IMT Nuremberg Archives

H-1155

International Court of Justice

H1155 -0002

RIBBENTROP - DOCUMENTS,• nr. -• r j-- " ....... — „ wim.

Exhibit Doc.No. No.

Doc.Book

Iran soript Page

Description Date

US.5 2829 PS

1337 PS

D.472

.636

A. AUSTRIA.

253

1

Affidavit von Ribbentrop

Hitler's decree, electing Ribbentrop member of Secret Cabinet Council

'Ribbentrop ’ s actions as Foreign Minister. See Archiv dur publizistischeArbeit page 6005 •

a.c 4&a.W 7 ec~ << < <ac-

Nov. 1945

2 Feb.1938

22 April 1943

2161 PS N 554 German Communique 12/16/18 Feb.1938

'IS. 72 1780 PS N 587 Jodi’s diary 11/12 Feb. 1938

US. 76 2949 ps

/

N 1157 Telephone- Goering to Ribbentrop 13 March 1938

2307 PSRGB.1938 I No.21 Page 237 13 March 1938

B. CZECHOSLOV/JJA.

US. 93 3060 PS T8i,- Prague to P.O.Berlin 16 March 1938

US. 94 2789 PS i 786. Henlein to Ribbentrop 17 March 1938

US. 95 2788 PS 786/7 Conference with Henlein 29 March 1938

us. 96 3059 PS 789 Memo on stirring up ofSudeten Germans 29 March 1938

2360 PS 742 Voelkischer Boebachter 13 January 1930

US.83 2800 PS 753 Ribben trop/Attolico 18 July 1938

US. 86 2791 PS 754 n n 23 Aug. 1938

us. 87 2792 PS 754 n n 27 Aug. 1938

US. 88 2796 PS 755 Conversation Hitler/Rib-bentrop/Imredi 23 Aug. 1938

us.89 2797 PS 758 Conversation Ribbentrop/X Kanya 29 Aug. 1938

US. 81 2786 PS 740 Ribbentrop/Keitel 4 Mar. 1938

3571.

H1155 -

-2-

Exhibit Doc.Eo.______ No. __

Doc.Book

Trans_______Pa 13c

cri.pt Description Date.

US.97 2858 PS 0 791, 895

Telegram German F.O.to Prague 19 Sept.1938

US.98 2855 PS 0 792 ditto 16 Sept.1938US.99 2854 PS 0 792 ditto 17 Sept.1938US.100 2853 PS 0 792 ditto 24 Sept.1938US.101 2856 PS 0 ! S 2 d.tto

1 24 Sept.1938GB.23 TC.23 1 964 Eunich Agreement 29 Sept.1938US.90 0.2 0 766 nticipate breaches of

Interationa. layr Ln at caclci ng Czecho slovakia

1 Oct. 1938

US.116 2815 PS 0 907 Telegram Ribbentrop to Prague 13 March 1939

US.117 2802 PS 0 908 Conference Hitler"Tiso 13 March 1939US.110 2790 PS . 898 Meeting Hitler Ribbentrop

with pro-Nazi Slovak Tuca 12 Feb. 1939US.118 2798 PS

US.126 3061 PS

1439 PS

C,LITIIUATA.

0 911/ 917

931

German F.O.Minutes of meeting Hitler/Hacha

Czechoslovakian Gov. report

Treaty of Protection 1

15 March 1939

23 March 1939

GB.4 TC.53A

2953 PS

2959 IS

1 943 Incorporation of Memel.

Letter to Ribbentrop

Report

3 April 1939

29 June 1939

19 July 1939

D. POLAND.

OB.30 2357 PS

TC.73-37

2 977 Hitler’s Reichstag Speech

Extracts from Hitler’s Reichstag spoech

20 Feb. 1933

20 Feb. 1938GB.31 TC.76 2 980

%

Ge man F.O. Secret Memo "It vd.ll be the goneral impression that the Poles will be next" 26 Aug. 1938

3572.

H1155 -0004

3573.

ExhibNo.

it Doc.No.

Doc.Book

TranscPage

ript Description Date.

D. rOLANI) (continued)

TC.73 -40

TO. 73 -42

Conversation Lipski/Ribbentrop l0 Sept. 1938

Hitler at Sports Palast "No more territorial problems in Europe". 26 Sept.1938

GB.27 TC.73 -U 2 985986

Ribbentrop/Lipsli _general & peaceful settle­

ment of Danzig Issue 25 Oct. 1938GB.23 TC.73 -1,5 2 986 Polish reply sugze sting

bilateral agreement but unacceptable that D.shouldreturn to Reich 31 Oct.1938

GB.33 G.137 2 988 Preparations to be made to occupy Danzig by surprise 21 Oct.1938

GB.34 TC.73 -48 2 988989

Beck/Hitler (Ribbentrop present) "some new form- korperschaft.Minister could be quite at ease" 5 Jan. 1939

GB.35 TC.73 --9 2 990 Ribbentrop/Beck "No violentsolution of Danzig... afurther building up offriendly relations". 6 Jan.1939

GB.36 2530 PS 2 990 Ribbentrop ‘s speech inWarsaw "Continued progress and consolidation offriendly relations" 25 Jan.1939

G3.37 TC.73 -57 2 991 Hitler’s Reichstag speech 30 Jan.1939 '

US. 27 L.79 L,./ 359,408930

Hitler’s meeting atReichschancellery 23 May 1939

US. 30 1014 PS L 371 Hitler's Obersalsburgspeech " 22 Aug.1939

US.166 2987 PS Q 1257 Ciano’s diary

GB,41 C.120 2 997 Fall Weiss for operation against Poland 3 & 11 Apl.

1939GB.J8 TC.73-61 2 991 Letter Lipski to Beck 21 Mar.1939

2). 4q0TC.73-147

(N.B.

992

TC.73 i:

A.qgacAtAA- 2o ze ,sLipski’s final report 10 Oct,1939

5 Polish White Book)

H 55-

Exhibit Doc.No. No.

Doc.Book

Transcriptpage______

Description Date.

E. NORWAY & DIWARK.

GB.77 TC.24 3 1061 Danish German non-aggressionPact 31 May 1939

957 PS Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop 24 Feb. 1940

004 PS

>D.6zq

F. GRESCE & YUGOSIAVIA.

Rosenberg's report to the FHrer with enclosureNo. 3t2 <ed/&4<~6-

17 June 19403etkucl /940

1871 PS Report on Hitler/Ciano meeting 12 Aug.1939

1842 PS Meeting Mussolini/Ribbentrop 19 Sept.1940

GB.119 c.134 5 1137 Letter from Jodi 21 Jan.1941

US. 166 2987PS Q 1257 Ciano’s diary 20/21 Jan.41

GB.129 1834 PS P 1161 Robbent r op/0 shima 13 Feb. 1941

GB.123 2450 PS 5 1140 Assurance Ribbentrop/ Cvetkovitch 25 March 1941

GB.120 1746 PS.

H. RUSSIA.1195 PS

5 11381143 Minutes

Partition of Yugoslavia

27 March 1941

12 April 1941

TC.25 German/Sovict Non-Aggre s s i on Pact 23 Aug.1939

GB.129 1834 PS P 11611250 Ribbentrop/Oshima 13 Feb. 1941

US.146 1039 PS P 1204 Rosehberg’s file 28 June 1941

C.77 G.F.O. Treatise on Barbarossa

A18 May 1941

US.167 3054 PS Film 1262 Ribbentrop1s announced attack on USSR as seen in film 11.12.45

22 June 1941

3571-.

-5-

Exhibit Doc.No. No.

Doc.Book

Transcript Page

Description Date.

1. U.S.A. (JAPAN & AGGRESSION AGAINST U.S.A.)

2508 PS

US. 149 2623 PS

Q

Q

1218

1219

Anti -Cominte r Pact

Tripartite Pact

25 Nov.1936

27 Sept. 1940

GB.119 1834 PS P 11611250 Ribbentrop/Oshima 13 Feb.1941

US. 33

us. 153us.155

1881 PS

Ig82 PS2896 PS

L

Q

3871251

1239

Hitler/MatsuokaKcne 72aa - a

Ribbentrop to Ott

4 April 1941 *

10 July 1941

US.156 2897 PS Q 1240 Telegram Ott toRibbentrop 14 July 1941

D.656 Extract from”Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent Japanese Gov.between1 July and 8 Dec.1941

Uy

29 Nov.1941

D.657 ditto 8 Dec.1941

us.157 2911 PS Q 1241 Ribbentrop/Oshima 9 July 1942

2954 PS Ribbentrop/Oshima 6 March 1943

US.159 2929 PS •P.O.File J.62 Ribbentrop/Oshima 18 April 1943

735 ps Report of conference on killing of Allied airmen 6 June 1944

728 PS Letter of Foreign Offiee 20 June 1944

740 ps Letter dated 30.6,4- 30 June 1944

GB.8 TC.51

D.6392921 PS

1520 PS

Decree covering ProtectorateBohemia & Moravia 16 March 1939RGB. 1940 1 p.778General Order of 18 May 1940Seyss-Inquart 4 July 1940

Memo of conference Hitler/ Rosenberg/Lammers/Bormann on 8 May 1942 13 May 1942

L.205 Telegram Kennedy to Depart­ment of State 8 Dec.1938

3358 PS German F.O.Memo 31 Jan.1939

1752 PS Preparation for InternationalAnti-Jewish Congress 15.June 1944-

3574.

H1155-000DOCU. IENT X '0 . 2829-23O d I ICL U.5. ______ __ U i COU I3EL

POSITIONS ELaJj BP JOACHIih VuL hIBLLJTx.uP

1. Member of NSDAP (Ne.zi Perty) 1932-1945

2. Rcichsteg member 1933-1945

3. Toroign Policy Advisor to tho Fuehrer 1933-1945 1

4. Roprosente tivo of NSDAP (Nazi Porty) ion Foreign Policy 1933-1945

5. Sv cit l Dclegate for Dissrsront uostions 1934-1937

6. Ln ooseodor et Lrrgo 1935-1938

7. hmi ssador in Lone on 1936-1933

8. Org nizcr rnd Chief c," th Ribocntrop Burce u (Djenststclle Ribontrop) in the • -2-5inist-y foniForcign Affairs.

9. Rcichstunictem for cn- ■ -f~irs . hc..]945 t10. Lemb r Ox . . < eroo Uihuu1 Counci . 1,33-1945.

11. Member of tho "cktutr olitic.l steci et ( nme i Heedqus rtsrs 194.0.]9.7.

12. Cenertl of th b (brrgrpon:hzer) 1933-1945

I certify thet th. c; . roi forcgoins correctly lists positions I held fron 1930 to .jL5.

Lonc et iurnborg, Uui” ■ oy . 2 _Novemocr 1915.

] . v. Pi • bo f it re DF/NF—FT—■— *- —M cUAUili- VU-I HMBElLROP

Extract from Reichsgesetzblatt, 1938._ Part L_______ Page 112.

Decree sotting up Secret Cabinet Cc-ar.cil 4 February 1 938.

For ny guidance .in the conduct of Foreign PoJi.cy, I au creating a Secret Cabinet Councils

I noninate as President of the Secret Cabinet Council:

Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath,

I appoint as members of the Secret Cabinet;

The Foreign Linister , Joachin von Pibbentrop,

The President of Prunsia, -niztez for ir and the Lir Force,Field arsha.i Hermsn Gbring,

The Deputy of the Threr, Ruolf Hess,

The '.linister for nlughtnonb and propaganda, Dr. Joesph Goebbels.

The nister and Head of the R.ih Chansllcry,Dr. Hens Heinrich Launers,

The Supreme Comander of the Lrry, Col v Gen., Walther v Brauchitsch,

The Suprene Co.mander of the Navy, miral Dr. L.C. Erich Raeder,

Suprene Co..nander of the irued Forces, General of the Artillery,VTilhelm Keitel,

The Reichsminister and Head of the Rcichschancellory will conduct the current business of the Secret Cabinet Council.

Berlin, 4th February 1938.

FUhrer and Reichchancellor,ILOL8 HITLED.

Reichs minister and head of ReichschancelloryDl'. LL - ERS e

3761.

-0009

22•4•1943.

Bron the Archives for publication purposes__

D. 4+7260054

(1A)

JOACHIL VONRIBBEITROP

LinisterforEorcimn Affairs,S.S.obergruppaufuhrer

1. Joachi von Ribbentrop who adopted in 1925 the particle "von" as a title was. born on 30 April 1893 and was the son of a retired Lt. Colonel Richard ‘ibpentrop who died in Berlin on 1.1,1941 and his wrire whose maiden nancwasRittwitz and Caffron. Pibbentrop’s fauily ctuno originally from —--•—6 -LclIIU o

Ribbentrop spent his childhood and his school years mainly in Uetz where his father's garrison was stationed for a time. Between the ages of

5 and 17 he lived in Bwitzerlan, then he spent a year with a raiiv-op a professor in England. At the age of 13 he went to Canada where he Y.a to earn his living, Ee obtained vr] on the construction of thegrdatduete., ridge, across the river of Sto Lawrence and was engaged for two years on

Hl- ding caissons and railway trucks. ith the outbreak of the 191). war heqAde.his way throusht to Germany on a Dutch ship. He entered, as a volunteer, the 12th Hussar Regiment where he received a co.ission in 1915. After being ounded, he.was made: in the sprng 3.913, adjucant to the Plenipotentiary of

the War Hinistry in Turkey; ac the end of the war he worked at the Mar inistry and was later appointed jutant of the peace delegation. He retired

as a first lieutenant.

Ribbentrop turned now into a tradesian : - •business, liiting hiself mainly to dealings in vincs. L0 his marriage on 5:701920, to Anna Henkcell, tha vell-knovm German chapagne vaults. Up to the present there are five children of this marriage. Having already made connections abroad he now established fresk links vith England and Trance. He succeeded in extending those to political circles, having joined in 1930 the service of N S D A p

and started an import and exportThese activities led

the daughter of the ovmer of

At the time of the final. struggle for power in the Reich, Pibbentror Playedansinportant, if not strikingly obvious port in the bringing about of the decisiye meetings be twreen the representatives of the president of the mulch and the heads of the N.S.D.A.P., vho had prepared the entry of Nazis into.pover on 30.1.1953. . Those meetings as well as those betureen itlrs abd von Papon took place in Pibbentrops house in Berlin Dahlen.

.. After the 301 , too Ribbentrop romined something of a confidential Ceru*:0 theFoshrer in discussions with forrig statesmen and politicians until in April 193- he was appointed by thc president of the Peich, von Hindenbure» Special Couissioner on the question of disaraent. In this capacity he undertook, in fay 1.934, journeys to London and Rome, wrhcre he es ablished contact ith . ussolini; in June ho was received by Bar thou and Dpuerguein Paris; in Dccc.ibor by Laval. In September 1933 he was the guest ? a ader of thc French Ex-Serviceon’s Association Coy, with whon he had in coupon the desire to bring about closer co-operation between Trance and Herany through the activities of the ex- serv.-icemen’s organisations of the

o ountries, .But in particular he prepared in this capacity diplomatic achiovenent of the equality of Germany in political and nilitary datters which Decq, a reality with the declaration of her sovereign rights to re-arm on0,3.9550

, On 31:501935. Ribbentrop was appointed ambassador of a special mission and on 2151935 charged with securing a Teval treaty with England on the basis o- 35 to 100, the signature of which followed on 18.6.1953, After the rezoccupation of tho dc. ilitarized zone in the Rhineland on 7.3,1936, Ribbentrop represented the ’ eich at the extraor inary session of the League of nations in London as a special envoy and explained before that assembly the reasons for Germany's attitude. Soon after this Council meeting Ribbentrop handed over to the British Government the Great Peace Plan which had been * developed by the ruohr r and Rcichchancellor in Reichstag on 29.3.1936,

-1-

Sa 1181936 the FUhrer and Rei.chchancellor appointed Ribbentro as abassador in Lcndon. At this difficult post Dibbentro, strove Jo active an understanding TOtn England. During his activities in London Ribbentro^ was at the seme German representative at the non-intervention conference, I yhich yas expented to localise the Danish Civil Ter. In his capacity as thee extrao rdinary andplenipotentiar abassador, Ribbentrop led in Autum 1936 the discussions in Berlin ith iuschaloji, the Japanese Abassador at te at, tine, on TheGetun-Japanese Anti-Conintern Pact, which was signed on 25.11.1936. On 6,11.1937 Italy too entered this pac‘.

On 4-2.19.9 the Fuehrer and post of the Pocej. gn Ri oi.s ter in s, turn was appointed President of +1

eichhancellor appointed Ribbentrop to theCession to Baron von Neurath, who in his

Ribbentrop took part,. as early as 12Fuehrer in Obersalzberg The Anschluss of Austri

rith Dr Vo1938, in the

0Llo in that capacity conversations of the

-reav uennan xencn (CrOSS over also the work of the he remained in attendanse Italy.

on -3,301938 nlst bo m devtsolen) was born.Austrian Foreig aliri with Hitler during hi

then Aus crian Reichschancellor, rhed as the nour on which the Om 14,3, Ribbentrop took

Between the 2 and 9.4tate visit in

After a sumer full of crises, :of the -udeten-Ceruans was cleared up at the conference of the "Four treat en» (Hitler, aussolinj., ChambcrJain, Deladier) in iunich(29-30.9.1938), vrhen the purely Ceran parts of Czocho -S3 ovakia vrere awarded to the Reich. On the following day, the tension which was felt throughout the vrorla was eased by the declaration made jointly by Hitler and C harbcr lain on the German-British relations. A Gernan- Italian Court of Arbitration called by the Governments o.ungary and Czecho- Slovakia and presided over by Ribbentrop settled, on 1•—-*193°•, territorial disputes between these tto countries. Still under the retrospect jniluence of the unich discussions, the Reich’s Foreign minister von Ribbentrop, who had travelled specially to Paris, and the French Foreign

nister' Bonnek, issued on 6-12 19533, as a result of their deliberations,on the mutual

including the threat of • ■ at the conference of th

the question

" — —---9 —-.2 — -C. relations of thatr res and Poland (5.1.59, Be as with other European friendly, the Pu hro : declaration of 30 129

.ve countries. As th as in mich, 26-27.] ...

eraan one ol -unioh, relations between the Reich

correct and bold

hu solf ju at, during

could at that timeboentrop in Tarsavr) as well still be regarded as

historic veproblems of foreign pol his policy". Iu May J.

ncant to hi: extraordinary help

in his Pcichstagof 1958, "Pibbentrop ’ s of dealing with all

in carrying out11 order to ensure the pol.icy of

Pact of alliance wito Icaly was concJudcd Soon, however, the Slovaks and the Czechs degnated into a throat to the nurope. Thanks to the foresight of the Pr_sident of the Czech Protectorate, hr, Hacha and las Foreign Lanis ter Chvalkovsky, also -this crisis would be so Ved without fight- On the Lth, -larch 19.59. Dr Hacha, in view of the +n as on by Gernan troops, laid the fate of the Czech people and country into ne hands of the Fuehrer of the Gorman Reich. (16 th arch institution

Gf the Protectorate Bohcni.a and -oravia). At the sane tine Slovakia announced her autonony and asked for the protection of the Reich, After previous negotiations betceu Ribbentrop and Lithuanj.na Foreign minister Urbsys also the emc1-land could return into the Reich on 22nd iarch 1939.

the Reich, thethe animosity between peace of Central

• 9

2 OU; 1

Although it had been possible, to regain vithout conflagrations all the territories, cut off the Reich by the Dietat of Versailles, all endeavours to settle, with Tarsa the questions of Danzig and the Corridor were frustrated through tne intorferenoc of ngland. An English pronisc of guarantee stiffene Polands attludo to such an extent, that in the course of the surmer the crisis, which had existed since tho spring 1939 increased to a danger of war, although the Tuchccr had offered a guarantee of the Polish frontiers in return ior the rocur of Danzig into th. Reich and a very magnanious solution of the Corridor question. hen tho TTostorn Fntente already thought the . ring round the Rciuh closed. the Goman foreign Policy suoceedod in ceiling to an agrcemon 6 of consultation and non-aggression with Russia which Was signed by Ribbentrop in -ioscow on 23rd.. August 1939, On the 28 th and 29th Septeber, when Bibbentrop .ms in -ioscow for the second tjjc, the negotiations on a fiontier — and friendly agrocmont and Goman — ussian cconoic p] arm-i ng were ended.

-2- 3575.

davs' Polishfrontier violation released on the 1st September 1939 the 13 C2S Victorious campaign through Poland. Al previous iDpentrop and the British and French Ambassadors and an -X-SSo-ini proved unsuccessful; on the 3rd, September and three hours later the French Ambassador handed their meclarations of war to Ribbentrop. In spite of that on the euenrer in the Reichstag addressed France, but again in vain. another

negotiations between offer of mediation first the British Governments 'the 5th October 1939

peace appeal to Britain and -

During the lull in the winter of use his influence on European events® enissary, the Uner-Secreti

had talks with the Fuehrer

1939/40On the

President Roosevelt tried to lst. February 1940 his

ry of State for Foreign Affairs, Sumner Wells, and the Reich Foreign iinister.

With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on 9th Aor;1 101.0 . p,.hours befaretthelan.ding of Eritish troops in these territorics," Pecanagainst the Hestern Powers. Simultaneoly with the torching of the Gsrcanan ies into ho land and Belgiua, on the 10th lday von Ribbentrop prencossdeinronto.reprosentatives of the foreign prose, the Engish- di-triot nten ' A\ bcen mnade knowm in Berlin, to invade th Ruhrdistrict via Belgian and Dutch territcry. After ijar’han Petain bad ,m a

the anaAmistice.on 17th June 1940, shortly after Italy’s entry into the‘ war, rhcszuehrer he presence ox the high generality and the Reich Forcienhad rocc-vodanapeotzoracorecosracmmezon.zothjne the Blgation,

nf ,2-fter the victory in the Test, the Fuehrer turned to the realisation ofchisuplonsfora United Europe. In agreement with allied Italy, shown and C«nty.the repeaced noctings of the Forcign nistor, von Ribdentrop, . and -ount.dign, m by decisions of importonce in talks betvrcen Hitler A00.-/S30ini thezselves, began at first an econonic infiltration or the

the letter orh.stategan building up of uutual conditions of confidence, om-cstrer.induced the Hungarian and Rumanian Government in their negotiations onsterrikorial reconciliation to ask for an arbitrator’s decision by the xis "ojchstookplace under the chairaanship of von "ibbentrop on the 30th ugust ’ PAW Vionna- After that, at first nungary, which since February 1939 auher • to the Anticointern Pact, joined on NOvember 1940 the mrinartite Pact / C hadbeen simned betwcen Cerdany, Italy and Jajan oh the 27th septe /r ' -944• . The necessity to trensforn the anticoincern Pact into a sccufit PtLtuwiche other countries t. join, had resuud ProihemUm . h3 U.S, beconinsnoru andxore Llctoing towards Japananu nne -XiS and Iron the increasing help being given to Britainculminated in the U.S.,.. law for help to Britain in .arch 194,1.under.her new Head of State, Gencral Antonescu followed the exapleordnary:. General ntonescu himself perforod the signing of Puaniatsdeclaration of adherence to the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.

whichRumania

Co zonuth,12th November 1940 the Chairman of the Committee of the People’s nanast2rrvth2tForcunucn-19zsar -olotov, returncd in tae RLchsrorei

on pe-heyear 1941 brought Bulgaria into the Three Power Pact on 1/3. Later 4n 2543 Jugoslavia also joined the Three Power Pact. However, a few days Sr Xt igning or the Pact in Vienna, a revolution took place in Beigrade, brougS 6A bY.Lon on and -osco and resulted in a Cer.an invasion of Jugoslavia on of the on.tho.sane day. Foreign iinister von Pibbentrop issued a declaration of the Reich Govern ent’s resolution concerning Jugoslavia and Greece cenclusion of the Ger.nn-Turicish Pact of friendship (18.6,41) was reGaraeThe us a German diploatic victory over England.

. The Foreign Office ccruunique issued the norning of 22.6. cot-- cf raordinary significant information regarding the treacherous activities pfithessaviet Gqvernnontsincc the conclusion of the Ger. man-Soviet Pact priendshiP at the sau.e time the German invasion arnies crossed the Russian

— •I1 U-L6. e **

-3- 3857

On 25.11.1941., a State Governaent meeting vras held in the Ambassaor’s Hall of the net Gernan Chancellery wras signed by the representatives of the signatories of the inticomintern Pact, prolonging the Agreenent, and the representatives of the Governents of Bulgaria, Denark, Pinland, Croatia, Runania and Slovakia joyfully acclaiuc the participation of their respective countries in this Pact.

Rules were laid dotm for ruutual operations against the Inglomerican eneny and after the entry of Japan and U.S., in the war, a nilitary convention was signed in Berlin on 18.1,1942 betveen Gerany, Italy and Japan.

-4- 3589.

H1155-0013

D. 636

Eraiination of descent of SS-Leaders , -------------------- --

________ SS No. 6JO83 gazette No.

Carried out in the SS bureaufor problens of descent. Person making the von Ribbentrop Joachin

application___________ _______ -______F ianc ee/Wi f e

Name : V. Ribbentrop

Christian Name : Joachom

Occupation : Foreign lLinister

Rank : SS Gruppenfdhrer (Lieutenant General)

SS Unit : R.F. SS

SS No. : 63083

Reason for missing particulars and ro-aarks :

To No. 1 : J.v. Re was adopted by Gertrud von Ribbentrop on the

15.5.1925 and thereby received the (civil) name "von Ribbentrop1’.

(Gertrud von Ribbentrop - born Berlin 19.5,1863., spinster, lives in

Nauiburg on Saale, Sedanstrasse 23. She is the daughter of Karl

Berthold Sigisnund von Ribbentrop, knighted on the 3.6,18840, Lt:

Gen. in the Royal Prussian riy.

,11 _____________l h1 TRANS LATON OF DOCUMENT NOT 2461-PS

A O" • O°£ ice -f U „S, Chief of Ccunse ],(l(•

DOKUMENTE_DER DEUTSCHEN HO LIT IK GROSSDEUTSCHLIND 1938

Vcl. 6, port 1, 1939(of itch by Poul Meier-Benneckenstein )

Pago 124, no. 21a.Official German Statement of the meeting of the Fuhror

and Reich Chancellor with the ustrian Bund Chancellor Dr. Schuschnig at Berchtossacn(on 12 February) fr m 12 te 15 Fobrunry 1938.

The Austrian Bund chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in company of the Austrian state secretary for foreign affairs Dr. GUIDO SCH-DT and the German ambassador VON P/PEN paid today a visit to the Fdhrer and Reich Chancellor at OSERS LLZB ERG athis invitation in presence of the foreign Reich minister

I3BETROP, This unofficiol mooting originated from the mutual desire to discuss all questions pertaining te the relationship between the Gorm n Reich and Austria.

* % • -X- • -x- -X- a 5* -x-At the conference which took place between the FEhror

and Reich chancellor and the Bund chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg at the OBSRSLZBERG at BERCHTESGADEN on 12 February. All "" questions u relationship between the German Reich and Austria wer A d iscussod in detail. Purpose of this discussion was to eliminate Cifficultics cue to the execution of the agree­ment of 11 July 1936.

It was agreed that both prrties aro resolved to stick to the principles of this agreement and consider some a basis for a satisfectory development of tha relationship between the

two c puntrios.In this sense both parties, after the discussion of 12

February 1938, have agreed to the imodiato exocution of measures to u:rente e to effect such close und friendly relationship between both nati ns as it is proper for the history and total interest of the German nation. Both s tatosmon '..re c vncod that t no measures t kon by them onstituto at the same timo an effective contribution toward

the peaceful development of the European situation.The Austrian overnmoni issued a similar communication.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2461-PS

4 NOv 194.5I, KRNSTM. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby cortirythat I Am thorpuehl. Conversant with the English and German 1 nungos and tnat the above is a correct and true translation of Document ’No. 2461-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738

H1155 -0014

-0015

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTT 1780-psOFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL__________

Translation of Excerpts from Jodi Diary

1937

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing neces- ganr. Fu07 allotment only for export. Armed forces and construc- tionc for four-yesr plan must be cut doun by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no rora orders to be placed "rith industry so they ’"ill have a chance to fil 1 the many orders previously olaced. with them.

The sentence "oney is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the rav materials.

Had hcntest and (illegible), especially hm ad ^rain (Brotge- treide) , der nd conoid able use of foreign c. . ncy for the feeding of the peopi ..

33 Lurch;

Peoort to the Minister about ne lfivens of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasised the lecersit: to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt "ith daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front er, i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, .1 concct of policy to the Conranders-inChief of the Armed Forces, e Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made■y the Chief of the Armed Forces Office ("ar Department) (des Chef "A (R Kr. l’in) ) and by Commander-in-Chief of th? Air Force (Dir-

otive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (1o minutes ■ re kept) .

Intention of I- to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the services (C-in-C, Air Force) ; furtiermore, to incorporate them into nobiization instructions.

193811 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersal zberg. Schuschnigg together "ith G. Schmidt* are ngein being p t under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol .

13 February:

In the afternoon Generel K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the effect that military pressure by shnmming military action should be kept Up until the 15th. proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

Pge 214. February: NO. 1730-PS _ Continued

went® 21400‘cloch the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris the dirreront hmtosthescounter-Intellirence orrice VII ana initiate.

is Theeect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression tionrested that Germany is undertaking serious military prepara-

15 February

results the_evening an official communique about the positive esu-ts of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

mnEhanges in the Austrian government and general political CX* 1111 IL O U.Y.

P.R February:

. At 1300 hours General K. sees th Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planneo. advances (vorstosse).

3 March;

cg--The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officersShal-.be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see Sonal !-,.They.shoudnot see to it that the Austrian "t-ai1icht better against us, cut rather that they do

them per- Armed Forces not fight

10 March;

By surprise and without consulting his ministers ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March ' ’strong majority for the Legitimists in the preparation.

Schuschnigg which should bring absence of plan or

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General cslled.back from Cairo Olympic Committee. ' General v Schebert is ordered.to.come, as as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who la

. th the District leader (Gauleiter) Eurckel in the Palatinate, generas Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the

eiC Skanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow“at 10:15, according t.o the wish of General v. Viobahn, to give him the old draft.

"Prepare case Otto."

it The same night, Reichenau is

Adm i r a takes

1300 hours: . .. Chief of Operational Staff (and)over the Foreigheotro.is nR detained in London. Neurath

A „erEuehrer"ants.totransrit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet.Personalletter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are "5’8" force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Aw corps; Mthoutreservele

qenu. Air puts 300.-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda Ponphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe) ,3 bomber 20.(4Kampfgeschader) and two companies as airborne tro’ps with prantzeprtnplanesare held ready at civilian airport. (rriedensrlug-

o_ Subordinsted to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force &E,,3Hsouadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn. , Regt GeneralV - --1Me

H1155-0016

Page 3PaRIIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCIENTNo, 1780-FS. Con tinued

11 Merch

o Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is riven on 11 March at2:°° without simnature; at 1300 hours with his sipnature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by reri ments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit UpS-r_ Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chan­cellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Ovn movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans -arge scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed, and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed, its doubts if it should initiate the movements started.

Colonel WinklerThe Air Force has

that have not yet

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major that the situation has changed once more The place.

General Viebahnoccupation win take

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech Question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they win have to be newly prepsrec on the basis of the changed strategic position because" of the, annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memor_encum Lia of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem 48Jet. is.changedbecsuse of the Czech strategic troop concentra- t-4n.of 31.’ ay, "hich occurs without any German threat and with­out ne S.iphtest cause for it.

to aBecause of Germany's self restraint, its loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he

Therefore,Loss

take once more, on 30 May. the new order is

consequences lead is not willing to

issued for "green11

22 Nay:

Fundamental (see enclosure).

conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein

23 Kay:

Major Schmundt r eports. - ideas of the Fuehrer. Further con_Which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the

Fuehrertake.place "iththe Chief of the Armed Forces High Commana "-Kw) on 38 ..ay, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (Tar Diary L)

f erences ,

30 .May:

The decision m i l i t ary

Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

Page 4 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT

" 1730-PS. Continued

of Amy must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag) , combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly rhe Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After din­ner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of th Army, are rather un­fortunate. This applies especially to the rgkof GeneralWietersheim, in which Gen er al AA am s (die legt) that the western weeks. The uehrer he into the re.rk that 2 good for arm thing. " only be held for threc this despor. lent op ini - widely rrithin t i

to top it off he claims dazu dem General N,

fortifications can onl;• omes very indignant ani

such a case the whole n" + you , Genera ' .

. ft r * ■ -co. .-S unT ytun. ! . .

to quote from eins in den Mundb held for three■iames up, bursting ny would not be • to sition will not

ati > „ The cause ofih/held very

n various

er noch

......... ,, . *..7 -"n" " . ... ... i - uca -‘JO, memories; politiosi consCeratic. pls - a part as well, instead of obeying and executing ivs mil l a. y mi:cion. That is certainly

one with traditional devotion, • it the vigor of the soul isLacking because in the end, they do not believe in the genius of ne Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII.

And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political demege, for the opposition be­tween the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk,

ur may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops, it I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost

.he morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right .ament comes.

'-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser) . ecompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

ald the Honved inister v. Raatz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great‘ar, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the

old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the U ders tend ing that we have neither demands from, nor claims against hem, out that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by

Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator beteen them and Poland, The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 49 hours would be indis­pensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.

6 September;

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General S.aff Fischer.

Page. 5 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTNO. 1730-PS. Continued

of t.Eeforesthat he is briefed by me on the political attitude the exact moment. The seme with OQI, Generai v. stuelpnagen.o September

Ac. General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Arm- Hishommand.will be informed five days in advance if the P-ani8 to.take place. I agree and add that the overall meteoro- 1osics situation can be estimated to some extent, oniy for two

46‘Sni2 monent°(zeaay-25*6202 tazi. the pias "ay 6 changec up

-gp General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he won ders whether trie previous basis of the plan is not beinq abandoned Itepresupposed that the Western Powers would not interrere ad cisx/ely It grecually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his.decisioneventhouch hemay no longer be of this opinion. It restrbeadeed that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is

I.must_sdmit that.I en orrying too, When comparing the change political and military potentialities, according 24 June, 5 Nov 37, ? Dec 57 , 30 May 38, - '

of opinion abou

statements with the

-n Spite of that one must be aware of the fact that nations 111 do everything they can to aon], pressure to must pess this test of nerves, but because only very few

w.the ert of "ithstendine this pressure successfully possible solution is tc inform only a very -- - ’of newS that causes us ‘ '

the otherWe

people

through anterooms as heretofore

.. the onlysmall circle of officers

end not to have it circulate

U

us.

1800 hours to 3100 hours; Conference with eL:gp ,, Command and Chief of Generai starr or the’Ar porhe fn?ese™\er? Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

(x-1 4 o‘c1 per)anapreannpuncement t the APayorrderpXaBefehl)

10 September:

Genera] Halder back from Nurnbeng ye +,,4gignec decree subordinating the Reich''Labor Service that.t A-Fyehrer High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decidedthat the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions vound loin iced hatand their plece would be taken by two other divisions (3 U rmy ——-e 81 D-e). words

11 September•

In the afternoon conference with Secrptnrv e q+,+ fommorhecrnistry °f Pudlle ^ightenment and ^^$2

J ahnkeon imminent

The joint preparations for refutation (wicer-cung) 4 on.yiolations of internationai law, and the exploitation of Iur » o1"tions by the enemy, were considered particularly important!

15 September:

Chier-ortcenmrrning,cenferenceswith Chief of Army High Command and discussed what could'be oSnArry and Air Forces ; the question was of the date au, to .De done, f the Fuehrer insists on advancement115 -5’ ue to the rapid development of the situation.

-0019

Page 5 PA^TlIE TRANSLATION of DOCUMENT ^0. 1730-PS. Continued.

16 September;

. Genersl Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours He 1eseribes the results of the conference between Cham_

ertain. and the Fuehrer., The next conference will take place on one 3-S- or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the by the Armed Forces Hich the Ministry of Finance, border.

Fuehrer, the order is given in the eveningCommand to the Army High Command and to to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech

an+, . ' order is issued to the railways to havethe empty rollin stock kept in readiness clandestinelv strategic concentrat ions of the Army, so that it can be starting 23 September.

for the transported

17 September

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans." ith,previousmilitory training to the Replacement Army the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free orps. The Armed Forces High Commend nuts Lt

(reporter on youth cues ‘

Sudeten

as acvi s Hen] e in at the disposalCol. Kcechling

of Konrad Henlein

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to Sudeten German Free Corps. take care of the

20 s ep t enb^r:

England and the contents of • Free Corps start and already have

to the proximiI attempt

'rance have handed. over their demands in Prague"ne "n1n. The activities of the

6 such an extent that they may bring about . about consequences harmful to the plans ingrether strong units of the Czech Army

_ , , border). By checking with Lt. Col.o lead these activities into normal channels.

hichassumin brought

ere still. unknown.

Koechling,

-oWard the evening the Fuehrer also permission to act only with groups up to approval of the Corps HQ.

takes a hand and gives 12 men each, after the

The motorized reinforcements by the . take effect.

CaptainsrndcousatTslenhone.cex1.fram_theAcjutant of the Fuehrer.Chiefs by Captain Ebminutes ago that Prague i

submitted during the conference with the’ . , "The Fuehrer has received news five aid to have accepted unconditionally.11

1245 hours; Department heads are informed and directive :c siven to continue preparation for IGreeni,but"neverthesetsvt.is,." everything necessary for a peaceful penetrations torgers

of the Ts,end.Ib of ‘ y Hagh Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

Sept ember;

1920 hours:. Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesbere yon Stulonagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject- g) n,8

cennnt.vet.benascertained (D-Day)(x- Tag); continue preparations 20/mroins.to pla..In case Green" occurs, it will not be before - September. It it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

by General

H1155-0020

Page 7PAATTAL TR•SLATIONOFDOCUh:ENIT NO.178C-PS. Continued.

25Seemo er:

cy --er 01 tne Fuehrer, two Death Hesd (Totenkopr) Ss batta iong.haye movec into the Panhandle territory near A3Ch -iPfel) to the rear of the Free Corps. "5

25 September;

advance units and be cause t in any case.

the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the has stopped the intended approach march of the

he Czech border, because it' is not yet necessary oes not intend to march in before the 30th

prreach towards the Czech frontier need be

toFuehrer

In the evening of the Dresden and Vienna are rut for Popular Enliqntenment possible Czech propaganda

sth, fixed radio stations of Breslau at the disposal of the Reich Ministry*

and Propaganda for interference with transmissions.

Question by devartment to be allowed to leave and the Armed Forces High Comma

Foreinn Countries'1 whether Czechs are cross Gsrmany. Decision from Chief of nd: yes.

1515 hours* mhe chef Genoral Stumpf about there about the Fuehrer' s oni ni on 30th.

01 the Armed Forces High Command■•It oi the Godesberg conversation

in no case will x day be beforeinformss and the

It is inportant that into mil i. t a ry en qa emen t s replied.

We do not permit ourselves to be dravrn because of false reports, before Prague

A cuestion of Stumpf about y hour recu + on account of the weather situation, a g;m. of the Air Force and Army cannot be expectea. dawn, me Air Force can only start later on a

s in the reply that aneous intervention

The Army needs the ccount of frequent fogs.

The who is to E Heh. et ..as to make a decision for

have priority. the commanders in chief

The opinion of Stumpf is to proceed. The Fuehrer hss o omm i t m e n t e me inst Pra qu e.

also that the attack not made any decision

of the Army has as yet about

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses n important speech at the Sportpalast. the people and the world in

2 7 s en t enb er;

1320 hours; The Fuehrer being advanced to a line from area by 30 Septenber

consents to the first wave of attack "nere they can arrive in the assembly

22 Septemben:

Stapf (°) reports about a conference latter states that a Great Tar can nAr8y it may last 7 years, and "re win win it.

nith Goering where the oe avoided any longer.

1700 hours; Tension conference with Chemberla; X6S. The Fuehrer has decided on

ne Duce and Daladier in Munich.

H1155 -002

Page 8 PARTIALTRANSLATTI OF DOCUATENT NO.1780-PS.__Continued.

out 1e 0 ct o_ lunich ig signed. Czechoslovakia as a power iszones as October.

or th ill be occupied between the 2ndbe occupied. he Temaining part of mainly German character

Y the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrerand his determination not to shun eve the victory without the use of force."

ermi nation no

the weal and the doubtful in that tray.

a World War have again wron The hope remains that the people have been converted

1939

23 Auqust :

Received order Perlin and take oven Office. (m).

from Armed Forces Hiph Command to proceed to position of Chief of Armed Forces'Executive

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Hieh Command. X day has been announced for 23 August been announced for 030 hours.

Armed Forces Y time has

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSIATION CF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS.

22 November 1945

I, Ludwia /4thoroughly conversant with that the above is a correct Document No, 1780-ps.

37443052, hereby cer e English and German

that I

d true translation of excerpts

am.and in

LuCwig HartmanT/437443052

H1155 -

TRNSLTION OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, part W OFFICE OF U.S. CIHEF OF COUNSEL

. Telephone Conversation betweenGoering and Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop

13 March 1938, London9:15 - 9:55

48 you mow the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the ndninistration current government procedures (Fuhrung der Regiorungsgesch-

i' -nd therefore I wanted to inform you. There, is overwhelming in -ustrin, th.t you can hear over the radio.

Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it?

G: Yes, the last march into the Rhinelend is completely The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to ! c last mist remember it Wes the first tino that he saw his hoeland how, I mainly want to talk about political things. Wel this s:py We had given an ultimatum, th t is just fo.lish gossip. From +1 " very beginning the National Socialist ministers end the roprosQatircs o, the peopic (Volksrefcrenkn) have prcsonted ticultimatum, L,or en more and more prominent pooplo of tho movement Party partici-s.d, ‘ end as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist minisos askoa us to back them up, so they would not be completely beatnsp as am -nd be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told n we would not 01lov Schuschnigg to provoke - civil wrer, under ne c-rcimstances. Whether by Sciuschnigg's direct order, or wilHn- sent the Communists -nd the Rods had been ■ rmcd, and were al,y milring demonstrstions, which were photographed with "Heil Mogul one so or, naturally, all these facts caused scc denger for cncr- Neustadt. Then you hevo to consider thet Scluschniggnade hespeccn- pi, te--ing them the Fatherl ancish Front (Vatcrlendische yro;- would -8ntiS - st ian, on could not knew that they would civalate -ke that end therefore Soyss-Inururb who alrcady had taken .r the

sked us to morch in immedintely, Bai ore mre had -cnuy m rehed up to the frontier since We could not Ihow wh.thr . c .Mould be i civil a or or not. These ar. the actual facts vha, can be proved by documents. This way the people may......... The TLorine -C interusting: Tho absolute complete enthusiasm lor the Natomi Socialisu which is surprising even +. 11 1r, +L. .ci. ■ 011

overshadowodnight Ycu

gai:.

government

I ro:

.• n ? . c~,7 ° T ---- — - •-V-- /--•

S:. 4'°- .. Anong tlc members of tho Fatherl-ndish Front worNe ion 1 Socialists, out these people had to join the F.Lh.loish ront,,otherwise they woro subjected to terror, mainly cconomic11y,

m • everybody who did not belong to the Fetherlendish Fron lost Ais jOD S0 the Fathorlendish Front really seemed to be somethng. But actumu-, thusewere all our people which is just being ascovercd now, . nd that explains thu whole situation, which did oven sup ass all

east We thought.but with the on. c-the Jews and a part of those deep black oncs, ther is no

our expectations. At 1coption of

as

So it seems thet all Austria is on our side.

G: Tel .let n tcll you, if there were an election tomorrow, - I greedy told S-I he should invite the representatives cf the demo oremic 22wers “ they could convince themselves that f, i3 w s really an o ec^ion carried through on a democratic basis - nd we sho have Al - votes in our favour. Absolutoly1 Only now one gets the re- Portshow thoso PCDplo hove ocen mistreated; I believe it is absolutely Ac0SS ry that serious people from England and Fru co should be asked •0.0 O ver hore and to vrtch what is actually going on. The biggest trick .hich ever had been played was done here.

I believe that days I had a few fore yesterday, big surprise vere

this conviction will grow here. During these last conversations not to forget the one I hed the day be- Tilings are like that: at the moment they had their .........later on I shall tell you more but generally

2949-PS, part W

TR.NSLTION OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS (Cont’d)

People act very sensibly. The day before yesterday I told Halifox - a long time - thrt the whole English public what is going on in Austria.

who was with me quite opinion knows exactly

There is something e any elections as

should be back first

else I started to say: We cannot afford to long as our troops are stationed there, theyBesides, during the next few days our troops

nc could stop that, any militory man known +1,+will return. No onc could stop that, any military men knows that, Wen such 2 thing is running, when the order is given to start the nae-cr takes its course, till the troops have re chad their destin-

tione.ond til th-I aro rondy to bc shipped away and returned. As i was -nsormed yesterday, on figures with 5-6 days. T is is now nothing but a friendship rerch. Nothing has happened, not one shot

to take over Vienna ord HicncrNeustndt.b3 an easy job - as it was c1) over.

Was fired. Still We h. vPut l om convinced that il iPut no on could h ’ those people. lhey to fight for Rustri nothing behind it, 2

d that pooches ofe fonntios, determined nd soon, that there w

. 0 on could suspect. Officials, for instance,reported -nd tne high r ups just as well as the s aller ones ond the onus in the ranks in between, -hoy all told the same story: TYOu ‘ con ot in pine if We only onco had mentioned that we wore sympath izing with you "e ToUd becn put ruthlessly into the streets with pur 1amilies." It was such a. brutal system! They only could fool the world by covering all their deeds with the vord 11 Christianity" theJ.Were so slimy. But they verc the most brutal days that ever did exist. I hve to ony I take my h t off to those

2949-PS, Part W, p, 12

TRAlSL.TLON OF DOCUENT 2949;_______ Cent: d.

at least they are honest. On top of i Thore they die. not behead people — well, some of them they di d

eut nre they killed them economically, they ruin d then. Ono, . ant to sy: it is claimed that we ovcrpovrered th. Austrian pcople

.nu tuck away their independence, then one should admit at least that just on- little pert 02 it was out under pressure - not by us - end that was the government which cxistod on such o small basis. Tne Austrian people n VC only DOon r-cd by no". J would just suggest to Halifax or to some red -erous people whoin h have a picture of vhat ie country, then they will ec yesterday, you know if th

som

trusts to just send them over, so they may ing on hero. They shall travel through the everything. Besides I also w nt to point out

• nd so on, i - n Jcugh bccaususcrupulous states, ann who would send baceuso Z German brother-nations - .

whcre would one find such n un-million. to denth onl

R absolutelythink oa. knows pretty well

ridiculou onc lizcs t I do

Gstate in th thing from inter: sts!

Ribbentrop, I wouliWhole got hurt by our

f the status ea

one fact union?: w17

ticul: rly:ru take away

inatny-

have one into re stind of in to cr. ato

+,tace of minorities does not ex the people are German, all tho state is involved in it. An.d an interest. You may say that C few hundred thousand Ger nans

aor- than 0.15 Ove c speak Gcrmen.

that is .against our ? They only could rmnny. The prcen- all Austria. All

u setes "hich as thle only onus might have Itoly ond Jugoslavia nad Hungery because

point

fuel etc. ... thoy actuc reforc, it is ridiculous

re living there - these whc could say

the not

sd, that t: ir and tho-

undort

rumor Czechoslovckit hadwould be satisfied with ono word from htest thing against Czechoslovrkia.

I bnat they are . Besides I do want te me yesterday and

to

d was taken out ofm that I would

R, Of Lrcady informed theif called here yesterday and told L.ocrna

lore

G. st

re uny l

The German tree opposed tovhol

t o rToday t

ncrely sc ' advance do

but all over the

t these villages Ci no more take place smller columns ar

soldier.

on thcir march through Austria, ctor only one dissolved battalion

march

vaSin tae joy and pleasure 3 to military principle

R. Now let ne tell you this: Later on I my farewell visit to everyone already the embassy tai s care of all business. I do

want to talco a plane. I paid day before yesterday. The net have any more authority.

G• But the Fuehrer thought because you are just there the people vhat is really going on. Above al1, th t it to think Cormany had given an ultimatum.

that you could inform is absolutely wrong

R- 1 have lroody spoken very openly vith Halifax and Chamberlain, is no doubt about it. Only the fact that the newspapers----people to CSX questions and it does not seem to be right if I still remain lt would look strange, somehow.

There start

here,

G No, no, 1 think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I wont that you once more, - but no, - not at 0 moro, “ but gencri 1ly speaking - tell the following to Halifax -ini -t is n°t correct tnat Germany has given any ultimatum, lie oy 3chuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him

ll once. ond Chanber-

This is a. by SI, -

3949-FS, Part W, p. 3

H1155 -0025

H1155 -0026

TRASLATION OF DOCU/T 2945-13

__ __ _________Cont’d.

Gleise-Horsten an and Jury. Furthormorc, it is not true that we heve pre­sented rn ultimatun to tnc Fodoral President, but it nlso was given by the othors end as far as I know just a miliboy-attacho camo along, asked by S--, because of technical ouosti cn; ba vas supposed to ask whether in case S-I would sk for the support of Corran troops, Cormany would grant this recuest. Furthormoro I went to state thet S-I "sksu us expressively — by phone as by telegrom to send troops bocouse no aj d not know ebout the situation in Wicnor- Ncusirdt, vicuna, 'aid so on; occnusu arn.s had been distributed there. And then ha coul.d not knew how tae Fstn.rl-ndish front migut react since they always ana had such n big mouth.

R. Lr. Goering, tell nc, how is the situ t ion in Vienna, is everything settled yet? ‘

—• Yes. Yesterdaj l londed hundreds cf tirpinres with some conp-nios, inorder to secure the airfield and they were received with joy. Today the Acvance unit of the 17. dvision marches in, together with the Austrirn troops Also I want te point out het the AUS irion troops did not withdraw but that they got together and Irnte rnized imnediately with the Germ n troops, wherever they were stutionod.

E. That had to be oxpectod.

G. Ino mrching-in took place, then, nccording to this wish. Now wre also recognize that further invasion is no more necessary. The whole affair is rolling as it is supposed to roll nd it has crystallized ilito a innrch of 3° if you wont to call at like that, as soon ns it wi.ll stop, - which vn I1 be either tomorrow or the day after tonorrow, - the transport back shall start. The Austrian Government

H1155 -002

TRISLTICN OF DCCU BT 2949T-P3OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

ent'd

has infornto us thnt it vill then hld a free nnd secret election, n the basis of " mecrntic principles, so that every ustrian will be able to ive his reel free vte in a free and soctet election, ind therefore they want t. ask people fr n hronA so that afterwards no repronch of falsificnti n can be : ao - lilzo Schuschni id - so that they willsee that this is a real and secrst election. It is also in our interest because ve are ahs olutoly conrince" that "re shall get ar ov erv helming majority. The ref re it is also in ur interest that this election will be handled absolutely c rrcctly. After the election then we shall see the ocision the peoplo mne and we shall see vhnt is zoin - to hnpo.n.

But nhove ne thin- you must not Leava any doubt: Te vill respect the .cision, Austria vill mko in any respect. And, im"ense she leciclos

for uni n - of vhich we hove no doubt - then no power on earth will be able to setarste us. It mev be that n worl -lenue of all states nay overpower Germany, but it wron’t be possible that w vill t lorate to he sonaratod aain if Austria Pecic s to "o to /other vith Coru.nny. An this is no threat for any st te whatsoever, I want t> moko that clear. In no respectare we threatenin’’ the CSR but the CSR has now the possibility to come to • friendly and r 7 sonblo nrruemant with us. They say (the CSR) : " Ve did not mobilize any soldiers in the Vest. Nothine has been charred in the present situation." Everythin - under the condition that France remain sensible and des not take any steps, Naturally, if France renizes n v * bi mobilization close to the boar’er, then it'llnot he funny.

R: I believe that they vill behave all ri-ht.G: "e have a clear conscience an that is the d cisivo factor. Before world

history ve hnvu a free conscience. Fever has it happened in the world that anyone Pid interfere if two ‘r ther-nations united. That would be a minst the sovarei rights f people. That would bo absolutely ridiculous.

R: I had a ion." intensive conversation with Halifax, an/ I told him ourbasic conception also in rospoct to tha G rman-En lish undcrstan’in~.........

G: That I vrnted to say, you know yurslf, Ribbentrop, that I always was in favour of a Germon-Inlish undarstanin. Noone else woul be more

-.lad than I, if the nolish really wanton it seriously, and if they also roconined that we are alio a proud nnd free nation. ftot all, we also

do represent 2 brother-nations,R: I can tell you one thin", Jr. Gocrin"o The other day I sp ke to

Chamberlain after that rerkfast, and I • t a vry -ond imrossi n of him, and he vo me a mossane, some news for the Fuehrer, which I shall deliver personally to the Fuehrer. Will you be in Berlin this nfterna on?

G; Yes, I will, TTe celebrate the "Nemorial Day" (Holdennodenktnc) but let me tell you this, you’ll have to stay in Berlin. The Fuehrer himself mvs ma the order that everar minister.. You know, otherviso we would have a reot mirstion ....... Yesterday not ne sin-la ministerand official was at home. I voule have needed 1000 planes. Naturally, they all nnt to enjoy this ecstasy of joy. Therefore I had to ke n the B ntlemon baclt by usin' draconic monsuros.

R: I cannot tell you that over the nhone. But it is better for me to takeoff today.

G: Yes, I leave it entirely t vru.R: Othervise, it will not make sense. I’y conversations are concluded, anf

if I sit around it might iva a funny imrression. But I had an excellent impression of Cham’: ricin.

G: I am lo to hear that.R: The other day I spoke quite a while with him. I do not want to speak

about it over the phone, but I have the impression that Chamberlain also is very serious about an understanding. I told him in this conversation that after the Austrian problem hal boun settle’, the indersteninc

between German” nd nglnnd will be s.o much less complicated than before. I believe, he realized that.

2949—PS, Part W, p. 5

-0028

TR.NSLTION OF DOCU] ENT 2949W/-FS

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL c 1 -1

G: 7 - Look, since the vholle prohlem has been settled down there andno mere dnner of excitement nn? Disturbance exists - and this wns n source of renl lan er - che veople shoule be thankful for our having eliminntec this source of crisis,

R: I told them that, too and also pointed out that we not ri of nsituation, vthich caused olvmys many troubles. Even if there was some excitement at this moment, the rcot line for tho Cuman—En lish unde rstonding ciul only be strenht ned by it, I also said to Halifax at the end of our conversation that we honestly do want to come to an un‘erstan?in • and he repliod that his only wrry vs the CSR,

G: No,no, that is out of the question.R: I told him then that we were not interested and ve did not intend to

do anything there, On tho contrary , if our Fellovr-Germans vere

2949-PS, Part W, p. 6

H1155 -

TRANjLATION OF DOCUET 2949 w P3OFFICE OF UJ 3 CHIEF’ OF COUNSEL

Cettcu in a sensible way, mlent there, toc. then be shoula core to ar agre

Yes,able -am a-sc con ‘iced that Ealifax is an absolutly reason-

I got the best impression of Rall -ain: He thought it woula a littl public opinion, because here it 1kill say, W fore I beli that if the En_l

im L» the leaner 30 curing the 1

in this whichth: t

lter a few in the sense

. case tnd if he sive w.C vorlted it out tog at home, our Fu hrer by tn: public Englis

k3 like force etc. I hav man, the man in th? stre with Austria. And there

GoVernront will tull Cha ftr ell he is the leads' few vceks if he ren1lv

i • O,eran-Enslish i ly u intelligil

rent problem

e-ner 13 "ors, as far as he could h opinion which

f world history ; like w all

mhis is absolutly clear. (The following ner- are natters which Go concern pcool

natters vhich CO not concern than at anuiiintelli gible) ., anu there are

u my last converthir, but at (ic fsvour

that he cid nut rtion lit

mi n-L

act to th. be convilt th

I g

h-E

lor. or 1css elortce ench ness .

everythin, is otner und are

in wonderful peace. Tao peoples overjoycu *ni express their happi-

All the people over here think..............

hnother people which other ......... the otherhuol0re3poioility ir such miseryovercone—-3lue3 I u.st SoY, Mussolini beh.vec vonder

state t s the fully.

ears the people.

V ~ T } - ---9, - noa.ru .recuy about it.

Onderful .

