Aiding Peace, Abetting Violence: Third Parties and the Management of Conflict

Conflicts (i.e., grievances or disputes) aboundin social life. Most attract little attention,

peter out quickly, and leave no trace. However,some escalate and spread, engulf masses of peo-ple, persist over time, and spread havoc in theirwake (Black 1990). Among the factors distin-guishing conflicts that die from those that thrive

are the presence and actions of third parties(i.e., people other than the principal parties whoknow of the conflict). Just as bringing in UnitedNations troops can alter the direction of a dis-pute between states, so a new alliance of gangmembers can rekindle a smoldering turf battle,or the intervention of a parent can quell a sib-ling quarrel.

Third parties have a presence in at least fourstrands of scholarly inquiry, each associatedwith a distinct discipline: social psychologistsaddress bystander apathy in emergencies(Darley and Latané 1968; Garcia et al. 2002;Schwartz and Gottlieb 1976); political scientistsexamine the causes and effects of internation-al alliances and dispute settlement (Greenberg,Barton, and McGuiness 2000; Snyder 1997;Walt 1987); anthropologists focus on the socialconditions underlying feuding and other formsof disputing in tribal societies (Colson 1953;Thoden van Velzen and van Wetering 1960;Witty 1980); and criminologists document therole of third parties in promoting and defusingmodern interpersonal violence (Felson 1978,1993; Oliver 1994; Silberman 2001).

Valuable though all these strands are, nonewholly answers the question: when will third

Aiding PPeace, AAbetting VViolence: Third PParties aand tthe MManagement oof CConflict

Scott Phillips Mark CooneyRice University University of Georgia

When and how will third parties intervene in the conflicts of others? When will third

parties further violence, and when will they foster peace? These are questions addressed

by Black’s theory of the third party. The authors conducted the first systematic test of the

theory, drawing on quantitative and qualitative data from in-depth interviews with 100

men imprisoned for assault or homicide. Specifically, they tested Cooney’s elaboration of

Black’s theory, which argues (1) that the social location of a third party, based on ties to

the principals, predicts whether he or she will act as a partisan or settlement agent or

remain uninvolved, and (2) that the third-party structure of a conflict, based on the

general configuration of all the third parties present, predicts whether the conflict will

escalate to violence. The study results confirm most of the theoretical predictions

regarding both third-party behavior and violence. The discussion also extends the

theoretical model, offering new concepts and suggesting how the theory can be applied

to a range of subjects, such as international war and the long-term historical decline of

interpersonal violence.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 22005, VVOL. 770 ((April:334–354)

#2172-ASR 70:2 filename:70207-phillips

Direct all correspondence to: Scott Phillips,Department of Sociology, Rice University, P.O. Box1892, MS28, Houston, TX 77251-1892([email protected]). Numerous corrections officials inGeorgia and Texas made the research possible throughaccess to prison facilities and generous logisticalsupport, including Dan Blackstock, Captain Butcher,Tim Carr, Bob Frady, Terry Kleckley, Brian Owens,John Prevost, and Warden Wilson. Earlier versions ofthe article were presented at the annual meeting ofthe American Sociological Association in August2001 and the Rice University Department ofSociology Brown Bag Series in November 2003.The authors thank Michael Aguilera, Woody Beck,Jim Coverdill, Karl Eschbach, Bridget Gorman, HollyHeard, Elizabeth Long, Tom McNulty, Martha Myers,Graham Ousey, Susette Talarico, James Tucker, theeditor, and the anonymous reviewers for advice andcomments on the work presented in this paper.

parties aid peace or abet violence? That lacu-na has been filled by Donald Black’s (1993,chaps. 7 and 8) theory of the third party. Histheory predicts and explains when and howthird parties intervene in the conflicts of oth-ers as well as the effect of their intervention onthe conflict. The theory is general, designed toexplain third-party behavior in all social set-tings at all structural levels. Although it doesnot address crime as such, Black’s theoryapplies to much criminal violence. Mostassaults and homicides stem from conflicts(Black 1983; Cooney 1998a:155–57), andmost, about 70 percent in America, also occurin the presence of third parties (Luckenbill1977; Planty 2002).

To date, Black’s (1993) theory has not beensubject to formal testing, although a good dealof evidence (primarily cross-cultural and his-torical) has been marshaled in support of it(Baumgartner 1993; Cooney 1998a; Senechalde la Roche 2001). This article presents theresults of the initial test, focusing on conflictsbetween individuals. The data come from in-depth interviews with 100 men imprisoned inGeorgia and Texas for assault and homicide.Each respondent recounted a matched pair ofconflicts—the violent conflict that led to hisincarceration and a similar nonviolent conflictfrom the same period. The respondent thendescribed the social characteristics and behav-ior of the principal parties and third partiespresent during both conflicts. We used theseinterview data to investigate two questionsaddressed by Black’s theory of the third party:

1. Does the social location of a third party (i.e., hisor her ties to the principal parties) influencehow he or she relates to a conflict?

2. Does the overall third-party structure of a con-flict (i.e., the general configuration of all thethird parties) influence the likelihood that theconflict will turn violent?

The results support Black’s theory, sug-gesting that future studies of violence andpeace would profit from the inclusion of third-party data. The results also extend the theory,yielding several new lines of inquiry into theorigins of third-party intervention and its effecton the branching of conflicts in violent andnonviolent directions.

VARIETIES OOF TTHIRD-PARTYBEHAVIOR

Third parties may aid peace or abet violence ina multitude of ways, such as counseling restraintor encouraging confrontation; providing advice,money, or weapons; intimidating an adversary;mediating the dispute; joining in the fight; orstanding by as the principal parties do battle(Black and Baumgartner 1983). Despite its vari-ety, third-party behavior can be reduced to threebroad categories: partisanship (lending sup-port), inaction (remaining uninvolved), and set-tlement (intervening neutrally).1 We illustrateeach reaction with a case from the interviews(using pseudonyms to protect confidentiality).

PARTISANSHIP

In real-world conflicts, third parties may engagein several types of partisan or support behaviorin a single case, as the following example illus-trates:

Dave was dating Melissa, but Melissa’s family didnot approve. Melissa’s brother, Greg, disliked Davebecause they were members of rival cliques atschool. Melissa’s father, Ted, thought Dave was tooold for his daughter—Dave was 18; Melissa wasjust 15. The conflict came to blows in the parkinglot of a fast food restaurant after school; Dave andGreg ran into each other, argued, and fought. Later,Dave and Melissa were on the phone and Tedpicked up the line. Ted proceeded to threaten Dave,warning him to never see Melissa again.Capitulating to the pressure, Dave and Melissabroke up, but the conflict did not end. A fewmonths later, Ted and Greg were driving and sawDave walking down the road. Ted swerved off theroad and into the grass, almost hitting Dave, butDave took cover. Dave could not be sure if Tedwanted to kill him or just scare him, but, regard-less, he was furious. Adding fuel to the fire,Melissa called Dave later in the afternoon andlaughed at him, taunting him for almost being runover. That evening, Dave went to a party and toldhis “homeboys” (friends) about almost being run

THIRD PPARTIES AAND CCONFLICT MMANAGEMENT—–335


1 Black and Baumgartner (1983) presented a com-prehensive typology of settlement roles (friendlypeacemaker, mediator, arbitrator, judge, repressivepeacemaker) and partisanship roles (informer, advis-er, advocate, ally, and surrogate). Our focus is limit-ed to the broad categories of partisanship, inaction,and settlement.

over. Emboldened, Dave and his homeboys decid-ed to “shoot up” Melissa’s house. Dave and hisfriend Sam left to retrieve guns. The pair returnedwith six pistols—not enough for all the home-boys, but enough to inflict carnage. Since Melissalived just two blocks from the party, Dave and tenhomeboys walked to her house. When they arrived,Dave saw Ted’s car in the driveway and noticedlights on inside the house. Dave and his homeboysstarted firing, unleashing round after round at thehouse. Ted was killed in the hail of bullets.

