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant• 1938-1941 Discovery and exploitation of first uranium mines in Bulgaria• 1955 Signing of the Warsaw Pact• 1961 First research reactor built at Kozloduy

• 1974 Completion of Unit 1&2 (KNPP)• 1981 First feasibility study for a NPP in Belene• 1982 Completion of Unit 3&4 (KNPP)• 1987 Completion of Unit 5 (KNPP)• 1990-91 Halt to the Belene project• 1991 Completion of Unit 6 (KNPP)

• 1989 Soviet workers leave and Bulgarians are in charge of control roomspreviously off-limits and operations for which they were not trained

• In the period 1990-1993, the number of reported accidents was 93,although none surpassed “Level 1”.

• Sep 1992 fire at Unit 5 & 6. Lack of transparency and necessity of an adhoc investigation

Background information: Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant

• 1990 inspection of Kozloduy. Western inspectors were“horrified” by its state.

• 1991 IAEA report: recommendation for closure• 1999 WENRA visit to Bulgaria

• 2002 TVEL (Russia) only supplier of nuclear fuel to Bulgaria

• 2003 Belene project restarted• 2005-06 Belene project tender issued and assigned

• 2013 Referendum on the development of new nuclearfacilities (failed)

2007 Enlargement: Bulgaria – EU negotiations over KNPP

• Feb 1993 Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) – Bulgaria joins in June.• Oct 1995 restart of Unit 1 after closure “a threat to the security of

all European citizens” (European Parliament)• 1997 Agenda 2000: closure by 2002

• 1999 EU’s stronger stance on closure: Verheugen visit

• Dec 2002: Energy chapter of the acquis communautaire closed- 30/31 Dec 2002: Unit 1 and 2 shut down

• 25 April 2005: signing of Treaty of accession in Luxembourg• 1 January 2007: Bulgaria joins European Union

- 31 Dec 2006 Unit 3 and 4 shut down

2007 Enlargement: Bulgaria – EU negotiations over KNPP

• Closure = ‘national betrayal’, ‘Kozloduy is not just a legal cause, it is thefate of Bulgaria’ (internal politicization)

• Power relations are more favourable to the EU, which makes a strongercase for the closure and is able to pose conditions on the funding.

• Messy, non-transparent, and unstable governments were unable tospeak with one voice in favour of the old reactors– EU membership was the key priority for the governments in power.

• Security of supply (RUS-UKR 2006 gas crisis) shows cracks in EUsolidarity

• After Accession, nuclear energy still accounted for 34% of electricitygeneration

Consequences of accession to EU for Bulgaria’s Energy Sector

‘Bulgaria imports about 75% of its primary energy resources(oil, gas, nuclear fuel, coal) from Russia.’ (Nitzov et al. 2010)

Source: Oliva and Sorbello, 2012

Bulgarian energy mix - and electricity generation in 2010

Consequences of accession to EU for Bulgaria’s Energy Sector

( ¹ according to BP Statistical Reports 2002 – 2013, due to discrepancies in data number for X year was taken from (X+2) Report, i.e. data for year 2000, forexample, taken from year 2002 Report )

Bulgaria’s Energy Mix 2000 - 2011 (in Mtoe)¹ Nuclear consumption 1974-2010 (Mtoe)

Source: Oliva and Sorbello, 2012

Comparison between Lithuania and Bulgaria

Financial Assistance

Why different financial outcomes?

Comparison between Lithuania and Bulgaria

more negative attitude towardsRussian imports – strongerposition

different priority ascribed toNPPs

different mobilization ofresources: political, technical

different share in primary energyconsumption

different technicalspecifications of reactor: RBMKof Ignalina was the only oneoutside Russian borders

Analysis: enlargement as a ‘learning process’?

• EU pursuing institutional interest of enlarging its competence in the sphere ofnuclear safety

• European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) development from 2007established High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Waste andSpent Fuel Management, and the creation of Nuclear Safety Directive

• Establishing its political credibility through the ability to deal with complexnegotiations, such as nuclear safety, which could potentially be used in solvingthe problem of so-called nuclear unsafe plants of other CEECs

• Indirectly, though the closure of INPP, for example, addressing the externaldimension of market and policy in energy sector. 2006 European Councillaunched Energy Policy for Europe (EPE)

Further research

• High-level interviews

• Comprehensive assessment of the financing for the decommissioning

• Wider analysis of the learning process that has built the EUframework on nuclear safety through the cases of Lithuania andBulgaria (among others)

• Research into Visaginas and Belene

• Focus on social consequences of both plants’ decommissioning

• Consideration of the ‘external pressures’ on energy policy formulationand on nuclear energy issues.

Bibliography

• Foss, N. (1999), Nuclear Safety and International Governance, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

• Froggatt, A. (1999) EU Accession and Nuclear Power, Financial Times Energy, London

• Janeliūnas, T. (2009), ‘Lithuanian Energy Strategy and its Implications on Regional Cooperation’, inSprūds A. and Rostoks T. (eds.), Energy: Pulling the Baltic Sea Region Together or Apart?, Riga:Zinatne.

• Maniokas, K. and Stationis, R. (2005) ‘Negotiations on Decommissioning Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant’ inLithuania’s Road to the European Union: Unification of Europe and Lithuania’s EU AccessionNegotiations K.Maniokas, R.Vilpišauskas and D.Žeruolis (eds.). Vilnius: Eugrimas: 297-349

• Nitzov B., Stefanov R., Nikolova V., and Hristov D. (2010), ‘The Energy Sector of Bulgaria’, Issue Brief,The Atlantic Council of the United States

• Oliva E. and Sorbello P. (2012), ‘Nuclear Energy in Bulgaria: Strategic Implications for the EU andRussia’, European Perspectives, vol. 4, n. 1.

• Tejada, M. (2005), Bulgaria’s Democratic Consolidation and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, Ibidem,Stuttgart.

For statistical data, BP’s yearly statistical reports were consulted

Thank you

Correspondence•Paolo Sorbello paolo.sorbello@gmail.com•Inga Freimane i.freimane@hotmail.com