Democratic Peace and Federalist Peace Theories:Allies or enemies?

By Ira StrausExecutive director, Association to Unite the Democracies (Federal

Union)1, 1985-91,U.S. coordinator, Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO,

1992-present

Theorists of Democratic Peace (“DP”) and of Federalist Peace (“FP”) have been arguing against each other ever since Alexander Hamilton attacked the DP theory of his time. They seem to differ over everything, even the level on which they propose to build peace: 2nd image2 (domestic regime change) for DP, 3rd image2 (creation or strengthening of international institutions) for FP.

Federalist Peace and Democratic Peace theory have, accordingly, usually been treated as opposites.

Yet, in historical practice, they have been complementary not contradictory. Indeed, as we shall see, they are necessary to one another. This suggests there has been some mistake when the polemics between DP and FP, or between 2nd and 3rd images, have beencarried to the extent of negativity on each level about the sound steps that can be taken on the other.3

1 Federal Union was the original public Atlanticist organization; among its early adherents were Theodore Achilles and Will Clayton, who became the primary authors in the State Department of NATO and the Marshall Plan, respectively. Formed in 1939 as Inter-Democracy Federal Unionists, its name was shortened to coincide with its British sister organization when it was incorporated in 1940. In 1985 it was renamed Association to Unite the Democracies (AUD). Since 2003, for internal corporate reasons, it largely reconstructed itself as the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies, while keeping AUD in existence formally. 2 See further below for definition and discussion of the categories, “2nd image” and “3rd image”.3 It could also be noted that this need for mutual supplementation is more than theoretical, since neither theory can by itself resolve more than a fragment of the threats to humanity. The end of the Cold War revealed the threats to survival not to have gone away but to have metastasized; by now they far exceed

Interestingly, the two have been intimately intertwined in modern history, despite their mutual polemics. Modern federation – a termthat refers to the strengthened form of federalism that emerged from the American Constitutional Convention in 1787, and that received its basic exposition in the Federalist Papers of Hamilton and Madison -- was an outgrowth of representative government, i.e. themodern form of democracy. Conversely, modern democracies have succeeded where the ancients failed -- stabilizing internally, spreading cumulatively, and keeping the peace with one another -- thanks largely to the federative element in them, i.e. to their social contract theory distinguishing private from public levels, their extension domestically through representative and federal structures, and their increasing federative cooperation internationally. Modern democracy and modern federation have grownup together; so has the peace among democracies and the mutual organization of democracies. There has been no FP without a lot ofDP at the same time, no DP without a lot of FP at the same time.

In this paper we will review the arguments the two theories make against each other. We will find that their mutual polemics revealsubstantial gaps in each of them. At the same time, we will examine how in practice they have helped each other fill in their gaps, and consider the potential for their future cooperation.

DP and FP in the American tradition: a curious inversion

Democratic Peace theory -- the proposition, stated in its popular and perhaps simplified form, that democracies do not fight wars against one another -- is today the most influential substantive theory extant in international relations. It extends far beyond the scholarly world; it is an operational guideline in Western policymaking. It became a major element in U.S. government thinking in the 1980s and played an accessory role in the last decade of the Cold War, even though it was still widely doubted inacademia. With its validation from the ending of the Cold War on Western terms, it rose higher, becoming a main basis of policy: inthe 1990s, for a policy of conditioning relations with the ex-

the capacity of either theory taken alone.

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Communist states on their meeting of democracy criteria; after 2001, for a high-risk policy of democratization of the Middle Eastas the answer to terrorism. The latter policy largely discredited itself through the Iraq war and came to be widely viewed as dangerous adventurism; nevertheless the theory remained the only operational theory available for a number of political actors and agencies, and was revived as the primary basis of official policy with the overthrow of Mubarak, long a target of American democracy-promoters, in 2011.

DP conforms to popular Western ideals. It fits in well with the main Jeffersonian tradition in American rhetoric. However, it alsohas deviant, almost heretical aspects when viewed from the standpoint of American institutional history and foreign policy tradition.

That tradition has been mostly Hamiltonian4. Its successes have provided the practical foundations for the successes of Jeffersonian and DP ideals, as seen in the consolidation and spread of democracy over the centuries since 1787 and the acceleration of that spread in recent decades. However, Hamilton was a critic of the DP theory of his time. His “Peace doctrine”, if he had one, would have been a Federalist Peace theory. But he did not explicitly develop a comprehensive peace theory.

4 That the core tradition is Hamiltonian, and highly successful, has been elaborated by Walter Russell Mead in Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (NY: Knopf, 2001). The tribute is the greater since Mead’s concluding preference is for the Jeffersonian counter-tradition as the milieu for successful American policy synthesis. Mead’s book is brilliant in expoundingthe specifically liberal and Anglo-American quality of Hamilton’s realism, reflecting a geographical position of sufficient security and power as to leave space for greater generosity and a more enlightened form of self-interest than orthodox or continental realism. However, it fails to recognize the central roleof the Federalist element in Hamilton’s thinking, both as the enlightened application of self-interest among the States and as the basis for the insular security (Federalist No. 8) and collective power that made possible the subsequent enlightened U.S. policy-making in foreign affairs. One might say Mead’s book perceives major components of Hamilton’s thought -- commercial, realist, enlightened, Anglophile -- but not the key that holds them together. Asa result, it cannot grasp the heart of the historical evolution of the Hamiltonian tradition into 20th century Atlanticism, i.e. a policy centered on Atlantic integration as the nucleus of global integration.

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We will need to piece together FP theory, by building on the elements of it that were elaborated by Hamilton in his capacity asa Constitutional founding father. His criticism of DP, ironically,will be the most useful point of departure: it is there that he addressed a comprehensive peace theory, and he was impelled by thelogic of the debate to answer it with something like one of his own.

Hamilton’s critique of DP and his implicit FP theory

At the pinnacle of American institutional history lies the FederalGovernment and the story of its re-formation and consolidation through the Constitution. The meaning of this institutional history is generally viewed as having received its most authoritative exposition in The Federalist Papers, of which Alexander Hamilton was the organizer and primary author.

Hamilton’s basic piece in The Federalist, No. 6,5 was written as a refutation of the version of Democratic Peace theory then 5 No. 6 was Hamilton’s second contribution to the series, but his first -- No. 1-- was written in the style of an introduction to the whole series and to multiple writers, not as an exposition of his own thinking. No. 6 is not only Hamilton’s cornerstone piece within The Federalist but the most widely cited of allof his writings on international relations. The American realist school of international relations, which takes Hamilton as its founding father, cites No. 6 as its point of reference, although Hamilton’s perspective in No. 6 is not realist but federalist; realism is for him only one of several instruments of analysis and a warning against false utopias and ill-calculated projects, not a doctrine or ideal, nor a prescription against ideals and projects in general. Weconcentrate in the present paper on Hamilton’s arguments in the Constitutional Convention and The Federalist, not on Hamilton’s writings in the 1790s on specific foreign policy issues, because the former alone had the role of stating the rationale of the Constitution; this gives them a foundational status that cannotbe attributed to Hamilton’s other writings. The Federalist is often and deservedly attributed a unique role in Constitutional interpretation, although the debates in the Convention, while harder to interpret since dialogical not expositional, deserve co-equal status. In the later writings on foreign policy, Hamilton demonstrated that he appreciated the pacific tendency of commerce -- a major plank in the very Democratic Peace platform of the Antifederalists that he critiqued in No. 6 -- but his position remained consistent since he saw it only as a tendency, not a comprehensive final solution to the problem of war.

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widespread among the “Antifederalists”, i.e. the Constitution’s opponents6. The latter held that peace would be secured among the States, not by erecting a powerful “aristocratic” Federal Government above them, but by keeping alive the republicanism of 1776 in each of them with their grassroots independence and their un-aristocratic commercial spirit.

Hamilton countered with examples -- going back to the Greek city-states and Renaissance Italy -- of how republicanism, commerce, and grassroots passions have often been sources of war not peace and how neighboring states are natural enemies unless organized together to be friends7. The Federal Government, he held, was essential for limiting the quarrels among its member States and keeping the quarrels that did arise from degenerating into war. Since its weakness under the Articles of Confederation was riskingits demise, it had to be strengthened until self-sustaining; only 6 The tendency to prefer Hamilton’s political position against the Antifederalists should not lead us to presume that his theory was right against them. In particular, modern DP theorists could argue that Hamilton was right at the time but his very success helped make him wrong today. Such an argument would run as follows: Hamilton and his fellow Federalists, by establishing the biggest and best organized commercial republic in history, laid the cornerstone for the evolution of today’s world of large and stable modern democracies, whichhave over the subsequent two centuries become numerous and mutually peaceful. Asconsequence, something like the old DP theory of his opponents has proved true: the democracies of the modern post-Hamilton type of do not go to war with one another. This would create the paradoxical situation that it was his success in transforming democracy that made the proposition of his opponents true; it wouldhave remained false had it been more fully believed and acted upon in his time. While this is an interesting theoretical possibility, it is probable that the DPamong modern democracies has emerged not solely out of internal democratic factors but also out of other, still more Hamiltonian, external factors, as we shall see. 7 While we are expounding not critiquing Hamilton’s argument at this point, it is worth noting from the start a weak link in his case. He did not really answerthe core argument of DP, which has been stated more clearly in its late 20th century version -- that Republics are mutually or “dyadically” peaceful; rather,he simply showed that they are not generically peaceful toward all other states.To be sure, there were not sufficient “dyads” or pairs of independent Republics extant to test their mutual relations in 1787. It seems Hamilton felt he had answered with his references to conflicts among Greek city-states, but we would count many of them as the opposite of democratic today, and none of them quite met modern standards; he counted them as “republics” under the broad usage of the term in his time.

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then, in his reasoning, could the peace be viewed as securely established.

Before proceeding further, I would like to pause to make sure the reader has noticed the subtlety of Hamilton’s position. He did notargue that a Weberian sovereign government wielding a monopoly of legitimate force was needed for keeping the peace -- the idea presented in a number of simplified Hobbesian versions of Federalist Peace theory8. Hamilton would, to be sure, have been sympathetic to an argument for central military hegemony in the long run9, and he was far from negligent of the role of armed force: in other Federalist numbers he expressed appreciation for the “superintendent” role of the Federal Government in maintaining thepeace by supplying armed forces to secure States against insurrection and by the ability to train and command loyalty from the State militias (see appendix to this paper). But this role wasno monopoly, nor necessarily a hegemony. His argument in No. 6 wasa more minimalistic one, going through three logical stages:

8 While such a view is sometimes associated with world federalism, far from all World Federalists share it. A world federalist, advocating an international nuclear stewardship agreement and agency, supplementing arms control functions (mutual nuclear information and surveillance) with fledgling common defense purposes such as asteroid defense, has argued as follows in favor of security alliances as stepping stones to world federation: “United States of America is asecurity alliance in itself of states in large part responsible for their own law enforcement. One of the purposes of the new constitution of 1789 was to create stronger unity against insurgencies and foreign threats. And until 1903 the U.S. relied mostly on state militias for its mutual defense... A Global Union will not miraculously evaporate large-scale group tensions and bring us peace eternal. Hopefully we can avoid a repeat of the War of Secession of 1861. But it won't be by telling everyone to lay down their weapons and be nice to each other. Or asking everyone to immediately surrender their weapons to the UN. It will only happen if we can build the deep trust that joint military operations slowly foster.” (Andreas Olsson, email of 3.25.2006)9 In the short run military power was highly decentralized, given the technologyof the time and the frontiersmen who had to protect themselves communally. The Federal Government quickly achieved military superiority over individual States,but its use to enforce decisions on individual States would have been too costly, had it been employed as first resort rather than held in reserve as a back up for more regular means of enforcement on individual citizens through Federal courts; and Federal military superiority was at risk when the issue was not defiance by an individual State but a group of States or region.

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1. The States need to organize together to a degree that (in Karl Deutsch’s 20th century terminology) would be “sufficient” to ensureuse of cooperative rather than conflictual channels for dealing with common business and resolving their differences, and reliablyat that, over “a long” period of time. Hamilton (unlike Deutsch) went on to specify what competences must be federalized in order to achieve this “sufficiency” in the case of the American states, namely exclusive Federal authority in the major matters of common business, particularly war, peace, and foreign policy, and supremethough not exclusive Federal authority in regulation of commerce and militias. The Confederation, which had already specified most of these competences, was “sufficient” as a temporary filler to connect the States, to the extent that it worked; his warnings of the danger of internecine war were always couched in terms of its not working and its possible disintegration, leaving the States “unconnected”.

2. But the Confederation was indeed at risk of disintegrating, as a result of its weaknesses. Congress was losing effectiveness in the absence of a wartime enemy to unite against; attendance was dropping off; even in wartime it had not been able to exercise itsdeclared authority reliably; and states were augmenting their roles and mutual tensions.

3. To be made sustainable and given assurance of continuing over the long run, the proclaimed Federal authority must be rendered efficient and operational. This required that Federal authority penetrate directly to the individual citizen for the conduct of Federal operations, via Federal elections, Federal courts, Federalsupervision of State militias, and having all State authorities swear supreme loyalty to the Federal Constitution (in this way penetrating to the individual more deeply than the States): that is, it must have not just a proclaimed sovereignty on key functions10 but the effective sovereignty to define reliably what 10 The faction of strong Federalists at the Constitutional Convention argued that the primary sovereignty already belonged legally to the Federal Government under the Confederation, and the problem was to make this legal sovereignty operational and reliable. See Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as Reported by James Madison, published under various titles, usually and hereinafter referred to as “Madison’s Notes”. The Federalist position was laid out in the debates of June 19, 1787, particularly the speech of Rufus King near the end of the day and the

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actions are lawful what unlawful and enforce this determination without interposition of intermediate authorities. This point is repeated frequently; it replicates the more subtle of Hobbes’ definitions of sovereignty, which is authoritative penetration to the individual without intermediation. The consequence of this basket of interlocking core powers is for the Federal Government to hold fairly reliably, not a monopoly on force, but the final word on regulating the use of force -- the other half of a subtle definition of sovereignty11.

In his initial speech at the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton spoke about what was perhaps to him a deeper concern, namely, to

subsequent speeches of Wilson and Hamilton. King declared the States “were not ‘Sovereigns’” in the usual sense of the word: “They did not possess the peculiarfeatures of sovereignty, they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances nor treaties.” They “retained some portion of their sovereignty” but had “divested themselves of essential portions of it.” James Wilson added that the colonies became independent from Britain not from one another in 1776, as they declared independence collectively from Britain in their capacity as “United Colonies”, making them confederated from the start. Hamilton “assented to the doctrine of Mr. Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of Nature.” (Hamilton went on to argue that a strengthening of the Union, even if violating some points of the subsequent Articles of Confederation, could not be declared to “dissolve” the Confederation, and the States could and should give up the legislative equality which the Articles had allowed them.) This claim of an unbroken central sovereignty, inherited in 1776 from the Crown, became a basis of subsequent Federalist legal doctrine. Similarly, Federalists held the Union had from the start created the States, just as much as the States created the Union; Antifederalists and States Rights theorists recognized only the second half of this equation. 11 For the wording of this aspect, I have used the language of Robert Dahl, who with these words clarified for modern political science what is valid in the Weberian idea of the sovereign state, or “THE government”. Like Hamilton, Dahl arrived at something more subtle than simple monopoly of the legitimate use of force, without discarding the role of central regulation of and hegemony in the use of force. In this way he preserved the fundamental insight in Weber’s overlysimplistic formulation. His refinement implicitly refutes the influential 20th century “pluralist” and “corporatist” schools. The latter, after easily proving that Weber’s “monopoly” on force does not exist in any state, leapt to the conclusion that they had disproved the idea of any final or sovereign locus of authority, and proceeded to describe politics as an endless loop of influences among a plurality of societal forces, including governmental agencies, with noneof them standing definitively above the others. They mistook Madison and modern federalism as providing validation of their view.