Here the conflict between Dave on one sideand Greg and Ted on the other included sever-al third parties who provided partisan support.Melissa, who was the grounds for the conflict,sided with her father and brother when shejeered Dave. Dave’s friend, Sam, helped Davefind guns. Finally, Dave’s homeboys accompa-nied Dave to Melissa’s house, and those who hadguns joined in the shooting.

INACTION

Third parties may know of a conflict but not getinvolved. When they remain on the sideline,they are engaging in inaction, as illustrated bythe following case:

Chad lived in a large apartment complex. Lateone summer afternoon, he went to hang out at thepool. There, he saw an attractive woman and beganto talk to her. During the conversation, Chad askeda man sitting near the woman for the time. The mansaid: “I’m not going to tell you what time it is, butI am going to kick your ass if you keep messingwith my girl.” The man spoke loudly enough foreveryone at the pool to hear, and Chad felt humil-iated and disrespected. Chad and the man thenbegan to argue. Even though the argument con-tinued to escalate, no one intervened. Chad want-ed to fight, but it appeared the man had just gottenoff work from a construction job because he hada tool belt with a hammer in it. Chad wasn’t goingto start a fight empty-handed against a man witha hammer, so Chad left the pool and walked backto his apartment to get a knife. When the man sawChad walking back to the pool with a knife in hishand he grabbed the hammer. The two resumedtheir argument poolside, and a fight ensued. Bothmen suffered serious injuries, but throughout theconflict none of the third parties made any attemptto intervene.

Because inaction is the absence of action, itseffect on conflicts often is difficult to observe.That generally is not the case with the final cat-egory of third-party behavior—settlement.

SETTLEMENT

Settlement, like inaction, involves neutrality onthe part of third parties (at least initially), but,unlike inaction, it involves intervention in theconflict. Settlement ranges from the forceful(e.g., physically separating combatants) to thesubtle (e.g., offering reluctant combatants aface-saving option for sidestepping escalation).Nathan, a respondent from Atlanta, noted that“if you feel like you got to hurt a person becausehe’s humiliating you, embarrassing you, if some-one steps in and says ‘let it go’, then this isyour automatic out—you can walk without look-ing weak.” Whatever form it takes, settlementcan profoundly alter the direction of a conflict,as the following case demonstrates:

Andrew’s conflict with Vic arose out of a love tri-angle. Both men were dating the same woman,Beth. Each knew about the other, and the men hadseveral arguments that almost came to blows. Onenight, Andrew and Vic happened to come to Beth’shouse at the same time. Both men were upset, andthe rivals began to argue and push each other.However, several people intervened. Beth’s twosisters, Karen and Helen, and Karen’s boyfriend,Chris, were all at the house and separated the men.The men cooled off and then left the house at dif-ferent times. A few hours later, however, Andrewwalked past Vic’s house, and Vic threw a beer bot-tle at him from the front porch. Andrew walked upto Vic’s porch, and the two began to argue again,reigniting the conflict. This time the men foughtunimpeded. Andrew beat Vic to death.

Andrew’s conflict illustrates not just settle-ment, but the power of settlement. Settlementagents were present earlier in the night and sep-arated the men. But when the conflict resumedlater and the settlement agents were no longeraround, it resulted in lethal violence. The con-flict and the principals remained the same. Theonly difference was the third-party structure—and the radically different outcome. Settlementagents can be the difference between life anddeath. But when will third parties act as settle-ment agents and when will they remain inactiveor take sides? These are questions answered byBlack’s theory of the third party.

BLACK’S TTHEORY OOF TTHE THIRD PPARTY

Black’s theory of the third party is one compo-nent of a larger theoretical and meta-theoretical

336—–AMERICAN SSOCIOLOGICAL RREVIEW


project. His theoretical corpus addresses themyriad ways people and groups manage con-flict. After an initial focus on law (1976), Blackwent on to develop theories that predict andexplain variation in the handling of conflictsof all stripes, including those that result invengeance, negotiation, avoidance, and toler-ation (1993, 1998, 2004a, 2004b). Black’smeta-theoretical corpus introduces a newexplanatory paradigm—pure sociology—thatcan be applied to any and all social behavior(1995, 2000). Among the distinctive charac-teristics of pure sociology is a unique unit ofexplanation—the social structure of the eventor its location and direction in social space.2

Each case of conflict has a social structuredefined by the social characteristics of theprincipals and third parties. Change the socialstructure of the case (its geometry), and theprobability, severity, and form of conflict man-agement change as well.3

For Black, third-party social characteristics,their ties and statuses, thus play a crucial rolein predicting the fate of conflicts. Black(1990:56–58; 1993, chaps. 7 and 8) proposed,for example, that the amount of social dis-tance between the principal parties and thirdparties predicts both the behavior of third par-ties and the nature of conflict management.Drawing a parallel between physical gravita-tion and social gravitation, Black (1993:126)argued in his paper “Taking Sides” that “eachadversary effectively creates a gravitationalfield that attracts third parties with a strengthproportional to their nearness to them and theirdistance from the opponent.” Black’s gravita-tional principle means that third parties whocombine closeness and distance—close to oneside and distant from the other—are stronglydrawn to conflicts. Third parties only slightlycloser to one side are weakly drawn. Black

(1993:126) summarized these relationships inthe following proposition: “Partisanship is ajoint function of social closeness to one sideand social remoteness from the other.” 4 Thirdparties equidistant from both sides are there-fore drawn to neither. Those equally distantfrom both sides are cold nonpartisans, exhibit-ing inaction and reducing the chance of vio-lence. Those equally close to both sides arewarm nonpartisans, acting as settlement agentsand also reducing the chance of violence(Black 1993:131–35). Moreover, each align-ment of third parties tends to produce its ownpattern of conflict. “Conflict is likely to beprotracted when partisanship is strong, dissi-pative when it is weak, minimalistic when non-partisanship is cold, and remedial when it iswarm” (Black 1993:135).

Cooney (1998a, chap. 4) elaborated Black’stheory and applied it to the literature on vio-lence.5 Because this study tested Cooney’selaboration, it is important to consider the twodirections in which he took the theory.6

Initially, Black (1993:126) specified two rel-evant forms of social distance: relational dis-tance (how involved are people in one another’slives?) and cultural distance (to what extent dopeople share a common culture?). BecauseCooney applied the theory to intrasocietal vio-lence, most of which tends to be intracultural,he dropped the cultural distance componentand added another Blackian variable thatappears to predict third-party behavior: orga-nizational distance—whether people belong



2 Other distinctive features are the use of a multi-dimensional conception of social space, the avoidanceof psychological and teleological explanations, anda focus on the behavior of social life rather than peo-ple (Black 1995:847–64).

3 For examples of work that applies and extendsBlackian theory to a variety of conflict managementsubjects, see Baumgartner (1988, 1992), Borg (1992),Horwitz (1982, 1990), Morrill (1995), Senechal dela Roche (1996), and Tucker (1999).

4 Black (1993:127) further proposed a status effectthat partisanship is a joint function of the social supe-riority of one side and the social inferiority of theother. The status effect is not addressed in this dis-cussion.

5 For other elaborations of Black’s theory, seeBaumgartner (1993) on domestic conflict (includingdomestic violence) and Senechal de la Roche (2001)on collective violence.

