IMT Nuremberg Archives

H-678

International Court of Justice

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0002

THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION IN STATE AND ARMED FORCES

ACCORDING- TO LAW AND JUSTICE

1) Prefatory notice: A distinction must be made between

direction and administration.

The State was politically directed by the Fuehrer with the

Party ( as the political embodiment of the will of the •

people)} it was administered through the higher Reich

authorities and Ministries .

The Armed Forces were dir^- cted by means of operetive ,

tactical and to a limited extent also organisational orders•

they were administered through the inistrv for Tar, after

the dissolution of that, through the Hjvh Command ns the

common directing Ministerial authority of the extensively

delegated sel£= administration of the branches of the Armed

, Forces.

For the State, the chief of the Reich Chancellery,

for the Armed Forces, the chief of the High Command,

was the comprehensive, centralized executive i.e. co­

ordinating, offine.

The Hich Command, represented in on admin is tretive sense

the whole Armed Forces as supreme Reich authority and so

belonged 91so in the circle of the Ministries and stte

machinery which were co-ordinated through the Chief of the

Reich Chencellery. ( with agreement of the Chief of the High

Command as fer as the Armed Forces were affected).

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0004

II) For the Shte and the co-ordination of the highest Peich

authorities, including the OKW ( Hich Commena of the Armea

Forces), the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr.Lommers, is

the ouslifie representotive for information concerning hi,

experiences and the difficulties, with O-binet Councillor, Dr.Ficker as his substitute.

He is particularly familiar with the duplication and

the parellelis confusion of the State machinery created

by the special plenipotentiaries, Reich Commissioners ona

overnment Chiefs in the Occupied Territories ( Gonera1

Government, Poland, Bohemia-1 Aravin, Alsace-Lorraine,

Ministry for the East, eto.), vhich 01so involved the Armed

Forces to a considerable extent. The last General Pleni­

potentiary for totolwor-mobilisetion. Dr. Goebbels, and

his over-lappings with the I inis tries and Special Doni

potentinries ( Goering, Saukel, Sneer, Pleiser, etc.),

represents a particularly drestic example.

Ill) The OKU, which originated from the rmea Forces Office

of the inister of "ep qs e small lirectine staff, h-d ?

puite similer fonction - s the Reich Chancellery A Orsr had

only in very few fields, such as the Office of rme Forces

Overetions, (Tehrm-chtfue rungs -Amt ), Office mcunter. Intelligence Abroad ( Ant Auslera-abwehp), Armament Economy Officer Prisoner of Wor matters, also certain .professional,

2entrn tasks as their o"n fields of activity, which were

used by the 3 branches of the rme Forces. In all other

respects, the Ce, on the contras, rolled on the technical

activity of the vorious ports of the rmed Forces, which

hac the properly trained and completely stuffed offices and

departements. They were charged with directing the pgort-2-

HO678 -0005

of the Preft of the decree or regulation and then the perti

cipation of the other branches of the Armed Forces wos

necessary bafore it could. submitted to the OKW. Or the orr

charged also all the 3 branches of the ’ rmed Forces to work

out proposels, which were condensed after examination ond

comveri son and which served es sunmarrt end guidance. If en

agreement of the experts -nd offices could not be nttnined

then I mede a lest attempt to bring -bout an accord, if

that feiled too, the Fuehrer had to decide.

Three factors influenced this work :

a) The Lir-Eonce most of the time, invoked Goering, his

ministerial powers, and thus refused pnpreciation and

recognition of other view-points, anc thereby also the

principle that the Armed Forces were one unit, which could

onlv live under uniform conitions on that no pert of the

Armed Forces could claim an individual existence for itself

b) The MavE invoked regulorly special circumstances, becnv

the same conditions did not apply to it.

c) The Army, ns the strongest branch of the Armed Forces,

constantly wanted onl its own vievg -nd conditions to

prevail, and kept insisting that it had the widest ond

oldest experience.

Each branch of the Armed Forces tried then to secure

• decision of the Fuehrer for itself, thus bypassing the orr.

It cost me a great don1 of trouble to induce the Fuehr

to refrain Prem such spontaneous decisions -nd to dem-nd

first of all an examination by his orr. Onlv. when I succeed

in putting this through, could on impnrtinl rule, advantage

to the whole, be put through. It cost a great outlaw Of

-3-

energy nnd struzgle to induce the Fuehrer en the Vnrious

brenches of the 'med Forces to nopt this method of workin

phove n^rtv lines, Sheer powerlessness in monv ooses -ithe

the help of the ox- en® the exigency of the vor, vith it’s

increasing 1-ck, in personnel end materiel, "es the fir

decisive factor, which f inally led to the oopen1 to the o

,TPle-se, intervene!”. I filled the offices of the OK ore

end more with departmental chiefs nn® experts from ell the

three brenches of the Armec Forces; this proved to be

qventaceous since proof wos given of non-porti sanship nd

eech branch of the Armed Forces believed thot it’s interest

were safe-gunred es much aS possible.

In spite of the fact that the Fuehrer recognized thot this

method of co-ordinotion nna exhaustive evominstion rvorir

the best solution for -11 three branches of the rm Fore

wps the necessery nna right one, it "9 s never possible to

prevent his spontaneous interference by sveciel decisions

«nd personal directives, in which unfortunntely, he often

used the services of his military edjutonts, without my

le-rnine about it, so th-t I could stop it. He recognized

Absolutely no official, bureoucrotic efforts, without which

howrener, a great orgenizotion cannot be directed in ° just

pnd non-partisan manner. He had no re-ra for the principl

of "compatence" , nor for the legolly founded departmental

work. His principle wos the recognition of the most useful

effort toward the aim which he was pursuing'. at thet time,

according to the rule The stronger will must force it’s

wev through”. This cannot be achieved by • machine of

burecuratized officiels, ot least, mot in p,onor 1 1 -4-

HO678 -000

And, so rersoned Hitler, find myself • mnn with will-power,

who ruthlessly forces his way through, appoint him aS

special plenipotentiary, permit him to use the trained

machine of officipls an the Ministries, with the condition,

homewer, that he brashes aside all those so-called lesal

consicerati ons and scruples, and thot he acts without

preoccuvetion, independently and energetically.

Sue cess a 1 one,not just 5 ce i s .the d ecisive_ factor •

IV) This shows the conditions, often borderins directly on

anarchy, which took more ond more serious form in the civil-

sphere ever since 1938 (elimination of the Reich cabinet).

They increased since the strrt of the Easter compnign of 194'

et the same rate as the military situation grew worse.

The Armed Forces did not remain untouched by it. Impulsive

decisions of the moment eliminated risht and lawfulness to

an increasing degree. The sub-conscious thought, thet he

could not master the continually worsening situation with

normal means, led to conditions, which removed the Fuehrer’ e last scruples.

Behind all this stood the enonvmous driving force of

the Party; Goebbels, Himmler, Bormann. Only this can explni

how the Armed Forces, ever since the reolize tion, thot only

p victorious war against Pussia coal’d prevent an evil end,

was drammed into committing meo sure s in violation of

international low, °nd thereby mede themselves accomplices.

V) The source of all the trouble, hoewer, lay in the

following three circumstances :

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0008

1 .) The. invincible distrust, which aS not elimin: tod even

up to the last, of many leoding personalities (high officin

end officers) of the Monarchies en Republicon post, who

had not fought for the Neti onel-Socinlist revolution.

2 .) The fact thet the Tarty had hardly yet produced in tho1

short time enough prominent personalities °s leaders for

ste offeirs or the Armed Forces, in whom only Hitler thoug’

he could blindly trust.

3 .) Hitler, therefore, lived under the impression thot he

alone could and must unite all the powers in the State and

the Armed Forces in his person. (Dictatorship instead of

cabinet ).

He could not eliminate this dissension in his soul, omd

solve it aS • true dictator would heve hed to do:

either to grant full confidence and use the profession

trained Leaders Corps (Fuehrerkorps), but then without ony

reservation or to remove immediately the existing lendershi

machinery (Fuehrerapporat ).

If Hitler hod hec confidence in even onlt • limited circle,

whose advise he would h-ve trusted ■ end folloved, his

genius would not have had to leave the path of L-v end Righ

As it was, he gave in to evil spirits like Bormann, Goebbel

Himmler, who remained his intimate friends up to the end,

after Hess was in England and Goering finally fell into

d isfavor.

I dare say, that Hitler did not listen to us soldiers and

our ideas because in the bottom of his heart, he did not

trust us, because he saw in us the other world ona only

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HO678 -

’’bourgeois” contemporaries.

Intolerance and distrust caused ths Genius to become isolate

And become an uncompromising dictotor. The decisive turn

towors erbitrary octions from methods which were not

justified by war conditions, begins in the veor 1942, when

the war become a "Go-Banq" gome of to be or not to bo; this

is becoming clearly obvious through the triol. The ideologic

theory nlone did not justify the method used, ?_t le^st not

in ^dv^nce!

Here the OIN hod to follow the compulsion of its Commander

in Chief.

VI) If I go bock to the point of origin, the turning-point

of our (OK) ond my own personal prestige lies in the ermy

(navy on nir-force ere to be eliminated), and lso portly

in the OK itself which remained aloof from the influences

to which I was exposed dey ond night. The onlv person who

con exploin thet development is mv Chief of Central Burenu,

Lieutenant Generel Wintor; being in close touch with the

ermv personnel office in Berlin, he could follow the course

of events.

Certain it is thet those sentiments ~qeinst me were only

created bv the subseouent knowledge of the high Officers . I

of the Army, while the ouostion of complicitv in guilt is

egitoting minds toev. Men like v.Runstedt, v.Kluge,

Kesselring, v.cichs, Schoerner one others hove ~Iwevs

mpinteined their fri endship with me ond tried to understand

me. But ° 11 those who fell into disfovor, were relieve^, \

and who, with some justice, felt themselves treated unjustlv,

become my enomis, because in their oninion-7-

I did not plead for them sufficiently. This I can understan )

very well, but it would only be justified if they knew

my proposals for personnel. I never won the reel confidence

of the Fuehrer, that is • confidence base on a human

understanding and I lost the confidence of the Generals.

Field-Marshal v .Brauchitsch Pid not fore eny differently;

his wounds have apparently been heeled by time. The denth

of General Schmundt , the Fuehrer’s Adjutant-Chief, destroyer

the last bridge between me and the Generals of the prmy.

My activity in connection with the attempt of 20 July 1944,

together with v.Rundstedt, made me even more unpopular.

, I hereby affirm on osth :

that I answered the Question about ”The Problem of coordina­

tion in State and rmed Forces occoring to Law and Justice’

which wes submitted to me by Dr Otto Nette, defense counsel

of the defendant Ex-Field Marshal, Wilhelm Keitel, to the

best of my knowledge and conscience.

I am informed that this document will be submitted as

en effiovit to the International Militemv Tribunal in

Nurnberg. I am aware thot the giving of • f~lse statement

unc er o th, intent i ona lly or by necligence, is severely

punishable.

Nurnberg, 8 Perch 1946

s./ W. Keitel

1, John E.ROBINSON, Civ . X 046350 hereby certify that

I am thoroughly conversant with the Tnelish and German

loneueces; and that the nbove is • true and correct trenslot

of the original document.Kohn B. ROBINSON Civ., X 045350

Hi~h Command, of the Armed Forces and G-eneral Staff. // ( 1 -

While the "Soldiers" welcomed Hitler and nis movement - although not

without reservation - , a movement, soon arose among the old General Staff

Officers the importance of which had not been recognised before. The

Generals of 1933 were the young General Staff Officers of 1918. It is quite

understandable, that these officers attempted to re-establish the "Great

General Staff" of the old Army. The Great General S,aff was the absolut

ruler of the Army, the General Staff Officers were looked on as the pick

of the best officers of the army, they constituted an enclosed corps of

selected officers, qualified for leadership, with a pronounced "Fs-prit

de Corps". This "Great General Steffi was really an organization of the

greatest importance and had a decisive influence on all foreign Political

Affairs Which might possibly have to be settled by means of military force,

and therefore also on the preparation as well as the plaining of armed

conflicts.

Such an institution was incompatible with the national-socialist

ideology; two claims for leadership met on the same, very important ground.

There could not be any doubt that HITLER, even before ne had taken over the

immediate supreme command of the armed Forces, had already thought of taking

supreme coinmend over the entire Armed Forces in the case of war. It was

in accordance with the principle of the authoritative Leadersnip State,

that the need of the State should direct, that means command, the State

Policy in the most important - even in all - branches. This principle

penetrated all spheres and naturally formed a particularly favourable form

of application in the military field. According to the national socialist

ideology, it is, however, the "Puenrer" , who has to decide alone in a certai:

sphere. In the negative sense this means the rejection of all responsible

co-operation of the "Fuehrer" with the "advisers" and dependence on them.

The previously existing collective agencies ( e.g. an executive committee

consisting of several persons, or organic bodies, or boards) and even

constitutional institutions like the Reichstag, were robbed of their

responsible function, as far as they remained, they became either an

ornament or an instrument. Therefore if the leadersnip principle was

considered as a basic one, all attempts of the representatives of the

HO678 -0011

General Staff to re-establish the General-Staff leadership and the General

Staff routine in the Armed Forces were bound to ieet HITLER’s determined

opposition and be wrecked by it*

a conflict of world-historic importance was fought out behind, the

scenes in an almost academic form, a conflict which ended with the victory

of the Leadership Principle in the Armed Forces, without convincing the

Generals of the General Staff. They kept silent and obeyed in the end,

even tnough divided among themselves. They obeyed pernaps not so much

because they were convinced by HITLZR’s thesis, but because of their

traditional educetion in obedience and the realization, that further

opposition would be result in inconceiveabl damage to the Army.

The Generals were trenquilised until the end of 1941, because

tremendous successes spoke for HITLJR. But the old opposition started

again as soon as reverses occurred. It is significant: sone of the

nigh General Staff officers stated at any time officially, that it was

risat ’ to bring the war to an end. The war for them was a question of

metnod, not of principle, the General Staff, however was for them a

question of principle.

now it is strange to see that from the attitude of the generals to

this principle an opposition arose, which was more than an real difference

of opinion, it was a personal enmity which was barely concealed by the

forms of usucl social etiquette and soldierly order of precedence.

Tnis opposition was € real opposition of great importance.

The lecdarsnip principle in its innermost character is no national

soialiet invention, it is based on military necessities and has grown

*" *ha- This is shown especially in war, where discussions become

impossible, when most rapid rescztionshev to be made. The General Staff

is necessary for the preliminary deliberations and planning it is not in

principle called upon for decision and leaders .ip.

The Great General Staff as an organ of leedersnip has to thenk the

monarenical system for its attitude. The monarcns were the born war- lords, in othor words Cormanders-in-Cniof. as it constituted a grave

danger, to make the fate of a people depend on chance, this institution

H0678 -0012

of advisory Army commend originated which in reality was the actual leadership

of the Army. ( see the Army-Commanders in the Franco-German war and in the 1st

wrld

1 Apr. 46

HO678 -0013

-he principle of the great General Staff as a leadersnip body is contrary

to the primary principle that the supreme commander as commender-in-cnief

also commands- Therefore the leadership principle in the military field is

also a return to an original principle, but in the political field it is

the assumption of a military principle in spheres which are not suitable

for the basic conditions of the principle.

KEITEL and JODL advocated the leadershipHO678 -0014

principle in the military

field. They recognized that general staff work was necessary in peacetime

in order to deal with preparations and plans for possible wars for defense,

but that the general staff officer in time of war must only act as an

assistantandexpert for tne commanders. It would be morally wrong if the

supreme commander's outwardly apparent autnority to conmand. wore only a

phantom and not in accordance with actual leadersnip and responsioility.

It appears certain tnat the general staff officers of tne old stamp

in their propositions not only believed that they were acting as patriots

but were apparently very worried lest the "former corporal of the orld

War" would take over the supreme command in case of war. but deep dowmn-

pernaps unconsciously and due to hereditary - was the wish to keep up a

social prerogative of the class or to secure a new one.

KIT-L and JODL were also generals of tne old school, they also came

from tne CLUS2EEZ-MOLIZ School, but they were of the opinion that nowa­

days it was not essential to preserve traditional conceptions and

institutions, even though these had served well in the past, but rether that

it was having the right system under tne given circumstances which mattered.

They themselves did not come into consideration as profitting' by the system

they supported for neither was commander or would become commander. KlITlL

was certainly a tested general staff officer and organizer but no strategist;

neither did he not want to be one, but only tnat which’ the decree of

4 February 33 laid down for him. JODL as Chief of tne Supreme General Staff

might even have had 'reasons to mold a contrary point of view.

I, CA-hEaIE BJDFORD, brit. Civ., 110561, hereby certify tnat I am thoroughly conversant, witnthe English and German languages; and that tne above is a true and correct translation of Document,

CaT—RIC BDTORDbrit, Civ. , 110561.