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attain the fulfillment of “the great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government”. He enumerated several such necessary supports for the Federal Government: “interest”; “the love of power”; “an habitual attachment of the people”; “Forceby which may be understood a coertion of laws or coertion of arms”, for use not against States but vis-a-vis individuals, parallel to the authority over individuals that the States already had; and “influence”, which he feared his listeners would view as the kind of central Courtly “corruption” against which the colonies had just rebelled, and by which he specified that he meant sufficient offices, honors, and finances to draw large-scale interests to theFederal side and so have a centripetal force as great or greater than the centrifugal forces of the States with all their offices and interests.12

Here too he did not say hegemony over the States was needed, although he would have preferred it (the specific plan he offered,for illustration not debate since he knew it could not be adopted,would have come close to providing immediate hegemony), but only aweight of central Government business comparable to the weight of the State governments so the former might avoid getting torn apartby the latter. This substantive parity, when coupled with the penetration to the individual and the superior legal sovereignty for the Federal Government that he argued for in the subsequent debates and that was embodied in the supremacy clause of the Constitution, would enable Federal powers to become reliably operational; and when further coupled with the direct proportionalFederal elections that he argued for in the subsequent debates, would -- at least under what we might call “ordinary conditions” -- enable popular loyalty to the Federal Government to grow until it surpassed loyalty to the individual States. Thus, from a standpoint of modern integration theory, it could be said that theidea of Hamilton and the other theorists of Strong Federalism at the Constitutional Convention -- James Madison, James Wilson -- was to set in motion a process for the Federal Government to

12 Hamilton’s speech is recorded in Madison’s Notes for June 18, 1787. This was an all-day speech, the longest by Hamilton or anyone else at the Convention, and Hamilton’s most frank; it became notorious for its open divergences from the normal rhetoric of the Revolutionary era.

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accumulate a hegemonic power eventually akin to Weber’s 20th century description of the sovereign state.

In the debates at the Convention, however, Hamilton made clear that the “ordinary conditions” for this integration process to succeed were dependent on a sufficient compatibility or homogeneity of interests among the States. This homogeneity would allow for proportional representation and equality of human beingsin place of the former equality of constituent States, without risk to any State’s fundamental interests, and thus allow a largerliberty for all as equal citizens of a larger society. This homogeneity prevailed between the Big and Small states, rendering unnecessary the long tense debate over their respective weights during the Convention. But, he added, it did not prevail between North and South13.

In other words, a sharp enough difference of fundamental interestscould be found between North and South that it might render a common government oppressive to one or the other region rather than a benefit and liberator to all. Voting as equal citizens would, between Big and Small States, dissolve the sense of being separate corporate entities when it came to Federal issues, but could exacerbate the sense of corporate separateness of North and South, literally making “a Federal issue” of their differences. The growth of Federal sovereignty could be smooth across individual States yet might still fail between North and South taken as regions; the conditions between the regions were not the ordinary ones fit for the integration processes that the Constitution set in motion, but extraordinary ones that could disrupt those processes.

The Constitution in the end contained most of the key elements desired by Hamilton, although he viewed it as barely adequate; andits greatest failure was the one he feared: between North and South. Even if the Constitution had contained all of Hamilton’s wishes, the divergence of societal interests between the two regions might have still, for the reason he gave, disrupted its subsequent integrative processes.

13 Madison’s Notes, speech by Hamilton in debates of June 29, 1787.

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This points to the limits of government in reliably imposing peaceacross divergent interests -- and thereby to limits of FP as a reliable scientific proposition.

However, these limits are often successfully exceeded in practice.Government does not always break down when it surpasses the limitsof its reliable underpinnings. It often works. The most relevant example is the closest cousin to the North-South issue in the U.S.: the British Empire where it retained authority unbroken by the American Revolution. Within this space, the Empire was able peacefully to abolish slavery, despite massive slaveholding interests extant there, without a great rebellion or civil war.

This in turn points to the possibility that government can sometimes impose integration across chasms of interests and engineer transformations of societies toward commonality of structure and interest, thereby creating the underpinnings for thepeace it upholds.

It is a potentiality without guarantees, however. If endangered interests are powerful enough to hope to succeed in rebellion, theoutcome depends on daily exercise of the political arts of leadership and compromise, plus a lot of luck. Speculation can go in a number of directions on this point. Perhaps a more completelyHamiltonian Constitution, with appointed state governors, and with“the Militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States”14, would have made it more difficult for Southern States to secede and mount a rebellion in 1861, meaning fewer secessions or a weaker rebellion put down at smaller cost? Perhaps; but it was the defection of the Federal armies and officers in the South -- already formally under exclusive Federal authority -- that gave the rebellion its chance,in collusion to be sure with the independently elected State governors. Was the problem that the Democratic (Jeffersonian) president in 1857-60, Buchanan, had appeased the South too much, giving it leeway to prepare military secession -- a view that has intrinsic plausibility and is widespread among academic historians

14 Madison’s Notes, speech by Hamilton, June 29, 1787, Article XI of his illustrative draft constitution.

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but is almost unknown to international relations specialists15 -- or was the problem simply that the Republican (neo-Federalist) president-elect in 1860-1, Lincoln, was not compromising enough and scared the South too much? At an earlier stage, if a Hamiltonian leadership had been elected in Federal politics after 1796, could it have consolidated Federal authority better, insteadof the weak leadership of Adams, followed by a Jeffersonian era that rested on slaveholding interests and entrenched them more deeply?

There are “what if” questions, of the sort that it is never easy to answer. Perhaps a more Hamiltonian Union could have held together without civil war, but political sentiment forbade its establishment in the first place. It was the American Revolution itself that, by destroying the old central authority, put slavery beyond the power of common management. In those Britannic realms where the Revolution did not take place, slavery was abolished peacefully. Where the Revolution did take place, British authoritywas gone, and with it the traditionally entrenched imbalance of power in favor of the central government; and no new central authority formed by mutual consent among a balanced group of ex-colonies, half slave half free, proved strong enough to proceed topeaceful abolition. The Revolution was the operationally decisive variable.

For this reason, it is unsound to blame the Civil War on the Constitution without tracing the causal chain back to the Revolution. If the argument is that the Founders established a Federal Constitution too strong for the society beneath it, whose fractures did not permit trust in such a powerful superstructure, then it needs to be acknowledged that the underlying causal sourceof this problem was that they had just mounted a Revolution against the established and long-accepted central government -- a central government that had not been dependent on slavery as one of its founding conditions. If the argument is that the Founders committed Original Sin in their compromises with slavery in the Constitution, then it needs to be acknowledged that the underlying

15 A rare exception, and one almost unknown in the profession, is Henry Usborne’s work expounding a minimalist form of international Federalism, Prescription for Peace, published in the early 1980s. See n16 below.

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causal source was their earlier and much deeper compromise with slavery in mounting together with slaveholders a Revolution against the old central power. The Revolution was conducted in thename of liberty but had the result of entrenching the slaveholdingpower, raising it from a peripheral interest in the Empire to a central part of the political balance in the new nation: therein lay a true Original Sin, far more serious than the sins attributedto the subsequent Constitution. The anti-central government passions, once unleashed and enthroned by victory in a civil war from 1776-1783, proved almost impossible to dethrone -- given the peculiar balance in which one regional half of the new nation had a interest so odious as to require power unto itself for protection -- without a second and more terrible civil war. The second civil war was not entirely inevitable, but highly probable after the first one. Federalism (the strengthening of the Union) averted many more potential inter-state wars and in several respects postponed the North-South one, creating a slim possibility of avoiding it altogether, while in another respect helping bring it on. What endures as an accomplishment of Federalism was to reduce it to only one more war before the peace was restored among the colonies/states in perpetuity, and restoredon a higher and more secure basis at that.

It has been necessary here to go through this dialogical back-and-forth on the operational cause of the U.S. Civil War, because it is usually taken for granted in international relations literature, and sometimes in American historical literature, that the Constitution is to be given the blame for the Civil War16. It 16 The view is almost unanimous in international relations literature, where it is typically taken for granted that the U.S. Civil War constitutes a definitive refutation of the claims of international federalism to be a path to international peace. The view is more ambiguous in American historiography: there is a voluminous literature that blames the Civil War on the North, on the existence of a Federal Government, and on Lincoln; but there is a curious artifact that, when American historians are polled on who was the worst president in American history, they invariably vote that dishonor by a wide margin to James Buchanan. Presumably this means that the cohort of experts in American history views Buchanan as to blame more than Lincoln. The reason for the blame is presumably his coddling of the South and his failure to exercise against the South his powers as Federal Commander in Chief, which might have obstructed the preparation of rebellion and secession. Theorists of international relations seem unaware of this artifact. It raises a question of

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is said that it established too strong a common power for the divided society beneath it; or alternatively, that it made immoralcompromises with slavery for the sake of forming a common power and so led to Civil War. These appear to be opposite explanations,yet both somehow come to the same blame-the-Union conclusion. It is a case where the tone of the music tells us more about the meaning of the tune than its actual words: both explanations are anti-central government in spirit, whether it is blamed for being too strong and uncompromising or for being too ready to compromisein the course of building up its strength. Central power gets censured either way it turns; it is not allowed any practical leeway. The Revolution, by contrast, is treated as above criticismin either regard, given leeway for every sin of omission or commission. A serious analysis of operational causes would reveal a far deeper culpability on the part of the Revolution than of theCosntitution: it undermined the central authority that was the necessary basis for restraining and eventually eliminating slavery; it made extreme and unqualified compromises with the Slaveholding Power, in fact created that Power as an independent force for the first time. In both respects, the Revolution committed the original and deeper of the sins of the Founders; it left the subsequent Constitutional Convention and Federal Government to manage the resultant problems as best they could, without having any good options left.17

whether the dismissal of Federal Government as an instrument of peace in IR theory has been based on analysis and evidence, or on assumption and prejudice.17 The only justification for the Revolution, given the evil it unleashed in theslaveholding power -- the justification given by the Founders themselves, who mostly did not share the later sentiment in favor of the word “revolution” -- was that it was a necessary evil, in order to defend what liberty already existed among whites. However, in retrospect the alleged conspiracy of the British Crown against all liberty stretches credence: the root of the quarrel was a typical trans-Atlantic dispute over burden sharing and paying the taxes everyone agreed were due for the French and Indian War; it was by dint of mutualescalation that the grievances grew serious. Jefferson feared the causes for revolution might still be viewed as “light and transient”, which is why his Declaration of Independence had to reach for a conspiracy theory -- a discernment of a “plan to establish absolute Despotism” behind the pedestrian facts of the trans-Atlantic quarrel -- to justify a further escalation into war,with all its uncertain results and massive repression on both sides.

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The Constitution’s alleged sins dissolve when placed in view of their origin in the sins of the Revolution. The blaming of the Civil War on the Constitution, far from being a sophisticated historical and political science explanation, emerges as a-historical and unscientific. Why then is it so ordinary, while themore sensible attribution of causal responsibility to the Revolution is virtually never made?

The only plausible explanation lies in political prejudice in favor of the Revolution. We are not speaking here merely of the recent political correctness, but of something far more broad-based and deep-set in the American national identity. The Revolution is given the benefit of every doubt; for compensation, the Constitution is often given the blame in every case of doubt. The Declaration is treated as the pure and innocent Garden of Edenwith its “all men are created equal” clause and its language of liberation; the Constitution is treated as the Fall with its centralization, its non-abolition of slavery, and its 3/5 clause -- often described literally in a language of Original Sin18. Thus are the moral equations squared: the necessity is satisfied of finding someone, something on which to blame slavery even while holding the Revolution sacrosanct.

Why is the Revolution treated as absolute, all else as relative toit? It drew a line of blood, a line that outlawed all opposing views as Tory and treasonous. This line is still affirmed as the dividing line between good and bad Americans, citizens and traitors. It is perceived by most Americans as the font of all that is good in the country, the source of its freedom and greatness. The Declaration of Independence is repeatedly cited andrecited as the criterion of political good and evil. The purpose and core sentiment of the Revolution and the Declaration -- “independence” (of the locals from the old central government) -- is equated with “liberty”. This creates a taboo against central

18 The 3/5 clause is widely described as the Constitution’s monstrous compromisewith slavery on the ground that it counted a slave as only 3/5 of a person for Federal representation instead of a whole person. In reality it was the Southernslaveowners who wanted slaves to be counted as whole persons and so get the South more representation; the Northern opponents of slavery wanted slaves not counted at all until after they were freed.

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power, which the Constitution violated. It is why it was hard to get the Constitution ratified in the first place, and why it has been under suspicion ever since as a betrayal of the Revolution. Nothing is blamed on the Revolution; that would be inconceivable for most Americans not only psychologically but logically: the Revolution is tautologically without blemish, since the definitionof the political good is taken from it. For Americans this is a basic axiom of thought, a shared foundation of public discourse, as well as a proven moral standpoint that only a bad person would question; they would be surprised to realize that it is substantively problematic, logically a mere tautology.19

This is why American scholarship20 never blames the Revolution for subsequent evils in American history. It is why scholarship consistently criticizes the Constitution for shortcomings vis-a-19 Comparative analysis of revolutions finds that bloody revolutions tend naturally to produce such a line of blood against a large part of traditional thinking, an absolutized foundation for new thinking, and unconsciously tautological or viciously circular modes of thought on its basis. Thus the creation of a Year 0 by the French Revolution, its deification of itself and itsgoddess of Reason, the Russian Revolution’s turning of itself into the Absolute moment in history, the Soviets’ never-ending tests of loyalty and purging of deviationists, the deductive doctrinal orthodoxies of the Soviet and other institutionalized revolutionary regimes in the 20th century. The consequences for intellectual repression in America, described in the text above, emerge fromthis comparative analysis as structurally similar to the other revolutions although considerably milder, thanks probably to its good fortune of having a more natural and less unrealistic ideology. For further comparative contrast, Britain’s last revolution, the “glorious” one of 1688-89, was bloodless; this spared Britain from having to fit all its subsequent thinking onto one side of aline of blood.20 The same holds for much though not all of world scholarship. The American Revolution is the great successful revolution of modern times, more basic even than the French Revolution, which took inspiration from America and itself failed in the end. While the French Revolution is widely glorified, the AmericanRevolution endures as the Ur-Revolution and the bedrock of legitimacy for all who live on a modern revolutionary ethos. Paradoxically, similar deference is given to it by many conservatives around the world, who in the 20th century cameto hold onto America and its revolution as a talisman for protection from more radical revolutions. Last and not least are the British, who in a spirit of showing themselves good sports in defeat have mostly dropped their natural national criticisms of the Revolution, and in diplomatic spirit have reconciled with their former colonies on the basis of an unqualified affirmation that the Americans were right.

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vis the Revolution but never vice versa. It is the unexamined ur-prejudice, whence arises the illogical preference for anti-centralgovernment explanations of why there was a Civil War.

But the very issue that we were refereeing by the American example-- the issue between Democratic Peace and Federalist Peace theories -- was whether central government (or by extrapolation strong inter-state organization) is helpful to peace. No wonder the issue has been dealt with so poorly, leading always to an illogical conclusion that the American Civil War counts against the establishment of central government! It is a case of vicious circles and tautologies running so deep as to dominate the entire world of scholarship. We can now see why the refereeing of this issue of war and central government has consistently miscarried inits logic, even among serious international relations scholars: ithas run into the ur-prejudice of the American nation, truncating key factors from the historical and comparative narratives used for reference. We could proceed, if we had space enough, to trace this prejudice forward from the period of its origin and show how it has rendered critical evidence invisible to subsequent Americanresearchers. And Americans have formed the core of international relations scholarship in the 20th century.