6 Cooney (1998a, chaps. 2 and 3) also presenteda Blackian status proposition not tested in the currentstudy: Violence is a U-curved function of settlementagent status superiority. Violent conflict is thus pre-dicted to be frequent when settlement agents areeither below the principals in social status or con-siderably above the principals in social status, and tobe infrequent when settlement agents are moderate-ly higher than the principals in status.

to the same, different, or no organized entities(e.g., kinship groups, gangs).7

Next, Cooney identified four common con-figurations of relational and organizational dis-tance and specified how third parties in thesesocial locations will behave and the likelihoodthat the conflict will be violent or peaceful.8

Consistent with Black’s original formulation, thefour social locations are defined in terms of athird party’s ties to both sides of the conflict.Figure 1 illustrates the four social locations:(1) close and distant individual ties (the thirdparty has close relational ties to one side and dis-tant relational ties to the other side), (2) closeand distant group ties (the third party has closerelational and organizational ties to one sideand distant relational and organizational ties tothe other side), (3) distant ties (the third partyhas distant relational and organizational ties toboth sides), and (4) cross-cutting ties (the thirdparty has close relational and/or organization-al ties to both sides). Close and distant ties pre-dict partisanship and violence, whereas distantties predict inaction and peace. Cross-cuttingties predict settlement, although not invariably.Third parties who have equal ties to both sidestend to act as settlement agents, but those who(as in the current cases) have ties that cross-cutthe conflict but are not necessarily equidistant,have a somewhat lower probability of acting assettlement agents. Even so, the presence of thirdparties with cross-cutting ties should dampen theprospect of a conflict escalating to violence.

Our predictions regarding third-party behav-ior can be summarized in the following hypothe-ses:

Hypothesis 1a: Close and distant individual tiesincrease the probability of partisanship.

Hypothesis 1b: Close and distant group tiesincrease the probability of partisanship.

Hypothesis 1c: Close and distant group tieshave a stronger effect on partisanship thanclose and distant individual ties.9

Hypothesis 2: Distant ties increase the proba-bility of inaction.

Hypothesis 3: Cross-cutting ties increase theprobability of settlement.10

Our predictions regarding conflict manage-ment are formulated in the following hypothe-ses:

Hypothesis 4: Partisan structures (all third par-ties in the conflict have close and distantties) increase the probability of violence rel-ative to individualized structures (conflicthas no third parties).

Hypothesis 5: Settlement structures (all thirdparties in the conflict have cross-cuttingties) reduce the probability of violence rel-ative to individualized structures (conflicthas no third parties).

RESEARCH SSTRATEGY

Our data came from in-depth, face-to-faceinterviews with 100 men imprisoned for ahomicide or aggravated assault that stemmedfrom a conflict. Each respondent described amatched pair of conflicts: the violent conflict(the crime that led to incarceration) and a sim-ilar nonviolent conflict from the same period.In both conflicts, the respondent was theaggrieved. If, for instance, the respondentassaulted a man because of an unpaid debt,then the respondent also described an unpaiddebt from the same period that he handlednonviolently. Thus, the research produced 100matched pairs of conflicts, for a total of 200conflicts. The respondent then served as aninformant, providing data on the principal par-ties and third parties present during both con-flicts.11



7 Black (1976:93) used the concept of organiza-tional distance to predict the handling of legal con-flicts.

8 Third parties who are organizationally close toone side usually are relationally close to the same side.However, this is not always true. A third party couldbe organizationally close to a principal, but rela-tionally distant (e.g., a member of the same familybut long estranged or a member of the same largegang, urban police force, or national military).

09 Recall that close and distant group ties create anadditional layer of social distance. Such third partieshave relational and organizational ties to one side, butnot the other. More social distance should increasethe chance of partisanship.

10 Black’s formulation of the theory does not pre-dict that cross-cutting ties predict settlement, only thatequidistant close ties do.



Figure 1. TP Social Location and Predicted Behavior

Note: PP1 = principal party 1; PP2 = principal party 2; TP = third party; Arrow = relational tie; Circle = organiza-tional tie; White Space = social distance.

11 Third parties are those who know about the con-flict between the principal parties. However, theresearch was limited to third parties who were pres-ent during the conflict because these were the thirdparties the respondent could best describe. Thus, in

the case of a conflict that extended over a long peri-od (most did not), the research may have missed asmall number of third parties who knew about theconflict, but were not present during the final con-frontation.

DATA COLLECTION

After refining the instrument in pilot interviewswith 23 parolees in Atlanta, Georgia, the first-named author conducted the main interviews intwo prisons: the Lee Arrendale State Prison(LASP) in Alto, Georgia (n = 55) and theFerguson Unit (Ferguson) in Midway, Texas (n= 45). Because identical methods were used atboth sites, no further distinctions are drawnbetween LASP and Ferguson. Both are referredto as “the prison.”

To identify potential respondents, the prisonprovided a list of all inmates incarcerated foraggravated assault and homicide. Prison fileswere used to determine whether an inmate metthe criteria for inclusion: the violent crimestemmed from a conflict; the offender was aprincipal party; the offender admitted hisinvolvement; and the offender and victim bothwere males.12

Of the men incarcerated for the specifiedoffenses, 157 were eligible for the research.Recruitment of these men took place at meet-ings held in groups based on prison housingassignments. The recruitment meetings focusedon the purpose of the research and the confi-dential nature of the data. Although the men metin groups, their decision to participate remainedprivate to ensure that inmates did not influenceeach other.

The recruitment effort produced a responserate of 69 percent, with 109 of the 157 eligibleinmates agreeing to participate. The responserate of 69 percent is reasonable because theinmates were not offered financial compensa-tion. The decision not to offer compensationwas partly forced and partly chosen. The HumanSubjects Committee rejected compensationbecause of concerns about coercion, and prisonofficials argued that inmates who agreed to par-ticipate without compensation would be moreopen and honest. The results (considered later)

support the prison officials’arguments. From the109 inmates who agreed to participate, 100usable interviews were completed.

Most of the respondents were young minori-ties with a prior record serving sentences forhomicide. The average age was 27 years. Theracial–ethnic distribution was 68 percent AfricanAmerican, 17 percent Hispanic, and 15 percentwhite. In terms of criminal histories, 74 percenthad a prior record. Specific to the currentoffense, 75 percent were imprisoned for homi-cide and 25 percent for aggravated assault; 13percent were serving a sentence of less than 10years, 32 percent a sentence of 10 to 20 years,and 55 percent a sentence of more than 20 years.Geographically, 31 percent were from majorurban centers: Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, andSan Antonio.

To assuage inmates’potential fears, the inter-views were conducted in private rooms such ascounselors’ offices and conference rooms.Corrections officers could not see the inmatewithout walking past the room (most did not)and could not hear the inmate in any event.Furthermore, the interviews were documentedthrough notes rather than tape-recording.

Each interview followed the same format.(1) The respondent described the violent con-flict in as much detail as possible. (2) Therespondent answered closed-ended questionsabout the principal parties and third partiespresent during the violent conflict. (3) Therespondent was asked to contemplate whetherhe had faced a similar conflict during the sameperiod, but handled it nonviolently. In theabsence of a similar conflict, the respondentwas asked to contemplate the most serious con-flict he had handled nonviolently during thesame period.13 The “same period” was definedas the 2 years leading up to the violent conflict.(4) The respondent described the nonviolent



12 The original design included all sex combina-tions, but the pilot interviews showed that whereasconflicts between men tend to be brief with clearboundaries, conflicts between men and women tendto be protracted, with the crime often representing theculmination of numerous intertwining conflicts. Thus,male–male conflicts are better suited for a matchedpair approach that compares discrete events.

13 Of the respondents, 60 percent faced a similarconflict during the same period. The remaining 40percent described the most serious nonviolent con-flict from the same period. Interestingly, respondentswere angrier in the “serious” conflicts than in the“similar” conflicts, suggesting that the “serious” con-flicts were not a trivial substitute (according to com-parison using the “anger” measure described in Table2). Most importantly, the substantive results regard-ing conflict management are the same in both cases.

conflict in as much detail as possible. (5) Therespondent answered the same closed-endedquestions about the principal parties and thirdparties present during the nonviolent conflict.On average, the interviews lasted an hour to anhour and a half.