Very gcod, inactu. .e always thought so !

the y ou

! Ho (M) said chuschni.

nov.188 vuntsa to carry out t e llgiole ) . Everysin i,

IC. of an he m: ter

■a him about the you cannot do that

WS how Schusch- words unin_

votes which as no-votes ana O4

63 Innsoruck ?tr

ne nor no Only

2949-FS, Part W, p. 7

H1155 -0030

TRANSLATION OF DOCULENT 2949 W. pSOFFICE OF U J CHIEF OF COU.SEL

Cont 1 a

Anyone of the small people v.ould n

withi f s or

u

eone took a onu thun vroteIv.cr Te

OVeto ox

act coniderco as one sinco it v.s torn into

SeQ it out hex! thi 3 wa and you tor then is waa or 2 ye3-70

hicallv ?

trur as I cm here ■ 3h 11 stil] pui lish

Th re th whi ch

6unbe-

oil, every torn vote evera.l were torn. A. together

30 1Jbut every

qui tc Unbeclisva b l e

V. - but

W 7 5 : nyV on

_,1le your

id: I ul hr. licie they suia th.t th

you W J j rry

into

2949-PS, Part W, p. 8

H 55-

Ekc/ITON 07 DOUUNT 3949rs, nW ____ ._____________ ____________ _______

d el i Teredo ell, let’s say, this Tr, Tcter 'iro this list and he norl:ed it. Thente went inco the nexs vocng olrce a.n JEDS-- Druck; they had the seme 1303*, erery vov: hed these lists ( ords unintelllible. } ii. liciez sa.dp tiI tent to vote” "Plense, -r, lcleri. It is bain; merken enain. Vot he goes into the till’d, voting-once, whece pge2.1a one hes the saume list, because every voting-plece c2aya npd the srne list.

R t It is unbeli ? vabl eG: 1‘ov, he iveg ais vote for the third time. The only fear

these pcole hod fps the folloving: Thpt one mi ht find more esvo Ues than those trese ecole entitled to vote. But even

thet would not have bosherac tnen, they "ould just have sub UPa cted th cm.

H: They just "ould have subtracted then.G: S.-I believes - end so ao I, - th t he ney stijl find nut

thru 1ntoroga tion of the cunloyees that they plreedy had fized beforehand the numbers of the yes ano no-OUS and also the nnouat of eonle trho ned not given their vote at all.

R: unintelll ibleG: That was the most brozen election hi ch t:ov]d ever nave taxon

olece.R: Inuiedia tely vhen I was informed first I exrersed nyself very

stron ly arpinst this election as a pure swindle e few days 8o in ny conversation with Halifax.

C: Listen: Another stinole vos enacted. Insite of the fact that * then then is a neg ninister for foreign affairs, the an Hassa-also oors - I believe"the one in London, Frank enstein, (it.) went

and they have responsibility (unintelligible) toward their ol covernment — they ver? ande to cone, chen ,ed opinions of the nr ministers according to their convictions. This is bein, investigated. S-I in formed me about it yesterday. He said, he found out, that there still exist connections between the enba sales and underground forces, that is unauthorized neone of the old covernment eno that these emonsendors represent recuests of the old government on behalf of the new one. Do yc u unders t a nd ?

R: Yes.G: And this is supoosed to have haened in London.H: Yes, yes. Frencens tein himself .... we have a fe” people,

I know, they are very unfriendly.G: How is Frontentin?R: 'ell, toere us — I do not know how he really feels, you

see, - they borrot ed st'estila flag for today -G: That is fineh: Yes, that is ok. but I believe he always stoted himself

loyal and decent toward me, I connot say differently; I cannot Sny hot he really feels though. But, as you know, e he.ve a, few people here tho are most disorrepble.

C: But tell Frankenstein he has to represent the present {govern- nent.

h: les, the t is understood.G: hell, any way, S-I tola me yesterday, I do not Know if it

Voc the Austrian minister in nclonc or in Poris, I believe in P-ris, vho &Skao? , is it correct that the Austrian govern nent csked for the uerin tr ons. So he was fol a by the new foreign office: Yes, that is correct. ■'ell, we said that the ne” ministry for forein affair did say the government hod not asked for them. Tois matter is being investigated.

2949-PS, Part W, p. 9

TluNSL.TION OF DOCUGENT 2949W-FS CTFICS OF’ US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

CONTID

zhere ' tre “ for morc fellovs thore who. just try to minglo in: .11, th nk Y C u SO much , A -r . G Do I i ng .

G: Comc over horc, it is benutitul cver hero.

’ .11, I shall come this oftornoon. Generally sponking, 1 1o believo it is a won Aerial thing.

G: wont to tell you, 1 an happy beyond any description. You o not knowhr" much - suffor-- under the Austrian question. That wns whnt nLwnys 2 mu suffer so immenely as a German, I never could unoratand,

that i forei n powers were ngeinst us, - whun just Germans were year- nine for Gerens. Aways this punclratel me to my marrow.

h: I have also, you know, in a very short time - I 1o not think I am "ron- - one will sey here - by God, it is ood that finally a Pros-em hes been Settle I in such a peaceful vy - isn't it fantostic,-

G: Now listen, I lo not ask for enythin, but that the world will respect the election in Austria as we lo, if this will happen then I believe that in the next future unintelligible

R: ind then I believe, we may - -

G: Kibbentrop, then you heve to mention another thing, if you have a chance.to, - it is Very important. The lustria poople is ruined economically. There are many many unumployod people, a terrific misery. Incase austria will make her decision in favor of Ger- nny, Ve will be able to help these people with our crent economic Pr2 ram. -e can continue the lutobchn immediately, wu can build H0e. hichveys, we may buy again timber, also some cattle, on imagine, Auserin always has lived from tourists. Ima, ine, if now uustrin.wil make her decision for Germany, then - I an sure - there kill not exist a German who will not potto lustrin next summer

hell, I believe the unemployment problem will no mor within a short time. I gurrantce rrou, I personally -

exist there,

G: I bclicve-within the next cploye: in iustris - but

be put to work in austria

o wsks — there -ill be no more one un- everybo y will be workin and. they will herself.

I ■■ nt to tell you one aore thing: I have not left any doubt what 0cVur “ tht in case of n threat, or if any thin- would happen -

■ 1e "uehrer an. the whole ntion will stand behind it - 100 percent.

II you the following, confidentially: The Fuehrer wh

K:G:

Contro—-e-, - is too much involved in this respect with 1 ' IV rt .since it Concerns his homeland. I bcli ve if he receives

u ' -nreut ,-n.vhe Austrian question he will never rave to make it clear, ncither will the 2 nations. That would b.i nctic intter, in Germany That is clear.

"ive in

It:

Well

I here is no doubt, cho ver peoplos, an . both sh 11 put

threntens, us up n fanatic

now, will strike at both resistance.

I believe there is no oubt about that any whore.

2949-PS, Part W, p. 10

TRANSLATLOD of DOCUiENT 2549 :i = •OFFICE CF U S CHIEF OF COJNSLL

004.471-JUED

Yos, if.enyoncc insists on it, all riat-. But I alleys say if there is m states men in the Wo rid unscrupulous enough- because 2 Goman people want to get united - ready to threaten with wer, or who ever is ready to send nillions of people to the battle-field,- let hin come.I rather want ny people to be olininatcd than that they may cike in to this.

I never left any doubt about that. But I say say, that I an of the opinion thst one is rather reasonable, I do belive.

In that.,:- I heve to say,- I'd not see anjthing reasonable, that would ba the most absurd thing. Then the world must have beco e an insane asylum. It micht be diffurnt if there Ic.S a people over t.ero which mieht resist with all its force against a German invasion and ask the uhcle world for help. Then I might understand that. This is just ridiculous.

" Yes, Hr. Gocring-

• ell, do cone: I shall be delighted to seo you.

• I shall sec you this afternoon.

• Tle weather is ’wonderful hor. Blue sky. I ai sitting hcr. on my bulcony,- all covorod with blankets- in the frosh rir, drinking my coffee, -utoron I heve to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds ari twittering, and here and there I can hear ovr the radio the enthusiasm, which must is wonderful ovr there.

That is marvellous.

• I do envy .11 those, who could be there rostrlcy. I have to sit here and have to keep the key - position.

Just a whole ago we also listoncd in.

It is interesting, did you hear the Fuehrer's speech from Linz?

No, unfortunct.ly not.

To mo it was the ost interesting one- it uas vcry short,- the most interesting speech I ever heard from the Fuehrer. This nan who ...asters the lineuceo as hardly any one- this man could hardly speak. It was not uch that he said, but he .was deeply moved. Then later he phonal no and said: "Gocring, you ce.nnot igine, how beautiful -y ho.cleni is-Ihcd forcotton it." Today, he is visiting tho grave of his parents where ho •wall deposit a wreath. Linz, imagine, for rany ycars it has been the first time that he is in the city, at the grave of his parents,— how crazy and grotesque circumstances have been. Iginc, shortly bofor the P-rchtesscdenor ceruc.unt,- ’hen the house of ay sister was searched, She is -crricd to the present secretary of Justice,- tho pictures of

the Fuehrer and the one of 1 yscl - of her own brother- vure taken away.. ( Next sentence annot be understood) Nothing was vritten about that.

.ho the Fuehrer v.ry much shocked?

Yes, very much so. I bolicve, that he goes throw h dark days. Scenes are supposed to heppen. .. Bcsiics, Jeri Fries is with him.

2949, Prt W, p. 11

TRANSLATION 0? DOCUENT 2949 T- X 3OFFICE F U 3 CHIEF CF COUN3EL

CONTINUED

Ro Yes, I alrotly havu recd the erticle by cr Price, this morning.

G, Fron Linz?

R. By aeri Fricc, v ry good,

G, Yes, I nccn, cone -ruing Linz?

R. Yes, about Linz, wo dcrul,

G. .Lil, this dou3 interest mo, because, he is supposed te-----

R. I do knov: The Fuehrer cskud for hie. cna entel his opinion, if helid consider thet, lct he dil set hero, as force?

G. hat does H P write about it?

R. ell , he writes,----- it looks liko it must have been ovcrwholming.

G. Inegine, this small town of 30.000 inhabitents, clinost half a LillionPeople : re supposed to hcvo pa thurel horc.. - cll, lo coc!

R. God bye, and Heil Hitlur.

G. Hail Ei tier.

C.nTIl IC.TE OF ThBL-TIOIV ___

23rl lovubor, 1945.

I, GCETZ NL.YER, T/5 33 812 159; heruby cortify that 1 .8:. thoroughly conversant with the Eglish and German langtgcs; and that the ubovo is e true and correct translation of the Docu ent 2949-S, Part V/.

T/5 33 612 169.

2949—PS, Part W, p. 12

113 /% hoit K TRaNSLTION OF DOCUIENE 2307

OFFICE OP U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

1938 REICHSCESET7

-aw concerning the Reunion of Austria with the Ge man Reich, Ajazh. 13, 1938

ts bordie Wiedervererigung Oesterreich dell Deutschen Rcich,

procinineasich Governent has ordained the folloving lav, vhich is hereba

ARTICLE 1. The Federa the Austrian Federal Go ve 11 German Reich, hereby beccme ; text:

--IT -ona. L0w of -arc concerning the reunion

w of the Genian Reich.,

• 13, 1938, ordained by of ustria with theIt has the folloving

By virture of Article 3, Section 2, of the Federal congerning,extraordinary nensures in the constititona. NOe25, 1934), the Pedoral Governmenc has ordenea.

Constitutional Lav field (B.G.BLT. I

Article 1. Austria is e c.ri

Article 2. On Sunday be held for German nen and question of reunion with th

3 a free and secret La over twenty years

plebiscite shall of age on the

Article 3 the issue.

In the r the ajority of the votes cast shall decide

Article 20 renting of this iemulations for the iplenentation an supple-

U lienal Lavr shiall be provided by decree.

Article 5. This Fethe day of its proclamation tonal Law shall enter into force on

The Federal Cover. ment is entrusted Constitutional Lavr. execution of this Federal

Vienna, March 13, 1938

, .ARTICLE IIo The laws at presen+ in force in until further notice. The in-comtotion or Rei.h by the.Fuehrer and Reich Chancolior or by thc Rcich delegate this power.

Austria shall remain in force-O ...ustria will be effecte star to whom he may

ARTICIE Ill- other Reich Mini;

The Reich Minister of the Interic

trative regujations ne, law.

oncerned.ntatLon

in consultation with the the legal and adminis- C supplementing of this

This law shall enter into force on the. day of its proclamation,

Lins, March 13, 1938

: oLF HITER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; GOHILTG, General Fle-d Larshals Reich linister of Aviation; FRICK, Reich hinistor of tin Interior; VON IISITOP, Reich Minister-of Foreign Afairs; R.IESS, Deputy Tuchrer,

3761

-0036

- 2 -

CERTIFIC.TE OE TRINSLTION _O"307-Pe

17 Ioverber 1945.

I, FEL.LX EDVID SH.RTOII; 045312, hereby certify that I an thorough conversant with the Eglish and Curan langung.s; ana that the above is a true and correct translation o? Dooucu 1.o, 2307-pS.

FELI EDW.RD Sl.RION, 0463 2

3762

l

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3060

OFFICE OF U. 5, CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Prague, 16 Merch 1938

Foreign (Office), Berlin •Cipher Cable (Secret Procod.)

—0- 57 of 16 Mer.With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.

-1th Rebuff.to Frenk heshed A sAlutary effect. Epve thrashed out matters thHenipin, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises:

e.1• The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Hogation is oxclusivoly docisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten -sh Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.

g 2* Public speeches .’nd the press will be coordinated uniformly ".hm approval. The editorial staff of "Zeit" (Time) is to be improved.

2 _3• Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line whichnt he.end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of

2 ’’dual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The objectives are to be 8,t.in 0yery CAsC with my participation and to be promoted by parallel

-omtic ection. Laws for the protection of nationalities -0-sschutzgesetze) And. "territorial autonomy" are no longer to be tressed..

. , 4-, If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or dosircd Drrre Henlein issues important statements on his progrom, they oe +0 ha applied for and prepared through the Mission.

5• All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies 18 to be transmitted through the Legetion.

6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, end will come to Prague at any time if requested.

I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as thF is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest 96 foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittolstelle ( Central Office for Re.cipl Gerxans) and request them to support this uniform direction of the Sudeten Garmen Pery.

(Initial illegible),

(Five names and inirim] omitted)

VRTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION _OF_DOOUMENT 3060-PS

26 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and thet the above is a i correct and true translation of Docment No. 3c0,-ps.

UMWIG HARTMAN T/4,

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2789-PS

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

KONRAD HENLEIN Hof i.B., 17th of March, 1938

Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs;

In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.

I beg you, most hor.ored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Gcrmans herewith.

We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.

The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.

In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.

I would appreciate if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.

Heil Hitler.

Loyally yours,

/s/ Konrad Henlein.

To theReich Foreign Minister vn Ribbentrop, Berlin.

*****

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2789-PS

10 November 1945

I, S/Sgt. CHARLES E. BIDWELL, 13146034, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2789—PS.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL S/Sgt., 13146034

TOP SECRET(Instructions for handling omitted.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2788-PS OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET POL 1 789 g (N)

SECRET

Noteson the Conference on 29 March 1938, 1200 hours,

in the Foreign Office__________ on Sudeten German Questions.

In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed list participated.

The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party:

1. The Sudeten Germans must realize that they are backed up by a nation of 15 million which will not tolerate a continued suppression of the Sudeten Germens by the Czechoslovak Government.

2. It is the task of the Sudeten German Party to formulate such demands from the Czechoslovak Government as it deems necessary in order to obtain the privileges desired by it.

.The Foreign Minister explained in this connection that it could not be the task of the Reich Government to give Konrad Henlein, whose position as the leader of the Sudeten Germans has been expressly acknowledged and again confirmed by the Fuehrer, detailed suggestions a out what to demand from the Czechoslovak Government. It is essential to propose a maximum program, which as its final aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears dangerous to be satisfied premturely with the consent of the Czechoslovakian Government; this on the one hand would give the impression abroad that a solution has been found, end on the other hand would only partially satisfy the u eten Germans. In any case, caution is the proper thing, because

one cannot have any confidence in the assurances at BENES and HODZA according to past experiences. The aim of the negotiations to be carr ed out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian

oyernment is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extention and gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German Party a one is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich cabinet (REICHSREGIERUNG). The Reich cabinet

self must refuse to appear toward the Government in Prag or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and d1sipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given y Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2788PS

CONTID,

Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein wes instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichninister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial Germans (mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle), as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.

In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate.

Berlin, 29 March 1938.

R (Initial)

H1155 -0041

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2788-ps

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSET,

List of those present in the conference onSudeten Germen Questions

on Tuesday, 29 Mrch 1938 1200 hours

Present;Reichsminister von Ribbentrop State Secretary von Mackensen Ministerial Director Weissaecker Ambassador Eisenlohr - Prag Ambassador StieheVortr. Legationsrat von Twardowski Legationsrat AltenburgLegationsrat Kordt

SS Obergruppenfuhrer Lorenz Prof. Haushofer

FOREIGN OFFICE

Central Office for Racial Germans (VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE )

Konrad Henlein Karl Hermann Frank Dr. KuenzelDr. Kreissi

SUDETEN GERMAN PARTY.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2788-PS

11 November 1945

I, IUWIG.HARTMAN, T/4, ASN 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly versent with the English and German languages; and that the above is a

true and correct translation of the Document No. 2788-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMANT/4, ASN 37446052

- 3 -

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3059-PS OFFICE OF U, S, CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The Sudeten German Party has "been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of P monthly payment of 15000 Merks; 12000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 Mprks pre paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propagenda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regerd to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.

Herewith submitted to the Dept: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August?

Berlin, 19 August 1938

/s/ WOERMAN

*Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept, (handwritten marginal note).

(2 letters illegible). Mr. Schmidt, V(olks)D(eutsche) M(ittel) St(elle), has been informed by me today on the current payments of the Foreign Office to the Sudeten German Party, (initial illegible) 24 Aug. (Handwritten note).

DECISION

1. The payments to the Bureau Buerger will be increased to 5500 Mprks monthly until further notice, effective 1 August of this year.

2. Mr. A. R. Herold, for information and further action.

3. Herewith returned toSection Politics IVBerlin, 23 August 1938

/s/ DRUCKMANN (?)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3059-PS

26 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 30€9-PS^_

LUDWIG HARTMANT/4, 37446052

IR NS LA TION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2360-PS OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

’’FREEDOM IND BRE.IDi

Munich Edition

Edition 31, Vol. 52Munich Edition

Munich, Thursday 31 Jan.1939

VOEIKISCHER BEOBI.CHTER

FIGHTING ORG.N OF THE N/kTION.L SOCIALIST MOVEMENOF GREATER GERMANY

Tho Fuehror boforo the first Roichstag of Groater Germany.

Wo are fighting a tremendous battle battle altogetherI - WO will win this

Adolf Hitler: The German Reich today is stronger than over.

Pano 1, columns 5 and 6 bottom (excerpt):

°nthe basis of this unbearable provocation which was stilfu rthor emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and.t orro rizing of our Germans there I have now decided to Solvo, h° Sudgton-Gorman question in a final and radical manner. on 28 May 1 gavC:

1. The ordor for the preparation of military steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October.

2. I ordered the forceful and speedy our defensive front in the west.

completion of

I, GoetzI, Goetz Mayer, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thorquch ly.convorsant with th' English an corman langages; ano that tho above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2360-PS

Goetz Mayer, T/5, 33812169

H1155-0043

TRNSLaTTON OF DOCUNENT 28 7'0 PS OFFICE CF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL,

BERLIN, 18th July, 1938

The Italianhad -- t ■ ador today vanted to know what the British Inbassador had. talkedto neabcut on 15th July, 1938, I repeated to ittolic0 thecontents of our talk

Attolico remarked fellow-C ountrymen Gene:a short t

aft,er ry talk that it was quite possible that his al Russo, General Pariani and others who were here

n agomay be of the opinion that Prance would not intervene in a Geran-Czech conflict. He, ittolico did not know what his governmentthought of it but personally healready mentioned e mistaken

convinced that h: ntrymen

the choice between har intervention on hepower, The lac ter woul.d not happen

l an eventuality France had only ccr.pj.ete abdication as a great

S

For the Reichministor only (Handwritten note)

. Attolico added that we had rade it unni stakably clear to the Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He also knew the appointed tine well enough so that he could take perhaps a two months' holiday now which he could not do later on.

. Gi ving an idea of the attitude of other govermaents Attolico entionod that the Rcuanian governent had refused to grant application

±or leave to its Berlin Minister.

CERTIFICATE OF TRINSUTIONT OF DOCUMENT HO. .2800-PS

24 November 1945.

1. Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify conversant with the English and German languagesj and correct and true translation of Document 10. 2800-PS

that I am thoroughly that the above is a

LUDWIG HRTILI T/4, 37416052

Pi-RTIL TRISL-TIUl O1 DOCU.ENT 1O 2791-}S OiFICE GS US Ci.I~j Ox' CUJUS^T.

On the voyage of the "PATRL." Irbassador AITOLICO ex- P-sined t9 me, that he ht instructiuns to request the notification of a conte: platec tiile for Gerzan action a ainst -zEchosolvekis fror the C-r.un _cvernrent. (Oriinully reads!! that lussolini had authorized hin to request...'"but has been changed to read as above.

in case the Czechs should agcin cause aaprovocation euHnst Germany, Gernany woul narch. This would be tomorrow, in sixmenths or perhops in • year. Hovuver, I could prorise hi. , nhot the Genian "OV- rnr unt, in case of an increusin gravity of the situation or as soon as the Fhrer r • de his decision, would notify the Italian Chief of overni ent as rapid ly s possible. In any case, the Itelian governnt will be " the first one who will receive such a nctificition.

23 Ju 1938

R (initial)

C_RTIFIC-E OF PARTIAL TRLNSLATIONOlDOCU-lT ________________________

10 N Veber 1945

.I, WILLARD E. SKIDLORE, Lt (j_) USER, 391590 hereby certify that I er thoroughly conversant wLhi tha English and rernan lan_u..eS; ana th. t the abcve is c true a.nd correct

partial translt tion of Dccx.^t No. 2791-PS,

WLLLARD Lt (j,) 391590

E. SID.ORE7U SNR

55-0045

-0046

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2792-ps

OEFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL____ _

Confidential. Berlin, 18 July 1938

Amgagodey the Italian Ambassador asked me to tell him what the British Ambassador had said to me on the 15th of this month. I restated toAttolico the contents of the conversation. restated to

here attoliqo.sdded to ny communication that his compatriots who visited dorsi.shorttime.2g0, such as General Russo, General Pe.rie.nl and others, PO 8 p 3 We eof the opinion that France would not intervene militarily in & Gernan-Czech conflict. He, Attolico, did not know whdt M.

About it, but he himseir vas °f the opinLonithet"these cop “t riots.nen ? ed.by him were mistaken, because France in the1486 "O have only the choice between intervention end complete

on as a great power. The latter would not take place, however.

assumed resigna-

To the Reich ministerTo the Undersecretary of State To the Dg. Pol.To the Director Recht

(The following is a handwritten note)

Only for the Reich ilinister:

Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed to the our. intentions against the Czechs unmistakably. A so as

the date he had information so far that he might go on leave maybe . two months, but certainly not later than that.

tofor

out the

As.anindicetion of the attitude of other governments Attolico pointed that the Rumanian Government had refused to its ambassador in Berlin leave he applied for.

251.

cate Anagsador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to communi CVe Vne Lo-lowing:

He had received another written instruction from Mussolini asking that.Gercanycomnunicate in tine the probable date of action against z echo Slovakia. Mussolini asked for such notification, as Mr. Attolico

assured me, in order "to be able to take in due tine necessary measures on the French frontier." necessary

Berlin, 27 August 1938

N.N.4. 1 replied to ambassador Attolico just as on his former demarche, thst I could not impart any date to him, that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any‘aecislon."85

Berlin, 2 September 1938

- 1 -

TRANSLATION OF DOCULGNT N0. 2796-PSOFFICE CF ’ .0. CHIEF OF CC'USSL

Office R.1. (Dr. Tordt)Unter Staats Sekrotar WocrmanpcrsoncllyM. D. Gaus-personally

Aboard the "Pabrial 23 August 1938 Pras, G. K.

Whil.c in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Fuchror and the Regent (Rcichverwoscr) of Hungary were engaged in a politicel discussion, the

Hungarian hinistars Inredy and Konya vure in conference with hr. von Ribben- trop; Fr. von Toiszacker also attended the conference.

Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: point 1) the negotia­tions between Hungary and the Little Entente end 2) the Czcchoslovakian problem.

The com.ents of hanyc in regard to point 1): Negotiations with the Little Entente woro mostly of n historical nature and offered really nothing new, in any case they ucro inadequate to explain sufficiently a commnique submitted by Kenya at the end. This communique is to be issued today by the conference of the Little Entente. It would soon that Baron Tporin Budapest and Ambassidor Lcsconyi in Belgrade hev. agreed to it. Thus the' question whether it would bo opportune was really outdated. Hovorthcless, it had to be discussed thoroughly in order to develop the Corman point of view. Von Ribbontrop dccri.bo. how in his opinion the renunciation of the use of force, which is to h roclrimod a ain would not have the desired political effect, namoly, a } rot oction of Tungory ageinst Yugoslavia ospoc- ially in the cvent of a hungorien-Czoch crisis. On the contrary, Hlungary would block the road for her inburi ontion in Cnochoslovekia and mako it more difficult for the Yugoslavs to abandon thoir Czoch confoderats. The impart­ial reader would reason that Hungary vas detaching herself from Goruen Czech politics and was waiving horn cloins for ro vision for whoevor did not partic­ipate would return vith umpiy hands.

The counter arguments of llcnya n re little convincing. They led into a discussion of point 2): namoly, tho attitude of Hungary in case of a German Czech conflict.

Von Ribbentrop incuirod what lungoryis attitude would be if the Fuehrer vrould carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of tho Tungaricns presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches towerd the North and perhaps the Hast. orcovor, she ltngorian rocrmomont had only been started and 1 to 2 Loru years’ Li. for its development should be allowed.

Von ib ontrop thun explained to thu ung:rians that che Yugoslavs would not dare to march. whilo they voro between the pincers of the Asis Powers. Rumania a ion - wo.ld therefore n't movo. In land and France would also remain tranquil, Englend would not r cklosaly risk her Empiro, Sho knew our nevily acquired powur. In reference to timo, however, for the above- mentioned situation, nothing definite co eld be predicted since it would depend on Czech provication. Von Hiboontrop Repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate.

H1155-0048//

TRANSLATION OF DoCUE FT NN. 2796-pCONT ’ D

The Hunrim reply ths rumuined ... c nditien 1 one. TTpen the cuestion of von Ribbentrop, whut pur- Se the d. sirud Guner 1 St ff Conferences were to have, not much more was br ught fotwld than the Fun rian desire of a mutual inventory f iilitary miterial .nd prepuredness 1 r the Cz, ch conflict. The clear political b.sis for such . conference - the time of Hunguriun intervention - W.s not bt_incd.

Tn th'- me-ntimu, moru n ositive 1 nguuge W..3 used hy Von • rthy in h; s talk vith the Fuehrer. He wished not to hid his d ubte with r grd t. the English attitude, but he wished to put Hungaryts intention to Purticiate on rec rd. The Hungarian Ministers were nd remained, even later, more skeptic..! since they felt m r strngly about the immediate danger for Hungary withits unpr tected PLnks.

Then Von Imr.dy h d a discussion with the Fuehrer in th. afternoon he Was very relieved when tK Fuehrer explained to him, that, in regard to the situati n in questin, he dei jad^d n.-thin o! Hunpiry. HeThimser would not kn.w the time. "hoever wanted th j 5j themei weulc h ve t , particip..te in the cookin. ..s uell. should Hungry wish conferences of the General Staffs, he would huve no objections.

The Hung-rian position my be sunmed up t d.y as follows:

a) Hungary is glad nt to h Ve to expect ny inquiries f fin.1 character.

b) Hungry probably believes th.t she c nn t intervene soner than two weeks after the st.rt of the cenflict.

S i E. ne d F eizs acker

C.TTICTEO? TB’SLTION .0DACI : IT Nn. 2796-pS

30 D. center, 1945

1, IITTC Hi.RTT.N, T/+, 37446052, hereby certify th t T m thor- u-hly conversant with the English und Pulm n lungu Kes; nd th ...the bove is " - true and correct tr nsl ti n of Document N . 2796-PS.

H1155 -0049

Poco l THINSL/TION OF DOCULENT 3797 - ps QEEICEOE -U.S cjiry O.CQUISEL

Borlin 29. Lug ust 1538

cichsmini stor to-dry hnd c newr talk with von -./Ny: u on the 10+4..,j,The-cichsninist.r confronted • KNY.. with the rojolctne fc end nclish ross vor the Blcd Consunicuc -ndrrcentcdf.th brond this event, eso c:inlly t this tino, was considerod Is r'ttX r

fun.nrinn.cricndship end . ronunciati m or Hun "riin revisionist

roquc st Czech,

es cci:

cli 6 ‘ Ir * von INYA Mentioned the nIrcody Knovm -gccte if +. -- sinstyonanthoe ct that tho soc-11cd Pmnamn SEusione 3Ototen 4. -- nd The 1u-e Inente were ox poblcnatic v-luc y r 1 r: .14

Prove y oin thr t the excessive lunaien lononds f or o^Ut^on' V inority inCzochoslovki would prevent the N rcont .on Ico .o effective. But cven if it b.cnme effects- .............. -econ.von KANYI,

still iloro prcisc

VoJ by tho other provisions r. uot inf ri- ti on Aro

ne urc.nt £ro , it vrould n_ver

te.lhat ettor. The

upon hov the 31c

porty end thus Hun nxy would be freed C-ne the use of forco. Von KANYA exoeetr -Hest to wh t extant the nurecment

cichsinister vill be informed on ", Von,hN.A agreed that much depended

S -ented in the Hungarian dress durine

tho

ConC-rning Hun ary ‘o ilitor conflict von IUNY.. enpi.oncc sEva period of one strenth of Hun Durin to-ny " , Hun ry* .110- •

to vro y. -x/S ayo the.t ? devolope

of C Gor on - Czech s country would need quntoly the armod

as x-r as nripmontOctober 1st of thi

ovorBa on -VJ situ-tin rs

corrected th. better, to take p

mndcountry would bi in tic conflict

said that ready ,

(i.lctiblc)

To the Rcichsinister UnJer secretary of St tc ir. D. Bol.Lr. Dir. .ivcht.

C RTTFIC.’TE OF TL.NSLATTONOB 0C U AT 1). 27. - pg

12 Novcmbor 1325

I, /OL‘C NO D. THOK.jc, ../SGT thorou hly c nvursnnt vj.th the above is a true anl c rruct tr

. 77 ^3, hereby certify that IDn.iosh nnd Gcrnon lon un os ; andslntion of the Docunt to. 27,7 -

authat thePS.

VOL.G.NG E. THOOANN

: /SGT 31 77, 435.

PAPTIAL TRANSLTION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2786OFFICE OF US rHIEF OF COUNSEL

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS - RIBBENTROP • KEITEL

Letter from General of Artillery KEITEL to VON RIRPENTROP d.ted Berlin, 7 March 1933

- Not Translated -

tetter from Ribbentrop to Keitel

Berlin, 4 March 1938

(illegible ink notes) '

My honored General:

Enclosed I forward to tou the minutes of a conference with the local Hungarian Ambassador for your conficential cognizance. As you Can judge fr om it, Mr. SZTOJ.Y suggested that possible war aims it n st Czecho-Slovakia be discussed between the German and Hungarian armies,

I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other purties as well would be informed about this.

I would greatly appreciate it, if you notify me briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.

With best regards and Heil Hitler

Yours very obediently

(No signature)

To the Chief of the WehrmachtamtGeneral of Artillery KEITEL

Berlin w 35Tirpitzufer 72/76

Enclosure of Minutes of Conversation with Sztojay at Berlin, 4 March 1938, signed R (Ribbentrop) is not translated.

CE TIFIC..TE OF TRANSLATION (P^RTLX) FROV DCCTOT NO, 2786-PS

Nov. 13, 1945

T, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly cohversant with the English and Germun languages; and thut the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document no. 2786-PS

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORELt. (jg) USNR391590

-005

TRNSLATTON OF DOCUMENT 2858“ PS

CEZICEOUS CHIEECP COUNSEL

Pace Noo 2773. Decoding-

From: Foreign Office, 19. 9, 38

To: Emibassy, 19.9038, 2330 hre.

Nr. 244 of the 19.9,38

21 hrs, 36 min.

Secret code method

Decoding office 1000 hrs.

Please infozm deputy Kundt, at Xonrad HenLein’s

request, to get into touch with the Slovals

at once and induce them to start the i.r demands

for cuconony tomorrow

(Signed) ALTENBURG

19 026

17 November 1945.

CERTTE’ICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCU. IENT _

I, L• 4- Hill, 1..C., 217840, hereby certify that I with the English and German languages; and that the correct translation of Document No. 2858-PS,

ar thoroughly conversant above is a true and

L. A. Hill, M.C., Major, British Arny, 217840

3713.

H1155 -0052

TRAIISLATION QF DOCUTIIT 1.0. 2855-PSOificp o£ U.S. Chief of Counsel____

Deciphermont

From Foreign Office

To Embassy

16 Sept. 38

16 Sept. 33185 hours.

Secret Cipher page No. 2760

No. 232 of 16 Sept. 38

Toni ht 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood wrere errested in Germany. This measure is an answrer to the arrest of Sudeten Germans since the Fuehrer’s speech of 12 September. I request you to ascortain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively at CO by the Gestapo. Cable report.

ocrmann

(Handwritten note followrs)

Impossible form. he aecortai.r, o) o : proper agent (Gesc 1. 7. 'a ■ -)

‘cts as alro - c omr uni cat ed to the

17/9

> signature il] cgibc) .

15 Nov. 1915.

I, ILLARD EVANS SKID: 0PT, Lt am thoroughly conversant vith the above is a. correct end tru

"JE.U...n. 391590, hereby certify that I th English and Gorman languages; and that 3 trnnslction of Document No. 2855-pS,

NIILRD EVANS SKIDLORE LT (jg) U.S.L.R.

391590

PARTAL TLAWSLATION or D0CU/EGIT N0. 2954PS

CEICTOU,G.CTCGOTNSBL__________

DECTPHEED_MESS AGE

Disppbched fron theForeign Office 17 Sept.

Received by theLegaticn 17 Sept.

15 o’clock 20 min.

Secret Ciphor.(260—25'

No. 254 cf 17

Most Urgent

I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the following:

The Reich Government has decided that?

(a) immodintoly as Czech subjects of Czech descent, Czech Hpc.iug Ucwd included, will be arrested in Germany as Sudcicn Gormano have been in Czechoslovakia, since the beginning of the week.

(b) If Pny Sudeten Gormans should be executed pursuant to P death ecntencc on the basis of martial law, an equal number of Czechs will be shot in Gormeny.

********

(Signed) WOERIIANT

CERTIFICATE OF PRTTL TT0ISTATION_____ OF DOCUIWr ip _per-ps

24 November 1945

1. Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Erel.j.sh and German languncec; and th-t the above is a correct and tine translation of Document No. 2854-pS,

LUTWIG HARTMANT/4, 57446052

TRANSIATION OF EOCWNT NO. 2853-pgOj 1 ICE OF U .5. CrIIEF OF CO W

DE-CYPHER

From Forcign Office Berlin 2.9 1905

To Embassy Proguo 24.9 2000

Secret Cypher El 2101/2102

Tolegran No. 268. Foreign Office, Berlin to fr.r.-L Embassy, xr-igua en 24,9.1938________

According to inforn tion received here Czechs

hovo arrest, d 2 Geman frntier-policeren ,

coven customs-officials and 30 railmayr-

O ficials• As co un terneasuro al] the Czach

steff in Marscheee wcre arrested. yo nro

prepared to exchange the rr ■ tod Czech

fficinls for the Ger 1t 1C.cials. plowo

approach JeV3 1 4 i t there rnd wire resul:.

(jge1) WOHMAIIN

HMB/HB 1.8 996

CERTIFICAIT OF OT NSLTIONOF OCLTJdTT NO, 2853-13

I, Evelyn E.F. Glazier, P.0. , TRIIS, 37371, hereby certify that conversant with the English and Ge men languages j and that the and correct traelntlon of Doounont.2855-2Se r

I a thoroughly above is a true

EVELYN E.F. GLAZIERP.O., WRIIS, 37371

H1155 - 0055

LOjSsil so. 2856-ps-EE-CEOF U s CELEF OF COUNSEL

Decipherment

2 HhEazsep-ognicBeruan J4 September 1556 Aoure ‘24 September 1800 hours.Secret Cipher

. pages 2795 and 2797" 363 of 24 September 1938

To telegrams No. 432 and 435.

2 Embassy authorized to PISSible necessary rem val from special train.

agree there to mutual arrangements for the

of 500—600 Reich Germans by

g.. At discretion tantler—place and time f

report.agree withtransfe the government there the rail-line

i the people tc be returned. Cable

O' nfidential:

Yi el 5 *Of the execution of any^entences ostag ez arrested here for the prevention Sudeten-Germane is, Cr.u e8.pas8ec oy military courts against

--"1Se, cut of quesuicn.

Woermann

16 November 1945

C-RTTFICAT3 OF TBANISLATTON O_DOCU210.285. pg

I am thariugghisdneEezat (U, 391590. hersty certify that thet the abave i. & and

Willard E. Skidmore Lt (jg), USIR, 391590

H1155 -0056

TO,. 2Jr

No. J.

Ex r ot 1 rom Statument made by thc Primo Minister to the House of Connons on September 28 announcing the Reichschancellor’s reply co thc Message which he had sent to him that norning.

"I have informed by j morning. H

' something further to say to the House Herr Hitlcr th: t he invites me to meet

yet I have

Solini kcs need not s:

; has also ■ accepted y whet my

him at Munichinvited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladicr

"nd I have no doubt M. Daldior will al answer will be."

now been tomorrow Signor

No .

AGREEIENT CONCLUD:D iT :UNICH ON SEPTEGMBER 29, 1938.

eermnny, tae United Kingdom, France and Italy, toking into consideration the a8cement, which hns been already’ reached in principle for the cession to Gereny of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terns and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, arid by this agreement they cach hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure fulfilment:-

1. The evacuation will beuin on the 1st October.

2•. The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation ofthe territory shall be corpplote by tc 10th October, without any existinginstallations having noun destroyed and that the Czochoslovek Government willbe held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations .

3. The conditions governing tae evacu: tion wil.l be lai down in detail OJ an international commission ocmposcd of reprcsentatives of' Grmany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy nnd Czochoslovakia .

The occupation by stages of the prodorinantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1st Octel r. The four turritorcs marked on the attached map () will be occupicd by Ge 1m n troops in th- fodlowing order’ the territory m rkod No. 1 on the 1st and 2nd of October, the: territory marked ho. 11 on the 2nd . nd 3rd of Ociubor, the territory ma r . No. Ill or? the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October, the torrit. cy mrkuu No. IV on the 6 th and 7th of October. Thc remaining territory of prupmdntly Cermen character w£11 be ascerbainc by the aforesaid intorna tional commissin forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

7- The international comission rferrcd to in p.ragveph 3 will determine th- territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These terri- to-1es.will be occupied byinterntional bodies until the plebiscite has been 1o .1 ea. The some commission will fix the conditions in which the pleb­iscite is tote held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar' plebiscite, -he eormiecion will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the -nFernationl oonmission. This conmission will also be entitled to recammenc. to 14. four Powers, . Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy,\in certaim exceptional HSUS minor inodificatioras in the atrictly ethnographica deter- v' mination of the zones which ar- to bi trnnsf-rcu without plebiscit.

See sketch map based on the original. The sketch mao illustrating the Eelchschancollo.c‘8 mumorundum of Soptenibur 23 (see Cmd. 5847) is\ -lsi reproduced. ‘13\ >

-1-

(1486)

TC.23

tepitraFheroavilhbo 4 richt of option into and out of the transferred his nore‘.+0 ptionto be excrcioc within six months from the date ofdti'- 6 41 ’ A Gorman-Czcchoslovk comnission shell dcterminc thelatioi^anj thq.option,.consider wya of facilitating Che transfer or popu- 1 * ion an- Settle questions of principle arising out of the said trnsrr.

the 8; Tha Czcchoslovak Govornmont will within a period of four weeks from «h 1 r Le Arooront release from their military and police force" ■ nviudetunSarns who my zish to bo rulesea, and thcCzechoZlovek Government"2, Sudoten’Ccraen who - gervanc

ADOLl HITLER,

NLVILL CHIBLEL/TN. EDOUAID DAIADLER. BENJ1‘O MUSSOLJII.

lunich, Scptenbor, 29, 1936.

Annexc t tho A/rcor ent

His Majesty’s Govornmont in tho United Kingom qenthpve entered into the above nqrecment cn tho°n tnc oiler, contained in paraeraph 6 of th.

curntec of'th n.w Loundarics"--n-S-oVaK itete against unprovoked aggression.

.nd the French Govern-that they stand by

Anclo-French proposals Of the 19th

When the question of has been Settled. G a ny Cze choslovakia .

th, Polish an Tungrian minorities in Chechoslovakia ‘Y on thcir port will five a gunrantec to

Munich, September 29

ADOLF HITLER.NNILLE c. BETLLIN .EDOUD DEL/DIER.TRTro MTSSOLINI.

1938

(1) See Cmd. 5847.

(1634)

-0058

TC.23

Declara tion

The Hcals of the Covornnents of the four Powoere declare that the Pl-e8 01. the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, ir not S5 t-ed W-thin three months by agreement between the respective Governments shall form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the Governments of the four Bowers here prosent ,

ADOLF HITLER.NEVILLE CI LAMBERLAIN.EDOUARD DALADLER.

BENITO LUSSOLINL.Munich,

Septembor 29, 1938.

SunnlementeryDoclarat i on.

, Al questions which may arise out of the transfuz: o? the territory shall bonmansidnrod 48 co inc within the torns or "feronco to the internationel '

-DOLI HITLER.NLVIIT.S CHAMBIERL IN.

. DOUARD DALADIER.BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich, September 29, 1938.

Col ositionof. the international Commission

.Thafour Ioals ofGovernmont here present agree that the international C / 4; -sio 1 Povi od for. in the agreement signed by them to-day, shall consist -nd Tf meretmr ol.tate in the Gormn Forcign Office, the British, French Snda-t linn -mbassndore accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be noinnted by the Government of Czechoslovakia.

ADOLE HITLER.NEVILLE CI iAMIERLAIN.EDOUARD DALADIER.BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich, September, 29, 1938.

(1244)

PARTLL TRANSLTION OT DOCUTTENTCOFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesNo. Most Secret Ausl. VI, 1.10.38

To:

7 Copies7th Copy

OKH (Section 6. AtmGencrel Staff)OKM (Naval Tar Staff, 1st Division for the attention of Min. Rat: Dv

Eckhardt)Reich Minister for Air and Civ the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Foreign Office via the Foreign

C. Air Force (AircEorce General Staff for dueller)Office Representative (VAN)

Enclosed is a .list international law vhich dran up by Sectin L of the OKI, of the violations of

may be expected on the part of fighting troops.

Otring to the short time allowed for the compilation, had to be filled in directly here for the time being. colums C 1 and C 2

The branches of the ..rmed Forces are requested to so that a final version may be dramn up. send in an opinion here

The same is requested of the Foreign Office.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Araud Force

By Order

sgd. Burkner

3 Enclosures:

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4-Pa-o 17 RPSL-TIOl OF DOCUILSNT C 2

Continuod

eV CERTIFICATE OF ERNSLATIOI!

OF PeCUmET NO. C 2

19 Tovombor 1915

1, CLiRI BOULTER, F/O.IRNS. 59549, .hereby certify that I an tnorou h-, conversant vith the English and Goman -an U0GOS; and that the above is a true and corront partial translation of Documont No. 02.

CT.FJ BOULTER, P/O .IRIIS 59549

H1155-0075

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

CZ/15.

In Duplicate

Diplogerma.Berlin, 13th March 1939.

Prague

Telegram in secret code

Nith reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.

In case you should get any written communication from President

HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any

other actcn on them but pass them on here by cipher telegram. More­

over, I must ask you and the otier members of the Gmbassy to make a

point of not being available if 1 0toch government wants to communicate

with you during •he r.*-t "ew r.“

(signed) RIPJNFDD

F 12 426. A/C2/2

17 November 1945

CERTIFICA.T: o7 TLANSLATION

OF DOCUMENT 2035-S

I, L. A. Fill . M.C., British Arujr. hereby certify that I am thorsughly conversant vlot ’-he English and German languages; and that the above is a true ard correct translation of Document No: 2815-FS/

L. A. Hill, M. C.Maj or, Br itish Army217840

H1155 -0077

TR.L-1ICN CF 1OCUS1T HUBLR 2872PS _CEU.8, CI ITFCFCOUI ISEL

13. II. 39

CO._ _____ _ —LIHL.FUHLRiM THESLOV..P. 2 121131..2 TI SO

in thc stucy of the FUlr.r in the Men- cich Chancery ron 18.40 - 19.15 hours, 13 lcrch 1939.

Other P rs ns Pr.sen vror3:

T>n icic. lni ’ inist r f S. Gencn .1 HotelStet. J cx • 1y Diutrich, State B.crctazy Iepplor, - —nist . 1 Durcensky,

-utumn .f last yeor, Gurm was vith r.gold to Czochsa as for exnnple in the case prevent the development i

-lSVeT Tic: and p bs in C zecho

. cpuriancu: twolince the nt s. One

1 Chv, J wh c. uld notarable to Gerany.not been mutilated u: renounced clcins to ti on her borders in o:.. space. There had bei in Germany, On the :

lol; to :

nces, whiici were intol- umany t thank that she hi t f . rebe: rance Germeny had

insulted 0 Czech side

I

Zechos-ovic. a noxmal living bhis. 1o Czech hod lost his job C Czcchs hc.l be n received by us.

be. n ruf.led, nor had they been

ac m3.SsnL

their bread. Jvoryvhur cgeinst • The Gern Ms h sc that thcir situ tion This development was n t

1 IS

w

-2 ■ been pr : vokuc • j-ct to censtont s

icd cut.ns of earning riminated

I

in the press. It (the press) I- ’ any things vrhich had happened then atmosphere. During this tie bh (

'ta the cgre nen.s L o r an Cbs. Lu t • Iy

urlr to mnintoin

—ance nber crisis.

, Until the loyal attitude not mentioned

. wholesomeunfavorsb-e t' ins about Geimoy, systematic ’ agitation. Prmphl.ts continu us. The momentary" situnt temporary affair, time and ngein h advantage of Gonunny had been mrl. already spoken 1 this to Chvalkos continuously been thr vm on ti ta economic area vhi.ch c ud on]v 1-y

certc.n organs ha and pr paganda by

peat udly published not ceased thcir

-r

pacification that Bohemia 1‘never tolercte in hor cvin t

oncx

scribed to the Czechs as a . on a chinge to the Cis- 10 people, The Fuhrer had pruc.cncc him that cil had-

‘entIcl urope was a fixed, clo -y pacified. It needed

1′10 OS made c• Gurmeny, and t-bod of unrst

c_uld

Inrecunt Wo-lcs the circumstances ho." bocomne unbenrable. The old spirit of Benes ha. a inbruu rvivod. The Czech poople had been incited to resistance. Conditions wre insecure and tumultous.

4’

. 1TC> TaC. .

the cVincients in Brunn and glen occurred.the C^cas in tho situation in Czich

nationals why thing bcfuro

es they

H1155 -0078

2302 PS (cint.)

had treated vrcs unstable

not see

intorprct s Jved the Czcch qucstion th r

we have decided c nsidercti on 2

L-s

howV-T, this s luti on utoly to purcuc it to :

r this ide. lo_ica3. principlo

corcins ads i r c. nclus

our worldPosults, then

on, without

The second tisoppointront £o the past yuor the FUhrr had had t or not to pornit Lun_ory t : occupy

the

a wror mpressionto be annexed to Hun Slovakia was further serious problems wrhi

ne had 1 c use believed that ry. This error vs f 1n 1 •

Ule 01 Slovakia. In • ccisi n, whether he’- r had be n underSlovakia wished

n the fact that

in the crisis t then that he £5 own affairs.

tho Fh

1 --;menJ en. on the ixiportnnce of the more -rhewec this probler, it was only

toc thatum t

vakia

At 3 uni ch the FUhrer but took the line . f nati some of his friends in Hu wrishes he had carried .ut

1 nx in hisdecisions ng which aljenat

t LCHunjory

Now he had declared he was ur,:

SLovckia frcm the Czechhe

unga. okin

not n. vo

e and V-U.L’. 0]]I" the FUhr-r 1 anta onizc his

horl Sider separation

they wore then

Novr he had purmi this question clcer in of the Cerpcthion moun

affairs or not. He did n. would net plo ‘je his people VICS not in any w:y desired ’ secure final ccniirnticn c. vish that reproaches sh ulc

hathwas and._. Sievakia for enurt

c mo hcr- in rlor to moke Gumeny had n, int erests e rent to him vhct happened

; 1 -Von a sin, Ie s b the Jlovol pc onl

cg vrhich

thing which di +

S tc .be

was onl

C 1r-m lun_er3 the preserved at all. ccnercl, but in th

ruclly tishedsome

nd het hear his d.cisi had stated at thot he would support t by his word s 1 n independence. If with Progue, he vro fur whi.ch he vres n

It

n- rmitt

.on, unrest vroule not

but of h urs. He

-n.locvor on.Av. kia w ku i

t uld stand

intercede fir German intnw Carpathians. Gunanny h c belonged t Gorony.

not

m rcy of events rid nly

She had never

H1155-0079

T.10031./T101: or DOCU. 3107 NO 2002 ps (c n

OFFICE GF U.S. C JEF OF COUNSEL

The FUhr-r c.slo. thu Reich Fureign Linistur if he he.d ong rencrks t . ad. The Iui.ch Foni linistor "is emphasised for his part the conception that in this case a.cecisi.n w-S a quest i. n of hurs not f days. Ho sh vred tho FUhrer a mossage he had just received whi.ch report C Hungerion tr. p movements n the Slovak runtiors. The FUhr-r rond this rep rt, monti ned it to Tiso, ond exopr.ssoc the hope that Slovokia vr. uld socn decide clearly for herself.

Tiso thnkod the Fthrer for his mr.ls. E had for some time longoc to hear fr 11 th Flmor hineclf hon he (the Threr) stood in relation to his (Tis- is) people and c ntr3 and hotr he recorded the pribloms. He t k note of the stoteon, ond :vo tho assuronce that theFhrer c. uld 1 ely on Si valia. Ho .wishe. t > be oxcused 1 r the fact that under the pressi n made Ly tho Fhror w rds he c uld n t clearly express his opinion at that n mon+ or could hor’ly n 1:0 a decision. He tisho. to withdravr vith his friend and to thinl. the vthe uusti n over at his case; they w.ul. hv-rT, shuu that t; y or worthy of the Fhr-r’s care and interest for their c untry. lit: that tho e nver satis n was ended.

Si n

CEIFLC 02 DUCU 71 HO. 2002 20 Noveber 1945

I, MHD L. ST..IDIL..G, P/0, ..2.h.S., 52012, horcby certify t ct I an thoroughly c avers ant .it . the nish and Comen long uug 3S; and that the above is a true on corroct tianslation of d. cuent lumber 2802 PS.

ST. l D.l N el

TRAlTSLATIOI OF DOCUM21772790PSOFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(initials) R-M_

22Py for the office of RAM (Reich Foreign hinister)

Discussion between the FUEHRER and Professor TUCA and jcretary of -tute KARIASIN, in the presence of the Keich Foreign MiniSter in the new Reich Chancellery in. erlin.on Sunday, 12th Fubruary 1939 between 1700 and 1815 hours.

+ After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting voic es.the opinion that ho, though only a modest man "himseir, well claim tospeak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison guve him the right to make such a statement. He states that been uehrer.had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had nation T \?nf -On° acknowledge the dignity of the Slovakof Tn Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership

the. Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Ob- PViously.future association with the Czechs had become an impossi- bility Tor the.Jlovaksfrom a moral as well as economic point of Visw;,hefact that they stiH belonged to the Czech state was only transitorv" aus°.of the thought that tne present government was only the pressure of heandhis colleagues were determined to give in to Slovakia sure of.the.3l ovukpeople and to bring about an independent D-ovaKia• The destiny of Slovakia rested with the Fuehrer •4 ,c hehed sufferod imprisonmont for his convictions, he was equally prerared_to sacririce his life for his ideals. Should there be’a risingthe,Czechs would immediately try to suppress it with blood-

“ac"oH1my°pcopazptd 8ang2a woPd or PohtDf.F19 054

CERTIFICATE CF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 27 90 PS

22 November 1945I, ERNST H. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, 1.., _ sonyersantwiththo English and Garman languages; is a correct and true translation of Document No.

hereby certify that I am thoroughly and that the above2790 PS.

ERNST M. COPTPlc.,

33925738

H1155 -008

TISLATION OF DOCUTNT 2798PS uFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSRL

Conversation betwocn the Fuchror and Reich Chancellor and the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich Foreign lninter von Ribbentrop, and of the Czochoslovakian Foreign 1 nisber, Chvalcowsky, in the Reich Cinnccllery on 15 liar ch, 1939, 1315 to 1415 hours.

Others present vero:

Genorn.J. Field liershal GoeringGeneral KcitelSecretary of the State von WciszckorLL istcr o2 tnu Stnte leissnor SocrcterJ of tho State Deicrich Councillor of the Legation Hewel

President Hacha greets t being received by the latter. He

Sli

thanks for

lowed. (They oro seated) Hlachn.: Ke Lad ago. He had never talten part in politic

and fol-

p.Cte .ct

in 1925 was appointed Prauch he

He must ment, a.

had n connecti " po lit i casters11

that hisrestricted tc a x President lasaryk

end ver

but hd.d been as such ho ■

In 1913

-o1c-unn lom cexne

colum mi cations vith tllie never

Bones even more rarely. The misundor St anding . Oclcrvri s u

a legal official urposoly had nut tial to the parties

called to

tions vit

been "persona crnt supper for the Juc

o heu met the lotte

thet inacdiniclJ after ho revolution, he 2od as', tuncto for Czechoslovokin to be an independent si foil co 1.10 el hcacinc tho state. He vra.s en oilOV-rC Ol 10 V fl i c n ic " the position. In ficult task of hi;to receive him.

oprcsonted to him as pat:position he

an:

ue andof Justice. -.S

I vou. r nthor .ch with them. h the govern- vernment were

he met with

1/

so strange

This fell the task.1. His.■tic du faced 1 . most clif-

th'. Fuchror

1

+

ho VaS c nvinced tlic.t thc fate 1 Czochoslovalci.c vas in the hands of the Fuehrer, and he believed taut Ls fate w s well cared for in his * hands. Ho had no grounds for complaint in vhnt had recently tckon Mloce in Slovekis. Jie Rd long been co. vinced tire the various populations in this body—politic cnnnot live together. Although thein Inneun.ge w ns quite sim- ilar, they hnc devolopodcifferontly and Czechoslovakia was moz0 closely re- hatod to Cornny than to Slovnicis, which lenns noro towrd the Hngyrs. The Cochs had hod relations only vith the Protestant slovks while they ha nopulsec the Cotho.l :B, For these reasons a 6boc uncer st anding could never have been reached, and ho was glad that matters hue developed in this HN• he V3 nut Lonc in this opinion, which sucly was shared by 80% of thc population.