It appears, then, that the question has been decided against Federalist Peace only by virtue of America’s most visceral, ill-examined prejudices. FP is the weaker scholarly tradition vis-a-vis DP, because the Constitution is the weaker tradition psychologically vis-a-vis the Revolution. This makes it at least probable that actual case for FP is stronger than has been academically recognized.

This does not mean that the skepticism raised by the Civil War about FP can be completely removed. In the case of an international federation, formed by consent among previously independent states, the post-Revolutionary situation in America will often be more relevant than the situation in the loyal remainder of the British Empire, despite the advantages a new federation would derive from modern military centralization. An international federation would be vulnerable to fissure if its membership spanned deep chasms of regional interest, and would

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have to rely on a fair amount of fortuna no matter how great its virtu.21

Old government, with established legitimacy developed often over centuries by whatever means and habits, makes for peace among its society just by being there; the tradition of its hegemony and identity-focus gives it considerable authority to act to sustain or create societal cohesion and homogeneity underneath it. New government for a new Union must rapidly build belief in and support for its legitimacy; this is why it needs to sink deep democratic representative roots reaching down to its individual citizens, in order to create a sense of common citizenship and belonging, and at the same time satisfy the interests of each of its major constituent sub-entities or sub-societies so as not to frighten their members back into a sense of separate interest fromthe whole, and not disrupt the growth of loyalty to the whole. Thus, for an operative theory of building peace with some reliability through new union and new government, such government must be democratic, must be federal, and must preside over a fairly homogeneous society. If sub-societies are too divergent, the new union may have to use consociational devices22 to maintain consensus among its constituent entities; this reduces the 21 We cannot examine adequately here the possibility that the risks could be overcome by constitutional pre-planning of transitions to societal commonality (e.g., if there had been a plan in the U.S. Constitution for a gradual transition to the end of slavery). It is a constructive suggestion of modern federalists grappling with this problematic, but is itself a complex subject. Itwould greatly reduce the risks if it could be done, but it would be difficult for deeply separate societies to agree at the start on a plan of transition to become a homogeneous society.22 Arend Lijphart, in his works on “consensus democracy” and democracy in pluralsocieties, is the major proponent of “consociational” practices, among which are: requirements for specific distribution of executive and other leadership posts among constituent groups; requirements of consensus among the leaderships of the constituent groups for specific types of legislation; and special weightings for representation of constituent groups in the legislature. The U.S.Civil War could be blamed on the failure to extend consociational devices into the Executive branch, as Calhoun advocated in his proposal for a dual presidency; but also could be blamed on the presence of consociational devices in the Senate, giving the South inadvertently a collective veto on the development of the Union and of Federal law, and a basis for its continued development of a separate society with the kinds of centrifugal tendencies Madison feared.

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penetration to the individual and the involvement in joint democracy, and so slows and weakens the development of a sense of common citizenship and loyalty, but avoids crises and disaffectionthat could sabotage that growth altogether.

For Hamilton, Federal Peace theory in a sense merged with Federal Freedom theory: Hamilton was concerned, in his comments in the debate on population versus State representation in Congress, withthe freedom of a society and its people to develop and make progress for their interests, seeing this as the crux of the matter for holding the society’s loyalty to a new union. Where several societies have enough homogeneity or sufficiently compatible interests that they can merge, each growing as well or better together as separately, it becomes possible for them to enjoy their freedom together and vote together as individuals, finding in this a path to greater freedom and, inter alia, greater peace. The problem arises when that homogeneity of interests does not pertain; then an uncertainty arises in Hamilton’s mind: not ana priori conclusion against union, but a risk that makes it necessary to examine in each instance the pros and cons of union and whether the terms of it are viable.

What, then, can be safely concluded, as a statement of HamiltonianPeace Theory? It is that a strong Federal Government makes for peace among its member states, on condition that they have sufficient compatibility in their underlying societal interests, along with sufficiently democratic cultures to underpin a federal representative form of government. The compatibility is what enables states consistently to follow up on an initial investment of the core of their sovereignty into the central government and avoid any sense of crisis as its legal sovereignty grows into practical supremacy: Hamiltonian Peace Theory in this respect merges with 1950s-60s international integration theory23. The 23 Where they differed was that Hamilton put the evolutionary progress on the after-side of the establishment of a constitutional union and joint democratic processes, while the 1950s and ‘60s theorists mostly preferred non-constitutional functionalism for the early stages and put off federalism and popular voting until the far end of the integration process. Protracted crisis in the EC in the 1970s and early ‘80s led to a decline of neo-functionalism and its modification by incorporating elements of federalism as the EC drew on federalist forces and processes to emerge out of the crisis; the result was

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requisite societal compatibility existed between the individual States that up to 1787 were perceived as conflicting on the more superficial level of raison d’etat, and in fact the Union worked smoothly on the inter-State plane after 1789. However, adequate societal compatibility did not exist between North and South24. Hamilton did not speculate on what would happen if this led the Union to break down. We know in retrospect what did happen: a civil war ensued, after which the Union was reconstituted and the peace among its states secured on what to all appearances is a permanent self-sustaining basis. The integration processes, given the strengthening of their Constitutional foundation in 1787, (a) succeeded between individual States, as Hamilton predicted; (b) did not succeed without violent crisis between North and South, ashe warned; (c) nevertheless did succeed after the crisis ended, indicating that the Union had, through its penetration to the citizens, sunk roots so deep as to transcend the bitterness even of a terrible civil war.

The Constitution’s Peace theory and its recent displacement by Democratic Peace theory

The previous section gives an overview of the actual peace theory of Hamilton and the federalist movement, a theory that is considerably more subtle than the one usually attributed to federalism. It is based on the comments in The Federalist and in the debates of the Constitutional Convention, putting them together

termed “neo-federalism” by John Pinder, and brings modern theory back somewhat closer to the Hamiltonian one.24 How much compatibility is needed for “adequacy” is a question we have no space to answer here except in haste. The case of the South indicates that a single vital interest among a basic constituent group in the Union can be enoughto bring it to crisis, even if there are greater interests in common. North and South shared enormous interests, including a deep homogeneity between the historical experiences and political cultures of their white populations, but none of this sufficed; to disrupt the Union, it was enough that the socio-economic structure of the South diverged far from the North, vital interests were tied up in that divergent structure, and it raised normative questions so basic in society that they could not be forever postponed or depoliticized in the North. At the same time, the Union survived the Civil War, and never thereafter was in danger; in the end, the common interests and homogeneities didprevail, but only on the other side of one last major war.

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and sometimes teasing out their implications25. It is what we mightreasonably call “the peace theory of the U.S. Constitution”26, the basis on which it could hold forth the promise in its preamble that it was made in order to achieve “a more perfect Union” and “insure domestic Tranquility”. I have restated the theory in some passages above in the language of contemporary political science so that it can be more readily recognized for its points of contact and difference with other peace theories.

But, it will be asked, did Madison, the second author of The Federalist and the most important single person in the working out ofthe Constitution itself, agree with this theory? Isn’t Madison supposed to have had opposite predilections from Hamilton? The answer is that the view of the Madison of 1787-88 was in all essentials the same as Hamilton’s, and in some respects more far-reaching. He had the same preference for population-proportioned representation in both houses of Congress, the same view of the irrelevance of the Big State-Small State debate, the same fears about North and South, saying all this on the same days and in thesame debates as Hamilton at the Convention and recording it all inhis Notes. He too welcomed a stronger central government for superintending the peace and ensuring more adequate attention to the common interest vis-a-vis local interests. He too felt in 1787that the Constitution fell short of the Federal authority needed; he urged at the Convention a Federal legislative veto on State laws to prevent centrifugal forces from gathering strength.

The particular point Madison emphasized was the need to remove theConfederation’s sharpest checks on Federal power -- the checks 25 Any such exegesis runs risks, but it is the only way to understand the texts,which were not intended as a 20th century scholarly exposition of the theory of peace. I take as a model the way Ernst Haas teased out the implications of Mitrany’s functionalist arguments in order to turn them into a theory of evolutionary integration of societies and consolidation of peace among them, which came to be called neo-functionalism; my result, as I will explain later, is a “neo-federalism”. However, unlike Haas, I do not need to modify substantially the political views of my subject (Hamilton) in order to turn his arguments into a theory of integration.26 To be sure it is not written in the Constitution itself but underlies it and it to be found embedded in the debates and writings of the Constitution’s proponents. In the language of a currently influential school of Constitutional interpretation, it is the “original intent” of the framers of the Constitution.

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provided by the power of the States to resist Federal law and sabotage Federal decisions by dint of inaction -- and replace themwith balances within the Federal power structure and within the federation-wide society. While he never used the exact formulationof replacing extra-Federal checks with intra-Federal balances, which might have scared some of his readers, it provides a summation of his contribution. His widely celebrated Federalist No. 10, usually considered the basic statement of the theory of the Constitution as a guarantor of freedom, is about this. Too often No. 10 is read in the context of No. 51, i.e. out of context and in reverse order. No. 51 speaks more simply of “checks and balances” in a traditional language; read carelessly as the first or primary text, it can be used to reconcile Madison to an anti-governmental spirit, but at the cost of turning his words against their actual purpose. No. 10 followed Hamilton’s Nos. 6-9 for a reason: it was written to build on the points in those numbers andserve as a climax to them. Together Nos. 6-10 mounted a cumulativeargument in favor of stronger and more central government; the main new checks and balances it sought to create were not against Federal power but against local (state) governments27. On the Federal level, as we have indicated, No. 10 would do the opposite:remove the crippling checks hitherto placed on central power, which would be replaced mainly by the smoother and more reliable balances that were possible within an enlarged central democratic polity. It was the Antifederalists who wanted to maintain strongerchecks and balances against Federal power. The “checks and balances” of No. 51 have a quality of giving reassurance to the Antifederalists that there would still be adequate restraints on government, at a time when everyone understood that the main purpose was to form a stronger, less strictly checked central government; and even so, in No. 51 Madison repeated the thesis of No. 10 that the dependence of government on elections and the variety of an enlarged federal constituency were the primary securities of liberty, then went on to institutional checks and 27 The State governments, Madison said frequently and with some heat, were immoral in their excessively independent power, and naturally so, obstructing the common good for the sake of selfish interests or out of power-jealousy and failure to coordinate. They were, as such, intrinsically corrupt: such selfishness at the expense of the common interest was the very definition of corruption. A stronger Federal power was the antidote for Madison to the localistic corruption and immorality.

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balances -- mostly within instead of as hitherto against the Federal structures -- as supplemental securities. No. 10 is the first and cornerstone Federalist number of Madison, his grand entry onto the stage like No. 6 of Hamilton, where he sets forth what ismost important to him. It codifies the core argument that he made repeatedly at the Constitutional Convention: that democracy will be improved not undermined by enlarging its territory and population far beyond the classical limits28. Read atop No. 10, in proper order, No. 51 is understood better.

In No. 43 Madison mixed his arguments from No. 10 with Hamilton’s from No. 9 and arrived, as we shall see below, at a democratic world federation as the solution to the problem of world peace. This point was speculative, not foundational for the Constitution itself as were Nos. 6-10. It may be considered the Constitution’s 28 Madison said it so many times that Hamilton, in his own notes on the Convention, called it “Maddison’s theory”. Hamilton added an astute observation from what we might today call a developmental integrationist point of view: thatthe equilibrium of factions portrayed by Madison, while a good idea, might not remain a safeguard against “compact factions” over the long run, since the growth of common sentiments in a deep Union with joint elections could eventually enable shared passions to come to run through the whole extended society. Here we may note an important difference between the two writers which explains why Hamilton provides the better guidance for theory. Madison’s primarystyle was as a theorist of classical equilibrium, while recognizing developmental aspects; Hamilton’s thinking was more dynamic, although it included elements of classical balance. In No. 8 Hamilton laid out a geopolitical vision of insular security of the American Union as one of the several separate empires of the earth, with enormous growth in its prospect but seemingly fixed ultimate boundaries for its insular security. In this, Hamilton ignored the global dynamism of the progress that was underway in modern times and whose pace was quickened by Hamilton’s own achievements; subsequent Hamiltonians in the 1890s were the first to hold that the former insularity was inadequate and America’s security in an increasingly interdependent world shouldextend beyond its continental boundaries. Both Federalist writers, it is safe to say, underestimated their own achievement in political construction, a modesty that indicates both that their theory was stronger than they thought and that itneeds some constructive amendment. They also underestimated the ongoing progressof technology, whose advances were further speeded by American patent law and Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures; technological growth has subsequently been understood as exponentially accelerating. The fact of this underestimation makesHamilton, with his emphasis on the dynamic factor, a more reliable basis than Madison for a solid modern theory, but needing to be carried still further in this factor.

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implicit speculative theory of world peace, supplementing the Constitution’s more definitive theory of the domestic American peace.

The U.S. Constitution and the decision to establish a sovereign Federal Government is thus based on a rejection of Democratic Peace theory in favor of Federalist Peace theory.

Yet when the Bicentennial of the Constitution rolled around in 1987, it was the Democratic Peace that got the pride of place at the celebration; Federalist Peace theory went almost unmentioned. No attempt was made at a compromise or synthesis, such as a Democratic Federalist Peace theory; we will have to try ourselves to make up later for that hiatus.

It was a slight to the Founders. To be sure, this is not in itselfa condemnation. The Founders were not gods, even if they are oftentreated that way in America. Perhaps the slight was deserved?

If we examine recent trends in scholarly theory, we might easily conclude that it was indeed deserved. DP has gained rigorous political science formulation and been found to survive well undercareful quantitative testing since the late 1970s. Meanwhile the Federalist Peace theory has been widely considered discredited in the academic world ever since Karl Deutsch presented in the 1950s a seemingly quantitative demonstration that “pluralistic” securitycommunities (i.e. mutually peaceful groups of independent states) are a more reliable basis for peace than “amalgamated” (federated)groupings29.29 The supposed quantitative demonstration of this proposition, which appeared in Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), was based on a mistake in logic. To explain it simply: “pluralistic security communities” were defined as peaceful and so bydefinition never fail, whereas “amalgamated” groupings were not so defined and so could fail. It followed by definition that “pluralistic security communities”were more certain to secure the peace than “amalgamated” groupings; all the counting did not demonstrate any substantive conclusion, it only confirmed the definitions. Despite this, the Deutsch demonstration has entered into the woodwork of international relations theory as if it were fact and has been widely used as a basis for further inferences. We will discuss in greater detailfurther below the influence of this mistake, and how it could happen that this great scholar, one of the fathers of quantitative political science, could make

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If these recent conclusions were justified -- and Deutsch’s was not, but the fallacy in it is little known30 -- then Americans could still celebrate the fact that they formed a Union for purelypractical national reasons, but meanwhile be happy with DemocraticPeace for their theory. This would be convenient, since DP is morecomfortable for Americans than the Federalist theory: it fits moreeasily with their habitual anti-government rhetoric, and it makes

such a fundamental error on what was perhaps his most important proposition. 30 The influence of Deutsch’s argument was brought home to me when Andrei Kozyrev, newly appointed as Foreign Minister of the Russia Republic within the USSR, came to Washington while the Soviet Union was still intact and spoke favorably of the prospect of break-up as something that would lead to better relations with the other republics of the USSR, much as it had between Norway and Sweden. (The most celebrated example in the Deutsch volume was that Norway and Sweden reached a condition of peace and trust after separating, while as a Union they suffered mutual acrimony reaching the point of threats of war while discussing the terms of break-up; it was a dramatic example even if the general conclusion was not justified. The book provided a helpful definition of peace or“security community” as a long-term absence of threats of, fears of, or plans for war between groups of countries, and showed that this condition existed in anumber of cases between independent countries.) Asked if this would not require developing hundreds of new treaties among a dozen new countries, Kozyrev answered that this was normal, countries everywhere having hundreds of treaties with other countries. Kozyrev’s policy can be lauded for helping keep the subsequent Soviet break-up mostly peaceful, or can be damned for having encouraged more break-up than was necessary. The cycle of secondary conflicts begun by the process of dis-Union cannot be said to have ended even today. A myriad of treaties and agreements did indeed emerge after the USSR dissolved, but they cannot be said to have provided for more than a fraction of the cooperation achieved on a routine basis when there was a common government. Among the cooperative factors that have suffered badly have been the economic interdependence and the common market which, even when they were badly compromised by the Communist character of the state, had nevertheless existed throughout the expanse of the Soviet space as long as a common state existed; the end of the reliable larger market has brought severe economic losses to all the former Soviet Republics, particularly the smaller ones. The break-up also brought an end to the democratic reform process led by the cosmopolitan central government in Moscow; with authoritarian provincial elites gaining sovereignty in many Republics, political liberties soon went into reverse, particularly in Central Asia where European influences could not rush in to fill the space left by the Russian withdrawal. The results in real life turn out to have been highlymixed and ambiguous, as indeed was the evidence of the various cases that Deutsch mistook as providing quantitative confirmation of his theory.