TWO METHODS FOR TWO QUESTIONS

It should be recalled that our research focusedon two distinct questions: (1) Does the sociallocation of a third party influence his or herbehavior, ranging from partisanship, to inac-tion, to settlement? (2) Does the overall third-party structure of a conflict influence violent andnonviolent conflict management? Because ourdependent variables—third-party behavior andconflict management—required differentmethodological strategies, we describe the sam-ple, measures, and statistical techniques foreach in separate sections.

DATA AND ANALYSIS 1: THIRD-PARTY BEHAVIOR.Our analysis of third-party behavior was limit-ed to conflicts that occurred in the presence ofthird parties. In this portion of the research, the100 matched pairs of conflicts were treated as200 separate conflicts. Of the 200 conflicts,154 occurred in the presence of third parties.Combined, these conflicts contained 1,327 thirdparties. To be included in the models, cases—defined as conflicts and their constituent thirdparties—had to be free of missing data at bothlevels. This criterion produced a sample of 136conflicts and 852 constituent third parties (miss-ing data are discussed later). None of the prin-cipals called on official third parties (e.g.,police), so all the third parties were informal(e.g., relatives, gang members, friends, neigh-bors, acquaintances, onlookers).

Table 1 describes the measurement strate-gies and descriptive statistics for the variablesrelated to third-party behavior. Third-partybehavior was measured through three nominal



Table 1. Measurement and Descriptive Statistics for Variables Related to TP Behavior

X

Dependent VariableTP behavior

Social Location of TPClose and distant individual

tiesClose and distant group ties

Distant tiesCross-cutting ties

TP Structure of ConflictPartisan structure

Settlement structure

Mixed structure

ControlsAge

Teenager20’s30 or more

MaleTP (n)

Note: PP = principal party/parties; TP = third party/parties.

Indicator

What did TP do during conflict?

TP has friendship ties to one PP,but not other PP

TP has friendship and gang/fami-ly ties to one PP, but not otherPP

TP has no ties to either PPTP has ties to both PP (friend-

ship, gang, family)

All TP in conflict have close anddistant ties to PP

All TP in conflict have cross-cutting ties to PP

TP in conflict have differentforms of ties

TP ageTP ageTP ageTP sexNumber of TP present during

conflict

ResponseValues

PartisanshipInaction

Settlement

1 = yes

1 = yes

1 = yes1 = yes

1 = yes

1 = yes

1 = yes

1 = yes1 = yes1 = yes1 = male—Count

Mean

0.44

0.10

0.180.28

0.46

0.28

0.26

0.610.300.080.736.26

Range

0 to 10

0 to 10

0 to 100 to 10

0 to 10

0 to 10

0 to 10

0 to 100 to 100 to 100 to 101 to 42

outcomes: partisanship (lending support), inac-tion (remaining uninvolved), and settlement(intervening in a neutral manner). Of all thethird parties, 33 percent chose partisanship, 52percent chose inaction, and 15 percent chose set-tlement. The distribution of their behavior sup-ports research noting that partisanship occursmore often than settlement (Felson andSteadman 1983; Luckenbill 1977).

To measure a third party’s social location, anindividual level concept, relational ties wasoperationalized as friendships, and organiza-tional ties was operationalized as common mem-berships in families, gangs, or both.14 Thisallowed a third party’s social location to bemeasured through four dichotomous indicators:close and distant individual ties (third partieswith friendship ties to one side, but not to theother), close and distant group ties (third par-ties with friendship and family or gang ties toone side, but not to the other), distant ties (thirdparties with no ties to either side), and cross-cut-ting ties (third parties with friendship and/organg/family ties to both sides) (see Figure 1).Of the third parties, 44 percent had close anddistant individual ties, 10 percent had close anddistant group ties, 18 percent had distant ties,and 28 percent had cross-cutting ties.

The third-party structure of a conflict, a con-flict level concept, referred to the general con-figuration of all the third parties who werepresent. Did the conflict occur amid polarizedenemies, mutual friends, or some combination?The third-party structure of a conflict was meas-ured through three dichotomous indicators cap-turing the configurations that emerged in thedata: partisan structure (all third parties hadclose and distant ties), settlement structure (allthird parties had cross-cutting ties), and mixedstructure (the third parties had some combina-

tion of close and distant, cross-cutting, and dis-tant ties). Of all the conflicts, 46 percent had apartisan structure, 28 percent had a settlementstructure, and 26 percent had a mixed struc-ture.

For the models of third-party behavior, weincluded controls for age, sex, and the numberof third parties present during the conflict.Because the informant often had to speculateabout the age of third parties, three dichoto-mous indicators were used: teenager, age in the20’s, and age of 30 years or older.

To model third-party behavior, we used cross-tabulation and multinomial logistic regression(MLR). As an extension of logistic regression,MLR is appropriate for dependent variableswith three or more nominal outcomes. WithMLR, one of the nominal outcomes becomes thereference. Then MLR estimates a model, con-trasting the remaining nominal outcomes withthe reference. The resulting odds ratios repre-sent the net effect of a unit change in the inde-pendent variable on the odds of being in thefocal outcome relative to the reference. Toaccommodate the multilevel data, a contextualapproach was used. Conflict level values wereassigned to all the constituent third parties in aconflict.15 Robust standard errors were calcu-lated using the sandwich estimator in Stata toadjust for the clustering of third parties withinconflicts.

DATA AND ANALYSIS 2: CONFLICT MANAGE-MENT. Our analysis of conflict management wasnot limited to conflicts that occurred in the pres-ence of third parties. Instead, conflicts that hadno third parties were used as a baseline for esti-mating the impact of third parties on violenceand peace. Do partisan structures increase thechance of violence? Do settlement structuresincrease the chance of peace? In this portion ofthe research, the 100 matched pairs of conflictswere indeed treated as matched pairs. For a



14 Because family and gang members usually havestrong personal connections to one another, we couldhave operationalized their ties in terms of relationalcloseness. However, an organizational operational-ization not only accommodates cases in which thereis organizational closeness and relational distance (seenote 8 earlier), but also allows the qualitatively dis-tinct nature of family and gang ties to be distin-guished from the nature of friendship ties. Treatingthe family as an organizational system is by no meansunprecedented (Swanson 1971; Todd 1985).

15 Despite the advantages of hierarchical linearmodeling (HLM) for most multilevel projects, thecontextual approach was more appropriate for thisstudy because the conflicts often had small numbersof third parties: 25 percent of the conflicts had a sin-gle third party, and 50 percent had three or fewer thirdparties.

matched pair to be included in the models, boththe conflicts in the pair had to be free of miss-ing data. This criterion produced a sample com-prising 94 matched pairs of conflicts.

Table 2 describes the measurement strate-gies and descriptive statistics for the variablesrelated to conflict management. Conflict man-agement comes in contrasting forms: violenceand nonviolence. Violence was defined asattempted or actual force, but did not includethreats or minor pushing and shoving. This def-inition was appropriate because most of the

respondents came from a social milieu filledwith threats and posturing. For the inmates, realviolence was a real distinction. Furthermore, thedefinition facilitated the inclusion of the mostserious, and therefore the most comparable,nonviolent conflicts. Because the design reliedon matched pairs, 50 percent of the conflictsended in violence and 50 percent ended in non-violence.

As noted earlier, the third-party structure ofa conflict refers to the general configuration ofall the third parties who were present. In con-



Table 2. Measurement and Descriptive Statistics for Variables Related to Conflict Management

X

Dependent Variable—Conflict managementTP Structure of Conflict—Partisan structure

—Settlement structure

—Mixed structure

—Individualized structurePP Structure of Conflict—Relational distance

FactorLoading

.91

.85

.83

.85

.78

Mean

.50

.33

.22

.22

.23

0

Range

0 to 1

0 to 1

0 to 1

0 to 1

0 to 1

–1.60 to1.83

(Continued on next page.)