-1-

TL.NSLATION OF DOCUEENT 2798-ps (cont 1 d)

c .. half an hour ago he had received the amnouncec..Cnrpetho-Ukroine hac declared indepenent. iA, el0ptathat.the

Fuehror zdnhovonono too favore ble expurionces’with thesxodoteat tho „ .ff ad Probab]-y hoard rumors in the last Tow deys th-t p1mri . .1 connitted Q Violation of the constitution. This viol-ti n • 1 indstitutionwuld then have to bo blamod on‘hin.lSBut°hetionuristnen-

Constimution itselr had rotbemn observed by a portion orth, 5 hte ho’rogota, utthisccomontgon,nnfertunately oveata occred to enforce .dor "E Drluesht ebout by application of ne. ormer hcJ no not been intentional. But, ah-rw not shedding any tears over SLovak;,

V

he was

But now he came to that which moved hin nostLPi-: De-leVed chat the Fuehrerhe stated the opinion that CzechosLov national lifc. The rcoamhicci 10.,

"aS che on j whosd under st and cki.a had the right to vent ,

quired the best relations tence as an independent no part of the Czuch people, it must be considered that for only 6 months. Czec:o

witl 1ynat

' his. him if

1 live a lly re-

of its oxis-

There We

naned as friends. This was

such. Only in journnistic The overnmoni vreg t-yin,

about all that he wished tob3

x course, several exceptions, but ;1 • Slovakia had been in existence roen reproached for still having• they are not tho nce who ore cles Cic this system still have every means, to shut them up.

presentThe Fuehrer

this jouney f tho he became convinced

hePresiic ent, but this mornin.

tint

President coulc oc Oof hours util Gerr

uney, in spite of t! nt age to his country

ft or ionto require

IC consideration meed age of the it was only a matter

no enmity U ovanel cy oti nations that do not v

oslovakia. CzechoslovThe Fuehrer gives oi,

onC us--n e-ch: on principle, feels -n -f, or at least uninterested PeoD-e have no hatred for Czech-

examples to aliavery ttitude owarcs US

has shownitself in connectionoccupation of the Bhinelend + +A0; +0 r . —3 --o-u-, uuring tnenote to Franco saylngtht"uchtnotimo.Czechosdovakj.a had addressed a in the case that M-Sc‘ would 1 108 107 i kic Vould hu also ready to join in, Slovakia 21 done sj nputgtoie military stepJ against Germeny, Czecho- vas originnu, maa t?^ 3c Goch.fhet tho territory in questionstance, against Tt,lv Curin' t£ "-tuc.sho hed shcn m3 times, for in- ation had become ube-rnin- "h sgien eonflich, ct.., In 19,8 the situ- quonces. Ho di 200 r1 S0etihit8 ihe haddecilod bo raw thu conse- ruthless defender of the r- ht« - f 26 ' Mnetion bub ho was the most determined to take y "stept hbsn ofhis °y peopl onc in shis agh ha was ruthlessly and without scruples st^ds touthic.howstho front soldier vho His loyal attitude al^. psrrsscm-s.UPmdfichbs for his conviction. Slovakia. He took thorispsrsPonsnb-.foltho romzining port of Czacho-. --s him into a hostildl ononby’srppsuthonfigngyctthkucoof Hungry to- iorcing her to solve the nrobiem -cgg:.,1 --Y Po-iticc1 rmc.tions and

Germany did. He did th! s' desuite fcorpine to ethnographic principles as tariff situations ron108 T + th\ fact thet tho craziest econ ions not because ho could 1 Hetookthe responsibility tor these vincod th-t it rrs the right thing to gdothorvisc bub because he

ct

mC and restrict-was con-

For the other an end. London and Per Czechoslovakia.

court ri e ie were s Czechoslovakia was nothing but

not in a position to really stan a means d up for

to

-2—

-0083

TRANSLTION OF DOCULENT 2798-PS (cont t d)

Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him.

If Czechoslovakia had kept closer to Germony, it would have been an obligation to Germany but he was glad that he did not have this obli­gation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the little Carpathian lits. He did not want to drw the final consequences in the autumn because he had believed that it was possible to live together. But even at that time and also later in his conversations vith Ch alkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Beneschs tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkovsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change; The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans and many other things which, to him, wore a symbol of the total positive, it first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his consequences because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months agb. ..by did Czechoslovakia not immedictely reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tre- mendous burden for such n state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. Since, Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission such an arny is meaningloss. He onnumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevit­able development of cconoric necessities and, further, the protests from national groups which could no longer enduro life as it was.

"This it is th t the die was cast on the past Sunday. I sent for the Hungarian ambassador and told him thet I am withCrawing my hands from this country”. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to .march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czecho­slovakia into Garmen Keich. He wanted to civo Czechoslovakia -ullost auto­nomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed dur­ing Austrian rule. Germany’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia vill be deter­mined tomorrow and the de alter tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czcchoslovakcian military towards the German troops. Ho no longer trusts the cuvorument. He believes in the honesty and straight forwardness of Hecha and Chvelkowsky but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The Gornun Irnay had al— roacy started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.

At 6 o’clock in the morning the Germany arny would invade Caecho- Slovakia ron all sides and th. German air force would occupy the coch pirfiolds. Thore existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force, mo other possi bility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in be able form. I that cascit would be easy for the Fuehrer organization of Czech life a generous life national liberty.

to give Czeci. e Slovakia at the new of her own, autonomy and a certain

~3-

4

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2798-PS (cent ’ d)

Ho would "o“itnessed.etthe moment a croat historical turning-point, dia IUt".no.like to .torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. Ho if cechbsuovhthtnboccusonofapetrec but in crcor to pritect Germeny. Czech «.»■ ,-n . ofolost year would not have yielded, the• — P-oP-o oud have been extrmincted. Nobody covld have prevented

-t WS his will that the Czech people shoul 1 live

wiichvrould make Par-Sdchangcoxcdssionlyt8 tnoaczeghcudrasbefozpd Siostine would 5rozk outtomorror, th pressure would result in countor- pessibi uldanrihile to one another and it would then not beh in more for him to civ «» promised oilevintions. 11t-:n

him from dcing that

nother10 pron

woulc also be killad and this would result

for th

; if his ins i. The vrorL

selfwould not move r

. Q hatred which would servation, not to -r-.

"Th one hihi.ch could be summar the moor mny gol.

He felt pity press. It wo uld in a Gorman proverb;

mory to

was Uhe st ■ one which

another one, tho attitude of suggestions,

!0- Affcirs. There existed two trends in Ger_ .id nut Want any concessions and wished in me- hoslovakic would be conquered with blood and

Which corresponded with his just mentioned

That Was the reasoninvitation ws the last If it would come to a fBut the visit of H.

‘ight

contribute to finding for Czechoslovakia as His aim was only to c.

cha could

why he had asked Haena to come here. This —eed which hecoulc offer to the Czech people, the blood shed wou.l.d aslo force us to hate.Perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would °. construction which would be so far-reaching 1c never have hoped for in the old hustria. o necessary security for the Gorman people.

The hours went past. ;.t 6 He was clmost c.shamnod to say that t bi tallion. The nilit ■ rg action was rosity. He would advise him novr t cuss what should be done.

- clock tho troops would march in.hero wos one German division to cnch Czech no smcl1onc, but planned with all gone- retire with Chvalkowsky.in order to dis-

-in Hochn states that the situation was quite clear t in this ccSo any resistance was senseless. But he vmi0 ,

about, to r> him and that k the Fuehrer

Hours all of the Czech people hold council with his men. 1

. — . - - - - - - - - - - ---4 —-‘A- fron resisting. Tho Fuehrer says he shoul, now rolling military machone could not be : ices in Prague. It was a great decision but he could see the ogeg--4 , C-lons.pcriod.of peC.co botwaen both nations. K the Vision Poss-bisit for erent ne coulc foresee the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

Theturn to his off-

would be diff-

Hacha asks whether it was the whole ouoc, , : ..diserm the Czech army. This could perhaps 0150B0’done in a Efferent "manner

WallThe Fuehrer states that his decision w n vmhct a decision of the Fuehrer meant It was

no,,, . . - - and asked thc other gentlemenshoredhis.ppinion which was answered in the affirmative, to —sarm the Czech army was by the German army

whether theyThe only possibility

, Today this was or Hacha the. herdest step of his bolieved that already in a few years this decision would b omprehensible and in 50 years probably as a blessed one.

life, but he 0 viewed as

-4-

oH1155 -0085

„ TRANSLTION OF DOCUMENT 2798-ps

S (cont ’ d)

After that both Czechs are retiring.

hfter the conference between Hacha and Chvalkowsky with our gentlemen at the conclusion of which one had come to an understanding o th: wording of the agreement, the gentlemen mentioned at the beginning of tnis memorandum come once together to a final discussion in the Fuehrer’s study.

Once again the military situation is being thoroughly discussed ond the General Ficldmarshall describes the situation once more in detail, .ho fuehrer thinks that perhaps Macha’s message may have not cotten through to some places Vhoro clashes of arms may be expected, but one could by and large figure on an invasion without incidences.

The Fucnner continues that according to his belief inspite of all the embittorment thich could be caused by the invasion and occupnti on by Germany nevertheless tao conviction vroullc slowly dawn that a living to— gethor of the tvo nntions for centuries was advantageous. The idea that the tWo people were compelled to fight each other would disappear.’ Coccho_ S- VAkia WaS surrounded by Gornany and every reasonable person woulc have to amit that a C-ose liviE together o:2 the jwo nations whiould be the watch_ worn. Furtnermoro the problem of den- tionalisation played no part since such an idea was complete foreign to the Gormans and to Nationalsocialist ieo08.de don-t dcsize nor cim at denationalisation. The ones should -1Ve neppi-} as Czechs and the other as Germans.

Haeha replies chat this ram rk of the Fuehrer tras of the create st importance to him.

The Fuchrcr continued that only in economic, military and political matters cmixc. no opposibion be allowed. Czechia should keep her own head of state, ano his principles which he will carry through forod the basis for a pact-ication of this territory for centuries to come.

Hacha interjected and remarked that in ether words thi.s was not a plan for purchasing souls like it was during iustrial rule, and asked whether economically, a custom’s union was planncl.

Tae first point the Fuehrer denied with a smile, The sccoi.d point was answered in the affirmatire by the General Fioldmarchall stating that Germany and Czech" a were one territory economically spooling Fm'ihermoro Czechia would receive orders which would certainly double her production.

throughThe Fuchror said that the Czech people would again economically

the union with Germany because they would become a port of theHe did not vant to dosoroy Uech c conomygreat Germn oconomi.c torritoly

but. would enliven it tremendously

Hacha asked been prepared. whether detailed directives to ttnt effect had already

The Fuchrez mic commission becat a few wecks ago he c Againgabout tne past and the tactics employed by Bones and finally mentioned -de <8 - on which Cato He had announced his decision to act to a smal cirele•, The Fuehrer concluded that this settlement which now would be made

was o be final, bearable, and should leave no doubts. In any case the --echs wouc obtain more rights than they had ever within their territor

replied that this wao the responsibility of an © -or him, too, the whole affair hac come very d n 00 know a thing about the entire business.

econo- suddenly. He tallied

granted to the GermansJ

Thereupon the agreement was signed by the Foreign Affairs, hacha end Chvalkowsky.

Signed:

Fuehrer, the Reich’s,

Hewel

for

H1155 0086

I TRANSLATION OF DOCULENT 2’798 ( cont 1 d)

CEITIFICTE OF TRNSL/.TION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2798-PS

21 Novenber 1915.

1. GOFT7 IMER, 1/Sg, 33,812,169, hereby certify thet I nthoroughly convorsant with the Engiish and Gorman len guacs; and thct the bovro is n e -r cb and true Lrnnslntion of do curont No, 2798-pS.

GOETZ IlER T/S AUS 33,312,16?

Document 3051-PS

Extradedinary Envoy and Minister PlenipotentiaryV COLONEL DR.B. EC ER

-zechoshvak Representative on the United Nations Commission( for Investigation of Wai" Crimes

Nurnburg, I December 1945

ySupplsgenrtNg:_2t 2„the^Of ficia 1 Czesh ^Slovak Report

jr called l|ri-erman Crimes Against Czechoslovakia"

f Presented by order of the Czechoslovak Government by Colonel { Dr. B: Tcer, Plenipotentiary i inister, Czechoslovak Representa­

tive tothe Commission of the United Nations for the Investigation of .ar Crimes in London, at the tine Chairman of the Czechoslovak Delegation to the Nurnberg Proceedings.

By order of my Government I submitted in September of this year an official

report to the four prosecutors of the International Vilitary Tribunal in ac­

cordance with Article 21 of the Statute of the International Military

Tribunal, as established by the Agreemint of 8th August, 1945.

On 14 November- 1945, I submitted Supplement No. 1 to this report

concerning Konstantin von Neurath s responsibility for crimes committed

against Czechoslovakia.

Hereby I submit Supplement No. 2 to the first official report. This

Supplement No. 2, which is also a government document according to the above-

mentioned article 21, contains further proof of the guilt of the defendants

in regard to the preparation for an attack on Czechoslovakia. The report

contains, in other words, as a supplement to the first part of the original

official Czechoslovak report, further proof concerning the following actions

of the defendants:

a. Pre-war infiltration by natives and by imported "Fifth Columns".

b. Subversive activity.c. Bribery and use of corruption.

The supplement contains also further proof of the collaboration of the

German Reich Government and the German Reich Nazi Party with the leaders

of the German minority in Czechoslovakia - especially with the leaders of

the Henlein Perty (SDP) for the purpose of removing the Czechoslovak

Republic and preparing the military action of the German Reich against the

Czechoslovak Republic.

4 "b..‘ of . " in r_ -vsLovakia have been questioned in regard

n -136-0 mattors; partly by the tanistry of the Interior (Dopaztment of

H1155-0087

* a Document 3061-PS

Political Intelligence Service); partly "by Czechoslovak Courts of Justice*

present report contains relevant excerpts from these statements.

3• K?rl Hermann FRANK formerlythe Reichs Protector *s Deputy

and later German Minister of State in Prague. (Interrogated by the Ministry of the Interior)

a) Record of 15 August, 1945, in Prague.

Frank stated in this record that during the year 1938 he was several

times in Germany. He participated in a trip to Freslou, together with the

entire Party Administration of the SDP, in order to visit the Athletic

Festival which was to take place there. He spoke there for the first time

with Hitler. Hitler told Frank to "hold out and wait". Frank added in the

interrogation that he interpreted Hitler’s words as meaning that Hitler

himself had taken the fate of the Sudeten Germans into his own hands.

In reply to the question as to who hed organized the illegal crossing

of the border by members of the SDP into Germany in the autumn of 1938,

Frank stated that the illegal crossing of the border took place in accordance

with a proci .nation by Henlein dated 17 or 18 September, 1938, and published

in Asch, as well as in accordance with illegal circvo-s and that the

psobe who crossed the border illegally joine” *li. • : 2‘s.l t bee Corps in

Gernany. Frank himself had, as he seid, crossed the Uc:cer on 17 or 18

September, 1938.

In reply to the question as to whether he realic. thn: he thereby

committed high treason, Frank answered: "I was compistely aware of the

fact, that by following the proclamation of Henlein, with whose proclamation

I was in complete agreement, I as a Czechoslovak citizen had committed

high treason in the oy s of the Czechoslovak law."

At the interrogation on 15 August, 1945, Frank stated th-t Henlein

and his staff were at the Dondorf Castle near Bayreuth. Frank was,

according to his own statement, a more member of the staff. Henlein himself,

who had the title "Freikorps Fuehrer" (Free Corps Leader), was in charge

of the staff. According to Frank the Free Corps was formed at the order

of Adolf Hitler, and during the last days of September in Reich German

territory it was provided with a small number of small-arms belonging to

the German Wehrmacht, Frank stated further that Henlein’s proclamation -

he meant the proclamation of 17 or 18 September, 1938 - was issued by

H1155 -0088

Document 3061-PS

Hitlerkg order. He admits thet this proci mation may possibly have been

compo’ in the 1 inistry of Propaganda. Trenk then described the formation

of the Free Corps, which according to his statement was composed mainly

of Sudeten Germans and which had a force of approximately 15,020 men, and

told of attacks and actions which the Free Corps had undertaken on

Czechoslovak territory. The orders for such an action in the vicinity of

Asch came, according to Frank, directly from Hitler or Himmler. Fronk,

himself, agreed to these actions ond crossed the border for the purpose

of joining the Free Corps. Frank st'ted further het he ngreod • ith all

of Hitler's pi ns in reference to Czechoslovakia, whether they wera of a

political or kilibary nature.

b) Record of 9 October 1915

In reply to the question 's to who financed the Henloin Party, Frank

answered th t he thought the perty had been receiving money from Germany

since 1936. However, he did not know the source. In the year 1938 money

arrived from the so-callod "Volksdeutsche iittolstelle " in Berlin (Central

Office for National Germans) through the nediotion of the German Ambassador

in Prague. He stated th t he had been with Henlein several times at the

German Ambassador’s in Prague end thot he together with Henlein had

received money for the Party from the German Anbessedor. He admitted thet

the receipt of the money was not consistent vith the duties of a. Czechoslovak

citizen.

He dnitted -iso that he h-d gone alone to the German Embassy in

Prsgue soveral times and that he informed the Germon Arbessedor about the

inner political situation in Czechoslovakia. He added "The delivery of

information to Germany from tho SDP by means of the Embassy began in May,

1938, and tht brought abont e direct, political cooveration with the

delivery of confiaon*1a1 material also". Frank Emitted that he thereby

had committed high treason. After Henlein's conversation with Hitler

" Onrelbors (Erank does not give tho Gate of thig conversetion but From

the content of his st tenant it is evident thet this conversation took

Pleco at the end of aaugast, 1338) the perty received direct orders from

Berlin through Konrd Henlein. He admitted further thet the activities

described above were directed against the Czechoslovak State, that they

- 3 -

Document 3061*PS

were high treason and that the Germen Imbessy in Prague was villing to

assis toward this end.

c) Record of 9 October, 1945.

In the statement of 9 October, 1945, Trnk explained the role played

by the so-celled "Aufbruchskreis". The Aufbruchskrcis was a group of former

National-Soci: listic delegates with Kasper, Krebs end Jung at the Head. The

Hation 1 Socialist Party WAs voluntarily dissolved in Czechoslovakia in

1933, in order to prevent its being dissolved officially. Several of its

leaders lied to Germany (see pege 10 of the original Czechoslovak document).

In 1937 sever -1 of the former Nation* 1 Socialists, vi 1ed :c coined in

Czechoslovakia, succeeded in getting into the Honein Percy «hile several

of its exponents, among them Kaspor, wore token into *h: chief administration

of tho SIP. Other Gc? wan Jationa?. Souie li sts of " o. ouJ.ov-Erle remained

poernane ntly in Germany and carried on from there rpoyagmce against the

Czocnoslovek Tspublic. Tv those belonged in pari.. : . , the :o.rmot member

of the Czochoulovek Panli nent, Krebs. Froxz seic bl - F. bs w: p friend

of Frick °d that he hed therefore be. n tehen into th- k ch 2 uisiry of

the . nko--o‘ . s b - ■. -2 w s in couc. with tho Coirzen o the "Volksbund

fuel das -Ll 15.0 ■ • 2.0..® 1 Socio by for Germanism .broad). Steinachor;

whom he met porcon-l’y i: Jormany. Ft l cuntirmotes:6 that ihe

"Vo kunC tur jas Dcut.chinn •m L Innc." flpne: kb. co. "ormen

Perh/. ".e 0Le3 W“3 -l*T3 roccivs by Foulsin b:ooe a ’k -be the

purposo ti i 3 coneciion w1c b ne Commen Reich .-v.’ . : .is (nivhstallen)

w-s 12e oote-3.ishea : rf netlomi un‘u, na both sido r' 4H beriu and that

it t? ou 1 h 2 the- r) nation No a of 2 . c 10«. tet:, on the

sene -J 11e adtc.1 to t e s,0co, e.i mo t -t '.hr. th>.< .. 2 ...cr < 8

existoc. since 1933 and th- • in 1936 • further connec 10 -*tven iho SDP

and Kreis was esaahli ei ia cuznecthca with the o 2b.a o/imac class

(Reichsnzchrst nd)- Similar connections were steblsche: -:orn the field

of Pariy edu ation -nd within tne field of sports en.. -.-t cluciton.

d. locord of 10 October 1945.

In his st foment on this day Frank admitted on the basis of the

documents placed before him that Konrad Henlein received direct orders for

espionage from the German Reich Authorities (Reichsstellen) and th-1 he had

- 4 -

H1155-0090

Document 30S1-PS

then carried out by Sudeten Gernen persons. Fe believes, =s he said, thet \

thereaw9s ?. special German espionege system in Czecho slovaki- , end that it

W°S cozducted directly by Germony. In the summer of 1938, os Frank remembers

Henlein was twice with Rudolf Hess; Frank continucd his account with the

words: "All conversations during the summer of 1938 between Henlein and ne

on the one side end the Reich Authorities (Reichsstellen), especially Adolf

Hitler, Hoss, and Ribbentrop, on the other side, were for the purpose of

informing the Reich Authorities of the development of the political situation

in Czechoslovakia. They took pi ce t the request of the Reich authorities".

Frank told further that he had a conversation wi th Ribbentrop in

August, 1939, through the mediation of Lorenz (Loranz, the SS- Obergruppen-

fuehrer, was the Leader of the so—called Neticnal Gernen eutzul Office

LVolkedeutscha Mlttelstelle/ in Beilin, which took over the role of the

"Volltsbund fuer das Deosschtun in Aislende") and informed Ribbentrop about

the political s2kuptino n Czechoslovakia ond especially about the negotia­

tion of the Czechoslovak Goveenment in regard to the sbasus of the

nationalities- At noon he had a conversation wl! H:sJor, in which

Ribbon t 0? coo pori. 21c result of this cenvessetien was the oscuronce

(Fraek did u b sn7 by w’uu) that the policy of the SD in Czechoslovakia

would be °20 over, on taob the Reich would be able to carry out the solution

of the Sc.ci an German qt,elioi Bamk • ated exgtecel; that ih: s trip to

Ribbentrop and Ller vac A secret one and th t Ee.le:- wa one , ty one

who knev *oit it 3:z! esaued further that th02 hese aegoriations

he ccuniitied an offense against the laws of fie Rey130.10 I. -u1:

"In reply co the question I c*6c that I am awera of tne tee~-on tnich the

Part/ ant its entire coief adiinistzation committed by .enck, : money from

a foreign country for hostile actions against the S,a:0.

e) Record of 12 October 1945.

In this interrogation on 12 October, 1945, Frank described she trip

of • lergo mejorit c“ vnc Fazty idmininbrntion to +: - Jar ettag of the

N-n- - aenbore- During this period Kon-a Henlein 1d a convoreetion with Hitler (according to Erenk.’e statement) -nd told Fronk afterward that

Hitler ed (Jeering would take • Aitd otena an rogra to the Sudoton Gorman

«lestlon-whlch actually happened. Frank contimacd: -j romamdez ony th„

H1155 -0091

Document 3061-PS

they ^th spoke sharply ond threateningly ’gainst Czechoslovakia end

announced the solution of the Sudeten German problem." Frenk said further

th t fter the return from Nurnberg the further activities of the SDP were

already directed toward rmed revolt. He uoted an order for the battle

against the Republic issued by Henlein on 17 September, 1936. On the same

day Frank fled with Henlein to Germany and from there they both directed

all ctions egoinst the Republic. Ho described the activities and actions

of the Sudeten German Free Corps to which, as Frank stated officers of the SS,

SA on NSKK were ssigned. Hitler sppointed Henloin ccrmen or of the Free

Corps; Frank ws his doputy, Propegende for the prpse of di ’integrating

Czechoslovak! ’ w s handled 2t this time by the Minisiry of Fropogndo, Arms

were smuggled from Germany into Czechoslovakia. Trerk a3&ol bo his testimony

th t 3t the t time a colonel or lieutenont colonel of ine Ge: nen ormed forces

had for the ti: 3 being eon assigned to the Comm nd oi tne Free Corps as •

liaison offi er. He then described the events of ter iho Nunich Agreement.

Ho w-s present t 2 l rge public demonstr ti on in Korlsnod, ot which "itlor

decl' ro d: "roe yod Sud *e-ormene the .onior is recdy to dreu too sword11.

2, T, nd of 25 October 1945.

Frank descrided iho course of the occupation of the so-called Sudeten

territory, hcw toa xiemlein. perty hod bocoun a p r5 of ,21 S.P through

Hess, ho th: now crrraiion of the porsy was corre J 30. j

according 50 tne Germru 2 -tcn, and how, finlly, th 1 r on Nti

orgenzetions such as the SS, SA, NSKI, 1S/, HJ ani. HIM wo.e eotblishei

in tre :ude ten c rr! tors. Fankmenioned. the nomcs of the 3unten Germans

who had been plecod - 3 she hoac of tro v‘:lous pa*y orge"i-ion.. He then

described the election for the Reichstag which was procinimed :D the Sudeten

territory on 4 December 1933. Finally he described the orzorination

- 6 -

DOCUMT NO. 3061-PS_OFFICE, U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

of te Reich German State Administration in the Sudeten Territory, of

which Henlein, as Reich Commissioner, was the head. He confirmed the

fact that the majority of the leading positions were taken over by

Reich German officials. He mentioned also, how the population of the

Czech territories, which had been occupied by the Germans iu violation

of the Munich agreement, were treated. He said, ’’German officials were

apoointed also in the Czech-speaking territory. The majority of the

Czech schools were closed and the Czech children were sent to /German/

schools. All signs in Czech were removed; protection for the Czech

minority did not exist.” When the interrogator reminded Frank that

Hitler had repeatedly stated that he wanted no Czechs, Frank said:

"I admit that in the annexation of purely Czech territories such as the

vicinity of Doms.lice, Pilzen and Purnov he (he means Hitler) has in no

way complied with his declaration.”

He then described the terror system which was employed against

the Czechs and the Jews in the occupied Sudeten Territories. Finally

he descrided the preparations for the final occupation of the rest of

Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, and the cooperation with the Czech

Fascists for this purpose. He characterized this latter act of

Hitler's in the following manner: "Even though Hitler declared that

he did not want any Czechs in the Reich, he had broken and vicl. ed this declaration by occupying the Czechoslovak Republic.” And Frank

added: -'As everything else that Hitler undertook, this action was

enthusiastically approved by the population (Frank means the German

population) end the population backed it”. He then described the

march of the German troops into Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March

1939, and the arrival of Hitler, who, according to Frank, wa,

accompanied by Lammers, Frick, Stukart, Himmler, Daluege, Heydrich,

Keitel, Brauchitsch and other generals. Frank. +-etney wi} Henlein

and Hoeppner, was snnoneN -4 Lbiur in his private parlor car.

- 7 -

D-CUENT NO. 3061-PS OFFICE, U, 5, CHIEF QF COUNSEL

\

According to his statement, he happened to be present on March 16 in

the room where Ribbentrop broadcast the proclamation and the establish­

ment of the Protektorat over the radio, and added: "Subsequently I

found out that the proclamation was composed by Hitler together with

Frick, Stuckart and Ribbentrop during the night of the 15 to the 16

of March, 1939". He described then, how he had been ordered to go to

Vienna to see Hitler in the Hotel Imperial between the 17 and 19 March,

1939. He, together with Neurath, was received by Hitler during the

forenoon. Frank continued: "Hitler told us that he was apoointing

von Neurath as Reich Protector and me as State Secretary". Frank

stated further, that Neurath had been placed directly under Hitler.

Frank accepted the position as State Secretary, although, as he said,

this was in conflict with the principle of self-government which he

had defended up to October 1, 1938. He did it because it was Hitler’s

order. He learned later on that Hitler had mentioned to Hacha that

either a protective agreement in the form of a Protectorate must be

made, or else the German troops would march into Czechoslovakia, and

that they were ready to do so.

Concerning the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and

the establishing of the Protectorate, Frank expressed himself as

follows: "The conclusion of the protective agreement between Hitler

and Hacha and the establishing of a protectorate suc}. as the

establishing of an independent Slovakia with ar. independent, pro­

tective agreement between the Reich and Slovakia signified an action

of pure political force. This violated all lews, since Hacha,

according to the Czechoslovakian laws, was not authorized to negotiate

such an agreement with Hitler without prior consultation of the

parliament still in session."If T

" aware of the fact that my appointment as Secretary of

State was a cne-sidee political act on the part of Hitler and that

- 8 -

DOCUMENT NO. 3061-pSOFFI3E, U. 5. OHIEP QF COUNSEL

thebestebishing of the Protectorate was carried out without regard

for Munich, Voelkerbund, the agreement concerning the protection of

minorities, etc.1’

2. RECORD ON 19 NOVEMBER 1945 OF MRS. MILADA RADLOVA,nee HACHOVA r 11 3-0": *—-e2-2-mzahers.fmea

DAUGHTER OF TH~~ FGBMFR DECEASED SO-CALLED STATE PPBSIDENT

D&. EMIL HACHA (taken down "by the Ministry of the Interior)

Mrs. Radlova was questioned concerning Hacha's trip to Berlin

on 14 March, 1939 and his conversation with Hitler. She described her

father’s departure, whom she accorpanied, and his arrival in Berlin,

where they got off at a hotel, and said among other things? IMy

father has never given me a complete report of his conversation with

Hitler. From his verbal remarks I only found out, that Goering said

to my father during his visit with Hitler on the night between 14 and

14 March, 1939 that he would be very scry if he were to be forced to

destroy so beautiful a city as Prague, in case my father did not give

his approval of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the German Army,

and if the Czechoslovak Army were to use armed force in opposition to

the occupying forces. What Hitler said to my father - Dr. Hacha -

I heve not found out. Not until later did my father tell me that it

was a great blow to him to find out that Bohemia and Moravia were to

be occupied by the Germans. As a matter of fact, my father thought at

first that his trio concerned Slovakia since it was knowm that many

Slovaks, as for instance TUKA, SANO, MACH, etc., wanted to make

Slovakia an independent state. Not until his arrival in Berlin on

14 March, 1939 did my father find out that on this day Morevska-

°stravahad becn occupied by the Germans. He had also told me that

Hibler was vory much enraged, because my father arrived so late in

Berlin.

- 9 -

DOCT 1. 3061-p=' ---CE,U.S.CHIEFOF COUNSEL

3. -02-12-4012913 1345. PR. AUGUS!" PQPELKADIRETOR OF mu.

7.—SC-CALLED PRSSIL.W,

EEEE.EORER

OF STATE. HACHA.

Popellca. stated, that he had learned about the conversation

ween Ktler •a *achr during the night of the 14 and 15 March, 1939

throxeh a docament which Dr. haa pereonally composga ana agncaThis document w&8 retained ,

secrot document in a spocia] cabinet

Dr. Popelka, as director of the Chancery, ha accese t. this cnbinetand read the document. He recalls having read that Eacha had to wait

until 0200 hours in the morning during his visit with Hitler. The

room in which he waited was brilliantly lit. Hitler was surrounded

by a large number of military alides. r-produqod in the docuamenta statement made by the dcfende.nt Gosring to the effect that if Hacha

would not accept the conditions which had been placed before him with

regard to the occupation

- 10 -

H1 155-

H1155 — 009

\ 3061-PSof BOhemia and Moravia, he, Goering would attack Prague from the air

and destroy it ccpletely in order to give England and France a warning

example, so that these countries could see what would happen to their

cities if they ergaged in war. Hacha began the conversation with Hitler

with the Slovakian question. Hitler did not react to it and told Hacha

that he had just given orders for the German troops to occupy Bohemia

and Moravia i. 0600 hours on the 15th of March. Hitler then presented

the conditions which Hacha was to accept. Hacha objected. However,

that did not help. From Dr Hacha's documont it was evident that he had

been forced to sign the document for the Cer an protection, that he had

not voluntarily sought protection and that he signed the document

under psychological pressure. Dr Popelka continued: "The document

read, as I remember, that Dr Hacha was under such a mental strain during

his visit with Hitler that he had an attack and had to have an injection

by Hitler's personal physician, who was present. From the document and

from remarks which Hacha made later in my presence, I am under the

inpression that dacha acted unier the pressure of Hitler's and Goering's

threats against the Czechoslovak people, and that he was given no time

iii which to thir k over the matter or consult with the proper governmental

agencies."

4. EECCRDOP19 _NCV_ B_R,1945. OF DP JOSEPH amt FOK Ju FOlu CICAL ELPORTELRIFLRMVIEN) DR HACHA AT THS MLLSi Y Or TH IN2ERIOR IN PHaGLU

Dr Kliment seated that he accompanied Dr Hacha as an officia of his

chancery to BerJ.in. He was not present during the conversation

between Dr Hache and Hitler, He can renember the inCormation which

Dr Hacha gave to him and other outstanding Czechoslovak persons in

the Hotel Adlon when he returned at 0430 on 15 March 1939. During his

visit to Hitler, Dr Hacha had ’.ranted first of all to solve the Slovakian kproblem. Hitler had listened to Hacha and he had then only said that the

question of Slovakia was not the object of his interest. He had decided

to occupy the Czechoslovak countries with the German Armed Forces, start­

ing at000 in order to secure peace in Central Europe. He added to this

that his decision was final. Then Goering stepped over to Dr Hacha and

- 11 -

-0098

U DOCUMENT NO.~3061-PSOFFICE, U, S. CHIEF. OF CQUNgEL

said to him: "Xy official task (Ant) is difficult. I have nothing at all

against your beautiful city. However, if you went to do anythin*- at all

against the decision of the Fuehrer, especially if you should attempt to

ret help from the West, then I shall be forced to show the world the

100 percent effectiveness of my Air Force". Dr. Eacha. then told those

who had accompenied him that it was not until these ferreechine threats

had been directed against the entire nation that he decided to si^n

tho declaration already placed before him concerning the protection of the

Czechoslovak countries and the Czechoslovak pet pie through the Chancellor

of the German Reich.

Dr. Kliment continued: "It is clear to me, as an immediate participant

of those days, that during the fateful nioht Hitler, Coorin- and the

others who were present, especially Bl3bentrop, employed the highest pressure

that could be used against the spokesman of a people: that is, the threat

to destroy completely their capital, Precue, from the air. Only the fear

of reprisals ameinst the Czechoslovak people influenced Dr. Ea.cha, in my

opinion, to bow to the dictates of Hitler."

Dr. Hacha confirmed that during the conversation with Hitler he had

received a streneth-oivinp injection, although he had protested against it.

Concerning Ribbentrop's participation in the events on 15th uf March 1939,

Dr. Kliment said: "Concerning- Ribbentrop: Aside from the treacherous rolo

he had played in submittin. the despotic order concerning- the establishing-

of the Protectorate, I can still rementor today the everbearing and

imperious manner in which he conducted himself when he took over the town."

I can report another breach of confidence which he committed against

the Czechoslovak people. He had assured Dr. Hacha that it would be impossible

in the Czechoslovak countries for a Sudot en-Gorman to carry out reprisals

3minst the Czechoslovak population. Instead of that it is common knowloco

that K. H. Frank, the former Sudeten official and the arch onomy of the

Czechoslovak: people, •Ps appointed to tho most important Reich Office in the

Czechoslovak countries. And Ribbentrop. in spite of his promises and his

ivc and oroz r-rttptpnbton 4 alt tho events mentioned, did nothing to

keep his promises.

- 12 -

- I 30c 1-PS5. ) ^^CVtTm^F_FORM SIOVaKIAN political L^lD^RS

The following persons, who wore leaders in the so-called ’’Independ­

ent Slovakian State”, were interrogated.

a) Dr Josef Tiso, form r State President, interrogated by the

district court Bratislava on 19 November 1945.

b) Dr Vojtoch Tuka, forn. Minister, interrogated by officials

of the Ministry of Interior (Depe.rtnent for Political Informa­

tion Servico).

c) Alexander Moca, former Minister, interrogated by the district

Court Bratislava on the 19 November 1945.

d) Dr “ikulas Pruzinsky, interrogated by the district court

Bratislava on 19 November 1945.

e) Adalar Kocis, interrogated by the district court Bratislava

on 19 Novuoor 1945.

T?to db.-jcct of uho interrogation xms:

The prticipation of the Na.i conspirators in the tearing away of Slovakia

from the Czechoslovak Republic, carried cut. on 14 March 1939.

All witnesses confirmed, partly fyos personal experience, partly on the

basis of inforurtion that they had received, the following facts:

a) That Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering and other Nazi leaders demanded

the proclamation of the "Independent Slovakian State” from

Slovakian political leaders on 13 March 1939.

b) That hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering and others at the same time

threatened in various ways the occupation of Slovakia by

German troops up to the river Vah and the distribution of the

ronindor of Slovakia among her northern and southern neighbors

if the Slovaks did not declare their "independence"; whereupon

during the night between the 13th and Lthof March, Ribbentrop

gave Dr Tiso until 14, March at 1300 to make up his mind.c) That incidents such as shootings, bombing attacks etc, were

organized in Bratislava by Gernans with the assistance of

SS-officers and in cooperation with the local German Consul

- 13 -

0100

3061-PS

in order to justify the invasion by Goran troops.

I horuby submit the present document in the name of the

Czechoslovak Government and I have the honor to state that my Government

reserves the right to submit additional docunentary material to the

prosecutors.

Colonel Dr. B. ECER

/s/ Dr B. Ecer

Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Rcprosontativo of the Czochos lovakRojublic at the Commission of theUnited Nations for the Investigation

of War Criminals

Chcirman of the Czechoslovak Delegation in the Nuernberg Process

- 14 -

H1155-0101

PARTLAL IRaESLaTION CF DO0U/ITT 1- 30 53

_ O3TTC 03 __

1a(-_606. 1920ETO3SGESETILAT PrlST II

DAOTARam CT owENNTIG THE cMA x-SUOVL TLLATY03 PE "n TON 0020U03 Li" 2R IIB cENRICH AJD 12E t.UE 03 2 ia tLA . l.arh 64, "J.9'39

Belweon the Gcrmen Cov-oreni and he S1o"PK. Governncni, a, treaty was sirne on 18 M-rch 19:9 e Vicnne AtU. o 25 ha j*c ; 19 /3 :n secLin extend? ng protection by the Geuen Re..ch to che Suete o Slo-2Le.

The treaty bccpme effectlve on March BZ hereinafter.

1939; Its text is published

Berlin, March 21, 1939,

VON E TBB1N"!B J?Reich Min-ster of crolgn Affairs

Treaty of Protect? on to le cutorded by }o Gorman Rcj ch to the State Of

lne Germen Government a,nd the f"tork Covernmont hevo agroe, after the Slovak State hpg vi~ced iiol.: dcz the groteccioo o: (ogmc n Pelch,to regulate by treaty the consequon:os . ec. ' 1og Pcu ■ o.e t. i t. Eor rtis purpose the unde: reignod mepreson:e cives of cho two goveramnexie have egreed on the following provhejons.

ARTICLE 1, The Cerman Retch undertakes to protect the pol.i cel independence of the State of Slovkie en the integrity of its teerutory,

AFTIOLE 2. For the pupose of molcing effective the protection underiekon by the Gernan elch, the Gernen ymsd f 5 con ch.a1. Lve the Tchi, ab all times, to constuci military install tcns aza to Bo.p chon garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in en area, delimd.ted on its wescern side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and. on its enstern side by 2 line formed by the epstern rima of the Lowor Carpathians the Nhite Carpathians and the J-vornik Mountains,

The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to pscure that the land raouired for those installations shall be conveyed to the Gomen arced forces , Furthermore the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Boi ch for the m? intCLpj.ee of the German t:coops and the surply of military inst-Lations.

theMilitary sovercienty

zone described in thewill be assumed by first paragraph of

the Geruan armed forces in this Artlcle.

German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, ^tc engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated zone : hell be subject to Gorman jurisaiction.

aFTICL- 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.

ARTOLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign affairs in close Pgreemeni with the German Government.

- 1 —

1 H1155-0102

PARIIaL TRANTSLATION OF DO0JENT 1. •

(Cent-d)

ABT I CIE 5, This ircpty shall besone effective as of the dnte of its sign ture and sheLJ bo vaL.C lor - pcrioi oi cwenty- five yeacs. he two govenmenis wH rcach *n un063 str.) 5 on ilu extension of this treaty in du Line Defore th expirihon o. chn period.

In witness whereof the rep tesenta si ves of the two parties hevc signed the bove treaty i.r duplicate.

Vienna., Merch 13, 1939. Berlin, Morch 23, 1939.

For the Gormn Govornment: For the Slovak Gcvernmonb:

VO J RI B21. ROP DH. Joz9 TsOI?., 70:33 IT/ADR - F r E JR Ci 11 S K!

GEBZIFICAIT3 OF TRAITSIAT1ON

Uj 0021180.1159.-17 Noverber 1945

I, Ludwig Hertmen, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I em thoroughly conversant with the Englsh end Germ-n. lengages; ana thpt the above is e correct and true trensleticn of Document No. 1439-PS.

IU.WIG HARTMeN 2/4, 314-1053

- 2 -

A H1155-0103

(703)

TC53A

Note to the Law concern5.ng the Territory with the German

Reich of 2j L^rch, 1939,

D.d,d.P. Vol.VII Pt.2. p552. Note 2.

The transfer comissioner (Ueberleitungskecmmissar) for the

Memel Territory, Gauleiter and Gbet’praesidont Erich Koch, effected on

3 April 1939 during a conference at “emel the final incorporation of the

late Memel Territory into the national-socialist party Gau of East

Prussia and into the state administration of East - Prussian

Regierungsbezirk of Grunbinnen,

PARTIAL TRANET A721W285285.T--23OMFicE omS-ATIOI OF DOCUMENTNo .2953 E8--- - -2 U S CHTEF op nATS-t, __ ,

The Seiche Fhrer-SS Chief of Security FQ.Ill 1123 AZ: g.Rs. /39

29th June 1939H1155-0104

FOS. /Zt.Stamp-Foreign OfficeRn 38 g. Rs.received 29th June 1939

1 Encl.

To the Reich Foreign Minister Stamp- Most SecretSo Major General (Gruppenftthrer) v.RibbentropWilhelmstrasse 63.Berlin W. 8.

Dear party comrade v. Ribbentrop,

Enclosed please find a further report about the "Woldemaras Supporters" . As already mentioned in the previous report the "WoldemarasSupporters" are still asking for help from the^Rvich, I therei ore ask you to examine the question of financial support, brought up again by the "Woldemaras Si porters" , set forth on page 4 para 2 of the enclosed report, and to make a definite decision.

s t of the ''Woldemaras Support*rs" for financial support could.—opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms should, not, however, De made, und :• any circumstances.

Heil Hitler.

.Tours

Enclosure.

HEYDRICH.

F 12 348.

A/L/2

Translation of Extract to RM 33 Most Secret

in the middle of May it was decided to form a secret Lithuanian national socialist party. Its leaders are the most trustworthy members of the "Woldemaras Supporters". The direction of the work within the Officers - Corps is said to be in the hands of old members of the. "Woldemaras Supporters". Besides that, they are said to have one assistant who is on the personal staff of President Smetana. In order to make full use of antisemitic feeling in Lithuania. it is intended to stage programs against the Jews. The sum of 100,000 Lit (about 41,000 Mark) is required for this illegal work. Besides that a leading "Woldemaras Supporter" is enquiring whether the Reich would send weapons as well. The reply was given to the effect that money would possibly be provided but, weapons, however, would defini­tely not be delivered.

The fight against the Jews would result in a further increase in the escape of Jewish capital, causing Lithuania to be more depen­dent than ever on the German market.

18 November 1945.CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION CF DOCUIENT NC.2953 PS.

I, Betty D. Richardson, WRNS. P.O. 65370, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English a.nd German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 2953 PS.

Betty D .Richardson, WRI’SP.O. 66370

H1155-0105

TENSLTION OF DOCUMFNT 2952,~PSOf FI OS OF U S CHIEF OF COL^SEL

ZU R.M, 33 g.Rs.

1J1OI..NDUI[

During the last L yeers, Lithunnian activists, under the name of

"o-DH-HS SUPPORTTIS, have asked German offices repeatedly for support

in the matter of weapons and noncy through the mediation of ramo1 Con­

fidence agents of the foreign office and the Sbetc Police H.Q. in

Tilsit. Imminent Large scale plots to soizo power were always pointed

out with these rec 10s6s without anything ever happcning afterwards

Thorough investigations havo shown that the so-called MToldemeras

Supporters" are composed of persons who are dissatisfied vrith the

Government of the Lithuanian President SETON: for the most varied

reasons. • cortnin uniformity —i.sts mezoly in the rejection of the

friendly disposition towards Poland of the intollectu-1 circles, as

well as the Christian Democratic Party, which at present is decisively

roprcsonted in tho Lithuanian Government. It has not yet been possible

to identify the presence of a definite policy in the leadership of this

group, ho connections worth mentioning exist with Voldemaras, who lives

in Fr: nee, writing religious compositions and receiving a small pension

iron the Lithuanian Covurnment on the condition not to return to T.-ithu-

ania nd to romnin quict politically. It mist therefore be considered

as extremely quostionablo whcthor this Group of Activists, vith vrhom

the nan.c "Voldomer 18" is hardly more than an advertisement, vill attain

political influence in the near future. It is not in the interest of

Germany to weaken the position of tho irny Commander RLSTIKIS, whose

influence on th. political direction of Lithuania is increasing. On

the other hand it is not disadvantageous if the friendly endeavours

towards Poland- meet with active opposition.

The Voldemor.s Group has occasionally been supported, for these

reasons, vith the approval of the Foreign Office (AUSSEN/JiT)

by small amounts of money (amounts of a £u hundred maerke) so that

its activities and its duv.lopi nos could I . opt under observation.

Support through the delivery of am.s, aircraft and motor vehicles which

had been asked for at different timcs, has hot boon given.

H1155-0106

Page 2____ _29J2T.NLTIOT GF jGX.,^ 2592 - F3 OEICL OF 'J S CHIEF OF CLUBEL

___

It will be cppropricto to cept the scme prccticc in future as well.

Support on & lcrgcr scale will offer prospects for success only at

such time us t • l/oldeme res group has shovm that it is in the position

to crocte the basis for an effective intervention in Lithuanian

politics by itself.

With rocld t> 10 pogrom- plans of two 11 oldenares Supporters’*

it has to be said that for some time past the Lithuanian Government has

been working successfully towards the climinction of Jewry from

Lithuanian ocono^y. mhis hrs resulted in an ever growing increasing

emigration of Juis during the last yenrs. me Jc3 hevo always been

excluded from Lithuanian public life. The preparation of pogroms could

easily locd to c dis urbenco of this : 11 planned development, which is

gratifying to us.

Berlin, 19th July, 1939.

Doertenbach.R-M. (Added in handwriting)

I support small regular payments, o. g. 23,00 marks quarterly.

(jignod; w

CEHT.FICIE OF TRNBLTICN OF DGCUhfLNT .2592 -PS. , ________

-oveber 16th, 1945

I, Ffe EFNJTM. CCHN 33 925 738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the. Document 2592-PS..

Pfc EFT M. COHN

33 925 738.

H1155-0107

PS 2357

ETRAOTS FROM SPEECII- BTFORE REICHSTAG

80 February 1938

f| y

n the fifth year following the fir„tagreement of the Roich it 8 Ereat foreign politics

‘ 1111s us with e;.w-- sincere era+;e; , .-ratification toour relations with the seete

~ Terences, not na,

the course of these-emrs there has been

in relations .... m, .-his 8001 work, which

e able to state that

"e kad had perhaps the

been a detente, but in a constant iprovenent

$

1

P

.08 ~ With suspicion by so mnny at

50s* and I mry oy that, sinoe the Eac Save up its continual attc. .

m-tepts to unsettle "n of great personal attainments as the , 1ost dangerous spot fro- the • " coraadssioner, the

P -ron the point of view or v

ontarely ats chltadte Th;77“ P2a0easpects the national codtaoaa i 46 3tatecity of Danzig ana ' state, and both the. W respect Polish rights a ,to a friendly understandin, . . -ents* And - the way

which, anattars of certain mischief. ■ in spite of the

the tine, has stood the

of Nations finally

Danzig and appointed a

the poison out of theakers

relations bett

‘ succeeded in finally taking

transforming th .Uo a sincere,

een Genuany and Poland andfriendly cooperation.

"Relyine on her friendshipsuzturea to save that ideal J. “ " not leave a tsk which is anak " ° pevades the foundation

"°us— peace "

stone

for the

H1155-0108

EC.73. No.37.Document Iio. 37

Txtrnots fro Chancellor Hitler’s Reichstag SpeechFebruary 20, 1938.

ith one State only did wre not want any connection or any close relations - vith Soviet Russia. ...... .1

"Any attempts to spread Bolshevism, irrespective of where they occurfed. wou-d have our abhorrence and, if they threaten us - our enmity........ . . ... "

"In the fifth year folloring the first great foreign political agreement

of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state

that in our relations ith the State with which wre had had perhaps the

greatest differences. not only has .here been a detente, but in the course

of these years thr has been a constant improverent in relations. I know

perfectly vell that this is above all attributable to the circumstance that

at the time there was no Testern parliamentarian in Rarsaw, but a Polish

Marshal, who as .an eminent personality realised the significance, so important

to Europe, of such a Geron-Polish detente. This good work, which was regarded

with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I my say that,

since the League of Rations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle

Danzig and appointed a non of great personal attain ents as the new commissioner

this most dongorozs spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely

lost its menacing chracter. Tho Polish State respects the national conditions

in this State, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights.

And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an

understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has to-day, in spite of the attempts

of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the

relations betzeen Gerzony an? Poland and transforming them into a sincere,

friendly co-operation. \—-Teplyins on her friendships. Germny will not leave a stone unturned to

save that ideal thich provides the foundation for the task which is ahead o?

( 2*,-) (3548)

Most S

H1155-0109

76

io the Reichninistervia the State Secretary.

F 12 31j

Cerr n polic : rotieasily, but must not lead to Vv /cither xe--d are looking for trouble re.

leave Czecho: lovakin to hersolf, i

interference and through internal ;

Lotl . woul perh

hould, without direc

signs of disinto. ration, due

or

lorejgn

fcultsto her ovm

This process, hoveveplace step by step cu would have +o

-CO - loss of power in the

ve to

tertite by of a plebiscite nd an amexion or F 12 2^8.

The Etech protlen i nut yot politically acute h Foz uy in cataction, which the Entente wouna ortch 1: i

" ""ed inactively, and not even if this action should come quicl-ly and sop;; .- Spr-s-n ly. Germany cennot fix ..

"" this fruit oould be plucked without too great a risk,

prepare the desired developments.She can onl

rig

For this pur the sJogan ezan. inglanl at prosent of tthe Sudet nLC 1 TE have

• used up to 01/, is. to be taken up graduollythe choic ox nationality w.

conviction that

padewor

the Czecl of

I 11

aiding the fact tat the m;.."" -emical process of dissolution of ' ...•-o EU or may not be fin-i, ccg,. ..--- speeded Up bymeclniico] ozunis

Ate of the act

el be clearly decided by>ay of -zechoslovakia, however, woula no

.but would nevertheless be definitel y

5 This method of approach towards'

our relationship with Polandi£ to be

departure the problens or boun it is unnvoiduble that the Gemann

a the south .

to the east and north cast must ,,8 alee the Poles sit up. The fact ht

liguidation of the Czoch qucstion, i w111 ■ • •I

that I oland will be the next in turn.

-U 51 later tide ascuption oinkes in in inturnationel politics a a fine. footer, to hotter. In thin sense, lncttane, it L suportazt for t

ti befag, to ocrz on tn Soraan policy, adoz th 1am cad rovoa slogans of "the aight to cutoncury" na "Racial unity*. a, tha .n m ,

be interprotod as pure inpcrialisn un our pou na 2. .i - "" "-e “ -OS-sltuicc tour plun by the Entonte at an earlier dato ana moce onc 0,. . .

-----1 • u-l OU forces colc stand up to.

F 12 297.

H1155-0111

No.40.OopTiont No.40

tr ct from .... Lipski >3 inute of his conversation v/ithI von Ribbentrop

Nuremberg September 10 , 1938.

" von "bbentrop emphasized the necessity for good Polish Goran relations: this "s his.own conviction -hich hod rora

to the oottion interest. linkins both states. His persorai wor

was oonCiztzod y tho lne adoptoa ty tho Chanosllor. As zong, therefore,as tee Crnocllor degttoa to mant-in naa presont

post, he would work positively for the devoloprent oe Polish- German relations.

Sranted this general assumption minor issues disturbing

Polish-Gerzan relations must be settled in a friendly spirit.

(3529)

H1155-0112

T.C.73 NO.42.Document No. 42

tracts from Chancellor Hitler’s Speech in the Sportpnlast

Seot ember 26 1938.

.e " no interest in oppressing other nations. Te desire to be happy in

our own w and let the others be happy in their am ways.......... «

"The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our

relations ath Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would

rogard each other as hereditary enemies I wanted to prevent this. I know

well enough that I would not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic

constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are

the most blood-thirsty way agitators. In Poland there ruled not a democracy,

but a mean; and with him I succeeded in precisely twelve months, in coming

tom agreement which, for ten years to begin with, entirely removed the danger

of conflict. Ne oro all convinced that this agreement -.-ill briry lasting

pacification. Te realise that here are two peoples which must live together,

and neither of which can do awry with the other. A people of 35 millions will

always strive for an out-let to the sea. A W to understanding then, hnato

be found; it has been found; and it will be continually extended further.

Certainly things were difficult forthis area. The nationalities and small groups

frequently quarrelled among themselves. But the main fact is that the two

Governments, ana all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples

and in the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve

their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more value than all the

chattering of the League of Nations Palace at Geneva.

(3521)

H1155-0113IC73•

I"POLISH WHITE BOOK".

No. 44.

Lipski to 4. Beck.

Berlin, October 25, 1938

In a conversation on October 21, over a luncheon at the Grana hotel, berchtesgaden; at which Hewel was present, a.. von Ribbent~. put -orard a proposal for a general settlement of issues (Gosatisshe) between Poland ana Gerany. This included the reunion of panzic titl 5 tne Neich, while Poland would be assured the retention of ra;l-ray and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the b ri l -"-inn- c an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Ponorze. I cxchancc * von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the polish geran A8recnent by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-Gran irontisrs possiblosphcrefor future co-operation between the'twoIou Goren Foreign iinister specified joint action in coloialpattors and tho edieration of Jevs fron Poland, and a joint policy towards Ru jia on the oasis of the inti-Conintern pact. 11. von Ribbontrop asked Me.tocouunicate his suggestions to you. He would like to discuss those —a-erS w—on you, wicn my participation.

.In -V reply I referred hi. to the Chancellor's declaration on +h, -ani8 question, nade to AC on November 5, 1937, and repeated to you in Berlin on January 14, 1938. -

I also pointed to the importance of Danzig a, repeated the Polish Governent ‘s principle of internal life of the Goman population in thegovernment is established

a port to Poland, non-interference in tho Jrec City, where conpple

and

Finally, I said that I wishod to warn iz. von Ribbentrop that I could S1, no Possibility of an agrocnent involving the reunion of the Free pJ Wi th tho Reiche I concluded by pronising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you.

. fter tho conversation M. von Ribbentrop invited .e again to call on.d—m and, mentioning the issue of the union of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia yl a Hungary, put to Le the question whether I was raising it with th. German Governent as a Polish postulate. He added that, if the Polish Government agreed to the German conception regarding Danzig and the fotor Roade, the duestion of Sub-Carpathian Huthenia could be solved in accordance irh oland‘8 atvitude to the -attcro I answered that .y only task vas toIn 12V ahe Gornan Governent of Poland's attitude in regard to Hungary's Gosrnintin Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, as Poland had also done to the Italian

2148.

H1155-0114

LLEECE’S INSTRUCTIONS TO N.LIPSII

Warsaw, October 31, 1938.

in connection with your indication of o achieve a gen aL agrecmens which wouza

relations in acco dance with he prcs-m.

the Reich Government's desire fnally stabilize Polish-German

as exmess(d by I, 2th inst. , pleas views :

O: a food and friendly co-existence von Eibbentrop Ln his conver 2 cj.on at Berchtesgaden on the

inform the Eovemning circles of the Reich of our folloving

(1) Although, tc a general European value of good Poli,

Olu‘ mil i

not only of undiminisha political chaos, has gan

gatinfaction, 1 h last crisis did not lead tofj ct: in ihe eyes of the Polish Government the aions, in a general stabilization of peace is

-rpo-ance. bui, in face of the dominating general >d la weight and cogoocy.

(2) In the sphere of Polish-German neighbourly relations, in spite of local difficulties, gat progress hc.3 been ma do. since j has not escaped our notice that the Raich Chaucollcn’s deslaccions in ragard to us, made in his public statements, contain increasicly precise and unequivocal formulas.

(3) The Polish -German Lgrecnent ofpolitical upheaval post-war Euxope stances, it is only logical to emy

4 has stood the test of io ne experienced, in

th. greatest these circum-

ovemnen» by impressing the aid Agreement was not of a

_ . . ----- . . it expresses the firmresoiution to repair mistakes of past history, which has been so abundant in S rif e and conflict without advantare of either of on, -+;..c

publics of both countries with the fact that th transient and tactical nature, On the contrery

(4) in the opinion of the Polish Government the subject of any future understanding concluded with rhe object of permanently maintaining good neighbourly relations wou.d have to be the folloving:

(a) A certain extension in the period and form of the 1931 Declaration, as the basis of relations between the two States.

(b) Such a settlement of the problem of the Danzig Free City as would prevent, in future; the continually recurring difficulties of a technical and psychological nature which arise from friction in this sphere. The question of the Free City is urgent because in the state of affairs, hitherto prevailing, with the League of Mations reserving very far-reaching prerogatives to itself» but not able to fulfil its task in a manner beneficial to the Free City and to Polish interests. the need arises for the Polish and Reich Governments to approach the problem in a spirit of frankness.

(5) On the Polish side the fact will always remain that so important a State as Poland has access to the sea which is reduced to the minirum possible, and this at a time when the Republic's sea commerce and its mercantile marine are naturally developing on a very wide scale. The construction of Gdynia port considerably enlarged Poland’s possibilities, but the position of the Free City at the mouth of the Vistula (which, especially since the creation of the Polish Central Industrial Area, is an increasingly important comnunication way) confers quite special importance on he Free City from the aspect of Polish maritime interests, A very large number of further basins can still be excavated at Gdynia, but it would be impossible to find any substitute for the natural port situated at the mouth of the main Polish waterway. On the other hand, the exploitation of any port under normal economic conditions is only possible when it is situated within the Customs area of the country which forms its hinterland. For this reason, in po.st ages the Free City of Danzig, while enjoying local autonomy because if the nature of its population, was even under Polish sovereignty. It should be added that the Danzig delegation to the

3622.