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no demands on them to give up any of their independence to an international organization.

But then again, perhaps the slight was not deserved. Surely it ought to have been examined with greater care. The discrediting ofThe Federalist’s theory of the Constitution is not something that ought to have passed as a form of celebration of the Constitution.And, comfortable though it may be for Americans to leave it to other societies to do all the hard business of uniting internationally and make no demands on themselves, it is implausible that this is a sound or responsible approach. In any event, the place to look for the causal explanation for this public slight to the Founders would assuredly not be in the latest developments in academic theory, but in political trends and fashions. Ever since the 1790s, the Jeffersonian party, which inherited the Antifederalist constituency and its Democratic Peaceoutlook, has presented itself as the party most faithful to the Constitution. It has done this, managing to keep a straight face despite its resistance at every point of Constitutional and Federal Governmental construction, by raising up of the banners ofStrict Construction, States Rights, and Nullification as legal constructs. The claim of the States Rights party to Constitutionalauthenticity was long denied by more responsible political leadersand seemingly suffered a final defeat, after exacting a terrible cost, in the Civil War. In the decades after 1865, Hamiltonianism enjoyed a comeback, expressing itself in domestic policy as progressivism and in foreign policy as Atlantic-based internationalism. In the 20th century, Hamiltonian Atlanticism evolved by stages into the core of U.S. foreign policy; it bore fruit in an Atlantic alliance that went through three generations of World War and Cold War, and was institutionalized permanently in the last of the three as a political and economic as well as military confederacy. This was one of the factors that made it possible for the Cold War to end in a peaceful victory for the West and for its enemies to turn immediately to seeking to join its institutions. Yet long before that vindication occurred on theglobal scale, as the Cold War dragged on and a sense of hopelessness set in, a reversal took place in the mentality at home. Anti-governmentalism rose to a higher level in the 1960s,

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with the discrediting of “the Establishment”, than ever before. A “new federalism” was equated with decentralization not with the Union, giving an impression that the verdicts of both 1787 and theCivil War had been reversed in the mindset of many Americans. It was not surprising in these circumstances that the Constitutional celebration in 1987 embraced the DP outlook of the Antifederalists; in effect it accepted the Declaration of Independence as a higher arbiter of American morals than the Constitution itself.

It was a kind of ultimate revenge of Jefferson on Hamilton. Throughout most of U.S. history there had been a balance between Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian strands in American thinking, particularly in the elites which learned -- as Jefferson himself tended to do when in power -- how to marry Jeffersonian rhetoric with Hamiltonian practice. Even the rhetoric came to be balanced in the neo-Hamiltonian era of Theodore Roosevelt. But Roosevelt gave way to Wilson with his new Jeffersonianism. The balance in rhetoric was gradually lost, and all but collapsed in the 1960s. New extremes of government-bashing were reached in the New Left and subsequently in the New Right. The traditional American spiritof “bigger and better” -- the spirit of Hamilton’s No. 9 and Madison’s No. 10, and of American business and society for nearly two centuries thereafter -- was replaced by a spirit of “small is beautiful”.

The Founding Federalists’ style of thinking was no longer in fashion by the 1980s. Fashion is often the arbiter of manners; andas of 1987, it dictated celebrating the Constitution largely in the language of its Antifederalist opponents. Anything else would have jarred on the national ear.

It would have sounded out of place to speak of Hamilton’s No. 6, with its tone of a rude awakening from what he called “the deceitful dream of a golden age”, and its demands for governmentalconstruction as the way to realize such practical opportunities asexisted in America for a better political order. Even in his own time, Hamilton’s comments often seemed out of place. His formal manners were impeccable but the content of his speeches could easily have qualified as bad manners. It was a risk that had to be

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run if matters were to be clarified. Despite seeming out of place,he helped define the meaning of his time and place. We will have to run similar risks if we are to clarify matters today.

2 nd Image, 3 rd Image, or a 2.5 Image Theory: which is needed?

DP and FP theories operate on seemingly different levels: that of the national state and that of the inter-state system. These correspond to what are called “2nd Image” and “3rd Image” theories.The distinction comes from Kenneth Waltz, who asked31 the methodological question of whether war is to be attributed to problems in the nature of human beings (1st image), defects in the political or economic structure of countries (2nd image), or defects in the international system structure (3rd image). The three assumptions point to sharply divergent conclusions: that peace is to be obtained by reforming the morals of the individual human being (1st image), by reforming the structure of each societyand state (2nd image), or by reforming the structure of international relations (3rd image).

Democratic Peace theory is generally presented as a 2nd image theory: non-democratic states are the cause of war. Federalist Peace theory is generally presented as 3rd image: the lack of international government is the cause of war. This leads to a presupposition that the two theories are mutually opposed. The twotheories, it is safe to say, have had opposite public “images” forthemselves. This has obstructed cooperation between the two approaches. And yet, as we shall see, in the real world the two approaches have advanced primarily in tandem in modern history; each would benefit -- in the sense of being able to advance farther and faster toward its goals -- from a more conscious development of cooperation with the other.

Federalism has usually mixed a strong element of the 2nd image backinto its seemingly 3rd image theory. From Hamilton to Streit, the domestic content of the federating states has been treated as a necessary criterion for Union: democracy has been upheld as the 31 In Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York, Columbia University Press, 1954).

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first criterion, while careful discussion has taken place on the importance of other 2nd image criteria of homogeneity as well. At the same time, the high theorists of DP, from Kant to Russett, have strongly supported 3rd image international institutions32. The two sets of views have been close in practice, as if each approaching the same dividing line from the opposite side. The appearance of opposition, underlined by the preference on one sidefor directing its polemic against 2nd image approaches, on the other side against 3rd image approaches, has served to obscure the actual closeness.

In the first half of the 20th century, the academic study of international relations was in its infancy; its exponents had a professional interest in its becoming an independent field of studies from domestic political science. Not surprisingly, many ofthem preferred the 3rd image, which emphasized the autonomy of the international level of operations. Waltz attacked the 2nd image as“reductionist”; he was making a point that carried professional aswell as logical weight.

At the same time there was a professional distaste for the ultimate 3rd image approach -- world government -- which if successful would abolish international relations altogether and reduce global politics to a form of domestic politics. This approach was denigrated as a manifestation of “the domestic analogy”, i.e. the idea that what worked domestically to bring peace would also work internationally, and was said to represent

32 One could include others here, such as Babst and Doyle. Also Rummel argues infavor of international cooperation among democracies, at least as an alliance for promoting democracy; this much he supports despite his emphatic criticism ofgovernment in general, including international government, a criticism from which he exempts democratic states for not really being states in the classic sense of the word. There are points of contact even here with federalists: Streit used, as the defining motivation and criterion for governmental Union, that free people should unite to support and extend one another’s freedom. For America’s Federalist founders, Union improved and softened government and democracy, but still it was, crucially, a government, not just a confederacy of separate governments: that was the distinction they emphasized at the Constitutional Convention, where they worked out -- in terms that I have tried to compile and clarify in the present paper -- the minimum that was needed for constituting a state that would still be a state in the traditional sense.

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just another failure to grasp the uniqueness of the international level of operations33.

The 3rd image approach is also often termed the “System Level”, with the 1st or 2nd image taken as the “Unit Level”. This lends force to calling the 1st and 2nd images “reductionist”. Nevertheless, systems theory is far from unanimous in denigrating the unit level. In the theories of many systems, the interplay between system and unit level is crucial: neither level can be reduced entirely to the other, and both levels tend to improve or degenerate together. A combined 2nd and 3rd image theory would be appropriate for a genuinely non-reductionist system theory. There is also mild 1st image element in both DP and FP: representative democracy and federation have been shown in the course of history 33 R.W. Manning emphasized this point. In reality all international theories make use of domestic analogies and vice versa. Sugunami has demonstrated, in TheDomestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, that domestic analogies are inevitable and appropriate on the international level, and need to be evaluated by comparative professional methods rather than dismissed as an affront to professional interest. Even those that say that all politics is a struggle for power, domestic like international, and that influence is just a form of power, are working by analogy, and a misleading analogy at that, inverting the actual relation between “power” and “influence”. Serious scholars of domestic politicaltheory such as Robert Dahl have clarified that “power” is an extreme form or subset of the broader category of “influence”, not the other way around. The essence of Madison’s argument, as of Hume’s on which he built, was to refine thepolitics of influence so as to put behind the cruder forms of power politics andenable humanity to progress to more civilized ways of doing business: he reserved power for enforcement of the outcome of the interplay of influences andfor the last resort in checking other power rather than as a first resort or omnipresent threat for exerting influence. International relations has also achieved some degree of “civilization” by similar methods, although far from as much as domestic systems: 3rd image channels have been developed for communicating civilized forms of influence, ranging from the gentler uses of traditional diplomacy to the modern development of 3rd image institutions for integration of countries, although the basic 3rd image structure continues to beone in which the threat of force is inherently embedded among countries that have not been deeply integrated with one another. The question of how far international relations can be “civilized” and turned from power to influence asthe primary coin of the realm is a question of supreme importance. Nevertheless,it has made for a striking metaphor to say that all influence is just another form of power, perhaps for the very reason that it turns the actual relationshipinside-out. The aphorism has been popular among realist theorists; it gives an alibi for power politics.

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to have transformative effects in turning a tribal “people” into adeliberative “citizenry” fit for close horizontal interaction bothinternally and with other citizenries.

Nevertheless, polemic between the three images comes easier than synthesis, and makes for livelier reading. DP theorists have overshot in polemicizing against the 3rd image; FP theorists, in polemicizing against the 2nd image.

The polemical overshooting was partly out of a legitimate concern on both sides. FP theorists were concerned that the 3rd image was unduly neglected in public discussion and that false 2nd image explanations such as Socialist Peace were popular. DP theorists inturn were concerned that the 2nd image was unduly neglected in IR studies in favor of the 3rd image. Accordingly, they polemicized against the 2nd and 3rd images, respectively. Both were right in their concern and in the need for a corrective, but both overshot in the corrective. By polemicizing in too one-sided a way, they ended up excluding the middle ground which they actually on the whole shared.

Given the alacrity with which DP has been taken up by governments and political elites as a purely 2nd image theory since the 1980s, it seems the FP theorists have had the greater ground for their concern. This is further underlined by the way the simplified version of DP has served as an underpinning for democracy-spreading adventurism in the Middle East after 2001.

It was not quite the case that no 2nd image theories were studied in academia before DP regained traction in the 1980s. The problem was rather that it was only the Socialist Peace version that was studied, and SP was not just false but counterproductive. Both DP and FP advocates shared a concern about this. It was perhaps a matter of left-right biases in academia; it was in any case not a matter standing outside of 2nd versus 3rd image biases.

The Pavia school of European Federalists has explained the propensity to 2nd image explanations by putting the problem in a context of political cultures. As long as power remains overwhelmingly in national state hands, politics remains

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overwhelmingly national, and so does political culture. 2nd image explanations are always useful to major national political parties, as a way of advertising themselves and their domestic programs as the solution inter alia to the international problem. The prevalence of 2nd image discourse is a reflection of the overweening strength of national political culture and the weakness of transnational political culture. In a world in which the national government is the only instrumentality available for individuals and parties to operate upon when facing international problems, it is natural for people to reach for a 2nd image approach as it is the only kind that they can hope to implement through existing channels of political action.

Federalists have accordingly polemicized against the 2nd image and its mistakes, particularly in its forms of socialism, nationalist regeneration, and religious regeneration: these purported roads topeace actually exacerbate international conflict. Some of them have also polemicized against DP, seeing in it a source of belligerence and error, such as a “war to make the world safe for democracy” and the equation of this with a “war to end all wars”; others, such as Streit, recognized that the particular DP version of 2nd image theory was not without an important element of truth, and maintained, in keeping with the actual mainstream of the Wilsonian tradition, a balance or intertwining of DP 2nd and FP 3rd elements in their analysis and prescription. They have viewed the stopping of aggressive autocracies and the development of international institutions as jointly necessary for making democracy safe and preventing future wars. To put it otherwise, they have shown a decent balance of concern between making the world safe for democracy and making democracy safe for the world; whereas the purely 2nd image version of DP does not seem to acknowledge any potential problem of national democracy not being safe for the world.

Russett, as a DP theorist has pointed out that “3rd image” theorists have profited off the chaos of the international system of independent states in the earlier ages of autocracies, and neglected to consider that this might be irrelevant to how the

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system would work in the emerging age of democracies34. Conversely,Streit, as an FP theorist, pointed out that opponents of 3rd image supranational authority have profited off the authoritarian reputation such authority had from an earlier era when autocraciespredominated internationally and democracies had to defend their independence from them. Both have a point. Additionally, 3rd image theorists could point out that DP theorists have profited off the success of inter-democracy international organizations since 1945 in stabilizing a democratic peace in their interior space, neglecting to consider whether national democracies alone would have been so peaceful or even so stable in their absence: had there been no EU or NATO, Franco-German relations might have remained as tense after 1945 as after 1919 and the OECD zone of peace never emerged. Such unearned profit or “free riding” by theorists has gone both ways; in recent years, the latter way -- DP free riding on FP achievements -- has been the more prevalent. On a negative note, both theories could be counted as unproved or overstated in their claims, in view of the free ride, and prone tofoster mistakes in the area of overdrawn claims. On a more positive note, both theories could be counted as part proved and mutually reinforcing, and the free riders might be partly forgiven: if both theories are virtuous in the main thing they enjoin people to do -- to build democracy, and to build international organizations, particularly inter-democracy organizations – then more of each is needed if peace is to be secured. In that case we might wish them both a pleasant free rideand a good practical profit from it, moving the world forward in practice, even if by fits and starts, on a combined level.

While much of the DP literature has strictly opposed the 3rd image preference in the international relations profession and seemed tobe calling for a return to the 2nd image, it would be more reasonable to make a more limited claim for its anti-3rd image arguments. DP theory has refuted any exclusive 3rd image approach and shown that 2nd image elements are important in international reality, but it has not shown that the 2nd image suffices or that

34 ? Bruce Russett, with William Antholis, Carol Ember, Melvin Ember, and Zeev Maoz, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), 137-8. All subsequent citations of Russett are from this book.