P.2

W. Keitel

Relations of various commands in the east (Barbarossa) and the exclusion of the Wehrmacht High Command (O.K.W,,

Before the beginning of the Russian campaign "Barbarossa i.e, up to 21 June 1941 the Vehrmacht High Command (O.K.W.) b worked out the. fundamental, gener, 1 "Instructions" and "directions" for the campnign against the USSR according to orders and directives by the Fuehrer; it presented them‘and niter they were put in final shape through the Fuehrer, made them public. When cOmbat began the henceforth authoritative leadership of the Commander in Chief of the Army (Ob.d,H.) began in the field of operations, population policy and war economy according to the directives that had been given. Exclusive ri nt to command a.nd executive rower wore concentra: In the Corander in Chief (0,c.H. ). There was no "dictatorial interference" on the part of the Wehrmacht High Command as thi presentation of the prosecution (particularly' the Russian) which often referred to the OKW seems to indicate. In case supplementary orers had to be"given at the volition or by the. interfer nc of the Fuehrer, this was done by oral orders or oy written confirmation of or 1 instructions alreny civen to the Commander in Chief of the Army (Cb.d.H.) (OKH). The executive power was in his honds And he alone wes authorized to give the necessery orders. The opportunity to do this was offered by the regular dnily reports on the situation, for the purpose of which the Command, er in Chief of the Army with the Chief of Staff cppear d personally at , the Fuehrer's at least every other day. Loter the Chief of Staff came daily (often twice) to report since the Fuehrer himself was Commander in Chief of the Army (Ob.d.H,). In the East the Fuehrer waspersonally and directly in commend with the Army Chief of St f f; the Wehrmacht Hi ph Command and Keitel personally vere, compl e t elyec1u e - - F‘s-- ‘ - ----—--——=-r TIA r

^gn,^g rn e ,d. There were no direct orders by the We hr mA.pmmand to any offices subord i nA .ted to the Commander in Chief

9 the Ary (Ob, d.H.) becnus- only one could give orders to A-- the office .3 in the rll of operations. If, therefore any peumen-s hev • en presented in which- mil itar ornon-m±1 itar

Qlices .*21er UO n order of the or:'!, this can be nueonly to the fact that the Army High Command. (OKH) in its executive rc2rs issued upon higher instructions of the Fuehrer, referre

.° the OKw• Otherwise it is a case of confusing the Wehrmacht with the Army High Command (OKH)High C ) with the Army High Command (OKH). Moreover,

, _ -rship of the Commander in Chief of the Armynew only a few offices to which he gave his orders directly;

rney W re the Army groups CHeeresa-ruppen) and in regard to all non-orerative_Huestions Vvig the Genersiquartermaster) to th. A6he8t ofrices in comi and, that is,. in the entireterritory poperations the Arry Hi h Commands (Arnee-Oberkommenhos AA°).).en the commanders in the army renr nrea. For nurpose of total leadersnip a numoer of non-military organizations Were suboriinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army (ob a h4Ke,tekforce with the right to gut them under the’ comman of sub-comrenders. The following nay be namen:

. the strict lead

ard to all

HO678 -0016

P. 2 A) Military Organizations:(cent.) ' ....... ,

1) Security Details (Abwehrkommandos) under Army Hiph2) Propaganda Companies - Comman"s3) Representatives of the Foreimn Office (with Army High

Commands and Army groups)4) Economic organization "oldenburr" (instructions on

special subjects by Goer in) (2- year Plan)5) Technical formations and field economic details (Feld-

wirtschaf tskommandos) (Attached to the Army Hish Command (AOK’S and commanders in the army reararea)),

6) Special services (libraries, front theaters, movies)

P.3

B) Non~Mllitary Organizations;

1) Organization Todt (CT) : , Detailed to the Army Hi~h2) Reich Labor Service (RAD)) Commands (AOK’s) or command

posts in the army rear area, which dinnosen of them as a task forae,

3) Einsatzstab Rosenberg+) Reich Railway Offices and Personnel (At the disposal of

the chiefs of transportation in the army rear area)

C) Not subordinated were:

1) The organizations of the Reichsfuehver SS and Chief of t German Police, i,e., the "Einsat zgruppen" and "Kommanos (Gestapo and SD) and the"specif I details” ("Sonderkom­mandos") in the prisoner of war camps (Orders directly from Himmler, or Heyderich (confirmed, by witness Ohlendo

2) The clvilia.n administration in the Reich Commissariats3) Transport Regiment "Speer" (motor transport columns)

(Kraf t wagen- Kol onnen)4) Sauckel’s special d. legates in the zone of operations.

Without maintaining that this enumeration is exhaustive, it proves that state and Porty organi zatione were everywhere' ■ hsiculate within the structure.

The military organizations mentioned under A diR not caus any difficulties to the command offices disposing of them,ever though, in technical respects, they were given certain instruc­tions, exmeriences and material means of assistence by the High Comrend of the Armed Forces (OKW) (A 1,2,6) for their benefit.

The organizations unr B 1 and 2 were placed at the dis- posal of the Army by personal and direct special orders of the Fuehrer to the heads of these organizations with instructions to arrange for their employment with the Army High Command (OKH). They received from the OKH their commissions for work 3 thezone of operations and their distribution to the command posts of the Army but maintained their independence in intern? service matters (pay, rations,disciplinary procedure, etc.) il regard to Which they were under their central offices. As wor1 of thanks as their auxiliary services were, the Army High Comr (OKH) or the orennizations in whose territory they were employ made use of their services reluctantly and only because the Fuehrer demanded it and a refusal was out of the question. The reason was that they maintained a second official channel to their central offices (Organization Todt, Reich Labor Leader) and turned to them in all matters disagreeable to themselves. But these central offices recognized decisions of military commanders only if they came from the Fuehrer personally, who was the sole common superior and to whom alone they were obedient.

2,4 This situation led to manifold friction and difficulty, and in most cases to demands on the OEW Chief, by both sides (Army High Command - Cerman Labor Service or Todt Organization) (OE - RAD or OT) insofar as these central offices of the organizations did not get direct decision from the Fuehrer (via the Party Chancellery of Bormann). In these cases, the- Fuehrer usually commissioned Keitel to transmit his decisions to both offices.

Frictions with the Peichsbahn (B 4) in all cases, as far as - know, were settled directly by the Wehrmacht Transport tion Chief.

Orders to Rosenberg’s Detail Staff’ ("Kins atzstab .Rosenberg") went through most varied channels: Chief of the heich Chancellery, Chief of the Farty Chancellery, Goering. When it was a question of protests or contradic­tions of military agencies, the Chief of the OKw waS commissioned to relay to them the orders of the Fuehrer.

Thus, although the OKW hod no agency to handle or consult with the organizations under B, nor had any kind of dir oct contact with their employment or assignments within the scope of the Army, there were frequent instance: when the Chief of the OKW was called upon as an involuntaramediator.

The organizations under 0 led a fully independent life in the operational territory of the Army, or in the Reich Commissariats; they were assigned to the military offices, only for rations and quarters.

The direct superior of 0 1 waS only Himmler by himself Assignments , orders and their execution were withheld fron the military offices, with the indication "Fuehrer order."

The Chief of the OKW was also strictly excluded from communication with these offices.

P.5 Kxceptions were*

2 under a The orders and plans in the bandit war to theWehrmacht Commanding Officer (participation of the Wehrmacht Operational Staif and the Army High Commi nd).

5 up 3 er C Auxiliary services for the Army through themotor transport column emorgency (Coope ration Command) .

"‘Speerl in cases ofwith the Army High

The channel for the Fuehrer’ s orders to C 2 was by WRY of the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1. r. Lammers, in so f as tt Fuehrer did not personally give any verbal orders, to Roseri erg or the Reich Commissioners themselves. Contac between the Fuehrer and the Reichsf uehrer bb took place directly with no third party present, in other cases via Bormann, the Chie f of the Party Chancellery. Bormann waS almost invarinbly the bearer of all complaints against Army offices or the part of the organizations under B - except the Reichsbahn. Bormann made it a principle to appl to the Fuehrer personally without informing the Chief of : OKW.

HO678 -00

Allin all, the above description presents a picture• 0 the ireumstances which, in spite of—or precisely

because of—a common universal supreme commander in the person of Hitler, led in actual fact to the unbearable conditions of duplication and contradiction described under the watchword ’’Fuehrer order1'. Each one laid claim to an •alleged Fuehrer order or a Fuehrer authorization.

When there were differences, disagreements, arbitrary and insubordinate actions, however, it was the Chief of the F." ■■ < aS mediator or as arbitrator or as the ever accessible mouthpiece of the Fuehrer who had to transmit the litter’s final decision although he usually had absolutely no authority of his own to decide these questions, and by the very nature of the case, could have no such authority.

I herewith affirm in lieu of pa h:

that I have answered truthfully and to the best of my knowledge and conscience the question submitted to me by th defense counsel of the defendant Field marshal Wilhelm Keitel, retired, concerning subject "he division of ■ authority (Bef ehlsverhseltnisse) in the fast (Barb rossa) and the exclusion of the OKW," I know that this document is to be submitted to the International Mlilitary Tribunal in Nuernberg as an affidavit. I have been informed that intentionl or careless deposition of an incorrect affirma tion in lieu of oath is subject to severe pen ity.

Nuernberg, 14 March 1946.* vwnmmom

(Signed: N. Keitel)

0018

: f E niz t: on: Todt

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H0678 -0020

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conol IC L ‘gan:.- zzati on ol.denbur.

rny Rcer Aroarmy Hi_h Comnan

High Comnmand of the Ar y, Qucrbormaster

General

P len ipote 1 ia: T- Guneral lor te en Loymen U and vse of 1 abor.

Re.ch Icor ; Scrvicc (2,..0)

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(o.T.)

: J ■ eci al Purpose :G-oup A S ci: 1

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. .0ic‘i Ihchr r BS Hocc Office for Rich Mect ity Heydrich

: Bpecinl Pur, esc:: Group B Speed 1;:F. Detnils:: istri Co rmy :;Group Center :

: Special Pur ose.:Group B( sic)Special: Puc so i is : District Arry: Croup South

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chrrincht Corn andor U! croine

I

:Security Offices of: the Irries Pr pauanda C ). pani.os

of the ArmiesSpecial k rvice

I, Wanda S. Tioszen X 046 265, hereby certify that I an thoroughly convorscnt with the English and Gornan languages, and that the above is a true and correct trenslation.

19 larch 1946 Wanda S, Tioszen x 046 265

The economic Armament Office

in the Supreme Cort land, of the -.ehrnacht.

(DaS -1. hU3. IM OKI;.)

1 .) When, on 1 October 1935, I took over the Position of the Chief of the

ohrmacht Office ( TEELMACET ) with VO BLOVG3EIG I found a war economic

Cepartment under Colonel TFOM-S who had been the Chief of the Staff

with the army Ordnance Branch (EEILSWAFTENAMT) before that.

V •3LOMBJEG had sent for TaOMaS in 1934/35, in order to have a technically-

trained adviser at his disposal for the restarting of rearmament, and as

liaison with the Ministry of Economics and the appointed economic organi­

zations (Reich Union of the German Industrial Organization) as well as

with the branches of the Tehrmacht (Ordnance-Branches) (WATTEHAEMTER).

2 .) This "Tar Economy Department" - "later war Economy Staff" - as a minis­

terial office was the organ of the oich ar Minister which had to repre­

sent his interests at the authoritative and responsible Economy Offices,

later also with the Plenipotentiary for Economy, created in 1935. Even

when I already was the Chief of the lohrmacht Office, the War Minister,

as a rule, still communicated with THCM±S dire c 11 For the ministerial

work in the sphere of war economy the question was the rocuporation of

the former - but dismantled armament industry and its reorganization and

utilization for rearmament itself. Thus they were merely ministerial

functions, for communication with the competent offices, which the Tehr-

macht end its Supreme Commander ha.c to exorcise.

.) The rearmament itself, namely th: ermament programs, the supply of arms troops

equipment etc. for the planning of equippe/of all three branches of the

iehrmacht, lay solely in the hands of the three Supreme Commandors who

placed thoir orders with the industry direct through their Ordnance

Branches. As long as those orders were kept within the range of the capa­

bility end productive capacity of the firms, no .friction or difficulties

occurred (see 4b)

H0678 -0022

4 .) The main task of the War Economy Department wes:

a) to ascertain the productive capacity of industries important for war

( statistics) as well as their extension capacity,

b ) to examine the parallel running orders of the branches of the Wehr-

me.cht from the side of the Possibility of their fulfilment, and to

propose accordingly, to tho war Minister a possibly necessary coor­

dination and sequence.

C) to supervise the distribution of raw materials and to eooly for raw

materials from the Ministry for Economics.

For this purpose regional offices were created with the service commend

headquarters (WJa.JXKCRBISKOMCADOS) in the definite form of War Economic

Inspectorates'’ ("WEERWIRTSCHaFTSIISPEKTIDIZN") who wore the conni ctj ng

link with the industries which were important for war economy and carried

out tasks a) to c) in the 6phare of the service command. The distribution

of orcers of the branches of the fohrmnacht, their equalization and the

overlapping made it necessary that all, three branches of the "ehrnacht

wore represented in these Ker Economic Inspectorates in order that pro-

iosals for equalization could be made to the offices of supply of the

throe '.’ehrnacht benches, in agreement with the firms, or to procure in­

structions f c r it from the Wer Minister,

5 .) Txiis purely statistical and coordinating work included no authority of

any Kind to give orders5 the 7?,r Economy Staff performed an advisory,

ninistorieloffica for the direction of the fehrnecht in its intercourse

with economy.

Those conditions also remained unchanged under the Chief of the Supreme

Cormand of the Wehrmacht (CEEF O.Z.W.) after 4 February 1938. They only

Pleced the right to issue orders, when intervention was necessary in the

direct communication of the vernecht branches with industry, on the

Fuhorer himself, because the Chief of the Supreme Command of the tehrmacht

could not give orders to the branches of the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht’s

branches’ own responsibility for their srnemant supplies remained unch^n—

ged by this,

6 .) An extension of the tasks of the Tahrmacht Economic Staff (TEOMAs) took

place from 1936/37 for after the creation of the Plenipotentiary for Eco­

nomy (G.B.W, ), an office was needed which, in case of mobilisation, - i..

0024

beyond the current production program - could ascertain statistically

tho production potential of industries imortont for wer end the necos-

sarios of life end were suitble for armament vurooses; an office which.

wculd not only ascertain the highest possible potential in case of war,

but would also prepare them for it theoretically.

This paper worth, under the leadership of TEOMAS, was again done by the

ehrmacht Economic Inspectorates *hich in 1937 received the name: arma-

ment Ins doctorates" (IRUJSTUIIGSAINSPZITIONENW) .

The outcome was "Mobilization Plan firmament11 ("MOBILMLCEUITGSPLANRUSSTUNG)

which registered the industries which were to be changed over to the pro­

duction of ermaments in case of war, when the Supreme Commander of theI

'..ehrmacht would orf or the change from peace time economy to war time

economy, an'1 which iso decided which articles for which Brench of the

ehrmacht the firm should then produce. In this resect there was close

cooperation with the Fnipotonti ery for Economy.

This latter information was contained in the yearly production plan of

the ehrmacht (EELTIGUIGSPL_LBE:NLACHT) which had boon drawn up by the

branches of the Wehrmacht on the proposals of the armament inspectorates.

7.) To those three tasks:

a) coordination of the current peace time orders on the basis of the

statistics < n production capacity,

b) sefeguarding and distribution, of raw materials,

c) preparatory worlt for the mobilization (mobilizaticn plan and production

plan ( FERTIGUIGSPLaN ) for the entire ehrmacht),

a task was added in war which also was only of an advisory and statistical

nature .

In the war against Poland and also later on in the Nest (further extended

on the basis of the experiences in Polan), experts trained in war economy

from the Wehrmacht Economy were assigned to the army groups and high com­

mands of the armies in the form of small staffs 'nd teams; as technical

advisors and ssistents in all qv stinns of war economy which arose on

the conquest and occupation of territories of economic and industrial

value.

— 4-

8.)-0025

The Economic .-irmament Office. together with the Supremo Command r f theam, ma ormisad preparations for the organizatj-n of those grouos

of experts and the tochnicel tears.

In general, it consisted of:

a.) technic?! advisers to the staffs of the troops (at first

called liaison Officers of the Supreme Commend of the Wehrmacht/

Econ mic Armement Office),

b) Epconnalss-nce staffs for industries and raw materials imortent for war occnomy.

c) technical teams and units for the safeguarding, repairing an

protection geinst destruction of industries and maintenance

installations imnrtent for war and daily life.

This crennizetinn wes therefore -operc hy the Supreme Command of the

"chrmacht (Economic -rmamont Office), because it depended on skilled

ersnnel frrm all three hrenchc of the ohrmacht and the civilian aco-

n my ,s well as the "Technical Emergency Service.1’ ("TSCEIISCHE NOTPILTEI )

-ho actual disposition and utilization was‘effected by the -rmy which

alone had the means for it.

-ho rsenizetis n was plecec under the rogimontel commencing officers

'.nd formod ? port of their troros. It wos usec exclusively at the orders

of the high comind of the troops, for which the technical - visors with

the st ffs of tha troops subnittao the suggestions in e-ch ceso, (te the

General St'ff for Suvly or Chief Quertermester). (DGSGLST.B I

ODE OBSRQUARTIMLI SIZR).

The distinguishing m-rk of its ch recter of non — combatant troops rr

"special unit" (" SODEILIEEIT" ) is the explanation of its original

connectinn with the Economic armement office (Supreme Command of the

ohrmacht ). The latter hed certainly laid Aown the regulations for its »°U0s0s ( ZCEESEIIMUIG), but had no influence whatsoever on its opera-

tions and the carrying out of the tasks in its operations, --nd had no

chonnal or right to give orders.

9 •) asks:

a) Advisins the high command concerning the importance and significance of

- D -HO678 -0026

industriel_conoornsanc suply incustries (oower, water, electricity,

repsir, shops, mines etc.)

b) Safeguarding those instellations egainst destruction by enemy end own

troops (e.g- Dismantling the nest valuahle perts, stripping).

c Utiliz ation for the purposes of own crnduct of the war, own troops end

for the populati n.

f) Koconnaissanco of the industries imortent for wer end Ceily life end

obtaining information of their mro ducti n capacity for own utilization.

g)Ascertaining the stocks of raw materials of metals, coal, ore, fuel

etc. for the resumtion of industry of for own utilization for the further

conduct of the w = r.

With the oxcetion of the tasks mentioned under f) and g) .all other

functions served only the maintenance of the fighting troops, the occu­

pying troops, and the resident population.

10) The statistical enquiries f) and g) were rocrted by official army

channels to the comatent offices of the home country (Plenipotentiary

for Economy, Pour Year Plan, ermament Minister) who had to arrange for

profitable use to be made of thorn. The Wehrmacht itself had no inde­

pendent ri~’ht of seizure!

11) It is true that (acc rding to ’’Book THOVLAS" 2353-PS )(BUCE TEOMAS"

2353-PS) raw materials and also machines ft r the production of war

equinent were removec tc Germany, as the pro sccution states, since

both served the enemy’s prosecution of the war, and as they had to

stop' productic n.

12) a military office did not order the rorr v?.l tr Germany, because it had

no right to dispose of "bec ty” of this kind. Only the Supreme Keich

authorities mentioned under .10, and nobny else, can have caused the

removal, by virtue of the fuehrer’s authorization or by reason' of a

direct order by FITLER to the Supreme Commander of the Army. The Supreme

Command of the Wehrmacht ond the Chief of the Supreme Command of the

Wehrmacht, also the Economic Armament Office, had no ri.vht. V issue

decrees and orders, outside their own sphere.

- 6 -HO678-002

To swa an therefore it c?n ~be statocL:

1 .) The '’organization" for the seizure, the safekeeping and the protection

of all economic goods discovered in conquered and occupied enemy

terries was a creation of the Economic armament Office in the Supreme

Command of the Wehrmacht (Gen.THOMA.S).

2 .) The Chief of the Supreme Comnend of the Whhrmacht had obtained the

Fuehrer's consent for the creation of this orgenisation on the sug­

gestion of General Thomas, and had effected the practical orgenizatinn

and rearmament through the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht . (Secia-

list personnel was obtained through the Economic armament Office from

the three branches of the ohrmacht and from civilian organization.)

3 .) The organization was placed un^er the Supreme Command of the ~rmy

for duty en? suitable puroosos, and was assigned to the highest

commend authorities ( cuch as police, anti-aircraft units of the air

Force, ermy units), under whose sole authority they came.

4 .) an individual command channel of the Supreme Command of the ohrmacht

conomic Armament Office to these commends etc. did no t exist. The

higher troop staffs had been informed of their purpose and gave the

orders for their use according to the suggestions of the technicel

advisers.