H1155-0115

J

Congress of VicnnsiXr its.chieftask, the meintenence of its connectionon. lishst ate micht arise as the result of the deliberations

h-stonical considerations are meant only asProsent-day renlitios provide clear arguments of Polish interests in relation to th.

with whatever typeof that Congress. ....illustration end commentary, for a definition of the bolas" 5* h-hho -----SUS in relation to the Free City.the ne(22, Tngthercirzumstenos,inthcundcretending of the Polish Gevermant population of the .48 80V ern ed by two factors: the right of the German development- tna qit ,04 the surrounding villages to freedom of life nd 0s a port it is counted wtS PoP nd mettor ppocrt ining to the City the majority of the population ouopdt ;AE ar fron the nationcl character of with Poland. In the prose t ’4-crthi2g in Danzig is definitoly bound up

gUMratoe plosa: of affeirs the ozisting Statute andcgrocments

UnrcstrictcdThe CCCSS to the scr. by wr torry -.nd -;7,n,

ownership of the rilwnys servinc the port t Den-ithe port nt Goy ia. The inclusion of the

.nd

Othcr contains yet

rights derive

res City in the Poli the Polish minority. ish Customs

nother c;c., :.2- -carinsl conditions. The StatuteDenzig Scnctc,"thorastshiaouditionvhiep, —1 declarations of thefailure to fulfil this cend;4 W "I . 11.-93 2, 1hnsncver bcen fulfilled. The position of the Free Sitl -on ~ 3 most unfavour_bly upon the economici. ton re

c d

end desiring C friendly understanding

tee Polish Government proposes the eL... . ' I

to c(7)T4 cine 11the foregoing factors into consi with" m e the stnbilization of relations by with the Government of the Comon Reich - replacement of the Tor 01, .e r.4.1 bi-lateral Polish-omewoL.entipns Euurutcc c.c its prerogtives by a existence of the Free City Teeme nt;. This 4greonent shoule .guarantee the cultural life to its German mlomtt8 So5s.1tocssurefrcedcm of national and rights. Notwi+hstnn;0Miorlt and -also -shoule guarantee all Polish Polish Government must tthosnorplicatios involves in such a system, the attempt to incorporate tL8 Frthtstnysothor solu tion, end in particular any conflict. This woule not only t £ into.the Rpich, must incvitubly lead to a would suspend all possibility of Police of 1 oc1 difficulties, but also Even in 1933, rfter the coXsf Jot sh-Gormon uuderstending in all its aspects, of the 1934 Declaration, °2rs8 Pilsu^kJ opeacd which lcd to the conclusion sure criterion for cgA’s4 PUsu.ski raised the Danzig question as a1,2s was made khon Bththrothe Copnonnzeichlsintcations, toards Polena. remember, in a conversation 4, " IPO , chnhclsmnd clso, so far as I i expressly consider t’rt .bet 20 larshal Pilsudski and Dr.Goebbels.y . insider tuct this point of view is binding upon Polana,

have Cohcpsaqfothouvazont.czducoroqcy thusc questions, I em rozay to’ deem it necessary however With, tho governing circles of the Reich.which ve adhere, so* that my 1ythtt youshould Pirst present the principles to would be dangerous for the future. tcct shoul not end in a breakdown, which

(1945)

H1155-0116Co 137.

Translation. —

| Top Secreto

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

C.137

Typed by officer

Berlin, 21/11/38.

NOs^>.1/38 top secret important L la.

Re The FUhrer and Supreme Commanderof the Armed Forces OKV No. 236/38top secret important matter L la of 21/10/38,

10 Copies 3rd Copy.

(Handwritten) to be placed before Important MatterBy hand of Officer Only.

the C-in-C

1st Supplement to Instruction dated 21/10/38.

The Flhrer has ordered:-

1) Apart from the 3 contingencies mentioned in the instructions of the 21/10/38, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise ("4). occuna tion of Danzig").

The preparations will be made on the following basis:-

Condition is a guesi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favourable situation, not a won against Poland. -- ------------------ :--------

No. 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (0137 No. 230/33 cop secret important matter L la, dated 27/9/38) wil come into operation.

Occupation by the army has to take place from East Prussia.The troops to be employed for this purpose must not simultan­eously be earmarked for the occupation of the llemelland, so that both operations can, if necessary, takc place sinultaneously.

The Navy will support the army’s operations by attack from the sea according to detailed orders from the C-in—C Navy. The forces participating are to be instructed to co-operate with the army. The details of the support to be given by the navy are to be agreed between the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Mote:- i.e. OKH and OGi).

far air force units can collaborate in to be investigated by the Reich Marshal

the occupationof the fir Force and

the C-in-C Air Force and to be agreed in direct co-operation with the other two branches of the armed forces (Translator’s Note:- i.e. OKH and OKQ1).

The plans of the Note:- i.e. OKH,

branches of the armed forces (Translator'sOKI and OIL) are to be submitted by the 10/1/1939.

2) Noo 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussiain the case of becoming involved in war" (010/ No, 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will also apply for the "occu­pation of the liemelland" (part 3 of the instructions dated 21/10/38).

Distribution^ The Chief of the Supreme Command of the-KH = 1 (Copy Nod ) OKI = 1 (Copy No.3) Armed Forces.RdL u.ObdL= 1 ( " " 2) OlW = 7 ( "No.4-10) KEITEL.

3625.

TC 73, No. 4

ILINUTE OP N. BECK’S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR HITLER,

Berchtesgaden, January 5, 1939.

The conversation took place in the presence of H« von Ribbentrop, Ho von lioltke, Mo Lipski and Count kichal Lubienski.

The Chancellor began by asking al- Beck whether he had any special questions to ask. as he was quite ready to be at his service with any explanationso in replying, ii. Beck mentioned the Danzig situation and the Danube problem.

The Chancellor explained at length how the arbitration at Vienna had come cboub, laying the blane on the Hungarian Government's tactics for Budapest’s pailure to give effect to the postulate regarding Carpathian Ruthenia,

The Chancellor pointed out that in regard to Poland he always and invariably tried to follow the policy initiated by the Declaration of 19.54.’ In his opinion the community of interests between Gerany and Poland, so far as Russia was concerned, vras corpleteo For the Reich, Russia, whether Tsarist or Bolshevist, was equally dangerous, Tae latter was perhaps a greater danger because o Coruunist propaganda, but tne former was more dangerous in the military and even more the imperialiskic sense. For those reasons, a strong Poland was an absolute necessity for Germany. lt this point the Chancellor renarked that every Polish division engaged against Russia was a corresponding saving of a German division.

The Chancellor further declared that he was interested in the Ukraine from the economic viewpoint, but he had no interest in it politically.

The Chancellor then discussed the Danzig question, and emphasized that, as it was a German city, sooner or later it must return to the Reich. He stated that-, in his opinion, by way of mutual agreement it would be possible to find some way out and achieve a form of guarantee to the legitinate interests of both Poland and Germany, if an agreement was reached on this question, al], difficulties between the two States could quite definitely be settled and cleared out of the way. He emphasized that he was ready in that case to give an assurance, similar to that vhich he had given France with respect to Alsace and Lorraine, and to Italy with respect to the Bronner, Finally, he drew attention, without stressing the matter, to the necessity for greater freedom of communication between Germany and East Prussia,

H. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.

In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new- some new form, for which he used the term "Krperschaf t", which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the Geran population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the ali nister cou.d be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Pplish Governent.

3626.

H1155-1

18

I’C 73, No.49

-XTR-CT FROM 1LUT& OF M.EECK’S COTVEPSATTOr

1. VON PIBTETOp

-Beck asked von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that Koreas previously, after all his conversations end contacts with

Gerami statesmen, he had been focling optimistic, todry for the first

time he ".s in - pessimistic mood. Particularly in rgard to the

Denzis question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.

In ails'. cr 2. von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that

Gormy was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their

policy toweres Polend was still • 6csire hr the furth r bulzeane up of friendly relations. It was nuccesczy to scok such _ acthoa or olcarins oxy the difficulties • s woula roeocct the rights a

interests of tho two parties conccmea.

H1155-0119

EFEECH BY RIBEENTROP IN WARSAW,

25 Januaryr, 1939.

PS 2530

”.............. In accordance with the resolute will of the Geraan

National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of

friendly relations between Genpany and Poland, based upon the

existing Agreement betwreen us, constitute an essential element

in Geraan foreign policy. The political foresight, and the

principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides

to take the iomentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that

all other probleas arising in the course of the future evolution

of events will also be solved in the samne spirit, with due regard

to the respect and understanding of the ri' htful interests of

both sides. Thus Poland and Gerany can look forwar to the

future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual

relations.......... ."

(2133)

H1155-0120

Eztract from Chancellor Hitler's January 30, 1939. Reichstag Speech

"We have just

TC 73 No. 57

celebrated the fifth ann; vensap . +,ivith Poland. her , cnguersmr 0 the conclusion of

. the true friends of Lec s Q5 21 he.g dif rence of ngreeent. One only needs to ask on-sc e-i ± . 2.52 he thisif this ngrecnent, Ihich brought 00 —-.WI ,ishb. hevo h -J ocned to Burope years ago. In signing it. the -rent Polish ,hd not benontcrei into five people just as srent a service as 4 rendered his rendered the Ger nn p00p7, N; 1. . the ncionnl-Socialiststetefricndship botwoon rine,thetrouoled onths of the pnet yerr thethe political life or Suropc. I “ ’ 1 '' been one of the reassuring factors in

ur non-aseression pact bpinion to-day enon

(2105)

(Ghe ime Re ichs oche )

TANS.’. 05 DOCUCJNT NO. L-79 FPICE 0? U S CFIEF )F COUISHL

TOP SECRETTo be transmitted by officer on

l inutesof a Conference on 23 Lay 39

Place: The Fuehrer’s Studv, Naw Reich Chancellery.

AdiiZ-viT1- on d +y. It-Col. (9.s.) Schundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Pi eld-‘arshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder

Col-Gen. Von Brauchitsoh, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Mich Gen. ( f Artillery) balder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-..dmi.Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.s.) arlinontLt-C-1. (G.S.) Schmidt, Capt. 2nge1 (Army), Lieut-Comdr. Albrecht. Cant. v. Belov (Army).

Suhject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

(Page 2)

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference;

1) Analysis of the situation.2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces

arising from that situation.3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisi ns and work

resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

lie uehrer's observations are given in systematized form below

Our present situation must be considered from two points of viev

1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;

2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our militaryT * m - -A--- _ ..n. e

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same

Germany has dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments”, The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat f f orce. (. 3)

H1155-0122

A mass of 80 miillion people has solved the ideological problas. So, jo, must the economic problcm3 be solved. No Gernen can evade the creation of the ncccceury economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems "CnneS coura,, Thc principle, by which one evades solving the problenby A22-ing oneself to circmstances, is inamissable. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attncks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude .of the state, is the basis o1 2— power. One zany refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one W& or the other. The choice is between sdveucenent or declinee in 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compellec to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the c3ion longer than that.

Wo are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, vhich is shared bj tvo other naticns: taly and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been tajcen in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 ycurs, the situation is today as follows; (p. 4)

The national politiccl unity of the Geras has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attaine. without the shedding of blood.

The cmarkation of frontiers is < f military import '.nco.

The pole is no " suppl nentary cnany". Poland will alwnys be on trie side of our adversaries. In spite of the treaties of friendship, Poland has always had -ne secret intention of ecploiting every opportunity to do uz harm.

Bansig is 1 cp: nding our the scttlamem

ot the livi.

fronof

thin] populat cd

C space on the Ea he Baltic problem

depute at all. It is a quostion of6 and of securing our food supplies, of

Food supplics- cnn be expected only

going Gorman exploitation willOver and fbove the naturol fertility,

enormously increase the surplus.thorough-

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Bewore of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the 1ood problem. Rcmenber - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict vith areas in the East will be advantageous, harvests, even less in time of wer than

the West, the possession of extensive We shall be able to rely up n record

in peace.

. The population of non-Goman areas will perform no military service, and will be " nilcble an a source of labour. (n. 5)

The P’lish problem is inseparable Ir conflict with the West.

, .Plend’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Tolan l -s of “oubtul value as a barricr against Russia.

It is questionable whether military"'success in the West on be aqhiavca. by a quick decision,-quertionable.too is the attitude of Poland. ’

The Polish government will not resist pressure fron Russia. Polandsees danger in a Gexman victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the Viclory.

There is therefor no question -of-apr ring Totend,_an we tre left with ’ ""----------------------- 818

H1155-0123

Page 3 OF DCUENT 2.-791 -j S CE IFF OF COUTSET,

ToattackPlandatthe first suitable

o v. e cannot e-pect a repetit Our task 13 to isolate Poland.

Therefore, the Fuehr attack. There must be no and England).

in of the Czech affair. There will be war The success of the isolation will 3. decisive.

er must reserve the ,;c+ +,;04,0, "5 .right to give the final order +.s-u.taneous conflict with the veec., c wune vestern Powers (France

the Vestis not certain that a

fight must beGerman-Folish conflictprimarily against will not lead to wa:

F und an ent a l ly therefor e:England and France, (p 6

in

Conflict with Foland - beginning With ar attack On Poland - will only be successful if the Tostern Powers keep out of it._ this is impossible, then it will be better0 ach. in the est and to settle Poland at the same time, a

The isolation of Poland a matter of skillful politics.

-apan is a weighty problem. Even ip+p;pc.p.collaboration with Hs -oSeg., to , c \. tirst for various reasons her theless in Japan's own interest'to’tak”Te t and restricted, it is never- good time. Ke tne ioitiative in attacking Russia in

Economic relations with Russia are possible only ie political relation,

224" in Press com ent. It is not im- sr t disinterested in the destruction 85eDs .0 oppose us, our relations with Japan

nave improved. A cautious trend is possible that Russia will show of Poland. Shouldmay become closer

ussia take

if there were Italy and Japan, I few annihilating blows. (p 7 ful sottl ement with EngI-na w, . - — PEngland sees in ov. lomenTthe J prepare ourselvos moaken England. EhgnanalaE "Soundation of heg

Would be conof France □land and Russia against

rined to attack England and e Fuchrer doubts the possih;

Germanyance with a

What wi 11

nd-death strugglour

for the conflictcmony w ich would

enemy, and the conflict vith England

struggle be like?

gland cannot deal with Germany . imperative for England that the

bgsin aS possible. French blood will o the Ruhr asin will determine the

It is and w ar subjugate us with a Pew Powerful blows, should be brought as near to the Fuhr

(est *n)- The possessinuration of our resistance.

tions of hettraind, let 1 ignored must be occupied by armed force, between Germany ane Poland snored: I England and France intend th and Belgium in their nemlra. ad. ' 2 conflict, they will support Holland finally to force them intrmcdtperntsoske them build fortifications, in order

Dec lara-

Aibeit uder erstest, and Holland wiu yiele to pressure, (p g)

occupVFOlland’witsnidendsntandeta intervene in the Polish line on Dutcl soil up f0 the‘zuSded"ge must 3im at securing

war, WO must a new defense

The war with En

The bility. inj ustice

ides that we c an e must n um our j ut of life or

and France will be a life-ar-death

get ofr cheaply is dangerous; there 20816, and it is n longer a cuesti demt- for 80 million human beings.

is no such possi n of justice or

Question; Short or iong war?

TRANSLATION 7 F DO C ENTN, L- T§ of U S CHIE? 07 COUNSEL

Every country’s arned forces or government must government, however, must also be prepared for a war aim at a short war. The

of 10-15 years’ duration.

-LopTistory.has alays shown that the people have believed that wars voula . A long war. Even today this ide stin persists in ow ^PO «i.le to fl a„=ecoptrary, eyery state wil1 hold out as long as posGible, unless itsuffers srave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin), sngland has siniler veninersy.

lies

England knows hat to l se a war will mean the end of her world power. (p 9)

7*^ 1 is the driving Rorce against Germany.( uiteraily; England is the motor driving against in the Pollowing. Germany) . Her. strength

The British themselves resistance and gifted a every new development, bravery of the Nordic r The German average is h

are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm s organizers. They know how to exploit

Tney } ave the love of adventure andace. Quality is lowered by dispersal, igher .

in

2- Norld power in itself. It has been constant for 300 eaus . Extended by the acquisition of allies. This power is'not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a Psyehol2cical force enbracing the entire world. Aad to this -mmessurasle. wealth, with consequential financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power courageous air force.

England’s we?.kne ss

andIf in the Id ar l we had lad twc

have beenthe battle of Jutland had begu-- defeated and England brought to her k

inbattleships and two cruisers more

fleet, provide

war. (o 10)

the British fleet would it would have meant

food supoli England. England could longer possible.

. he mement England’s food supply routes are atee -ne import of food and oil depends on the cut, she is forced to capitu-

fleet’s protection.

I th e erman Air Force attacks English forced to capitulate in one day. Put if the capitulation will be the result.

territory, England will not be fleet is destroyed, immediate

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can it would be criminal, however, for the goverrmenl element of surprise.

lead to a quick decision, to rely entirely on the

Experience has shon that surprise may be nullified by:-

l.

3.4.

Disclosure outside the limit ere chance, which may cause

Fuman failings;Weather conditions.

of the military circles concerned; the collapse of the whole enterprise;

1

1 s

The time the that weaForce impossible

final date for striking must be tension cannot be endured for 1 her conditions can render any s

ixed well in advance. Beyond that ?. (p 11) It must be borne in mind prise intervention by Navy and Air

This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.

H1155-0125

Page 5 TRANSLATIONOFDOCUENTNO.1-79OFTICEEUSCHIEF OF COUNSEL,

An sffort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final “ec-s-ve blow. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter.This will only be possiblc on account of Poland.

if we are not involved in a war with England

2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England arc eliminated.

, The army will have to hold positions essential to the If Holland -nd Bolgim -re successfully occupied and held, also defeated, the fundamental condisisns for a successful will have been secured.

Navy and Air Force, and if France is war against England

England can then be blockaded from Tostern France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade. •

(page 12)

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines*Time will not be on England's side;Gerrany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subse­quent military operations. World Var i is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have "been different.•

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force. It is im­possible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all res-urces is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken tne most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army’s battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. (p 13)

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these nositions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the er my does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true or the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter­measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941, Against Poland for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter- measur es.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

Hi 155-0126

TRANSLATINT )F DOCUENT ND. L-79P&8 6 ( OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF 00^551

This is the plan of attack.

The plan demands:- (page 14)

1. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:-e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more

effective? individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

(b) is air attack m re important on a factory than on a battleship? here ere bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army.The Army must move straight Prom its peace stations to overrun neighboring states. (Literally: Neighboring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy’s weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will include representatives of the three services, and, as and when necessary will call upon the services of the three Commanders in Chief or Chiefs of Staff.

'This Staff will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

(page 15)

The planning staff is reap nsible for the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decisions taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of cur adversaries, they must, at some time, come to the end of their resources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - 120,000 men in each age class!

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot Line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entirety, is important.

The objects

1. Study of the problem in its entirety.2. Study of the procedure.3. Study of the necessary requirements.4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and skeptical judgment.

H1155-0127

7 1 " Translation o? bociwiiT i;o. t-^9A OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Working principles:

1• No one must be admitted who is not concerned.2* „0cne ay know more than it is necessary for him to know.°° / must the person concerned know, at latest? No one mav

- now of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know

At the request of Field Marshal Gering, the Fuehrer decrees tha

a) Tae various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.

b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding program.c) The armaments programs are to be postponed to 1943' or 1944.

Certified correct record (Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

18 November 1945

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATIONOF DOCUMENT NO. L-79

I, Leo Davenport. s/Sgt, 32496587, hereby certify that sant in the English and German languages and this is a Document No. L-79.

I am thoroughly conver- true translation of

Leo DavenportS/Sgt, 32496587

TR.NSLATION OF DOCUENT 1014OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUEHRER ON 22 LUQ 139,

- It nay also tur out diffcrently regarding Englan ana France. One annnot.predictitwith certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier, not on block Retrod W M of rolationse Host iron dcterination on our side.Retreat before nothingo Everybody shall have to ake a point of it that We, veredekerurined frc the boginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle tor. -1e,or ceqthe • Ger.any has won overy war as long as she was united." Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidence. Faith in victory, overcoing of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. i long Perio. 0f Pcace would not do us any goode Therefore it is necessary toe4PeC everythinge hlanly becring, it is not nachinos that fight each other, but uen. Ne have the better quality of men. Lmntal factors are decisive. The opposite cap has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation do because ho nntal prorequisities were not sufficient. Frederic Great secured final success only through his iental

fell the

power

Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The living forces, not the arrival at a certain 1im, out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be Quick decision because of the season.

ai is eliii.nation ofEven if war should break thc primary objective.

I shall give a propagandistic whether it be plausible" or not. whether we told te truth or not. Right is what atters but Victor;/.

cause or starting the var, — never ni nd Tt vioter shall not be asked later on,

in starting and naking a war, not the

Have no pity, brutal attitude, right. Their existence has to be Greatest severity.

80 4 jllion people shall got what is their secure . The strongest has the Right.

Quick decision necessary, d crisis may happen only if the

Uns- akcable faith in the Geran sol rli or nerves of the leaders cive way.

First ci, advance to tne Vistula andsuperiority will break tho

Narc

force shall again bnerves of the Poles

broken at once

Our teclmnicalEvery newly created Polish

Constant var of atrition

Nev Goran frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. idlitary operations shall not be influenced hese ref-octions» Coplcte destruction of Poland is the .ilitary ai ■

To be last is the -ain tiling. Pursuit until co.plete clizination.by

Conviction that the Gen.an Wehracht is up to the start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday : orning.

requireonts. The

CaTWIC..TE OF .3. O‘ DCCULN2 NO. 1014-ps.

I, FREDNIEBRGLL, 2nd L Inf 0-133 55 6712 Oct. 1945

+-----—--------------- -------------— __hereby certify that I athoroughly conversant wi ta the English and German languages; and that the above is a true translation of Docuent No. 1012-ps.

’Sgd' FRED LB.RGLLL

2nd Lt. Inf.?-133 55 67.

2159.

H1155-0128

-0129

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2987-PS OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL________

Extracts from the Diary of Count Galeazz* Gian*

.Introduction (From Para. 5)

. But the alliance /between Germany and Italy/ had one clause according to which, for a period of three to four years, neither Italy nor German would raise questions likely to disturb order in Europe. However in the sunmer of 39 Germany advanced her claims against Poland, mmturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that. Germany had any intention of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these denials I remained unconvinced; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11 I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Euschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to go to eat, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have nw d.me,about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. ""e 1‘ ibbentrop," I asked him while we were walking in the garden, What do you want? The Corridor or Danzig?" »Not any longer" — and he

fixed on me those cold Musee Grevin eyes of his — "We want war."

* * *January 20 and 21, 1941 (Mussolini and Ciano are visiting Hitler and

Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg)

Mussolini says he brought him up to date on Italian affairs and a ed to him about the unenthusiestic but not actively antagonistic

attitude of the King, and finally told him of the Badoglio affair, which Hitler compared to the Frisch affair. The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him. outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of it ending before 1942. And what will happen to us?

There were many other conversations, the most important of which took place Monday with the military leaders. Hitler spoke for some two hours about his forthcoming intervention in Greece; the entire question was presented from e technical point of view as part of the general political picture. I must say that he is a past master at this, Our military men were much impressed ...

On the whole, results of the visit are good. There is complete solidarity between the two countries and we will act together in the Balkans ... * * «August 11, 1959

I have collected in the conference records verbal trenscripts of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Here I shall only note some impressions of a. general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times about German intentions towards Poland not to feel embarrassment now over'what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.

- 1 -

H1155-0130

PARTIAL TRANSLATION or DOCUMEN’T' 2987-PS ____________ (Pont ta)_________________________

..Thewill to fight 18 unalterable. He rejects any solution which might 8atisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain that even if the germans were given everything they demanded, they would attack just the same, Decause they are possessed by the demon of destruction.

Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this doesn’t shake him in

c east. I realize how little weight this view carries in German opinion.

The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a. clear conscience. He has not.

August 12, 1959

Hitler is very cordial, but he, too, is adamant and relentless in his decision. He speaks standing in the large drawing room of his house, in front of a table on which some maps are spread. He displays 8 thorough knowledge of military affairs. He speaks with great calm and becomes excited only when he advises us to deliver the coup de grace to Yugoslavia as soon as possible.

I soon realize that there is nothing more to be done. Our arguments cannot serve to check him in the slightest. He keeps repeating that he will localize the conflict with Poland, but his affirmation that the great war must be fought while he and the Duce are still young leads me to believe that he is once again speaking in bad faith.

He has words of high praise for the Duce but listens in a disinterested and impersonal manner when I tell him of the trouble which a war will bring upon the Italian people. Fundamentally I feel that the alliance with us is useful to -he Germans only for the number of forces we can divert from their fronts; nothing more. Our fate doesn’t interest them. They know that the war will be decided by them, not by us. And at the end, they promise us a gift of charity.

August 13, 1959

The second talk wluh Hitler is shorter, and I would say more conoiee. Even in his manner the man reveals more than he did yesterday his desire for immediate action. The parting is cordial, but reserved on both sides.

At the Palazzo Venezia I report to the Duce . . .

The Duce s reactions are mixed. At first he agrees with me. Then he says that honor forces him to march with Germany. Finally, he admits that he wants his share of the booty in Croatia and Dalmatia.

December 3, 1941 Wednesday

Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with th2.-uce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations “ th Amexice: concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end: -hen’ invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that -ta- declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling

e a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the

- 2 -

H1155-0131

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2987-PS (Cont'd.)__

communicetion and said: "We pre now on the brink of the inter-continent?I war which I predicted, as early as September 1939.” What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy - much too easy - to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin’s answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

December 4, 1941 Thursday

Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans loss and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it . . .

*****

December 5, 1941 Friday

A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a. separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn’t . . .

*****

December 8, 1941 Monday

A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened, One thing is now certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that in the "long run” I may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis . . .

*****

- 3 -

A

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2987-PS. - ______________ 1 Cont * d.)___ _______________

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATIONOF DOCUMENT NO. 2987-PS

20 November 1945

I, KENNETH R. BOYLE, Captain, Infantry, 0447520, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and Italian languages, and. that the above is a correct and. true partial translation of Document No. 2987-PS.

KENNETH R. BOYLE Captain, Infantry 0447520

- 4 -

H1155 0133

Extract from Count Ciano’s Diary. 2987 (1)PS

Introduction

Poland,"ntuediiythtnutnour°no3?edgranyaadxancedgher-olaimsagainst tiues denied to our -nbassador that "‘2-carrying the controversy to extrenes, peni+, +1,, d-on°unconvinced; I wanted to Make sure for De8P2 these denials.I remained salzburge it was in his realms FusEhf’thnt onsdusustlinFovent to perwhile ve were vaiting to go to oat, of the decision to sartteed

ks, just as he might have told ie about the most unimportant and con.onplace adinistrative matter, mrell, piboentrI t ouan while we were walling in the g-. — ■ s’ -D-entroP • I asked him or Danzig?" “Not any longer’ — and

ibbentrop" garden, "That do you '■ — and he fixed' on

Grcvin eyes of his —• IVTe want warwant? The Corridor ae those cold usee

(2)January 20 and 21, 1%1.

ussolini says he brought hin up talked to him about the unenthusiastic

to date on Italian affiars andbut not actively antagonistic him of the Badoglio affair.attitude.of the ing, and finally told — J. — saugzo alar,

nich Hitler compared to the Frisch affair. The Duce is pleased vrith theuconversationon the whole. I am less pleased, particularly as t -) bentrp, who had alrays been 50 boastful in the past told me, when 1 asked.hinn outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of it ending before 1942. and vhat vill happen to us?

H1155-0134

c 120. (SeC-24.6/C-120)/A

DIRECTIVES FROIIHILZ ND KEITEL __

PREPARING FOR WAR A1W THE INVASION OF

POLITO.

(Extracts from a file containing irectives with detailed Annexes. The Directives are mostly translated in full. The Annexes, owi.ng to their length, are given mostly in the fcrm of precis. The extracts are supplemented by C-f 26).

1. Translation of document signed by CEj^TEL.

Top SecretOfficer Only

The High Command of the Armed Foroes Berlin, 3rd April 1939WFA Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only L la

SUBJECT : Directive for the Armed Forces 1 939/40 5 copies2nd copy

T he Directive for the Uni. orm P reparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Defence") and Part III ("Danig")(Margin- will be issued in the middle of April, Thei:r bas.i.c principles al note remain unchanged.in ink"Attached") Part II "Fall We:.zs" is attached herevith. The signature

of the Fhrer will be appended later.

The Fuhrer has added the folloving I irectives to "Fall Weiss":

1 ) Preparations must be made in such a vray that the operation can be carried ou‘> at any time from 1.9-39 onwards

2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise ti.ne-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the 3 branches of the Armed Forces

(SEC-21. 6/C-1 20)/A

3) The plans of the branches of the Armed forces and the details for the time-tab le must be submi.tted to the OKW by 1.5.39.

= used as an operational codeword for Defence of the Reich Frontier. See .Annex I.

+ Translator’s note: "Fall Weiss" (literally "Case White") is the cover name for the intended invasion of Poland.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

(signed) KEITEL. 614

H1155-0135

Distribkion: "0121OIM

++ RL u Obed L = 0K7(L)

Total

1 (Copy No. 1.)1 ( " " 2.)

l( " ” >)2( " " 4 u. 5)5

++ (Tuslator’s Note : RcichsmarschaLl dur ufivffe un»l .Oberbefohshaber der Luftwaffe, i. e. Goering. )

(SEC-22.6/C-120)/3

Top Secret.Officer Only

The Suprume Conmoucer of the Armed Forces Berlin, .11 th April., 1939 OKW Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only. Way'Ll

5 copies2nd Copy.

Directive fpr th’.-- Unifom Pro;'ar dvo. of T'-r by thT/uricd brea,

I shll ]agr ovn in a latex directive chc future tucks of the Arncc Forces cd thc prperetions to bo ma/.e in accordance tith these for the conuct of the var.

Until that Ciroctivc coiiGo into force, the Arned Forces . must be preparcc for tle following eventualities ;

l) Safeguarig of the frontiers of theGerman Reich anc protection agninst surprise air attacks. (see annexe l)

IT) "Fall Weiss" (see annexe II)

III) The Annexation of Danzig (see lummexc ill)

Annexe IV contains rogulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the. oven t of a varlika - development.

(signed) Adolf Hiter,

.Distribution :

OKOKI

(Copy No.

OKW (W2A/L) 2

II

It

1?

II

It

23)4 u. 5)

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/C

3. Precis of Anmox3 to 2, translations of the text)

(The Anne 1)

3 in quotes are

- 2 - 615

H1155-0136

Annexe I.

Directives of a general nature to the 3 branches of the Armed Forces for the defence of the Reich frontiers and air and sea Cefencee Preparations for this must be made in such a way that an effective defence is possible at any time without A genera-, partial mobilisation. The code word is "Frontier Defence ("Grenzsicherung")

The Directives are supplemented by

"Special Crders".

Setting out the organisation of defence powers in more details Of particular interest is para 2) of these Directives translated below showing the intention of concealing nobilisation. °

" 2) Lemal Basis .

It should be anticipated thet a state of Defence or State of War as defined in the R,V. Lav.9 of ±.9,38 y.-jll not be declared. /ill measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilisation are to De based on the laws valid in peace -time".

® Translator's Note: R.V. "Reichsverteidigung" = Reich Defence.

(SEC-24,6/C-1 20)/D

4. annexe II contains the directives for "Foil Weiss"

©"The aim is then to des­troy Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satis­fies the requirements of defence"

In para 1) headed "Political Hypotheses and Aims" it is stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland, however, change her present policy which is based on the same principle and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a "final settlement" will be necessary notwithstanding the pact with Poland. . ® The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. "Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France and British restraint as a result of this- Should Russia intervene, this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism. German military exigencies will determine the attitude of the Baltic States-. Hungary is not a certain ally, Itely’s attitude is determined by the Berlin- Rome Axis".

In para 2) - Military conclusions are drown from the above political promises.

The remaining paras set out the tasks and operational objectives of the 3 branches of the irncd Forces. "A camouflaged or open ('general' added in ink) mobilisation will not be ordered before D-day - 1 at the last possible moment".

The Arny may, on its Southern flank, enter Slovak territory. In the North, a junction betwcen Pomerania and East Prussia, must be quickly established. "The preparations ior the opening of operations are to be made in such a way that without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilised units - positions can be taken up inmediately by the first available troops."

- 3 - 616.

\ S--24 6/C-120)/E

5• Translation of a doctacnt signed by Kcitc].

T2:. od C Officer

Top Secret. Officer Only

Hiich Comnn of the irr forces.- Hr 67/39 Tov Secret Officer Only. L(I)

-0137

!Berlin, 22th Jue 1939

larsincl Storp: Ob.c.M. A I Op 76/39, received: 26, 6, 39.enclosures:Several initials.

5 CopiesSubject "-11 w Loc w 2n Copy

The Aumy High Connen1 is herewith directed te --ex e Asures necessary for the cpture, in mdanncca

condition, of the brid es over tii Lower Vistula. o. +"c cop-etiun of ureparctions, thc Army High Comman. w:1 brie-ly report to the Armcd Torccs IIgh Conna.

ne presum- bly is ricke' sinitial.)

Marginal note-n blue pencil ;

Besides, the Arny and Navy Hhgh Commandg -.Till agin eamine whether the clement of surprise in sucaen Attacks against te bridgc at Dirschau will bo impaired by - race dine actions of the Nnvy in the Danzis ^y, In vi.w of the ipportance of the tridge, it sh til to stated if the consent 0 tl 4rmy High Comand to the intended measures of the Navy (mining before D-dny) is uphele.

.ccor -in ly an

.nn ounce nent, ith its alarming fleet, must not be ado before D-day. ven the measures

The Chief of the High Commnn of the irme forces.

(signcd) WEITEL. 21. 6.

n f rot of Cd. + tc. : y cose alorm. hercoro, Ghe onsent of the CIW

S requirc 1".) etc in red pencil, nitinlled by 3 =Translate- 1s Note:

CIINIEWIIID,

Dis tri1 ution:.e ----- • «-r Mi.—,.

OKHOIQR. I. u, Ob. d.L.Ausl/ibcrW/L

1st Copy 2nd Copy 3rd Copy2th Coy5th Copy,

OS But thisust first be settledith the Arny Highonmand Generaltuff)’)

+ Translator’s Note: Probably Gdynia

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/F

Annex II is supplomentod by fu thcr "Special Orders f -r । ll Weiss” t---- ------------------ —

Here again it is to Innoxc I, that a £ stated, as in the Special Orders attached

tate of Defence cr War vill not be declaroc

-2- 617

H1155-0138

. The directives refer to mobilisation (a clandestine mobilisation "-.not include the civil sphere and the armaments industry, a public one will) the area of operations and exective power, the organisation of frontier guards, Goering’s powers, clearing the ron ier areas, receiving refugees, evacuation measures, division of

responsibilities, comnunications, etc. As regards feeding the troops, e rectives say that they can take food from the occupied area,

on orders of the Army High Command, but the German minority should be spared because of its distressed condition. Requisitioning may be carried out "in accordance with the Hague Ta nd Var Convention". Supplies by people of German race must however be paid for in German currency.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/G

7• Annexe III deals with the Annexation of Danzig

"A lightning annexation of the Free State of Danzig may be carried out, independently of "Fall Weiss", to exploit a favourable political situation".

The rest of the directive deals with the tasks of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces in pre paring and carrying out this operation.

Annexe III is supplemented by "Special Orders for the Annexation of Danzig",

The annexation should be considered as an act of restoring a purely German area to German sovereignity after a long separation. In this case, too, a State of Defence or Var will not be declared. Mobilisation is not intended "as the coup will be carried out by only a part of the Peacetime army". A number of other adrri n -i gtra to ve and organisational measures in carrying out this operation arc laid down.

(SEC-24+,6/C-1 20)/H

8: In Annexe IV (unsigned) the organisation and exercise ofthe Eowers of Command in East Prussia in case of a warlike conflict are laid dovn in detail.

(SEC-24.6/C-1 20)/l

9. In Annexe V dated 12.5.39., signed by Hitler, the operational areas for the Army are defined under reference to a map which is included in the file.

With regard to these operational areas, the folloving directive is given in the last para of the Annexc,

"If our troops advance beyond the Reich frontier or the further frontier of the Slovak protected zone, the operational area will be extended accordingly in the direction of the advance".

(SEC-24.6/c-1 20)/j

10. Precis of Directives dated 10 May 1939, signed by KEITEL.

Subject : Exercise of military powers in the operational areas of the .army.

These directives, outlining at first the principal tasks of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces, deal with the division of

-5- 618

H1155-0139

military authority and duties Letwcen the 3 branches and their various comnnuuls in the opera tical areu.ofthe_rmyin_genoral.

(SLC-24.6/C-120)/1

11. iranslati n of a document signed by HITLER.

Top SecretOfficer Only

The Supreme Cotmnnnor of the Arno Forces

fc1. To: Scout >YR/Ul)

Berlin, 10th lay 19

7 Copies •2nd Copy •

samp:d.M. AI50/39

eive:5.39losurcs: 1

suched in notereport)

iSubject : Dicctivo for the unilorr prcpar: tion if War,1y th Irmed Purcus, 1939/40 (----*37/39 G-KChes. WB4/L(1) of 11.1.39. )

Hier.with, p.3 Prt VI of the "Directive", iistructi.ons lor tho oconomic-var and the protection of our ■ ovm econony.

The Commeuniers- in- Chi? of tl - 3 branches of the4rmed Forces vill X -pot to the aracc Forcos Hi h Comnand on the mcacuzus talhun in con3CGuenc. of those instructions by 1st August 1939

’Sinai note inying penoilne 31.7.se in greenicil:-rial report in time".1 in copying pencil;‘are leave: from 1.7. onwaris) ba report has been-de on 30.6. Ia(Initia]l) 29."

(uigna) Allolf Hitler,

Note in red pencil: "Sulmit report about 20/25.-VI

Traalator • s Note :S. (SCIINLWIND)-16,5.)

Distriluti >n;~

O.K.H.0.K.M.

R. .L.u.Ob,CeL.O.K... (w Stb)O.K.W, kusl/ibr)O.K.W. (L)

1 Pruof Nr. 1)i (1 n 2A 7 ii n •K» Y ,1 ( " " 41 ( " " 5,2 6 u. 7

- 6 -621

H1155-0140

C 120 L

(SEC-24. 6/C-1 20)/L

Frecis of Annexe VI referred to in 1 o

against the ancmy ecorourl2221^ic ^3,^ of protoctionfb

ourecomomv". '- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - —

Navy and Air Forcc in particular are directed to make preparations for the immediato opting of economic wanear. Principally against Britain, and, as second priomity, against France, in the event of "Grenz si che rung" (Translator > s Note, see Annexe I) bein, ordered. The measur., to bo takeiX Army, Navy and hir Force are described in detail -nd based on the ansumption that the operations will be offensive inchercter.

. ■ A Directive for "Tall Weis:." (see Annexe TI) sets out as the mnin objective the capture, in undamaged condition, of Poli ah economic installations. A speedy occupation of the irdustrial areas of Polish Upper-Silesia and Teschen is considercd important, remand must be cut off from imports by sea, and this mnst be born’ in mind when dealing with ships sailing under neutral flags and perhaps carrying goods for Poland to neutral ports.

759

H1155-0141

TC 73.

OFFICLAL DOCUMENTS

concerning

POLISH.- GLRMLAN and POLISH - SOVIET RELATIONS

1933 - 1939.

The Polish IThibc Book.

No. 61 .

M. Lipski, to M. Bed:Berlin, Mrch 21 , 1 9 39.

I saw M. von Ribbentrop to-day. He began by snyin, ho had asked me w call on him in order to discuss Polish-Gernnn relations in tliei entirty.

, . He conplained about our Press, and the Warsaw students' demonstr-tions durinG Count Ciano’s visit. Ho said the Chanccllor was convinced that the poster in Danzic hnd been the work of Polish stulents themsclves.11 reacted vigorously, assorting that this was a clear attcmt to influence one -ouncc-tor unfavourably to Polund.

Jie mentioned the question of Jub-Corpathin Huthonia, which had particularly troubled Polish opinion, and stated that this question had been settled in conf amity with Poland's wishes. This was to be cormnicnted to you by Anibas: ador von Moltke, He spoke of the exports’

negotiations on the Minority questions, and dwelt on the fact of the faiilure to rcach agreoment as to a joint couuniquc.

At this point I interrupted him to correct his ineccurate state, niFurther, M.von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Borch-

tesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Ni. Hitler put forword the idea of cuarantccin Poland’s frontiors in cxchan e for a motor rail and the incorporation of Donzigc in the Rcich. He said that there ha been urther conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, andthat you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way oi nccepting thgsc Su, escions. He tave me to understand that all this had made cn unfavourable impression on tho Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M, von Ribbentrop nad had a talk with the Chaunccllor only yesterday. He stated that the Chon- Ce-sor WaS still in favour of good relations with Poland, od had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutu _ repptions: Me von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the irppression thatd1htieulties arisinc between us were also due to some nisunderstanding or the Reich’s real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a hi her plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on ach other.

Some days prioi’ to the date of this conversation a poster had been put uP.in • efeat Danzig, bearin 8 the inscription: "Entry forbidden to Poles nd dogs. This hnd caused protest demonstrations by Polish students.

$ ' «

1397.

-0142

I IC 73.

Ttomust not bo forgotten that, by defeating Russia in the World War S hadbeen a contributory factor in the emergence of the "pom’, wtith’theObzinusly they could not Forget the shdling of Polishits. Hitler's policy in himh, honour; , Subsequently, thanks to Chancellor

of the PoS^to at plenewnich woule have lea to the amihilation Danzig and tarn. had Bclongekdo th scasnaalsnbe remonberod tiut through Gor-ny’s breckdovn had Polane obtalnod‘taco"toathttr2cs.

the Eomarksasthntut,vzanat t SlST^M. von Ribbentrop replied that it was dif fieri +. i

historica concoptions, ana he stressca that the Ethnto s O1 prime importance. GT T

t > puroly was t -day

p,. I remarked that Pomorze certainly was Polish had .thatin.rgrd to the annexation of Bohemia , nd used historical arguments.

ind alluded to themnd Moravia the Germans

but h“rVonizbabentr°PnTroglladtthqtator.al Denzig was a Gortaan city,actuated by sentiment. 8 ' D nzig questinn Poland also was

necessity to Poland* g pontane sut thetin addition it was a vital coula bo settled by’vay of a remaarked that that

with respectt polasgrronten.%hich the Chancellor was preparcd to give Ribbentrop stressed S fron tie rs and Pomorze in Particular, M. von been able’ttgivsssuchaPpintathat no previous Ceraen Goverunent had

Ribbentroponnstiontith Danzig, the motor rad and the gurratec, ar. converantions wm tioncdthe.gu stion of Slovakia, indiceting 2 obviously an twaurr.e.poesible on this subject. He emphasised that anti-sovlet tundenctendingwbetwesn - zoulahave to include expis.it With the Soviets, and lead to Bolshevism in

von

4,He gffiracd that Germnny could never that a Polish-Soviet Uuderstending woula Poland.

- stated that no • Bolshevism. He saia element in Poland was

Polish patriot would allow himself t he realized that, but in this respect a danger. °F‘°‘

be drawn towards the Jewish

O

that gPei G,conerplly to M. von Ribbentrop’s aruments, I

of any other Sountryressswaso ncerned its tonc wis now quieter than that of the uproar in the British p-jbhen mp.rtorted that he took no n ticcortanen He Ehat

had ssuhoputgrtlVotdustrasva-thiafact that 197. ur public opinion recalled that we had gar 1 - i Ne ortholess it remained quiet. r oues#i of reall2ation *of Coranysletly understandinz attitude on the

of the Sudeten probiem, the tutha strion probler. After the settlement W, and had clouded the atmosphere DtvosnoprpothlonRuthenla han

P 'inted out

questionthe

2 -1399.

H1155-0143

TC 73.stated that nov, during the settlement of the CzechO-Slovakian

question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The oyech xSus.Was —lready hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, 04P1 toour disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav pe’ple

our in resard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphnsizea our.oAunityofrace, laguage anc religion, ana mentioned the help We ad E iven 111 their achicvement of independence. I pointed out our lungfrontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the cf reetcould not underst nd why the Reich had assumed the protection on-2yaih thet protection being directed against Poland. 1 3aid

1 phatically that this question was a serious Llow to our relations.

M. von Ribbentrop reflected a moment, ana could be discussed. then answcred that this

I promised to refer to you the suggestion y >u anc the Chancellor. M. von Ribbentrop rer Jarsaw during the next few days to trJk over ti thatthe, talk should not be dolayed, lost the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland vas rejcctic all his offers.

of a conversation between arkd that I might go to is matter. He advised

kinally, I asked whether he could tell me anythin- about hi conversation with the Foreign Minister or Lithuania.

™ M•.von Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen 0-ctter s return from Rome, and they had discussed duestion, which called for a solution.

Inview of the importnce of this conversation I am roport through Prince Lubomirski. am

M. Urbszys the Memel

sending this

Arising out of the conversation remarks: I am prompted to make the following

aboutThemfactthat.M.von Ribbentrop said nothing on his own initiative

pfundenental exchange of vicvs betvrcen you and the a p-S aimed at securing our neutrality during the Memel crisis is

on iiVonEibbentrop 8 suggestion of aconversatimn and his enphasis Estes SC1c3 ax a proof that Germany has resolved to carry .out her clearly PrAamme quickly, an< so desires to have island’s attitude -- —Y < tei aned ,

ana un.theso.circumstances the conversation acquires very real importanoe, S' be carefully considered in all its aspects.

or +wI ausunethat you will be desiring to sunmon me to Wersaw in a anytwo 121 regard to this matter.

- 3 - 1401

Extract from

D, 490.

H1155-0144

Testimony of JOACHII VON RIBBENTROP, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 20 September 1.945, ]430- 1615 f by Col Howard A. Brundage, JIGD, OUSCC, and liro D.C, Pool., Special Representative of the Secretary of Stateo lsc present : Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter, and Pvt Clair Van Vleok,

Court Reporter.

Q Put your mind-, please, on ugust 39, as the crisis approached. Do you recall when Durksen came back from Lonon to Berlin?

Ao No, I don't reiiaber, but I suppose I was probably at the front at the moment vrj.th the Fuelrer, I su poses I don't know whether he came back from Switzerland or what. I don't remember now.

Q You don't know?

A No; I don't recall it, noo

Q He came back, I believe, the 18th of ..ugust, directly to Berlin.

A The 18th of Jugust?

Q Yes, or approximately, I may be a day or two off. He vrasnot in London?

A Oh, he Was not in London.

Q He was not in London when war was declared?

A Let me see. That is quite possible.

Q He returned to Berlin?

A It may be also that I don't recall his reports, tha. his is the reason I don't recall his reports at that time, you see.

Q I am speaking of his reports over a period of sixteen months.

A Oh, yes.

Q He was in England for sixteen months altogether?

A Yes, but I mean probably that explains why I don't recall hisreports in this important period, you see.

Q That explains it?

A This important period in Lugust.

Q No; I am asking about his reports over a period of sixteen months, during his own cbassy in London. He came back to Berlin on the 18th of .ugust, or about that time, and he asked for an interview with Hitler and, naturally, for an interview with you, since you were the tinistor of Foreign Affairs.

M Yes.

Q according to my information, you did not receive him?

A I don't remember now.

-1- 3868

■ .2 That situation could be morc dramatic? Here is a Foreign -n1ft er»,who has chosen a particular ma to be Ambassador in a country withgwhich war . threatens , and war actually broke out very soon. He I tns 1ron 1113 post approximately two weeks before the outbreak of Wspasks to see the Foreign ilinister, and the Foreign ilirist.r is too busy to see him..

A I don’t remcmber that.

Q You don’t rciembcr that?

A No, I did'nt see hin.

Q Yes

A I don't remerber, no. , Tasn’t he ill?

Q No; he was in perfectly good health.

A I don’t remember that exactly.

Q Surely, you recognise that to be a very extraordinary situa­tion., You appreciate the draina o? it?

I assure you — this was the situation you are talking about, VaS it?

1 n Yes. I will put it to you another way, Herr von Ribbentrop. If you had recei cd hii, surely you could not have forgotten and inter­view under those circustances?

. Well, I wonder — let ac see, on the 18 th — it is very diffi­cult novr to recollect the exact dates. He canc back on the 18th, you say, of Lugust? ‘ -

. . 2 .Yes ’ 1 may bc onc or two days off, but war broke out on the-St.0-pteuber, as 1 recall, 30 let us say a fortnight before that, a.-itt-c -sS than a fortnight. Surely you must reneaber those days with great clarity?

A If I hadn't seen him, that I didn't see him? I don't

I don't rcmember why. know.

You are quite sure

• • A Your question is in turn astounding. How could a Foreign anister fail to romember whether he had seen an l.bassador under those c-reuastancesi his own nbassador returning from the capitol?

That was the circumstances on the 18th?

Q Surely, vri thin two weeks of

you reneber them, Herr von Ribbentrop, the outbreak of war.

This was

:2, A , , Yos, but there was no tense situation, There was, of courseh Polande The situstion had been tense and perhaps was still, but

there was no such tense situation with England.

Q It was not tense within two weeks of

I don'tI don't remcnber whether I saw hias

know The loth of august, you say that

the outbreak of war?

I must think about that, was? That surprises me.

2 .T fne loth of ugust troubles you, say the last two weeks of—-8usto it is all the scumne whether it was one day or the other.

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H1155-0146

• I wonder vihether these circumstances weran’t different, TTasn’t he thgre on an illness or something? Hadn't he been away from London for quite a time already?

Q He came to Berlin and asked to see the Fuehrer and he asked to see you. He was not received even by you, although he repeatedly sent word to your secretaries, that he sat in Berlin, in perfectly good health, in the hope of seeing you and finding it utterly incredible that you should not receive him.

He surely saw the Secretary of State, didn't he?

Q That is not the question.Ly information is that he did not and that you cannot reember must be very

I want to know whether you cannot remember, striking to you, isn’t

he saw you.The mere fact it?

A I don't remember that, no, I must think about it, I must think about it. The Fuehrer didn't think much of Durksen, so far as Irenember.

Q He didn't think much of hin?

A Not very much, no, but I say I don't remember now. I can't tell you at the moment.

Q You recognise how strange it is that you can't tell me?

xi I am certain if he had been there, and I couldn’t have seen hil, if the situation was that way, he had just come over from London, wanting to see me, I mean if I couldn't see him, perhaps I wasn't in Berlin, I don't reneber now.

Q That would interpose no barrier. Germany is not a large country.

A _ It is s mctines difficult, you see. I don't know where I vras. Fossibly I told him to see the Secretary of State and make a report about that. That is possible, but I don't remember at the moment ,

Q The matter interests 1 very much because of your insistence in other interrogations that you and The uchrer endeavoured until the very last momnent to come to some understanding with ngland.

A Te certainly did,

Q Then I sp^ak to you quite frankly, because this is an impor- tant matter. I just cannot believe that when you did not take the op- portunity to talk with your own azbassador, whom you had selected, when he returned froln the capitol, again, Herr von Ribbentrop, I coine to the unpleasant and inescapable conclusion that you are not being frank with me.

- Ch,yes, absolutely frank. No, that is not right, but you can only understand it by this way: that I can assure you that in the whole discussion vith England, in all those events, the nae Durk­sen, and the attitude of Durksen, never has played any role. This again comes very much out of the attitude of the uchrer towards diplo- mats, old diplomats, and embassies and so on. The Fuehrer was so much against most ox these aabassadors, ans so on, that he hardly ever saw them at all. I couldn't even induce him to see any of them. So it is perhaps understandable in that way. I don't re.ber at the ionent one instance where the reports of Durksen in the sixteen months, where the nauune of Durksen or his opinions or his vievs played a role, I must say, in all the FChrer’s decisions which he made during all that time.

3872.

H1155-0147

<1 1(i

I am not interested in the Fuehrer at this moment.

ilso myself.

I a interested in your views.

Also of myself.

A You were ine man who selected him to go to London and had kept hin there. it a moent when you vrere endeavouring, according to your statenent, in every way to avoid war, you failed to talk to the man who was presumably best inPormed?

A I must say quite frar.lv. in my pere eption, so far as I re- neshera we never consiCcic Turiu.ov as a ian who had let us say, ny particular confidence or the Fuhrer’s particular confidence, never as such. Everybody can tell you that he was a quiet, routine diplomat we had sent there, but he was not a man, I don't think, during the sixteen months, who was ever ca!od be give his views on anytning of that sort. These things were go nexa Uy deno.

Q -S a inatter of fact, he was recalled during that time on two or three occasions, but in any case, if you send such a man to London at that time, it does not support ycur contention that yeu were ser­iously interested in working out an arrangement with Great Britain.

We certainly dido

Q Again, either way you put it, it destroys your contention that you wished, at allost any cost, to make an adjustment with England.

A During the last fortnight we still did, I mean during the last fortnight, up until the war broke out, we did in he last week very much. This was also done, not through Dur ksen, for instance, this was done then through Henderson. For instance, Henderson then went to London, but Durksen played no role in these questions.

Q nation,

You made a very poor choice of ambassador in a critical sit- Either way you were guilty of dereliction.

A When we sent Durksen there, I reember we considered for a long time who to send. Then we came to Durksen as a quiet and routine an- bassador, who would look after matters as well as he could. "'hat was because we had nobody else. That was more or less the idea then.

-4- 3880

TC. 73. No147,f No. 147•

FINAL Report from the former Polish Ambassador in Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, October 10, 1939.

+-n consequence of the German aggression against Poland, vhich vras begun the hout declaration of varon Saptenber 1, 1939, at 4.45 a.m. (the hour at which the.G ermans started co bciabard Westerplatte), I left Berlin with the personnel ptheEmbasy on September 2, and travelled to Poland through DenmArk, Ssedon,

land, Estonia, and Latvia. Being obliged to leave Poland, ovring to the Soviet invasion, and now residing in France, I consider it my autl’t present my i inal report on the terination of my mission in Berlin.

My mission to Germany began in September 19373. the capacity of linister Plenipotentiary ana then Ambassador. ’

I fulfilled it first in from October 1934, as

+ H1155-0148

Polish-German relations vrcre based upon19341 in which the Governments c? both State u--g least ten years to refrain from resort to force to sc-41 might arise between them.

the Declaration of January 26■-took for a period of

any differences which

r , In the course, of the negotiations vhi.ch I conducted with the German overnment, and which ended in the Delcaration of Januar 26, 193, it was

expressly specified that existing intern - --- - ‘would not be infringed by that Decle ration,text itselfGerman circles

This attitude of Poland’sional obligations of the tvro States

and this found expression in themas fully accepted by authoritative

in the same way the priniciple o? independence ; constituted the starting-point of the conversations • was fully corfirmed in numerous conversations during vith the highest Reich officials, and was recognized relations.

for Polish policy, which with Che.ncollor Hitler, ; the years 1934 to 1938 . as the basis of mutual

on Polish-German relationsAs you are in possession of my previous reportsduring my mission in Berlin, in this report I shall confine myself to a chrono­logical outline of the last phase of those relations, beginring with October 1938.

The German action in relation to Poland, initiated on October 24, 938. in ard Gotm,ofusugses ions vhich vere vritharam after a conversation on November 19, and put forward again in Januery 1939, in March 1939 asuned the For of pressure supported by the entry ofGernan troops into Slovakia ard theat the occupation of Memel.

by 1,The question fovon Ribbentrop the return of the Free City of Danzig to the Reich, raised .

on October 21 ---- -- ' • -xs quite unexpectedhad been +L, :4 p - - -e-yected, panzig questionsin hesnothcisub- excharges of opinion bettreen the two Governmentsof theReiche Government, cwlicitly conFired ir the Chancellors, ‘statementso 0 emer,*,.and January 14, 1938, that the Reich rosvected the ledstatus of the Free City together with for her part did not intervene in the

that the Reich respected th;Polish rights and interests, while Poland lif e of the Gorman population of Panzig.

basis“hilq.the.central Reich authorities hondlcd the Danzig situation on the ASS n -x above prinicples, in the territory of Danzir itself the activities

aS.GaulaiteraFoerster, a Fart’ eutreldst, vs to cuso of numerous comhbdt- on. and tense Situations from the moment of his arrival in the Free Citv Tt

con.be sqia confidently that li. Foerster ws the individuni who EOntributca m8 to tho.continual.nisundcrstardings e.nd tension that arose betrecn the two

+ 1 bviously, it « difficult for me to cstimato how far li. Foerster

autsoronabdsoprnonptiotivo, n2a to hat dogroo on the the haghost

I frequently happened that after assurances in regard to Danzig questions hd been given to me by members of the German Government, during the “very next few days M. Foerster’s activities, particularly his speeches tothepanzigex

3617

i-0149

’ -2-

Perty Convention, niornted shat hnaboon scda in Berlin, and thus revived the vith the Gemnan chrustz.PS ar 7 as it wa.s knovm that he hna 01080 contacts

In reply to M. von Ribbentropt s suggestions of October 9,, +, ,Government handed him counter-proposals on NoveEber 19, 1938. *

r Subsequently these matters were mised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs E: :9, in.convers ationswith Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden on Sanunry rs‘. 39 • With the Reich linister for Foreign Affairs, M. von RibDentr ir 1979 the Jaguer 6, and during the liter's visit to Warsaw on January 26 1 939, the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Ge man Declarton.