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the 3rd image is irrelevant. Other theorists have in return refutedany exclusive 2nd image approach and vindicated the importance of 3rd image elements. The upshot of these two successful demonstrations is that a mixed approach is unavoidable. We need a 2.5 level theory.

More precisely, we need a dual-level systems theory, one that includes 2nd and 3rd image elements. The time is not ripe for a definitive synthesis at a precise 2.5 level; what is necessary is to weave together DP and FP approaches, along with other approaches to the problems of peace. The result would not be a fixed quantifiable synthesis theory, but a perspective on systemicdevelopment of the world order.

One might, to be sure, describe such a combined perspective as just a different kind of DP -- one that argues that democratic states tend naturally to federate, because the substance of modernfederal government is simply democracy raised to the inter-state level; and through federal unification they stabilize both themselves domestically and their peaceful relations with one another internationally. In other words, it would be a variant of a widespread DP historical formulation: that democracy has needed time to communicate its peaceful values upward from the domestic to the international level.

One could also, however, describe a combined perspective as a different kind of FP. Modern democracy itself is a federative social contract, a union of individuals joining to form a polity with genuine sovereignty yet reserving their own sovereign-like sphere of individual rights. It is this federative essence of modern liberal democracy that makes it liberal and peaceful. Federalism has needed time to communicate its values both to domestic democracy and to the international system.

In other words, we might engage in a democratic linguistic imperialism gobbling up federalism within it, or a federalist linguistic imperialism gobbling up democracy. We would thereby achieve theoretical economy and consistency for either a pure 2nd image or pure 3rd image version.

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However, it is more reasonable to treat our overall perspective asa composite theory, containing 2nd and 3rd image elements from DP and FP, along with other elements and observations, rather than a single-level theory that subsumes everything else.

To avoid any sense of mystery at this point, it may help to offer the reader a brief foretaste of such a mixed DP-FP theory coupled with historical narrative. We should underline that our historicalnarrative is a perspective not a quantitative theory: it provides a view of the potential future as well as of past developments, and, taken as a whole, could not possibly be quantified or verified statistically.

1. The theory: DP and FP grow hand-in-hand. Peace among democracies grows only to some extent on its own, as does mutual organization among democracies; their growth is for the most part closely intertwined. Modern democracies are inherently part-federal in their social contract theory and nature, tend to free up their mutual communications and create enhanced options to cooperate and organize together, they tend to recognize themselvesin one another as collections of similar free humans not metaphysical “others”, and they tend over time to federate and consolidate their mutual peace on the international level.

2. The narrative:

DP has in practice grown hand-in-hand with FP. The interplay of the two was appreciated in very general terms by the first wave ofnational democrats -- Mill, Mazzini, Garibaldi -- who were also European Unionists. Many of them joined in the International League of Peace and Freedom, whose journal was Etats-Unis d’Europe. However, their perspective went in terms of two consecutive stages rather than intertwined moments, first nationalfreedom and democracy in each European country, then in stage two the United States of Europe. Stage two never arrived -- at least, not on this peaceful evolutionary plan. Instead several of the liberal nationalisms degenerated by stages into organic, integral and fascist nationalisms, leading not to a DP but to world wars. The democracies of the original West did not go to war against oneanother as long as they remained democracies, but newcomers to

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democracy outside of the original West did not always remain democracies.

Out of this experience arose a more urgent conception of federalism as necessary for saving democracy, one born as much of catastrophic fears as of evolutionary optimism. In reaction against the earlier mistake of a two stage concept of the nationaldemocrats, with the federalism always deferred till a later stage,the new federalism reversed the stages and said that federation must come first; otherwise anti-democratic reactions could keep reviving by route of nationalism. Getting such a sequencing implemented in practice would have been difficult or impossible. Nevertheless the demand for it enabled international unification to be raised to the level of a co-equal priority alongside intra-national priorities within the overall policy of stabilization of the restored democracies in Western Europe after 1946. The work ofintegration took shape in the Marshall Plan, OEEC, Council of Europe, NATO, ECSC, EEC, OECD… The prime movers in the creation ofthese institutions were supporters of the European and Atlantic Federalist movements35. The product, while far from a full federation, was a complex Euro-Atlantic confederacy, like a split-level home36. The result was to bring democracy out of its period 35 That the EU had federalist inspiration is widely recognized, since it was written into the purposes of the original treaties, although still often underestimated in favor of the role of functionalism which served as a tactic (the record is reviewed in the history by Sergio Pistoni, The Union of European Federalists, from the foundation to the decision on direct election of the European Parliament, 1946-1974, Milan, Giuffre Editore, 2008). For the Atlantic institutions it is less well known; the federalist role was not predominant there as in the EU, the goal was not made a part of the Atlantic treaty commitments, and it is more easily forgotten. Nevertheless it was still indispensable in the logical sense that, inits absence, the decisive figures in the drama -- such as William Clayton, John Hickerson, Theodore Achilles, to name only the Atlantic federalists in the U.S. State Department who played the central roles in developing the Marshall Plan and NATO -- would not, as Achilles often later attested, have moved the world inthis direction from their fulcrum. See the present author’s Supranational Norms in International Affairs (op. cit., 1992), ch. 2, and Tiziana Stella, Atlantismo e Federalismo nella Politica Estera degli Stati Uniti (doctoral dissertation, University of Pavia, Dipartmento Storico-Geografico, Pavia, Italy, 1999).36 The elements of federation are stronger on the EU level, yet the Atlantic level fills in elements of strategic integration sufficient to make the EU a union of states not just a common market. The Atlantic level -- NATO plus OECD and G7/8, plus inner filler provided by the EU -- is not a federation but

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of crisis and lay the ground for a subsequent spread of democracy through all of Europe.

In his time, Hamilton had had a similar success in stabilizing andsolidifying democracy in eastern seaboard America, laying the ground for democracy to spread in the next half century both across the American continent and throughout northwestern Europe. But democracy remained unstable in 19th century Europe, as we have seen, due to the time delay in uniting democracies there. Only after the crises of national democracy in the early 20th century did the policy of uniting democracies come into force, providing the basis for the resumption of the cumulative spread of democracy.

Among the “catastrophic” generation of federalists of the interwaryears, Clarence Streit made the most far-reaching synthesis of thefederal and democratic elements. He laid out this perspective:

a. Democracy and federalism go together, there is no first stage and second stage, both are necessary to the other. Their progress is, if not parallel, at least intertwined in a spiral motion.

b. International federalism tends to lag behind the spread of democracy. Federalism is in a sense simply democracy raised to theinternational level, but it takes time for democracy to communicate its principles from the national level, where it triumphs first, to the international level, where most of the regimes for a long time remain authoritarian and the slogan of international unity initially belongs to the anti-modern, anti-democratic forces.

c. As national democracies are consolidated, they become trapped in a sense of national identity that is defined by equating their freedom with their separation from others, and by ancient wars against their nearest neighbors -- the very countries most likely to have also become democracies meanwhile. The initial time lag infederalism becomes self-perpetuating.

reaches the level of confederation. The whole is more than the sum of its parts,rising to a considerable height above the ground level of traditional episodic cooperation among separate states.

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d. The “federalism lag” creates crises and instability for democracy. It leaves national democracies overburdened and subjected to increasingly sharp forms of nationalism. This particularly harms new democracies in countries with historically authoritarian political cultures, such as Germany and Russia. Unable to link their destinies to the old stable democracies, theyare pushed back toward an enemy relationship to the West. This in turn favors reversion to authoritarian ideologies.

e. Democracies are unlikely to go to war against one another. In fact, all the democracies in the Western European-Atlantic area have been at mutual peace since 1830. Nevertheless they need mutual federation for security against dictatorships, and for attraction, integration, and stabilization of newcomers to democracy. A democratic peace exists among the original Western democracies, but its consolidation and extension runs in practice through federalism.

f. Thus, while there is still a need for further extension of democracy, the urgent need is for a remedial effort to federate democracies. In this sense it may be said that federalism is “the first step”. The meaning is that federalism is now the top priority, not that it arrives chronologically everywhere before democracy anywhere; the union must be of democracies that have already arrived, while keeping a door left open for others to joinas they become democratic.

In this synthesis, the logic was laid out on the basis of which the Euro-Atlantic institutions were formed after 1945, reducing considerably the “federalism lag”. The result validated the theory: it did serve to pull the democracies out of the cycles of crisis into which they had fallen in the first half of the century, enabling democracy to stabilize in Western Europe as never before and to spread cumulatively across the remainder of the industrialized world.

Such a “synthesis perspective”, intertwining DP and FP elements, is quantifiable only to a limited extent. Within it, some of the contributory elements are quantifiable as sub-theories. DP is

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quantifiable, as has been shown by an enormous amount of scholarlywork. Portions of FP could also be tested through quantification, if the scholarly world were to define and carry out relevant tests, e.g. the ability of federalism to increase peacefulness andstability among democracies; the conditions under which it serves this purpose; the federative37 propensity and capacity of democracies with one another compared to the weaker federative capacities of non-democracies.

However, the propensity of democracies to an ultimate global democratic federalism is something that cannot be verified in advance of the achievement of that goal. Inter-democracy integration on the global scale has a different context than on sub-global scales where there are usually two additional motivations (external enemies, and internal similarities in the socio-economic not just political sphere), and even on the sub-global scale the integration has rarely yet come close to federation. It is something that can only claim a measure of plausibility, derived from historical narrative.

Global historical perspective, kicked out the door by the trend ofquantification, thus re-enters through the window of the need for comprehensiveness -- the need for something commensurate with the scope of contemporary problems. Perspectives can and must be evaluated critically, but there is no simple measurement for them or repeatable scientific test, there is only a possibility of overall comparison of the plausibility of different perspectives, and of their respective balances of hopes and dangers, in light ofall knowledge and experience.

As a small step toward a shared knowledge basis, let us look at anoverview of the history of DP theories and perspectives.

A brief history of Democratic Peace -- and Socialist Peace -- theories

37 “Federative” is used here and elsewhere in a broad sense, not to refer exclusively to full-fledged federation, but to varying degrees of integration, carried out usually under an inspiration of federalism and often but not always with a goal of federation, and excluding primary reliance on imperial coercion.

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18 th century: rise and fall of DP theory. The DP theory in the late 1700s was similar to that of today. It was close to the heart of the theory of the Enlightenment. It held that “commercial republics” -- the socio-political ideal of the philosophes -- would be peaceful in tendency and not go to war against one another.

Kant is often taken as the original exponent of DP theory.38 He didexpound a version of a democratic peace theory; indeed, he gave itits strongest theoretical expression in its time, even if much thesame thing about DP was said in a simpler language by Tom Paine. Astrong case can be made, however, that it is unfair to Kant to separate out the spread of democracy nation by nation and treat this as his idea of how perpetual peace would be built: he did nothold to this factor by itself but in conjunction with a fairly strong form of international organization.39 38 While Kant would be given an important place in any event, one work did more than all others to put Kant at the center of DP theory: Michael Doyle’s two-part1983 essay, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12 No. 3 (205-35) and No. 4 (323-53). It was the same essay that put Democratic Peace theory itself at the center of attention.39 Just how strong Kant’s international organization was to be is a matter of dispute, varying as it did in Kant’s own writings, but by all accounts it was tobe powerful and the restrictions on states substantial; even in the minimalist version, states retain their mutual independence but only as entities disarmed of standing forces. Roberto Castaldi, citing some of the very passages that classic international relations theorists have treated as proof of Kant’s realistic insistence on a merely associative or confederal not federal international institution, has shown that the passages have the opposite meaningwhen understood within the normal structure of Kantian argumentation: Kant announces the conclusion of reason, counterposes the hypothesis of extant empirical evidence and opinion, and returns to the conclusion of reason. The conclusion is buttressed by a range of scholarship wider than the one familiar to the English-speaking world, as can be seen by a glance at his references: “For a confederal interpretation see Riley 1983; Mori 1984, and 1995; Mulholland1990; Portinaro 1996; and Archibugi 1993. Bobbio (1985) initially accepted the confederal view, but then favoured a federal interpretation (Bobbio 1996). For afederal interpretation see also Levi 1978 and 2002; Yovel 1980; Albertini 1985 e1993; Axinn 1989; Loretoni 1996a and 1996b; Castaldi 1998; Malandrino 1998, and especially Marini 1998 and 1999.” In an email to the present author, 17 October 2005, Castaldi summarized the debate as follows, “Recent accurate studies of allKantian texts show the Kantian preference for a federal solution (see especiallyAxinn 1989; and Marini 1998 and 1999) -- which is more coherent with the whole of Kantian philosophy [over the confederal solution].” He also cites Kant’s

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The other half of Kant points to another theory of peace -- international organization as pacifier, with democracies as the states most fit for organizing together internationally. We may call this other theory “federative” in its generic form and “Federalist” in its Hamiltonian form. It was strongly present throughout the Enlightenment, not only in Kant.

This second element usually gets omitted from statements of DP theory today. The omission has at least one positive aspect: that it is useful for developing a formally testable single-factor theory. However, is unfortunate as a guide to practice. As single-factor theories, DP and FP are mutually contradictory, but this isan irrelevant tautology: so would be any two different single-factor theories. More relevant is the fact that, in practice, the major proponents of the one theory have been involved with the other as well. The separation and opposition between them as formal simplified theories is something that serves to mislead many of their followers into simplistic practices.

The importance of the second, federative factor for the Enlightenment proponents of a democratic peace can be seen not only from Kant’s proposals for a pacific union, but from the American founders themselves. Franklin’s original political project was a union of the colonies within the Empire, subsequently embellished with the idea of an imperial parliament,

preference for a constitution -- explaining that Kant understands this term as defining an indissoluble union, such as Kant had said the Americans had established -- compared to a league of states, and notes that Kant applies the idea of constitutional union on a dual level, national and supranational: “he clearly states later that to establish peace we must ‘turn our efforts towards realising it and towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose (perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collectively).’ (The Metaphysics of Morals, 1798, Conclusion, p. 174). These passages suggest that Kant knew the American constitution, or maybe The Federalist itself, where similar concepts are developed…” The European Federalists never tire of citing a line from Kant that suggests a complex temporal intertwining of democracy and federalism rather than a theory of two separate stages (which would put all the this-era priority on domestic democracy): “The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution depends onthe problem of law-governed external relations among nations and cannot be solved unless the latter is”.

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a precursor of the 20th century idea of Atlantic Union; independence came later as a second best, and the ink was barely dry on the U.S. Constitution before he was writing to a friend in Paris urging upon him a “Federal Republick” of Europe. Paine and Jefferson made suggestions variously for a Franco-Anglo-American or American-Anglo-Spanish confederacy. Hamilton himself, as we have said, devoted the 6th Federalist Paper to refuting the DP theory of his time, and argued in others of the Papers that the Federal Government was essential for stabilizing the peace among the States and “superintending” the public order.

Madison in The Federalist No. 43, as we briefly indicated earlier, notonly recapitulated his exposition of the merits of an extended federal republic for securing democracy against factional turmoil by diversifying factions and so improving and stabilizing democracy, but merged this point from No. 10 with Hamilton’s from No. 9 about federal power insuring the states against the risk of intra-state insurrection by providing a convincing back-up force against it. From the combined point he deduced an ideal of world federation: “Happy would it be if such a remedy [a larger encompassing federation] for its [democracy’s] infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally effectualcould be established for the universal peace of mankind!” This was an idea of World Federation of Democracies for World Peace -- Federalist Peace theory, FP not DP.

While the relation of DP and FP was intimate in the late 1700s, itwas -- outside of an occasional passage in a Kant or a Madison -- only a liaison or friendly association, not a marriage or synthesis. DP was in principle widely believed in itself, without reference to FP -- and was soon discredited in itself.