5 .) The channel for reports and instructions went by way of the troop

staffs to the Quartermaster-Generel of the Supreme Commend of the

army whose administration staff contained representatives of the

highest Reich Authorities (food, economy, Four Year Plan, Armament

Ministry) who reported to their departmental chiefs.

6 .) The Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and/or the Economic Armament

Office had no authority or right to intervene in this hierarchy or

to give it any orders.

7 .) Orders from me as Chief fo the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht

concerning the utilization, employment or confiscation of economic

goods have nqt been issued; this can be seen from Document 2353-PS.

8 .) On the basis of the experiences gathered in the lost and the inter­

vention of 2eich Marshal GOERING through his Plenipotentiary Powers

by the Fuehrer, an organization, exceeding by far all previous organi-

HO678 -0028

zetion, was established for all economic matters fcr Russia.

9.) This organization was prepared for Reich Marshal GOERING by the Chief

of the Economic armament Office with State Secretary KOERNER (without

the participation cf the Suormne Commander of the Wehrmacht.)

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht placed Gen.QHOMAS at

Reich Marshal' GOERING disposal for this purpose. The Chief of the Su- influence

Pene Command of the Wehrmacht obtain no/cf any kind in this organization,

and thereby excluded the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and himself.

One person only could take over the responsibility for-this task and its

preparation, which by far exceeded the compass of the Supreme Command of

the Wehrmacht Economic armament Office. As neither the Supreme Command

of the Wehrmacht nor the Army had been commissioned, but instead Reich

Marshal GOERING had received General Plenipotentiary Powers, I purposely

withheld the participation of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and

therefore as requested made General THOMAS, available.

10-)Genoral THOMAS, therefore, in this case acted on the solo orders of aeich

Marshal * GOERING and within the limits of his authority as commissioner

of Reich Marshal GOERING. I was neither held to GOERING’s directives by

the Fuehrer, nor did I and/or the Supreme Commend, of the Wehrmacht come

under his authority. I was not represented in GOERING’s staff for direction

of ocor V, ^d had nothing to do with the Eastern Economic Staff. (i.Stab

Ost). (See Page 386 Bock THOMAs.)

I hereby certify upon oath that I have answered the question submitted

to me by DR.PR.OTTO III3, the defense counsel of the defendant of Field

Marshal , retired, VILZLM KEITEL, concerning the organization of the Eco­

nomic armanent Office in the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, according

to the best of my knowledge and conscience. I have been informed that this

docunent is to be presented as affidavit to the International Military

Tribunal in -uernber6. It is known to me that the intentional and negligent

giving of an incorrect statement under oath is punishable with heavy penal­

ties.Nuernberg, 8 March 1946

s/ W. KEITEL

H0678 -0029

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCu^NT

May 18 46

i, Catherine Bedford, Brit Civ., 110560, hereby certify

that I am thoroughly convergent with the English and German

languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation

of the original Document

Catherine BedfordBrit. Civ.,110561

The prosccution autherities especially the

Soviet Russlan pvosacution has raised tte

accusation against the Getman Azmed Forces

and against the 3vpren: Csmmnand of the A-med

horses (CxW) that the crias, aginst hanunity

end Th? war crimas, presontei a3 eviderce, are

traceabl e to orders for which, according t

tue prosecution, you also orr being hold ret

ponsikte. Even if, accordie co youl admission,

a direct responsibility on your part if not to

he assume , it neverthe. Js epcers necessary

th-t you express , jr 9in1on about these

t ccuentions as a precuution.1 . - --363 blezercre, ,t‘ .t you state vho

s respousiolo f the derel pm^nt of the

1riehtful conseq.ences which nppea. ed in con

rectlon with. the condtci of th- v&l.

After A ‘L - Il"LR took over the governnent In •$35,+1 s. and ss e

(cha fgsti 4g o:gnizetions of the p ri -) lout their orgina.t p-r- • pOSo.

- ez search id fur ner tasks which thay corsidera 30 be the ideological

-nd T . erial m.liter izatio1 (-ehrhnftmachug. ci tho Gen mar peopte.

- the sure rsti as the importan 9 o: the SA (o- its failure) docreaccd,

-e C was Ti.sed aau. extended t the pulict-mouing. €sghtng and

2 ute 1 orgumnizt-on bee. use it had proved j tael f .it - el and trus

W rhhc, t- th 3 Fchrer dvring the Rl LHM putci., it was :.c systemabi-

caily enl r^-.d by HLE in oracr to spread its iafvense gre luelly

even iore.

This tne Pauchszuchrer St and "aie! o: tie --cnan Police succeeded

..1. P-notr iing into all functions of the st te en its admins, strut ion,

with the -Xcepvlen ot the Arned forces as an Org - a t on.

HO678 -0030

HO678 -0031Page 2 “2.-

The"SS Special Task Groups" ( SS-Verfuegungstruppe) , the later

Wffen-SS which I do not want to discuss in any greater detail here,

was founded in 1954 after the RCEHM Putch from Hitler's bodyguard, the

Leibstandarte Adolf HITLER, Thus Hitler’s promise to the Armed Forces

"frherc is only one armed for-e (Waffcntraeger) in

Germany, that is the Wehrmacht",

Wes abandoned although the(SS Verfuegungstruppe) characterized as follows:

Thcy_ar—(Wehrmacht) nor of the Police-"

The doctrines HIMLER inplanted into his SS and Police as an

organization were to reach a new, incaluculable sphere of action, once

militaty complications begun.

A soldier could not foresee, indeed, not even imagine the effects

this system would have in foreign territory, that is, in occupied terri­

tories conquered or annexed to the German sphere of power.

-he effort to associate itself with the commencement or comple—

tion of military campaigns, or to obtain police powers in these areas,

at least for the Gestapo (Sipo, SD) alreadv became recognizable during

the occupation of the Sudetenland and later the r st of the Czech territory

(Spring 1939) and was presumable if not in a direct order to the army -

tolerated by EITLIR, if not actually encouraged. He knew only too well

that he could not require that from the Army directly and therefore he

refrained from issuing an order to vest the executive authority in

Army - occupied territories in the command — functions of either the

Gestapo or the Supreme Commander of the Army, thus during the occupation

of the Sudetenland the sole sovereign rights of the executive power

of the Army High Command were successfully maintained, with the compro­

mise that the Pudeten German Free Corps (ELEIr) - into which HIMLR

had certainly already introduced his men - became subordinated to

ETTR only after the completion of the occupation campaign and the trans­

fer of the military executive pow r to the civilian authority. However,

EEuLI out of this immediately became a high S3 officer. Through the

immediate formation of Protectorate Government on the day after the Army

units marched in, the participation of the police was circumvented; E.E,

FRATK immediately became a high S3 official and as such and also as a

-2-

HO678 -

ministerial deputy (Staatssekretaer) he took over the police- power in

the Protectorate.

Warned by these proceedings, the Army High Command, energetically

supported by me with HITLER, had put through the following before the

Polish war:

a.) in occupied Polish territories the executive power and its administra+

tion should be vdsted solely in the Army High Command

b.) the German - Polish border was closed to all official and private

individuals and organizations Army military police and seen t field

police (passes could be approved by the OKT only).

In spite of this, during the course of time members of the Police

were able to penetrate ihto Poland in unknown ways, as later became known •

to the CKW certainly on EIIMLER’s order, and possibly with HITLER'S

tacit acquiescence. Further details are nknovm to me. At any rate, acts

of arrest by the police occured on the part of the Gestapo behind

the Army front, which were not ordered by the OEW, or the Commander,

so thnt complaints reached the Supreme Commander of the Army, as I

learned at the time.

It is possible that this first occured at the time when the

main part of the campaign was nearing its end. I know that General

v. EUZCHLER had a clash with HIMLR on that score and that General

3-Aso-TZ directed a complaint to the Army High Command, even if at a

later time only. Von BTAUCHITSCE opposed the increasing division of the

executive authority between the Army and the Police. HITLER recognized

the subordination, which - as far as I know - has then been assumed in

regard to the Army High Command,

However, some time after the return from Poland around the middle of

October, v. BRAUCHITSCE asked to be relieved from responsibility for the

executive power. He then declared that he did not wish to hold responsi­

bility for the Army in view of police measures taker, because the Army

hs been Ecumbered with dealings of which I did not approve and which

were forcibly passed on to it.-3-

H0678 -0033

Although it has been my belief that maintaining the military

administration offered the most protection to the population, I still

re=ge tice- suprorucd the requcsi of sho Commnander .n Chief of

the Army to be relieved of the responsibility, because the Gestapo —

in spite of its subordination to the military commander — carried out

arbitrary acts that clearly originated with HIMMLER ar HEYDRICH, Thus,

civil administration was established in the Gemeral Government of

Poland in around the middle of October, that is, two to three wreeks

afer termination of the campaign.

I sorely know that all commanders in Poland were grateful for having

been relieved of co - responsibility.

Warned by these proceedines von BRAUCHIT CH insisted in 1940

that in the Western campaign no co - assignment or supplement of the

Gestapo should take place in France, Belgium and in Holland, In this

I vigorously supported him, HITLER recognized the Army’s wish, inasmuch

as the Army — controlled police forces and security units. One Field

Police Chief was appointed to the staff of the Military Commanders

administrative force for each of the military governments which the

Army High Command set up in Paris and Brussels, HIMMLER's direct in­

fluence was thereby eliminate, but to be sure only outwardly and

apparently; be cause connections with Berlin apparently still existed

in the Reich Security Main Office (R.S.H.A.). As early as the winter

of 1941-1943 HIMTER urged the removal of this situation of his ex­

clusion and tried, at the OKW Gen, Qu, to which the direction of the

military government at the Army High Command had been assigned, to

secure the appointment of one each higher SS end Police leader in France

and Belgium, The OKW deinitey refused. All of HIMMLERI s efforts to win

my support in this respect likewise failed.

In "nrch or April 1942 HITLR, who in the Eeantita. had himself become

Conmander in Chief of the Army, suddenly gave me the order to take commend of

General qu§ for which he would nimself order the appointment of a higgler

SS. and police leader. My remonstrances remained without effect.

as of 1 April or 1 May 1942, a higher SS and police leader for France was

thereby created, who was subordinate to the military commander only with

respect to nis own person, while all technical orders were given by EI.MLER.

The independant exercise of the executive power (executive with respect to

the population) wes thereby withdrawn from the military commander, except for t

the cases of direct attacks on the Armed Forces proper.

-hat was the beginning of the xCesses which have only now become known

aceinst the population, the Jewishporsecution and the arbitrary application

of the "Nacht- und - Webel" decree on the part of the police, etc.

HL-L. R renouncod Belgien, because the chief cf the military government , Allgemeira SS

REEDER, belonged to the General SS,/ae probably benived that he could gain

influence ever him also in this way. Several days after the military

occupation, dollend and lorway Were given Reich- Commissioners as Supreme

Administrative Chiefs with executivu power and thereby also one higher S3

and police leader each.

The preparations for the Faste-n campaign in the winter of 41/42 was

from the beginning under the influence of a racially and politically

ideological war, in accordance with the principle: war against the active

carriers of the communistic idea and against all the resistance in the

country Deingrolinved out of an ideological and mortal enmity, although

AITLER, several times expressed this as his opinion as politician and

statesman, nore of us soldiers had at the time any idea that conditions

could develop to such a point of degeneration as actually secured and that

that could be his wish.. e knew his military abilities, his soldierly

attitude end we had experienced his magnanimous and concilietory manner at

the conclusion of the armistice wit.. France and during the period following

it. All this would have appeared t* be a complete contradiction to an

attitude which could have foreseen, yes, and what is more, intended the war to .

take such a course.

HO678 - 0034

0035

It was in March 1941 - before the Yugoslav

to the assembled generals for the first time for

coup d'etat when he spoke

the attack on the Soviet(

Union, at that time still planned for the middle of May, 1941, ( thc wes.

8 weeks earlier, in connection with the start of the strategic railroad

concentration) about his conception of the ideologically conditioned war

which deviated from the normal rules of warfare, and about his methods. Zven

tien , before his last conference in the middle of June 1941, he ha.d developed

ideas , which showed the generals the harshness of the struggle, the dangers

from the part of the population that was fanatically comunist ic, the

overlordship of the comissers , and the partisan warfare which was to be

expected, and furthermore prescribed the application of corresponding

defense measures. The impression was the weightier and more lasting because

he pointed out that he did not expect the understanding of the generals,

but that they had to believe in his correct judgment of the conditions to

come because only he - not the gener is - understood the struggle led by

him in Gormany and the world enemy who had been made fanatical by this idea.

Ic -one of the generals - of the few, entrusted with the war plans —

did the thought then occur, nor co id it have occurred, as with what methods

this soldiyTs1 war Wi s to be accompenied. Not a word about extermination

of the population OT the J ews, nf mess-executions or deportation to

Concentration Campe was ever let fall. On the contrary, the economic

development of the country, preservation and safeguarding of its harvest

and the raw-material reserves were strongly emphasized. To no general did

the thought ever eccur that anything would be required from our soldiers, -

except in cases of self-defense, whon anything is permitted - thet would

inj re the soldierly honor of the armed Forces, No Genral then stepped

forward and voiced his opposition er protest, even though the majority

inwardly denied tne necessity of this war, and had the most serious mis­

givings and anxiety, This was the situation especially when orders came for t

tne suppression of political agit tors , agents, and commissars, for refusal

to recognize this class of people as prisoners of wer, trensfer to the

Gestepo, and furthermore at times suspending the right of court-martial for

the population, and in part even for their own soldiers. These were very

-6-

HO678 -0036 serious encroachments on the rules of warfare as hitherto known and practised.

Rut they still would have been endurable perforce if the responsibility for

the aplicetion of such means had remained entrusted to the cozmending n

officers and commanders Alone, that is, without giving authority at the '

same tims to non-so1dders. Hone of the high-ranking cozmenders epressod

refusal of the directive..

Durins tnis time, when written orders had to follow oral directives,

smous./UspuUs arose between myself and HITJ.^ especially when he

demanded the inclusion of tae Seicasfuehrer SS. The text of tae ,

"Guiding Principles" for tae "Barbarossa" order concerning the administration

and development of the territories to be occupied led to sharp clashes

because of tae powers given the Keichs fuehrer SS. It was clear to me that

here, alongside the Army and tha Army High Command as the sole responsible

and executive power over the population, - a Police-Executive branch had

now been created whose powers (as ETTLER admitted later on) gave me the

strongest misgivings. My counter-proposals, supported by v. BR.UC.TTSCE,

were unsuccessful; the "Guiding Principles" which sea been altered by

HIxLER personally, were given the context that he wis.nod, although none of

us could grasp the actual conse uencos. Only too wol1 did my suspicions

prove to have been rigat. By these plenary powers, HTTL2R had cleared

the way for HIMBER to become a factor in tae direction of tae war in the

East, alongside the Armed Forces. The "yog1 Snete" for this was that

the Soviet Government had not ratified either the a.ouz Rules of Lona-

Warfare of 1937 or the GETEVa Convention -nd thus had knowingly na

willingly exempted themselves from observance of the rules of international

lew, taerefore we were exempted in the same manner,

Under their Chief, aTaLEa, the Police began the realization of their

plans in the most unrestricted manier. It was self-delusion for the

Armed Forces (ox. cnd 02) to Mas behana the test of orders, saying that ■

LL-naEA--actea in his "gvnecpettg" and "separate responsibility" - Both

the Armed 3orccs and the police had to tke their orders from the

aleaest.superioz. ETTL. but—in the long run this could not leave the

Armed Forces undisturbed. At any rate, nobody foresaw or could foresee

the forms and results which the empowering of HIMMM would take on because

of t-o veil with which HITLER himself also concealed this side of tae

H0678-0037 -

3 conduct of the war from the Armed Forces, until the authorizations were

fo-low-d by de ds and events were no longer hidden from meny nam^nders

ond Commanding Officers -, if not in their full extent, then at least

88 to their system-, whenever their command was affected. Tae monstrous

cher cter of t-ese developments has not be^n changed by the fact tnat HITLER

emphasized over and over again that he kept the Armed Forces apart from

anything t-at in the eyes of the public or the world might bring upon them

this stain of having waged war in a dishonorable way, egainst international

law. The police Wes there for such jobs as that.

In summing up there must be established:

1. Alongside tue Armed Forces as the legal protector of the Reich internally

end extern lly (es in evury nation) , a peculiar, completely independent

power-factor arose, and was sanctioned by law, which politically,

biologically, and in police and administrational matters actually drew the

powers of the State to itself.

2. Even at tha Beginning of military complications and conflicts the SS

came to be the ectu1 forerunner and standard bearer of a policy of

conquest and power.

3- Aftor commencement of the milit-ry campaigns the Reichsleeder SS,

hit upon the plan, by which, while concealed at first and very little to

be seen outside, but from time to time making suitable appearances, he

could in reality build up his power under the guise of "protecting" the

annexed or occupied territories from political opponents.

4 Fror the occupetion of the Sudeten Territory, beginning with the

organizations of political unrest, that is of the so-called "Freedom .

movements and Incidezt6" , the road leads straight through Poland and the .

Western areas, in a steep curve into the Russian territory.

5. With the "Outlines" to the "Barbarossa" plan for the administration

and utilization of the conquered Eastern territories the Armed Fences

were a^fingt their intention and without knowledge of the basic assumptions

drawn further and further into the subsequent developments and activities.

6. I and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the effects of AmLERIs

full powers, and had no idea of the possible effects of these full powers.

I assume wit. out further discussion that tne same holds true for the

OXE, which according to the order of the Fuehrer joined HIMMLER’s units-8-

and geve orders to the subordinate arny commanders. H0678 -0038

7• In reality, it was not the Comnander in Chief of the Army who had

the executive power assigned to hin end the power to decree law and

meintein law in the occupied territories, but HIMMLR and HEYDERICH

themselves of their own authority decided on the life or deeth of the

people and prisoners, including PW’s, in whose camps they represented

the executive power.

8. The traditionel training and concept of duty of the German Officer

with regard to absolute obedience, with responsibility borne by his

superior, led to an attitude,regrettable in retrospect, which in spite

of his recognition of their lawlessness and his inward rejection of then,

still shrank from a rebellion against these orders and methods.

9. The Fuehrer, HITLER, abused his authority and his fundanentel No.

1 Order in an irresponsible way with respect to us. T_is No. 1 Order

read, more or less:

HO678 -0039

1) . No one shall know about secret matters which do not /

belong within his own range of astignments.

2) . Noshall learn more than he needs to fulfill the tasks

assigned to him.

3) . No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary

for the performance : of the duties assigned to him.

4) . No one transmit orders which are to "be kept to subordi­

nate Offices to any greater extent or any earlier than is unavoidable

for the achievmentof the purpose.