Tn the course of a casual exchange or views with the Chancellor at reneption to the Diplomatic corps on March 2, he once morersdura °n. at.theo long as he stood at the nead of the Government of the Reich there vs no need to fear that rolations botween tho tro oountrLcs voulabooxgosd to’dangr."

During the period from October 1938 to March 939 the ce, +44, towards us acquired certain features which in Poland bean n t i attitude standable mstrust and criticism, -o-and began to evoke an under-

in connection with the problem of Sub_(-r,-;- .praindonuolomonts,cting to the -trinent of‘ Polish Entorrit. toraogbstio Sryiseykra inian rolations, were supported by Goren propaganda and Party t8wiri:s; andGeztap) Vienna became the oontre or these activities, and + "---1sS Q that city incessantly disseminated Ulrainien broodcsts 1‘+: 1, to Poland. In Germany Ukrainian raps and panphlots in the chstshostile directed against the integrity of the Polish Republic, were distrbuted. ‘

thsa-"peSSWBETrlandnbntszvazaauonstharattar.th2.Gerzanssolzoxa = that

nepinst Poland, and thatir Ukminian torroristic ledonts Ver supported by UkminEanitzgsobocnuse they oonstituted the most active clement among the

hostiictorolonan tha territory.ofSlovekia Certinny begon to on nativities rntin, uloJS.n th . Activity grcv stronger as tho German plan fOT sop “8 --oekia from Bohemia was graduclly realized.

...a revisionist ideas concerning Polish territories ver openly propagated.

aareaCdnzver"her-1g58airqotPolish-Goxan relntions -re oxosoa to serious citizenship From Gexony." Tuthioss expulsion of 15,0 Jews of Polirh

actcSumming.u, Ivishto stnte thnt the cboto porioa brought with it a the Deomritnon of 1934 ormn rolations. urprecedented .".11100 tho conclusion of to avoid Su grater mSion? efforte “ to bo by Polend in order

The crisis in Polish-Goxman relations began in the first half of Hank 1939. GoxtmAetingcbyasurpriso,taravrithout cny contret vith the Polash Govorxmnont, the ioravin, extndim, ne "Sit i ion.on the Polish frontier, annexing Bohemia and estabiishi, ddrmgsouprotoctorate over•Slovokia, duilding fortifications and

base at Kernel. " 8 orn Slovt ki ., and, finally, establishing a naval

3618.

H1155-0150

-3-

In the course of these Gernn activities, which developed at lightning speed, T. -ed ir voin fremlnrch 11 to 13 to obtain an intervie 7 with the German 1lihhster for Forcign Affairs and the Secretary of State. On the evening of larch 13 I chanced to meet General von Keitel, and informed him that — despite German activities so inmediately affecting Poland . fo r three days I had been unnble to make contact with the German Government, General von Keitel promised to intervene with 11. von Eibbentrop the next day on the matter, but this brought no result.

The Germnan assumption of a protectorate over Slovakia vras a step explicitly directed against the security of Polard, and the fact that it was carried out in conditions of complete serrocy from the Polish Government was in contrad­iction to the prinioples on which the execution of the 1934 Declaration was based. The military operations against Poland in the southern sector in September completely conirmed this.

Pt was in this atmosphere of tension between the tvro countries that T had a conversation on March 21 with the Reich minister for Foreign Affairs at his invitation, ‘ n‘

without going into the not; ils of that interview, I wish only to recall that the tone of M. von Ribbentrop’ s exposition departed considerably from that in which matters affecting the two Governments hnd been previously discussed, and was in the nature of definite pressure. He put forward the German claims, and urged that the Polish Government should take the swiftest possible decision. . In this conversation II. von Ribbentrop made no reference whatever to the ultimatum in rogerd to lcmel, which he had presented the previous day to the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I inquired about his meeting with M, Urbsys, he confined hinsel? to a few explanatory remarks of a purely general character.

The news of the entry of German troops into lemnel, and of the Chancellor’s demonstrative voyage ctthe head of the German Gleet along our coast, was as great a surprise to Polish public opinion as the German entry into slov-ki. had been.

Despite the prevailing atmosphere, which certainly was not conducive to neg0tjations, the Polish Government did not hold aloof from further discussions w-th the Gemnn Government. On March 26 I handed M. von Ribbentrop our count­er proposals, in the form of a written note, in respect to Danzig and the motor road. Although M. von Ribbentrop's personal reaction to it was of a neGe iV choracter, ne stated vhnt he would cormunicnto a reply only after

e na er.had been ref erred to the Chancellor. The reply in question was not transmitted to me, and only on the occasion of his speech to the Reichstag on April 28 did Chancellor Hitler impart it puclicly.

As.is knom, the Polish Government. not vrishing to increase the tension, azd cs1rous of leaving the woy open for further conversations, maintained is.,rc ion as to the subject of the exchanges of opinion which had taken place n marsh. By his declaration to the Reichstag on April 28 and his unilateral

denucin ion f the Declaration of January 26, 1934, which forbade resort to orce in mutual relations between the two states, Chancellor Hitler annulled e policy inaugurated betwecn Poland and Cerany in 1933.

In his conversation with me on I gainst the military stops Poland ha:

for Foreign Affairs after th;t' ken

von Ribbentrop spoke strongly ming from the Reich Minister

into Slovakia, and the nav ion sounded strange, to sa

. —e.one32 the least

n Ary’s occupation of Prague, the entryn off the Polish coast, this object-

3619.

H1155-0151

enthefhee.of,Gemany‘s obvious steps, of a military character, towards Polard ere *p Tolond.to north and south, steps about which, moreover, noiandwasleftcoplctely uninformcd by Berlin, it is difficult ot imagine certain responsi le Polish authorities could have been expected not to take an tain.prccnutionaryueasuros, Germany’s explanation that Poland, by forming Ans 4 an with Grea Britain, hhd joined the so-called ’ encirclement front’in the Gereny,and so had violated the Declaration of January 26, 1934, is, This ca4ight of he situntion brought a out byGeran action, entirely groundless covered tho ut reeronce to the legal aspect of tho problem, which was thoroughly covered in the Polish Government’s momorondum to the Reich Government on Hay 5.

. The 1934 Declaration wms concluded for a term of ten years. For this period both States renounced resort to force in their imutu relations, * The 4PP-ication.of force can be direct, thet is to say, through a dircct attack by the Pa iculer Statec Dut it can e ually well be applied by indirect methods, which sometimes are even more dangerous, because they are less apparent to the' world. The tactics employed by Chancellor Hitler’s Government usually relied on the second method.

nr At the time of the 1 arch incidents we had to deal writh a definite instance of pressure brought to bear on Polend through her military encirclement.

I should remark that inRibbentrop on March 27, 1939 bothfrom this

countries might be the tvo Governments suggestion.

appeased by theThe Rei- h ]

versation which I had with 11. von sup esion thnt public opinion in

publication of a few reassuring words nister for Foreign Affairs rejected

backAfter Chancellor Hitler’s speech on April 28 I left for Warsaw, and wrent to Berlin in the second half of layr.

mu On ny return I took steps to ascertain whether there vre.s any desire on The Gernen side for convorsnti ns with us, I was authoritative German circles did not consider the : and that a certain period of time must clause to a

> given to understand that moment suitable for discussions lovr the atmosphere to clear.

..The whole of Geran diplomacy ws taking the line of opposition to Great Brit-in. The German Press vas chiefly attacking Great Britain, endeavouring to represent the attitude Poland had taken towards the Geren demands as resulting rom the Anglo—Polish Agreement,

Grave signs of Ge many’s aggressive intentions become more and more apparent^ . Rearmament proceeded at cn unprecedented pace, and the General St te administration was entirely subordinated to military reouirements.

From April onnard contrabend i-territory of Danzig, being carried on by it Was observod that fortifications vrere

ms developed on a large scale in the

apparent that, contrary to interne tionnl standing with the Reich, was heading for

sea and air, Simultanciously clandestinely built

rccments the Free Citycomplete militarization,

It became in under-

in spite ofDanzig’s continualGovernmentthe

anxious to avoid a conlict the Reichutmost restraint

recments the Polishdisplayed until the end

theThe

From April onward r sphere of national 1 German aim to extorr

considorable aggmovotion of the situation occurred in inoritics Tae reason for this has to be sought in

1 j — ------- —ement in the Reich, which was to beachieved through the totalitarian legislation and the 2 rty m.chinery, and by placing the practical control of tho entire life of the Polish

Germany in the hands of the Gestapo,

tiorminority in

On the other hand, the German propaganda machine launched Ciampaign in defence of the allegedly oppressed Ger.an minority this connection I desire to recall that Netional-Soci-lism hns dostrine for Germans living abroad, subordinntinc them to the interests of Reich foreign policy. This became the subject of numerous conflicts with various countries, even in South Africa.

a violentin Foland. Increated a special

%20

H1155-0152

—.This Rational-Socialist activity in Poland increased in strength from Arrilonwar, when the Gornn Goverment decided - as vs confirmed by the nunerous cases reporte during the first days of the war - to exploit the German minority for Civersionist, political and even military Sims.

of urinthe period 3 .uission in Borlin 1 Frequently drew the attention of authoritative circles to the need for rinorities, in the interestsPolish-Gormn relations, to confine their activities to the cultural

and educntionnl sphere. The subjugation of the Coren minority to Reich poliay hostile to Poland vm.s, of course, bound to provoke an understandable reaction on our port.

As in the case of the Suletens, German propagnnda exaggerated evcrylittlc incident among the Gernnni rarity in Poland, and in the rinni plv.se the Press Wa.S daily publishing completely fictitious stories.,

Any measures against espionage, treason or sabote persecution of the cultural life of the Germen minorit material, the same incidentas new acts of terrorism.

inFor lack of other

‘s, to be republished

r ceased

have many proofs that a lerge to give credence to this cxa.

public opinion in Germany finally ropnnende.

the Inspite of.the prevailing tension between Poland ana Germany, members of the Ebassy maintained nornal contact on current matters with the ministry for Foreign Afi airs During my froquont absences from Berlin the Charge vrrniresPrince Lubomirski, often saw the Unde--secroter or Stta, 12 Toelen" and o l er high officials in order to discuss various matters, and he took elery opportunity 01 indicating our desire for action to moderate the tone of the Rressin both countries. ... This,hovever, produced no response from the head i thc Press Department of the lZinistry Por Horciem np-:.c

By the end of July the clandestine mobilization in Danzig vras orocecdine at an extraordinarily intensive pace, * •

At the beginning of August occurred the well-lr.ovm incidnet of the Free s attempt to rid itself of the Polish Customs conrol.

pon A Gust.9 the State secretary, 11. von Veizsackor, asked the Polish Charge CAfa ires, Erince Luomnirski, to call on him, and made an oral statement on the

Danzig Customs inspectors’ incidnet. This step vm.s tantamount to German Governent interference in relations between Poland and the Free City otate Secretary avoided giving any explanation of this action. The

c, The .Polish Covernnent gave its reply, also in oral form, to Charge d» Affaires in Warsaw the next a.y. the German

From the beginning of August frontier incidents sta -ed by the Germans inereased in nuniber, not only in the Donnig scctor, but clong tho entire Polish Gernn frontier. The tone of the fan. Frees becanc nore Al mor aressiie The entire propaganda machine va.s directed against Poland and her integrity.

for onaust21came the announcement of II von Ribbentrop’s imminent departure corMosco ? conclude a Sovict-Gom.n Pnot of iron-Aggression. The Soviet- ernan negotiations had been shrouded in the deepest sccrcy, ana rumours of thenswcro.recgived only from certin indirect sources, Dovm to the last moment the Soviet Enbassy inBerlin flatly denied the existence of any 901141001 negotiations, intimating that only economic matters vrere being" discussed.

This SteP on the part of the Gerne.n Goverent constituted a complete reversal of their intorna tioral policy. Under the slom-n ’’The Piet-Ing Bolshevisn" Chanccllor Hitl r fed engced in the Spenish Civilvrar,tanahidst created the so-called Inti-Conintern Bloc. During the whole of m‘ six-year stn„inBerlin the.Gorman Chancellor, as well as all his collaborators, conti qa1:y.d ciareu that the found tion of Hitlor-Ger n poling was exclusion of 3oV-et Russia from Europe and the struggle against Coruunisn,

II .0:

3621

H1155-1

-6-

M. von Ribbentrop more than once told me of his view that Poland should join the Anti-cominton Fact and that Russia nust be pushed still farther east.

t By signing the Pact with loscow Chancellor Hitler threw over his own principles, thus demonstrating that behind his actions was only an opportunism of the moment.

On August 21 at five p.m, I vms recievca by Fiola-arshl Goering, with whom I talked for over an houre The conversation was of a friendly character: it was more a personal than official exchange of opinion, and Li. Goering laid particular emphasis on this circustancc, I recall the more important points of the conversation:

11. Goering expressed regret that the policy of Polish-German understanding -ay.in ruins and, seeking the cnuses, deci- red thnt but for the A lo-Polish Alliance the crisis would not have developed on such a scale, in spite of the difficulties over Danzig.

He gave it unequivocally to be understood that he anticipated war with Poland.

He admitted that by concluding a pact with Russia the Reich had made a complete volte-face, and explained thot in her international relations Germany must choose betvrecn England and Russia.

For my part, I pointed out that Poland followed a consistent policy in relation to both Germany and Russia.

I observed that loscovr desired to provoke war in Europe, which Goering d-id not deny. “ °

P said I was at the Chancellor’s disposition if that would assist in find­ing a way out of the situation. M, Goering assured me he would inform the Chancellor accordingly.

The British Government, and later the French Government, began their efforts at mediation with the Reich Government on August 22.

I shall not go into details of these negotiations here, as during that period there was a direct exchenge of views between Warsaw, Paris and London. I desire only to point out that I was in continual touch vrith the French Ambassdor, M. Coulondrc, and the British Ambassador, Sir Revile Henderson. Both these ambassadors spared no effort and did their utmost to save the peace and bring about direct negotiations between Poland and Germany to clear up the situation.

I cannot omit mention here of the moderating influence of the Italian Ambassador, M. Attolico, who during the years vre spent together n Berlin worked unremittingly in the cause of peace.

On August 23 Sir Nevile Henderson presented H. Hitler with a letter in II, Chamberlain’s ovm hand. He recioved a negative reply,

Erom August 25 onwerd, German action againet Poland assumed a character verging on aggression. The troops concentrations on the polish frontier, observed for several days past, steniiy increased in dimonsions. It wa‘ significant that on that daytclcphonic communication between Germany and the West was cut off. Frontier provocations rev more and more frequent and grave. On that same Cay Prince Lubonirski handed a note pf protest to the German Ministry for Foreign /if fairs in connection vith these incidents. The Consulate aan Marienwerder reported the severing of telephone lines, The Consul submitted a protest to the president of the region, and personally intervened with bin in respect to the deportation from Hrriemrerder of the teaching staff of the Polish High School. On his return the Consul ma.s confronted with the -police, who had forced their way into the Consulate builirg and had taken possession’ of it.

3658

H1155-0154

The Chancellor asked the British A bassador to call on him, and put forvrard a proposal for an understanding with Great Britain. The next day the British Ambassador flev to London. The Chanoellor also received the French Abassador,

On August 26 I visited the Under Secretary of State, E. VToermann, and handed him a note protesting against the previous dey! s violation of the Polish frontier on the Last Prussian sector by a patrol of ten German soldiers. During this incident a Geman cororcl was shot dead on Polish territory, some 300 metres from the frontier. The Geruans left a nachine-gun behind.

Then I submitted a note rotesting against incidents which had occurred on August 21 on the Silesian sector, during which Polish frontier patrols had been shot at by Gernans.

On that same day news vas received that H. head of the Free City of Denzig.

Foerster had been appointed

And on the same day the French Anbc.ssador handed M. Hitler a letter from M. Daladier.

On August 27 the issue of food-ration cards was announced in Germany and arrangements were made for controlling sales of renynnCe clothing. Military and air attaches were inforcd thr t they must not leave the district of Berlin, without spceial perission from the German War Office. There followed an extensive calling up of older categories of reservists.

Me Hitler handed the French Ambassador a letter for H. Daladier.

On August 28 the Germans published the notes cxchen;cd between II. Daladicr and M. Hitler, in which the latter for the first time officially demanded the urion not only of Danzig but also of Pomorze with the Reich. Late in the evening the British imbasscdor, who had returned from London, presented the British Governmentts reply.

On August 29 the German Chancellor inf-tried Sir lTevile Henderson that he would expect a Polish representative with fall powers on August 30, and that the German demands concerned the return of Danzig and Pomorze to Germany as well as protection of the Genan minority in Poland. The Gcrman Government made their participation in an intornational guarantee to Poland dependent on the Soviet Government’s attitude.

On August 31, at 2 a,m, I saw Sir Mcvilc Henderson, wrhen he informed me of his conversation with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. I learned that M. von Ribbentrop had prepared certain demands in the sphere of Polish- Gcrman relations. The Britsih inibnssndor could not give me any details, as II. von Ribbentrop hod read ou the Gorman Ccnnnds very rapidly and had refused to provide him vith a copy of the text.

Sir Nevile Hondo-son pointed out how threatening was the situation, and advised the establishment of direct Polish-Gernan conteot. Te discussed the most effectual means of achieving this. I told the British Inbassador that T would immediately report to my Governont.

To this end, in addition to telegrams, early in the morning I sent Prince Lubormirsli to Tarsaw. As Germany had suspended all regular means of comm­unication with Poland, Prince Luborirski motored to Poznan and thence flew to TTarsavr, arriving before noon.

3659.

H1155-0155

Sooh after 12 o’clock 1 recicved telegrphic instructions from Warsaw to hand the Minister for Foreign Affairs a declaration of the Polish Governmentt s fevourable attitude to any proposal for direct negotiations.

At 1 P.m. I asked for an intorviov vith the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of presenting my Govcurnent's conmunicetion.

At 3 p.m. the State Secretary, M. von Wcizsacker, telephoned to inquire whether I sought an interview vith the Foreign inister in the capnoity of a fully empowered delegate or in some other capacity. T replied that I wes asking for an interview as Mbassador, to present a deal .ration from my Government.

At 6.15 p.m, I wos recuosted to call on Ik von RIbbentrop immediately. He received me in the presence of Minister Schnict,

Having communicated my Government's declaration, I presented it in writing:

"Last night the polish Government vrere informed by the British Government of an exchange of views with the Reich Government as to a possibility of direct negotiations between the Polish and the Gorman Governments,

"The polish Government are favourably considering the British Government's suggestion, anC will amlte them a formal reply on the subject during; the next few hours."

I added that I had "been tryirg to present tlis dcol ration since 1 p.m.

M. von Ribbentrop asked me whether I had come in the capacity of delegate with full powers, to vhich I replied that for the time being I had only been instructed to submit the above declaration for the German Government1 s informat- ion.

M. von Ribbentrop asked whethor I was acquainted with the latest Anglo- German conversations, to vhich l : nswerc that I had received indirect infor- mation regarding them, since those matters had been handled directly between Warsaw and LonCon,

At the end of our conversation I'. von Rib" entrop stated that he had thought I would cone as a fully empowered delegate, and that he would inform the Chancell- or of the Polish Governmont's declaration.

On my return to the Eribassy I found mysole unable to communicate vith Torsaw, as the Germnns had cut the telephone lines. This prevented my getting in touch with my Government by the quickest means. On August 26 the German authorites had severed direct railway corrunication with Poland. Telephonic communications had similarly been rendered impossible or i peCed since the same date.

I informed the French and British Imbassadors of the neture of my conver­sation vith M, von Ribbentrop. I learned of the invitation extended by the State Secretary to both ixibassc.dors and the American Cherge d’affaires, to call at the Ministry for Forei n Affairs between 9 and 10 p.m. There they were informed that as a Polish plenipotenti: ry hl not rrivod, it was considered that the Germen proposals contained in sixteen points had been rejected by Polend. I desire to state emphatically that the German demands, contained in sixteen points, have never boon hancc or corunicnted to me by the Gennan Government.

The Germz.n viroless had bronCc .st a sirilar coln unique at 9 o’clock, publishing the German propos: Is as corpprised in the sixteen points, while the Press issued special editions. lot until the Gornn proposals vrerc published in the press did I learn of thcir exact nature.

At about 11 p.m. Prince Lubol irski arrived by car from Warsaw. During the same night the Gorman wircless stations broadcast false inf oration of aggress­ive action taken by Polish milit-ry detachments on the German frontier. The same night had yet another conversation with the French and the British Ambassadops.

3660,

Hi 155-0156

-ma-ntheenrlyhours.of Sertenber 1 T learned from the wireless that Geran nubez of Polish 4nded Eolezd, and that the Goren air force h bombed a

In the morning I received a statin that in the iztererts or leave the Ebassy building, rt on the Director of the Trotocol,

note from the I nstry of Forcien If f g ir sH personal safety I va.s requested not to about 1 Dom Prince Lubomirski called in my name B won DoornberG, and asked for my passports.

Arrangenonts for our departure v Hungary, whereas the ministry for Foxreasons doparturc to Donrurk vroul.d he linistry for Foreign Mffairs that the leave simultaneously with that of the Embassy Polish consulates would leave separately ana

re discussed, I sug irs considcre

onne

ihe route via 'or technical nged writh the

.. of the Berlin Consulate vrould while the personnel of other

T different routes.

7 personnel in the Erb

In accordancements for thein Gerany,

rotection of the proyents nade between the

Me Richert, handin us every attention

in the event ofC.1

I. exchanged notes wich the S.r

sh and Swedish Govern- ne State of Poland

co him. M, Richert and his staif accorded

I handed the keys of the General to the Councillor of at our departure»

EbAssy.building ond those of the Berlin Consulate the Sedish Legation, II. de Post, who was present

In theForeign Aff

tenber

open towntenths decl:ovied a s:

reived a note from the linistry for x to cormunicnte to ‘ ’

ion of its intentionI replied innedictely of comuni.c: ri.th an unofficial note toto my Govern enb, phoned to say tnat Warsaw via Denamr,

I' was not : Shortly a:

they wrero - to which T

the Polish Government the to refrain from bombarding given by the Polish Govcrnnent say that, owing- to the absence

co transnit she contents of the Gernan note rds the ministry for Foreign APPairs tele_

•epared to e presse ny

dish telephonic comunication withs ent

were informed of the Gernan noteinistry for For-

Cn Bertenber 2 members of the Erba,

>

A ropresenta

' S-tn anniversary of my arrival in Berlin, with the nc tnc Consulate General in Berlin I left in a specia

. from the Tharlottenburg Station at 8,30 a.m, for Denmark vc ox the Protocol accompanied us to the frontier.

Every cour shown us during the journcy

Septeber 3Emla s in Trrsa.w

the Danish frontier st ing agreement as to th

frontier Curinewere to cross the

tion of St. Peter lasted all the day of date when the members of the German

the nigh iithuanian frontier# We crossed the Danish

sontatvo"detene BGtrcoTtan,tuqfrmaGormny r.oms notieicd by the detained in Poland, he was obliged to hold the Captain Bicly, and Embassy Attache IA Szubort, by telephone to the sneci-1 . ..n.c 2’, ... . ,Pn1or-0 g., 4,1 S. ° 1 - " of tho Swecish Ministor in Berlin, On szuboxt dudyyothavoatinr.ecthodctontion sctt1c1, Einiy and

of the German Eribassy had beenAssistant Military Attachein Germany. I commended

!them

we were given a. most hospitable and cordinl reception.

H1155-0157

TC 24

No, 4603 - TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN

THE GERIAN KEICH AND THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK.

SIGNED AT BRELIN, MAY 31st 1939.

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor of the German Reich,

Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to confirm this resolve by means of a Treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland:

M. Herluf ZahJ.c, Chamberlain, Envoy Jxtr a ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin;

The Chancellor of the German Reich:

M. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister fox' Fpreign Affairs of the Reich;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1.

The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in no case resort to war or to any other use of force one against the other.

Should action of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 be taken by a third Power against one of the Contacting Parties, the other Contracting Party shall not support such action in any way.

Aricle 2.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible in Berlin.

The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a period of ten years from that date. Should the Treaty not be denounced by one of the Contracting Parties at least one year before the expiry of that period, its validity shall be extended for a frush period of ten years. The same shall apply tc subsequent periods.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of both Parties have signed the present Treaty.

Done in original duplicate, in Danish and German.

BERLIN, May 31st, 1939.

HERLUT ZAHIE.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP.

1222

H1155-0158

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE.

.Onthesignatur, this any, of the Dano-Gurman Treaty, the agrcorsent existing dutween the two Parties on the following point has been put on record: -

, -The Contracting Farty which is not participating in the conflict shall not be deemed to be giving support, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Treaty, if the attitude of that Party is an harmony with the general rules of neutrality. Therefore- the fact of a normal ezchange of goods and transit of goods continuing between the Contracting Party not involved in the conflict and the th-rd Power Shall not be regarded as constituting illicit support.

BERLIN, May 51st, 1939.

HERLUF ZAHLE.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP.

1225

H1155-0159

24 2. 1940

Reich-ilinister von Ribbentrop, Berl.: n.

Foreign Cffice.

Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop,

party Corrade Scheldt has returned and has made a detailed report to

Privy Councillor von Grindherr who wLI address you on this subject, Ue

agreed the other day that 2 — 300,000 RI would be made iediately available

for the said purpose. . Now it turts out that Privy Councillor Gr"tndherr states

that the second instalment (Rate) can be made available only after 8 days.

But as it is necessary for Scheldt to go back i acdiately, I request you to

make it possible that thi.s second instalrent is given to him at once. With

a longer absence of Rcichsautsleitor P..1,Scheldt also the connection with

your representatives would be broken up, which just novr, under certain

circunstances, could be very unfavourablo.

Therefore I trust that it is in everybody’s interest, if P.1L. Scheldt

goes back inmediately.

Heil Hitler!

/s/ Ros enb ergo

3765.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 004-PS

Office of U.S, Chief of Counsel

COPY

The Political Preparation of theNorway Action

(The enclosures mentioned in the report have been omitted from this paper sinoe they are only relative to specifi 00 matters. The complete report in- cluding appendices has been submitted to the Deputy of the FOhrer by Reichs- leiter Rosenberg on 17 June 1940)

The Office of Foreign Relations (Ausaenpolitisches Amt) of - theational Socialist Party ( NSDAP) hns had contact with VIDKUN . 9ING, leader of the NASJONAI SAMML. NG in Norway, for years. The

djrector of the "Office North" (Amt Norden) of the office of Foreign Hlations - later victim of a fatal accident - paid him (Quisling) a Personal visit on one of his trips to Scandinavia.

When in 1939 the general political situation was beginning to grow critical Quisling gave the Office of Foreign Relations an estimate of the situation and his opinion about the possible intentions of Great Britain with relation to Sccudinnvin in case of conflict (Great Britain s) with the Cormen Reich. Prior to the convention of the NORDIC ASSOCLAIION (Nordische Gesellschaft) in Luebeck, Quisling was received by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG in Berlin. He (Quisling) pointed out the decisive geopolitical importance of Norway in the Scandinavian region and the advantages gained" by the Power in control of the Norwegian coast in case of conflict between the German Reich and Great Britain. He further explained the extra­ordinarily clever, democratic and particularly anglo-saxon propagan­da which had been accepted favourably by almost the entire nation, also because of Norway’s economic dependence on the seas and there­fore on England. Since he did not believe that the small nations would remain neutral in case of conflict - as had been the case in the World War of 1914 - but was convinced that they would become in- Volved in one way of the other he requested support for his party and press in Norway, basing his request on the "pangermanic" ideology. REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG also requested Director (Amtsleiter) Scheldt to arrange a meeting between QUISLING and his Deputy HAGELIN with State Secretary (Staatssekretaer) KOERNER, bearing in mind that this matter

might be of particular interest to GENERAL FIELD MARSHALL GOERING with regard to air strategy. This meeting with the State Secretary KOERNER did take place. At the same time Staff Director (Stabsleiter) SCHICKEDANZ, directed by REICHSLEITER ROSEHFERG, । submitted the attach­ed memorandum to Reich Minister and Chief Of/Chancellery (Roicbsmini ster und Chef der Reichskanzlei) LAMMERS for the information of the pEhrer bY the end of June 1939 (Enclosure No 1).

After the Luebeck convention Director (Amtsleiter) SCHELDT took a vocation trip to Norway to further pursue this matter. His observations are found in the attached report (Enclosure No. 2). Even during his presence in Germany Quisling had requested a short, pertinent training programme for reliable party nctionaries especially selected by him. This request waerarnnted by REICHSTETTER ROSENBERG.

1431

H1155-0161

In hugust1939 a 14 day course was held at the School of the Office for Foreign Relations of the NSDAP (Aussenpolitisches Schulungshausder NSDAP) in Berlin for 25 followers of the NASJONAL SAMLING who had been selected by QUISLING.

In September Burgermcister Dr. WINKLER revealed that he had been chargod with the financial aspects of QUISLING’S request by GENERAL FELD LARSHAL COERING through State Secretary KOERNER^ The outbreak of war and the beginning of the Polish campaign delayed the decisions (Enclosure No 3). A further reminder of REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG to GEIER-L FIELD M/RSHLL GOERING in the course of a talk about the importance of Norway in connection with the matters set forth originally by QUISLING had no practical results.

At the same time political tension increased in Norway as Russian-aotivity made itself felt in the Baltic regions. Of this QUISLING kept the office (APA) inforaed .through his deputies in Germany, The outbreak of the Russo~Finnish war at the end of November helped to further increase the anti-German currents in all Scandinavia and played into the harids of the anglo-saxon propaganda which was now building up to full strength. Greater Germany was represented as a secret ally of Soviet Russia and as the real culprit in Finland’s misfortune* At the same time the Western Powers promised Finland military support which could only be supplied via Norway and Sweden. The possibility of a plan by Great Britain to occupy Norway and possibly Sweden to effectively close the blockade against Greater Germany and further to gain convenient air bases against Germany began to take shape under the pretence of altruistic help to Finland. Its aim was to involve also the Nordic Nations in a conflict against Greater Germany. QUISLING informed the office(APA) about these new possibilities shaping on the political scene, acting through his deputy in Germany.

As the activities of the Allies became more and more notice- able: in Norway QUISLING again came to Germany to voice his fears. He was received by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG in the early part of December and he again presented his ideas. Firmly convinced that in the long run a genuinely neutral position in the great conflict would becone impossible for the small nations and .and in his firm faith in the victory of Greater Germany in this conflict which also an ideological one, QUISLING considered it his duty - supported as he was by a small but determined minority - to tie Norway’s fate to that of Greater Germony as the new centre of strength of a nordic-germanic Ji fa community. We knew that his courageous group was the only pro-German Perty. His deputy in Germany, HAGELIN, had also arranged for a talk between QUISLING and GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER which took place about this time. During a report to the FChrer REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG again mentioned Norway. He particularly pointed out her importune© in the case of England deciding to occupy Norway 'with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, for the purpose of strengthening the blockade and under the pretence of help for Finland. GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER, too, upon Ids request, was called to the FOhrer in connection with his talks with QUISLING. As a result of these steps QUISLING was received by the FOhrer for personal instructions on the 16th. of December and again on the 1i3th. of December. During this interview the FHhrer em­phasised repeatedly that the most preferable attitude of Norwwey as well as all of Scandinnvia would be one of complete neutrality. He had no intentions to enlarge the theatres of war to draw other nations into the conflict. If, however the enemy were preparing an enlargement of ■’ a the sones of war with the aim to further throttle and threaten the Greater German Reich then, of course, he would be obliged to arm against such steps. Then the Bhror promised QUISLING financial support for his movenent based on the pan-germanic ideology and for the prupose of combatting the increasing enemy propaganda. -he military matters of the questions were now transferred to a special military staff which assigned special missions to QUISLING and heard his opinions (Encl. No 29).

1433

H1155-0162

The political trcatment was to be han! C by HGICHSLEITER ROSENBERG, expenses were to be carricd by the H roi rn Ofice (Auswaertiges Amt) and Reichminister for Foreign Affairs (i oichsinistor vom Aussen- politischen Amt) was to be kept infornol nt all imes. Maintenace of liaison with QUISLING'was assigned to Director (Antsleiter) SCHEIDT who, as matters developed further, was attached to the Naval Attache in Oslo, Comaander (Korvettenkapitaen) SCHREIBER. Strictest secrecy was ordered for the entire matter.

Then, in January, during a conferonce between REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG and Foreign hinistor von PIBENTROP it was decided to appropriate to QUISLING an'initial sum of 200,000 Goldmark. This money was to be taken to Oslo, in two inct Lents, by the liaison agent SCHEIDT where it was to be handed to Q ‘TSLING, In the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Imt) Privy Councillor (( chcimrat) VON GRUNDHERR was the only one to be told of this arrangelent. (Encl. No 3),

Lu show in the atteohod documentary memoranda QUISLINGS reports tr: nimitted by his deputy i Cormny HLAGENLIN concerning the possibiliity of active intervention of the Western Powers in Norway with consent of the Norwogi n Coverrent bee no more and more alarming. These reports continuously smol -anted with more and more accurate confirmations by Quislin ‘e c nfidants were in certain contrast with the opinions of the Cor i Lgrtion in Oslo. The Legation believed in the neutral intentions of the Norwegian Govern- ment of that time, the NYCIDSVOLD . ond was further convinced that the Governent would take arms in defence of its neutrality policy. The Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) held the same opinion as is Bhown in the attached documentary memorendum dated January 8 which is the result of a talk between Director (Amtsleiter) SCHEIDT and Privy Councillor (Gehoimrat) VON GRUNDHIERR (Encl. 8). It is of .special interest that HAGELIN, Quisling’s Deputy in Germany, whose intimate connection with QUISLING was not known in Norway succeeded in getting a foothold in the circles of the NYGARDSVOID Government. Thus he heard the uncoloured opinions of the members of the Government who conducted themselves like a secret Norwegian-Anglophile society.

In the documentary memorandum of January 13 he relates the opinions expressed to him by two Norwegian Ministers. The gist of the bpinions was that Germany had already lost the war and that Norway - if only because of its large Merchant Marine - could not do other than favour England in her politics, in wir even more so than in peace. And further that the entire nations agreed with this policy (Encl. 9). During the night of February 16 to 17 the English raided the "Altmark" in the Joossingsfjord. The rcaction of the Norwegian Government to the Altmark-affair seemed to indicate that certain secret arrangements had been made between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. • This was further emphasised in Director SCHEIDT’s consolidated report covering January 20th to February 20th (Enel No 11) after he had received HCELIIN’s report. HAGELIN had overheard the conversation between two members of the Storting during which one member said to the other that the actions of the two commanders a... •of the Norwegian torpedo boats had been a "proarranged affair”. The same report also refers to the English diznds for air bases in Norway and for freedom of trade in the Norvegia w tors. It goes on to say that although the ITorwegian Covernxent refused those demands it was agreed that violations by the wnglish would be answered with paper protests only. Such - u s, and qmfirnations thereto were time and again suppliel tlrough QUISLING. In complete contrast to those opinions the German Legation, oven after the Altmark Affair, relied fully upon the good will of the lorvegians. The Ambassador cited the signing of the Norwcgian-Gorman trade agree­

ment as weighing heavily in favour of his point of view.

-3- 1434

H1155-0163

HO —--nd) onsidp -5 the Mo.wagian Govunmnl 1/GhEDSVOLD somewhat dependeni on thc G - c: G--man Reich (Thol. Nou 11 ana 12). 1 thesereports Wone ctreutly smitte to the Bhrer by KEICHLEITERROSENBERG, QUISITNC always emphasised hat moro than 90% of the country was behind England, and bhat he only rpr. sented • minority vhich, however, was chosen by virtue of its intuition to take cherge later on as represen­tatives of a NE Norwegan nati.c.

ApagU frcm financin] suport which vas fothconing from the Reich in currunoJ, QUJSLTIG had also been prorised - ’ ipm 1b of mnterislfor imnediho use in Ne way such as coal and sugar. Additional help was pronised. The shipunbs vere to be condncted urder cover of a new Trade Ccupany to be esnblj.she in Germiny or tirough especially selected existing firms whi.le HGELIN was to ncb as consignee in Noway. HLAGELIN had already confernu a th ho rorci : listers of the iygardsvold

Government as for instanoc thc Linisser of '-'in ply and Conmerce (Versor- gungs-d Handlolcnurister ) and had bsen assured D2 wissicn for the im­port of coal. At tll: savi: tit the coal Lransports wore to sezve possibly to supply tho technicnl mocis necessenr to lnunch QUISIIIIG's political action in. Oslo with Cernan help. Io was QUISLIG's plan to send a number of scLected, parti cuarly reliable men to Cenmany for a brief military training course in a copleicly isolated carp. They wore then to be de tailed as area and angungu sp.ciliets ro German Special Troops who ver a to ba taln to Oslo ol th. coal varges to accomplish a political action. mhus QUTSLING pLannod to get hi id of his leading opponents in Horway inoluiing the King, to reven all military resistance from tho very boginning, Ltn diatcy 1ollovrng this political action and cpin an ofliciel r.^um, of QUISLONG vo the Government of th Cean • Lolt t miLituny ocuup tion of Ncz ra, vs to take place. -L1 1ulj. r preprauionc Were to be •. omy l t d previous- ly. Though this plan ocnoinod the great avantiga o? sarpise it also containc a cruab numbez of angurs winich could possiblj cause its failure. For this re sun : ; rcoived i qnit. dilatory bre at- nt while, at the same tims, it was not dsapproved 13 far as thc Normgian were concerned.

In February, after a conferanco with GENEREL PIELD MLRSHAL GOERING, Rl SICHSIZITZR ROSENBIIRG infomed the Se orctery in ne Office of the Four Year Plan (in.sberialdieklor im Vienjohrcsplnu) WOHLTHLAL only of the intenlion bo prepare < o cl shi pments to Nomy to the anmed confidant HAGEI IN. lrther dutils vre disenssed i.n n cc n'erence between Secretor Wo-rEIL.m, SbafP Di : - Of n ; .2 (. r y; LI.Since WOHLTFLAT recciv.d no further instructions fron the GENELA FIELD

ARSHAL, Foreign Einister von RIBBTNITRUP - afser a cosujta ion with REICHSLETTER ROSISNBTRG - consenled t ■ coe 'it, ci a se shi mts through his officee Based on ropolt of R IC SITIE IOSENLEG co the Firer it was also arranged to , QUISLIG teh Kao ns and ing1.sl pounds per month for three months commencing on the 15th of lnrh, to supporc his work. This money vs to be poid through the liaison unt SCEELT.

Meanwhile ILGiLIN,through his connection in Norway is trusted agent of the Norwegian Niavy, had bean comnissionca vith the purchase of German AA guns (Flaks) through the Cernn Navy N Lstry. Irough this connection he gainelmnore cu. nore ineigkt ito the actual ideas and intentions of the Norvogtan Ngors ola (r ven nunt and into the Allied preparation, which l LC. alrenr storted in ioxwvay. VLL1e in Ger my on the 20 he o. Worch to atiend conferences regarding the delivery of the Gorunn AA guns, he made a detailed report about the increasing activities of the Allies in Norway, toleraed by he Ny arrdsvo d Government o According to his reno cs t. o Ales were tlrec ay check- ing the Norwegian con sunj bu" ' : landing -nd transport porsibilities. He also stalc3 bt th . --cl lormandont emAMEC whe was c hange l with this rec 1 ■ - (l ■ conf lonbal talk ti th Colcnol SUI L0,Conmi ndant Ox Noz’vil, vho ie n fcllowur oi 90131 TN ; luing the couse of the ta.ll he toad 1im U. tho A ied i tontic.e to Lend Otorised troops in Stavenger, Droboim nd yo=sibly Jso at Cirlenes ind to occupy the ajrport at Sola (Encl, no 14.)

1437

H1155-0164

grang5tho XiSSiS incroncnanis.orel and vritton warnings re- Governments stipulating th 21 nts. botvoonatheAliod ana the Norwegian towns the Norwegian Government 10,55 o.anAl lied occupation of coastal was the ease in the Altmrk IFe"OE-d not.8obeyond paper protest, as 26 (Enol. Nos. 15 and 16) Me piitea ind.eg4in, in his report of March , Norwegian Foreign Minister Fomieen.ou that.the speech of the containing some protests Tg n. eazin th Norwegian neutrality and London by the Eni;, ."5 not being taken seriously either in known that the Covs; ht in.Norway. by.the Norwegians. it was well England. Howcver, toond no intentions to take a stand against last minute the int0 APuuearances towards Germany up'to the fire. This was to acmnu+1. --ended to issue an order to had been done. There wagt tothn evezything within their power the King, the ConeninwAamaron iquousseriesof conferences between ed Minister or war LJUNEeEaG Tnb’.th boon “ n.Prince and the newly appoint- request of England os cori ymndubeen placed in office at the special as well as the comanding 4 Derson olnee --

tent ioned octions by Enplond were qute un onat she could onl- ... 1

to denox

. in office at the special 4 person close to the King

mod to HAGELIN that the above y vin the w ir“sheveroancebeusince she .

---ro- of the Norwegian i Countorblow which was not

portS- Furthermore Englend feared a’cemto be allowed to materialise. r, Nm, : . -Uw waLLULI was notfied by London that Germany intended Mrvgian Coverament was a1so noti- and the Norwegian Codst.sdte on , onine the waters between Jutland was revealed on or about Irch 15 SScgfron England this plan Foreign Affairs Coraittee of the' squfungmsocret, se ssion of the As a matter of fact durin ° .•h mtorting by Foreign Minister KOHT, for the occupation of Norway he course • the military prep rations military authorities anato’ttatsapya had boenandopted by the German got to London. Th view of 77. m / Istery how this plan back his earlier -dsye".0 all. this news QUISLING could no Longer situation in Norway. He noontin uqwtching the development of the would mean a grave risk W d > point out that any further delay report ever to be suhnittoa houeboyo.wosprobably the most decisive -rzodiatesztranemittea At to ROSEAUPERG

SCHINT to mke spodainaPerlinHtEm ws roqucsted by Colonel And a Colonel of the GEnerrangementsfor a conference betwoen QUISLING his conference was held£ CoS some neutral ideation.

La confirmation of openhagenin the beginning of april.and his confidants ana in contract isinformntion coming from QUISLING

on April 8th. initiatea Sthein dehythe oreign office, the Allies, their intended occupation 5 p w irst major blow as an introduction to to the Sth. “ Normy, During the night from the 7thannouncenent of this hez m e Norwegian coast and made publi reports anvays tNxwoz’sreoption, consistant wiLh the growing weakerX °.AP,Was more than protests on paper Comuan of the mw™ r : hen, after proper preparations and by the morning of orersrenter Gernany undertook the counterblow in airfields and seaports. * oocupied the most important Norwegian

proper to 30)

are"eportssabout the further political devclopments in Norwayud ui the appended documentary menorandum (Encl. Nos 18

seemed

developments of the miiPti, action i oriented hin (Roseibeng) about "the

1238

most daring decision which was now approacneNU--.,,on the continuous warnings of QUISLING as reported to himREICHSLEITER ROSENBERG, And that it actually happenedn-tk-RoN-TE-M

FJORD that behind the stern f the last Gernan Troop Transpor e bow of the first English destroyer which convoyed the Transpcri fleet. "his destroyer was wiped out by the

g

Appearcd the llicd Troop

German Navy.

Berlin, June 15th. 1940

1439

H1155-0165

H1155-0166

SECRET CUNNLAND MATTER

1(27

THE Ch..F

OF THE HICHER COINIAND OF THE WEIBLCHT

WFA/Dept. I. No, 22126 /40 g.k. (Iv)

Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76,

3rd ipril, 1910

2 copies 2nd copy

To theReichs inister or Foreign Affairs

Dear Herr von Ribbentrop,by comnanl

o uzu sunrez, L011 a ppuuu........................ — High Command cf the Tehrmacht. The High Command of the Nehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupY

The military occupation of Denmark of the Fuhrer, long in preparation by the

and Norvray

.11 the questions connected with the carrying out of thisThe tine at your disposal for the political preparation of this

operation is on the contrary very much shorter. I believo myself therefore to be acting in accordance with your c.m ideas in transnit iinc to you herewith, not only these wishes of the wehrmacht vhich would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholi for, purely . -

itself withoperation,

cting in accordance

military reasons, butconcern the

Iso if I include a series of requests, which certainly ehrmacht only indirectly, but which are however of the greatest

importance for the fulfillment of its task.

I would request, in order to bring about complete agreement of action, that personal contact between the German Plonipotentiaries and the militar- Comanders appointed for Oslo and Copenhagen should be established as soon as possible, Lhe entire direction of the military operation is in the hands of Inf, General v. Pallenhorst, Commander of group XI: Under him, the occupation of Denmark will be dirocted by the High Command for special ~pemti ons XXXI, 0. in C. Air Force Koupisch.

In accorlance with the TUhrer’s specific instrvctions, may I further­more request, that the number of persons par bicpati u; in the pr opr rations be restricted to the utmost. Apart from thc Foreign Office n.. Uhc -gh Command of the Wehrmacht, other his her Teich authorities an 1 similar oftices are not in principle participating. The necessary instructions to the Higher Reich authoritics will only be .given on the day of occupation itself by the High Command of the Wchracht.

Heil Hitler,

Yours faithfully,

H1155-0167

TRaNSLATION OF DOCUMLNT N0.1871-ISOFFICE OF U.S. GHIEF OF COt ; j

un

oMinutesof the conferonce between the Fthrer and the Italian Minister for + eig iffairs. Count Ciano, in the presence of the Reich Fordi. Ait. ,at Oborsalzborg on 12 August 1939. --t--

At the beginning of the conference the Fahrer with the cia of n-ns exPlainsd.to count Ciono tho present situation of Gorany rron the mit ry in the west. Thore are threc hre-B-through points in tho\oot ot tt-o— Thore are three brer rench had in former times alvays

and strategic reasons attempted to break thr ugh for googr. phicnl • which have now been protected with particular care, so

that a break-through seens impossible here as well. Moreover f t;+ havac lsoboen.built along the ruxbre ana Polcinn borders up to ho moh nr" err0that yiolation of Belgian neutrality would no longer givo Fr inyaniitory adventages, but w uld only involve the drngor that Bc1giun 2° ?h . German side in order to defend her neutrality and the Flonish port of the population. The only rennining po isitheroforq.theoreticnlly throuch the Netherlands, But they too would, in the ePin that iffcv ehr h defend thcir neutrality energeticnily becnuse thy Woula East teattiftheysheu ldpzrticipote in a eeneral conflict they Tould l03e their Netherlends are conpletely unsuitable as on asconbiy ro for a 1onve ™ because of the nunorous rivers nd the possibility of flooding 1-8 or e the land which lies below sea level. In case of a brooch of'cutchEnaPrts.q Germany would of course novo into the country irmdaintciy and .....................!possibility of reaching the Meuse in a few hours because of ithe Goman border. Besides, the Rhino uhich is 1 to 1, kn wide ingoiinalrfors

ttacks from ‘‘

ncotould

under pressure from ssibility of attack

uld have the

natural protection against this directi n.

The third possibility of attacking Germany is aput i XV > f • ettackine Germany is a blockade by the British tcE Jrit ust be kept in nind thet tho ships used for tho blockade would be

attacked from the air from Germany, since 11 of England is within the radiusCi of the German air force, because of the IOnc .ncg , 41 ..

Navy

on.attnekof the Gornan cir force, bocauso of the long range of the latest German bombers. There are no further possibilities of Nordic countries would no doubt remain neutral and areany side, since there in hardly nny question of occupying such lor, e -rens as Norway and Sweden. in the same way Switzerland wouldcort-iniy defend her neutrality to the last against any invader.

attek on Germny. Thesafe from air attack from

Gernany has likewise built strong fortifications in the East. The mhrer showed Count Ciono the various fortification systems of nast Russia(nigSberg, Heils berg; triangle, border fortifications). On the rest of the German fr ntier8 (Grenzmark .biles ia) strong fortifications sre also being built, which have been

. deve ©Ped, particularly on the Polish border opposite Berlin, into an impregnable system of lines lying one behind the other. Of course the chptici is exposcd to air attacks, since it lies only 150 In from the Polish border, particularly could beoqusgnofgits aize (28 m nort to south ni 15 k 0st t‛ Post) the cYty possibility dfrona very crot altitude (8 to 9,000 meters) without the SdhH tyof.2 eking certain targets but with the certainty that the bombs w. u-d hit Somewhere within the city.

, Proceeding to the military situation of the western powers and Poland the Fthrer again pointed out England’s vulnerability from the air. Although some prggress has been made in aircraft production, the anti-aircraft defense is still quite backward it is known that England decided on a certain type of anti­aircraft gun only last fall, and we have enough experience on the basis of our own ( years of rearmament to know that mass production is possible only a lone time aiter the choice of a prototype, so that effective anti-aircraft defense can be expected in England only after 1 to 2 years. Moreover, London and other great cities and industrial centers have the seme disadvantage which characterize ' Berlin s position in regard to polish air attacks; from high altitude, out of range oi the. present English AA guns which are left from the war, bombing can be carried out in absolute safety, which would be successful in any case in tho general target area.

H1 155-0168

TRANSL AT ION OF D3C.Ji.HKT NOc 1871~ps OEEEOEU.S ,_CnTEF OF

At the present time England has no increase in ggc . .units of the ships under construction cannot i^X^^-ti^0 first

2 tO„CCO men have been called up since the irtroduction^fJi Ugland hecpa vhe roncsecry troops

put et tno disposal of only tworoj.cn, "urbhemno.re sha nan transfer a nny €""U" of Pip

As for the land armycompulsory military servisc, she will be in a posit.cr to divisions and one cozgd a: o>

a home

bombers to France butwould attack England im fighter planes would be

12 VI groups ofC Gorman air fleet

urgently nocded fcaK of war. and the English protection of their own country

F hr or timea o Woatwal

In regard to France’s situation the after the expected conquest, within a short a position to assemble 100 divisions at the clsowhore At“thocznalnbr-.Sozcgour ro ihasconondgqafronithe ttalimn border, and

begin® Moreover, it as his ooinion +Lr the ddent Stnugs-e which would then fortifications any moro then tLowosthtstho French cannot ovorrun the Italian

aid that in a general conflict Polnnd Germany would be in

> Which would force Franco

At this point Count Cinno showed signs of extreme doubt.

The Polish Army varies greatly in its -,g .there are a number of nr ri6r - - t 1 . * Bosides several crack divisions defense. At present r-me or. nits • Poland is very weak in A and anti-tank is supported economically for a Ensdnnduconaot.supplyher. If, however, Poland acquire these weapons, a id o.m.co S on 10 Poriod of time by the West, she could f Warsaw and CracotsnroGornny8.supniprity would bo rducod. The fanatics istricts. Besides, te cPoSedtby the inditfarent peasant population of other e considered» out of 9, million iono.ihepopul tion of the Polish state must re Jews, end an estimated 9 oninh bitentsle maillion are Goman, .about 4 million 'ewer real poles than the total pipn.Vtroinionsesouvhot there are considerably few ave to be diffosgitly evaluated in gtiono.onporon these, 2a mentioned before tances, Poland would be conquered by 832 Shehtirsypehor Zndor those circum-

As Polnnd makes it clear by her wh Jr +44, •all in any event be on the si 4 of . c -6 Gt5it r th t 111 case of conflict she iquidotion nt thic nceltm" t ? 21 Gereny and Itrly, quick ith the western domoerct. deenlbe.cf gdvontege for the unavoidable conflict astern frontier, not on^ X 11 pihile?-lmnd shauld rarin on Germany's ontingents would be tiodup in porost.r usgian.D ivisions, out also furthern the event of previous iuihm2oronin Silesiap vhich would not be the case iquidato the pseLavindutrdr ide tionGenor ally spooking, it would be best to no ixis portnor protcettth8 X “" thotothena This is fnirly cono, if f the uncortain ncutrals, ina other: is just finishing off onearticulerly in considetotih sit 0 Princo.Roeent Poul .ho (tho rahror) suggestod, ttitude toward the -is 1i C -t y Prince Paul clarify his political ho axis and Yugoslavia’s leaving the D He ne thought of a closer connection withttoro Recently the prince regentstorn powers. The sarig +n«,. „ In "7 t -- —4U ovu&ut -lusurance 1ron the

.25894150.912888910 K22o2s-F2o822poyad an tno °“0 of C-Foncu . erestin the aims of the western deuocrac

he Axiston comynotsnycontvorystondprint in Englend, tho Balkon countriosf Italy and Germenve- re+ only on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally ossible rd th sinihy° Th S y Germany has supported Bulgaria as much asy neutron osipPdtesonf “ oponsand vill continue to do 30. Yugoslavin vould mocracies onen, 14 .6 . . e G ingerous to toke the side of the testernrmemy-o5S fwi \ moment when there would be a turn to the worse for -"-28-35222

doubtless not give up his neutrality unless naonternyinygoorrpt. king Oatol

be c

"A8Ve of Iotions, Prince Paul agreed to the as in London and sought reinsurance from the

democraciesand who denied any

Afiterwards it was learned that

ond Slovakia is under German influence and even has German

H1155-0169

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1371-PS OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

that R urning to the Question of Danzig, the FEhrer explained to Count Ciano withdraw s.imp ossible to yield on this point. He has agreed with Italy to "iohldravathe.Germans.from South Tyrol, but for that ver reason h must carefull: created eryth &tha could give the impression that a precedent has been applied to thewithdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, which coula be oPP+e withdmwi g8ions, too Besides, his justification to the German people pnthe. withdrayl. o4 these Germans from Italy is the German policy, which is in &‘directed toward the east and the north-east. The cast and the north- snhero ig"rthe Baltic countries—have always been Germany’s uncontested reeds the interest, just as the Mediterranean is Italy’s own sphere. Germany needs the grain ana wood-producing countries of these eastern regions for ‘ economie reasons.as.vo11. Dinzig is not enly a cnse of materinlintsrests, however, although this city is the biggest Baltic port.to 40% of the tonnage of Hamburg. The turn-over amounts

easier to understand

Danzig, the Nordic Nrnberg, is an old German city, al feelings in every G-man, and just this psychological for er 4 respect public opinion. To make the situation easier to unaerstena sorenTtalian, Count Ciano should imagine that Trieste is in the hands of ugo412 vig.ond a .strong Italian minority on Yugoslavian territory is bing trimtydeopthobrutongforco It ccn herdly be supposed thot Itoly would 106k on

which awakens sentiment- element foreces the

grCount piano replied to the FAhr er ‘s explanations by first pointing out thej :- - - — -- ---- • • F--1- b -1l OU • L.

gt.iurprise amone the Italians at the abolsutely unexpected seriousness of lm-ien: Neither in the Milan conversations nor in the talks on thethe situation

osension of his visit to Berlin was any indication given by the Germans that the - ua ion with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, the Reich foreign.minister had duel' red that in his opinion the question of panzig will be settled in the course of time. on the basis of this state the Duce decided, true to his conviction that a conflict with the western democracies is unavoidable, to make his preparations for that eventuality and made his plans for a certain period of time of 2 to 3 years.unavoidable now, Italy would of course be on Germany’s side, re-emphasized just before Count Ciono s departure, but for various reasons, onumerated in detail, Italy would welcome a postponement of the general conflict.

of ffairs,

If a conflict isis the Du co

. .Count .Ciono then explained, with the aid of a map, the Italian position at.thgnutbrenk.of n genoral conflict. Italy believes, he said, that a conflict with Poland would not be restricted to that country, but would grow into a general European war.

TheFhrer remarked that opinions differ on that point. He personally is irmly convinced that the western democracies will in the end shy away from

precipitating a general war.

believe itglint Ciano replied that he hoped the Fhrer was right, but he did not 1 -l• In any case, one should adapt one’s reflections to the worst

P°Ss-bl1e i.g., to general conflict, since the Abyssinian conflict Italy has actually been constantly living in a state of war and therefore urgently

,C breathinE spell. Count Ciano proved with the aid of figures how great +4 Y S materinl effort had been, especially in the Spanish conflict. Italy’s

s. ock of raw materials is now exhausted, she needs time to restock her warehouses.