Under the DP theory then extant, the French Revolution should havehad a pacific tendency. It was conducted in the name of Democracy and Republic, eliminating at home and abroad the aristocracies andmonarchies that -- it was argued by DP advocates -- went to war asa matter of sport, sacrificing the common people for the sake of aristocratic honor and pride. But instead of peace, it brought world war. And the non-French peoples often rallied to their national restorationists rather than to The Democracy.

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The democratic peace theory seemed to have failed catastrophically. DP proponents felt a need for a new path to world peace. Those who were wedded to a 2nd image approach to peace-- whether through domestic reform or domestic revolution -- beganto look to a different domestic image for the way to fulfill the pacific promise formerly seen in democracy. In Socialism they found their new hope. SP theory replaced DP40.

To be sure, the disproof of Enlightenment DP theory was not logically conclusive in the terms of today’s arguments. Today the test of DP is peace in mutual or “dyadic” relations among democracies. The test failed by the French Revolution was different: France’s wars were mostly against monarchies not against democracies, and France was a tumultuous revolutionary democracy not a stable commercial republic. Nevertheless the refutation seemed convincing to DP believers in its time. Aspects of the DP theory were revived some decades later by free traders in England, who opposed mercantilism and war-making and -- behind the convenient shield of British power -- played sometimes constructive roles in the era of the Pax Britannica. But most of the believers in peace through achievement of the Good Society domestically had meanwhile passed over to socialism.

40 The defection of 2nd image proponents from Democracy to Socialism was so overwhelming and endured so long that Waltz felt as late as 1954 -- when a kind of DP was already underway, as France and Germany were already reconciled in NATO and the EC, and the peace among the democratic great powers was on a path to something like permanence – that it was sufficient to refute the socialist version of 2nd image peace theory in order for him to dismiss the entire 2nd image idea and show that a 3rd image theory is needed. This was the structure ofhis argument in Man, the State, and War. He threw out the 2nd image baby with the socialist bathwater. Contemporary DP theorists have in turn refuted Waltz, showing that the Democratic version of the 2nd image has far better justification than the Socialist one. However, they too have exaggerated what they had shown: just as Waltz lumped together all 2nd image theories and treatedthem all as equally dismissed when he trashed its Socialist version, so Waltz’s DP critics lumped together his emphasis on the merits of the 3rd image with his mistaken total rejection of the 2nd image, dismissing them both together and concluding that the 2nd image suffices by itself for the theory of peace. This too was a leap in logic, a Waltz-in-reverse, again throwing out the baby with the bathwater, again swinging the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.

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19 th -early 20 th century: Socialist/Organic Peace theories and their refutation . Napoleon’s wars, explained the Marxists -- repeating what German and southern European romantic conservatives had said against Robespierre as well, simply translating it from religious into economic form -- were caused by the selfish egotism of the enlightenment and the bourgeois social order. It was not enough toeliminate the monarchs and aristocrats who made war for sport. What must truly be eliminated to get peace is the egotism of the bourgeoisie and their manic competition for market domination. This egotism is what made it impossible for Robespierre to consolidate national unity and necessary to resort instead to terror; it is what inspired the manic imperialism of Napoleon. Thebourgeois democratic revolution was only a half-way job. Nationalize the economy and empower the lower classes, whose natural inclination is to cooperate to produce rather than competeto sell and dominate, and then the nations of the world will trulybe at peace. This was the crux of SP.

The Socialist Peace theory has been amply refuted many times over -- theoretically, historically, and by practice. Socialist countries -- in the serious sense of the word as required by SP theory, namely countries that have nationalized their economic production processes (not just welfare market economies with social democratic parties sometimes in office) -- have gone to warfrequently, once several of them came into existence after 1945. Indeed, they have fought each other so often that it has seemed hard for any two independent socialist regimes to avoid mutual war: the “dyads” are almost unanimously war-ridden.

The sharpest theoretical refutations of SP came from Hamiltonian federalists: Lord Lothian, Lionel Robbins, Clarence Streit41. They showed that nationalization of the economy only intensifies international conflict. The same result comes from nationalizationof society rather than economy -- the program of the opposite extreme, the right wing, in the interwar years; derived from the same underlying 19th century romantic theory that peace required

41 Lord Lothian, “Pacifism Is Not Enough, Nor Patriotism Either”, Oxford, Burge Memorial Lecture, 1935. Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (1937) and The Economic Causes of War (1939). Clarence K. Streit, Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic (New York, Harper & Row, 1939).

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recovery of an idealized organic unity, it was leading to fascist regenerations of national-state solidarity and a new world war. (More recently, Islamist movements, with roots in the 1920s intertwined with fascism, have led to similar religious regenerations of the state in several Islamic countries, with similar results of exacerbating international conflict.) The temptation to such national regenerations -- whether economic, social or religious -- after World War I was explicable as a distorted response to the trauma of the war, sublimating the international problem into the national one. International problems were not being managed adequately, they were impinging harshly on every country as seen in the World War, yet the national political system provided the only machinery available for people do something, no matter how ineffective or counterproductive, about the problems. Instead of the hard uncertain task of trying to develop an international machinery strong enough to sustain international solidarity, the easy way out was taken: to reinforce the structure of national solidarity and carry it to an extreme42. In this way the Hamiltonians explained the rise of totalitarianism.

It is worth dwelling on the implications of this. When there is a deficit of international organization and solidarity, the worst place to look for resolving the problem is through reinforcing the

42 Streit, Union Now..., ch. 2, section on “The Internal or the External Problem”and the subsequent sections (I give the sections rather than page numbers because the book passed through many editions). This was a precursor of the “2nd

image-3rd image” distinction, and in some respects a more profound treatment of its implications than would be found in Waltz. It is important to note, however,that Streit’s analysis did not completely negate all 2nd image theories, such asDemocratic Peace, and by no means equated DP with the specific object of its criticism -- Socialist Peace and fascist peace, or their sequel today, Islamist peace theory. Nevertheless, it did criticize all exclusively 2nd theory approaches, warning against them as sublimations and substitutions, processes that inherently contain a propensity to excess and disorientation when the compensatory behavior fails to move one toward the goal. Streit recognized the phenomenon of DP among the Atlantic countries since 1830, and held that democracies are very unlikely to go to war with one another. He also recognized the pacifying value of market economics and commerce, writing a series of articles under the title “Free Enterprise makes for Peace”. But note the carefulwording: “makes for” peace, not “makes” peace. The distinction was important. To“make peace”, he argued, more was needed.

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national level of social solidarity; the real problem is to attaina strong yet moderate and balanced degree of solidarity on both levels, national and international: this is what is socially functional and what makes for peace. In other words, the problem is not to achieve a final consummation of national solidarity, butto maintain good sense and good government within every country, and meanwhile build a more adequate degree of international organization and solidarity. This is what FP theory prescribes. There should be no infinite passionate consummation on any level, no attempt to substitute the national for the international level by increasing the passion of national unity. The national level ofgovernment is already strong enough, although not always moderate or balanced. Good, moderate, democratic government within each country is important; the “2nd image” is not neglected in sound FP theory. Both 2nd and 3rd images are thus important in FP, although its federative work takes place on the 3rd level. They are reciprocally intertwined: international federation must be foundedon countries of democratic structure and political culture; international federation in turn serves to secure national democracy and its moderation.

This consideration may be seen as a moderate answer to the extremist ideological debates of the 20th century -- and one that has been on the whole successful, to the extent that it has been applied in the Euro-Atlantic area after 1946, gradually weaning the greater European space off the ideological civil wars that hadtorn it for half a century. The underlying logic in this return tomoderation was anticipated in the thought of John Fiske, the popularizer of Darwinian evolution in America in the late 19th century: that progress in social evolution is a progress toward ever more sophisticated combinations of cooperation and competition, not something based on ever more extreme competition (as is often mistakenly thought to be the social meaning of Darwinism) or ever more extreme cooperation (the socialist and fascist version of Social Darwinism, relegating the competition tothe sphere of wars against external collectivities). Market exchange was primarily a form of cooperation between buyer and seller for mutual benefit, with market competition woven in to ensure integrity and efficiency in the terms of cooperation (the price). Democracy offered competition of orators soliciting votes

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in place of competition of weapons threatening death, in order to decide the policies that society as a whole implements cooperatively; here too, the competition was to help keep the cooperation (the joint policies) honest and restrain foolishness. Fiske considered modern federalism, born with the American mutation of federalism in 1787, the most advanced combination of cooperation and competition yet developed in the political sphere,allowing peaceful democratic competition on multiple levels and freeing democracy from fixed territorial limits. As such it was destined by evolutionary logic to spread beyond America to other countries, and spill up from the national level to the international level, perhaps mutating further in the process.

Fiske’s argument, with its late 19th century Darwinian methodology,underpins the point of the 20th century Hamiltonians that what is needed is a moderate, balanced, structured solidarity on both 2nd and 3rd levels -- nationally and internationally -- not a radical consummation of unity on the 2nd level. It in turn was anticipated in the central 18th century idea of James Madison, based on David Hume: that it is not only the vices such as greed for power that need checked and balanced, but above all the virtues of collectiveself-love that need balance and sophisticated social organization to prevent excess. Too intense a human affection within groups is a cause of factionalism and strife. One of the purposes of a more sophisticated form of political organization, articulated not onlyinto separate branches but into multiple federated levels, is to moderate and balance the virtue of human love for fellows of the same species, restraining its translation into circular self-love among closed collectivities. In other words, Madison, following Hume, favored cooperation and built government primarily on sociability, but keep the loving cooperation honest and restrainedfrom excesses that can turn into vicious forms of competition against outsiders or dissidents, by weaving into its daily workings an element of balance of groups and interests and competition among them. Douglass Adair and Garry Wills (who elaborated on the wider implications of Adair’s research in his books, Inventing America and Explaining America) showed that the mutual goodwill and involvement of human beings was at the heart of Madison’s moral code, and Hamilton’s alike: the normative basis ofAmerican democracy was not only the cold negative Lockeian anti-

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governmental constraints and negative checks on human evil, but the Scottish Enlightenment’s “moral sense” with its observation ofthe positive empathy of members of the same species for one another. From this arose the need to widen the orbit of intercourse when this empathy is raised to the political level, and to regulate the positive passions by forming positive balances, in order that a more refined, dispassionate discourse for the public good may develop atop these passions.

Late 20 th century: revival of DP theory . The Hamiltonian refutation of Socialist Peace theory was thus profound and comprehensive. It should have been convincing, building as it did on the core achievements of modern political thought and practice. Nevertheless, few people paid attention to it until Communist countries themselves began making wars on one another. Meanwhile democracies in the West displayed an impressive spectacle of mutual peace, made all the more impressive by being complemented by 3rd image organizations linking the democracies internationally and giving visibility to their grouping qua group. Thanks to this,the old democratic peace theory began to revive.

Democracies, after all, were not making war on one another, and there were finally enough of them around to quantify this as a statistically significant result. This could not be explained merely by similarity of ideology, or by having a shared enemy: theautocracies went on warring against each other, even those among them that held what looked to outsiders like identical ideologies.While no two democracies were going to war, there seemed to be no pair of adjacent independent Communist regimes that did not have awar or threaten one another with it.

In view of the bitter experience of Socialist war, high ranking Soviet scholars and institutes of international relations, in cautious language but probably in full awareness of the devastating implications of what they were saying, refuted their own official doctrine of the Socialist Peace43. At the same time

43 This process of self-refutation was traced carefully in William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l969). The tracing was accurate, although Zimmerman was mistaken in his premise that it would end in a collapse of ideology in favor of a “realism”

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they began to recognize that the peace and joint organization among the Western democracies was what they called an “objective” historical development, not a mere Cold War artifact, and had positive value. These became ideological foundations for the subsequent peaceful self-liquidation of Communism.

In the West, beginning in the late 1970s, a few independent-mindedprofessors, notably R.J. Rummel44, Michael Doyle, and Bruce Russett, began reconsidering the possible validity of the DP. The

without ultimate goals or perspectives, excluding anything like either Democratic Peace or Federalist Peace. In fact it did not dead end there but wentthe full way over to a “westernist” perspective, accepting Western global leadership instead of Soviet leadership, DP and FP instead of SP, and hoping to find a place for Russia within the DP-FP. I discussed the prospects of its issuing in such an ideological reversal in a 1980 graduate school paper, “Ideology and Sectarianism in Soviet Perspectives on World Politics” (unpublished mss.). A partial return to neutral realism has however ensued sincethe early 1990s, due primarily to disillusionment with the prospects of Russia’sbeing integrated into the DP-FP.44 Rummel’s scientific work has suffered some unfairness due to his political views, similar to libertarianism in most matters except foreign policy and tending to treat government and power as the causes of war and killing; his important book on democide is entitled Death by Government (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994). This may have caused him to be unduly neglected as a founder of modern DP theory. It is an unfairness that I do not wish to add to, even though my main discussion in the next sections will be neither of Rummel nor Babst nor Doyle but of Russett because of his comprehensive treatmentof the more generally accepted core propositions of DP theory. Rummel’s own DP theory today is more far-reaching than the one that has grown into a Western consensus over the last three decades and that is the subject of the present article; it extends beyond affirming a lack of war between democracies to affirming that “democracies also have the least severe war and foreign violence,the least internal violence, and do not murder their own citizens... [This] is fully substantiated empirically. See my "What is the democratic peace," at: http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DP.IS_WHAT.HTM, and my recent blog, "A Blue Book of Freedom," at: http://freedomspeace.blogspot.com/2006/03/blue-book-of-freedom.html. Also, DP [is not just] a dichotomy -- only as no war between democracies [-- but] a scale with democracies or democratic dyads at one end, and totalitarian nations or dyads at the other end. On this scale, the more democratically free the country or dyad, the less war, foreign and domestic violence.” (email to the present author, 3/18/2006). Some of Rummel’s other internet accessible writings are "Power Kills" (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE6.HTM), "Never Again" (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NH.HTM#SUPPLEMENT), "Eliminating Democide and War Through An Alliance of Democracies"

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idea that democracies never fight each other was taken up with alacrity by the U.S. Government beginning with the Reagan Administration. The West in effect began to proclaim itself a “zone of democratic peace”. Most international relations scholars resisted for some time; having triumphantly defended the autonomy of their 3rd image turf, first against early 20th century American “moralism” and “legalism”, then against 2nd image Socialist ideology throughout the Cold War, they were not anxious to yield it to a still older 2nd image American ideology dating back to the 1700s. Nevertheless they were gradually impressed by the accumulation of evidence supporting DP.

After 1989, the ex-Communist countries acknowledged the zone of democratic peace as a reality and consciously wanted to join it; this hope had been part of the motivation for the changes of 1985-1991. They understood this, however, not solely in terms of the 2nd

image, internal-democracy version of DP theory; there was another,3rd image component to their thinking: their desire to join the Western international and supranational organizations, above all NATO and the EU. They saw this as a way of guaranteeing the consolidation of their democracy and insuring against an overflowing of their renewed national independence into ethnic nationalism and conflict. In effect, they took up both of the grand “peace and freedom” theories of Western political culture: the DP theory that Western governments had begun propounding in the 1980s and that was beginning to find favor in academia, and the FP theory that Western governments had propounded in the 1940sand 50s and that lay at the root of the Euro-Atlantic institutionseven if it had fallen out of favor in Western discourse by the 1980s. And they took up the two theories with an alacrity that startled the West: for they were going through revolutionary transformations in which grand issues needed resolutions in a proximate timeframe, not a long evolution as felt more comfortableto the stable satiated West. For integration with the West, they needed the West as a full participant, but were living in different timeframes on it: for them it was an immediate live issue, needing resolution in the course of their revolutionary

(http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/ALLIANCE.HTM), his blog (archive at http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/Z.BLOG.ARCHIVE.HTM), and commentary (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/COMMENTARY.HTM).