Indicator

Form of resolution

All TP in conflict have close and distant ties to PP

All TP in conflict have cross-cutting ties to PP

TP in conflict have different forms of ties

Conflict has no TP

What was your relationship with ___?

How long had you known ___?

How many friends did you and ___ have in common?

How often did you usually see ___?

What types of things did you and ___ do together? (no=1, sum)

Response Values

1 = violent

1 = yes

1= yes

1 = yes

1 = yes

0 = family 1 = friend2 = acquaintance3 = seen, never met4 = stranger0 = five or more years1 = three to four years2 = one to two years3 = six months to one year4 = one to six months5 = less than one month6 = did not know0 = a lot1 = a few2 = none0 = almost every day1 = a few times a week2 = about once a week3 = about once a month4 = about once a year5 = few times before6 = never beforelegal work; illegal work;sports; school; bar/club;drink/drug

Table 2. (Continued)

X

Functional Independence

Situational Controls—Anger

—Physical size

—Gun —Intoxication

—TP (n)

Note: PP = principal party/parties; TP = third party/parties.

trast to the third-party structure measure usedto analyze third-party behavior, the third-partystructure measure used to analyze conflict man-agement includes four dichotomous indicators:partisan structure, settlement structure, mixedstructure, and individualized structure.Individualized structure was added to desig-nate conflicts that did not have third parties.Of the conflicts, 33 percent had a partisan struc-ture, 22 percent had a settlement structure, 22percent had a mixed structure, and 23 percenthad an individualized structure.

Black’s approach to conflict managementalso considers the social characteristics of theprincipal parties. In a recent paper, Phillips(2003) tested Black’s (1990) model ofvengeance and found that principal parties witha high degree of relational distance and func-tional independence are more apt to engage in

reciprocal aggression. Relational distance andfunctional independence were included in thecurrent study as controls.

Relational distance, or the principal parties’level of participation in one another’s lives, wasmeasured through five indicators: the nature ofthe disputants’ relationship, the length of the dis-putants’ relationship, the extent to which thedisputants are embedded in a social network, thefrequency of the disputants’ interactions, and thescope of the disputants’ interactions (Black1976:41). Regression factor scores were used todefine relational distance, with each indicatorweighted according to its contribution to thebroader construct (all indicators loaded on thesame factor). Functional independence, or theprincipal parties’ relative ability to survive andprosper without one another, was measuredthrough three indicators: the disputants’ reliance



FactorLoading

70

.81

.90

Mean

0

6.49

0.40

0.354.41

5.44

Range

–3.36 to1.18

0 to 10

0 to 1

0 to 10 to 20

0 to 42

Indicator

Had you and ___ everworked together in a legalor illegal business? (mustbe in position to rely onone another)

Did ___ ever loan youmoney?

Did ___ ever back you upin a fight?

From 0 to 10, how angrywere you?

Were you bigger than ___,smaller, or about thesame size?

Did you have a gun on you?Sum: From 0 to 10, how

drunk were you? From 0to 10, how high wereyou?

Number of TP presentduring conflict

Response Values

0 = often 1 = off and on 2 = past, not time of conflict3 = no

0 = often1 = every once in a while2 = on a few rare occasions3 = no; would if asked4 = no; would not if asked

0 = often1 = a few times2= no; would if needed3 = no; would not if needed

scale from 0 to 10

1 = same or bigger

1 = yesscale from 0 to 20

count

on one another in a legal or illegal business, thedisputants’ reliance on one another for financialsupport, and the disputants’ reliance on oneanother for protection (Black 1990). Regressionfactor scores also were used to define func-tional independence (all indicators loaded on thesame factor).

Controls were included for the following sit-uational influences: the seriousness of the con-flict, the relative size of the disputants, guns,intoxication, and the number of third partiespresent during the conflict. Seriousness wasbased on the respondent’s self-reported level ofanger during the conflict using a scale from 0to 10. The assessment of physical size deter-mined whether the respondent was smaller, thesame size, or larger than his opponent. Thepotential influence of a gun was measuredthrough a dichotomous indicator of whether therespondent had a gun on him or not. Intoxicationcombined parallel scales measuring the respon-dent’s alcohol and drug consumption at the timeof the conflict (parsimonious specification wasimportant because of sample size, but the sub-stantive results for the theoretical variables werethe same if alcohol and drugs were treated asseparate controls).

It also is important to note that the matchedpair (or case–control) design controlled fornumerous confounding influences. Becausepairs of conflicts were matched within individ-uals and occurred during the same period, thedesign controlled for time-stable individual andecologic influences outside the theoreticalmodel. The respondent had the same individualcharacteristics and lived in the same neighbor-hood during both conflicts; consequently, suchinfluences were a constant for the pair and couldnot explain the difference in outcomes. Eachcase served as its own control.

To model conflict management, we usedcross-tabulation and conditional logistic regres-sion (CLR). Although uncommon amongsociologists, CLR is common among epide-miologists (Holford 2002:253–80) and econo-mists (Greene 2003:723–35). Epidemiologistsuse CLR in case–control studies that match aperson who has a particular disease (case) witha person who does not have the disease (control)(Breslow et al. 1978). Economists use CLR toexamine consumer choices (McFadden 1974).Statisticians have demonstrated that CLR is

appropriate for examining how the same indi-vidual behaves in different situations because itsolves the potential problem of autocorrelation(Steinberg 1992). In a traditional logistic regres-sion, situations clustered within individualscould produce correlated error terms, leading tobiased standard errors and inaccurate tests of sta-tistical significance (McClendon 1994). ButCLR solves the problem of autocorrelationbecause it treats each cluster—in this case, amatched pair of conflicts—as a stratum. ThenCLR examines whether the independent vari-ables can distinguish the violent conflict fromthe nonviolent conflict across the series ofmatched pairs (Stokes, Davis, and Koch1995:262–70; Long 1997:178–84; Hosmer andLemeshow 2000:223–59).

POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS

The current research had two potential limita-tions that need to be discussed before the resultsare presented: the use of informants and trun-cated data. Each is considered in turn.

Did the inmates, the principal parties servingas informants, provide reliable and valid data onthird parties? This question cannot be answereddefinitively. But there are good reasons tobelieve that the inmates’ accounts were credi-ble. To begin with, the inmates offered reliableand valid data on their own behavior. Eachinmate’s description of his crime was comparedwith official prison records. In Georgia, theprison records contained the inmate’s version ofthe crime and thus offered an indicator of reli-ability. Of the Georgia inmates, 96 percent (55of 57) offered a consistent account of theircrime. Those who did not were discarded. InTexas, prison records contained the police ver-sion of the crime and thus offered an indicatorof validity. Of the Texas inmates, 100 percentoffered a consistent account (the term “consis-tent” means the overlapping facts match,although the interviews unearthed more detailsabout the crime). These almost perfect resultswere probably the product of a selection effect:to be interviewed, an inmate had to admit thecrime and agree to participate for no financialcompensation. Given that the inmates offeredcredible accounts of their own criminal behav-ior, a more sensitive topic, it seems safe toassume that inmates offered credible accounts



of third parties whose behavior was sometimescriminal, but oftentimes not, and who werenonetheless unknown to the researcher.

Truncated data was another potential limi-tation. It should be remembered that 154 con-flicts occurred in the presence of 1,327 thirdparties, but our models for third-party behav-ior focused on 136 conflicts and 852 thirdparties. How did 18 conflicts and 475 thirdparties disappear? A small number of con-flicts that each contained a large number ofthird parties were eliminated because of miss-ing data (missing data for one of the thirdparties in a conflict eliminated all the third par-ties). The included conflicts averaged 6 thirdparties, but the eliminated conflicts averaged26 third parties. The eliminated conflicts con-formed to a common theme: all occurred inlarge public spaces (e.g., bar, school, parkinglot, basketball court, arcade), with numerousthird parties gathering around to see the action.In such cases, the informant could not provideinformation regarding the social characteris-tics of the third parties who gathered around.Thus, the results should not be generalizedoutside the range of the available data.However, it is important to note that conflictswith small numbers of third parties are thenorm in modern social life. Almost 90 percentof the conflicts in the sample (136 of 154)were retained. Moreover, the behavior of themasses that gathered around was a constant—none intervened.