She must also transfer her war industries, all of which are in an exposed location, to the south, in order to be better able to defend them. In the same way the Italian artillery, particularly the AA defense, is greatly in need of modernization. The long coast line and other exposed points are not sufficiently defended.

The strength of the fleet is also extremely unfavorable. At the moment Italy cen put against the combined English and French 11 to 12 battleships only 2 of its own, while in a few years a total of 8 battleships will be available.

TRANSLATION OF OCUl.EN’I NOe - (+ -

. OFFICE OF U.S. OHIEF OF COUNSEL

At this point the Fthror remarked that of course England and France will have /additional battleships of 35,000 and 0,000 tons.

Count Ci ano pointed out the long Italian coastline, which is hard to defend* and he numerous bases at the disposal of the English and French fleets, giving particular attention to the Greek ports.

The Italian colonies are especially vulnerable at present. Lybia is hard to attack from Egypt, it is true, while from Lybia there is the possibility of advancing to Marsah Matru. The situation in regard to Tunisia is quite different. The proposition of the Italian and French Arab population is 1 to 20, while the strength of white troops is 1 to 5 to Italy’s disadvantnge. Besides, the Italian fortifications on the French frontier are quite inadequate. only recently new armored bunkers wore delivered.

, !Though Abyssinia is almost pacified, with the exception of certain r gions

along the border of the English territory, where the English create difficulties among the poulation with their money and propaganda, this pacification is only on the surface. It would be sufficient, in a general conflict for a few English airplanes to drop leaflets over Abyssinia , saying that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would return, to make the revolt of the Abyssinians flare up again. Besides, Abyssinia would be cut off completely from the motherland in case of a conflict, and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in Abyssinia would be very uncertain. In a few years there would be an army of 4 to 500,000 men in Abyssinia, and if a conflict should break out then it would be possible to ttack the Sudan, Kenya, and French Somaliland successfully.

The islands of the Dodecanese would be in difficulties because of the attitude of Turkey. Of course Loros and Rhodes could defend themselves for years.

Albania is a completely undeveloped country and would make an effective base for operations against the Balkans only after several years. First roads have to

be built and the natural resources (iron, copper, chromium, and petroleum) have to be exploited, and then one could consider, as the Fthrer had indicated, advancin successfully on Saloniki and in other directions of the Balkons, as along the five fingers of an outstretched hand.

Italy has plans of economic autarchy which cannot be realized for several years and which would then put Italy in a position to withstond even a prolonged war without difficulties. Anothor reason for the Duco's desire to postpone the conflict is the Italians abroad, who were to be brought back to Italy according to plan. One million Italians live in Franco, of whom about 700,000 are definitely lost for Italy. The other 300,000, however, would be used by Frrncoas hostages in case of a conflict, as could be seen from some measures taken by ‘rnnco in September of last year.

Besides, the Duce personally attaches great importance to the orderly execution of the world’s fair in 191.2, for which Italy made big preparations and from which she hopes for good results in the economic field, especially as egards the inflow of foreign currency.

Besides these considerations, which are based on Italy’s position, there are others of a general political nature which recommend postponement of n general conflict. The Duce is convinced that the encirclement system of the western democracies would doubtless work at the present time. But after a certain length of time the points of friction "nd the seeds of disunity would come to the fore among the partners of the encirclement front, and the front would gradually dis­integrate .

Moreover, the Duce is convinced that the present enthusiasm in England and France will not lost very long. Soon, perticularly in France, the union socrec will once more be replaced by party discord, on condition that the Axis keeps quiet for a time. At the present time it is only due to the Axis that internal differences have been buried in the respective countries.

H1155-0170

H1155-0171

)TRANSLATIOH or DOCULEENT NO, 1871-3 OFFICE OF U.S, CHIEF OF COUrUEL

.Japan’s Position would also be much stronger after the termination of the in S conflict, which is to be expected in two years, while Roosevelt’s nosition in America would be seriously weakened after a period of calm in the field of

oreign politics, so that he could not be elected president for a third time, which would certainly be the case if a conflict should break out soon.

_ 4 Spam,which has just acquired government friendly to the Axis (serono suner, Beigbeder), needs peace after the civil war, but would stand at the side of the Axis in 2 to 3 years as a power not to be neglected. Thus, for exemple, within

years Spain would build 4 battleships of 35.000 tons each. the plans for whichhave just been taken to Spain by an’Italian General. Tho construction is to take place in El Ferrol.

For these reasons the Duce wishes strongly (le Duce insists) that the Axis powers should make a gesture which would emphasize anew the will for peace of Italy and Germany. This could be done by the publication of a communiquo which Count Ciano had given to the Reich foreign minister on the previous dey ena which he now presented again in the following English (and French version):

(communique in English—see original)

Count Ciano said in connection with this tentative communique that theDuce had at first contemplated a proposal for a conference, but, conscious of the Euhrer s misgivings, he now makes another suggestion in a milder form and is very much interested in its acceptance. -

.The Fahror declared concerning the conference plan that in future meetings ofthe poyers it will not be possible to exclude Russia. In the German-Russian conversations the Russians made it plain, with ref ornee to Munich and other occasions from which they had been excluded, th-t they would not tolerate this any more. Besides the 4 main powers, Poland and Spain would also hav to be included in such a conference, besides Russia. This means, however, that Italy, Germany, and Spain would oppose England, France, Russia, and Poland, which certainly is an unfavorable position.

CoUji t Ciano replied that the Duce is of the opinion thnt the one who wins at a conference is the one who is ready to let the conference fail if necessary and to accept war as a possible result. Moreover, the Duce took the TAhroris misgivings into consideration and modified his proposal. He sees in nn Italian and German peace gesture, as suggested in this proposal, the advantage that the wostern powers, which are internally not at all ready for war—but would surehy start it at the present moment, if they were, so to-speak, forced to the wall by the Axis and saw no other way out, according to the conviction of the Duce, based on very reliable information from the democracies. (Translntors note. This sentence is incomplete—possibly something was omitted in copying) The suggested gesture of Germany and Italy represents a face-saving way out for the western powers, which they will certainly use, for there are wide circles which warn against war and which would be backed up by a peace gesture. This menns, however, thi t Polnnd, which would doubtless be abandoned by the western powers, would be isolated after a time and would have to agree to reasonable solutions of the existing difficulties.

. The FAhrer replied thnt there is no time to be lost in the solution .of the Polish problem. The further we got into fall the harder military operations in the east of Europe will be. The air force could hardly be employed at all after ho middle of September in those regions because of the weather conditions,

while the motorized forces would also be unusable because of the condition of the roads, which -ore rapidly turned to mud by the ruins which set in in the fall. From September to May Poland is one big swamp and absolutely unsuitable for any military operations. Thus Poland could simply occupy Danzig in Octobor-. and she probably intends to do so—without Germany’s being able to do anything against it; for it is out of the question to shell and destroy Danzig.

‘ TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1871-PS( OFFICE OF U.S. CHILI OF CGUN.kN

Count Ci ano asked by what time the Question of Danzig will have to be settled, in the FAhrer’s opinion. The Fahr er replied that this question will have to be settled one way or the other by the end of August. The Fhror replied to Piano’s question as to hov the Fthrer :m"uo solution, that Poland will have to give up Danzig politically, whereby her sonomic interests will of course be preserved, and that she v ill have to cr ntribu: 3 by her goncral attitude to a release of the tensiono Ii is doubtful whether Foland will be willing to do so? for hitherto she had rejected the German proposals. The Fhrer personally made these proposals to Buck on the occasion of iiis visit to obersalzborg. They word very favorable for Poland , In exchange for the politicol ro+urn of Dnzig to Germany, with complete preservation of Polish cocomie interests and the establish ment of a connection between Eosr. Prussia and the Re:ch Cermony conceded a border guarantee, a 25-year friendsnip pct: and Po:tish pnrticipotior m influence on Slovakia, At that time Bock ickuou?cegc the proposal with the rumnark that he wanted to examine it. The shcxy rofse was ony the consequence of English intervention. Poland's aims can, morecvor: be seen clearly in her press. All of East Prussia should be occupied, they want to advance to Berlin, etc. In the long run it is unbearable for a big power to tolerate such a hostile neighbor at 1 distance of only 150 km from its capital c The Fhror is therefore determined to use the opportunity of the next political provocation, in the form of an ulti- matum, brutal mistreatment of Gornans, an attempt to starve out pnzie, or something similar, to attack Poland within 8 hours and to solve the problem in this way. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as an Italian,liquidation of Yugoslavia would mean a consider able increase of power

for the Axis.

Count piano asked when such an undertaking against Poland is to be expected, since Italy must of 'course prepare for all evontualities . The Fehror replied that under the prevailing circumst ncos an attack on Poland is to be expcctod t any moment,

A telegram from Moscow and one from Tokyo were handed to the TAhrer during this exchange of opinions. The conference was intcrruptod for a short time, .and then Count Ci ano was informed of the contents of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a Gcrn politic ]. mediator t Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the Russians were completely infor od about Germany's intentions against Poland, Ho himself had informed the Russian charge d’affaires, b: order of the Fhror.

The Fdhrer remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be willing to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the western powers. Stalin’s position is endangered as much by a victorious Russian army as by a defeated Russian army. Rus ia is, at the most, interested in enlarging hor access to the Baltic’s little. corany has no objection to that. Besides, Russia would hardly take the pans of P imd, whom she hates from the bottom of her he rt. The sending of the English-Fr nch nilitar mission to Moscow has only the purpose of averting the catostr phic state of political negotintions .

After further discussion of the communique proposed by Count Cinno, the Fhrer said that he wanted to think over for a day, this proposal as well as Count Cimao’s explanation of the genoral situation, and he therefore suggested that the discussion be resumed the noxt/day.

Salzburg 12 august 1939 signed Schidt.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1871-PS

I, C. Virginia von Scaon, X-046318, hereby certify th: t I m1 thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. I87I-PS.

C . VIRGINIA VON SCHON X-046318

.6.

H1155-0172

H1155-0173

TR-NSLATION OF EXTR.CTS

OFDCCUIENTNO.1822-PSNOTES

on the discussion of the Reich Foreign linister von Ribbentrop with the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano as well as the ambassadors von Aackensen aril 1fricri, in Rome on the 19 th September 1940.

All the saue, Gorony had won air superiority, and was bombing England, and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong reprisal attacks by day as well as by nichtn On one occasion the German Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as iugusb. But this attack had to be called off because of bad leather. realty large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Fuehrer wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain, that such an attack would mean the beginning of England's destruction, although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air, thcir results for England had already been extraordinarily serious. With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a short time.

The British armament factories had been seriously affected, and important ports, such as Fortland, had been entirely crippled. lioreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made unusable.

With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign linister stressed, that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be certain of Germany's sy-pathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the pace.

The Reich Foreign linister further announced a statement by the Fuehrer regarding the nilitary part of the Spanish problem, i.e. the conquest of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves.. But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain vith special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few staff els of planes. The Fuehrer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from the militamr point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the Spaniards were to be given assistance.

The Reich Foreign linister then showed the Duce the German map re gar di ng the Spanish territorial demands, and this ras duly noted by the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the Reich Foreign inister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not clash with Italy's in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign linister announced Serrano Suner’s intention, also to make a visit to Rome.

On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign ilinister) intended to sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing vith Spain’s entry into the war ,‘as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforenencioned materials, recognising the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack against Gibraltar as a declaration of W ir • The protocol would also state, that Spain’s entry into the vrar would be left to the judgment of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would cone into tne war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and, particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.

3819.

H1155-0174

iTLISL/TION OF DOCUlENT C 131 OFFICE GF U.S, CHIEF OF COUNSET,

Top Secret

Suprore Corzenc of the -re Forces. Fhror HQ, 21 Jenucry 191,1

LESt No. 8/^1 Top Secr^t To Secret.’„ . Only thru Officer.’Top Secret; 6 CopicsOnly thru Officer’ 2ndCopy

.. Enclosed please find c. short resum’of the speech made by the Euhrer -uring the final conferonce with the Dace on 20 January 41 ana C sunnry on the results of the conference held by the Chief of the Supreme Command of th- irmed Forces wich General Guzzoni on the ,9 January 41.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Irca Forces

- 2 enclosures -

Distribution:

OKH (GenStI) 1st copy010 (Ski.) 2nd copy

Ob.D.L. (lw.Fil. St. la) 3rd copy

O//FSt 4th copy

L 5 th coJ

iuso 6th copy

Top Secret

Enclosure 1 to OKy-pst No. 8/41 to_ secret Top Secret.’

Only thru officer I

znd copyhcsult on the Conference of the Chief of the Supreme^Command of the

imed Forces^ith tho Italian General Guzz^y on the 1 9 January 41

1 • ImortantItems from the ipprecntion of the Situation by General Guzzoni. ' *-------------

1,)mbaniaThe nost irportant Itolien theatre of war. Though front not sufficiently secure to meke it certain that the present line can b helC against Greek attacks in all circumstances, no danger of Valone. or Berat being lost. 21 divs, now in i1bania, intention is to send another 3 divs, from Italy.

Intention to form a group for attack on the northern Plonk. Strength about 10 divs, (including 3 divs. still to be brought from Italy and 4 -lpinc divs.). Wlill not be ready for attack

Top Secret

1851

Top Secret H1155-0175

1e5o toXnmST1 since transport facilities do not make it posg- phaetoship.the 3divs• or the personnel and equipment required for the remnfrsement of the remaining divs, any faster. Intention to attack

k fC’H 8roup in direction Korica, from there, some units to carry outaflanking moveznent to Erseke in order to cause the collapse of the'' northern part of the Greek front, the main body to continue the attack “ the direction of Florina as soon as supplies are safeguarded beyond Eorica (only 1.road available). Abandoned intention of making an attack with a limited objective along the coast in the near future.

2 .)LibyaIntention for continuation of campaign;Holding of Tobruk as long as possible. Defence of the Dorna - Eastern cage O the Djebel line, using the armoured unit stationed at Lfekili for Ofensive action. Sending of reinforcements from Tripoli to Cvre- naica, in order to strengthen the defence planned there, in case the situation in Cyrenaica continues to develop favourably, thus making if possible to hold the vestern part of Oyrena-i ca.If Cyrenaica cannot be held, defence of Tripoli.Ttalians belicve that Tobruk can hold out for some time and that the British will not advance upon Benghazi - Agedabia before the fall of Tobruk The folloving reinforcements are earmarked for Lj.bja:-Bringing the 3 divs, stationed in Tripoli up to full strength, trans­ferring one armoured div. and one infatry div. (motorized) from Italy to -r-Po-l• Completion of these transports about 20 February 41

3 .)East Africa *Situation difficult in the case of British attack, which is expected in the near future. Defence tc the utmost intended. It is desirable to aivert British forces from Libya to East Africa, even though it may render the situation in East Africa more difficult.

4• ) DodekaneseExpected attack on Dodekanese has not hitherto taken place. Supplies in hand for about 3 months. Forces in Dodekanese weak (handwritten marginal note;- these ought to be considerably increased), nevertheless a certain offensive power in the case of a Gerinan attack upon Greece from Bulgarian territory (especially against British transports from Egyot into the Aegaean). L

II. Views on the Italian appreciation of the situation1 .) ulbania

re-

2.)

/cry unlikely that the Italians will be able to muster the forces suited for an attack within the time provided. 4 support of a German attack from Bulgaria against Greece must therefore be"discounted.(Handvritten marginal note;- The German attack will however bring strong relief to the Albanian front)Libyahccher or not Cyrenaica can be held cannot yet be determined. Unless

the situation is basically changed, a loss also of Tripoli need not be cared, all the more since from ilay onWards large - scale operations

Wi- no more be possible, oving to the heat (handwritten marginal notes:- the loss of Llorzuk (s) is evidently considered trifling. Con- titio sine qua non:- no complications out of Tunis).

3 .) East AfricaDuration of resistance in the case of a British attack cannot be est_ inated.

4 .) DodekaneseNo resistance of any significance is to be expected in the case of a ack. Offensive action of the Italian Forces stationed there against British transports to Greece cannot be counted on (handwritten marginal note;- ought to be built up in order to form an important co. ppleentary operation during the occupation of Greece.)

- Employment of Genian units in Libya and .bania

Italians very warmly welcome the dispatch of the 5th. light div. (motor -zed) Corposed as suggested. Shipment to Tripoli can begin approxinatcly e ween 15 and 20 February; it will however be possible to carry out

transports of equipment before that date.

Top Secret-2- 1842

-0176

Top Secret.

2.) Al paniaDispatch of a German unit is Ccscribcd by Italians as desirable, but not necessary. Dispatch of a corps inpossible, as transport facilities inadequate. For reasons of transport, dispatch of only one mountcin div. with light cquipme nt could be considered.Decision not urgent at the noment. Itolicn attack - unless s trong Greek forces are moved from the Albaninn front to the Bulgarian frontier - impossiblo in any ct.se before the beginning of April, therefore German unit need not be sont before larch. Consequently new decision vhether a unit is to be sunt, at the beginning, of 1 arch. ' reparations for unking a unit available will however con­tinue .

Enclosure 2 toOKI/VES t. ] k. 8/41 top secretTop Secret

6 copies2nd copyTop Secret

Only thru officer

Speech by the Ehrer on 20 J: nurry 1941

On 20 Janucry at 1100 hrs., a rcport is rcCe to the FUhrer by the Chiefs of the Supreme Coiman. of the armcC forces and of the Lrmcd Forces Opcrational Staff in the presence of General von Rintclen on the result of the military discussions with GeneralGuzzoni and General Gandin.

II.) At 1200 hours, the Phrer developed before a vd.der circle histhoughts and views on the situation.Those present:-

on the Cerun.n sideThe minister for Torcign -ffcirsChicf of the Supreme Comnan of the

ArcC ForcesChief of the armoC Forces Op erational

StaffGeneral von Rintclen-mba. s saCor SchriltAn interprcter Prom the Foreign Office

on the Itolinn sic the Duce

Count Ciano

General GuzzoniGeneral harrosGeneral Gandin

Colonel SchmundtFreg. Kopt. von Puttknmer

Contents of the Fuhrer's Speech in Concise Form:-Finland of great inportance to us owing to the nickel find­

ings unique in uropc. Russians promise to supply us with the quantity of nickel required, but only as long as they pleased. Therefore Finland must not be interfered with any marc.

Denurche of the Russians on account of our massing of troops in Roumania has taken plc.cu and will be duly rejected. Russians always become insolent at a. time when they cannot be harmed (winter).

The massing of troops in Roumania "serves a threefold purpose :-a) an operation against Greeceb) protection of Bulgaria against Russia cnd Turkeyc) safeguarding the guarantee to Roumnnin.Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, alto-

gather therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.

Desirable thr.t this loployment is comletod without interfer­ence from the enemy. Therefore disclose the gac as Lete as poss- ible • The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last poss­ible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.

Top Secret

(21438)

H1155-0177

l’op SecretFor this runs which crue to li-ht a-

grisello=toraontto ttionnry chin tho rosult: Itlicns in he

vHn Hoevor if the GUx VLLL be nrorn. ,

ont

n unitS f can

Ozito the difficulties of t2 l~t ry discussions - it is not da unit to i1b0ni- +c77- .... . lx at rome •L- undos irnlle ronctions Toui

look on fro bchind the” crin the southecst, .

V-r-. un lec.s' -nt if f iclCs at t> Turkey

Cons tonz:Gcnercl )•

g;4,,04: -ituction in theS-tuction in the —

h-, . i ----- -IUUtrA. • -i 4- n •»oliceri+ .4.1. .lli 1t would bcfen miHaithozitninendput her

—t aim. —In this respect -cnt in his rifle:

The atteck

"eere in the positio

;n.4"4“ only from theanst the Bri+ick t i . • on--t-sn Isles is our ult.of 2 "n with only one rou

—S nuch worse then beF,ralcgaa eet

, ten• , 4, -ning can only be moa, ,,,,id not exist in under certrin conditionsa. tnree consccuti- -die goneral ti

in the more a.she pie

our Lc.se kecping should ~

IC cannot be r e of a fail;

cnte the situctionsince too

S

rt fron that

grou.r-enes to the S- of forces in S, . j, , , — Southern 7- lootnolu in Portu 7

locling of the *substitute for the ■

in theish fronti

J

t

hich, ho l wecthor

the protection of2 spn time

to ste lwaysin if Britain

S-n-e •J the a Gimnlter, WTe Once in osscss

ir force is only a poor nc mCe such properatiopoor68 would hc.ve ensured

De in a position to - thus put on end to Teysenar

sun to succcec ingettig s suecess and would Insicchiy

S short spacc of tine,enter the we.see 8rest denger comin- from Amer:,Though we Leje ve^% greater denger igtric even if she shoula Puesik, I prefer to fevouralle Political and economic icclockof Bussia. alle parts of these S’ .00 means 2 my aisposgre ements with preventing me f ,8 5. therefore tied down on " Very consider-

power to brin [20 SuPpl in the armement irdustr- Hugsiangfrontier, thus ille pitch. • 5 armoment of the air force"styithsufficient man-s long as Stalin -.0 . “ the highest poss-

gent and careful . ves, there is probcb), . jU1’ -ut shioula he ceased. 1-4 no dancer; he is intelli-^t^re, the Jevs, who at prese mi t move up again into the

succe

ss* stroforcee in soar

UnU S trya 4--; n/i a .. . _

We woul rico cn after

CCiterrcnecn

only occup- econd an third-rank positions.. It.therefore behoves us to , tring to worl 01+ ng,, , S .to be careful, is vh- 41. .. , out new demands which +01 "

t+ • do not lile explicit -eh theyr-cu nto the agreement- tor Tt is therefore necessrrstocndarrecise formulcs in these. S- mer19 "tolecon.mu ra, E medna rPtroonstentee on tle Rssien imperil u in been no denger tt 21h.end clever dipj.omncy.

Roumanion oilficlas‘cte,eut no, ' Russia ena fror +u ,ce turned those oilfields thelediterrcnecn.

oians are continuc.1)y ne c e .c.----- , •

That

in the ere of on lond she cannot i +. , ” ° the air force the--- ~XD0.nS C of •- ” ' ■ 1, " moinS debris fromo the c.xis depends onnd the life

fac-or-

vin1 renin vehun: 1cbut an onti-tonk unit „Ee;reforeve shall send he enmplo ed before the 104 hczn.be transported do not want to act 4, 0t period sets in.tank uns in this unit itheEritisn didin France. - metc,e -Il 6:- we

The troops are gy2e " ate eny Tritish tank which .tenis ond the anti- self-reliant that in erienced have confidence in 4eh. is . in action there, given the name *tetksuntez_mportont in the PiShtn. their.vecpons cna are Psgchqloice]reesons ‘ - 5 the huntsman his cuarry.

+ts, to plnces where they -- Hib a not an ormoured more quickly and can still

For employed it shall ance.self-reliant

ers" to the ant;,* CJeinst tanks, are to seek nnkusunners cleo for

out the enemy talk end battle itTe have

Top Secret

H1155-0178

Top Secret /• —enerel statements on the factors vhich are decisive for success

in modern worfore. In the course of these, reference to the importance Oof tre iningin up-to-dote methods of worfare. vhich recuircs much time and ei fort and a highly efficient "body of non-commissioned officers.

Importance of the air force and of the armored varfc re. The training of an armoured unit is beset with difficulties it is least possible to form an armoured unit boyr improvisation. Even the conversion of a fuly trained armoured unit to other wetpons takes months.

, . i.e hcve not achieved our . mat successes vith armoured troops by vorkin with hecv: tanks. .e prefer medium tanks. The French had very much heavier tanks than we had.

Our greatest asset were our ponzer- generals vho have developed completely nev tactics and have directed their units very cleverly and with an offensive spirit.

General reference to the importance of mines in land warfere. Examples:- mining of our vest wall.

-locl:c.Cc by mines which wore laic by the 16th ermy in the flank of our attack against Iro..ce.Ty means of mines, a field of attack can be complete ly messed up

uestion of the Threr cbout mines at Tobrul- and whether further mines could not be brought in by U-bonts.

Tonlslose 11 offensive spirit as soon as they encounter minefields. Croat heroiem 3 the engineer is requircd to remove or clear minefields.

Vievs on the var in the air and the comparison of Germen to British air raids.

It is necessary to have at one’s disposal a nighty anti-aircraft weapon with a great ammunit:on suppl: for c moment may come when the war will be conducted almost ezclusively y the air force and the navy.

Assinst henvily armed ships, only the dive-bomber is successful.Threr dwells on the excellent impression he has gained of General

Intones co.. He really is a personality.The Duce is of the opinion that his relations to the Le ion are not

good.Fhrer goes into generalizations on the subject of revolutions of

which onl3 the Fascist end the . national Socialist ones have had an immediately constructive effect. In Roumenis the predestined men wes murdered before the outbreak and the first-rank leaders of the le. ion with him. Thus it came about that the leading may grev out of the Army, who started off the revolution and removed the king. He is inspired by slonin fanaticism, is rec.dy for any battle for his country and will vage it vith, without, or if necessary even against the Legion.

One men mus t be the Threr, a head of Stete and eside him a lender of a movement are not possiblc. It would be best if Antonescu became simultaneously the leader of the Leg-ion.

CuRIIEICAIT OF IRAITSLTIONOF DOCUJIIT HO. C134

10 Hov 45

I, G-OETZ 0Yn, 1/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thorouhly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the aboveis a true and correct translation of Document No. 0 1 32

conmz LAYER T/5 33812169

Top Secret- 5 - 1855

1

H1155-0179

Page 1. TRANSLATION OF DUCOMENT 1834 - PS OF COUNSEL.

Circular RAM No. 56/ of 2/3. 2,1subj: conference RALV/ Oshiina in Fuschl 23. 11. 41.

65 214

FOREIGN OFFICE RAM NO. 56/R

Personal.

Berlin, 2 March 1941 Strictly secret.

In.the, inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese ambassador OSHIMA in Fuschl on 23 expossition is of fundamental significance general political situation, Spring 1941 . as it impends

for for

February 1941 • This orientation concerning theGermany at the outset of

signed:Ribbentrop.

Te: the German Embassy in AnkaraMadridMoscowRome (Quir.)Rome (Vat; )

The German Legation in Athens Bolsrad BemBudapest Bukarest Helsinki LisbonPressburg Sofia Stockholm

each particularly -6,5215

1569

Page 2TRANSLATION OF DOCUENT 1834-psOFFICE OF U 8 CHIEF OF COUNSEL ________ CONTINUED

Confidential

Memorandum.

the mgdningorstneSlavossatsaprarotssnethst:010g 32,8,88 R. St. G. B. in

and of 21Singo copies of vritten roports totheprcicn office are . ,

forwarded in a strong double envoi , 4., + ' --tice are to beenvelope rust have the inscription «To the putersonc sealed.. The outer orachier buroau hana, Hofrat ^-4 rorEproengntaiooznttention and the inner envelope must carry the -a,rc.. ,4 41 • o---ce,authorizing the report, or, in case this is' th- sth simner.of the order Ministerial Dirigent, it must have the 8 iatuu.ScetuSoprgtary,the and following this must stand: , - ° the Ref eratsleiter,

'•To the Foreign Office, attention of ______or reprosonative. w

On both envelopes of tho written . . , number thereof withut indication of th/"" G vill be noted the date and index will be given date-lanantio nnon t hoseqr t contents. In the anossage

envelope (ofp63 of 265062m911920

does not exist^th^sXot Caphopingcsenled qotorinl in the prescribed wayis to be used.

EnclosureTo RAM No. 56/R Strictly secret!

Extract

from the report with ambassador

of the conference of the Reich Foreign Irini Oshind in Fuschl on 13 Tebruary 1941. ister

Mdinistortayingrparticularlysincer nutual grectinge the Nan Reich Foreign doubtcrs in Jan™ 2£ 4b aSS4dor Oshina had won out against the many Germanyis Victry Lhhhtheerqlitics 'oliti carrida on vitl Germany. By (the RALE ) rcerets th t +"S0. / pOlities had been fully justified. He he had been workts, that 4 alliance, betwoen Geruany and Japan, on vhich into being only afLr S J a-bossador for years already, had come not been ripe for it earlier8 deteurs, but Public opinion in Japan had together now. ear-ier • The nain thing is, however, that one is

declared: The intesthe.ganeral politicnl situation the Reich Foreign Minister and he (RAN) had himself h^n^ ooked for ^understanding with England to undertake Amnatsfbeen sent to England as an ambassador in his time had existed in th- A ' " kin. this direction. A certain possibility doubted from 4. hsepersanofEing oven though it was to have beenRAN) had been more {inning.Whet her the king would exert himself. He (the considered the chances Skept al a readyat his arrival in London, and had chique in EnglandXn for understanding as 100 to 1. The war - inciter England war Gas duthen.nso won the upper hand. Then he (the RAM) left on a treaty vis.-payoid— c•Then.when it cane to war the Fuehrer decided Perhaps LffS8^

1570

H1155-0181

TR.NSL/TION OF DOCULSNTS 1834-PSSe 3° OFFICE OF U S CIIII 0. CCJISLL

_____ CONI'] NUHD_______________

The treaty was however in the interest of Japan, for. the Japanese emnpire was interested in as rapid a Geran victory as possible, which as assurod by the treaty with Russia. Furtherorc he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the Goran-Japanose relationship. Now the Ggg.ian-Japancse alliance has been made. Aibassador Oshima is the nan vho gets credit for it fron the Japanese side after conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

Those are no military probles on the continent any longer which could be dangerous for Geraany. Goraany would not tolerate it in any circunstances that England should get a foothold. Wherever the English might make this attempt, in the Mediterranean, in Greece or possibly in Portuga; , they would ismediatoly be thrown out. The war as such is already won to-day for the Axis, it is a matter novr of proving to England that it can undertake nothing nore against the Axis and that its hope of crushing the Axis powers, based on the blockade, hunger, or unrest in the Axis countries or occupied territorics, is vain. England had to be forced to admit that she possessed no prospects for victory any more and would have to sue for peace.

Geruany is observing developments in France sharply, the Reiclf oreign- minister continued. Germany has no interest in an occupation of the wholo country, particularly in view of French Africa, that it shovl 1 net fall into the hands of de Gaulle. Aside fron that France is neither a political nor a military problem any longer. Her power is broken for a.il tinc and would remain so.

As for the garrisoning of other countries occupied by Geruan troops - Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Poland, this is a purely police function which Germany was exercising and tied dovn few forces. In the present state of technical weapons (Stukas, tanks) it is po siblo to control the largest land areas with comparatively small units of troops. he hopcs of England for disturbances in the occupied territories are without avail Besides conplete peace exists there. In Goruany there is no lack of food, it is supplied for years. Also in the occupied lands there is sufficient food. In the cal of raw material supply curtain insuf fici once s occasionally do exist, for practical purposes, however, no tiling could happen to us. This is being taken care of by the Bour - year plan which is being malting Germany more independent daily, and in addition by the tremendous economic area vhich Gcmany controls.

Militarily, the Reich Foreign Minister continued, the Fuchrer had created a nuuber of new formations during the winter. In the Spring, 240 di Visions, incliding 186 first-class attack divisions are available. The Fuehrer is determined not to permit any more English troops on Greek territories, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia have already joined the three- PoWer pact; tomorrow we could sign with Bulgaria. The time of joining 1 is however deterined by military necessity. Bulgaria has recently sig? a treaty with Turkey, upon our instigation. This Turkish - Bulgarian deardtion signifies a clear separation of Turkey fron the warlike eV-opnents in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia

"ould undertake anything in case of German intervention in Greece. Should Vic tasks howoverbecone active against expcctations, sufficient troops are prepared to destroy them utterly.

Yugoslav statesien have recently been on -a visit to Germany in order to announce their willingness to live at peace with us and Italy, We were calmly awaiting developments. Yugoslavia would sooner or later have to cone ower into our canp, whether by joining the three-power pact or by other arrangements: The Prince Regent Paul appoars to hesitate yet, but he also would have to bow to the national reason. With tli Greeks cane dovm a peg or vhether the action against them would have to be carried out, the English had to get out of Greece.

• Lage 4 1LOl Ol‘ DOCUILIN 1832,,A 11 TT er .... _

OF COUNSELCONIINUED.

Italy, the Reich Jorc;, . . ...Greece had unfortunately Lcen att continued, had suffered reverses. Duce ihd believed he had to do tt4c r without our knowledge. The at the disposal of England" "ticubecaun had placed basesFiye-talian divisions stood asasnstt103 hadly prepared militarily. The Italian soldier is good but badly wgt Greek.divisions in bad weather, front in Gpeece is stable, no dance, cogu4Pped and poorly led. Today the are not camitted there, * to y-loncer • Gornan troopsthe fact is that Graziani had ttheucituation.o Italy in North AFric consequently surprised at Si di yEse01 late. The Italians were Wavell was to be explainea Sby +6,50110, 5 ictory march of General have not been trained enough ror tark-war^J of the Italians, who

I are.

leadership of a capable densuy, avonavsant a unit to under the bridgehead and also later to ai’aul,°en,ohold certain positions as < people stands finely behind the mice, ’ -nglish, Vhere we can we are helping Italy inUltimnately the events in N1,+L p,,: , u1-----which was sure to us. th ixica have no influence

a. Furtherore the Italian snere is no reason for worry, recard t supplies of raw material,

J l A tre - ---on the final victory

ana ReiwhuEarsign 4inister wont on, webut could not yet decide on an-ointhqthree-power pact sooner or later, food supply. In itselr a quidrpensstop because of difficulties in its Gibraltar problen to be attacked as 8 io Y Spain would have pernitted the the final victory. ‘ oon as possible and thereby speed

are standing on good

that Stalin is a cool ant above all in view of our riilitori undertakinc souething against us, this continues to show the tendency of shrensth. I .is. clear that Bolshevism cy or planting its shoots in other countries.7, S8«Soviet star woula rise over Europe. A German-Russian conflict, httevErs vattanti vely and with supresxe calm, victory and signify the end of the S-'viet • ccrantie Geruan

forto be sure, but in spite of this renotssufficiently trained for coibat retarding effect on English thl Sshegy d' u aco was done which had a strongly in increasing measure so thatarerrod io, eto. The bribing would centime inerica is in a condition to replace ' toudestroy very Luch uore than whole continent, when we sha11 win;, "61DC 7 have air suprenacy over the further develoguents. x " — supremacy over England depends on

at sea the comitent A , ,atively slight; after the end of ,U-bo at te aponhas thus far been copar- would multiply in a short tine, Marehithe ointment of the U-boat weapon boat weapon we would deal terrible bnwith the combination airforce - U. is already now making considerable bows on .England. The loss of tonnage Meat and fat are anready "sdarra leudifficulties for the English food suppy, by sinkines to a derinite 1eres"wnIt, is noatter of reducing imports

shape overnight. The landins inann.ssituation would take catastrophic depends on various factors, above'all on weatheT^iJionsT^0”

noticed thatinodcsriqarsthensica yroimiinister vent on, it nust o As far as he was concerned he would jttor.ee Y ofGerany and Japan.have an interest in keeping n"rue" liket.enter the war. However, we the war in spite of this it could « out of the war, Shovla America enter broad spaces of the denstiyouid.ntwacethewar militarily at all. "Te In East Asia, anerica would hardly tree .U8 and inerica kinke this inpossible, t would at once be threatened withdaretosand its.fleet beyond Hawaii, as the atlantic ocean there is - lotion by the Japanese fleet. In

xaoK ° cduiitent possibilities with the

144.

H1155-0182

H1155-0183

Page 5. TR-NSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834 ps OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

CONTINUED.

exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible but Africa also is too l ar removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. . 4 s up for practical purposes to the creation of anerican air bases in England. In an air war we are located in a strategocally advantageous posi ion with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically iron the broad basis of the European coat wldle England had to spread out in departmental fashion in its attacks on Europe and thereby split up.n an air duel - Europe vs. England. Gernany would always be superior. We e levcd,. however, that it should be possible to keep Aerica out of the

war by skilfully co-ordinated politics of the allied powers.

The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would hit it. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English - Anerican aarajorce at any time The nunber of pilots being at our’disposal is un­limited, the Sane is true for our airplanc production possibilities. As .ar .aS, duality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (not to talk of the American) and we are on the way to even enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too will be greatly re­inforced. Since the arny has been supplied way beyond its requirements, enormous reserves have been stood (the ammunitions plants have been slowed

Own because of the irmense stock of material); production can now concentrat on submarines, airplanes and anticraft guns.

• i • Every eventuality has been foreseen; the war has been won to-day n-itarily, econonically and politically. We have the desire to end the war HH-eK- .and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer is vigorous and healthy, fully, convinced of victory and deternined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan is of -portance• However, Japan, in its own interest, should cone in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key position in the Far East, Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it can acquire only through war., There are three reasons speaking for quick action:1) Intervention by Japan would nean a decisive blow against the centre ot the British Empire (threatening of India, cruiser-war, etc.). The effect upon the moral of the British people would be very serious and this would help toward a quick ending of the war.

2) A surprising intervention by Japan would be apt to keep Anerica out of the war. Anerica, which at present is not armed as yet and which would hes-tate greatly to expose its navy to any risks West ofthis even less so. If Japan would otherwise respect the 2u.10c L0leS03

here .. ould not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argumentoi lost prestige to make war plausible to the Anericans, it io very urlike thi, erica would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly whl-e -apan takes the Philippines without Amcrica being able to do anything about it.

Hawaii, could doAmerican interests

It is very unlikely

3.Wouldit seen to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for itself, ill during the war, in consideration of the coning new world vides, the

PoS-tion it wants to hold in the Far East at the tine of a peace treaty.AasSAdor Oshina agreed with me entirely and said that she would do everything to carry through this policy.

war The Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if Anerica should declare the :aui of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that Amerioa had --gnson to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it

, . 5 preferable to avoid this, th- entry into the war would, as plained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the

i inal victory of the countries of the three-power pact. The ForeignAen+8 tore 1V: ther expressed his believe to the effect that a temporary rising , , 5 -fitish moral caused by America’s entry into the war would be

Sr4e: b Japan's entry into the war. If, nowuver, contrary to all Pectations, the Anericans should be careless enough to send their navy

SP- e, of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East* this would represent1445

Page 6 TRNSLeTIONOFDOCUL.ENT 1834 PS OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

the biggest chance for the countries of the qm. the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign tinsti. Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. A-b, , to this, that, unfortunately he docs not Ehinle Ee / but he is convinced of a victory of his Le-t;n Tar

CONPINUN

1 pacts to bring is covinced that the .0" Oshimu replied ricana would do it.

The lLinister for Foreign Affairs further eplains that closest co­operation was retired for the comnon wa.ing of tae vrir, +28810 as far as news service and press were concerned. The co-operation vrl th the Italians is already perfot, the sane is true for the co-operation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. --m- wiun

each The.prsS, radi e, i these countries are already to synchronized wi other.that.j F one single weapon. The sane kind of close contactnustbenade.with Japan: The ambassador welconc this and intends to set upPFREctzxvezyithtonsarsnadetemmineng,aov ou Japonese propaganda can be most

various^ assdor oshina exPlained that when the three-pover pact was conclude intervene iwitnsan rasstiil present in Jaran. It vas then that the ^rcr-. -tnust be stated, however, that, inpressed by the Genian victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the three-power pact.

of .Arbassdor Oshiuda renarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feelare against America has arisen considerably.

qThe llinistor for Foreim AfPadrs rafcrred to the recent statement of th, Japanese Auibassacor in USA merica concerning Japan's attitude in case of 4rica ‘s.entry iato tho vrar, and uentioned hereto that he considers best to talk plain language to the USA.

.ppgoAbassador Oshina renarked hereto that the Japanese inistry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect.

the Thehinister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly due tothetdesire keepmmerica out of the var, plair lengage aast be used. Only

LaUaSndnrenlia, thet hoy are oonrenting firm determination, will they are not 2a in?V inkhe U.8.mrac nob 210 Nctiornl Socialism, however

hold, they into

road.

tke war n.7

into the war for no .

501.3

1 .ns. t and

and therefore are against an entr Lnctjely thac they are drawn

on by Roosev

not acdkesssgithutha.EShsshocnodsinot and string, but, of course, have no 8s- &t,n-hthe 7^ a realize that Germany, Italy and Japan have An, &5 for the Anerica. wccpe, thot, however, should the USAdetesmreggcressivointentions,.they vouacon®ront a strong; front of therefore n-ve1^" & frot a tha, w.ion includes the vroolle world. One woul rerengrtnave to workin ctone co-cperatior. against tho attempts of nis- DP SSitar? Y. he Er.tish propaganda-. As far as speeches and addresses continuous Pie.naturegare conce rnedi wovle he necessary to keep up a APF-ipe - 4 J o- -ce a- In this conecon the Minister for Foreign wilminscecerred to a recon renark uade by iatsunLas concerning Japanese "reatiy as nediater for peace negotiations. This rerark has beenln- exploited by the enery propaganda.

the Jewish mapulators. Therefo:

frieTheNinister for Foreign Affairs continued by saying that it was Japan's cuand ship vhich enadled. to ™ after the entikalinternpact was con-Enunede On thaothec hand, J ep an was abl.e to penetrate decpv into the now of itorost ir China. Gernany’s victory on the continent doesJapan' Franco cono ui 91 oftno .three-power pact, bring great advantages for

P • France, as a power, is eliminated in the Far East (Indochina).

1446

H1155-0184

TRANSLATTON OF DOCULIENT 1834 PS t page 7. OFFICE 09 U S CHIEF CF COUNSEL1 _ —3

England too is considerably weokun. d, en closoe to Singapore. Thus, Gernany has already contributes Jargoly to 1. shogi, of the futnre fate of the. two nations, Dne c ouu geogr:pn co. o:-~n we ecu".c hv to carr the main bur de a cf the fire. bai. i: tw fu Hare too- if Levany shoula ever be weakened Japan wotJd find l’ouf co.-ronbud by a vrorla - coalition.

We are sitting in thu sane boet. The fate of beta is being deterninea now for ce:turic: Cc000, Tte sas is ira fo bejy. Tne interests of th three Count -eE Wcu.d wver mersect, A det ear of Gereny would also nean the end of tne Jspans. ingertalisic idoa.

Aabassador Oshira definitely acreed vri.+.h ese stavetnta and emphasize the fact that Jcpene le.emic to ke, its irperdn1 pozi tion. The Reich Foreign Minister t 1. cizcvuss.1 i gon: poblct s vlca woula result for th parties of the re-poep pect efter the w. \ jy the new shaping cf ordor inEurope and East Asiia; The prcblens arising then vrovld require generous solution.

Thereby no overcentralization shtoull take place., but a solution should be found on a basis of pqritr, pe:tiouler”y in h: eccroric realm, in regar to this the Rej.ch Poreig sor c” ".re J to R1 an: al principle that a free exchange f trale shcai rtx p1 wce bemcen c two spheres of interest the European-Aicar hex." -Tu .nl r 720 Ladors’uip of Gernany and Italy, a the East-Asian nphu.6 of -trost or I • icomouship of Japan, As he conceived it, for e.dnng? ; Japan mt? J o. c:t trau and aako irae ngreenent directly with tle 2uC pundci st ites -n N.. ropjen henisphere, as heretofo. while Germany anC Tu2h2 0 . .d trr. c. itec. I an oke trade ageenents with independent ocu-ce y-n0"tbin uue inponc or5: of pewer, such as Chir. Thailand, Indonhini eto, urtn.c, as ctnen inc no economic spheres, one shou.lA Gunrut.ally crat c.0h-olhee prs qrencos with regard to third parties. Tne ab assaCor expressed agrcun wi.tn tai.s thought.

The Reich Forei.gn liinistee then pointed out as the or otic al, ha+ bhe the basis of nav scorc Ly cho (A, Gen a cy ax T+a. iy nre C.n d oren e 1 ij c threc-owr Dec cre "hcril proneo i.i in th- 10ut 1. Such a :eucon .houza Co) enn t-0 cit ac..on an. uiter cev toward 1sola1o.. in pull Lu opinion. 3 in watiub )o ica f r. nd. herself arire: signebory powrors showtba eval-atee . question , norcorer. was in no way acu‘

ouchec. unor. the question, explicitly .cCPe ing pcwe:s night be required, o.

c eruk u° Ciplometic relations.lot tuined on tnis, efsor eisming of the

the ( coasi on arises, but a.lro jointly ope:: thl uyos ox thu people in the USA tein uon.tlons bring about a swing intura.3 a sij+ion had to be chosen • in . e roug. The ccnon step of th orlospon/inc"y in propaganda. The

:c at “.ho uie.

Oshiina asked whether one ha.d calked with the Russians about joining the thrce-Poer pac Pei.ch Foreig l’iis.e efPim.mi tnis- Molotov had preserve the s nc Pcpocal to Stein ad hrenfue aulamwi fandamnel vrLllingness unde: °9 -Gain prndionse go iwe:r. con/’ions beio. xho PossLan interest in Tilmad, hc dase for c.cs - :qtori -w it!.Tuuvia ard be Straits prohl«d Cec L'.rod oue • wil.in; no o 1, eat fee; & ve-isien of the

- at : it exoroosod th ovje ture ut the Tucis nula hardly be "j—lBe to Det Bu.u:‘at th • Btecia. vLile.. rhe do • orae . f-reachi c for Pc -•n.A had no* he. uiy nppGal i - th. Tussan-. lixal’y, bovever, they 1 to 1• - 42 vith it jr 0o50cw i.x w*.. ‘ dw strort ecocnic interests vthichwe hase -n he Ba.] knna . pori.rrly in RmAd. ox3, Berids political talks -th hcia Tere s: 22. in sospen.o. Wbec Lka.t adlors ha developed further

they oouid bo reson -n this atter. Iho -sac trade treaty with Russia contajnad in torns of va.L 10! e b’n 22 biloa ruic narkse

JPOn the 101. stion of the Rech orcigr. nr ter corcerning the relaticnaof Japan t- 113 •.o bpor 0rle.:. rpl.cd ho’ N.ooto was ready to agree Upon a part on te c.on*Lct M f jho nor nt.Jecicul in coro. ssions would be 8Ven back CO Lizssjue Tne r0Jotiol i. genvel ar good? The Russians were giving conpnretcjvelv little to chiang- can -chk; and c ily gainst paynent.

1447.

H1155-0185

H1155-0186

Page 8.

TRANSLATION OFDOCULTNT1834 PS

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

_____________________

With reference to China, abassador Oshira explained, there are two view points in Japan. One wanted to strengthen Wang - ching - wei, the other wanted to read an derstanding with Chiang - kai - chek. Negotiations with th latter have been brken off ot late. The life of Japanese politics is however, as observed, not un forn. Reich Foreign Minister advises to hold back frou a new attempt at raanlng an understanding with Chiang - kai - chek until the Geran armies had again gone into action and to reach as extensive a consoligatresf relationskips as possible with Chiang - kai - chek under the inHF8son of h, sumpess of Geruan arms. One should not receive a refusal. Ah Gemany did net wish to shoot off her powder too early for an eventual bediation. Moreover Germany is prepared to assist Japan in the manner desired Of her, if the occasion should arise, 1so by strengthening the position of Wang - -1ipe - woj •

1451.

H1155-0187

PA.TIAL TAGLTION 0e DOCUL ri' NO.2-50-PS.OFFICE O U.3. C-Ts O- CO1ISLL,

VOLKKISCIU1 3.0 AClITER

Munich Edition, liodnes day 26 Narch 1921, Io. 35, Voltune 54,

huenchener.-Auscabe,_Mittwoch 26 lnerz 1941. 35, Ausg. 54.

(Pugc 1, hctding) /

"Yugoslavia also in ths Tri-Partitc Pact Lister Churchill again has lost a battle”

x x x x : : x x

(Pagc 2, Ieading in centre of pago)

”Tho Protocol on the Entry o? Yugoslaviu."

X X X X X X X X

(Pgo 2. Colurn 2. Line 42 to Line 60)

"Notes of the Axis Covernnents to Delgrade,

At the semc tize, vhen the protocol en tho entry of yu goslavia to the Tri-Partitc Pact was sidled, the rover, ments of the Axis pevers sent to the Yugoslavian Covernnent the follovjng identical notes :

•Mr. Frimc j inister :

•In the namc of the Ceman Govrmont and at its belies 5, I have the honour to inforn Your Excellency of the folloing ;

•On the occasion of the Yugoslevian entry to-day into theTri- Parti to act, the Corman Govornnent confirnis its deterination to respect the sovrcienty. an tozcitoricl integrity of Yugoslavia at all timese

X X X X X X X X

(Pagc 2, Colu 2. Linus G2, to 33)

‘lr. Primo Ninister :

..With reference to the corversats onc, thzat. occurpea in connection "ith the Yucoslavinn entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honour to confirn.to Your -ccllency hcruwith in the nao of the Reich Cabinet (Reichsrocieruns) » that in the agroemont between the Axis Hwers and nc Hoya Yugoslavian Governuent, the governnents of th. Axis powors durins this var will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or tronsportation of troops through Yugoslavian national terpitori,4• •

1159.

PARI’IAL TRANSLATION OFDOCUMENT NOt, 1746-PS.

H1155-0188

PART II (partial translation)

Conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia, Dated March 27.1941.

Page 1 - PAGE 4, LINE 13;

W F St

Top SecretOnly for general officers

To be transmitted by officers only.

Berlin, harch 27, 1941

1st copy v F St2nd copy L_____3rd copy W Kr G

Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia

Present: (stamp)FUhrer IOK/1/F St 'Reich Marshal ! Dept L (1 p I ) jChief OKI (Supreme Command of! 29 March 1941

the Armed Forces No 2(4391/41 top secret |Chief w F St (illegible)Major General Bodenschatz

(several pencil marks and initials)

Colonel SchmundtCommander von PuttkamerLieutenant-Colonel ScherffMajor von BelowMajor Christian

Later on the following persons were added:Supreme commander of the army (Ob,d,H, )Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H)Colonel HensingerLieutenant-Colonel SieverthReich Foreign MinisterAmbassador HewelBrigadier General (Gen.Ma j. ) von WaldanColonel SchmidtBrigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.

BDC-OK-1 631(remark in pencil at right lower

corner of first page)

The Fflhrer.

describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming larita-action and even more in re­gard to the Barbarossa-undertaking later on, Serbs and Slovenes were never pro­German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla) , which is always inclined to start a coup d'etat. In the present time, the country had only one strong man, namely Sto joldinowitsch, and Regent Prince (Prinzregent) Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage.

The present moment is for political and military reasons favourable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Bar- barossa-action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.

3680.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OB1 DOCUNT 1746-PS (Cont'd)

The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Governient, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unito Ko di.plomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Rounania’s main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassaor have already been notified. During the day, a message will still be addressed to the Duce.

Politically, it is especially important that the newr blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lighning like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would becomne sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favourable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonoiny later on) willpbe assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states: the Adria coast for Italy, the Hanot for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

This plan assumes the we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place vrithin the shortest time.

In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa operation will have to be postponed up to 4 weeks.

The military operations arc to be carried out in the following way:

1) . Begin of the operation . arita as early as possible with the limitcd aim to capture Crcck-Thracia and the basin ofSaolonili and to win the high terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march (Ausholen) across Yugoslav territory.

2) . Push frol neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order to relieve the flank of th- Italian front in Albania.

3) . Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction . towards Nis, then towards Belgrade, in cooperation with

4) . Stronger German forces penetrating fro the area around Graz and Klagenfurt in direction South East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslavian army.

PAGE 5, LINE 3-9:

5) . The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrad in attacks by waves; besides, the air force has to support the advabce of the army.

For this purpose, it is possible to makc use of the Hungarian ground installations.

PAGE 6, LINE 7-12H1155-0189

The Fuehrerorders the immediate starting of all operations. He expects the plans of

the different parts of the armed forces during the evening of diarch 27th. General von Rintelen is orderedto receive the message and verbal orders from the Fuehrer during the night of March 27th.

(illegible pencil initial)

3681

H1155-0180

1716-E3

PART V

SUBJECT: Tentative p-an fon th. owclination cf the Gemuan ana Italian operations trains 1u03.eia. od, Tarch 28, 1941,

The Chief of the leading staff of the Arncd Forces (Tchrmachtafuhrungsstab) of the Surrere Corand of the Irmed Forces.

Only for general officers

To be transriitted by officers only

Berlin, March 28, 1941.

(in pencil)(handed over to Gen.von Rintelen on larch 28, 1941 at4 Pom,)

K7/1 F St_Soomp

(Several pencil narks)Tentative Plan

for the coordination of the Goman and Italian operations against Yugoslavia.

(several penci rarks)

1: In the event that the political developnont reculres an awed interven­tion against Yugoslavia, it is the Goman intention to atlack Yugoslavia in a horcentrinaupnuzoonas Possible, to destroy hez oxtaod Fo.cos,ana to dissolve

For this purpose, the folloving units are being fored:

a) One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the denger for the rear of the Italian frontin AIbania,

b) One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under certain circunstrrses also in Southwest Hungary, in order to pen e rate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and westward.

c) Frobably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which W-- comittec in the general direction towards the Danube on both sides of Belgrad.

3• , .-fthe wegther situation permits, the operation against I •ri-.2nc or 3rd, In this operation, the right flank will

Spyian territory. In tho beginning, its aim will be limited - tnhe oasis of Soloniki and the high terrain of Edessa.

Greece will start move across Yugo- to the occupation

tn ed herefore, thC follovring tasls result for the participation of the Italian------- •IU05:

Hlankprotoction for the Ge wan attack group Graz by advancing oTards the line Split-Yajele, with forces as strong as possible.

b) Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment, tmek .group, in order to join with the German forces committed around Skoplje and South.

c) Eliminntion of the Yugoslav naval forces.

d) Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in

3710

H1155-0191

1746-PSFor the inner-politicnl integration of the Yugoslav national territory it

is especially desirnhle to favor the Croat independence novencnts in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks a cinst Croat territory, as long as it is not a question of cormitment against encry troops fichting there.

5• The fol—ovin ; chronolo iccl schedule of the German operations moy be expected:

a) Attack against Greece: April 2nd3rd.b) Attack fror the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or ipril 4thc) Attack fron the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.

(illegible initial)

OF TRIISLTTON OF DOCUIEENT NO. 1746-PS

19 November 1945

,, WALTER R. SLIGSON, 1st. Lt., Ord., 0-1558904, hereby certify that I an thoroughly conversant with the English and Goman languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated oxcerpts from Document Mo.1746—

•. "‘L

WALTER R. SELIGSON 1st. Lt., Ord., 0-1558904.

3711

6 /‘,a an, 4, /9Y6TRNSLTIONOFDCCUENTNO.1195-PS

COPY.

Suprere Command of the ired Forces W.F.Ste/ibt.L (rv/Qc)Nr j OO63O/4I Top Secret,

Fhrer’s H.Q., 12.4.1941.

Reforence: OKII/L (IV/Qu) Nr 04434/41 Top Secret of 3 April 1941 .

provisional Directions for the partition of_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Yugosl aria_ _ _ _ _

yugosnhs.Eihrer has issued tie followring directions for the partition of

1 •) Former territory of Stoiemrrk and Krain-

The territory of the fomrer Steierark enlarge towards strip of about 90 Kilometor breadth"and 10-15 Kilcreter death Steierark.

the South by a will go to Gau

The Northern part of Krain, with a border line which runs in the south onas far as.the river Sava but north of Libnch according to attached zap OKH/GEN Qu, will belong to Karnten. *

The territory occw^ic^by Jermar troops will be handed over district by district by the Ary High Comand to the Gauleiters concerned as soon as the pacification of the country perits.

, n banfonx qvc^^_i^ occupied by the Italians vrill bepreparedlet ter fro.the FHhrer to the Dace and carried out according to a nore

detailed direction of the Foreign Office. Until that tine no measures whatever are to be taken fro the Geraan end. (Telegram OrH-Gen qu/.bt. Kr.Verve •e Ob. Kdo. 2 I Hr 0801/41 g. Idos, is hereby dealt with).

2 .) The,,, territory beyond the river Nur (dbor nr-Gobeit):

.. The territory beyond the river ilur goes as a whole to Hungary conf oming hthe historic boundary, A later transfer of the Geran population in the

northreastern part of. this territory has been taken into consideration. The handing over of this territory to High Conmand. the Hungarians will be regulated by the Arny

3. ) Banat:

The territory fro the pointnational boundary to the entry of

■where the river Orava cuts the Hungarian the river isa in the Danube goes to Iungary

The territory east of the river Tisa will be at first under German protection as will the territory south of the Danube and east of the penerol line: mouth ° -the river Horava .. Danube - Pozarovac - Petro vac - Boljavac - Kugarevac - mm-nna: , .This territory comprises the Bos copper territory and the adjoining co s rict in the south-east. The above line is to be considered as the basis CAnhalt) and provisional demarcation line. At first Iilitary Government under the Aruy High Comnand is to be established.

4- ) Southern Serbia.

The territory inhabited by Bulgarian hjacedonians, in conformity with the etnographical boundary goes to Bulgaria.

Prelininary delimitation from tho military view point vrill be carried out by the -ry High Coruand which will prepare the handing over to Bulgaria.