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transformation, and carrying within it a large part of the fate oftheir countries.

The expiring Soviet Union was the loudest proponent of a 3rd image institutional approach; this contributed to the reluctance of the West to take such an approach. It called repeatedly in the years after 1985 for a “Common European Home” through the CSCE, seeing this as a way of managing the emerging changes, avoiding the risksof chaos, and keeping Russia integrated with the states that were escaping from its political control. Those escaping states, in Central and Eastern Europe did not disagree; in 1989-90 they too supported a strong institutionalization of CSCE into a European security system. This was declared both by the group they briefly formed (“Visegrad”) and by a diplomatic Memorandum of the Czechoslovak government in early 1990. The West demurred; it remained suspicious of the Soviets, given their long history of deception, and of the very phrase “Common European Home”, which inthe Brezhnev era had been used with a view to dissolving NATO and separating Europe from America. The suspicion reinforced the effects of the post-1960s Western turn away from the 3rd image supranational level of institutional development. The chance of catching the moment of revolutionary transformation in 1989-91 andwedding it to a new enhanced supranational order was lost.

The West agreed to an institutionalization of CSCE only in the later months of 1990, and only in a form so minimalist that the West itself came to wish by 1992 that it had been made stronger, as the West began dealing with ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia thathad spun out of hand and found itself short on relevant instruments apart from NATO. The process of serious reconstructionon the supranational level began only after national sovereignty had been consolidated in each post-Communist country. It took the form of bringing them individually into the EU and NATO. Inside NATO after 1993, this was discussed in terms of preventing a “renationalization of defense”; however, the renationalization hadalready taken place: NATO’s opportunity to throw a preemptive umbrella over the process had already come and passed in 1989 and 1991, when NATO was still in a defensive mode, suspicious of the changes in the USSR and of the proposals for a strong CSCE. The major portion of national military sovereignty, once regained,

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inevitably remained after the belated reintegration through NATO; the terms available in 1989 were no longer available in 1999, whenthe first tranche of new members was admitted. Ethnic disputes andresentments also reemerged as was inevitable. Nevertheless, the propensity toward ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe was checked and, except in the former Yugoslavia, stopped short of fighting asthe countries strove to meet the standards for joining NATO and the EU. For NATO, they were required to develop and sign basic treaties with their neighbors, resolving border and ethnic issues and establishing cooperative diplomatic relations among all adjacent pairs of countries. For the EU they were supposed to meetsimilar but more stringent and detailed standards. The Council of Europe and CSCE served as monitors and gatekeepers. Despite tense moments in some of the bilateral relations, the Western standards made a major difference in the outcome; a Hungarian president fellfrom office largely because of Western criticism of him for exacerbating tensions over ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania. It can be argued, however -- as Russians in fact argue --that the West has failed to enforce its standards farther east, particularly when it came to discrimination by two Baltic states against ethnic Russians, even if some of the more extreme Baltic laws were softened in response to NATO and EU demands.

In sum, a 3rd image approach has been applied for the Eastern bloc countries, integrating them into NATO and the EU, but belatedly and incompletely. The benefits of the 3rd image element have been substantial for those who have been able to join, but less than they could have been, and negative for those who have not been able to join or given much hope of joining, particularly Russia.

Some opportunities, once lost, can never fully be regained, at least not for generations to come. The opportunity to build a Common Home of real depth in the Gorbachev years was one of those opportunities. Construction of a Common Home could have been beguncautiously in the late 1980s and been given substance on an emergency basis in 1989-90. It would inevitably have devolved intoa Western-led operation centered around the EU and NATO, but wouldhave contributed a further CSCE layer of substance to the Western integration system, dealing e.g. with ethnic and border issues, supervision of eastern military forces (which would have meant a

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transition from Russian supervision to joint supervision under NATO leadership, with interlacing of Russian and Western deputies in some countries), maintenance of the major rational economic links among the Eastern countries, and jointly managing Western assistance while the Easterners went through their economic transitions. Its absence meant that there was no avoiding a partial restoration of nationalism -- renationalization of the military, separate national structural adjustment programs shattering the eastern common market and plunging many economies into deep depression, non-management of the Yugoslav problems until they had degenerated into deadly warfare, and just a few years later, an overloading of the EU and NATO with membership demands as the only institutional means for filling the new gaps in supranational management.

The ex-Communist countries were wise in looking to a mixed model coupling 2nd and 3rd images: intra-national democratization and supranational integration into the Western democratic community.45 It was the same dual approach that had worked decades earlier for some of the most important Western democracies, such as Germany. It was insufficiently appreciated in the regnant Western theories of the 1988-92 period; the old lag in federalism vis-a-vis democracy had reopened on the plane of Western discourse. However,to the extent that the post-Communist extended democratic peace has been successful, it is because the dual approach has, willy nilly, been followed.

The wrongly-accepted refutation of FP; the need for scholarly reformulation of FP theory

Having completed our survey of this history of theory, let us return to theory itself. We may begin with the logical mistake mentioned earlier in Deutsch’s attempted disproof of Federalist Peace theory. Upon examination the disproof dissolves into a

45 Michael Mousseau of Koc University has argued that it was the external influence of the West that preserved the peace after 1989 in Eastern Europe; thenatural trend of national democratizations, absent that influence, would have been to lead to a number ethnic conflicts in the Yugoslavian style.

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tautology: the “pluralistic security community” is defined as maintaining peace and not identified by any other clear criterion;inevitably all instances of it -- unlike the “amalgamated grouping” that is defined by a different criterion -- are successful in maintaining peace. This leads to a failure to look out for, much less count, the numerous instances of pluralistic groupings with some “community” characteristics that nevertheless have gone to war. A genuine demonstration would have required using other criteria besides success for recognizing a “pluralistic security community”; the problem is that these criteria would be difficult to define and investigate adequately, whereas other grounds for defining and recognizing an “amalgamated” grouping, namely the presence of a common state, were more readily found. When, among his two dozen plus examples of a “pluralistic security community”, Deutsch came across one where it broke down in war, he summarily dismissed it as showing by the very fact of its failure that it was not really a pluralistic security community.46 Quod erat demonstrandum; or, it would seem, quod erat erratum. The academic world mostly welcomed Deutsch’s approach, accepting his quantitative demonstration as ifit were valid and using it as a basis for further deductions. It is curious, the failure to notice such an obvious fallacy at the core of an argument, the readiness to embrace it instead as a basis for further theoretical development; it itself is something that needs explanation.

The imprecision of the quantification-categories was compounded byslippery language when Deutsch appropriated the term “pluralism” for a system of separate sovereign states47. The actual line 46 It would have been hard to give a more obvious confirmation of the tautological nature of what was being said, and it is surprising that the academic world was not alerted by it to the fallaciousness of the demonstration.The specific citations from Deutsch, showing how the intended quantitative demonstration slipped into tautology and the falsifying evidence ignored, can befound in my dissertation, Supranational Norms in International Affairs, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, 1992, chapters 5-647 Richard van Wagenen, who originated the categories that formed the basis of Deutsch’s work, made a precisely defined distinction between “amalgamated” and “non-amalgamated” groupings. Deutsch renamed “non-amalgamated” groupings as “pluralistic”, undermining the precision of the categories: in connotation they were no longer mutually exclusive or mutually exhaustive, and Deutsch relied heavily on the connotation in making his argument.

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between pluralism and monism in politics falls elsewhere. Sovereign independent unitary states tend toward the monist end ofthe spectrum, federally amalgamated states toward the pluralist end. Madison himself noted in No. 10 that a federally amalgamated state produces better pluralism in its factional make-up than doesa system of separate small sovereign states which internally can suffer oppression from a “compact” or monistic majority faction. To be sure, we are speaking of pluralism on two different “image” levels; a valid theory would have to acknowledge these as different kinds of pluralism. Deutsch did not acknowledge this; instead he simply categorized federal unification, quite untruly, as the opposite of pluralism. The slippage in terminology led Deutsch to a substantive mistake: by equating federalism with monism, he argued that it led to an overload of governmental functions in one central location, and thence to breakdown. This was the causal explanation he offered for his claimed quantitativeresult that amalgamation was the less reliable way to peace. Alas,Deutsch’s causal explanation was as misguided as the claim to havefound a correlation that needed such explaining. In reality, federalism has correlated to the overcoming of monistic governmental overload, not to its creation. It is the unitary sovereign state that suffers overload, first for being unitary, second for often being too small for its international challenges.There have been discussions for more than a century of ameliorating the overload in unitary states by dividing powers federally and redistributing them both upwards and downwards to locations where problems can be more efficiently resolved. As early as the 1880s, the British Imperial Federation League was discussing this in view of the overload of the Westminster Parliament with all the local, national, and Imperial business of Britain. The integration of Europe since 1947, with its aim of a Federal Union, has succeeded in making government more effective; it has prevented the recurrent breakdowns that occurred in the first half of that century, when the burdens of interdependence proved too much for unitary national governments to manage; and has done so largely for reasons elaborated by Madison and Hamiltonlong ago.

Thus it turns out to be a mistake when it is assumed -- as is widely done nowadays -- that FP has been disproved by Deutsch and

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all the later theories that used his results as premise. On the positive side, what has been shown by the criticism of FP is not that it is false, but rather that a particular simplified version of it is not true: the version that claims that the presence of a common government is in itself sufficient to guarantee peace, and that World Government therefore inevitably equates to World Peace.At the same time there is the empirical fact that federalism is one of the more successful forms of government and has often been quite helpful in achieving and sustaining an internal peace covering vast territories and populations. This indicates that there is some validity in the idea of the Federalist Peace, even if some of its better-known formulations have been wrong.

The normal procedure of political science would not be to discard FP theory but to look for more careful formulations of it, or to itself reformulate the theory for more serious testing. This wouldseem obvious. However, it has yet to be done.

Why has political science neglected this task? Sometimes the progression of theories and factional preferences in the world of scholarship is not entirely rational or objective, and for some time the main tendency in international relations scholarship in regard to federalism has been to favor refutations of it.48 Twentieth century federalists have done their part to contribute to the failure.

Hamilton and Madison in their time provided a careful discussion of the relation of federalism to peace. They discussed the need both for democracy and for sufficient homogeneity in a federation.They demonstrated the irrelevance of the big states-small states dispute that was dominating the Convention in 1787, and in fact itproved unimportant after the reinforced Federal Government was 48 I would be remiss to treat this matter in merely objective language; I have to confess that, in my personal experience, I have gained a strong impression that international relations scholars have been prone to leap to embrace any refutation of world federalism, seeing it as a kind of liberation. World federalism, after all, can feel threatening to international relations scholars:it is an all-encompassing Good Cause, it tends to demand a loyalty that endangers the sense of scholarly freedom and objectivity, and an actual world government would abolish the autonomy of international relations more definitively than any 2nd image DP theory.

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established in 1789; their real concern was instead with the North-South divide that was not getting sufficient attention49. It was the problem of lack of societal homogeneity between North and South that led to the breakdown of the Federal Peace in 1861; someof the sharpest tensions arose over the common citizenship in the absence of homogeneity -- the freedom of movement for citizens among all States, coupled with the demand for enforcement of by Northern States of the “property rights” of Southerners to their chattel slaves. This part of the Convention’s discussion failed tomake it into The Federalist Papers, no doubt for sound political reasons of wanting to avoid mention of the issue of slavery duringthe ratification struggle. There arose -- among the many people who have read only The Federalist not the debates of the Convention --a grossly oversimplified conception of the FP theory of the American Founders, e.g. that it was simply that peace is made by forming a common government.

Similarly, Streit 150 years later gave reduced attention, in the printed version of his FP book, to his broad perspective – which had several dialectical twists and turns, and showed reservations about a linear governmentalist FP theory -- than in his original manuscript. Instead, he inserted a couple new chapters, demonstrating that the League of Nations would have to become a Federal Government in order to enforce peace and law consistently.This demonstration flowed directly out of the debates in Geneva inthe 1930s about enforcement of sanctions by the universal League, rather than out of Streit’s actual proposal for a non-universal Union. It seemed like a safe and rigorous demonstration, based on repeated quantifiable testable phenomena of violations and enforcement under Leagues and under Unions. It is this demonstration that subsequently has been attacked as simplistic, and widely misread -- akin to the way Reves is misread -- as if itwere the key point in Streit and in FP theory. His broader perspective undoubtedly seemed harder to prove and more open to doubt; it pointed to a “way out” of the desperate, conflict-riddenglobal situation and into a more convergent, peaceful, institutionalized and sustainable world order, through a sub-global Union of Democracies. Yet it is this perspective that has 49 We have treated this at the start of our discussion; see also the debates recorded in Madison’s Notes, especially those of June 29-30, 1787.

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been vindicated by subsequent history, and vindicated to an extentsurprising for any broad multi-phased global political perspective.

Simplified statements of FP theory abound in the most famous exposition of Federalist Peace theory: Emery Reves’ The Anatomy of Peace.50 Today this book is known only for a single dictum in it: that where there is a common government there is peace, where there is not, wars take place. This was not really the organizing thought of the book. Its actual argument centered around the need for a “Copernican Revolution”: a transformation from separate nationalist perspectives to a common global perspective, coupled with a common authority strong enough to sustain the common perspective and overcome the otherwise logically sound arguments of national governments for upholding mutually contradictory perspectives of blaming one another for what goes wrong in the world. This Revolution, the title and theme of the first chapter51,

50 Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace, New York, 1945. Like Union Now, the book was a best-seller, and its dust jacket came to feature endorsements from the most important political and scientific intellectuals in the U.S.51 Reves acknowledged a general debt to Streit. His theme of a Copernican Revolution may well have been taken from an article by Streit on “The world as seen from Geneva” (New York Times, Sept. 13, 1931), where Streit described how, as a reporter in Geneva, the world often seemed topsy-turvy, “devoted to the proposition that all nations are created superior, the part is greater than the whole”, each nation thinking that all the others are out of step, each seeing only the others’ claims in this regard as absurd. And yet, in Geneva, there werealso the beginnings of a broader perspective, where all partial views are heard and the whole is seen as well: “What is new about the world is that … it has … begun to try to see itself as a world. What is new is the world observatory thatthe world itself has started in Geneva.” Streit included this article at the endof an appendix (“My Own Road to Union”) in Union Now; Reves put the idea up front as organizing conception in The Anatomy of Peace. Streit himself had started the book with a closely related issue in earlier manuscripts of his book: his Chapter II -- a discussion of the danger of focusing on “the internal” (national) rather than “the external problem” -- was meant to be his Chapter I. This chapter elaborated on the logic and consequences of mistaking the part for the whole. But Streit’s book was concerned first and foremost with presenting a proposal, not a theory. Reves in effect took Streit’s original opening and closing thoughts, brought them together, and drew out their systematic meaning. This had the potential to lay the basis for an academic theory of FP. But his serious theory was overlooked in favor of his simplistic line about government equaling peace.

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was what was needed to overcome the practice among national publics of seeking a way out of international crises through reinforcement of national power against other nations, a practice that led from mild nationalism to radical nationalism, to attemptsat radical ideological and religious solidarity, to sharpening of the contradictory national perspectives, and to world wars; that was the point elaborated in the subsequent chapters.