FINDINGS 11: TTHIRD-PARTY BBEHAVIOR

MAJOR PATTERNS

Table 3 presents a cross-tabulation of third-party behavior by social location for the fullsample. Cross-cutting ties had a moderateimpact on settlement: 39 percent of third par-ties with cross-cutting ties were settlementagents, but most remained uninvolved. Closeand distant ties had a strong impact on parti-sanship: 51 to 59 percent of third parties withclose and distant individual ties were partisans(depending on whether third parties with ties toprincipal party one were examined or thosewith ties to principal party two), and 71 to 74percent of third parties with close and distantgroup ties were partisans (depending on whetherthird parties with ties to principal party onewere examined or those with ties to principalparty two). Distant ties had an almost uniformimpact on inaction: 99 percent of third partieswith distant ties remained uninvolved.

Table 3 also illuminates patterns that can beused to simplify subsequent models:

• Of the 469 third parties with close and distant ties,466 supported the “correct side” (the side to whichthe person had ties). The three “traitors” were anom-alous. Thus, removal of the “traitors” from the sam-ple simplified measurement. Third-party behaviorcould be reduced to three outcomes: partisanship(regardless of sides), inaction, and settlement. Sociallocation could be reduced to four indicators: closeand distant individual ties (regardless of sides),close and distant group ties (regardless of sides), dis-tant ties, and cross-cutting ties. Indeed, these are the



Table 3. Third Party Behavior by Social Location: Full Sample

TP Behavior

Settlement Partisan:Side Partisan:Side Inactive TotalSocial Location Agent (%) w/PP1 (%) w/PP2 (%) (%) (%) N

Cross-Cutting Ties 39a 03a .4a 57a 100 234Close and Distant:—Individual ties to PP1 08a 51a 41a 100 245—Individual ties to PP2 05a 59a 36a 100 132—Group ties to PP1 08a 71a 20a 100 049—Group ties to PP2 05a 7 (3 traitors)b 74a 14a 100 043Distant Ties 01a 99a 100 149

Note: N = 852 third parties. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. PP1 = principal party 1 (respon-dent); PP2 = principal party 2 (opponent); TP = third party.a These percentages fit the theoretical model.b This represents three anomalous TP who acted as “traitors” and are eliminated from subsequent models tosimplify the independent and the dependent variables.

measures outlined in the Methods section in antic-ipation of this simplification.

• There was no need to estimate an MLR modelregarding the effect of distant ties on inaction.

• Third parties tended either to behave as predictedor to remain uninvolved. Thus, the meaningful MLRcontrasts were partisanship versus inaction and set-tlement versus inaction.

Following these guidelines, Table 4 elimi-nates the “traitors” to present a cross-tabulationof third-party behavior by social location for thereduced sample. The simplified approach pro-vides a concise summation of the bivariateresults: 39 percent of third parties with cross-cutting ties were settlement agents; 54 percentof third parties with close and distant individ-ual ties were partisans; 75 percent of third par-ties with close and distant group ties werepartisans; and 99 percent of third parties withdistant ties remained uninvolved. Do these rela-tionships hold in a multivariate context?

Table 5 (panels A and B) presents resultsfrom the MLR models contrasting partisanshipto inaction and settlement to inaction. Theresults for the theoretical variables and controlsare considered in turn.

Social location shaped all forms of third-party behavior. Consider partisanship in PanelA. The odds of partisanship were 14 timesgreater for third parties with close and distantindividual ties. The odds of partisanship were32 times greater for third parties with close anddistant group ties. Consider settlement in PanelB. The odds of settlement were nine timesgreater for third parties with cross-cutting ties.Both models supported our theoretical predic-tions, but the partisanship model receivedstronger support. Indeed, close and distant tieswere virtually a necessary and sufficient con-dition for partisanship (almost all partisans had

close and distant ties, and most third partieswith close and distant ties were partisans).Cross-cutting ties were a necessary, but ofteninsufficient, condition for settlement (almostall the settlement agents had cross-cutting ties,but most third parties with cross-cutting tieswere not settlement agents). It is important tonote that the moderate effect of cross-cutting tieson settlement stems, at least in part, from the factthat cross-cutting ties do not have to be equi-distant.

Some third-party structures shaped third-party behavior, but others did not. To determinewhether partisan structures had a unique impacton partisanship, Panel A contrasts partisan struc-tures to all other structures (settlement andmixed). If all the third parties in a conflict hadclose and distant ties, then the odds of parti-sanship were 3.6 times greater for each. Thisfinding supports Black’s (1993:127) predictionof a bandwagon effect: partisanship begets par-tisanship. (Black explained the bandwagoneffect through a reciprocal relationship: high sta-tus principals attract more partisans, and attract-ing partisans increases the status of a principal,so if a principal attracts some partisans thenhis or her status rises and other partisans tendto follow.) To determine whether settlementstructures had a unique impact on settlement,Panel B contrasts settlement structures to allother structures (partisan and mixed). Settlementstructures do not affect the odds of settlement.

The results for the controls were varied. Agedid not influence partisanship or settlement,but the null findings could be a product of meas-urement error (respondents often had to spec-ulate about the age of third parties) or limitedvariation (most third parties were in their teensor early 20’s). Sex influenced partisanship, butnot settlement: men were more prone to parti-



Table 4. Third Party Behavior by Social Location: Reduced Sample After Eliminating Traitors

TP Behavior

Social Location Settlement Agent (%) Partisan (%) Inactive (%) Total (%) N

Cross-Cutting Ties 39a 04a 57a 100 234Close and Distant:—Individual ties 07a 54a 39a 100 377—Group ties 07a 75a 18a 100 089Distant Ties 01a 99a 100 149

Note: N = 849 third parties. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. TP = third party.a These percentages fit the theoretical model.

sanship. Given that partisanship in this studyoften included violence, the gender pattern sup-ports prior research on sex and violence(Steffensmeier and Allan 1996). The number ofthird parties present during a conflict influ-enced settlement and partisanship: more thirdparties reduced the chance of both forms ofintervention. It is important to note that theresults for age and sex are almost sure to be con-text specific. Remember that all the conflictsoccurred between men. Most occurred betweenyoung men in areas of concentrated disadvan-tage dominated by the “code of the streets”(Anderson 1999). Other contexts might pro-duce different age and sex patterns.

DEVIANT CASES

The results offer support for Black’s model: 60percent (509 of 849) of the third parties behavedas predicted. Nonetheless, it is instructive toexplore potential explanations for deviant third

parties—those whose behavior did not conformto the theory.