3820.

H1155-0192

H1155-0193

$- 2 -

5 .) Serbia (Alt-Serbian):

The territory of foraer Serbia will be placed under German ~ii l -i tary administration of the Ary High Conmnand.

6 .) Croatia;

Croatia becomes an independent state within its etnographica; boundaries.There will be no interference on the part of Germany with its home policy.

7 ) Remaining territories inclndinr Bosnia (Do?nion) and hontone;;ro;

The political shaping of these territories will be left to Italy. Here also the restoration of an independent state of Llontencgro can be considered.

II. The dravinp uy of boundaries;

1 .) If the drawing up of boundaries lias not been laid down in the above part I it will be carried out by the Supreme Colmard of the Arned Forces in agreenent with the Foreign Office, the plenipotentiary for the Four Year plan and the Reich-l inister of the Interior.

The Operational Staff of the irnod Pordo 3 (L IV/Qu) is the authority which will prepare the drawing up of the bcundarics or the Supreme Co.mand of the Armed Forces.

2 .) The iry High Co.mand will forrrard as soon as possible to the Supreme Cormand of the Armed Forces W.F.St, , its nilicary require. ents in this regard - where not already laid dovn by the Hithrer - and with the exception of the territory under protection south of the Danube,

3») The OK/Brarch Econcyy and Iranot (om"i RU hit) vill forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff (Section L) its demands regarding the boundaries of the territory under protection south of the Danube (Part I. para 3).

40 ) As far as the Italians are concerned, tactical boundaries between the armies are valid for the present.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Arned Forces

/s/ Keitel.

3821.

Enclosure No, 2 to despatch No. 1511 dated October 20, 1939, from v the American Embassy, Berlin, Germany.

Source: Rei chgesetzblatt II, No.38, of Soptember 30, 1939.

TRANSLATION H1155-0194

Announcement relating to the ;" - 20 --- -——_____ .t .00171X111-30viet Non •Aggression Treaty

Septcinbcr 25, 1939.

On August 25, 1939, a non-aggression treaty was signed in Moscow.by representatives of the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Cho treaty is published herewith.

The exchange of the documents of ratification took place in Berlin on September 21; 1939 The treaty became effective on August 23 1939 in accordance with its Article VII.

Berlin, September 25, 1939.

The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs by Baront von Weisslcker , ..

NonnAaression Teatybetwcen Goonmyanc. inei •„ -ti 1

Union of Soviet JeeidlijI, ns""" " " ------- -- -- . - . e .. . - --The Government of the German Reich

andThe Government of the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics ■ -

directed by the vish to strengthen the cause of peace between Cmany and the UeSSR. and proceeding upon the basic provisions of the Treaty of Neutral.! ty concluded between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in April 1926, h&vo reached the following agreement:

Article l i ,o ■ •i . ’ > i ; \ { 1- .1 . . . • , . ,

The two contracting parties undertakc to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack’against one another, whethen individually or jointly with other powers.

Article 2• *

In case one of the contracting parties should become the object of war-like acts on the part of a third power, the other contracting party will not support that third power in any form,

Article 3

- C Ho v orumeu U v 1 chu tw JUttong p; ■ 1 j.s i, . 1. i. in fugu*: J. cruin in contact with each other through continuous consultation in order to inform each other concerning questions affecting their mutual interests.

(1714)

1-0195

Article 4

Neither of the two contracting parties will participate in nny grouping of powers which is indirectly or directly aimed. Arainst the other party.

Article 5

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two partics wou-d clear awoy these disputes or conflicts solely by means of friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions.

Article 6

•. The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years with the provision that unless one of the contracting parties denounces

on: Yoar before the end of this period the duration of the validity oi this treaty is to be regarded as automatically prolonged for another live years.

Article 7

The present treaty is to be ratified within the shortest possible time. The documents of ratification are to be exchanged in Berlin- The treaty becomes effective immediately upon sigture,

Dravn up in duplicate texts in the German .and Russi,n Languages,

Moscow, August 23, 1959.\% \

\

For the Government of the German Reich

von Ribbentrop

As Plenipotentiary for the Governme . of the U.S.S.R.

s. Molotov

(1715)

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4H1155-0197

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. i ch i f y pith

1c nt o f

riors, etc, vould be 31bstent) F L yorks fo

lent of TrDcrrnde .is try 0 public cni close.'" PODDcetion

e r p c r s o n i re c 11 y

nent )-0S

hi :r ct

lie

nnd ritho

ill. nndi sputc 11 b 'htcnmcnt ?nd pron he p T 0 P r m r nd - mini to my dcorrtment y n1 Prosso) rnd n. ’ll these pcti

lent TPS Torched ?l - nd oth e r me 1 i n my

proprorndehe oroDrerne he whole

nC

in addition vitics hr vc

contc}' rttention to 1 terminology

■ concorhir p of rll t

71U

in detrilcdoffici? is metc there F"hrcr. I ressons to

? O rrm or t the con

sc t

cnS tooi tlrnslssion of commnnicrtionmi cr l n(C(Ssitics in f trc oc-nic

1 i ni s t c r 3 c 1 d t... o n

ll propose. to ther

SerirtS (oc? 900). ‘ 2 foricr cncrr 1~ove r Povornncnt. ; Rcnion- (Krcisc). In vic.v of vhich epc~rs neccsge

C: onVT

in the sr me Reich Fhvsicirns Inspector of the: hclonrine thereto

provicwcd

0( r

' CCom

hrc rv- olc nwhe (ebout 80)

rin C oami

C ti­

rn1 other

T io nr l (Robict) Connie nt TO111d correspond to ssrriet to r Trin_

portion of bssis of the

nener confc- ‘ e 1 rmy 77Therro thoronhl

Tit contrins 3 or 4 Districts snrees thnt is the minimum lumber uturc civil ovcrnmont rnd/or

nr med commend of the Chief of

C t C ri nr ri

in order to ircd

Service., end c. s of mod ic-L

nA the mees

with th, the

rnd vctorinrry es pore

He i clisni ni st e r 9OG 4,hizhe? londe rs of the Construction DT. Todt Proposed to ship the rholc

oll-prcpnecd employ-lent of the for. end oi the oporntions. I conference tith

nssinnment first of ell be rvice , whereupon

tretivcly ndcr one. Lcadcr-construction Service

tooA, ’ ith Reich Leader ‘menn rnd hiStf Ricnhort rorrline the publication of four . SD8T( r s in thc Ri i ch Commi ss.~;,+- + n 4 . 1:1 Frthormonc , 01, 4 ...2 ’ . S S T-‘ VS O St •' U yi tn,-"."2 - the Protective nett

mho tecbonnattcareqsruror.nmomork In rlrory nt the bortcr -na- DrcrCovisiics Por trntining.to.d ctcrnincmhcther the

of

71

lion

H1155-0198

07 D/C’TIT i039-PSPanc 3

, . Disclscions rre -'Iso ndcr vroy vith Coypslcriery worpsfchrcr) chnlein rn? rith thc Rcich vonth Lerdor-

ship to rssure r necossrry rnd snitrblc mobolizrtion, intensive te Iks r1so took plrcc with the. Chief of Strff (S tf bschof) of thc SA, lie wes eskc.A to mske eveil,1le' numDcr of thc rntic ter ri tor

most lclicblc SA Lc pRors forv h he. arrocd to do

~i-

cstions together with other suThe personnel

subnitbc with the.

CohAcs

d tO thcRcich O who hrs

to ceroy to rd mi

Fuehrer. The SnJ rnizctionrl lor

inst voted the c out the swelling

"oStions will be.prrc(mont hrs been rorchcd r (Rei chsorerni s ntions-

instruction on best menne r fo me i nb c r ’ ।r y rc n b cLrerdv now th vi notion rjth

thm in Unc wholeco 11

u h (.

f nd C r of hrOcssi 1 s e C , ehclline of r cucstc

o NTO(SSin roblcm rnd

omship of Rusal

see for schoolin rnd prepare them in the

Tiers of Dr. Ley perty in order to trice over n lrbor unions in con-

important prohLem, DeTt economic lcrdcrshin, be hevi been r powerful sv hrvc the. com it me nt of noccsservr ’Wider ccrtein

cnnthlv di scissions Police. to the new order tein proporcd chenecs t

• fP?RJcd rs on cmincntly cl so in connection with the.

Lrbor unions nnoubtoly"ort of the Soviets ho crmon Lrbor Tro condi tions

pTC: red

CO

T( Lntionship of thetr ken ce

on hi d o no t

etc cuthority of

o h15VC bc< n ord. r by Pir pperv SupO3

sueTostcd bv the

blc to mthc .k rnm R i ch rovcrent in the.

before, the chre ido from thes; ne otirtions I

rector Fritof Blorc out moine

D Frothe OKV

ceiled the. responsible.mcly inistcrinl Di-Re i ch 3upcri nendcnt

attit’dc of the p

The w

into 0trils of political objectives nrmud persons in confidence. shout th

others. ith- I instructed

ton

tion DrcDerci Lonr

wi uno^u issuing rm for sbstrnti-l cov(

971 the whole tcrminoloqy s t r t e, me nt s.rue of the Te stern aucs_

the DIc

pnewred-in my officc, which I turned, cics. I enclose e few semplcshoSc Df hlcts, vhich mo- Lotcy be. turned over to2 or. development, dorl with the whole structure.urtionof the TTSSR, the. economic possibilities

thc work of Union since, thc Aermens

the 1933

in T

ne.-omint( rn

of the Soviet TInion.... , ihc JcvS in the. Soviet

-1Slea- 2( S1 ls of thc poll trken cmong

for th , of Turke ston, fonndetion of 1c

ukr? inc, /(pmen rrt in lrnrmo on the.

sive. works1 mini str-"!

the Ukrrinc, of the

viewpoint of the. n. the. Ukrrinc ion Ienmamc

ionre. in proparati on

er men lew in theinfluence of thc Gcrmen

. the TTkrrinirns from thein gc-- ,cditionenunbcr or Frticlcs arc ill Russion -rnznencvhich heve thc pirposc or

Soviet Inion about true con-

1 7

cnlichtcninm the people 0- th divions in qurrny. These rrt: D28is for ncvsprper erticlcs in the. r1, S; finelly, rftor extensive work tn et bused on the nost printed in mrort numhe r ena This mep cen be 11s,, .C .12

re rlso slitoblc es the nc!rly occupied territor-’

dories in the north

Conmisfor fixine the

re centrn cthnoloqic

stptistical reportbesis of cventv rs in the so11 th

to

rnd off bound r ri OS of the. future

meP of

oil offices.fiyine of bOun-

3 points R i ch

S, C T-S- O1 thcSC conferences, conducted for the wc. opPprtb ‘.mysc1f ,, cont inuous consult lion rnh oroni,ttionos _ PT-onis , i through my office rnd-through those of-the-iirlson men dccgctcd from’the other offices of the Prrty end

H1155-0199

1 in:

Paqc 4 1' TL ON 0T NT I039-PS

1- OT CO‘N3TL

t-rli possible.ork, inesmcl. es it is in full swine, r orc than 00 Rorionrl Comai ssirints r ro

be mnnnod . by political leaders, roprcsonta- ,8n a, ficisls of the. Reich ministry of the. n EeSt differs besicrL y from the

-1 the Cs*,ihcrceS we can cont on cvrc. ry t ( chni cal and r c^turcd popniption here in thcbi~ cities,

crel y Cve rythina ditional y for the

under pre c( nt condition md Chief comisseriet:D I

Int rior, coni tion

d c DArtmont

installation that is not thcvill hevc to be

typewriters, office. mr more down to the bed s accomplish. sch r pro 1 arranTcmcnts had to berosponsibi .i

followsOmi ■ ite

ease in the .rst, Drcpexc* ml token - not only m auto

irl, ebovc ts, It doc

l mid i c lot PpDc

14 days

rt nimbor ofsupplies and much

y on the basis ct 1TC of my ol rrvin- O'11 the

in full motion of the, T c.hoc

lor all these

the whole. time with all esweets down tofounded 1r the

pit PCI th., det

TO’S OTerDr. !cvom r

. I hevc reouesteds my pcrmoncnty rwd thoron -lily, through i n order to develop

worker of 7! Brae ti em) information composed hw front in tri

CCtion o the.

rho Drop the/ "TCst nmbcr

him which ri. 1 1 t c nebcre b th/

o 1various books

proprme nde lIC n hevc be

70 r} id e r ny co­- ncrel Consul Dr hd Drmphlcts for ificts hevc been

other lceftcts erc ricfr vrhi indivinel races. I do not e and will Lev thosc oriqinrL; oport nity with the rconcst

rttc T( 1 over /Iso for e s a cific time

to dccidc on this i

the. time me nt is

the. the.

advi sor

iso nd L tah CCC ption of for the. rd mi

DDTO d pDoc]s

1‘chror at tho first content s r 7 d c t e m

for myself

Continuous disc rcprcsc motive 3 a dcpartmint of under direction

no CVctrlL 2 the. riou

T1c political dcport- vien of all those, v cm be. used et

*L©‘T rne

(conOic of Ob -bc

bout this sobicct kW, th e p rop f m - nd;

po ibicel coopt. Iunder wry with

nistrr, etc. Secondly ion has been found.d

ma nee, -nd csident n

noccu pi. d •i ion hrs bean tr

not appear 7qcntsi net

department for Cult the development of t

: dCDrrt’cnt o cn ovr T by oni

rnn Sei< nee is

It OCcpi c77 i mmc rma nn. I nt e nr r t, dTkrpinion, end other 1 (Rcichsprcsscchcc) fo­

the deport me. nt of thc in fore ere ore co-wo ri

Question doesTnliqlte nment md. pre

dcD ty Jobno

koisser ere under d if possible.

Th s I hope thet militrry action the y

in- 'i sacs of the cich Press Chief one. Press chief for cech Rcichs- order to 1oci”c them in the sens.

me, I shot be preparations, which the p(h

’’hen, after_hror rs thc possibility for , report from

. ble to report to thc Fchrer for reechine « m those points of specie md personal n,+.

conclusion of the

up toT

0TR13TION .N7 1 0.03 -P3 9, November 1945

I, UIBLT‘1G lrt 1 rm thorouchlj lrnrucros; md thrt of Document I059-PS

rr

the rbovc

r, N r nt

2Gn-ish 1110 Gorlrn

rnd correct trenslrtion

‘OU NG i’l/SCT.

H1155-0200

TOP SECRIT

Fuehrer H, 18 May 1941High Connand of the .rmed Forces^^t" Dep.L (I 0p) No. 44747/41 UC.Ch.H.

Top SecretBy officer only.

To: Navy High Comman, Naval tarfure Direction4hir Forco High Conmand, General starr I...

The Foreign Office has prepared the attached draft of a Declaration

for the use in "Barbarossa" of Operational Zones.

The Foreign Office, howover, reserves its date (when the Declaration will be issued) of particulars.

ion as to thes well as discussion

The Chief of the High Command By Order

signed von Tolkonstein

(Note: The onclosuro is a draft for a operational zones in the .ctic Ocean Sea.)

declars tion concerning/the Baltic, andtthe Black,

Ge rman-J n pnnoso greoment Agcinst the Communist Intornetionale

NT 2505-13S OF COUNSEL

Ubkommen gogon lie Rommun- istischo Intornationalo.

The Governmont of the German Reich and the Impor$- Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim -c the conu_ unia-i; Internationale known as the C omintorn, is to drm tegrate anc subdue existing states by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist Intornati enele in tho internal affairs -f - tho.natinns net nnly on’oners their int rnal peace and S0C ial well-boinR, out is also e monance to the peace -f the worl ; cesiroua of c -operating in the defense against Communist subversive activities; have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The high contractin another f the activities to consult each other on and to carry them through

8 states agree to inf...-rm nof the Communist Intornati nale,

the necessary preventive measures in close collnsorati on.

Article 2

The High Contracting Portice will ointl- invite thir States vhoso internal peace is threatened by the suhversiye activitios of the C mmunist Internationale to acoPt defensive measures in the spirit f this agreementor to take part in the pre sent

article 3

The German as well as tne sent agreement is to be doomod comes into foroo on the day of effective for a period f five of this erinc the High C ntra< an •T -anding over the futu

Japanese text of the pro- the original text. It diennture and shall remain

years, 3 fore the expiration ting Part .cs will c mo to 0 form of thoir co-operation.

Tn witness thereof the undersmhes properly authorized by their respective signee this agreement an affixed their

, being duly end Governments, have seals.

. , D ne in duplicate at Berlin on Movomber 25 -92e_that is 25th of November f the 11h year of Showa Period.

(signed) Von Ribbentrip, Extra- r inary and pienit, g ent-ary ambassador of the German Reich.S onec) Vicomte Kintomo Mushakoji, Imperial Japanese

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Imbassacor

Supplementary Protocol

On the occasion of tho signing t against the Communist. Internationale ipotentiarios have agreed as follows:

cy of the agreement the undersigned Plon-

(a) The c. mpotent ing States will work in corning the exchange of

tythritics of the two High Contract- el so collaboration in matters con- -nf rmation about the activity of

Hi 155-0201

H1155-0202

n * l» n Gtt-x-nE-zusmamza-at.m-- ------

TRANSLTION OF DOCUMENT 2643-PS OFFICEUS CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"Reichsgesetzblatt", Pert II, Berlin, Novomber 28, 1940, No. 41, P. 279.

ATOUICEMENT

concerning the Three-Power Pact

between Gormany, Italy end Japan

on No venter 25, 1940

On Seotember 27, 1940, at Berlin, the Three—Power Pact

between Germany, Itply and Jppan wes signed by Representa­

tives with full powers of the German, Italian and Japanese

Governments. The Pact cane into force upon signature.

It is published below.

Berlin, November 25, 1940

THE REICH MITISTBR OF FOREIGN aFT.IRS

von Ribbentrop

* : *

H1155-0203

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2643-PS

(cont.)

-2-

THREE-POWER PACT

BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider

it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each

nation of the world be given its own proper place. They

have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate

with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia

and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime

purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things

calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the

peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the

three Governments to extend this cooperation to such

nations in other perts of the world as are inclined to

give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own,

in order that their aspirations towards world peace as

the ultimate goal may thus be rcalized. Accordingly, the

Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as

follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of

Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order

in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leader­

ship of Japan in the establishment of a new order in

Greater East Asia.

Article 3

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their

efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake

to assist

TEANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2643 (cont .)

Ito assist one another with all political, economic and

military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties

is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the

European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Article 4

For the purvose of implementing the present pacts,

joint technical commissions, tho members of which are

to dc appointed by the Governments of Germany, Italy

and Japan, will meet without delay.

Article 5

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid

terms do not in any way affect the political status which

exists at present between each of the three Contracting

Parties and Soviet Russia.

■article 6

The present Pact shall come into force immediately

upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years

from the date of its coming into force.

Ab the proper time before expiration of the said

tern the High Contracting Parties shall, if one of them

so requests, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith wnereof, the undersigned, duly authorized

by their Governments, hpve signed this pact and have

hereunto apposed their seals.

Done in 3 original copies at Berlin, on the 27th

dey of September, 1940, ia the XVIIIth year of the Fascist

Bra, corresponding to the 27th day of the 9th month of

the 15th year of the Showe era.

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ci ano

(Signature of the Japanese Ropri sentativc)

H1155-0204

H1155-0205

LTRANSLATION OF DOCUMEIT 2643

-4- (cent.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT ITO 2643-PS

7 November 1945

I, CERARD SCEaEBER, 2nd. Lb., Inf., 01332102, hereby certify that I al thoroughly covogsani with the English and Germen languages; and that tho bovre s a blue and correct trenslation of the Germen CC.Et of Document 2643-PS.

GERRD SCH-EFER2nd. Lt., Inf. 01332102

H1155-0206

nge cue w TRU3LTION OF DOCNI 1881-2S

OFFIC OF U S CHILF 61? COJISIL

Notes Fuen 20/41

regarding the discussion between the FUERER and the Japnnece Foreig Minister LISUOL. in the presence of the Reich Forei m linister and of the minister of State aLISNR in Berlin on the 4th cf ipril 1941.

Ma tsuo aa i art her endeavours for peace Cardinal CSP.RI.

menticned, that he was induced to naie those particularly in view of the personality of

Furthernore he had endeavoured to convince tha POL, that the United Stetes and D: rticularly the -nerican Fresilent prolonged the war in Europe and in Chinoe it was not the question to deternin , if -meric or its President were rigat or tron. Ihey certainly nad their definite reasons for their policy. Notvithst:anding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the « x in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the PO--, that Japan vas not fighting thu Chinese or Cnina herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entiru f or Cast. It is regretful that .erica ana Inglana sidod with Bolshevis.

The FUERLR interrupted that both countries aino sided in Spain with Bolsheris.

" mr"" ----- Uh • •--6’ -should instruct the proper authorities

equest , that the FULHRLR

wishes of the J-pancs ilitary Co.in need of Jarman hclp particularly concernin which could be given by na ming available to t

is bre ad -ind cd J Japan nas

Jspan would do11 as tho la cr utmost to

ost technical i

the U-boat war fare, m the lntost experiences orements and inventions.

navy, ofar u che country should docido to attach course, nad to bu prep rad for a ficht

n that c23c erica 'probably would side om) personally believed, that the unit

Singapore, the Japanese i ta the united States,

diplom ions iron ontcrine tStates could b10 ,i'T nt the S

. T ny and Nacy had, low ver , to count on tac worst t is vith w-r .gainst -erc.. Incy ero of the opinion r vould extend for fiv. yurs or ion ger and ould teze

ill in thin the warier.a war would best be conducted of subarines , • in all details best be exploited by Japan.

id hot

ific and would be fcig.it orc jerin experiences in nor guuril. tonn. It was question now such ill the t cchmnical iapr ove.ents

such could

: of

P

To sum up, -ntauoica requested that the Fuchrur should sue to it that ohe proPo O'man autnori tics would placo at the 1 isposal of tao ja- Ponosc thoso Covclogments and inventions concernin, navy . 1 d army, which were nocdod by the Japanese.

The Fuchrer promised this md pointed out that Germy too considered a conflict with the united Jtotos undesir ols, but that it and already made alloonecs for such a contingency. In Gurnnny one vas of the opinion that cricn’s contributions depended upon the pos.sibilitios of trans- port ut ion, and that this again is conditioned oy tine available tonnage. Gerny’s ar against tonnage, hotevor, means a decisive weakening not

merely against Ingland, but also against .anerica. (Gormmy has made herpreparations so , that no liuuri can could land in Zuropo. She would

)H1155-0207

• DOUJ.3 . dIIF

1881-23

conduct a most her Luftuuffo, ; have to bo acqu: and that quits : -=3 kign above

inst -orica vithlher U-boats and rior ciperiocc, wich tpula still

t fr on the fact, that the ly superior rs naturally

In the furt that Gurmany on

of t nc oul d j

Japan ould act involved vith 6hc yith whcm thc Unit d States mould Gormany or with Japan . icy would at a t imo, not co com. to - a.

. diatcJJ ta Jnitol 3tat

acher pointed out, thc consoquenccs , ifIt did not nattor

ivod if tith

Gemmany oulc str a conflict botWec tripartite powers

but 0o liquidato this

u •Gy8 standin

onCC

authoritic s vould place improvccnts and invent

United State

2 and -* in thcii

cause thj ction, the

t th. oth r country the somoe Therefore ithout delay in case of

his r. a .st, chat th in oxl.r that the p

e Or

JU 11

micht ian

‘C OI ith the

2- ‘b--- j -S - -ac-1cun rfurther that he has always dcclorca later a war with the united States

tionsui p

continued to drift along would happen rather socn whj should Japan, thor:r and tuhe the ris e upon n< would she perhaps avoid •

oull b• + T,

an 1tcl lot d.ci

- - -13 a o — e2pluin - d cry, th it P*ncr or voidable, if Japan opinion this conflict

strikc :wont o ri gat

gamed prominance in tho pan nany vho hosi tote to f * consilured in these circle:

rratigns--rica Just thus ticularly if she to be sur-. in fa­

do, hovovcr, sto path, one- day sh be under loss f.

that, i

ofwith ngorous thoughts.

1‘ along her present .at this would then

I - r -plied taut he use he hi ns ..If .

of the Rhincland, duc]was of tho opinion that accept the ris’c of an a self 10s still young an tudo was proven by even

m voidabl

--- un-rstand t,0 situation of h siilaz situations (the clearing ov- -cignity of orcd Forccs. He too exploit favorable conditions and

R ussin, bc it by ..n dangers cano to the:

S- —u2OP- n ply t o any

but

ficnt t dos ri at 3 LE . I- Lay of 110 or.a thos.

•30 in nis atti- all not hesitate

ilill not let

y f

atsuoc repliedpoliticians nad r by declaring that

ccntlJ-ric

tunt th- Unitod St tos or

the South Seas providerubber and tin t would war againswith the intontion

O -u0mica to t Japan thc .

-ha- aVCupT.d a a would not fight taat Japan - are fr

ther tacir ruling

un account of China or

ir

Such anin

rgunentation naturally did not

hadbecause of th education ori.n

I ux AS --nvlon- dowever, -hric felt ta. t Japan entered the war traction of Great Britain.

1 miss its effect upon tho Japa-on lines hich mny

i he Euchror comontcd on this not mcan anything but that the Un as long as the British World Lno;

that this attitude of -smerica did

istodw one day they could ad-

H1155-0208

ipage thrco IRNTLPION oF DoOICI? 1631-p3

UFPICL Oi J S CHILP oF COUISLL(Cont.)

vancoegainst Japan togcther sith Groat Britsin -hercas, in case of the collapse of 2110 01d egiro, they vould bo totally isolated and coula not lo anyt. Ing aginst Japen.

I, The Reich F or ign Min is ocr interjected that the ancricen3 precisely

mder al. cixcstncos wanted to maintain the poner?n1 position of -hg1ad an East -St, but that one the othr han it is proved by this attitude, to hat extent she fcors e joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoim conti the Fuehrer an r. os Japan. For chis r.. fact that ho (.x ts affairs could not i had expounded bcfo ding ais plans. Th:

od that it sconod to h Ln of i. ttcly cluor picture of tho re; on ac also he to inform him . C-) in his capacity as Japanm ter in Japan itself a singe ■

gcbfully.

all

inside of che for Foreign that he

financial he bedono.som.thi these . Foreign

irclos. Cnco cforc, he nd4CJc ) isc r for Forcign

' 3 about hi.3 inocntiorsa It scon ings and thus brcught about all

irsU C

indieJapan

inister had to opp 113 tia m'uth. Jnd

, how soon .... ccildPremier or to the .

icol l;thosiport O

and carefully in tie first place 1 make his decision it c. farore: Lc his proper ; lens tcuards -he ncinc

2 t he qu He xcu idderolopmen

mner.

decision TC would other

id ns vo to be indo witin .3c be spoil.d by sl.z.

6 inistor reg a in political and

o mistake, beforetell

amors

a close friend

which he asthough as a rule he ce3 he also could not tions discus -cd to th avo to study exactly

Co ma’n 'L add •. b

i Japan, so as to clear breast of Tnpcror. lhcn the

Shsuld he, proof th at tactical c had gron-i

fail to carry out nisin ucce

bortions, that would be r of conviction, and in

Apbi li t Les. -o.crc influoncs in Jnpan.

succeed, it rould prove that he felt confident that he would

On his return, ciac qucstioncl, he weal incc admit to the n- pror, the Premiez and the Ministcrs for the Nary and the .ray, that Singapore a d ocen iscussel < ho would, aonuver, st te that it .was only on a hypobneticnl basis.

Besidee this tsuo made the express request not to cable in tho mattar. of inc-porc because he nd reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he a mu id send n courier.

la- Fuchr.r agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortinatek could hot 3 y the sne of J-pjn.

The discussion was termin ted after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the th of -pril 1941.

signed: SCIDP.

CLRTIFIC.iL OF TR.NVSL./PI;OF 00 CJIL: EO 1831-P3

4 -pril 1911.I., ERNST M. COH, Pfc. , 33925738, hereby certify tn t Lam thoroughly conversa t with the English nd German langunges; and that tae above is a true and correct transl tion of ocunent1381--s.

PRTLL TRLISLITION OF DOCUIETT 1882-pS OFFICE OF U, B. CHIEF OF CCUi-JKL_______

. hufz RM 21/41

Notes on the tolk between the Reich Foreign linistor and • the Joponcso Foreign Minister Mtnok in Berlin on 5 April 1941.

(pages 2 to 3:)

atsnok then spoke of the goncrel high morale in Germany referring to the happy faces he had seen cvorywhcro among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works, Eo cxpressod his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his coutry the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence,

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation vhich had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, nnymyo a nation, however, which has to i.ght for a place in the sun must give th ran uPe The intellectuals ruined Frnnco; in Gormny they had o]rec.dy S bax „cd thcir pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to those doings; they will surely be the cause of the down­fall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

In mswer to a remark by ltsnokn, that Japan vas now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly nftor the previous lengthy doliber tion, the Reich Forcic Minister replied th t it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuhrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resigna­tion from the League of Nations.

(pages. 9 to 11’)

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation , which in its time was the only dominant power on the Eureponn Continent.

In conclusion the Reich Foreign linistcr once again summar- ized the points he wanted Intsnoka to take br.ck to Japan with him from his trip:

1) Gerunny had clro dy won the vr. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, nd -mncrica would also have to resign herself to this

fact.

2) There were no cenflicting interests between Japan nd G-rnny . Tho future of both countries could be regu­lated for the long run on the basis that Japan should prodolin .to in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe nd Africa.

3) onatever might happen, Gcrmy would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the wgr. Such an entry into the war was undoubtcdly Lora in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would h rdly over return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives • of Japan, a ch-ncc which would make it possible for her - to play a roal]y loading role il East.asia.

-0209

i-0210

PaTL-L TR-WSL.TION OF DOCUIENT 1882-pSC7FZCB OF rj. 3. CHIEV'O.F COUi^EL

4

Mntsnokn replied that he himsolf could enly repeat th't he hnd long been of the opinion thnt every notion would be offered on opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was confront­ing such ar opport unity, nd she. trould have to assume tho risk connee tod vith it. Shc would hove to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

Berlin, the 7th of April 1941

Jig. Schmidt

CERTIIC.TE 07 TR.IL.TTONOZDOCUINT _______________

C. 19 November 1945H/Virginia Von Schon, X-045318, hercbj certify th't I on thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and corrcet tr. nsl.tion of the indicated CcC rrt of Docunont Io, 1882-ps,

C. Virginia Von Schon X016318

PARTIAL TPANSLATION O’7 DOCUaCKT NO.?'?-FS OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSBL_______

TELEGRAM. (Code)

Special Train estflen No. 707, 10 July 1941, 2:51 P.M.Arrival: 16 July 1941, 4:00 P.1.

1. Code Office A& N . 6342. Dinloperm Tokio

T le ram in code (Secret code system.) To: Amhassndor personally.

* * * * * *

(Pare 24953)

I . -cm- --8 2nvu1VJ -uo tnanK tne JapaneseAm.ossa .or in Moscow for c nveying the cable report. It would be convenient lx we c uld keen on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing uy, I would lire to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese foreion minister, first of all because +1 present Japanese government would really act inexcusable toward the future of its nation, if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian prpblem,es woll &S t? secure for all times its expansion to the South and Sett-e the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese

Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which incides with our own observations as far as we are able to judee at the present war Sltution» 11 is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military prenortions ore completed.

It is, of course, also in our interest that Jnnan wants to secure for herself further possessions in the South, Indo-Chinn, etc., just as every measure of Jnnan direct toward expansion is principally wolcmed br us. I shall five you detailed instructions, within the near future, relative to the consequences which might, and no doubt will result from the occupation of

.S u al-

Iceland by American military. forces, and the attitude which we will take to­ward Japan in this connection. As directive for talks we can advise ready today that the sending of American military forces to the sunn ng land into a territory which has been officially announced by us as combat

area, shows not only Roosevelt's aggressive intentions, but the fact of the intrusion of •merican military forces into the combat area to the support of -ne-anc is in itself an aggression apainst Germany and Europe. After all one cannot enter a theater ef war in which two armies are fighting, and icin the army O one side without the intention of shooting and without actually doinc so. I O not douht for a moment that in case of the outbreak of hostilities ’ between Germany -and America, in which case today already it may be considered as an absolutely established fact that only America will be the gceres#or •apan will fulfil her oblications, as agreed upon in the Three Fewer Pact*

OWeVer, I ask you t employ all available means in further insisting unon Japan s entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I nave mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and apan join hands on the Trans Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After

the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Fact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England's cllanse or the tot 21 destruction of the English islands, rospectively, will only be a matter ptime:.An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be

ce With cur taking possession of the remaining positions of the BritishEmpire which are important

H1155-0211

H1155-0212

PARTIA., TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO, 2896-PS

Continued

for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the ne w order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter evory action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there.

RIBBENTROP

NOTE: Transmitted to Embassy in Tokio under No. 1018Telegram control, 10 July 1941.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2896-PS

29 November 1945

I, LUDIIG HARTPAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2896-PS.

LUDWIG HARTAN T/4, 37:46052

H1155-0213

TRAVSLaTTCIT OF ETFSODCEU--OF U s ch: OF COUNSET

897PS

Telegram(Secret Cipher System)

Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 h-es, arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs.

4 1217 dated 13.7for Minister for Foreign Affeirs, Answer to telegran 10,,(/ 1C8 Re;4rrived Tokie 12 July 1 941

fast as ' ossibl e!

chsministors for Foroign AfFairs

I am trying with all rcans to work towera Jayan’s entry the toragainst Russia as soon as possible. recially using arguments of personelmessace of Foreign Minister and telecram cited above to convince MatsuokaErson’ as well as the For-a orEice, ailitary olerzents. Nationalists and

frionly busness ton. 1 be22ovo qocor-Cang to ndlatezy operations,

Japanese Fxticization val1 socn take aLdco. The Ereztest obstacles

which one has to fight thereby, is the disunity orong .otvist erouge without unified ootzzana follots ana slomdy aajusteto the changed situation.

Ott.

CERTIFICi’TE OF TRNSITTO:OF EXCERPTS OF DOCIRGEET NO, 2897-pS

18 November, 1945

es; and that theaov- xs a correct and tzue translation of excerpts PronDocuzant 2897-PS

WOLFGINC X. THORMNN 1,/Sct 337791,26

3757.

H1155-0214

intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by the Japane se Govern- merit between July 1 and December 3, 1941

From: BerlinTo: Tokyo29 November, 1941+1393 (in 3 Parts, complete)

By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly however he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10’30 at night that I finally saw him.

This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the biswigs of the government end military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuhrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute cer­tainty that Japan’s moves were also given discussion at this conference,

.le Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order 111 East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and Probab- never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tri­partite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time. and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the mili­tary might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against J aPall.

. a As Fuhrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences tne very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United

" “ehaye received advice to the effect that there is practicallyh.pe o the Japanese- U.S. negotiations being concluded successfully,

ucause of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

.. If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches Acecision to ficht Britain and the United States, I am confident that that,"-- not oniy be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but ould bring about favourable results for Japan and herself."

I: "I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any ly cpnerete.intentions of Japan. . Is Your Excellency indicating that a stat

"ar is to be established between Germany and the United States?1

Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt’s a fanatic, so it what he would do." ‘ is impossible to tell

• Concerning this point, in view of the fact that' in the past that the United States would undoubtedly Germen troops, and from the ton

Ribbentrop has said

4070)

. try to avoid meeting g- ----- of Hitler’s recent speech as well as that

- Ribbentrop s I feel that German attitude toward the United staces i9 being considerably stiffened. There are indications at preseni that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

- 1 -

H1155-0215

{Part 2)

2. I made enquiries as to the future of the war against the Soit Union.

Ribbentrop: ”The Fuhrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiling cut that state and went on to announce that praotioally all of the moin military objectives had been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next spring Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountans and chase Stalin deep into Siberia.”

1: "Approximately when do you .expect that?" . . ■•*

Ribbentrop: "Tho campaign will be launched in about May of nextyear according to present schedules”. . • . ‘ ’

I: "According towhat ycu say, Germany is apparently preparing.tb-. gamble, quite a bit in her Russian canpaig. We hope that -air eonhaeffi/mg between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time." " *

Ribbentrop:" That is an item that Germany has been oonsidering for some time. By summer cf next year, I do not believe that air connesbion from the Ural area to Menchickuc will be an impossibility. ”

3• I then asked him about the campaig against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing- operatiors against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain’s influence in the NearEast, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea, I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than here- tofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to epnolude the war without attempting to go through with a campaign against England.

4071)

Ribbentrop:" Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is ir receipt of intelligences .hioh would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives that Churchill’s influence is on the war; that Bevincief of the Labour Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. All of these are t^nd3ng to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficnbs;

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe alb cf this* How­ever, I am convinced that things are getting bad in Egland, Under these circumstanoes, it may be that Germany’s various other camnpaighs may cause • England to fall even without our going through with our' landing operations against England herself. •

; • ",

Part 3. "7 •’ •"In any event, Germany has ebeolutely no intention of entering into

any peace with Enghand. Ve are determined to remove all-British influence from Europe Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of. ritain may remain, but all of her other possesions throughs the world

will probably be divided three weys by Gonany, the United States, and •aan- In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German Colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African Colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control

- 2 -

H1155-0216

European Fussia."

, In cnclusion, I said? "I am fully aware of the fact that Gemeny S war campaign is progroscing nccoring to schedule smoothly. Howevcr, suppose that Gernany is facer vith the situation of having not on-.Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas -n .Which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area.wall undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion Ox the outcome of the war under such an eventuality9"

Ribbontrop: "We woud like to end this war during next year. However, uncer certain circunstances, it is Possible that it will heve to be continue on into the follovring year.

"Should Japen become engaged in a war against the United States Germany, or course; woulc join the wer i.mm-d iabe.y. There is abs01e- no possibility of Germony’s entering into a separate peace wi-h hevtea States under such circumstances, The Fuhrer is determined on that point."

. In.closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents or our ta.k3 be kept a strict secret. Please therefo exercise particular cauthion in handling this message.

I have shown copies of this attache’s Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm, ?) Nomura Abe. Please show a copy to the Ary

message to the milihary and naval end Maj.-Gen, (Rear Adm.?)

and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

.. "the (In the.last section of the first part of this message we wrote +**. the I.S, 1 undoubtedly try to avoid meetin- Germnn troops"++4-he should have read: "the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war,)

25556.TD-1: 6942

(D)Navy Trans. 121-41-(7)

4072)

~ 3 -

H1155-0217

4016

INTERCEPTED DUPLOIIATIC IEESSAGES

SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMEENT BEiEEN JULY 1 AND DECELBER 8, 1941

(Secret)

From : Berlin,. D,657,

To Tokyo

December 8, 1 94-1 o

(Priority)

$ 14-37 Limited distribution

Reiy4 113(972).4

At 1:00 Pelle to-day (8th) I called on Foreign linister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once, Ribbentrop replied that Hitler vras then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussin . how the formlities of declarinc war could be carried out so as to make a pood impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told tie that on the mornin; of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.

It joes without sayin that this is only for your secret inforation.

Army 25978 Trans. 12/9/41.

Not available.

TR NSL TTC T c TU"T 2911PS.CPTITCFUS.CHITF©Z C

SECRESTST.TE TTER

Notes ccnc^min. the discusgicns between The iiinistvr fcr Fc re i en Af fairs uid . mb arsudorC shima at Steinert, on 9 July 19^2?

He theFcrign Ninister asked bc see the .mbassadcr at this time when the situation was as described by him and a question of fateful importance arcSe cencerning the point carrying on cf the war.: If Japan f.lt itself sufficiently strong Milit ary the moment for Japan to attack Russia was prssulyncw. He thcught it possible that if Japn attacked Russia 't this tine, it would lead to her (Russia) final moral ccllaspe, at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case never again would Japan have such an cpportunity as existed at tha present, to eliminate Once and for all the Russian Ecli.ssus in Eastern sia.

He had discussed this cussticn with the Fuhrr -nd the Fuhrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize cne point,to begin with: Japan should attack Russia only if she f .-it sufficiently"strong for such an undertaking. Under no circle lanc. s should J-pan se opratioh against Russia to be allow,d toboccmne a tement at b) hLfway mark, and we do no. want to urge «apan onto acti 2 that is not prcij.tablo for both sides.

- 13 CF TR SL TICN will -ATT NC 2911 PS

17.11,45

1, WCLFG NG E, TCR.NN, 33779426 ‘Sgt, hereby certify that I am thcrcuchly conversant with the Engiish aid -erman languges; and that the above is a ccrrect nhd tiu- translation of Document No. 2911 PS,

-LFC PG /SGT.

33779426

3.THCR] NN

H1155-0218

PARTIAL TRANSLATIOIT OF DOCULIENT NO. 2954-

C FICE OF U 2 CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Pages F 12027 C F 12028-

TO; SECRET (ubber Stamnp) linutes Reich Ministerfor Foreign Affairs 14/43 top secret

(in ink)

1IINUTES

on the discussion of the Reich Minister for Foreign ffairs with Anbassador OSHIIA on 6 iarch 1943.

Ambassador OSHIIA declared, that he received a Talegran ron Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his sovernnent to the Reich linister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) to following: The suggestion of the German Govermicnt, to attack Russia, was the object of a co.on conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during wlui.ola the question wras dscussea in detail and investigated exactlyo The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger, which threatenu from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its Germnan ally.. that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. Howevr it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the presecr ac situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction, that it wou’d be in the common interest, not to start the var against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.

The Japanese Government has the intention, to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.

The RAM brought up the question after the explanation by the Ambassador, hovr the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Ger- many wages the war against the ccmnon enemies, England and American, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However it would be more correct, that all powers, allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and Americs, but also Russia together. It is not good, when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German nat­ional strength. He has worries silently, that certain forces work in Tokyo, ho are ox the opinion and. who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.

(Page F 12035 Line 5 to Lin 14)

The the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritie roblen, and on all fronts - except those in China - there are mostly very few ground forces conmitted. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an arny affair, and he asked hin- self , if the necessary forces woula not be ready for that.

CERTIFICATE OF TRAIISLATION OF DCCLmTT NO. 2971-PS _

13 November 1 945 .

I, WILLARD E. SKIDLIORE, Lt(jc), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant vith the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Docunent No. 2954}.

WILLARD E • SKLDMORE ,

Lt (jg), USNR, 391590.3760.

H1155-0219

IFeRTJAU TRANSLATLON 0 DCC. No. 2929-PS

0PTCE OF U.S. CEITTP OF CONSEL

notation RA Nr 23/43 top secret

on the conference of the Reichuinister for Foreign Affairs with Ambassador

OSHLLA on 18 April 1943 in GaIJSFIL,

TOP SICRET+ +--- +-t+- --r- +•

The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without

any doubt this year presented the west favourable cpro.ctunity for Japan,

If she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her

disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak

as she is at tie ino.nent.

+++++++++++++

CLRTIIC.ATE OF IABLAIONOUCCUENT 110, 2929.-DS

18, 11. 2,5

2 I, LULVIC HA TiAN, T/4, 37445052, hereby certify that I axa thoroughly% conversant with the English and Gernan languages; and that the above is a! correct and true translation of Document No, 2929-pS.

LUDWIG HART [AN

T/4 37416052.

3859

TR 07 ECCUiairT 735-ps.. s CHIEF OF COUNSEL

-llesible pencil note at top.

Deputychief_ofthe (rned Fo r —No. 771793/4^0^?^ Ope Staff

uhbject: Trectrent of eneny terror eviators

S: 0. onlyaccess only through officer

Fthrr Headquarters . 3 /6.6 ..1 $44 1/3 iMost Secret

3 Copi os 1st Copy

Minu 0es o? • meeti ne

«ISt ih‘kiebekefHPonn"abrezKslconbrganog inforded the deputy Chief of question hed bee- hal a s5 1j I Aono 66 that e conrerence bn this Rel eh Forcign Mrislez ndty erareebeternsthe Reich thesuggestion mece by tL pel., ug.co3mhen8S.. C norary uc the original type of terror abtach 5 1 dorsieliniatorwhovished to include every bombing attacks on .. 1. __ ll ’1 1 n. P° 1 ule tion , that 13 alsomerely those attnc the civilian popul

on

out Ww th /C erenent, nimod direstly atstandard for the would have to beof court

evidence of the rule.

—1 1"----nou-d De taken as the e crimincl tobuon in this sense. Iy

mertial sentence o. handnnt re ry Es been no question

2) Deputy Chief of stated the following:

sential to announce L kind giving the nmes incident occurred and th:s would be to n,.

Cs5, fa lie wing tha 1: avion ncde by Kelch n no vices written in ik

f tie Senerelly dis- er Dr. Goebbels and e vein, it is es—

y "-nmvelY esteclished incident of this Id uri's of the tvi ctors, the plrce the

an- other relevant facts. The purpose of - ea the serious intentions of the

" 6 en6 V propaganda and espec- ny fumhur rurderoug action

egg. +,i—... •Uu*lon > Th. ref ore the question i.s photeistepeseknovsoh nuch.dcase oz whethor the necessary with the required °strtbunte t canstruct a — like tis

ialJ.y to discourage e

obererurponfhrer Keltenlcunnor replicd to both in the negative

b) Derut Chief of the WRSt rationed thet, apert Fron L t g avicsore, who fre for seereesting those enery

until th’y tre "Tecsuszacindkot eririne1 cf this kina.the Reception Camp for evi etors

bended over to the CD forgpaiuistsontined, they would beat Oberursel if the C 1

Eor this the WTSt wov corperi te with the Suprene for till 4ir ;"ce toseout the necessery regulrtions -- the use of the herd of th. bemg ot Oberursel.

Ob< reruppenfthrer Keltenbrunner nent with this view end that tn segregated.

20 reseed his complete egree-- —2 ttke harge of those aviators

enuthsuduestion of nrking tnnounceants, it is settled thet, fcr the present, A6reeent should be reached in every c, g, hetueenQ/t, OK, ona the Re hsahrez ss to acdidsthe -orm that the announcement should take.

H1155-0221

H1155-0222

TNSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-FS ( cont. )

The participation of the Foreign office is to be aseted yy the VE*o

3) . At t corfemeuce with Cclonel von Brtucbitsch (C-in-C Mr Force) on 66, it W9 det-oc ibat hhe 20wing ecilons were to be regarded as terror-action. justifying Lyncn law..

c) . Low level attad’o with sircrefi errnnment on the civilian populetion, a ingle persons as well ts crowds.

b) . Shooling on our own (Cermt n) air crews in the cir who have baled out.

c) • Attecks with sir craft ernament on passenger trains in the public sorvice,

d) . Attacks with rirerofb rzoment or militory hosyitels, bospisals snd hospitel-trcins which are clecriy markc with the Red Cross.

The heed of e Te ce;e ton oc-- Nou f.i.-rrs at Fberursolwill be informed ot tes9 facts iven in Secv n 3 ebove. If the facts of ony case of this kind tre established ■ n errint tion. the pri scners ere to be handed over to the SD. Colonel von Ecuchiicoh dec Sored at the end, that another reperr to the Ron ch rshell on this subject wouldbe superfluous.

sgd. Werlimont

Distribution;

Chief OEW via Chief WFSt Deputy Chief WFS/’Ktb.Qu (rough copy)

1st Copy2nd Copy3rd Cony

H1155-0223

- TRaNSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-pS OFFICS OF U S CHIEF BE COUNSEL

_______________

Fem$55s.2y-theChief_o£9EW on the agenda dated 6.6.44 No.

Most Secret S.O. only.

"If one allows the people to carry out Lynch law, it is

difficult to enforce rules!

Min. Dir Berndt sot out and shot the enemy aviator on the road.

I am against legal procedure! It doesn’t work out!

sgd. K. ” (Keitel)

Remarks by Chief of NESt:"To 3. This conference is insufficient. The following points

must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

1) .hat do we consider as murder?Is RR in agreement with point 3b?

(marginal2) How should the procedure be carried out?note )A. A.?(Foreign a). by the people?Office) b). by the authorities?

3) How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out against other enemy aviators?

4) Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?

sgd. F. " (Jod1)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 735-F3

b November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/0, W.R.N.S., 36482, herb by certify that I am thoroughly conversant ’with the English and German • languages; and that the aoove is a true and correct translation of Document 735-PS.

EE SEERRIFF8/0, w.-,.S.

36482

*pago 1

TRNSLTION

TilalLTION OF DOCJENT 728-2S H1155-0224OFICE Of J S CHEI} o3 COUN3EL

DR.FT

--bssador RITTER No. 4443.L3BURG, 20 June 1944

1.) ToChief of the buyruo Co.mand of the rica Forcesuith rcf-rence to your correspondents of 15 June 1944Nr. Fst/duo (Verwe) Nr. 771793/44 gEGhefs. I. ang. ,Onccminc tlic trontiont of eneny torror-avintors,

la spitc of the obvious objections, founded on international -0 ond foroicn politics, the foreign Office is bisicnlly in agrcc- cnt with the proposed measures.

CopySecret

In tho exminnt ion of tho individual cases a distinctionumnst b0nnle cbocn the cases of lynching mnd the cases of spoci 1 trcotacnt by the S.D. (Security Sovice)

in the cases of lynching, the preciscircunsta cos dcservin, camunication of 15 Jur

nuthorities are not dii

sta lishment of the

-or-, Une acco pnn/in ; not be dificult to do. upon publication. Henc

punishcnt, accordin : to points 1-4 of the .e, is not very essential. First, the Goran ectly rosponsiolo, since Centh had occurred 1 bee one concern ed with the case . Further- circustincos will be such, taut it will ict the case in an appropriate nannor , in cases of lynching, it will be of

prinry inp-rtence correctly to handlo the individual case upon publication.

II tod procedure for spcci -.1 treatment by the S.Dsecurity •-ViCc2 in dud in .; subsequent ubliction, tould be tenbloa nly if GRd-NTY, on this occasion siult neously would openly ropudi itc the conittacnt of International Law, presently

.nd sa 11 rocomized by GLuI./. .dien an encny aviator is seised by the -my or by the olico, nd is delivered to the nir

o) Rccoption Os up OBL J 3.L, ac has rcccivca, by this the le al status of a pris.ncr of w r. lhe -risoncr of of 27 July, 1929 cst ablishos definite. rules on the

9Forces (- very fact

rosccuti on of the Prisoner of .nr, anl the th penalty, as for oxnple in article (6: D,

Sontenecs Qy be carried out only three onths after the protective power nas. bcon notified of the sentence; in article 53: a prisoner of ..war will be tried only by the same courts and under the s: ac procedure's ombers of the Gcraan -rcd Forces. Thcse rulcs re so specific, that it would be futile to try to cover up -ny violation 0 them by clover wording of the publication _f n individu ] in­cident. On the other hndn . the For ci n Office cannot rccocna on tnis occasion a formal repudiation of tho prisoner of ar Treaty,

xecu-.th

-h eler-ency solution would be to fra over att inine a 1c . 1 ris.nor ofiodiatoly upon seizure they t -risoners of . r but cri innls.

prevent suspected fliers ir st tus, that is, that

over to the agenc hence not 6:0 to a

be told that they are not consid , that thej would not be turned

vinc Jurisdiction over -risonors of . r

livoredacts an

risenorto the authorities in char.

of Jar Camp; but that theyrmould be de-

that they would f the prosecution of criminaltried in a sury precccding. If the

CV-de’ at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned ny Subs-duent-y be Given the status of -risoncr of .ar by transfer totac -ir Forces (-...) Rccoption Capeven this expedient will prevent the possibility that Gu will bo accussod of the violntion of existing treaties and

IJR3IL. Naturally, not

yoc

H1155-0225

V TR--3L-TION OF DOCUNT 728--3 OFFICE OF U S CHIE OF COUSEL

(cont. )

ntcven.theadoptic of roprisls upon Geraan prisoners of or. t.nyr ate this solution would enaic us clori, t0 amin * tti ude, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly finan° to eXT thgprosent acrcocnts or of the need cicHsSSdavndcrnanoscne bolicve, ujon the puLlicntion or

Of the acts dccacd criacs listed under H41- by the letter if 15 June, vo note that those listed under 1 na 4 o/. "10115 er.m

bovilling to aisregra this. 28.o,s it “SX

Etcern 1ottocobinqNosa W.3' and 4 to tho th t =11 be dealt 24,2 E8 or • he civilian population by m 'viator will hl ; ‘ yithns cri.os. Thc varicus roots und.r 1, 3 -na L uaFornibo oimipieant ony ns os2oclly otstnding c2nepics. The

2 tuczsshounanotud «- in ordincry dvclling houses, in nut^obilcs, on ranepopdteton..

Publicaticn, the existence of

heZoroim.offico bas.3 its pinion on thc riot thnt it is t stnfe the civilicn p0-ty 4.5'35,)866 8121028'3

d be pointed out.III. It fol lLow

notion will have to be pjoccd be carri cd out 1

above, thnt the min weicht of theon lync 0 ings. Sh ou Id the c

.+ , , 00 SUch n extent th t tho purposcdetoncence of ency avictars is aetmlly aerie fli- tac Foreimn Office, then the str fin

thc civil un populations nust be st: drerent roponlist nhor than her

nsuption, then cert

edto wit: "the

which goal is

lici ty f or h ne ted to fo:Uigp ;ost li se.ly the sulmit c short; di vin- particui:

nJ.J in the prop

by cna.ya coupletely the pub-anda dircc- rtaonts.ountricS. .10

2olico,vould nuve to be infur.nl im dintoly to’ truthul rcport to a central 1opoaitory in DELI 3 as 1,0 place, tie, nuber ce dead nd wounded.

local dep

7ouldForci orris trrdudcpositoryqundat once f.rra roports to th upon civilia taticrGinccsiuilar strifug attcss .Mplo, in Aca, 3aoiMt C.CCSHEToAoinuahe .*»«*«. for gcaandertents or tho cverncnts in these th dirocted ° collect th. instnnecs or such s tho Civilionpopul tion in the sale met -nd

countjes are to zofing attack . to exploit than

G in collaboration with

x 7 • In Lh-, +4. i — t

that until further +Ao 15 June the intention was conicated would have to be renoticoruon undorstdin with the Forcim Office attaches prticuiapchsispriorto any publication. The Fcrim Office ihis understand in be -eto .Point ni also to the fact that for the entirc arotinroencdonotponhy until further notioc, but

by Order (sijed) AITT:R (crossed out)

H1155-0226

4nge 3Tr-LSL-TION OF DOCUET 7282 OFFICL 0/ J J uIIEF OF COUNSIL

(cont.)

DeTIFIC TE o j TR ISL.TION OF DOCUIENT NO 728-13

23 Noveber 1945

1, L. D-VAN.ORT, 32496587, hereby certify that I m th ou-hiy tonvcrs t.vith themnclishoniGcmen 1-ngungcs, Ml that the abcve is a true cm correct tr.nslatj.cn of Documnent 723-,,

L, D.VIN~OrT

hit1’3 a 1714

TRTNSLITLON OF DOOUNEEIVT T40-pSOFFICE OF U S CHISF OF COliNSEL

Ops Stamf of the Armed Forces (Verw,1) Io. 00 6986/2, Secvet, JO June 1944

Secret3 CopiesCopy No.1

Subject: Treatment of enemy terror-av.ctors

luarcinal note: "We nust reslty do somtning about this 110We hat is scill necessary?"

(initialled ) (W. Warlimont)

nitialled K (Keitel) and 30/6 (30 June) in upper richt hand corner,.

Agenda

Enclosed I submit the d: to the Chief of the Suj passed to the Azmed For

eme Command ofof the Minister for Foreign Affairs

. which has beens Ops Staff (VFSt) through Ambassador RITTER.

• Ambassador RITIER has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the nisterfor Foreign Affairs has approved this draft, but that he has

orderedEuvoy SONNLEITIIER to present the attitude of the Foreign Office to the Fuhrer, before the letter is sint to the Chief of the Supreme corand of the Ammed loroes. The letter is to be forwarded to the Chief 41 he. Supreme Coinnand of he Armed Forces only after the approval by the Fuhrer- of the principles established by the Foreign Office.

The Reichsmarsha,1 agrees with the precise wording of the definition of the erm ero-avjatoms" as gien by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and with the proposed procedure.

/s/ WARLIIONT

Distribution:

hief of Supreme Conmand of Armed Forces viEhy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops. Staff

KIB (^ar Diary)Qu (Verw,1)

Copy=4 1Coz44 2Co]} 3

(pencil note illegible)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 740- PS

2 November 1945.

, R...'.—2nd Lt Inf. 0-1JJ5567. hereby certify that I am thoroughly conven Sanl with the English and German languages: and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 740-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL 2nd Lt Inf O-1335567.

3756

H1155-0227

H1155-0228

T C 51C 3398/19/18)

No. 145

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax, - (Received March IQ)No. 102. Savin)( Telegraphic ) En clair. Berlin, MArch 16 1939 .