10). It is my conviction that if the entire consequences which arose

from granting HINKLER authority in the East had been known beforehand,

in this case the leading generals would have been the first to raise

an unequivocal protest against it. As these atrocities developed one

out of the other, Btap ^7 and without any recognition in advance of

the consequences, destiny took its tragic course, with its fateful con­

sequences.

I hereby certify on oath that I have answered the above questions

put to me by my counselPPtto NILTE, according to my best know­

ledge and conscience. J have been informed that this document is to be

presented to the International Milit ry -ribunal in Nuernberg as an

affidavit. I am aware that a false statement given under oath is severe

punishable.

Nuernberg March 1946

1 Apr 46

I, JOHN B, ROBINSON, Civ. , X-046350, hereby certify that I am

thoroughly conversant with the Eng] ish and German languagesand that the

above is a true and correct translation of the original document.

JOHN B. ROBINSON

Civ., X-046360—10-

"h> y.j?Develoument of thle sitletion in Frence 1940-1965

L and the milita ■ autaoritie-.** " — — • ° .. . • - ------------------ .

A ter oh1e conclusion 0 the arnistice there existed:

1 .) a. ) _C o i Frunce (i-jor snsrn France ,to sther with de1gLu, foxmed E. - Ingle sdminisorative area.) ,

b • ) uno o ou ioo. ( outhern ) France ,

sepsreted rom eech-oter b tlle lino of emarkation end this enlarged by the • barrier zone the Vichy governnent had no competence and no h dmihFs t rati ve rights.

c.) The regions to be relinquished; _lsacs, Lorraine, and the ore basin Longvy-BriaJ, whicn were entirely incorporat ed into the area or the Reich and germanized.

2 .) The French soveznent of Marshal retain, governing Vichy, ves recognized, in order to navo a French official admins- oravion as a partner, nd to secure the execution, were the

people were concerned, of the Gorman de.nds in uhe occupied territory. The high repute of llarshal. etan was fro. the beginning intended to torn the co ant er- .eight to the exile yev^.naent of the fugitive general De Gau.e. The govern- ment of Otain a.mene nad complete o vol.ent al authority in unoccupied France. Guneralv.ieuoron was sent to the E 1 ench govornmen0 in Vicn3 as Gila aSprosentctive ox tne German us n ri-a ent, and tlle larshal mado cztonsive usd 01 nl1s Services --particularly in the period up to the creation ox en e.bussy in Paris — for convoying wishes to tne suprome COnuansr of the troops in France, Field larshal von kundstedt, or a13O or f orwardin, to hitler through the illll0.ry cozucnder. Tho carrying out of disarmament in accordance wit. ths pro­visions of the crmistico was sugorvisad ana inspected b, control commissions, also in lTor6h Africa.

Go man offices in France;

a.))

b.)

c.)

d. )

the uprome Comando- of the German troops in France vith throe —rmJ Hig.. Commands and subordinate flold troops, entitled suprem Commander - west (Ob.cst) as tho purely milio.ry comand agency of the Army ( (0.E. . ) from about 1 Jly 1941 under the Fuchera ( rmod Torc3s high Command) (0. a....).

The lilstary Command er — Territorial Coi.mnds± vita subordinate military administration ana the regional.y located Superior Field - and fiel Commands as r cpresontative of the occupying power vith occupation (security) units (Divisions), also Counter-Intelligence- (_-bnenricomuando ) e.n Field lolico (both departments of the .ohrmacnt), wich WerC entirely Subordinsted.

The German police (Gestapo, etc.) cOmletelJ subo-- insce to ths Liitary Commander up to 1 ^ril

or 1 May 1943; then laced under cculnand of ililnler (Fuehrer-dscrec ).

The x reg, agenda Department Franco, n rars (attached to che military Conder) , but directed 0ecnnlcull3 by the Chief of the whrmacat grojagenda bepartent

HO678 -0040

OC tue Conand stef1 of the Armed Forces in the ATied1.21,S ---6- Comnuiand (Ol..), in cOOperatlon with the M-lit-ry Commandor and the Embassy.

6) The German abassy in? (Abetz), attached to uheM—-ltarY Coimander; tocnical right of direction onlyDJ the Foreign Minister J

f•) In iosbadon — with smal11 liaison bureau in Paris— yhe sties Commi s si on, with French delegation,(soo annox)

Accordingly tho Armed Forces high Command (OK. J had direct contact with: ---------

a ) Armistice Commission ( wchrmacht arrangement for .rmy,Navy, Air Force), ’

o.) Intollignce oervico (office for Foreign Intelligence),

c.) rropaganda Department France (Economic Loadorsnp otafr/,

d.) Armament Inspoctorato Franco (Economic rmament office)(techniccl instructions emanated frO the Four-ycar-pln)

To the Army High Command (OK) woro subordinated;a. ) The Military Commander

b.) tiie 3urprome Commandor uost (up to 1 July 1941), (for tue unburdening of tho -rmy high Comand for the must, later Armed Forces High Command (OK..),

c.) the German General in Vichy.

To the Military Commandor in France wore:

a. ) subordinated: the Gormau police up to 1 May 1942,

b. ) attached: the German Embassy in Paris,

C. ) attachod: the Liaison Office of the -rmistico Commission in Paris.

In g a - Gt communi c. tion with tho lilitary Co .'Th and ot* Woro:

a.) the Commissionor for the Four-Tar-plan (V.J.pl.), Goering

b.) the kich Minister for Armament ana war production, spoor c.) the General Plenipotentiary (Genoralbevol_ccchtigto )

for the Commitment of Labor (since 1942), sauckel.All oth-r Acich departments and the Foreign Office made use of channels through the -rmod Fol Ces high Command and _rmy high Command ( -uartermast.r Gunoral) (Ohw/Oh)(Gn. U. ).

whereas in the beginning only the ouprono Coumandr of heArmy (O.d.H.) through nis Military Comandor, and tho Ared

1 G e S Hish Command ( Olli ) trough the Armistice Conisson exorcised influence over tnu French 6oVurnmunt and/or admin­istration, constantly more authorities miltrutc--not only authorized but directly authorized by thu Fuuhrer.Altho gh they wor- actually referred to the Military Commander, who had to translate their requirements into COlLands, thcy went their own ways to a gre t extent. Tnis was particularly true of Spoon (7b) and Sauckel (7c(, who dealt with the French

2

-0042authoricie s d ire nat Ur ally materiafforded ngains ,

The 1--i

4

- j COilmand o r c.1ot be .ade

--- Wlv-l £e-—C to tii sir ow --J ln.ort.nt lntercsts, and ca an O-ortunit, co ___. on

caist the .niter. Co 0,- W1Un -1. th s_onsible L0r

Commander, who w 1941, as ouprame

the direct suyerior of S the uehrer nmself

U-I CO_dl 0lO

ne

C omman der oftaeso conflicts of Une --Tiy , co ala nave

cuoority; 1nstead ofoi S] eClel cucOrizations

9.) The internal condioions in Prance wore chaructorizea • J •

a. ) the counter-movemont of the uovermsent- d° Geulle) against the Vichy-governmeno

Laval,n-exile-ctain-

b.) ho policy of collaboration (vichy). the .policy °~ tho -sistene lovement Sp-it tnto tae amoo secrete and th.ovemont;" thoreby the french peoolo 1

^u_?...bnc coups from the beginning;

(de Gaulle) "Aerquis-

verc split

.11 3U,°6. ---esuP of the Resistenc. movement tnrougn sabotage, acts of terrorism, and undor-

—°Ve-len0, first in the big cities, an d u.onthe occupation forces (murders.°f destruction), visibly since c^u couone- one war against, Russia and specifica—--

attacl

ment ofun( fro.

-48Se conditions were 6roctly favored by chu con- S-u-;d l W-konins of the occupation troops vmicn Swt In a tne outoroak of the dusten campaiAn wilich woru in Poor rolationsnip th. sizd80‘ rne area ana ne requirements for protoconon 0. -ne most 1mgortent military objcctsl.his smmo of weakness led to counter measures wmen

and t;

and the "Nacat und Noboli d to those threatening dangers

>e omcm, UO• llucn-uIcnod of •nostagos

-8- "62.2 —-an3 O1 lighting.thJ menacing spread 1.201°2esistanco and undorground iovcents in all

S - -rance and constituted the reaction to t.incTocsinelJ harsh iothods of fignting employed by.thg Patriots1’ of the country. .s long as thoL d^cns^ measures (nostages - Nacht und IUb.1) were AP liod.onl by the -ilitary Commander and depended O11y— n 13 decision, -he- did -0- nonC—,. L—,limits of responsible and firmlyI-," UO bo so strongly ith idon.of collaboration that in the late utunnO- jLnux of 41/42 me was sunmonod +A +h. -

luonccd b

-A .4 . . . . --- umo X‘ U-L..and VAS 8iven instructions that no was to wateh over the ocurity and authority of the j-or ces only, witlout reguzdtoonssnd cosidorations. 40 (thcruorir) would—..-.tn- pciicy ox collaboration with the AlaSsadorbut not with the toleration of the occupation forces.

occupation.political deliber. tim

. A-.--- events, the responsibility onlyromainodinone of bme military Coander r s sections — •u- executive, up to tn^ spring or 1942 that is as long as tio Gorman polic, (cs+0.

This situation3-

HO678 -0043

was unfortunate/ changed by a Fuehrer1 s order on 1.4. or 1.5. of 1942 so that the senior SS and Police Leader as f; r as m wes concerned certainly came under the lilitery Commander as the highest German Authority, but the technical police orders had to be given by Hinnler, the Roichsfuahrer SS and Chief of the Gurman Police. By thet the Executive was deteched from the Military Qomnandor and removed from his rosponsibility. In this connection it must be noted that Himler, already for some months with the Quartermaster-General of tho Supreme Conmand as the superior office of the Military Commander, had looked on this regulation as being of no purpose. HIMLER therefore tried to obtain ny support for this plan; I refused it and hoped by that

’ to ruin the plan. Unfortunately HIMLE succeeded in getting the Fuehrer as hcad of the Arrey to take the matter in hand himself. He commanded the presentation of an oror draught , in addition he appointed himself Quert er master-General of the Army as the adninistretive office of the Supreme Comnand. In spite of all representative against it, which I energetically supported at the wish of the Quartermaster General, the Fuchrer co.... anded the presentation of the order on the transfer of the Police authority (executive) to the Richsfuchror SS, which came into force on 1.4. or 1.5.42.

Here in the proceedings, through the indictment on 5.2.45 I first learnt of the enti-Jewisi actions in France wiich must have boon introduced in May/42 and by the end of June practically hav led to deportation. Only now nes it become clear to me why HITLER on pressure by HILEE took away the Police authority from the Military Commander, for the lattr nust on no account have anytaing to do with the deportation of Jews. That corresponded to HITLER's conceptions and methods of keeping tho Army and the military offices in evury case out of such evil tnings so that they should not be blamed for them. Ho knew thiet tno soldiers completely repudiated thes measures, they would not compromise tno Ar-y's reputation in that way. To the extremely critical situation occurred that Wehrmacht (Army) and Police stood besidocechothor and in many cases even against each other. That was very prejudicial to the fight and defense methods against sabotage, acts of terror, resistance and underground movement. This also explains why the Police made the "Nacht- und Nebel "-decree its own, witnout the eut.orization and without the knowledge of the Military Commander and used it against the stipulations, just as it went its own and disastrous way in the question of "hostages". Due to the unchecked activity of the Police in France directed by HI I :LER., both have tody become a very heavy and hithorto unknown burden for the Wcaruach (Military Cormandor and Supreme Command of the We ar. xc ht) ( Militeerbos Jhlshaber und OKW) wnich had worked on tno basic directives of the Fuchrer in both cases.

10.) Howevor, the dovestet ing results only aroso as the sequel to the aggravation of int rior conditions in France which fall into throe periods:a.) From summer of 1942 wita the beginning of the Eastern offensive

(as already explained),b.) Occupation of the unoccupied territories of Southern France after

the landings of the Anglo-anricens in lorth Africa in November 1942, c.) wit- tno beginning of the invasion of the Anglo—Americans in

Normandy after 5 June 1944.

Each of these actions resulted in the greatest unrest among the population in tho country, strengthened the rosistanco novon.nt and the acts of terror under the strongest influence of DE GAULLE and on the part of the English. The consequences of tno intensified counter-measures could not be avoided, especially es the SS—Police Regine gave itself uncroesing airs as a power f. ctor of a political nature and repressed tho influence of the Military Coumander more and ...ore ! So we came from seeking for reconciliation with the French people ( collaboration), and fro... economic and political cooparntion, to a Police govornent , to evacuation of workers (compulsory survice), under the forced toleration of the French Vichy Government which thoroby lost its last retraining respect.

- 4 -

HO678 -0044

The following suffrod le st:

a.) French agriculture, hich was holpod with nachines and fertilisers at 2 heavy cost to Gcrnen supply,

b *) consuuor goods, car and sirpleno industry, which cortainly worked for Geraen interests, but were strongly supported and suppli.c with 4u5o or -rs ( more then three billiards Reichsnark per yar).

at first, raw uate rials end special nechinos were looted which, however, were again returned in the German’s own special interest, in order to oxploit^ the a.ya.ilablc labor in the nothor country of France. in general, a healthy industry remained which was harily denegod by air attacks.

But Franco soon forgot and probe.bly construed as weelmss the generous treetuent received in the very first period of tne collaboration ( “ic- took place by greoont , up to 1942, loss of North Africa due to tne Anslo-Aorican landings). Perueps the treatment of dual control was fron.tho beginning herily suitable for obtaining a really loyal cooperation, because it was contradictory and inconsistent. Considering suc- 2 cet strophical defeat, the eruistica treaty was very generous. I mention as examples:

) return of more than 3-4 millions of prisoners of war

b.) Allowing tne entire navy, to rorain as it was,

c.) Allowing all nilit ry airplanes to rozain (under control and diszentl: , wit.; the exception of some fighter units on duty),

d.) Allowing the colonies in Africa and of the bulk of the colonial ?my in Africa, to rorpin, even a partial roinforcezent in W.st Africa.

e.) Ho extradition of war criminals,

f.) Conversion of the prisoner-of-war status into a free working condition, etc.

The

solgpzreletions with France suffered very detrinental results through nany

offices of tne Reich which tried to circumvent the Military Coanderispower of decree, ot ot appeal to "higher orders" in opposition to it

a.) Four Year Plan (GOERLITG) ,b•) Ministry for Arsauent (SPEER),C? Ainistration for direction of Labor (arbeitseinsatzvarwaltung)(saUCKEL ),e.) Minister of Communications,f.) -oD- Organization (0.T.) (Construction of coastal fortifications,

construction of airfields).

Jesijes thet the Foreign Office had connections with the French V • tue • assy (Abetz), while the French Government on its side cp-plaints enc. wishes via the Armistice Comission and the supre of the Wehrmecht (OKW ).

Government stated all

mo Commend

Thesupree Cozan: of the Wehrmacht (oxw) had to undertake official inquires lu.ss.t2 verious offices concerned for its answers to notes, as far as

P uro-y.mipitery-quostions were not concerned. Besides that there was the cuznnoi, t- PETAT- Generel v. 1BUBR0IT (Vichy) - v.AUIDSILDI (Comnender-in- .122 of the West) (Co.d.West). It is remarkable that the French notes •.ne Ar-istice Co.mission were presented as documents in many instancos, Dunever.the answers, which acc^.j ̂tg_ that do not seem to offer any possibilities foxhorcugation.

as a convinced supporter of loyal cooperation with France, KEITEL ad -lways insisted that each note should be dealt with immediately and tlat an answer

- 5 -

HO67« -0045

should be given to the Arnistice Cornission .

The anarciy which the French prosecutor emphazised and the juxtaposition of the nany German hi her offices was recognized end Lede use of by the PETAIl - Governient . The uein promoter of this metlod was HITLER who continuosly issued special authorizations with which the authorized persons embarrassed the Military Cozander.

12,) The Supreme Co.--.and. of the Wehrmacht (OKW) bore the responsibility only for the eruas as given on pa^o 3/4. Since counter-intelligence (Abwehr), propaganda and erent inspection were under the jurisdiction of the Military Cormender , communication only remained with:

a.) Aristice Corissi on (IA .St .KOM.),b.) Conener- in-Cicf West (Obrbefe.lseber West), c.) Embassy Paris, though exclusively via the Foreign Office.

The Supreme Co.mend of the Wehrnacht (OKw) dealt with protests of the Armistice Commission, but the Fuehrar poe the necessary decisions in each case. Favorable decisions were nae in many cases which concerned especially the military sphere, neinly too the lischargo of prisoners of wer of the colonial arny in Africa, the armament there etc., and many and airforce questions.Cozmunications with the military co.maners in France and Belgium, were only dealt with by the Querternsster-Genrol of the Aruy according to the orders of the Co:mander-in-Chief of the ary (Ob.D.H.) (from December 1941 MITLR himself), at times, if ordered, the Wehrmacht Administration Staff (Wehrmachtsfuehrungssteb) took over occasional transmission of his orders to the quartermaster General of the army.

I hereby certify unon oaththat I nave couunicsted the above statement to zy lofense counsel, Dr. Dr.Otto 1ELT2, accoriing to tile best of my Enowle g o end conscience.I hav been informe’ that this docuont is to be presented as affidavit to the International Milit ry Tribunal in Nuernberg. It is known to me that tho intentional or negligent giving of an incorrect statement under oath is punishable wit?. heavy penalties.

Nuernborg, 9 March 1945.s/ W. KETTELField Marshal, ret'd.

I hereby certify umon oat-:that I have co.unicate" the above statement to the defense counsel of the defendant F.ol* Marshal, retired, Wilhelm KEITEL , Dr.Dr.Otto NELTE, accor ing to te best of Ly knowledge and conscience* I hevo been inio med that this document is to be presented as 2f:devit to the Interna!: tonal Military Tribunal inTueruberg. It t i anown to me that t-e incent i onal or nolignv civing of an incorrect statement under oath is punishable with heavy penalties.

Wurmberg, 10 Merch 1943

S / A. J ODL

- 6 -

SUPPLEMENTAL DOCULENT FOR THE DEFENDANT LILHEII KRTTL»

Document K - 14

Falkenhorst for Keitel.

r o

HO678 — 0046

HO678 -0047

Aponix: to page 3, nurber 3.) f.)

Fuehrer(Suprene Comnend of

in v iCx;y--rnyOffice ) since 1 July 1941

Co;

sks of •Wehr- 1

Comnanc. of theWehruacht (OKW)

Armistice . , Co. mission Wiesbelen

Cour; Co

Corns(Abwelr)

Prop! Arnamen tog ration (Four Fear

Plan1 February 42

Cj 1 ! a IC. .T. Cj IBLAlI.GF J 'Co;. _________

March 14, 1845

I, J:BROBITSOII, -046350, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English end German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation ef the ebove document.

J.B. ROBINSON X-46350

Not ice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal

in open court end then only that portion actually submitted

as evidence.