Deviant inaction, or unexpected inaction, wascommon among third parties who were sup-posed to be partisans or settlement agents: 42percent remained on the sidelines. In fact,deviant inaction accounted for 297 of the 340deviant cases. The rate of prediction errors washighest for settlement. Among third parties withcross-cutting ties, 57 percent did not getinvolved, accounting for about half of thedeviant inaction cases. The social characteris-tics of the principal parties should help toexplain deviant inaction. Black (1995:835) pro-posed that intimacy repels third-party inter-vention. Our results provide some support forBlack’s argument. In the conflicts between fam-ily members and friends, 49 percent of third par-ties engaged in deviant inaction, but in theconflicts between acquaintances and strangersonly 39 percent of third parties engaged indeviant inaction. The social status of the thirdparty relative to that of the principals should also



Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression of TP Behavior on Social Location

Odds Ratio

Panel A: Partisanship versus Inaction—Social Location of TPa

——Close and Distant Individual Ties 13.84***——Close and Distant Group Ties 31.71***—TP Structure of Conflictb

——Partisan Structure 3.59*—Control Variablesc

——Age: 20’s 1.06——Age: 30 or more .31——Male 7.94***——TP (n) .96†

Panel B: Settlement versus Inaction—Social Location of TPd

——Cross-Cutting Ties 8.86**—TP Structure of Conflicte

——Settlement Structure .56—Control Variablesf

——Age: 20s .73——Age: 30 or more 1.27——Male 1.64——TP (n) .90**

Notes: N = 136 conflicts among 849 third parties. Robust standard errors were calculated using the sandwichestimator in Stata to adjust for the clustering of third parties within conflicts. TP = third party.The reference category (a) for social location includes cross-cutting ties and distant ties; (b) for third party struc-ture includes mixed structures and settlement structures; (c) for age is teenager; (d) for social location includesclose and distant ties and distant ties; (e) for third party structure includes mixed structures and partisan struc-tures; (f) for age is teenager.† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed).

be relevant, although we did not have meas-ures of social status for all the participants.16

Whatever the complete explanation, the partic-ipants themselves saw the principals as “own-ing” the conflict. Third parties were reluctant toget involved unless it was absolutely necessary.Numerous respondents predicted, for example,that mutual friends would have intervened tosquash the conflict if heated words had escalatedto fists. Some respondents also predicted thatallies would have joined the fight if the respon-dent had started losing. But in the absence of anurgent need, most third parties understood thedictate to “mind your own business.”17

Deviant settlement, or unexpected settlement,was rare. Among third parties who were sup-posed to be partisans, only 7 percent attempt-ed to broker a peaceful resolution. Despite suchsmall numbers, an interesting pattern emerged:52 percent of the deviant settlement agents werewomen, although only 23 percent of the relevantthird parties who could have engaged in deviantsettlement were women. In fact, the genderedprocess of deviant settlement sheds light on abroader issue: women were more apt to bedeviant settlement agents, but men were moreapt to be conformist settlement agents. Amongthird parties who did not have cross-cuttingties, 12 percent of the women engaged in set-tlement, as compared with 3 percent of the men.Among third parties who did have cross-cuttingties, 24 percent of the women engaged in set-

tlement, as compared with 47 percent of themen. Interaction models (not shown) confirmedthat the effect of cross-cutting ties on settle-ment was significantly stronger for men than forwomen. Again, however, it is important toremember that our data are limited to conflictsbetween men. A sample of conflicts betweenwomen, or between men and women, mightproduce different results. Thus, we cannot drawbroad conclusions about the relationshipbetween gender and settlement. Instead, we noteseveral intriguing questions for future research.Does third-party gender moderate the relation-ship between cross-cutting ties and settlement?Does principal party gender moderate the rela-tionship between cross-cutting ties and settle-ment? To what extent can these effects beexplained by the social status of the partici-pants?18

FINDINGS 22: CCONFLICT MMANAGEMENT

Table 6 presents a cross-tabulation of conflictmanagement by third-party structure. Amongthe conflicts that did not have third parties, 32percent turned violent. Using individualizedstructure as a baseline, can the introduction ofthird parties alter the course of a conflict? Thebivariate results suggest that third parties arepivotal. Only 20 percent of conflicts with a set-tlement structure escalated to violence, asopposed to 57 percent of conflicts with mixedstructures and 77 percent of conflicts with par-tisan structures. Do these relationships hold ina multivariate context?

Table 7 presents results from the CLR. Model1 considers the third-party structure of a con-flict. The results suggest that partisan struc-tures and mixed structures increased the chanceof violence, but, interestingly, settlement struc-tures did not reduce the chance of violence.Given that our settlement structures were ratherweak (i.e., all third parties present had cross-cut-ting ties, but those ties did not need to be equi-distant), it is perhaps not surprising thatsettlement structure was nonsignificant regard-less of model specification.



16 Because settlement agents typically are of high-er status than the principals, whereas partisans usu-ally are of lower status, Blackian theory predicts thatdeviant inaction will be found among lower statuspotential settlement agents and among higher statuspotential partisans (Black 1990:56–58;1993:126–27).

17 Of possible relevance too is Gould’s (2003,chapter 4) point that partisanship is never automat-ic. Despite 19th century Corsica’s reputation forincessant feuding, Gould found that homicide theretriggered retaliatory homicide only in the 10 percentof cases in which the first homicide made the con-flict explicitly collective (e.g., the offender killed arelative of the principal). Although Gould’s relianceon court records may not provide an accurate pictureof how all Corsican homicides were handled, his the-oretical point seems valid. Thus, there may be a sec-ond bandwagon effect: partisanship on one sidebegets partisanship on the other side.

18 Deviant partisanship—unexpected partisan-ship—is too infrequent to permit an analysis. Amongthird parties who were expected to be settlementagents or inactive, only 2.6 percent take sides.

Model 2 adds the principal party structure ofa conflict to the equation. Controlling for rela-tional distance and functional independenceattenuated the impact of partisan structure andmixed structure. Partisan structure remainedsignificant, but mixed structure did not. Theattenuation occurred because the social char-acteristics of principal parties and third partiesare related. If the principals were strangers, itwas rare for the third parties to have cross-cut-ting ties. Instead, the third parties tended tohave close and distant ties or distant ties, com-bining to form partisan structures and mixedstructures. Nonetheless, partisan structure andrelational distance both were significant, sug-gesting that each has a unique impact on vio-lence.

Model 3 adds situational influences to theequation. The chance of violence increased if therespondent was smaller than his opponent, was

intoxicated, and had a gun. But the respondent’slevel of anger and the number of third partiesdid not have an impact on violence. Most impor-tantly, partisan structure and relational distanceremained significant in the full model, sug-gesting a robust relationship between the socialstructure of a conflict (comprising the socialcharacteristics of the principal parties and thirdparties) and conflict management.

CONCLUSION

Students of violence have devoted less attentionto third parties than their importance warrants,focusing instead on factors such as individual(Wolfgang 1958), neighborhood (Sampson andGroves 1989), urban (Blau and Blau 1982), andnational characteristics (Messner and Rosenfeld1991). This omission is understandable becausedata for third parties are difficult to obtain.



Table 6. Violent Conflict Management by TP Structure

Conflict Management

Non-Violent (%) Violent (%) Total (%) N

TP Structure—Individualized structure 68 32 100 44—Settlement structure 80 20 100 40—Mixed structure 43 57 100 42—Partisan structure 23 77 100 62

Note: N = 188 conflicts. TP = third party.

Table 7. Conditional Logistic Regression of Violent Conflict Management on TP Structure

Odds Ratio

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

TP Structure of Conflicta

—Partisan structure 10.34*** 3.80* 6.06†

—Settlement structure .84 1.26 .89—Mixed structure 5.45** 1.85 2.84PP Structure of Conflict—Relational distance 2.31* 3.62†

—Functional independence 1.63 2.88Situational Controls—Anger 1.25—Physical size .10**—Gun 4.90*—Intoxication 1.25**—TP (n) .96

Notes: N = 94 matched pairs of conflicts. TP = third party.a The reference category for third party structure is individualized structure.† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed).

Police and court statistics, for example, usual-ly have little to say about third-party actions, andless to say about their social characteristics.Eschewing official sources, the current studyrelied on information provided by one of theprincipal parties. This had its limitations: pos-sible faulty memory, bias, and lack of knowl-edge on the part of the principal, all of whichmake the method of inquiry less than ideal.However, other forms of data collection areeither not feasible or not advisable. Becausethird parties scatter at the end of a conflict,naming, locating, and interviewing all third par-ties would be virtually impossible. Likewise,observing third parties would necessitate mul-tiple observers, and because the timing andlocation of conflicts are hard to predict, wouldrequire an enormous investment of researchtime for each conflict observed. Conductingexperiments is feasible but not advisablebecause experiments cannot replicate real-worldviolence. Considering the relative paucity ofsystematic information, our methodology,despite its weaknesses, appears to be justified.