1Y telegram No. 120

Following is the text of • decree, dated 16th March, issued by Herr Hitler reguJcting the status of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia:-

"For ten centurie3 the Bohemian-Moravian lands belonged to the living spuCt of the German people. Force and lack of undort .riding • rbitrorily tore them from their old historical surrouncings and finally crceted a source of permanent unrest by incorporating th err within the artificial edifice of Czocho- Slovakia. From year to year the d mg er that a new, app Hing menace to European peace would enennte, cs hnd hnp.onod once before in the Post, from this living space, increased. For the Czocho- Slovul State, and those in power thora , had not succeeded in properly organizing the existence side by side of the netioncl roups rbitrnrily united within its boundaries and had thereby foiled *o awaken the interest of all concerned in the mnintcrance of the ir common State. It has there 3 proved its inmost incnpncity to exist and has for this re Bon now also fallen into actual disso­lution.

security and"The Gcrman Reich, however, cannot tolerate permanent

disturbances in these tcrritories that ore so all —impor­tant to its own pet Co and security and olso so important

• o th-. general well-being and universal pencc. Sooner orloter the Reich, .'is tho Power most interested and affected, by history and toogrephical pocition, would have to suffer the most serious consequences, Self­preservation, therefore, requires that the German Reich should be determinod to intervene decisively in favour of the rostoretion of n basis for i. reasonable centr.European order and should toke the requisito measures. For it has already proved in the course of its historical past of a thousand years that it clone, thanks to its greatness and to the qualities of the German people, can be called upon to solve these tasks.

"Filled. with the earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples domiciled in this living space, to guarantee the individual national life of the German ond,Ol thg Czech peoples, to benefit peace and the social wolf re of all, I therefore decree the following, in the name of the German Reich, as the basis for the future existence in common of the inhabitants of these territo­ries : -

1192)

H1155-0229

7 \T C P1 (Cont’d)

"Article 1

1..The territorics which formed part of the former -”ecno-3-ovnk Rcpublic ane which were occupied by Germon troops in March 1939 belong henceforth to the territory o- the Germon Reich. und came under the litter’s protection 03 the "Protec tornte of Johemia nnd Moravin.I

a. In 30 for as the defence of the Reich demands, the Leader and Chancellor shall take measures differing from the above in respect of individual parts of those aress .

"Article II

"Inhabitants of the protectorate of German race shall become German nationals and German citizens in accordance with the provisions of the Reich Citizenship Law of the 15th September, 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt i, Ts 1146). The provisions with regard to safeguarding German blood and German honour shall therefore also apply to them. They shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

"2. Theremeining inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia shall be nationals of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Mora vi a.

"Article III

1. The I re tec torate of Bohemia and Moravia is auto­nomous and self-administering.

"2. It shall oxercisc its sovereign rights within the scope of the protectorate in consonance with the political, military and economic importance of the Reich.

"3. These sovereign rights shall be represented by its own organs, authorities and officials.

"Article IV

The head of the autonomous administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shall enjoy the guard and honours of the head of a State. The head of the protectorate must possess, in order to exercise his functions, the confidence of the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich.

"Article V

"L. As trustee of Reich interests the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich shall nominate a 'Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.’ His seat of office will be Prague.

"2, The Reich Protector, as representative of theLeader and Chunce llor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich government, is charged with duty of seeing,to the obser­vance of the political principles laid down by the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich.

*'3. The numbers of the Government of the protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn.

1193)

H1155-0230

TCFl(Cont' d)

. 4’ The hcich Protoctor is entitled to inform him- 26110 -■ 11 meqsures tnken by the Government of the pro- tocto io.ond to siye udvice. He con object to mensurcs cnlculited to herm the Reich and, in css of danger 1gsie ordinanccs required for the common interest.

" • The promulgation of laws, ordinances and other -£ml announcements and the execution of dministr,tive measures and legal judgments shall be annulled if the melch l ro tee tor enters an objection.

"Article VI.

"1. ally the taken ov affai rs

The foreign affairs of the protectorate, esocci_ pro. action of its nntionols abroad, shall be

ar by thk Reich. The Reich will conduct foreign in ccordoncc with the common interest.

"2. The protectorate shall have accredited to the Reich Government wi ’minister1.

a r C p re s C ntotivo th the title of a

"Article VII.

"1. The Reich shall the protectorate.

"C • In the rxcrcisc shall maintain garrisons the protectorate.

accord military protection to

of this protection the Reich and miljtory cstnblishme nts in

"3. For the maintenance of order the protectorate may form The. composition, strength, numb decided by the Reich Government

"Article VII1.

internal security and its own organizations

ers and erms shall be

"The Reich shall control directly the post and telegraph systems. tro nsport.

"Article IX.

.. The protectorate shall belon to the customs area -he eich ana be subject to ito customs sovereignty.

"Article X.

"The crown is legal tender, together with the reichsmark, until furtller notice.

”2. The Reich Government shall fix the ratio of one to the other.

"Article XI

1. The Reich C in issue ordinances valid for the protectorate in so far as the common interest requires,

"2. In so far as a common need exists, the Reich may take over brenches of administration and create its own Reich authorities therefor us required.

"3. Tug Rcich Government may take measures for the maintenance of security nd order.

1194)

H1155-0231

- 4T C Fl

(Cont!d)” rticle XIT

"The low ct prcs snail remnin in force the principle of the Reich.

in Bo he mi': and oreviait does not conflict with

assumption of protection by the German30 ion;

"Article XIII"The Reich Ministor of the In

agreement with the other Minioters trotive and let -1 regulotions Cor fication of this decree.

crier shall is concurned, the

the execution asue, in' mi nis-

nd a mp l i -

"Hi tier "Krick

"Ribbentrop."Lammers

"Prague, March 16."

Extract from REICHGESETZBLTT 1940. Part I.778.

"Decree of The Fhrer concerning exercise of Governental - authority in the Netherlands-'* 18 Jay, ! 92,0 •

"Seotion 1. The occupied Netherlands territories shall be adninisterea

by the ’Reich Co.issioner for the occupied Netherlands

territories'...«The Reich Comissioner is guardian of the

interests ox the Re io . rid vosied wL:h sprme civil

authority. ”

Section 6. Doctor irthur Seyss- Inquart is hereby appointed Reich

Comissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories".

3763

1

H1155-0233

33

Translation of Document

Decree

of the Peich Commissar for the occupiedDutch territories re the confiscation of property.

By virtue of para 5 (P.G.BL. I pa 773) about Netherlands. I order ;

of the Fuehrer: s Decree of the 286h. ..ay 1.91,0 the exercise of the powers of governnenc in the

Para Lo

(1) Tae property of persons or associations that have assisted, or are assisting or of whhcn it is to be asssd. that they vill assist ant- German or anti-Peich efforts can be confiscated in whole or in parb.

(2) The saine applies to goods and rights which have served, are serving or are suitable for serving to farther the efforts naned in sub-para l.

Para 2.

(1) The organs of the Cernan security Police can temporarily seize property, goods or rights in a preparation for their confiscation. The seizure is carried out by public prcola.nation or written declaration to the owaer of the property, the direct possessor of the goods or the holder of the right.

(2) The organs of the Ceran Security Police car. appoint a teporary administrator of the property, goods and rights seized, either Sinltaneously with or after the seizure. The teporary adnnstrator can take such measures as are customary within the framework of regular administration.

(3) By the seizure, the persons named in para 2, sub-para l lose the right to dispose of the thing seized without the permission of the organ which has ordered the seizure, or, where a temporary administrator has been appointed, of this temporary administration.

(--) If a book open to inspection by the public is kept about goods or right which have been seized, with the object of assisting juridicio - commercial transactions, the seizure is to be entered in this book free of charge on the demnand of the organ vhich has ordered the seizure or, vhere a te.nporary administrator has been appointed, by this teporary adinistrator.

(5) ( oods or a right which have been seized can not be acquired in good faith when an entry in accordance with sub-para 2 exists, or 'mere the seizure has been publicly announced.

(6) The seizure is to be cancelled if, in the opinion of the organ which nas ordered the seizure, it has becoine unnecessary or impracticable in view of the circunetances of the case. The cancellation of the seizure is carried out in she saune ay as it is ordered (para 2, suo-para l). If an entry in confornity vi th sub—para 2, has been made, this is to be cancelled free of charge.

Para J.

If goods ar, at the time of their seizure, not in the custody of their owner they can not be confiscated if the owner announces his right vithin one month to the higner .3. and Police Chief, or, whore a tomporary administrator has been appointed, to the latter, unless the owner intended, by handing over the goods to assist the efforts named in oara 1,

-1- 3860

-0234

Para 4.

(1) nfiscation takes place by a Decrec of1 the Peich Conissar for the occupied Dutch territories or by the authorities denoted by him; it comes into effect on its public announcement or its communication to those concerned. Para 2, sub-para L, applies znutatis nutandis.

(2) The confiscated property etc. is to be benefit in the occupied Dutch territories, special regulations about this.

used for purposes of public The Reich Commissar will publish

Para 5.

Associations of persons whose property has been confiscated will be dissolved. No winding up will take place.

Para 6,

(1) Responsibility for the debts of the owmer of confiscated property ana for the obligations connected with confiscated. goods and rights remain in "3,0020- 59 T -.t 210.1 chs o-v -uny i a ount, . tis rc. or by the selling value of the oods and rights. Rights to confiscatea landed estate remain in force.

(2) In case of debts exceeding value, the thing confiscated is to be divided up among those who are, in accordance with sub-para l, the legal creditors and in conformity with the cisting Dutch bankruptcy laws.

Para 7.

This decree comes into force on the day of its publication.

The Hague, 4th. July 1940.

The eich Commissar for the occupied Dutch territories:

SEYSSIN UART.

3861

•"

*

/ Ago 1 IR-aLTLONN OF DOC J.NI 1520-2 OFFICL Ui’’ J S CILLF OF COJVSLL

--NOT__about_°_di sauSS jon_t ith_ thoNULILR

atthe_uchrerHondauer ters_on_thc 3th Lay 1942.a-uu-"***Epe:**,

frcSct at first Rcich Minist r Dr, Lammers.

H1155-0235

I bogan with reporting to tho Fuehrer nbout the result s of the 1941/42 collection of tho N.S.D.,2, of booics for the Geman -ncd Forces resulting in more than 9 Million boocs, ron which 46,000 librarios Tcrc Pornod.

• *m-7 -*- . ---G-.-hen I denlt with curt in roproschos rniscd gainst the

Ministry Enst, Tho rticl in the "inrornotion service" ofttho Ministry for -rop gd a concorinc construction and aias of the alinistry -nst ppoorcd without any mo-lolge whatsocver on y port. I hnd, aS a natter of principle, grec ith tn inistry for -ropnc nda thot no public tions whotsocvor re ordin ■ the occupied Eastcin Torritorics she u id be publishcd itasut my express consent.

This bee m o essential because even inistors t l zed -bout the11 --ol i c y of Q?* ion ..is a. *1 - o.?11 in ch- Inst, - lhan it : .s 1so said that I had declared 550 acn e unft fcr - = service and thus deprived the arcd Corccs of than, n1 on t i al 1-ft 90 Officers ithout wore as an advance ch in I. azog. I • mt to st to that, bee use -f V0 newly rounforoc L. rce, tnc linistry last has handed over 650 -cn; howcver, up to e fcn vocics ■ 0 only 240 on have been called nw y, -s c micoms tho 20 en in Taganrog, this is not a cnure tacn y me but by tnc Leonide Ituff -ast ar the armed forces ranmont staff, respa Therefore, this matter was none of ay ffrir. Furthemmorc, this dv nee co.zo has ucon dissolved.

-S re rdG the re-settlocnt f th- Gormans fro Lithuania, tic -uchre s .id th t as was under the inpression tn t people uno had olrody settled he C would have to be ro-scut] d gcin. I told tho uchrer that it was net so, tis was a matter concernin more than 3 C, 000 settlers c pablo of resettloent who were stilldetained in camps and who were orn down by the prolonged camp life.

^t 1est I ref err d to the new Molotov nchorandun regarding supposed horrors ond our ..co . mic ncasares, which , as a attor of f c., rofons to some st toncnto in the so-called "Grucn Jcldor" of Lie ocononic staff 1 st of the 4-year Plan. Presuanbly such state­ments a d been discover id on the bcdy of a shot agrarian lcdcr; a ycor ago I hnd lrendy expressed y concurn about the too-clcorly cxpressod t and ccics of these st tcncnts. nuaver of agrarian le dors lire ly had been cillod. Iso thrco territorial comissicners already have been cillod figatin tac partiss.

-henc tor I aascribed to thu uunrur the ccsiderationshich cusod 10 to grant 3 .if - 1 zini str - t ion to the Daltic countries.

First of all this was not proclaimed by Liw, but it was only my d .croc to the Roich Comissioncr with tnc corresponding directives. In praxis it emt nothin; beyond ; confirmation of an alrendy existing statu of affrirs and tnc bolition of a certain uncertain­ty. e Wcrc very short of officials and wcro thus fo ced to be most economical with human noterial. Howcvir, frequently efforts were noticable to mocdle with the trivinlitios of life which neccssi- t tes now demands and withdraws co mony soldiers from the armed forces. Ti 1ct th- doors op ax for s.l p00p1c to escape army ser- vic.. Furtaoracro, solf-dinistration w. s connected "ith on increased willingness to work. -fter -11 there wom. enough safet clauses whereby the self- dninistration could not undertake anything without the sanction of tho Co nissioncr Gencrall. In order to oli ninate any possible politic l danor, an orccption has seen dc with Riga has 10-12,000 officials -nd was to rec.ivo a Coran mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithu nnin a 1 if - dministration . Thereby a personal political policy of the Litnun ni an Directorate would be

) -go 2 “ T-N-LlLON 0 DOCUINI 15202 O.2LCL Ur' J S CHIlF F COJISIL

(c cat..)

avoided. 3y this measurc iliga dmini s tra 0 i on c

ould be an experinent for ainexed

• also cr ont c an h o Were ucetin ; the I

it a lnter Gnte this would ’ fication to proceed ore dr 'nd regulations in order to

5voc- alibi and ad deonstrited ltic nations more than half wy. if not be ac.cn o’.71 edged, ne had every justi-

stica-l} • i no 1 nearer copt ■ 11 decrees> ezainc the.n. Yct durin the whole of

-fterm 1 hot ill the

that, of couy the part of 110 Gern ho entire economic ain

economical measures-Hereupon I replied

Generally spun himand pr

h endelsjos. only they ne

Erou- ox profiteers. I one monopolies and -is.c1 to a;

nstom Central Tr 1c) are ft ) be supervised. Jr. LLLR to be tarot tied : in crier to

-nd the Z.0 (Zcntral-I ■ • aunt 4 Hy no-ecss ary,

a

of rron irdate the

i r

coaccb mono20ly ulnrly intcrcst for the produce; cd that the cco

t in whether o for hcro, ther. i in the retail s c. 1d still a

- Fuehrer intended

onopo-ye lhe question scttled at a later

question of the producers

monopoly

, iae ed not tact I

nec

nave not yet agreed upon

question

Thon the tcrritcrics W-

BORuL-all , who a.

ion of roluc

for th.., .mrthcland in the East Tas tn.

dy had G and for

but clint <,nc sa^uld not allo supervision, ut that one ou decrees, respectively orders us fro unenticipatcd surpri attitud , ho moroly question hadl sce st: lading in Greny dency by a lon which night h .mat was to be understood un in terpreted by tim mwren es,

d if th- Aci•.. .aid not p

v

lnd

port of thcroduce hundred a C

U

tr—d-om for the occupied Eastern ■er consult d Rcichsleiterch expo .ionco br the preparations I explained the the situations cel ssi stical groups being formed ovclogent to t‘s. place without ire at S•40 and that the intended or thc purpose of protecting L-t.V ntircly ngrced with this

"roll ciuu he c culd letters

ithin the Roich. Ihforms

minister J st, who also ducc too close a cpen- ns inside tac Rcich. freedom1’ ms to be nticipsto, that such a nd complaints on tne Fuehrer considered a

1Sc1Ssing its ui is ent. Fin lly it settled by myself

uld climinat e such a - Fuehrer read the dec

er, andand .; .vc

Goissioncrs toce grantod and would d

in the fora of 1~wde question was not but that the Reich

isting religious freedom so to sp ta. n.ccssrycecutive orders. I

-1 -e.-eveloencnt continususlyand rctci.n the executive sonte • \ls O sily possible that taui lenders or the churches

■c for as then

pointed out thet atriarch IS

as cd adhere and th

nd that . f I re ll.

ine O' ht t.

/ the c sc far .all practicalh- matter is necessary. Thc Fuehrer

women it w s c

-11 the Jo hat ith

ns were faithful

Somewh t unaccustomed to cirau -cv to -orli of che nation: I r nd it ny be poss'

"atf

—/ tac c SC, the uzch. Farthorore hcist .lusoun*. Tn

+ ML

“--Sm ;..m in as not for th?

outh were al re dy n id tr-ns ported

nis the writings—13J:0, are quoted the IU :r i n i an l an gu" g e c urech. also Such free:

H1155-0237

Page 3 TRANSLATION OF DOCUENT 1520-PS OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(cent.)

of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer erphazised that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he beljeved that he was still able to do something because of his authori.ty vhich at a later date would be difficult for anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out churchpolit.cal lectures in a small circle in my lecture house at Dallel, tin which the vhole problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future he necessary idealogi.oal fight would also be carried out with the necessary knowledge and on the necessary scale.

Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany's wards was discussed I pointed out that some representatives intcrprcted the point of vi.ew of the master racc, by travelling up and down the counby with the whipo it is tru , formerly one used to say of the Slavs that they like, to be thcasheso But this had changed raical.ly. Now the situation was that the pulic thrashing meant the sene as for the Orienta3.s "the Losing of face". Even the Bo].shevics mistreated the prisoners aboinably behind ihe walls- but never i.n public view. A number of ancndenls had occurred caused by though less talk. it is necessary that our foreign repr esentetives also know how to keep stlenta The Fuehrer read the draft of ry decree for the Rci.ch Comni ss.oner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.

I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the threc delesations of farmers in grateful acknowlcdgement of our agrari.an. logs.aj.on and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars pammLovs, posters, trahslations of German writings, etc. The dfioulty here, too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be transported. A par had remained in the Government General., The whole action was vory successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs of Ulranian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The fuehrer expressed h?.s surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even beauty of the people.

I then dealt with the employment of foreign workers in the occupied Eastern territories, I had appointed a special delegate for this who had been very active to cultivate all those existing connections and to institute new ones. t first the Danish minister LARSEI had travelled the Eastland with the General-Director JUNKER who was the chief of the Dani.sh Co.nnttee for employment in the East. This journey already had produced tangible practical results; in Port Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machin ry would be delivered within a few weeks. After an ini.tiial starting time about 75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erection of cuent works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now be prepared in order to benefit from i.t in the following year. Two exports had to be sent there, and within a few wcels one could start with the install­ations. The same applies to a large plaster factory, to the completion of concrete and vrooden shoe factories. Since it will probably become itpossible in the future to continue to provide the population ’with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business plannings arc also being considered. Especially the oil factory at Libau is ready to be taken over, also crcamcries, ship­building plants, etc. All those works thus proise a considerable increase in production for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with The Dutch, and Reich Conmissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first draft regarding the employment of Dutch

3795.

H1155-0238

Pag© 4 - -- TRaVSL-IION O£ DOCJ.N1 1520--S OFeICE OF J S HLIF F COUN5LL

( C ont . )

people in the region of Libau. It is plannod to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of lend to by cultivatcd under stipulation that after delivery of all tnat is claimed by the Gern n adninistra- tion, they are permitted to export the surplus to Holland. Setae of the details nnd still to be settled. The Fuehrer thought one could as a mattor of principle admit Dutchncn to the Eas., because if there Were not ore than 1000 people, then they would be bsor- bedo Ho did not wish lorgo colonies. The matter was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigate, Moreover the D.sF German Forcers Front had bought a wharf at Varnn in order to tackle the building of cm ercto ship a.

I then reported to tho Fuehrer tne planning of central office for planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the camittoc for the gencral policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich had sent their ennisnries. Naturally nothing would be done at this st-gc in which might somehow hamper the war produc­tion.

Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and the policy of the ■j-k, (Foreim Ministry) towards the Eastern territories. I reported to the Fuehrer that, for sone time, we had picked out the best of the prisoners by c cmis si on s of the Ministry East. The OK. had now established the Turkostan Legian through direct collaboration with us. -ccording to my information received from the manager of chief section “policy", the camp is in perfect condition, the Comander has learned the Turkestan languages, and the Tru xest ins have accepted German military terns .nd have .n anti-3olshcwist attitude. The legions of the Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the beginning on the part of the 3D,called all those peoples " siavics", had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the dispos l of tne German Rcich today. - new flag was created for the Turcest n legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuchrer the individual synbols for the designs for flags for the Georgians, rnenins, ser bcidschoni ans, Cuonnccssaci and Kaluc.cs. The Fuehrer and no objections t gainst those designes, however, he asiccd my opinion about the rnenians. I stated that amcnia was the best bolt between Turkey and serbcidschm , and

thus could stop a ranturanian moveent towards tne East. Generally spcakin; the armenian people themselves are stationary, a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.

I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign affairs claimed the political handling of the Eastern territories, in ns for as it has not been taken over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our protests convoced in increasing measure the most varied cmicrontse I read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from raris, fron Svi tzcrland , .11 of whom were staying au the Ellon Hotel in Dorling .Two of them, according to our infomation, were well-known espionage gents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here those migrants from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise, I sid that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question.. .In this connection wo had made possible the studies of Dr. DIIVZING and assigned him upon request for a certain period to the ... (Foreign Ministry). The -i. then created for him a separate dep rtcnt for planning and appointed him to be a Rogicruncsrat (divisor of the Govcrnnent).

It subsequently refused to return ni to us. Tho sanc applies in the case of the Turkostonian &YJ. The questions had long been discussed with him. le had merely loaned him to-the .... for the

H1 155-0239

fAge 5 - IR.-NSL-1IOV OF DOUaI 1.520-23 OF. ICL Oz J 3 clIIF 0? CUJ3-L

(cont . )

RHrPoSo of brondcastins propngone. Now the . tas senling him to -nris in order to collect oni_ronts. Tac Zuchrer gave the strictest instructions to tho Reich.inister Dr. LLUR3 , to inform the .... officially that it hnd to discontinue its octivitics in tac -st instntly- It as "130 to release the rcthined person litios to the Ministry Enst, and hc did not wish my further inquiries.I further explained that I had tal red to Suato Secretary v.

—--2-CR u fu wooits ago ond requested aia to infora the Hoi ch „oreign Hinistor that I WI s looking forward to spcaiing to him personally. “-I-S.L0.ER snid that tho to points of view differed, "hen -cizenector ws asiod about it after sone time, he said that he did not understand from this tli t at_he_was to arrange tho meotinsbctuocn Ribbentrop nd aysclf. he anvo interpreted this rmere that the natter was to be put off until after tac cm toss - oiErante had been convoced in Ecrlin. Some days a/go vre were inforcd by a liaison man of the i. tant thcy did net -t 11 consider the attitude thich I had reported to the Fuehrer in reward to the Caucasian people, as binding for them out that it ws of a purely private chractcr. fhe fuehrer once aure e.phaziscd his point of view.

I then reported to the Fuchrer on the wort of the preparatory reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a fev personalities Wem theuFuchrer preferred not to have used in Gcrany the Zuohrealities."The t sks of J ini st er SPEERwith me were ticn thorcu ;hly discussed

natters ofhad its own

ado the worst

—180 oi person- : relationship r said that he.

mu one .d traffic by the fact that the Govornment General

ndministration betBecause of these circastances

cen the front lines and the lot of isundorst ndings adinistraticns did notand frictions were caused. T

function and interfered with the uniform tocimicn direction so-t Vo Y nenrly catastrophic conditions resulted, if tac entire dinistraticn of rilrond traffic h d not been transferred to the

Helen Ministry of Conunication. Only by thsc mcnns had it bc- ,d1e Graiunlly possible to invrense the freu 125 to 220. For the construction of ermment wories it ic also n.cossay that control, and 3EE alro dy provea nt the cuties that he mew h mnny n technical tas

ily number ofthoroup hf res

ins and

; a central office has; be. inning of his officials well. ic succeeded to solve

onths, and he, th I told the Fuehr

R from the very b

n v-ry short time. which normally would have

his first drafts for an or two points, that is that t

, was icat satisfiod with tais had promised ny utost support nd that I a ad accepted in principle it, vith the only exception of

boy and the duration of the war and secondly Chief of the O.T. (Orcanistion Toit), g0 s

uld remin in force that the lopartiont

the Reich Clould ncve a rank of nss a decision arinst

Tho Fuehrer theneujonostatul r-p. molly thnt the acich -Ministry 3:— would be dissolved on the vry day peace was declared and all his.prosent tns’cs would be split up. Inc engcncnt of the artery roads throuch the East, however, hod still tccnnicnlly to be ccnirally “onduetede Thoy oro, therefore, t:sa for tac i.odiato w.roffort. Pee . -8° noithor has the intention nor the csnission to start --cin houscs now, but he must be empowered to prvent the buil-

mne, n-uhen of 1prge dinistrative palaces or sinilar buildings, VhiLe are not wor essential, Dr. LdEs su gostod co include by W ° -rocnent or docrec of the Fuehrer, that shis decree was jonly for the duration of the wr. I then described to the Fuehrer j

I

TR.aNSLlION OF DOCUM.INT 1520-23

OFFICE OF J 3 CHIE OF COUSEL (cont.)

the present general situation, according to which new plenipoten_ toricsrin-chief cndonvoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eostern territories, overlooking those digit ar ies who were appointed by the Fuehrer hinself. at the monet the pre bleu of the Cp-o-ent of labor was under discussion. In those places where the cexiissioners-in-chief had been informed in good time and had the P°S31blity to enlighten the populations concerned, it ms possible to Achieve a considcrnlbe voluntary readiness for vork. In hany other instances one adopted measures of enforccnent i.nediatoly, without taxing any consideration of the coissioner in chief with the

• resuit.that in certain towns a flight into the woods took place, in order that thcy would not be - to use their orn phrase - deported, ihose icn would decidedly increase the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other forced laborers had left the rains Going into the Reich during the night, with tho result that

tacy arrived half empty at the frontier of the Government General. 1 hey f too, would constitute a danger. .s a result at places which were included in the Four Year lan thensclses, the very Four Year d-an h2d Withdreun workers who were partially lost, and thus the CPPosite result Was achieved, that is a noticeable deterioration C. ihe sit nation and ill f eolinga the population. I already re­ceived a nubcr of reports from th. Jrriine and fra Latvia which Snirnthis stnte of offirs. If now acliu or lower tocnnicions proceeded s iz il rly without regard of the coissicners in chief.

chicyingthe technicnl effects. I point Jut that devclopent.. Rcich Minister ER would retain his authority in its old -:re I would be forced to decline the responsibility for con- dy42ns the future and, in m y casc, could not be subjected to en-vicisn if tho political situation would worsen very decisive by The fuehrer listened to the report iost attentively, -s mos ay i --Ae - A N a. • - . _ • 7--S10‘ nd then he s. il that, in any c se, thu arterial roads

be secured by technical nomns in order to supply the frontier“-th6uns ed muuniticn. The matter tas then discussed once norc.

Pointen out.whnt Erent ox fort it tool me to restrain the suprcno Hcish uthori ics frcn inter! er in: with the occupied Ester torri_ -oricsi tho argunents, hoover, ecc so convincing, that one

UO 7 - reo extent that the direction of the Enst could 10ricd out centrally. If tais painfully achieved position

+ . ° D, .bosen by such a fa-reaching decree for SHIZR, thetonreney .Hou1d revive evorynere to interfere with the occupied 4--.--rr- ories disrccording the Ministry Tast. The Fuehrer said Dr nmerno.circustoncos should that happend , and he insttuctedI: that he W38 to reject such de-nds on the Fuehrer'sorders.

nS no

of , -RS 2 s ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks 04len-18 cr S4-ER in the occupied Eastern territories in re

-timnship to myself for the duration of the -r.

: < the cpurau of tho discussion a number of other matters were 30 de- t,vith•The Fuchrcr approved the finan version regrdinc

uniLorg th he occupicd territories. - I peportcd to him the re- r. 28 the exhi bition niagta, Bruxelles nd of the .ork progress o tao omibition “Fight for LUROAL".-

The qucstion of the awarding the iron crsoss to the Estonians, -ithua nions, and Latvians to a problem of thu oc. Ihe arica -orceg.ri in. Vorof suchowrds. However, tnurc are sac politics. objcction8: -he Fuchrer believes to see n dangler in it, that in 280.°1huvuro caplicatione the bearer of the EX (iren cross)

. to be subjected to disciplin ry pun ish.ent. I expiindetunt S° diers o: ue 3altic nations - accordin.g to many utterances - —00ed.upon on AW rd aS 3 guarantee for Rcich citizonship. Thereby the political effect of a Germanisation and on the other hand

H1155-0241

IRaNSL-TION OF DOCUMENP 1520_sOF-- CL 02 J S CIEIF oF cuisiL

(cont. )the slirming of aationnlistic force, ttor VoS o be ex.inci once again WC .Id beconc possible. The

I informed journgyyinto the

me t o ext end his

the uchrer of ay intentjun to Eastlnd n the 14th May, The Grotings to the appointed an

stort iy first official Behrer authori zed

inisortivc cors.

- then repented tc the Fuenrcr the fe “ which P^uccd 2,500 tons,q dh still eail lo in the oconuy, t c 2 31500 ons.. Tho collection of wools too the loich.

sHlts of meba1 collection _ 3 collecting those me- igire "ouli be raised to d reached the nverge of

I handed the Fuchrar a fil. of lubber Plontnvicns, vhich has bec.

refusals

gtj regarding the lcvolopncnt fosjered by the foreign1935. Despite ill the -efic;,otrlmiste° t cultivated in-thens, later on - -nister granted -i .w ercs of 1end in Geranny.

-orthel nd and j.n the Govurnent Gneren where fro 1X3 on ro than 100,000 ha ill phen provide cnough to fill the

1 sythetic rabzer production.

tho ReichNow it is titivated in the and lpter on in the U-ino iillib worad. The haz EeP r: ich is still open

raring thedeportent of 6high official had yet be ith the ocpctant Rcica

eport I tumned the converstion toward the pl-nnin - s id tost if ter nearly one year no pointed because of the mony discussing

-cber CR.NZ who W/9 chief of press in +

Cp rtcnt cntioned the case af party

not want to . p .nt the opinion that ron’s. If G.12, w prootcd wiviin c

st, but whdmVO le

year. Ishi

not start ficht pointci linist .

inistey of finance didreitor. Dr. LiLvERS vas of

of the junX snid that the negotiations wi Special doparb far nore ext na. view nd ash d • if ter enticnin,

was in ret lity 2

was it a quest ist wh. hea fo1

i thatm cf :

1. t

boit

aW-/ with the highest 1r it then he c ouli be

as alrc dy a year in the"Po-nv ine ohc _r: jor Cranz, but his pr. f ess icn for nearly 20 yearO k on an equ 11 footing in its

istry (Ressortinist.This was nor

c 1'r. o t ubor of r Minister 0

aia), but it had other, with this point of mission era Offices were

1S X added that a Reich C iscioner a lcge2 VinOcountry. licro, too

vith he ve 1 not nich in faVor--Cmission. X mrs surprieca ne that just thc crc tit ; n .X told the Lehrer -.444, . —-n-Stry 8 the zish of the Fuehrer.then r.questcapr. * thnt tine l hed —dc specin ropositions

’ - to give e his support in this matter.

onere to

Dr.

overninnd he said that to begin

1 linistry for the East LuivE. had nndc out +

J

Berlin, 13thMa, 19/12 Signed: R.R/H.

C-IFIC:fE 02 IR.NSL.IION OF DoCuLVT N0 1520-13

26 November 1945.1, ERNST ii. COHN, -fe A99-, u

conversant with the Eh 1i “57 ‘ herehy certify thot I on thoroughlyis A true ana c g4 4-15 1 nn Geran lnngunezes; an I the the above

t. nslation of Docuent 1520--3.

rfc ER.1ST COHN■■ - •"" "e2 wTjwesaeMems -32457.

H11550242

TELEGRAlI RECEIVED

JRThis Telegram must be cosely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone, (A)

London.FRGI

Dated December 8, 1938.

Rac’d 6:13 pamo

Secretary of State, Washington.

1414, December 8, 7 p,m.

Under Secretary of State Lee 9- 1938

hir. Velles(Stamp)

(840. 48 )(Refugecs/1 072.)

PERSONAL FOR THE ACTTNG SECRETARY FRO RUBLEE

My 1403, December 7 3 p me

The representative of the Gman Enbassy assured us that we would receive

further explanation of the cancella tion or postponement of the Brussels meeting

in the course of yesterday. He said that this telegram was being deciphered

and that undoubtedly he would have further details, However, late last evening

he called merely to state that it was now understood that the meeting had had to

be put off in view of the sudden illness of the principal negotiator on the ( Filed

German side. He regretted that he could tell us no more. (Dec 10.33( FP

During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger's office in Paris.

We were told that the matter of refugees had been raised by Bonnet in his

conversation with von Ribbentrop. The result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when

pressed, had said to Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were

pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed had been

acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to assimilate

them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they

had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced, to live

in districts frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police

observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report to the police

as other criminals were obliged to do. The German Government could not help

it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious

to have them. It was not however willing for them to trice the property which

3754.

H1155-0243

- 2 -

had resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in fact

nothing that it could or would do.

From our German contact we have information that the French raised the

question of refugees not only in principle but concretely in respect to the

financial aspects of the question, Berenger, while attending the officers

meeting, gave a hint that his Government was preparing to take this line.

We attempted to dissuade him from crossing wires with our negotiation and he

assured us that he would do his best to keep the discussion of refugees on a

general plane but he added Chamberlain had requested Daladier to take the

matter up with Ribbentrop and so it would have to be taken up. Winterton

denies this.

The British assured us this morning that they did not communicate to

the French the details of the financial plan which they now tell us they

have prepared but which they are holding back for the present. They say that

they are as mystified as we are about the French move and do not know what

specific financial proposals Bonnet may have raised with Ribbentrop. With

regard to the visit of Schacht to London we have no conclusive information.

The British will say no more than that the visit is imminent. The Germans

say they are not at liberty to discuss the matter.

(Sgd) KENNEDY.

HPD

3755

H1155-0244

TRANSLATION OF DCCU.ENT 3358 -P3OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

la.nl stry for Foreign Affairs Barlin, 31st January 1939.83 - 26 19/1 Angeli

Enclosed please find for your attention a circular which has been sent to

the Gernan authorities abroad on the subject of "The Jewish Question as a

factor in Gornan Foreign Policy in the year 1938 ”

By Order

signed Hinrichs.

To:

All Senior Reich Authoritiesand NSDAP Bureau for Foreign Affairs.

to No. 611 39 secret. Foreign.

-1- 3725

H1155-0245

/ HH■'■

TRAISLLTION GF pocUEIT 335 8-p (cont’d)

Secret

Foreign 6,2.39.No, 611 39 Secrete Foreign If.

Copy to: Abw. I (Counter Intelligence l)

Pencil note: + Chief W« T,

w. StnLeChief Tept, 3.Att. Gr. of the AxLy General StaffOKII. Dept, 3. SKLOo - d.Le (ZA)Ob. d.I. Dept, 5, General Staff, usl. Ill

attention is requested.*

By Order

1 Enclosure

)

-2- 3729.

H1155-0246

I" TRANSLATION O DOCUTEENT 3358

(cont ‘d)

82826,571 Fecoama Berlin, 25th January 1939.

Contents;

The Jewish 9uestion_as_a factor in German Foreign Policy in the year 1938.

1) The Geruzan Jevdsh Policy as basis and consequence of the decisions for the

foreign policy of the yerr 19382) Ain of Gernan Jevish Policy: Emigration.

3) Leans, ways and ain of the Jewish Eigraticn.

+) The emigrated Jew as the best propaganda for the Genman Jewish Policy.

It is certainly no co-nci.cence that the fateful years 1938 has brought nearer the solution of th. Juto.ch question simultaneously with the reA1_ ization of the "idea of Gronter Cerany . Mince the Jewish policysas

oth the basis and consequence of the events of the yerr 1938. The pdvanc made by Jowish influence and the destructive Jetieh spirit in Po-itics, Econorv and Culture paralysed the power and will of the German the Ploutorisenninucre Perhaps even then the power-policy opposition of the,f0 er oneV allicd powers of the World Vere The heading of this S-cmes8 among the people was therefore cert .inly ore of the most ir_ por ent roquircents for exerting the force which in the year 1938 resulted in the joining together of Greater Ger. any, in defiance of the VVVI -LU.g

To:

All diploatic and qualified consular representatives abroad.

—3- 3726

H1155-0247

J

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3358-PS (cont ‘d)

The necessity for a radical solution of the Jewish question arose however also AS.cconseauence of the foreign political developent, whi.ch resulted in a further

‘°-° *eVS, in Austria in addition to the 500, 000 of the Jewish Faith living in the Old Seiche The influence of Jewry on Austrian Economy which had grown to enorous propertions undor the Schuschni.g Regins, made irmediate measures necessary, "th.tne Aim of excluding Jewry from German Econ.ory and utilising Jewish property in the interests of the colunity c The action carried out as reprisal for themurder ©f Legation Councillor von Rath (Gesandtschaftsrat) accelerated this process to such an extent that Jewish shops - till then with the exception of foreign businesses disappeared fro the streets completely. The liquidation of the Jewish ’wholesale Trade, Manufacturing Trade, and of houses and real estate in the hands of •Jews, vill gradually reach a point where in a conceiveable time there Wi- no longer be any talk of Jewish property in Germany. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that this is no seizure of Jewish property without compensation, as for instance the confiscaci.on of Church Property during the French revolution. On the contrary tac dispossessed. Jew receives Reich Bonds for his goods, and the interest is creditc io him,

. . The final goal of Gernen Jewish Policy is the c: tigration of all the Jews li v-ing in Reich territoryB It is foreseen that already the thorough measures in theeconomic sphere, which have prevented the Jew from earning and made hi- live on his dividends, vail further the desire to emigrate,, Looking back on the last 5 years since the assumption of power it is however obvious that neither the Law for the Reestablishing of the Professional Character of the Civil Service nor the NErnbeg Jewish Laws with their Executive Regulations, which prevented any tendancy of Jevry being cSsimnulatod, contributed to any extent to the Migration of German Jews. On the contrerycvory period of domestic political tranquility has resulted in such a stream of Jewish iruigrants returning, that the Gestapo has been obliged to put Jewish immigrants with German passports into a Training Ca.p for pol 1 ti cal supervision.

The Jew was excluded fro Politics and Culture. But until 19.38 his powerful economic position in Germany was unbroken, and thereby his obstinate resolve to hold out until "better tires" caec Indicative of the tactics of this "delaying*! resistance is the prograne of a Jewish Party recently formed in Poland, to fight Am-ns a Po-ish necsures aimed at Jewish emigration. As long as the Jew canearn money in Germany, then in the opinion of World Jewry the Jewish bastion in Gerheny need not be given upo

. But the Jew has underestimated the consequences and the strength of the National cialist purpose. The powerful Jewish positions in Vienna and Prague co APsed in 1938 at the. sane time as the System of States in Central Europe creoted.at Vors ailles to keep Germany down. Italy stood at Gormany’s side, with herRncin- -avs in the fight against Jewry. An expert on the Jewish question, Pro!. Goga took over the Government in Bukarest with a prograne aimed agri nst Jewry, vithout however being able to carry it cut because of overwhelning inter- national pressure from Paris and London. Jewry in Hungary and Poland was subjected to Special -WSe Everywhere the success of German foreign policy now begins to shake Jewish strongholds which have been established for hundreds of years from Munich and in for off States, like the trezours of an earthqurke.

It is also understandable that Acrid Jevry, "which has selected America as its Headquarters" regards as its own downfall the Munich Agrecent, which in American opinion signifies the collapse of the Democratic Front in Europe. For the system of PorlianentaryDenocracy has always, as experience proves, helped the Jews to Wc.t and political power at the expense of the people in whose country they live,

ns centat3 the first time in history that Jevry must evacuate a secure position.

3727

H1155-0248

TION OF DOCUENT 3358—PS (cont’d)

It showed itself in the efforts„ This resolution va.s first ferued in. 1938,to 104 estern Petocrncies prrticulorly those of the United St:tes of Aerica, torputtheanofin21 detciined Jevish withdr: wal from Gernny, in ’-ds-ewish eigretion, under international control and protection. TheAge- ' " 1 -resi ent Roosevelt "who it is well known is surrounded by g ’’hole row cf.Jeurycong his closest cniled aEvian without idcle.o1938to Ciscuss the refure questions, which was held in which is 40U 4any.Pe culaz resuts. Both of the questions, the answering of Pirst thecfirstesgtinl for orsnnined JenshEigration regained unanswerea: secondly thooquetiannofeotls.0 igratq shouuc be organised and financed and

In answer to the appear willing to cont Ccrmttee forned by it regarded its nain task

first question. Interibut on the contrary the Conference - and later the

der the dirroction of Publee an American --i thc. C of forcing Gerciyby irtorna+;ora npese, +,

release Jewish property to the gset.st cgi0 > > t Io S -Gernany s +0 "A.,, , • --D C vent: In other wors"aS to etigrnt-on of hur 700,000 Jeus vi.th Gorman Nationalover seriously desired t.s22s5da8 +0 Sothqdshthertnternationn1 Jeiry and other states at all unos- +8, tichtnzin.fenlow ' ews Germany

- ‘ -s tn-e WaS en equivalent of a Jewish State. The.l.s:- wore in overy case aixed less at

property. It

tactics hitherto employed in J.v nass erigration of Jews then at tho tre

It goes without sa, property, would be inrpo ying thct tho transfer of even a fraction of Jewish

SG12-e frcthe point of view of foreign exchange. The

0-6" -—

fellow Jews.to inigreto to Gemneny, at a ti 0 when Geranny w s could.not stop tho strenn of Jews P'c. tho East, it sloula be ever that according to police and taxation records Jews irnigrcted to Gernany without means and made while the German people lost their possessions as ■ inposed by the Treaty of Versailles' or joincnth’ - Consequently Ge:

over.

its destitute so weak that sheerphasized how-

the greater proportion ofoneg in a io ■ears or decadesresult of the reparations 1

— - — -s o? thc unemployed.an ostensibly human! t^ianwokd accuses syetyyforithe co assion, iith wnich property which wns tkn 2u"y fro tEs Co2mhpVopn. by fohlyhrguranrie tintca

houldThe second question, to what country gouia — t • , : ..be directed, could si ih’ry not ho ---iou.sn orsenised Jewish erigration of the con1r-g 1,2- - , . enswer cd the Evian Conference, as each• -I countries tamng part having nnnoie A +1.+ +1. - „ , .cerned with the refugee r0bi01 Annhogeod.thet th were Cundonentally con- take larco n—E,i, "2 - , - -! - -aed tnt there wcre not in a position toTows cv in1933/32territory. After over 100,000 and ostnblishingrthtnsenvsgcincccducitherelemlly or illeglly in escaping abroad thcir Jewishroiativos’niving.scooanoucisclscounirycithor vith the holp of a hunaniterian point of vicw, alzost orsScles8cqtheticn1 disrosed freu hernetically sealed its borders against ths" 7A. t40i lhnsin tke Lecntine proble: of Jewish enic.tion +8 p X P-resviical Jevish intruders. Thestill. 1ny states Av onrisathgrcCorosfer 11 Practical purposes at a stand- made out by German authorities from Jots tr.German Passports, saying that there is no+hi

s S

the ordinary way with them returning.

The emigration movozent of only 1,+ .00 -A nawaken the interest if not the undorstrnM.no 02°00nowshqsalrendy.sufficcd to danger. We con ostimete that the jotin dsc.contrios 111 the Jevish International Polities when lerr nurbok if Sisneui oxtend e proble of

osult of increasing pressure fro’ +hCfind Rumania are put on thepeople of the countries where they oro problem will not be solved when +. la Even fc Jewish

3728

H1155-0249

TRANSL/TLON OF DOCULEENT 3358-PS (cont ‘d)

It is even today an i. portant duty of Gornan Policy to control and when PoSSible diroct the flow of Jovish Eigration. To be sure there is no incentive to cooperate with other countries such as Poland, Hungery and Ruenia, who the. selves are striving for the erigrction of the Jewish sections of their populate in an cttept to solve this probicn. From experience with this procedure interests clash, although directed towards the samo goal, and retard the real- ization of Gernny’s urgent clcin for Geruan Jcws to be admitted into ether porticulor countries.

it is true thc.t the Rumaninn Governent sent an official appeal to the Reich Governnent in the amrie of human ethics and justice, to join with then in an international action to solve the Jewish question. On the other hand Poland at the end of Octover last year issued a decree, the execution of which has made it pra.ctica.lly irrpossiblefor 60, COO Jews of Polish Nationaltiy residing in Gernny to return to Poland, As is well known the Roich Governuent had then to decide to deport to Poland 60,000 Jews of Polish Nationality who vill be followed by their femilics, shortly before the Polish Decree cane into force. The Hungarian Governent it is true appreciates the German Jewish Policy in so far as they thensolves have in nind tho "Aryanisation" of Hungarian - Jewish bus­inesses in Gereny thet is Jewish owners of firms will be replaced by Hungarians. In general however it is apparent, that the States concerned" are norc egotist­ically interested in deporting their own Jewish elements than in any international solution, Germany will therefore take the initiative herself, in order next of all to find ways, nenns and destination for Jewish emigration frer Germany.

Palestine - vhich has already boco e the slogan of world opinion, as the land for the emigrents - cannot be considered as the + get for Jevish cimigration because it is incapable of absorbing a mass influx of Jews. Under the pressure of Arab resistance, the British llanctory Government has restricted Jewish Iigretion into Palestine to the ninimut For the time being Jewish criigrction to Palestine was helped to a great extent, as for as Germany was concerned, by the signing of an agreement with the representatives of Jewry in Palestine, whi.ch nede it possible to transfer Jewish property in the form of additional exports (Haavera-Agrecment), Apart fro the fact that emigration was nao possible by this 'method for a small number of wealthy Jews only, but not for the mass of Jews without means, + there were funamentel consideration of foreign policy against this type of emigration: the transfer of Jewish property cut of German, contributed to no snall extent to the building of a Jewish State in Palestine,. Gernony must rog ord the forming of a Jevish State, as dangerous, which even in miniature would form just such an operational base as the Vatican for Political Catholicisn. The realization that Torla Jewry will always be the irreconcilable enemy of the Third Reich, forces the decision to prevent ary strengthening of the Jewish position. .. Jewish State however would bring an international increase in power to Torld Jevry, lfre Rosenberg expressed this idea in his speech in Detmold on 15 January this year as follows:

"Jewry is striving today for a Jewish State in Palestine. Not to give Jews all over the world a. homeland out for other reasons: World Jevry must have a minature Sta.te, from which to send ex- territorial ambassadors and representatives to all countries of the world and through these be able to further their lust for power. But more than anything else they want a Jevish Centre, a Jewish State in which they can house the Jevish swindlers from all parts of the

- 6 -+ Pencil Note: irc these such people? 3730.

H1 155-0250

TRANSLATION OFDOCUENT 3358-PS (Cont’d)

word, who are hunted by the Police of other countries, issue then wi th new Passports and then send then to other parts of the world. It is to be desired, that those people who arc friendly disposed to Jews, above all the llestern Demccracies who have so nuch space in all parts of the world at their disposal, place on area outside Pal.cst.ine for the Jew's, of course in ord .r to establish a Jevish Reserve and not a Jewish ~Stato~ ....... ..

That is the progran.me expressing the forwign policy attitude of Gernany towards the Jevish question. Germany is very interested in maintaining the di.sperscl of Jewryo The calculation, that as a consequence Boycott Groups and Anti-German Centres would be formed all over the vrorld, dis­regards the following fact vihich is already apparent, the influx of Jews in all parts of the world invokes the opposition of the native population and thereby forns the best propaganda for the German Jewish Policy*

In North America, in South Amorica, in France, in Holland, Scandinavia and Greece, everywhere wherever the flood of Jewish inmigrants reaches, there is today already a visible increase in inti-Sereticisme A task of the German Foreign Policy must be to further this wave of IntiSemeticism. This will be achieved less by German Propaganda abroad, than by the Propa­ganda which the Jew is forced to circulate in his defence.* In the end its effects will recoil on themsclves. The .reports from German authorities abroad, emphasize the correctness of this interpretation:

The press and official correspondants continually report inti-Semetic Demonstrations by the population of North merica. It is perhaps indicative of the domestic political development in USA, that the listening-audience of the /Radio Priest" Coughlin, who is well known to be Anti -Jewish, has grown to over 20 millions. The Embassy in Montevideo reported on 1 2 December last year "that the Jewish influx continues fox’ months, veek by weck.» It goes withot saying, that Inti-Semeticism is groving" - Selonica reported on 30 Novemer 1938: "that Forces are at work to stir up the hate against the Jews" and that at the same time Greek Freemasonry is endeavour- ing to stem the hnti-Semetic movement. In Fronce the Paris Town Council (Stadtversammtung) was in April of this year to discuss a proposal, by which the- naturalisation of Jews was in future to be refused. The meeting on the Jewish question ended with the speaker being beaten up - Lyon reported on 20 December last year: "The immigration of Jewish Refugees has latterly led to undesirable occurrences. The antipathy towards the new intruders based on business and competitive grounds, which is general throughout France, is unnistakeable. " The aversion has grown to such an extent mean­time , that a Jewish Defence has already been organised against the inti- Semeticism in France (Report Paris dated 19 November last year), - The Embassy at the Hague reported on 30 December last year: "Under the pressure of countless Immigrants from Germany, who make themselves objectionable particularly in Amsterdam Anti-Semeticism is growing very much in Holland. And if this continues, it can easily come to pass that Dutchmen vill not only appreciate Germany's action against the Jews but will also find himself wishing to do same as we" - The Embassy at Oslo reported on Sth April last year: "While only a few years ago, the streets of Oslo were hcrdly marred by Jews at all, latterly a great change has come about here. On the streets, in restaurants and above all in the coffee houses, Jews sit around in hideous cluster. The Norwegians are being crowded out, more and more. The Norwegian Press, which formerly did not understand the Jewish question at all, suddenly realized what it meant to have the Children of Israel invade the country like a swarm of locustso it will be a very salutory lession, which is being meted out to the Norwegians",

These examples from reports from authorities abroad, con if desired be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation, that criti­cism of the measures for excluding Jews from German Lebensraum which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence would only be temporary

3758.

H1155-0251

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3358-PS (Cont’a)

and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned, what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew is to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interests of German propaganda* The object of this German action is to be the future international solution of the Jewish ques­tion, dictated not by false compassion for the "United Religious Jewish minority" but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations*

By Order

Schamburg

CERTIFICATE OF TR/NSATION OF DCCUIEENT No, 3359

13 December 1945

1, CATHERINE BEDFORD, 110561, hereby certify that I am thorouchly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No, 3359-PS

CATHERIE BEDFORD110561

3759.

H1155-0252

TRNSL/TIONOFDOCULFITNO.1752.-PS

Secret.

already nacLe for the International Oon^ress.

Reichsleader ^.Ifred Rosenberg received the order Fro the Phrer to sta -e an.antin-ewish Congress. The date for this congress was fixed for the 11.7. after a discussion, and after the corresponding preparations had been nade.

The folloving preparations for the congress have been undertaken;/

1,) in Gcrmany,

2.) abroad.

1 .) Preparations in Germany,

a) The financing of the congress has been taken on by the Reich Treasury of hiefe Schwarz. _ Further, after the Fhrer had decided on Cracow as the site o the congress, Reich iinister and General Governor Frank has taken over all the costs that arise within his General Government.

b) The site of the meeting.

.. 411 negotiations concerning billeting, feeding and welfare of the guests,the lecture rooms etc. have been readily settled with the offices of the General governor. (Instead of Cracow, a place that is safe fra air raids, for instance Zakopane, can be selected at any tic.)

c) The prograumne of lectures has been discussed with the appropriate offices,

1. Foreign Office

26 Propaganda '.Unistry

3• Head Office for internal security

, . and has net with general approval. The Reich Foreign Minister as well as de-ch --inister Dr. Goebbels have given their assent to the programme.

d) German speakers and lecturers have been visualised, a ongst others three Geran .ministers. The promise of these three gentlemen to attend seers certain. Some lectures are already on hand.

The final preparations, those for the cultural extra items on the progra.me, nave been taken in hand. (See the letter from Reichsleader Rosenborg to Reichs- leader Bormann concerning the appearance of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, with Furtwaengler aS conductor).

Even the formation of international organisations for investigating and combatting Jewry, which have been provided for in connection with the congress, have been broucht about, and scientific presidents of the organisations have been earmarked. Some individual personalities have already been approached. inongst others we already have the rpomise of Geheimrat Professor Dr, Eugen Fischer to be president of the European organisation for the 'racial-biological questions of Jewry".

e) The following have been entered as honorary members:

Reich Foreign minister Joachi 1 von Ribbentrop

Reich Minister of the Interior and Reichsleader of the SS Heinrich Hiler

3823.

9

1 g Reich inister Dr. Gcebbels

Reich ilinister and Governor Dr. Frank

2o) Preparations abread

The Foreign Office has accepted tho nunk of contacting the proinent European people, with the exception of a Ccw of the ozpiod territories in Europe, via its representatives abroad.

The Goran representatives abroad have received several official instructions, according to which thcy are

a) to propose delegates to be invited,

b) nominate lecturers,

c) approach the representatives of governments with a view to their participating at tne congress.

In the course of those insteucijcne bJing carried out, the following have promised their participation, or maibershp of the congress -ccit tee and meribership of the honorary conittee:

Italy: Minister for National Enlightenment 1ezzasona (honorary committee)

The former Minister of State Preziosi

France; 1 inister for Education Abel Bonnard

Secretary of State Paul liarion

Hungary: Minister for the Interior von Jarossh

( congress-co uittee and congress lecturer)

(Honorary counittee)

( c ongre s s -c onmi 11 e e)

(honorary cormittee and congress lecturer)

Holland: The leader of the NSB, lussert

( Porsonally invited by Reichslcader Rosenberg during the latter’s stay in Holland)

Arabia: The Grand iufti of Jerusalem

Iaq‘ Prime minister Gailani

(honorary co* uittee and congress lecturer)

(honorary coittee)

Norway: it the present mcment a representative of Reichslcader Rosenberg has arrived here, in order personally to convey an invitation to Prime Minister Quisling to attend the conress.

Contacts have also been established with countless otlcr countrios. For the time beiing the promises to attend of the proninent representatives are not yet at hand, On the other hand pronises have been received Prom delegates fro Sweden, Rouma:ia. Slovakia and illegal delegates from Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Further the office of Obergruppenfuehrer (General in the SS) Berger has undertaken to invite renowned leaders of the Gcrmanic volunteers in the IS to take part in the congress. Amoncst others, Britons and lmericans are visualised in this connection, who are also willing to speak.

The occupied eastern territory is included via the Ministry for the East. A nunber of promises to attend have been received from renowned personalities in this territory. Lectures have already been received from foreign speakers, amongst others from the former Minister of State Preziosi,

382.

H1155-0254

3 o) Reason for the importance of the Congress at the present tine. The reports fron outsiggGenary and the anti-Geran allied propaganda tries to make believe beyond all doubt that the whole war is being kindled by the other side more and more as a crusade, because the Goman nation plans to destroy the "Jewishpeople".

The Soviet Union: Ve refer to the pro-semitic Molotov - congress in ioscovr.

U.S.A. 17c refer to pormanent session of the Jewish Congress.

The last new beginning 6. 5. 1944,

England: We refer to the English failure to pay attention to their own White Paper regarding Palestine problem.

At the sa.e time,we point out the slcwly rising anti-Semitic feeling in the countries of our opponents. It seems necessary that the feeling caused by enemy propaganda that National Socialism is retreating on all fronts, be reputed by this great anti-Jewish Congress,

The invasion army is not fighting against the barbarian Gcrmany of annihilation of Jews but it is fighting for world Jewry!

What kind of propaganda is being duly turned out on the German side?

To give up this plan or to postpone this International Congress to an indefinite date, after half of Europe has already been won for this plan would support or strengthen the propaganda conducted against us.

It must be borne in mind that not a German authority but an international assembly is responsible for the Congress and issues invitations to it.

The preparations for the Congress have so far progressed with the greatest possibilities of disguise.

An arrangement, which has been made on general lines, mentions only an International historic and scientific congress taking place in a Town in the East of the Reich.

Berlin, 15th June 1944.Hg/Ve /s/ Hans Hagemeyer,

Head of the Department.

3825.

JOACHIM v. RIBBENTROP

H1155-0255

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• A AJx

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