No pas publie r avent present- tier devent lc tribunal en

audience publique et seullemont la oertie rellement vers de

au dossier.

Nicht Zu veroeffentlichen ver Darlegung vor den Goricht (Tribunal) in oeff entlichor Sitsung und dann nur jenenToil, welcher tatenechlich sur Beweisuehrung uebermit teltwurda.

He Iyxoranb 4O Toro, KaK mpeCTanJeHO na nyHOM

3acenax Tpuzyuaua M TOJIBKO ry vacTB, xoropas mpeLcTaBeEa

b kaHecTBe ORasaTeBCTa.

-0049

Document K14

Supplement to the Booh of Documents __

Defense Co-msel: Dr.066o N e l t e Defendant: Wilhelm V e i t e l

Field Marshal, ret.

H0678 - 0050

Document KU

MI/HSCH( 1324)J.Lan./R1

Synopsis of the interrogation: of General von Palkcnhorst.

24 October 1945 (AM and El)25 October 1945 (AM by Colonel AATEN

Note; Keitel also was a participant in the interrogation of 25 October.

3.) Cruelties against military men a) Keitel’s responsibility.

Falkenhorst states, that Hitler's order of 23 October 1942 (498 PS), to annihilate the Kommandos, caused him grca moral concern. His const ernabion was still greater when he had to surrender a group of English Air Landing Troops to tl SD for annihilation. (see 506 PS and 527 PS) in his endeavor to justify himself, Falkcnhorst - stated, that when he received this order in October, he had called up Keitel on the phone and tried to lodge a protest regar­ding it, but had been cut off immediately by Keitel. in November, after British prisoners had boon taken, but bcfor their execution, he called Keitel again in the attempt to prevent the execution of the soldiers, which was demanded in this order.

He does not recall the conversation exactly. Accordito his files (503 PS) he believes to have tried to keep tl soldiers back for an intcrrogation by the military security (’’Abwehr”) in order to avoid their immediate transfer to thSD, and thus to prevent an immediate execution.

In any event Keitel told him with evident indi gnatio that in applic tion of this order of Hitler the men had to

be executed.

-2-

HO678-O051

Document 14Falkcnhorst talks coarsely df Keitel, as "weak" and

as an instrument in the; hands of Hitler. He asserted, that the Armed Forces had no commander to protect them from the brutality of the Nazis. On 25 October 194-5, when Falkcn

horst was brought face to face with Keitel in cross- examination he was evasive in his replies and changed his former statements, but in the end he did not withdraw them. Keitel did not deny this conversation but disputed the topic of the conversation.

I, Dr.Karl NEUMANN,Br.Exp.F.permit No.112293, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. -

29 May 1946

Dr. Karl NEUMANNBr.Exp.permit No.112293

Ludwig KRIEGER Ober regie rung sr at Born 16th.Feb,1887

*/4e >H0678-0052

AFFIDAVIT.

Page 1

By order of Hitler a "Stenographic Service at

Fuehrer’s Headquarters" was organized in September 1942.

This office consisted of 8 Reichstag-stcnogrephors, 2 office­

workers and 7 typists. I was detailed to this service by

the Reich stag-administration from February 1943 until April

1945.

Page 3

Hitlers relations to the former Field-Marshal Keitel

were officially correct, Hitler on his part apparently

trusting him in general, and esteeming him highly and re­

specting him as a zealous co-worker, Keitel on his side was

frank and soldierly. Otherwise a friendly or confidential

note was absolutely lacking. Except for official receptions

etc. Keitel, as far as could be determind, hardly ever took

meals with Hitler or participated in informal conversations

with him. Also he was never seen to be called for inofficial

discussions at which stenographers were not present.

In prep-aring decisions of formulating orders Keitel

gave axp-ression to his opinions, even if they happened

to differ, in an objective, calm manner as befits a soldier.

He apperently knew from many years of collaboration with

Hitler the possible limits of influencing his opinions, or

decisions, or of changing his mind. For that reason he gene­

rally accepted Hitler’s decisions as orders in a soldierly

attitude. However, in individual cases he succeeded by emphatic

H0678-0053-2-

reasoning in changing decisions, or, at least in delaying

them in order to have them further examined.

Hitler, at times, did not seem to trust Keitel completely

which can be gathered from ole of his remarks made to his

most intimate circle, one evening, shortly after the assassi­

nation attempt of June 20, 1044, when he said that now, i.e.

after Keitel’s behaviour immediately after the attempted

assassination he believed, that Keitel was reliable and kr<w

nothing about the circumstances and background of the plot.

I declare on my oath that the above stater, ent is made

to the best of knowledge and consience and chat :t representsthe irulh.

n.A‘1 Camp, Ven "rimes Branch (d.nni atratlcn,

31 Merch 19 46

(signed) L udwi p K r1 e ger Oberegier ur. g : I: a i:

in the office of : cnography of the Reich: lag,

I, •2,H oV.Ve VhiIf, 4C0 . o, D 150649, hereby certify that I am thoroughly esant with the English and the

Gcrmon languages; a--, thc.t the above is a true and correct translation of Doc 1000U ho.5 April 1946

Dr. H,v.v. VEITH

AGO No D 15c (49,

COPY

JN TH CI’ OF IC.DCN; IICLID, on +his fourteenth

H0678-0054

dEv of Bc.rch One thous: n nine hunreA c.nA for tv- siy,

before me the und r signci FELIX LILI: GETN, Notary

Public thoreo , dulv admitted r.ne strorn, vrectising in

the s id City, en” Iso Commissioner to udminictcr O.ths

in the Sunr re Court of Juicctvro in Enplen1, person 1]y

cone cnd uop red GIILS RMILLY, of F. 10, Sloane venue

N- nsions, Chelsea, in the County of London, Err 3 nd af ore-

ssid, who having been bv me first duly sworn in Aue form

of if , to t' stifv the truth, the wholec truth and nothing

but the truth, made ort anA scid thut the, answers made by

him to ccch of the twelve Qucstions addressed to him rs

set out he rounder are true an’ correct g-

-• Quostion: V/oul. zOt kinly state the nertinent det; concorning zour vorson. 1 status?

,.ny er :

2. .Q”action:

An sr ur;

Age 39, British subject by birth, jour- nr l i st.

Is it correct that you ■ re the nephewof the form r Prime linister Winston Churchill, or thet you are oth rise ro] ted to him?

Yes, nebhcw.

3. Qvostion: ere you at Narvik • t Gin n troops trrive Ar1 il 19409

the time when the there on the 9th of

Ans~. ar: Yes.I

• Question: In h t capacity • ere you at Narvik at that tine?

-nSuers Daily Express War Reporter.

5- Qucstion: Wh.t cause rou to ro to Narvik at that time?

Ans /er: Instruction from the Daily Lxpress.

0- Question: Were you th' re on an assipnment?

Ansrer:_ Yes

7. Question: If so, by shorn?

Answer: Daily Fxnress

8. Qucstion: Wore you at Narvik on behalf of the press, snticipetinp rny narticular events?

H0678-0055

Answer>

9. Quostion:

Ans;. r r:

10.

* jnsor:

11. <1;r on»

Answer:

12. 'A1- i™:

Aris rs

On behalf of the Dailv Express, but not an- ticiptting cny particulor cvents.

That n:s the nature of the events which you anticipated?

See answer to ruestion 8.

Were you there because vrou expected that Britisch troops weald z rrive?

No.

If the reply to 10 ba in the af f irmctive: from whom or through vh* epcncy het you let rned that such i n English undertaking was intendon?

Sco tns cr to cuestion 10.

If the roply to 10 is negative: when and for whe.t purvosc had vrou coro to Narvik?

I vont to Nrrvik on April 5th 190 following instructions from the Daily Expr ss to rorort on the rencri l situation there and also on anv pos- siblc developments : rising out of it, should there

b-F-oF an „ct being recuired I, the said Not: rv, have nre-

pared these presents which I sirn en s001 to serre on: avcil •-■hen ■ nd where need mav reovire an’ shich, br wry of further

evidence, the said Giles Ronillv has also signed in my presence

et London aforesaid, the dav, month and year first hereinabove

ritten.

(Simen) CITES RONILLY

(Sipncd) F.‘/. CRAIN

Notary Public, Lent on.

A Commissioner to edrinistor Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature in England.

Potico.

Not to bo publicizod vntil prosontod bofore the tribunal in opon colrt and thon only that Dotion acivaly sohmi+40G as

idonco .

€A no nas " Dbicve

nvblier a ant rosontation dovant in tribunal on Sossion ot Sol’lnmont la nartie roelloment orSNA av dossior.

Nicht 7U vorooffontlichon ‘or Dalone vor Alom Goricht (rihinal) in on4 "ontli chor Sitznne vnd darn nur jenor inil, clcher tatsaechlich 7,1 r Bowroisfvehvun 7 vobermittolt vurdo.

H0678-0057

C 0 1 F IDLTIAL

United States Headquarters, BERLIN District BLRLIN , G1:1 LhN Y

Deposition of ROTRAUD ROElER

residing at BERLII’DhHLEM Koenigin-Louisestr. 91

to be read in evidence before INTERNA TI ON. L LIILITARY TRIBUNAL

appointed to meet at NUERNBERG? GEIANY

First interrogatory: How did you get krowlegege of the order for

the marking of Russian prisoners of war by branding?

Answer: I was secretary to the chief in charge of prisoners of war,

Colonel BFEER,and I saw all orders coming into the office and dis­

cussed them with Colonel BRLYLR.

Second interrogatory: Do you know that this order was rescinded

imnediatly after the defendant Field-Marshal Keitel received

knovlegdge of it?

Answer: About eight days after the order vas issued,it was revoked

by General Reinecke,I do not know,when general Keitel was notified

of the existing order.

(signed) ROTRAUD ROTIER

I certify that the above deposition was duly taken by me,and

that the above-mentioned witness,having been first duly sworn by

me,gave the foregoing answers to the several interrogatories,and

that the prescribed the foregoing desposition in my presente at

BERLIN (unleserlich) ,this 30 day of 1 arch 1046

(signed) Paul Li. (Unleserlich)lajor (unleserlich)LSST STAFF JUDGE LDVOC_TE

H0678-O058

2 -

I certify that the above-named officer is duly authorized to

administer oaths

(Hare) signed

Grigory L.HIGGINS

Lt Tol, F. k.__________Grade and organization

Asst Staff Judge Advocate Offici l Title

C 0 F I D E N TILL

1-0059

SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS FOR THE DEFENDANT VILHELM KEITEL

INTERROGATORIES FROM: ADMIRAL RAEDER.ADMIRAL DOENITZ,

HO678-006O

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal

in open court and then only that portion actually submitted

as evidence.

Ne pas publier event presentation devant le tribunal en

audience publique et seulement la prrtie rellement verse au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht

(Tribunal) in oeff entlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen

Toil, welchor tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermitteltwurde.

He Iy6JKOBaTb 1O Toro, KaK npenc TanJ eno na IySJIUHOM

3aceAaHM TpuyHaa I TOJIBKO Ty vacTE, Koropas mpeCTaBeHa

B FavecTBe HoKa3aTeJBCTBa.

HQ678-0061

Questions put 1 to Gross Adiral Raeder (retired)by Dr.Nelte

Q.1:_ Are you acquainted with the decree of 4th February 1938 creating the High Command of the Armed Forces (OK.) and appointing Field Marshal Keitel Chief of the OK 7?

A.: Yes

Q 2 •------- DO You remember the diagram "Organization of the German Armed Forces”?

A.; Yes. .

9,3: Do you consider the graphic representation of the OK 7 to be correct?

A. ? No.

Q. 4? Why not?

A,: Because, according to the drawing, the OK7 appears as an intermediate office between the Fuehrer, as

Supreme Commander, on the one hand and on the other, the three branches of the Armed Forces.

Q - 38 That was the actual relation?

The OK. was the personal military staff of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and not an independent office, not an independent authority.

2,5: How would you describe the institution of the OKTT from the military point of view?

A:: The OT7 aS the staff of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Supreme Commander was Adolf Hitler.Field Marshal Keitel was Chief of Staff of the Supreme commander, thcreforc, he himself was not commander.

-1-

H0678-0062

Q. 7: Did Field Marshal Keitel have the power of command?

A.: As any Chief of Staff, he had the power of commandover the staff itself, i.e., over his office and departmental chiefs.In ministerial matters, for which the OKJ was com­petent and which were transferred to the OKW from the former Ministry of War (RKM) the OKI had the authority to issue instructions. Matters of this kind were for instance; military legislation, Armed Forces reserves, defence, motor transport. It is of course, obvious that Field Marshal Keitel, as every other Chief of a Staff, could give orders and issue instructions, only on the basis of a general or special order by his Commander, Adolf Hitler.

9.8: And if they were signed by Field Marshal Keitel?

A.8 Then he did so "on the instructions" or "by order" of the Fuehrer, as the decree of 4 February 1958 states.

Q.9: What was the relation in rank?

A.: The rank of the General Field Marshal correspondsto the rank of Grand Admiral and within the same rank was below the commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces.

2.10: Do you know whether the Fuehrer on the one hand and the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces on the other respected these relations in authority or whether the actual procedure was different

A.: The Fuehrer as well as the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces naturally attached great importance to it. Tney were not to accent any orders from Field Marshal Keitel as Chief of the OKIT.

9.11: Do you know what the official relations were between FM Keitel and the Fuehrer, I mean, do you know how the Fuehrer thought of these official relations, when he made FM Keitel Chief of the OK7 and how they were maintained later on? Was FM Keitel to be what a Chief of tne General Staf£ is in relation to his Commander?

-2-

H0678-0063

R-"A. ; In my opinion, no. Lhe Fuehrer did not want

FII Keitel to be his military adviser, such as a Chief of the General Staff is. Certainly FNI Keitel was to give him information on military matters (with exception of strategy).

He was to see that the naturally extensive machinery, which the OKW comprised, worked in an orderly manner. He was, therefore, the Chief of a military office (Militaer-Kanzlei) .

9.12: who was or who were the military advisers to the Fuehrer?

A.: In matters concerning the entire Wehrmacht, it was FI Keitel, except in strategic and operational questions. With regard to those, it was General Jodi. In matters concerning the individual branches of the Wehrmacht, whether of an operational or other nature, the main advisers to the Fuehrer were the Conmand ers in Chief of the branoh of the Tehrmacht concerned. For the land-war in the East, it was the Chief of the Army General Staff.

9.13: How is the extent of work of Field Marshal Keitel to be judged?

A:: The work was very extensive and difficult,especially during the war. It was also very thankless work because often it consisted in presenting complaints to Hitler and in ironing out difficulties which, according to experience ,only seldom leads to the satisfaction of all concerned. Field Marshal Keitel was a tireless worker.

. 14? Has he suited to his position?

A:- He was suited to his post, as Hitler throught.

•^5:Ho you believe that Field Marshal Keitel could havemade his opinions felt?

A: Ho. As a rule, Hitler insisted on his point of view with the greatest tenacity. If he once declared: "It is my irrevocable decision", any contradiction was impossible.

HO678-0064

2.16: What could or should Field Marshal Keitel have done in order to make his opinions felt? In particular was there not the possibility of resigning from office?

A: The Fuehrer often stressed the point of view that aGeneral, just like every other soldier was not allowed to leave his post, He, Hitler, alone had to decide upon this.

& 17How do you explain the fact that Field Marshal Keitel could not prevent the issuing of many orders, which did not correspond to the generally prevailing opinion in the Wehrmacht?

A.: His position as Chief of Staff was too weak asagainst the Fuehrer. The orders mentioned almost exclusively concerucd the Army. The Army, however, had no Commander in Chief who could prevail against the opinions of the Fuehrer, since the Fuehrer after 1941 was, himself, Commander in Chief of the Army. When he issued a directive with his threefold authority as Head of the State, Supreme Command er

of the entire Wehrmacht and as Commander in Chief of the Army, by far the largest branch of the Armed Forces, then Field Marshal Keitel could only state his objections, but he had no power to prevail with his objections.

I assert in place of oath to have answered the above questions to the best of my knowledge and belief.I have been informed that this document is to be submitted as an affidavit to the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg. I am aware that intentionally or unintentionally malting an incorrect affidavit is a severe punishable offence.

Nuernberg 19 March 1946

signed: Erich Raeder.

1, Clare Boulter P.O. , TRNS. No. 59549 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages} and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.

17 May 1946-4-

H0678-0065

Questions to Gross Admiral Doenitz ( retired).

Q. 1; Are you acqinted with the decree of 4th February 1938crea-

ting the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKT) and appointing

Field Marshal Keitel Chief of the OK17?

A.: Yes

Q. 2: Do you remember the diagram ’’Organization of the German

Armed Forces”?

A.: Yes.

Q»3: Do you consider the graphic representation of the OKU to

be correct?

A.: N° •0.4: TThy not?

A.: Because, according to the drawing, the OK’" appears as an

intermediate office bettreen the Fuehrer, as supreme Co.-

mander, on the one hand and on the other, the three bran­

ches of the Armed Forces.

0.5: ’'hat was the actual relation?

A. : The 0KT" was the personal military staff of the Supreme

Commander of the Armed Forces and not an independent offic

not an independent authority.

0* : Hov would you describe the institution of the DKTT from

the military point of view?

A.:_ The OK was the staff of the Supreme Commander of the

Armed Forces. The Supreme Commander was Adolf H.tler.

Field marshal Keitel was Chief of Staff of the Supreme

Commander, therefore, he himself vras not commander.

Q.7: hat was the official relation to the Commanders in Chief

of the branches of the Armed Forces?

A.: The were directly subordinate only to the Supreme Commanc

of the Armed Forces, Hitler.

-1-

H0678-0066

Q.88 Whet was the relation in rank?A, As regards rank the Chief of the OKW was in principle

below the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces.

Q»9« Bid Field Marshal Keitel have the power of command? A,: As any Chief of Staff, he had the power of command

over the staff itself, i.e., over his office and departmental chiefs.In ministerial matters, for which the OKW was competent and which were transferred to the OKW from the former Ministry of War (RKM) the OKW had the authority to issue instructions. Matters of this kind were for instance: military legislation, Armed Forces reserves, defence, motor transport. It is of course, obvious that Field Marshal Keitel, as every other Chief of a Staff, could give orders and issue instructions, only on the basis of a general or special order by his Commander, Adolf Hitler.

Q♦IC: And if they were signed by Field Marshal Keitel?A.: Then he did so "on the instructions" or "by order" of

the Fuehrer, as the decree of 4 February 1938 states.Q. 11 ? Bo you know whether the Fuehrer on the one hand and

the Comm nders in Chief on the other respected these relations in authority or whether the actual procedure was different?

A.; The Fuehrer as well as the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces naturally attached great importance to it. They were not to accept any orders from Field Marshal Keitel as Chief of the OKW.