Our data yield firm support for Black’s the-ory of the third party, as elaborated by Cooney,confirming four of our five hypotheses. As pre-dicted, cross-cutting ties weakly promote set-tlement; close and distant ties strongly promotepartisanship (particularly in the case of close anddistant group ties); distant ties strongly pro-mote inaction; and partisan structures stronglypromote violence. Although the bivariate analy-sis shows that our weak settlement structures doreduce the probability of violence, the effect isnot statistically significant in multivariate analy-ses.

Our findings suggest several additional linesof inquiry. We consider four:

1. What is the reciprocal contribution of principalsand third parties (Phillips 2003)? In particular,how do third parties enter and exit conflicts? Byextension of how the state enters legal cases,third-party involvement in conflicts might bedivided into two categories: proactive (with thirdparties intervening on their own initiative) andreactive (with third parties being recruited) (Black1973, 1980). Additionally, a third mode of involve-ment, incidental, should be distinguished becausethird parties not infrequently happen upon con-flicts (e.g., a fight erupts in a bar). Black’s theo-ry of the third party does not address the mode ofinvolvement. Regardless of whether third partiesare recruited, join on their own initiative, or just

happen to be present, any action they subsequentlytake must come from them. Even so, there is a dis-tinct difference between the modes of involve-ment. When third parties enter reactively, theprincipals (or others) are helping to create thethird-party structure. Thus, principals spoilingfor a fight might seek out partisans, whereas prin-cipals aiming for reconciliation might mobilizesettlement agents. By contrast, when third partiesenter proactively or incidentally, their effect onconflicts is more direct. Whether variation inthird-party entry into conflicts affects outcomescertainly warrants investigation.19 The exit ofthird parties from conflicts should also be inves-tigated. Settlement agents, for example, mightforge a peaceful outcome to an episode of conflict,but what happens if they are not around the nexttime the principals encounter one another? Intheir absence, will the peace prove to be fragileor stable?

2. What is the relevance of area ties? A consistent,although unexpected, finding to emerge from theinterviews is the importance of place as a basisof solidarity even in the absence of a personal orgroup tie. In large cities, area ties are based onsmall units. Art, a respondent from Atlanta, notedthat area ties are formed “project against project,zone against zone, and neighborhood againstneighborhood.” (Ironically, the “zones” to whichArt referred are police zones.) In small cities,area ties are based on larger proportions of thewhole, such as the side of town from which aperson originates: north, south, east, or west. Intowns, area ties encompass the entire town inopposition to neighboring towns. The inverserelationship between the size of an area and thescope of area ties suggests that ties are forged inspaces small enough to be homogeneous, butlarge enough to be identifiable. Regardless of thescope of area ties, the pattern appears to be wide-spread. As one informant put it: “Everybody’srepresentin’ where they from.” Because area tiessurpass individual ties, but do not constitute groupties, the concept requires a new social location:close and distant quasi-group ties. Like otherclose and distant ties, area ties promote partisan-ship, create partisan structures, and breed vio-lence. One informant, Will, stated that “half theneighborhoods might as well be gangs anyway.”



19 In terms of Blackian theory, reactive mobiliza-tion appears to be a function of the social structureof the case. Black (2004b) argued that the use andlethality of weapons can be predicted from casestructure. Because mobilizing a partisan is the humanequivalent of acquiring a weapon, perhaps it toooccurs under specifiable case conditions.

Describing the conflict between east Reston andwest Reston, Eric noted: “There stays somethinggoing on. If it’s not about drugs, then it’s aboutfemales. The slightest little thing can start a fightbetween east and west. You can bump into some-one from the west side in a club and start a fight.”Roderick echoed the same sentiment, arguingthat area rivals have an “automatic beef ” againstone another. In fact, just going to a rival area canlead to trouble. Cliff warned: “If you don’t livethere, then you got no business being there.” Areaties are volatile and would repay close scholarlyattention.

3. To what extent do similar patterns prevail at otherstructural levels, such as conflicts between nationstates? In international disputes, the ties betweennations often appear to be critical in determiningwho lines up with whom (Baumgartner1993:228). In the 2002–2003 conflict betweenthe United States and Iraq that led to war, forexample, partisanship was exhibited by stateswith strong ties (based on trade, tourism, andcontact) to one another (e.g., United States andBritain), settlement by states with cross-cuttingties (e.g., Russia and France), and inaction bystates with distant ties (e.g., Thailand, Brazil).(Additionally, the higher status principal, theUnited States, attracted more partisanship than thelower status principal, Iraq). But is this true morewidely? What about other forms of internationalviolence, such as terrorism (i.e., covert mass vio-lence by organized civilians against other civil-ians) (Black 2004a)? Terrorism grows out ofstrong partisanship (without a steady supply ofsupporters, it will simply wither away). Hence,close and distant ties are likely to be essential forits understanding.

4. Do third parties behave similarly in other socialsettings? Our test applies to conflicts betweenmen from areas of concentrated disadvantagewho have social characteristics that attract vio-lence. However, third parties are active in allsocial contexts, such as families, athletic teams,businesses, religious congregations, political par-ties, and even academic departments.20 Some ofthese have little or no violence. Subsequentinquiry will have to determine whether the theo-ry accurately predicts the behavior of third par-ties, such as their willingness to provide supportor promote a settlement, and the nature of conflictmanagement across these diverse social settings.

Finally, our results have broader implica-tions, helping to illuminate some social roots ofviolent conflict. Over time, violence has indi-vidualized (Cooney 2003). In pre-industrialsocieties, violence typically was collective innature, with feuding, or reciprocal collectiveviolence, an especially common form. As soci-eties modernized, the number and scale of col-lective conflicts dwindled. Violence increasinglybecame an affair of individuals rather thangroups. As violence individualized, it alsodeclined in frequency. Studies from a variety ofEuropean countries consistently show that overthe past millennium, the amount of nonstateviolence has declined many times over (Eisner2001). At first glance, these trends appear to beconnected. The shrinking of the size of con-flicts leaves fewer people to be injured andkilled. However, reduced size also leaves fewerpeople to intervene to prevent violence. Ourdata suggest that both trends are true. Declinesin conflicts with close and distant ties reduceviolence, but declines in conflicts with cross-cutting ties increase violence. However, the for-mer effect is more fateful than the latter. Thirdparties with close and distant ties are more like-ly to intervene as partisans than third partieswith cross-cutting ties are to intervene as set-tlement agents. In addition, settlement struc-tures do not increase the chance of settlementor peace, but partisan structures increase thechance of partisanship and violence. Thus, thereduction in the number of conflicts involvingclose and distant ties may be a key factor in thehistorical decline of interpersonal violence. Ifso, it lends support to the idea that high rates ofviolence tend to be associated with strong socialties (Cooney 1998b). Although the decline incommunity is often bemoaned, a conflict man-agement perspective suggests that its weaken-ing ultimately may not be judged to be such anegative development after all (Baumgartner1988, 1998). The weakening of communityindividualizes social life, but it individualizesconflict as well. If people bowl alone (Putnam2000), they tend to fight alone. Fighting aloneis consequential: it lowers aggregate violence,averts injuries, and spares lives.

Scott Phillips is an Assistant Professor of Sociologyat Rice University. His research focuses on violence,with a particular interest in violent and nonviolentconflict management, use of force in the arrest anddetention of immigrants, and capital punishment.



20 In testing and extending the theory of the thirdparty, the importance of cultural distance should notbe overlooked as a predictor of settlement and sup-port behavior in conflicts that cut across, for exam-ple, racial and ethnic boundaries.

Mark Cooney is an Associate Professor of Sociologyat University of Georgia. He has worked on a vari-ety of conflict management topics, with particularemphasis on third parties. He is currently complet-ing a book on the handling of homicide in humansocieties.

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Aiding Peace, Abetting Violence: Third Parties and the Management of Conflict

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