2

Q• 12 ; Do you knov v/hat the official relations vrere between FM Keitel and

the Fuehrer, I mean, do you know how the Fuehrer thought of these

official relations, when he made FM Keitel Chief of the OKW and how

they were maintained later on ? Was F Keitel to be what a Chief of

the General Staff is in relation to his Commander ?

A.: In my opinion, no. The Fuehrer did not want FM Keitel to be his

military adviser, such as a Chief of the General Staff is. Certainly

FM Keitel was to give him information on nilitary matters (with ex­

ception of strategy), likewise he was to gather information and,

assemble particulars. He was to see that the naturally extensive

machinery, which the OKV comprised, worked in an orderly manner.

He was, therefore, the Chief of a military office (ilitaer-Kanzlci)

Q. 13 : Who was or who were the military advisers to the Fuehrer ?

A.: In matters concerning the entire Wehrmacht, it was FM Keitel, ex­

cept in strategic and operational questions. kith regard to those,

it was General Jodi. In n ters concerning the individual branches

of the ehrmacht, whether of an operational or other nature, the

main advisers to the Fuehrer were the Comnanders in Chief of the

branch of the .chrmacht concerned. For the land-war in the East, it

was the Chief of the Army General Staff.

Q. 24 ; vas his not a very thankless task ? I mean, thankless insofar as

Fl Keitel was often in the position of having to present objections

and complaints, which were to be made to the Fuehrer

and that then it often happened that he had to put up with the Fuehrer’s reaction to these objections and complaints; on the other hand, in that he was considered and described by the authorities, who had raised these complaints and objections, as a man who could not make his opinions felt?

A:: Yes, that is correct. He was always having to settleclashes which arose and this brought him small thanks.

912.2 Do you believe that Field Marshal Keitel could have made his opinions felt?

A.: No. As a rule, Hitler insisted on his point of view with the greatest tenacity. If he once declared: "It is my irrevocable decision", any contradiction was impossible.

9:16.: hat could or should Field Marshal Keitel have done in orcer to make his opinions felt? In particular was therc not the possiblity of resigning from office?

° The Fuehrer often stressed the point of view that a General, just like every other soldier was not allowed to leave his post. He, Hitler, alone had to decide upon this.

9•17•: How is the extent of work of Field Marshal Keitel to be judged?

Ax — The work was very extensive, especially during the war. Field Marshal Keitel was a tireless worker.

9.18.8 Was he suited to his position?

A.: He was suited to his post, as Hitler throught.9.19.2 How do you explain the fact that Field Marshal Keitel

could not prevent th- issuing- of many orders, which did not correspond to the generally; prevailing opinion in the Wehrmacht?

HO678-0068

k*: His position as Chief of Staff was too weak as against the Fuehrer.

The orders, mentioned almost exclusively concerned the Army. The

Army, however, had no Commander in Chief who could prevail against

the opinions of the Fuehrer, since the Fuehrer after 1941 was, himself,

Commander in Chief of the Army. When he issued a directive with his

threefold authority as Head of the State, Supreme Commander of the

entire Tehrmacht and as Commander in Chief of the Army, by far the

largest branch of the Armed Forces, then Field Marshal Keitel could

only state his objections, but he had no power to prevail with his

objections.

I herewith declare under oath:

that the questions put before me by Dr. Dr. Otto Nelte, the Defense

Counsel for Field Marshal Keitel (rtd) have been answered to the best

of my lmnowledge and ability.

I have been informed that this document is .to be submitted as an

affidavit to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg.

I am aware that intentionally or unintentionally making an incorrect

affidavit is a severe punishable offence.

Nuernber c 15 March 1946

signed (Karl Doenitz)

-5-

ha • 1,11%

H0678-0070

SUPPLEIENTAL DOCUMENT FOR THE DEFENDINT KEITEL.

INTERROGATORY FROM GEORGE s/ • ESSERSMITH.

H0678-0071

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant presentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulment la partie reellement verse au dossier.

Nicht zu veroef f entlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (‘Tribunal ) in oeff entlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

He "6JMKOBaTb 40 Toro, xaz npezcraBeHO na ny6JMUHOM

3acepaHun Tpxysaua n TOJIBKO ry uactb, koropas mpegcrassenaB KauecTBe OKa3aTLCTBa ,

1-0072

United Mexican States .) Mexico, Federal District;

Embassy of the United )States of America )

GEORGE.S. MESSERSMITH, being first duly sworn, deposes

and says as follows in answer to the interrogatories

adessed to him by counsel for General Field Marshal Keitel:

During my residence in Berlin, and during my later

fresquent visits there as stated in my prior affidavits,

I saw Field Marshal Keitel and spoke to him in one or

mo be occasions.However, I kept no diary and I am unable

to state with particularity when and where the meeting

or meetings occurred, the capacity in which Field Mar­

shal Keitel there appaered or the topic or topics of

our conversation. My judgement on Keitel expressed in

my prior affidavit is based on personal knowledge, and

on the general knovledge which I obtained from the many

sources described in my prior affidavits.

signed : MESSERSMITH Subscribed and sworm to before me W.John Wilson, Jr.,

Vice Consul of the United States

of America, duly commissioned anaquarriea,------- ■-------------- in Mexico,D.F., Mexico, this

3rd day of April 1946 ( signed: W.John Wilson,Jr.

Vice Consul of the United States

of America

Service No. 3588 Tariff No. 38 No fee prescribed.

SUPPIEMENTAL DOCUMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT KEITEL

H0678-0074

Totice,

Not to be published until presented before the- tribunal

in open court and then only that portion actually submitted

as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant presentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et sei.loment la pertie rellement vers gau dossier.

I icl • Eu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tri unal) in ooffentlicner sitzung and dann nur jenen

Tcil, walcher tetssochlich zur Beweisfvohrung uebermitto :1twurde.

He IyJIO2aTB zo ToTO -a- -DeCTaBeHO Ha. IIY5UHOM3"16a1 TPu6aa-a " To-k0 Ty ^0T£> xoTopa.s ipezctsbjzera

b Kavec TB e . A Ora 3 a T eJ3 cTa,

H0678-0075

Dawn iont Do. 21

SUl-LE-IIT to

DoCUIT3OOK

defense Counsel: Dr. Dr. Otto DDL ID

Defendant: Ficld lershal (Retla)

w#1ho1- EITEL

H0678-0076

COl Y

DIR FUJTRER Fuehrer Headquerters 20 July 1944.

Effective at once, I appoint Reichsfuehrer SS HIDILLER es Co:ender

of the Replacenent Arny end delegete to hin herewith all appropriate

powers in respect to nenbers of the replacement orny.

The Reichsfuehrer SS HIlDLR furthernore vrill exercise over the

replacement arny all powers as disciplinary superior and as

judieial authority which are those of the Supreme Commandor of the

Army.

DER FUZZIRER

signed: Adolf HITLER

H0678-0077

I herewith affirm in lieu of oath:

The above document is the verbatim copy of the Fuehrer Decree of

20 July 1944. It is knovm to ne thnt tills docunent is to be submitted,

to the International Military Tribunal in lTuernberg as evidence.

I know that the premeditated or careless deposition of a felse

effiration in lieu of oath is liable to severe penally.

Nuernberg, 21 May 19-1-6

eAgned: W. EEITEL

- 3 -

H0678-0078

UPFLElENTAL DOCUENTS FOR THE DEFENDNNT KEITEL,

- 22

H0678-0079

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribune!

in open court c.nd then only thet portion actually submitted

as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant presentation devant le tribunal en

audience publique et seulement la pertie reellement vers deau dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Garicht (Tribunal) in oeff ontlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen

Teil, welcher tetsacchlich zur Bewisfuchrung uebermitte .1twurde.

He "°J*o3aT” ToPo, xax rpo,cTazje0 sa32cexazz ^Sy^a « ty vacts, xoropak ttpozctabzona

B kauecrne Zoxazarexcrga,

H0678-0080

DOCUENT K 22

S u n n 1 c n e n t to

nccur?ent Book

D/fcnso Counsel: Dr. Dr. Otto NELTE

,^cf rn^: nt: Field Marshal (Ret’a)Wilhelm KEITEL

2273 2 c Paris, 15th April L946H0678-0081

TESTIMONY c( •

COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE SL7NE DEP.JjpSNT

This seventeenth day of Arril

in the Year Nineteen Hundred and Forty Six

before us Pierre Marchat,

the Investigating Magistrate at the Court of Justice in the

Seine Department, at our Paris Office, assisted by Laurent

Edouard, sworn assistant clerk.

Appenred the witness hereinafter named whom we informed

of the facts on which he has to +estify.

Being summoned in the absence of the Defendant, after

having been served with the summons to be given to him, and only the truth

s' orn upon onth to tell the truth 4 and having been asked by

us for names, surnames, ago, profession and address, whether

he is a ser nt, a relative or a connection to the parties

in Question and in what respect, the witness rerlied to us

and testified as follows:

Having been informed that we re :ecting in compliance

with the directives of the Chief French Prosecutor at the

International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg.

SGAPINI, George, 53 years of age, Ex-Ambassador of

France, 79 rue do la Tcur a Paris

testifies: The ten ouestions put to ne by the Counsel for the

Defense of Marchal KEITEL have been communicated to me.

1-0082

I considered it right to ans er them in writing and I rm

suhmitting to you the replies which I think it my duty to

moke to these ouestions.

In ans r to the cuestion of the Chief French Prosecutor

I beg to inform you that, in truth, I have completely lost my

eyesight as a result of the touls which I received during

the crmpnign 19141919.

It seems to me furthermore that the fact that for four­

teen years I ves President of the Union for the tar-Blind

would be sufficient to establish this.

READ, CCNFE. ED AND SIGNED

Signed: G, SC.PINI

P, ItRCH.T

E, LAURENT

HO678-0083

Paris, 15 April 1946

1. IS IT CORRECT TEL.T IS EXTRAORDINARY PLENIPOTENTION:RY TO THE

GERMAN GOVERNMENT YOU 1 EFE EIIRUr ‘TD BV TIE FRENCH GOVERN

ATNT (VICEY) TO DISCUSS FROELE s : GRIEVANCES CONCERNING

TFT TBNCH PRISONERS IN GERMANY?

It is correct th: t bv c letter - detod the 31 July 1940

•nd which I received on 30 August L940, Marshal PETAIN asked

me to contact the occunction authorities and the Reich Govern-

rent in order to straighten out certain difficulties vhich

might eventu. ly arise in connection vith the fate of our

prisoners of war.

That the French n* Germer Govern’ ent cAerd that as from

10 December 1940, Fr- nce vouli take upon herself in protec-

tion of her prisoners of Vor according to the vrincinles of

the Geneva Convention and that I ns to be entrusted with

this ne" mission which un to the present roment hrd been

assuemod by the United States of imericc.

And th; t I actually assured this rission as 16 December 1940.

11. IS IT CORRECT, THAT IN THIS CAP/CITY, YOU OFTEN NEGOTIATED

LITH THE GENERAL REINECKE AND TL..T FE, AS CHIEF OF THE LAR

PRISONERS SECTION AT THE HQ’S. OF THE 1EHNIE/.CHTS HIGH COACND

HD ALLEYS RISPONDED KINDI,Y TO FROEIEI'S AND GRIEVANCES

BROUGHT BEFORE HTM?

It is correc , that General Reinecke exemined objectively

1 nd without hostility all the problens that were brought

before him and nlvays tried to settle them with understanding

when they depended upon his sole jurisdiction. It was differ­

ent when pressure was exercised upon the OK1 by the Labour

Department or sometimes by the Party.

III. IS IT CORRECT, THAT YOU AND THE IEI'BIRS OF YOUR DELEGATION

VERE ENTIRELY FREE TO CORRESPOND ’ ITH ALI THE PRISONER C.MPS

AND LABOUR KOTLNDOS AND HAD FREE ACCESS TO THE?

1 .) Yes, in principle, but our correspondence was given to

the German Foreign Office which sent it through the OKU

to be delivered to the cemps where it vas submitted for the

third time to the censorship of the local Kommandanturs.

The same p: ceedings were used by tZ International Cormittce

of the Red Cross and other protecting powers for prisoners

of war belonging to other nationalities.

2 .) Yes, we are allowed access inside the camps.

IV. IS IT CORRECT THT VOU YOURSELF AND MEMBERS OF YOUR DELE­

GATION VISITED THE CATTS AND LABOU: contANTOS AN COULD

SFK TO THE PRISONERS WITHOUT TITESSES?

A.) Yes, as far os OK gave its permission to travelling

pluns submitted to them on the other hand our visits were

not as often as we should have "'iked them to be on account

of:

H0678-0085

1 .) The limitation of the number of our delegates by 10

and then 15,

2 .) The nsufficient number of Ge.men officers a ve il-

oble for escort or the transport difficulties.

3 .) The interruptions of visits ordered by OKU which

hcppened several times:

a) in the winter of 1942-1942; for about a whole

month certain "Uehrkreis" were closed to visitors

on account of epedemics of spotted fever.

b) in May 1942, soldiers’ conns (stalugs) wore

closed to visitors for about 5 months, officer

conns (Oflogs) for about 9 months, violating

the ogrecment of Gent va in spite of numerous

protests.

I c) 8 October 1944, final cessation of visits to

ctrrs on account vith our refusal to recognise

'-he Governmental Commissi on of Sigmaringen.

b) It is correct that ve could srock to prisoners with­

out vitness.

V. IS IT CORRECT TH..T IN THC FRENCl CAIFs THERE MERE TRUSTED MEN

CHOSEN BY THE PRISONERS THEITSETTS 1 HO COULD APPLY TO YOU IF THERE

ERE ANY COMPLAINTS TO BE MADE?

Yes, rt leust at the time when he could control it precisely.

VI. TS IT CORRECT THIT FOR L.CH 11 TTAR- REGION FRENCH OFFICERS

OF A CERTAIN ICE CHOSEN BY YOU ’ ERE AT YOUR DISPOSAL AS YOUR

REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED 1 ITH . ECLL PASSES BY THE SUPREME

COMMAND OF TH IEHRILCHT AND COULD TRAVEL ABOUT FREELY IN

SLRCH OF A JU FRISOIERS?

Yes, with one or two exceptions officers chosen by me were at my

H0678-00 86

disposal c my rerresentotives. The” had passes issued by OKV

and could move about freely in mi’ itary regions assigned to them

provided prrmission be granted to them by the military authorities

to which they were subjected. "hey were admitted only to cemps and

"commandos" of war prisoners. These officers were placed at my

Hisnos: 1 in October 1942. For the first time they were confirmed

by OKI; to the ct mp assigned to them in November 1943; then they

were again imprisoned at Oflag VI A till they were liberated by

American troops.

VII. IS IT CORRECT THT YOU COULD IFSCMBLE THESE FRENCH OFFICERS ANT

HOLD CONFERENCES LITH THEIT I IT: UT CONTROL AND ACTU ILY DID SO?

Yes.

VII’.DO YOU THINK TH..T THE SUTREIT COMLND OF THE I.EHRILCHT

EX.IAED ATTENTIVELY .II THE COLLINTS PRESENTED TO THEM .J© GAVE

THEM SATI .CTION IF THEY SIDIED DELL FOUNDED?

Yes, OK examined attentively all complaints. As to their

"giving them satisfaction if they appeared rec sonable”

it is hard to cnsvrer this cuestion because, whilst we c

considered that the complaints vre presented were reason-

able, the OKW rejected some of them as non-founded. There

would hove to be a judge to estimate whether they were

reasonable or not or else an exact definition of a reason­

able complaint.

IX. DO YOU THINK TH.T COLLBOTL.TICII DITH THE CHIEF OF THE SECTION

OF VIR PRISONERS OF THE SUFRLIE CO. MAND OF THE UEERMLCHT tis

ENTIRELY LOY..L?

I consider it as such so long as the German Labour Office

or party did not interfere or press upon the OK1..'. But it

is not ce rectIv speaking a ouesticn of collaboration bur

HO678-0087

rather a cuestion of conpuring two points of views. The Chief

of the war prisoner Section of OKW defended loyally the Ger-

r n point of view, at the sone tine l defended loyally the

interests of the French war prisoners.

X. DO YOU THINK, TH.T THIS COLLABOR.TTON ‘ AS INTERRUPTED ONLY

AFTER THE LANDING OF THE AMERICANS IN NORTH AFRICA?

I don’t remember any not;hie ch; nge at the tine.

H0678-0088

r

DOCULENT K 23

D o c it m ent-Book 2

S u p p l e n ent

Defense counsel;

Defende nt;

Dr. Otto NELTE

Field Marshsl,retired, ".1EITEL

H0678-0089

Questions asked of Vice-AImiral (ret) 3 u e r k n e r 2

former Chief of Office group Foreign Countries in the Count?

Intelligence Service (Chef Amtsgruppe Ausland im Amt Auslan

Abwehr (Chief, admiral -Canaris) on the occasion of th

deposition of the witness Dr. Bernd Gisevius .

A. Dr. Gisevius in answe. to questions put to him by the pro

secution stated, basing on alleged informations by the

High Command . (OKW) , that:

1 .) Keitel had been one of the most influential men of th Third Reichs

2 .) he had held one of the most influential positions, an that

1

3 .) he had exercised an enormous influence upon the army.

4 .) Furthermore ,. Dr. Gisevius assented that field marshal Keitel had surrounded Hitler by a ring of silence and by such means prevented that reports concerning abuse and complaints should not reach Hitler.

5 .) Lastly, Dr. Gisevius stated that field marshal Keitel had treated his subordinates - chiefs of offices and partments and the like - badly and that ho had even

threatened them, .with the Gestapo.

You had owing to your insight into the actual conditions the

possibility, to judge for yourself whether this description

of the field marshal’s position is true. I should appreciate

your answering these questions as fully as possible. I am

interested in your giving these answers as objectively as pos

sible, and whenever possible, quoting concrete details, plea

keep in mind that it does not matter what another person wo

perhaps have done according to his own character, but that

the point at issue is what field marshal Keitel actually did

and how he acted in the position he held and as tho individu

he was.

- 1 -

H0678-0090

1 an in a position to answer these questions only as

far as the former German armed forces are concerned and

only insofar as their relations to' the German Foreign

Office are involved, as I did not have anything to do

with other offices.

Field Marshal Keitel had "power” over his staff exelusiv,

viz, the OK* and the military offices immediately sub­

ordinate to it; furthermore, Hitler transferred to him,

as far as I know, after the withdrawal of Field Marshal

v, Brauchitsch, the latter’s authority as a minister of

war., so that he was empowered to exercise such autho­

rity by order of the Supreme Commander of the Army

(Ob. d. E.) The OE, as a factor of power, was far be­

hind the High Commanders of the Air Force and Navy and

also of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. All

these watched most anxiously that nothing was changed

in this situation, not to speak of the Keich Fuehrer an

the affen-SS. In this connection it is most indicative

that Himmler continued to seize upon large parts of the

OKl, and without Field Marshal Keitel having any pos­

sibility to defend himself, (Counter-intelligence, P.o.t

matters),

A) Intho_main, considering conditions in Germany only

the influence upon Hitler was determining. According to

the opinion of all officers who were in the know, such

an influence was very small, insofar as the person of

Field Marshal Keitel is concerned. Birring the last year;

it obviously was nil,

B) Any influence of the Chief of OKU upon the Air Force

and the Navy was impossible, owing to the strong po­

sition of their C-i-C’s.

H0678-0091

Owing to the fact that the Chief of the General Staff

of the Army, of the Chief of the Army Personnel Dept,

and of the Field Army Conmanders reported immediately to

Hitler the same can be said of the major part of the arm

c) As Colonel-General Jodi often said, Field Marshal Kei

tel had no influence upon the operational activity of th

operational staff of the armed forces (.F.St.)

What has been said sub l.) is v- lid for the rest of OK..

D) The Chief of OE. was very much intent upon a non-into

feronce with matters pertaining to the Foreign Office, t

which I was delegated as a liaison officer. This wont s

far that all subordinate military offices had been order

to keep out, in a very large noasure , of all matters pc

taining to Foreign Policy. This led repeatedly to great

difficulties, for instanco with the military, naval and

air attache's, as well as with the "German generals"

assigned to the allied countries.

I had no insight into the events concerning foreign poll

at the Fuehrer Head Quarters.In our sector, however, I

could observe how much Field Marshal Keitel was intent

upon not meddling with the Roich Foreign Minister in

questions of foreign policy. I am, therefore, of the opi

nion that any influence of the Chief of C T upon decisiv

questions of foreign policy was out of the question.

To 3. Keitel's influence upon the army follows from the answer

to 1., it was small. The Commander of the Replacement

Army, Colonel-General Fromm, was a very self-assured,

strong man, difficult to handle.

- 3 -

H0678-0092

To 4.

To 5.

He once told me himself that he strongly opposed Field

Mershal Keitel. Accordingly, there is no doubt, that t

Chief of OK had to reckon with a considerable resista,

of Colonel-General Fromm whenever he wanted to exert

his influence upon the replacement army. hen Himmler

became Commander of the replacement army, Keitel's po­

sition became still more difficult.

I cannot judge from my own experience, whether Field

Iershal Keitel had formed a ring of silence around Hit­

ler and accordingly had prevented that Hitler received

any reports concerning abuses and complaints. I do not

think it possible, in fact, for the entire military

sphere. I only know that my office chief, Admiral Ca­

naris, was seeing Hitler less and loss as the years

passed by. But, in my opinion, this was mainly rather

due to Canaris himself.

I do not know anything about bad treatment of his sub­

ordinate Chiefs of offices and departments by lior-

shrl K itol. If he used bad language rather often, suci

was considered as not more than customary among soldi

To me Ficld Marshal Koitol was always particularly com­

panionable. Admiral Canaris in spite of his frequent

fits of anger called him "Papa”, the two men were very

friendly and companionable to one another.

I do not know anything about threats with the Gestapo.

I have not been able to learn whether Field Marshal

Keitel intervened upon my request, and, if so, in what

manner, on behalf of the oavelry captain of the reserv

Ambassador Br, K i c p , whom he knew personally and wi

was sentenced to death.

- 4 -

H0678-0093

On the contrary, I ltnon thet among other thinge, the

Chief of OIW inbervened unambiguously in writins on b

hel£ of the then LIsjor-General Troiherr von Butbler,

of the Armed Forccs 0gerational Staff, whon this letter

wes attacked in wri- . ng by the Reichsf uehror 55.

Concluding I should like to state the following:

A 3 It is true thet 11 offices mentionod, including

the Foreign Office, watched with the eyes of Argue

that nothing Wee taken away iron them by the OKl;

but this did not prevent thot all unpleasant end

unsetisf ectory natters voro devolved, if at 11

possible, to the OK, particularly so, when .'ey

had to be rcpori.d to hitler. Adairal Cennri , toe

often bitterly complnined "bout this.

B.) During the entire.- wer, I never not any off cor who

night hevc been milling to take upon hims If vo­

luntarily the thorny office of Chief of C.. . e

(signod) Buorkner

I. Buerk nor)

uernberg, 28 June 1946

For the correctness of tho copy 3

(illegible)

H0678-0094

Docuhent K 24

Document book - 2

supplementary

Defense Counse. : Dr. Dr, Otto Nelte

Defendant • Fieldmarshal rot. W. Keitel

K 21,

H0678-0095

J 0 D L Nuernberg, 17 June 1946

Affidavit b,' the

former Col. Ge- ral Jodi

I know the former Fieldmarsha. . ilhellm Keitel since 1932 and for allmost »

10 years, during peace and vrartic, he was my direct superior. Thus I be­

lieve to know him better than all other witnesses, especially in view of

th. fact that I was well acquaitod with his fanily and entered into clos

personal relations with him.

1.) Keitel, in his capacity as Chi of the U chachtsaut and later a Chief

of the OKW, was the head of an office which, from the beginning t .S litt

liked by the arny, navy and air force and was even bitterly contested b]

the Chief of Staff of the armd forces.

As long as this working staff of the War Linistor and labor of the Fuchi

Limitod itself. to deal with questions concerning the Adr linisbey, vrhici

in the chrmacht had to be regulated individually, he remaincd in his

position unchallenged.

When however, he prcceaded to cS abllish an operational departrent in ordc:

to maintain a unified cormand ovor the Wehrmacht, the Wehrnacht componon

allarmlingly viewed this as endangering the independence of their various

co: poncnts, the Commanding officers of which claimed for themselves the

ri ht to be and to remain the only and direct advisers to the Supreme

Commander of the lichrmacht in all matters concorning the conduct of war.

H0678-00 96

Even thou h von BLonborg as we1. cs later Hitler had a different conccptio:

about the direction of the Wchrna.cht and desired a personal staff-v_.it for

a unified maintenance of the whimacht, the various components of the

Vchrmacht saw in the person of Keitel an ambitious Gencral, who wclcomed

suc'> a solution in order to appear as a strategic genius. This, however

is incorrect, for Keitel constantly rather belittled than enlarged his

capacities in this field towards me and he felt more even to the ta: : as

an experienced organiser, in vihici. he excelled.

Thus it can be explained, that Keitel was subjected to general criticism,

not on account of his person but by reason of ocing the possessor of an

unpopular office,

2.) Keitel as superior.:

Fioldmarshal ret. Keitel was wel liked by his subordinates; he left them

a great amount of freedom, vras rilable without ever being severe, worked

like a horse himself, helped his subordinates whenever and wherever he

could and I have never heard any isapproving remarks about hin as is

customarily the case, from the chiefs of deparbmonts subordinated to

him uring time of peace.

H0678-0097

Of the Chiofs directly subordi. ated to Koito], I have seen during the

war moru frequently only Adniral Canaris, General R e i n i c l

a: ' Gencralobcrstabsrichter Dr. L e h m a n n . The formor two never

said a dissenting word about Keitel. Lehmann corplaincd several times

that Keitel could not prevail upon Hitler and that he was not in -sitio.

to convince the Fuehrer of the necessity of strict court martial ] nish-

ment for all violations of Gcruan soldiers even in the Last and it the

fight against partisans.

L e h I a n n once declared : .„citel is so courageous, that he would

oppose a lion with his bare fists* towards Hitler, however, he is as

helpless as a child.

3.) K e i t e l as the subordinate of the Fuehrer . ‘ •-■will ■ I ■ >| « ■■ ■ * .1 • * * --- ---- --- --ue--- -------------- • • -- e ♦ +-

4

His not very strongly deva lope wilLlpovrer was dominated by the tronend-

ous energy of the Fuehrer’s willpower. Of course he often vigorously

opposed the Fuehrer in the beginning of tho vor, UThen, however, Hitler

be ame personal and so insulting that he had to feel ashamed before the

younger officers present when his requests for resignation wore re­

jected, he bocamc re signed and avoided cvorything that would leac so

such degrading scenes.

H0678-0098

He sought rclugc in his vrork ■ .d opposed the Fuchrr 01; , ..:.c21

with hin.His accented court' 3,- towards Hitler as wrc]l as c-i-8s Sc

officers o.g. von Run ds tcdt, noy often have been the cause

for scornful critizisn, espe - tally by the youngur offajur ...

4.) Keitel as hun being .

with all his ph y sic al robustacss, Kci. I was a sensitive being c. ' th.n

was no trace in his nakcup of brutal and cruel disposition. He was

grieved by the death of his son and daughter and the onsicty foi hts

wife during the boobing attacks on Berlin weighed heavily upon Lin, He

Wos hapBy whon he could bestow plcasuros upon other people and ho vras

unhappy vhen conflicts cros bu ween Hitler and the Tchrnacht and

between the Ox. and other c’dices. : • was hin alone who, during the

attempt of assassination on . ulor on 20 July 1941, took him hit: his

arms and ccInly and cautiously led hin amy like a child, - the first

unforgettable observation I ..ado upon rogainiz.g cor_c:

H0678-I

- 5 -

He supported the forily of Adnirel C c. n aris after his rriLc esuc.

he Vas effective in securing rom Hinmcr decent treat. -nt Pc:.

families of officers convicted after the 20 July.

He was no "murdercr", ro " xxecutionc.", he was a dubful oh dim

soldier, nuch too soft and too econt for Hitler, but hen st, true

and ready to help.

This is ny judgement of Keitel, vhich is not dictated by mi, nd-

ship or compassion, but by f •. blicntion, to truthfully correct a dis­

torted picture.

(sicncd) : Alfred Jodi

I declare herewith in place of oath : tho above affidavit was made by

me to the best of my lnowlodgo. It is lmovm to ne that bLis ocucnt

is to be submitted to the IMT in Nuurnborg as cvidene . I om c: yc : a

the vrongful. er negligent making of on incorrect statement is ecverclr

punishable.

(signed) : Alfred Jodi

Nuernberg, 37 June 1946

H0678-0100

Documcnt I 25

Anncxto

Looumcnt- 7 o■2 :2Defence Consol: Ir. Dr. Otto Nolto

Defendar 02 Ficl d Marslnl a.-, TT.TCcitcl

H0678-0101

direction of the A---- in” 1 ■ "* --* "• • - -- ----

Part A. 2n-f oru the Fuclr

15 Junc 1946

cook ver the supremo camman

Army) directed with the ncsicl-n.The Ob.d.E. (C in C of th of the following Iain Pra.aLgencral Staff of the.Army with; 9d.T-Chic? Quartermaster J

(Operetion -1 S ct;o -r1- i •’ nt*.-... 112)C.Qu.ll (0.g Lic .:onSc o ion and foreign

G, nor i Quart enaust er wit Acministr tion Qhicf for occupied icrritorics

b) Personnel Office (Tiel Echclo )o) General for special task (z.b.v.) with An-- L 2- Spuch

(For discipline Propnga a, welfare etc.)d) Army Surgeon G neral and vctcrinor - /+, . ..

the General Staff)o) Chief of Armament and Go: nen er of goplnccmcxt trnini.

Army - Fromm (Chief E.Ruest.-ne .

( nuocl Ai with sub- (Army Ordnr o rd inn ted (Army Ad minTo the General Avy Office medical inspectorates and Army legal Pept., Schools,She offices a) to d) cre at Aryfocdonortcrs,-pa t from small branches in Berlin:The office e) Chici of Armament and Commander of replacement training Army entirely in -erli.2) Of these Army offices th; following vrerc competent, under the direction of the Chief 1, for fee Forces —tt -e (that is for all three brnches of the Armed Forces na ' c

SS)a) Chief Transportation and communication (Centra: dir ti.. for Navy and Air Force also)h) General Army Office (A- replacement) ( spec.dept.)

e in BerlinJfi oc (AHA) OlbrichtOf- e (HWA) Loeb

-23t n Office (1 II) CcborI- plonged the Amy incocctor-teg, +--------- ‘* ------ ... -.7

0 Vcbcr ina TV insocotomn--c 7 Q etc.

H0678-0102

c) Army Administration Offie (m00d and allocatio o:2 textile, leather etc.)

mhhile these offices handlc - the individual matters for Che army itself, they prepared -t tho some time, eccoring to m3r directives to be approved 0; the Fuehrer, the entire distri­bution of personnel and ial at the isposnl of the Total armed forces which woE tl 1 ord ed by the Fuehrer or by me on his instruction.The chief 11. ucs. and B.d, . was the permanent 2cpri ct- tivc of the Ob.d.H. in the interior zone of opcrotiom ond the appointing authority 1 r the on tic r.p? - . -which belonged to the Ob.d.H. was transferred to him. He was the superior officer of th Leputy ommnnling .rcm?. (Military area com: andor)

Part 3 After the Fuehrer h .6 Lafon over the supreme com 'id. (as of 19 Fee 1941)

1) The Fuehrer subordinates o himself "directly” the Gencri I Staff of the Army under the Chief of the Gcncrel stacf.2) The other powers of the b.d. .(0JH) as the supreme ~d- ministrative authority - f it is ■'part from tho authority of command - were transfc m 1 to mc , that is T was to exercise them according to the dir . vct of the Juchror ”for him11. That meant that T -c. to - , in agrccncnt with the dailyissued decrees of the Fuc or, corresponding direct' as to the .‘.my office s - the eral Staff cztec-cC.

These authorities were hovsame decree inasmuch

narrowedor/oy the .chpcm ’ ' /

reserved for nimsc.. i.C .r.ctrelation with the Chef -HeCPCE-RuCS6 on the T. 0.5. art the chief of Army Personnel

H0678-0103

as far as fundamental an." important questions were concerned and this through his chief also aide General Schmundt.The Fuehrer had charged General Schmundt with the drafting of this short decree who upon my inquiry as to certain unclear matters called the decree "provisional".(It was finally issued on y in fall 1342 at the change of the chief of General S’ ff and was narrowed further for me

3.)I explained to the Fuehrer that without responsible aut­hority of command I coulo not do justice to the task, the Fuehrer rcplicd that T was bound by his instructions and that he himself alone oxcicised the authority of command.

4)ith the approval of the Fuehrer I therefore formed a small staff for him, called - Staff vith OF'”'} for which the chief of the Gcncral Staf. had to make General Buhlc (up to now Chief Org.Dopt. in the General Staff of thc Army) available. To was subordi:ntcd to me.This office of the Army ("'IH) in the Fuehrer Headquarters consisted of:

General Buhle (in charge,chief) a Lt.Colonel for personnel matters a Lt.Colonel fo materiel matters . and an office Lclp

General Buhle participated in al], situation reports and in al conferences as representative of le army interests and he handled the communications with:

Ger.Staff of the Army, especially Org.Office of the Armyb) Chief H.Ruost. and B..E. in questions of personnel and

materielc) Minister Speer in questions of materield) Armed Forces replacement Office (Tor Army interests)c) General Quartermaster (Supply matters)

After a short time of ma1’ ing himself acquainted General Buhl became in all

H0678-0104

questions of organis nt ion( f or ations), roplaccmont of personnel

end nct cric-, that is mcinto ".nee of the fighting powror of the

Army - in pormanont cooporation with the Genoral Staff of the

-rmy, - the right hand of th . uchror himsel?, even though he

was personally subordinntod to ne. He came into the same direct

connection with the Fuehrer as Col.Gen. Jodi as chief -TST.

This did not prevent, here at there, my exerting of influence

and the execution by me of th ; decrees approved oy the Fuehrer.

5 .)Thc chief H.Ruost and ..E. (Fromm), who mostly every four

weeks rude a thorough verb'1 report to the Fuehrer in my and

Buhle’s presence concerning tuo replacement situation of or-

sonnol and materiel for the ' any, etc., remained directly cubordi-

na tod and Tospons ible to t 10 uchror; the Fuehrer confirmed

this to him at his first report at the end of Docombor 1941. Th

did not prevent no together with the Chief rmy Staff General

Buhlo from being and romaini ng the intermediary and from

making decisions according t Hitlers instructions in minor

and current matters which Fr n trough to me.

6 .)Tho chief of the irmy Personnel Off ice, General Keitel cooper­

ated closely with the Chi.. of the General Staff and Chief

lido of the Fuehrer Genor 1 Schnundb. As a rule Schnundt cub-

mit bed the propositions of tho Chief P.A.,examined and

approved beforehand by me (changes in personnel, officers

rooloconent) to the Fuehrer for execution; he wns to make

hinn acquainted with the PA as future chief PA. On 1 Oct.

1942 Ce nundt became PA, herewith ended my influence whi.ch I

had requested.

7 .)Tho Sonern12.2.v. .(for .special t s!-s_vith Ar=Loc c1 branch

was su ordinatod to me in al? log 1 matters of the field orny

(not interior zone of operation). He reported to mo hi sonr

or through the chief of the y Legal Branch (Judge ..dvocato

Gonora1) the legal (pardon) matters or fundamental decrees con­

cerning administration of justice. About every 8 to 10 days

I mndo a collective report to the Fuehrer and

H0678-0105

executed the decisions approved by him vith the signature : "For

Der Ob.d.H., Keitel". In ignorance of the circunstanccs, Gerrian Arny

authorities inferred from 'is a "special authority". Sentences

against officers were pronounced by the Fuehrer personally, death

sentences against officers of all throe branches of the arncd forces

were channelled as before through the Lrny Legal Branch. In these

matters, except jurisdictici, the general z.b.V. was subordinated to

the Chief of General Staff.

8 .) With Arny surgeon and veterinary I had nothing to do. The necessary

influence on the nodical service was exorcised by the Fuehrer (OKI)

through no over the chief of the Arncd Forces medical service, which

was on armed forces office, created in fall 1941, in closest coope­

ration with the representative of the Fuehrer for the nodical service,

Prof. K. Brandt.

9 .) It is beyond any doubt that the Quart ormaster General, as an integral

part of the General Staff was and ronainod subordinated to the Chief

of the General Staff. It iu further true that a definition of the

responsibilities of the Quartemaster General to ne with regard to

the occupied territories was neither requested nor ever pronounced by

the Fuehrer, verbally nor in writing.

It is rather true that alvays when in absence of Halder or the Quertor-

master General at the situation conferences, questions or directives

of the Fuehrer concerning adninist ration of the occupied territories

cane up, General Varlimont ccted as intcrnciary for the Fuehrer* s

orders in direct communication with the Quartermaster General (or

his office). I nysclf spoke or telephoned with the Quartornastor Ge­

neral only in exceptional cases, strictly speaking only when he ap-

proachcd no in questions of a general nature, in my capacity as

0106

chief OKW, The Quartcrmaster G-neral was responsible to the Fuehrer him- self and directly.

It 3-s finally established ;

I never had any direct connections with the arny offices in the

"occupied territories" because the Quartemaster General vras alone

competent for that (except f a visit with v.Fclkonhausen in

Bruxcllcs) .

According to the scope of his duties it is obvious that the Quartor-

master General had a specially large measure of independence and had

to have it with the scale of ! is tasks and his responsibility.

Part C. The executive duties of the Arny offices in tasks of the Armed

Forces.

As long as the available means in personnel and materiel were suffi­

cient for the requirements of the entire armed forces, that is as long

as the requisitions of the branches of the arnod forces and the Vaffen

S3 could be filled immediately, the allotting through the management

of the offices of the army, available and trained for it in the former

Reichswehr Ministry and later bar Ministry, worked smoothly.

Although I endeavoured from the beginning to create neutral Armed

forces offices for this, I s: ccoded, until the war, only insofar as

I could tie these offices closer to the OKII and could staff then

along the lines of the armed forces (Bezirls Kormnandos, Wchrcrsatz—

Inspcktioncn, etc.) The decisive viewpoint was that nobody con­

sidered himself cheated by the fact that one interested party had to

supply also the others and hereby favored himself.

-6-

H0678-0107

-7-

Only vrhon ct the beginning o 1942 the requirements of cll

V’ehrmacht units could not bo fulfilled anymore, difficulties

arose in dividing the m trial on hand equal and in accordance

with the conduct of the vrar. The more I had to connect the

OK , that is, the Fuehrer with the distribution, the less,

howovor, T could dispense wi.ch the competent administr tivo

offices vhich surveyed and governed the territory. This is

how the decisive iffluonco of the OKI, concerning the allotments

and disclais, originated thich had to be forced upon the

requesting Tohrma.cht units.

(for lctcils see part A, n hor 2)

cone.a) Tronsoort and Inforntion:

The FSt. arranged the coordination according th needs of the

operative leadership, assigning the chiefs of the transport

and information don rtmonts of the Army as the central office

for the /chrmecht.

conc.b) Roplaccmonts:

The Ari nas c.lwcys been the chief consumer because it ronrosan-

ted oho masses; Navy and Air-Force were only small appendages.

Their recruiting need was covered by volunteers which at the

most had to be limited to the 1, the same for the Voffon-ss until

1943. Tn the General Irmy Office ( since 1940 under olbricht)

which regulated the entire personnel department for the army,

was a department called "chrnncht Recruit ng", which received

its orders from the om and rrangod supplying the Tchrncht

and —fcn-SS (bulk distribution) according to those orders .

The cnicf o_ the General Arny Office was the superior for

current affairs nd was subjot to my orders in ’ chrmecht

problems, although General Oricht had to deal with me in

ohr. cht problons, no was ?. eponsiblo for the vrork in the

"chrncht Recruiting" depart ment .nd in dealings with the

main Roich . U thori ties during the war he represented frequently

the total ohrnncht, that is, the OKU. Practical the .rny was

the only decisive consumer,

-8— H0678-0108

Lie "Tavy and Air Force, because of their numerical shortage,

were taken care of by the recruiting contingent and sometimes

"e e oblagatod also to suppl- the Army math trained personnel.

The tight with the civil. an pessorts ond tho econo y vas n

for the recruiting years, becoming subject for conscription, bv

for the soldiers furnished by the U.K., who ajain had to be

taken from the entire, econom , life. Tero were 22 civilian

onsumars an the entire

ovrers which they couldeconomic life,, who fought

not ( spense vrith, while the Vem-nacht

is, an the special into

offices to release those men

give notice to the U.K. of.:

Thereby he represented the C

kid to - insist, on the lege1 lomand in thor necd for no m

these arsumom. Genoral olbricht frequently led the eonforonco

st of the i^my, with the civil

urnishec - U.T., that is, to

13 according to time and o:bent.

, that iS, no, whenever the re-su. dessness of his conferences with State secretaries etc.

di 1 not rocuir ny personal presence in the ministry. This was

a very tedious and ungratif- - 15 task but served only the inter

o: the A2m” and was the only connection I had with Olbricht,

because Oboret (Colonel), later General, -oidoncan s cnko: of

the ghraacht Recruiting do- tnont, lately had indeed the

Xpert knowledge but not the authority toward the civil Aric

nd also lacked the necoss-r- effective punch

a nad nothing to do otherwise with olbricht, he was sub-

ordincto to Fromm with the numorous departments of his large

office. The fight for nanpe ", theoby aintaining the power

for the ohzeacht on the one hand, and the increase in ozoduc tion, beginning with raw materials u through the requirement

for food, consumers.s goods, traffic and war materials on the

ot icr hand, was the key point ar governing the people of tho

oniro nction during the war since 1942.

-A-

1-0109

Thu Fuehrer was the first to p cceive the insolubility of the problem

after the war in th. East in f winter of 1941/42. He used two methods:

a) H- incited to consumers (W. rmacht-conomy) against cach other and let them stru_gl. dospurtel,.

b) He took the mobilize formic workers under the motto: IGermeny fights for Europe, anyone who do.s not shed blood for it must work for it". (Commitment Snuckcl) .

The chief mistkc in the upkeep of the Army’s battle moral was, however,

that the Tucl. r refused the requests passionatoly presented to him aje and again by mc, namely not to Leavo the Selection, of the men declared

sontial (U.K.) vho ’ cr- to be turned over to the troops from the war

economy, to the employers, -hi ch I perceived and requested the just and

supra-portiol re—drafting for . ny Service through conscription nccordir

to years (starting with the y ungost) . The ucono.xy naturally furnished

the worst workers .'ho became nlso the worst sol iors. Thereby cho Army

fighting ponor abat d constant.. ■ even though a nunerical balance was

attained; the quality abated _ ighteningly and the enthusi stic youths

(recruts) weru unc b? - to pruv nt the slow deterioration which the Fuchr.

blamed on she faulty national- s cinlist character and influence of the

Officers Corps (n.S. -Command Officers).

The constant latent fisht for the conscription of men classiicd

U.K. for front Service concerned by 95% only the Arny; it was natural

that thereby T also utilized the aid of the Imy r present atiVeS, that

is. General OLbricht. This was the onl.y contact with him, but in which

also Gener lobcrst Fromm gl dy directed the responsibility to.ord no.

R~. c) Food Supplies and Equipment (Clothing and Leather) .

For th -nud Forces this was handled by the Army :dninist ration

Office (Hoorus-Vorwaltun S-Amt HVA) under General Ostcrkamp. As

far as the supply of textiles and leather as raw-materials was

concerned, the HVA presented the requirements of the entire Armad

Forces (without 3S) to Minister of Economics and alloted the

contingents to the branc s of the Armed Forces. Impnrtislity wac

assured b having the IITA subordinate to my orders i.e. the order:

of OK I for requisitions and allotments. To this and also it be­

came necessary that the uehrer intervened and used his authori­

ty since supplies wer- orce, the requirements of the branches

of th- -rmed Forces cou • no longer be met, and th. reduction for

the people and the Armed Forces had to b. decreed by the Fuehrer.

The saunc was true about the food, which was requisitioned by HVA

from tile - inistor of Food for the army, th. navy, the air-force,

tS3 " police and the prisoners of war. There was closest re­

ciprocity between the r. nircments mid the food-rations for the

entire popul tion. There is no need of proving, that for this

alone it -as necessary to secure the decisions of the Fuehrer

in executions which wet.o Jar beyond the scope of the Arm_d Forcis.

General Ost-rkamp, as c f of the HV: almays stood close b— me,

i.e. OKI;, so that it w-s possible for us, by mutual undurstanding

the minister of Food, to 1wavs rasunt en acceptable proposition

to the j uehrer, and alwa s obtained his consent. It is to the

merits of General Oster1" p, to h va given me excellent advice and

assistance.

-10-

H0678-0111

Appendix to direction of tho army in war.

The Fuehrerand Commn dor in Chisf of the Armred Forces.

F.H.Qu., 12/19/1941

I have decided to tnke over the Chief Command of the Armed Forces mysclf, beginning today.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army shall be subor­dinated directly 3o me. (He shall be responsible to me).

The other authorities of the Ob. d. H. (OK) as highest administrative body of the war-army (Kriegshecr) for main- t Ine, the army in war formation are uxrcised in coralline with my instruct! . 3 by the Chief OK! Feldmarschall Kital according to my orlurs.

Houcvor I ruServu tho right to personally give fundnmenta] orders .and directives to the Army Armament Chief and to the Coumandor of the Replacement Training irmy (Bef hlshaber dos 3rsntzhoorcs) and to the Chief of the rmy-Porsonnsl-Offico.

signed: Adolf Hitler.

F. d. R.

Keitel Feldmarschall

Notice

This is - in the r in points - a true rendition of the order

then given, accor ing to the notes which I made of the

destroyed original after I was taken prisoner.

W. Keitel

H0678-0112

I herewith assure in place of oath:

that I have answered to the best of my knowledge the

questions asked by my defense counsel, Dr. Otto N—na-,

concerning "Direction of the Army in War". I have been

informed that this statement, as an affidavit, is to be

presented before the into .-national Military Tribunal

at Nuernberg. I am aware of the fact that there is a

heavy penalty upon intentionally or negligently giving

an incorrect statement ulier oath.

Nuernberg, ............... 1945

Dr. Otto ITelteDefense Counsel

for theaccused TI, Keitel

H0678-0113

lTuernberg, 22nd ugust 1946

To: The Secretery General ’ s Office, Interna, tional 1 ilitary Tribunal,

N u e r n b e r G

Re.: Prosecution of the accused Field iarshal (retd.) '7. KITEL

At today's sitting of the I. T the Court egreed thet the undermentioned

three affidavits:

1) of the accused 7. Keitel, dated 17th August, document Mo. K 26,

2) of the ccused A Keitel, dated 17th lugust, document Mo, K 27,

3) of General Hermann Reineiclce, dated 12th iugust, document No. K 23,

could be submitted as evidence, as soon s the rere translated, and at

latest by the end of the final speeches.

The Prosecution declared, through Sir David laxurellFyfe, at the sitting \

that they had no objection to these affidavits.\

I should therefore be obliged if you vrould have them translated et

once.

I enclose 2 copies of each of these aff idavits,

(sgd.) Dr. Nelte

■Defense Counsel

6 Enclosures.

H0678-0114

Document K 26

Supplement to the

Doc u n e n t -Bp p k

Defense Counsel: Dr. Otto NELKE

for the

Accused: Field lershall Wilhelm KEITEL, (retd.)

Document I 26

H0678-0115 Nuernberg, 17th August 1916

A f f i d a v i t

by Field larshal "rilhelni IGITBL (retd.)

In the recording of evidence by the Organizations documents 4048-4050 and

4069 PS, vthich coneem the se.r facts, vrere produced. As in document 4069 PS

(report by General BOISSOT of 29th pril 1945) the OKT is mentioned, I declare

that the OKT and I as its Chief wero not concerned in the planning and prepara-

tion of the carrying out of the murder of the_French General 1ESNY, and further

that I had no knowledge of these events nor of their execution.

I think this is made clear by the contents of the documents themselves.

The authors of this murder had the men who were to carry out this murder

clothed in Wehrmacht uniforms and used "Tehrma.cht motor vehicle distinguishing­

signs for vehicles that did not belong to it. nobody will believe tha3 if I

had been aware of these facts I should have given my consent.

Into the plotting there fits in the UCommend of the OKI" reported by

General POISSON and which is invented. This is clear from the fact that the

OKT had at that time nothing to do with matters rooting to prisoners of war;

matters appertaining to prisoners of tar had been withdrawn from the OKI,

with effect from 1st October 1942, and tronsferred to Himmlor. The shameless

implicating of the OIT vre s only done in order not to disturb the Generals vho

were transferred from Koenigstein, but to make them feel thcy wrorc in safety.

This is not only one of the most shameful crimes but also an abominable

attempt to besmirch the honour of the German mod Forces by imputing this crime,

to them.

I hereby declare in lieu of oath:

I have informed my Dofonso Counsel Dr. Otto IULTE in this effidavit to the

best of my lnovlodgo and conscience. I am informed that th ,s statoment vill be

produced to the International lilitary Tribunal at Nuernberg as an affidavit. I

am aware that the intentional and remiss malcing of an untrue affidavit is liable

to heavy punishment.

Nuernberg, 17th August 1946 (sgd.) IILHGLI TEITEL,Field larshal, retd.

HO678-0116

Document K 27

Sup^Lsnent to_ t heA

Doe urgent Book

Defense Counsel: Dr. Otto ITLTE

for the

Accusod: Ficldlershal (retd.)

TTilhelm Keitel

K 27

Nuornborg, 17th August 1946

'. f f i ' a v i t

byFiolclershallilhe? a JsEITSL (retd.).

In h- ring witnesses for the Organizations

) SS

b) the groups General Staff and OKT,

there le.vo boon several mentions of members of the Armed Forces having been

appointed to mrd concentration camps and their being interrogated, although

I (and the OKT) re not immediatcly concor cd, i.e. oozing to lack of povror to

issue comends, to employ members of the Armed Forces for this purpose, I should

like to add something to make matt. •3 clccu ccause the rmod Forces "rry" is

not represented here by a Higher Commar. ing Bficor of the Army nor by a

Corrancing Officer of the Reserve ‘rmy (P.c.3.). Those tuo vould have boon the

competent Cormend authorities. The situation is as follows, according to my

ko ’ledge;

1. It is first to be ascertained, as t’ J evidence has shot, that mention can

c Ly be made of rd Forces members being guards in the sense of outer

guards, but not of their being on db, inside comps.

2. But even this must have only occurred in the summer of 1941,. At that time

Himmlcr asked the Fuehrer for replacements for the heavy losses sustained

by the TTaffen-SS at the front,by men from the Army. I raised an objection

to this vrith the Fuehrer and he said Himmler ought to comb out his individual

organizations and call up all the young classes fit for service in the field.

For that purpose the army was to supply as reinforcements up to 10,000

ol’er men vho wroro not fit for field s rvico to the TTaffen-SS, in order to

free all younger classes in all SS org izotions. That order was given to

B.d. C. General Oberst FRO1T at that ti 3 by the Fuehrer in my presence,

about July 1941.

Those unfit soldiers of tho Reserve r y passed out duly from service in th

army and ware again taken into tho TTffen-SS nnd thus became members of the

"Tf f on-sS.

1-0117

H0678-0118

(2)

It thus come obout, c.s nitness BRILL (Ss) testified, that sovoral thousand

former membors of the army were then, os net morbors of the S3, set to

guord concentr tion comps, nmong othor duties. But they woro, os the

roness BRILL confirmed, only used os outer gun.rds for the camps. The

rmod Forces h.d nothing to do with tit,

Members of the rmod Forces were cert .inly used to o minor ctent for

guarding nrmorents concerns, i.e. for suporvising orrested people from

concentr’tion comps working there, if ver supplies wero being node there.

The orrested persons were in "trorlzors corns'1 ctto.chod to the f-ctorics

end woro guordod thoro during vork-hons, os well os in the factories, by

militorr suporvising st off of thot port, of the Armoc Forces for which the

wer maberiol wo.s being mdc. int v.s n ngrocmont between the Armamonts

' inistry end ports of the Armed Forces, ithout ny coopcrotion from the

oxT.

I herewith declare in lieu of, onth:

I hevu rode the ebovo offid".vit to 1 defense counsel DR. Otto MELTS to

the best of myr kno”.lodge ond conscience. I om aworo thot the stotonent

is to be produced to the Intornotional ilitory Tribune. 1 ot Nuorborg.

I n '’.Iso ororc th t intentionnl or romiss mnking of n untrue offidovit

is linblo to severe punishment.

luorn'org, 17th ugust 1946. (sgd.) Tilholm KEITL

Field lrshal retd.

H0678-0119

Poem.;nt K 20

Hermrnn Rcinccko NTcu-Ulm, 12th ugust 191,6Gonorol

A£ £ic n :' i t

Subscribed at Internment Cenp PE 312, NTou-Ulm.

Thor, nppu rs General Hermnn Roincclo, vho is na.de emro thot these replies re

givun in lieu of or th and ore intended to be produced to the Intornntionr.l

ilitory Tribunal nt Nuernberg.

He being duly swor, deposes nnd soys:

1) The collective document R-178 rogording trontmont of Soviet-Russi mi prisoners

of wer ms shovm to Gencrol Reinecke.

up st ion: ro the events personally mid oficinlly lmovm to you, thich fom the

object .f correspondence cent inod in documont R-170? In yhet mnnor uns the

DIT or th. Cli.f 2 the Prisoners of Ter br nch of the OI‘ porticipting in these

events9

3-.sic-11" the OIT nd the Chief of the Prisoners of Tor br nch hod nothing to

do with the ozocition of orders co. warning c trontrent, Jnbour etc. o

prisoners of vr. The Chief of the Pri nor of Ter br nch cortninly never

g-va imcdinto orders in this respect, bec v. ; he h d no direct povor of

comend over the inmntos of c mps. The OK ms only entrusted vith matters of

executing given orders if difficulties occurred in hoving such orders executed

mid -hich could not be ntt ndod to loe 11. . In the colloctiv. documents there

is Is- no letter from the on; nd the Ox! is only referred to in this corres­

pondence. I think thet the Gestmo, hich : s occupied vrith the sorting out of

the Russinn prisoners of rr, thro toned the OIT if they cou.d not get on viith

crmp comnndnts or other inferior conmends.

It is of course iso possible th-t the competent office of the RSHA telephoned

to the OK’ mid than lcopt the nstrors received, in their om interest, without

such mi us. being upon to control. The ov nts which ero set forth in docuent

R-178 nro not 1 mom to m person -113 mnd ~ n thus unabl- to on enyrthins cbout

then. t the time in quostion Colo: I BPT: ms Chief of the Prisoners of Tr

Br nch, with Gonorolmjor Gro vonitz ns cucc sor.

2) Counsel for Defense Dr. Hito then inter s Gonorol Reinecke of the contents

of documents PS-W to PS-4052 ■ nd PS-4069, vhich

(2) H0678-0120

er- -rm up in English, concerning the rurcor of the French Gonor-1 losnoy.

Ho_docleros:

Th- -vets described in the documents shonn to no havo not come to my lmotledgc

acforo. Since 1st October 194L Hirnlor hod the prisoners of ver nff-irs in

his n ncs. nis Chics for these nff-irs s 3ERGER sho hod cuit. c different

poT-r Cor giving orders to thot the chief of prisoner of wr nffhirs in the

-- posses.-c . Cmbrr to the Lttor, he ‘ nd the poter to issue orders. 1,

nnd S f r S T lmnour, the inspector donling with cortein orisoner of mor

or ncho: ..ho .. s nt tht time Gonor-lmjoz TSTHOFF.—hod nothing to do vrith

ho shooting of General Tosncy.

(s d.) Hermon ReineckeGonor-1

Subscribed nd sorn to before me this 16th doy of uqust 1946 ot Ncu-UIn,

(sgd.)

Stomp:

Glenn R. Eockenzie 1st Lt. Cevelry

0521676

gerinl number

60th Inf ntr 111” Co