The idea of a “Copernican Revolution”, establishing a common perspective and a common authority strong enough to sustain it, could have been the basis for a profound clarification of FP theory. It bears a similarity to Hobbes, but underlines the role of democracy -- joint political campaigns and elections -- in building new joint loyalties and updating and sustaining joint perspectives. Unlike Hobbes, who was concerned with defining the legitimacy of existing governments and urging consent rather than disobedience and civil war, federalists were concerned with defining the terms for forming new governments that would be able to secure the peace and avoid international or civil war. The approach -- common perspective-formation and sustenance -- offers a broader framework for Deutsch’s definition of peace as “integration”, in turn defined as development of common channels for thinking and action “sufficient” to ensure the use of the common channels and avoidance of any threat of mutual conflict in resolving major issues. Reves, like Hamilton, thought in terms of “common federal government” as sufficient for this purpose; Deutsch showed that a joint government was not always necessary, but failed to give any alternative definition of what specificallywould be necessary and sufficient. Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalism filled in that gap by proposing a more substantive definition of integration as sufficient joint arrangements to bring a transfer of loyalties and expectations to the common level.

Jean Monnet, whose actions and ideas provided the basis for Haas’ theory, defined integration as a “fusion” of interests, achieved by a commitment to a shared view coupled with common institutions with sufficient authority to sustain the fusion, in contrast to anordinary diplomatic compromise or equilibrium of interests. This came close to Reves, without requiring “government” as a necessarycondition in the early stages, but intending to reach it in the

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final stages: Monnet was a federalist with a goal of a United States of Europe, using functionalism as a tactic not a norm. Ghita Ionescu, reflecting in the 1980s on integration theory, spoke of “integration of minds” as the ultimate criterion, such that the national interest would be seen through the prism of the common interest rather than vice versa; for achieving this, he spoke of the need for majority voting and a joint parliament for formulating the joint interest rather than reliance on consensus among national diplomatic representatives.

This brings us full circle back to Streit and the relation betweenthe whole and the parts52. It also brings us back to the need for democracy as a precondition for countries to be deeply integrable together; and to the other criterion, that member societies shouldbe mutually homogenous enough that they could accept joint decisions reached by joint voting. The lists of criteria given by the later integration theorists entailed always broadly the same groupings as European and Atlantic federalist theorists had spelled out from the start in the World War II period. The later integration theorists started from skepticism about FP as they understood it, yet their criteria brought them to the same practical results as the earlier federalist theorists had reached on the basis of a more intuitive grasp of essence of Hamiltonian peace theory and its requirements.

All the classical authors of integration theory could be understood as carrying out portions of the research project openedup by the conceptual foundations laid by Hamilton, Streit and Reves. The outcome of their work would have been more accurately called “neo-federalism” 53 than “neo-functionalism”. Located in thecontext of Streit and Reves, theirs are all Peace Theories as wellas Integration Theories, defining what is needed to sustain a 52 See previous note.53 I owe this point to John Pinder, who arrived at it in the 1980s by a somewhatdifferent route: observing that neo-functionalism had been generally recognized as mistaken on important matters despite its insights, and that federalism had been recurred to by the European Community in order to relaunch its progress, heconcluded in favor of a neo-federalism in which steps forward occurred neither by constitutional federation nor by automatic endogenous “spill-over”, but by a combination of federative normative inspiration and functional interest motivation.

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common perspective and escape the deep contradictions between separate power-based perspectives – the contradiction that is the essence of the Hobbesian state of war, another sorely misunderstood phrase. Hobbes himself tried to clarify that he meant by it, not constant warfare, but constant tension with spears pointed, flowing from separate actors with separate capabilities of murdering one another, and separate minds with imaginative capabilities for picturing such an intention in one another.

As we have seen, the heart of all these theories is a shared sophisticated conception, but has been widely misunderstood in favor of simpler formulations that were also shared among several of the authors. Hamilton’s real theory was not readily apparent tothose who read only his public essays in The Federalist. Nor was that of Streit in Union Now -- nor that of Reves in The Anatomy of Peace.

Reves failed to follow through consistently on his own central thought and work out the complex theory of peace it would have engendered. Instead, in order to offer a simple clear-cut scientific-sounding prescription for peace, he fell back on a muchcruder formulation: joint government = peace, lack of joint government = war. He used this skeletal formula as a basic dictum.Given the book’s title (“anatomy” of peace) and seemingly scientific pretensions, it was only natural for readers to mistakethis dictum for the book’s theme.

The formula was fallacious and easily refuted: peace sometimes exists without a joint government; and joint governments can breakdown in civil wars. Civil wars are usually more brutal and deadly than international wars. Governments are sometimes a cause of civil war: when different regions deeply distrust one another and fear the legislation the other may impose on it, each may struggleto capture the government before the other does. Governments can launch what Trotsky called “one-sided civil war” against their society; Rummel has called it “democide” and tabulated that it hastaken several times more deaths in the 20th century than international wars.

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Since The Anatomy of Peace was in its time the main World Federalist manifesto and its title staked a claim to define FP theory, it hasbecome a point of reference, or perhaps a straw man, for refutations of FP. Many a time federalism has been declared refuted by taking a quote from Reves and shooting it down with thesimple observation that peace sometimes exists outside of government, and governments sometimes collapse into war.

Actual Federalist theory on peace is a more serious matter, as canbe seen from Hamilton with his careful attention to the factors that could cause a new common government to fail. A brief glance is enough to see that Deutsch’s argument is directed against Reves’ simplified formulations, not Hamilton’s. Deutsch’s simply failed to come to grips with Hamilton’s ideas on FP.

The task remains, then, of refining FP theory to avoid the crude errors in the popular surrogate formulas that have been given for it, putting its propositions in testable form, and testing them. The presumption should be that FP is likely to have some significant valid substance, given the empirical success of federal government in uniting polities and minimizing the recurrence of war. If a formulation for FP is found false or inadequate, the next step is reformulation and further testing, not abandonment of the project.

Given the failure of previous political science to do this, the problem has been bequeathed to contemporary political science. It means a task of elaborating a careful FP theory; isolating separable testable elements in it; testing the elements and, as far as possible, the whole; reformulating the theory on a basis ofthe tests; and continuing from there through successive iterations.

Reformulation is a task in which we may be helped by a careful reading of previous federalists to find their more subtle points, rather than concentrating on the least subtle points (such as Reves’ simplified dictum) and using them as a basis for accepting or rejecting the theory; the latter procedure seems more befittingof polemic than of scholarship. One would, for example, peruse thedebates of the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist

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Papers, paying particular attention to their discussions of how and in what manner and under what conditions a common Federal government would “work” and be conducive to peace. One would peruse Streit and Reves for their contributions to integration theory. One would also look at the main academic texts of integration theory, understanding them as essentially federalist despite their authors’ frequent polemics against federalism. One would incorporate almost in the entirety, for example, the passages in Deutsch, Haas and others where they develop lists of criteria for Union to succeed and minimize risks of breakdown and civil war: these amount to elaborations of ways of avoiding the dangers that were already brilliantly delineated by Hamilton and Madison at the Constitutional Convention, and that were explained again after 1945, at greater length but in a misleadingly broad-brush form, in anti-world government writings by Crane Brinton andReinhold Niebuhr. And one would incorporate a conception of a Democratic Peace on a 2.5 level, i.e. intertwined with the growth of inter-democracy cooperation and union.

I have given some of the results from such a reading in earlier portions of this paper; I will build on that here, rather than tryto walk the reader at this time through a lengthy process of examination and exegesis of thousands of pages of federalist and neo-federalist texts. A reformulated Federalist Peace theory mightderive from the past writings a definition and several propositions for testing:

Definition. “Peace” has two meanings, for which the terms “positive peace” and “negative peace” are often used. Negative peace is an immediately observable fact of immediate absence of war. Positive peace has been given many definitions, but in all ofthem it must be “reliable”, i.e. must be expected and relied upon to endure and maintain negative peace for a “long” time, long enough that planning and action can be based on an assumption of peace and dispense with preparation for mutual war. For FederalistPeace theory, positive peace can be defined as follows, a relationamong units (individuals or states) in which their perspectives are put together or “composed”, through their mutual embrace a shared perspective that encompasses the survival of the core of each unit perspective and its further development without violence

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to or from the other units, coupled with sufficient arrangements or institutions for sustaining the composite perspective for as long as can be foreseen.

This definition of positive peace is similar to the one given in the Deutsch-Van Wagenen book previously mentioned, where the terms“integrated community” and “security-community” were also used forthis. The similarity is not surprising; the actual author of the definition was Richard Van Wagenen, who had read the federalist literature of his time carefully; he absorbed its criticism of a solely negative definition of peace as absence of war, and seems to have absorbed also its implicit roots in Hobbes’ concept of a common power buttressed by a composition of perspectives (the latter phrase was made explicit by one of the modern federalist writers, Bertrand Russell, drawing on Leibniz, but left only implicit in the main federalist tracts). At the same time, Van Wagenen wanted to avoid the simplified federalist mistake of equating peace with government; he was careful not to prejudge what joint arrangements would be sufficient for achieving positivepeace, nor to presuppose that the same arrangements would work equally well in different conditions.

This definition suggests the main sphere for testable propositions; namely, what institutions are helpful and sufficientfor positive peace, and in what conditions. Testable propositions come in three clusters:

1. International organization and peace. Does sovereign independence of multiple states contribute to international chaos and to war; international institutions to peace and cooperation? How much does supranational authority add to effectiveness of international institutions? How much do international institutions, particularly supranational ones, suffer from instability unless supported by socio-political commonalities and a joint identity? How to compare the democratic deficit in foreignpolicy per se, in the sense of lack of a democratic share of control over actions of other states that affect one’s fate in conditions of anarchy and risk of war, with the democratic deficitin international and supranational institutions? A specific proposition for testing might be that the democratic deficit is

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smaller and less dangerous when imported into international institutions, but is more visible there and usable for rhetorical attacks on the institutions; another might be that transformation of a supranational institution into federation overcomes the democratic deficit, but does not end the attacks on the central authority as undemocratic or distant from the people.

2. Conditions for peaceful success of supranational organization. To what extent, and under what conditions, are intergovernmental, supranational, and federal structures sources of conflict over thepolicies or control of the joint structures on the system level, to what extent effective in overcoming propensities to conflict among their unit members? Does functional economic supranationalism need its member states to have similar societies and modern pluralistic democracies, in order to develop support networks from pluralistic interest groups (a suggestion made by neofunctionalist integration theory); is this necessary for it to “work” in the senses of getting established, stabilizing, “spilling over”, and making for peace more than serving as a new arena for conflict? In order for federal supranationalism to make for peace, to what extent are the following criteria important: representative democracy, similar social structure, comparable wage levels, and a strong imbalance of shared norms and interests over opposing ones (absence of existential conflicts between the normative systems of the unit societies, absence of existential conflicts of interest between them, a heavy load of interdependence and shared interest)? Does functional military supranationalism, as a community of destiny, have the same requirement as federalism of a strong imbalance of shared interests and norms over conflicting ones? Does functional economic supranationalism, if it goes to the extent of forming a common market with free movement of people, have the same requirements as federalism for comparable wage levels? Does it also, as a partial community of destiny, also have the same requirement of imbalance of shared over conflicting interests? Howstrong an imbalance is sufficient? The criteria are basically different kinds of compatibility or homogeneity, plus democracy asa specific shared requirement, and for functionalism, modern pluralistic society. In the absence of some of these criteria, howserious are the dangers of functional or federal authorities

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serving as grounds for conflict? Some positive propositions might be that, when the criteria are met, functional, confederal, and federal unions correlate to intra-union stabilization and peace, in proportion to the strength and scope of the union; when criteria are not met, unions both have stabilizing effects and bring new destabilizing risks, the latter in proportion to the scope of the criteria not met and the strength of the union.

3. DP and FP. To what extent have DP and FP been intertwined; how does this affect the possibility of assessing DP and FP as separate single-factor explanations? It is widely noted in DP literature that there has been a concrete and growing realm of DP in the space of modern Western liberal democracies since around 1830, today forming the OECD space; this has coincided with a federative peace or loose FP in the same space, in the form of gradually growing alliance and cooperation, beginning tentatively in the 1820s (Monroe Doctrine, East-West split in the Holy Alliance) and definitively in the 1890-1910 period (Anglo-Americanand Anglo-French rapprochements), widening and deepening by stagesthereafter in the world wars, blossoming in a series of interlocking institutions after 1946, with further widening and deepening since then. Is the intertwining of these two historical developments, the DP and FP space among the modern Western democracies, so intimate and complex, with causal factors moving back and forth among them (e.g., dyad of democracies enabling unity and cooperation; unity and cooperation enabling spread and stabilization of new democracies), as to make it impossible to separate out DP (democracy) as cause from FP (cooperation and joint organization) as cause? Negatively, is each factor insufficient by itself, meaning that, without democracy, union is an uncertain guarantee of peace, and without a federative or integrative trend among dyads, their separate democracy is an uncertain guarantee of peace? Does DP fail to apply, or apply moreweakly, outside of the core Western space where there is also an entrenched element of FP, or apart from the growth of the Western space and absorption of near neighbors into its institutions? Thismay help explain several specific weak links in DP, some of which have been noted in some of the DP literature: DP among premodern democracies, DP in the Third World, DP between First and Third World democracies, DP among new democracies, DP between old

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democracies and countries that were enemy powers under previous undemocratic regimes, DP with countries with widespread extremist views in the population, and DP among countries that differ sharply in their religious, economic, or other societal interests.

The task of studying these propositions, in themselves and in their combination and further reformulation after testing and recombination, is for the most part yet to begin; only a few of these propositions have been studied or tested at all, and those mostly under other rubrics such as neo-institutionalism. In the absence of quantitative studies for the bulk of them, we will limit ourselves herein to considering their plausibility and implications.

From Theories to Perspectives

It would require only a cursory examination of the questions and propositions in clusters 2 and 3 above to see that neither DP nor FP is likely to be sufficient to achieve global peace in this era.From the FP side, a stable democratic and federal world governmentis excluded for some time to come by the sociological compatibility criteria as well as by the democracy criteria. From the DP side, even if national democracy were to spread worldwide in the near future, the peace globally would lack buttressing fromdeeply organized unity and fusion of security interests and perspectives among its national democratic units, which was essential to underpin the DP in the space of the industrial democracies.

Neither DP nor FP, then, is complete in itself or adequate for solving all global peace problems. Indeed, neither one taken by itself is fully consistent internally. Hamilton’s No. 6 still makes trenchant points against the simplified forms of DP theory that are the most popular forms. Professors Doyle and Russett haveproceeded to put qualifications on the theory and give it more careful scientific form, but those qualifications, if read carefully, significantly limit the pretensions of the theory compared to what it implies in its popular form. Doyle and Russetthave to some extent refuted Hamilton by emphasizing democratic

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dyads, to some extent embraced his points and prescriptions in thecourse of elaborating and qualifying their theory.

Even if DP and FP both suffer inadequacies, they both remain validin several powerful points that it would be perilous to neglect. Only a theory that incorporates elements of both of them is likelyto be successful as a broad guide to practice.

It is necessary to add the proviso that probably no theory will besufficient as comprehensive guide for global practice, because warhas too many causes. No single-cause theory likely to solve the problem globally, nor any two theories together. In view of the enormous cultural and economic gulfs between societies of the world, there are genuine fundamental differences of societal interest for the time being, making the world as a whole unlikely to deeply integrable in any brief time frame. This is only one of the factors that makes it is doubtful that any theory of peace could be successful in the sense of indicating a path that can be followed and would have a fair assurance of leading to a secure global peace. Another factor is the increasing capability of angryindividuals for committing mass destruction and the growing ease of doing the same by scientific accident. This makes it questionable whether any 2nd or 3rd image theory of interstate peace, even if fully successful on its own level, would suffice for the survival of the world.

At this point one might be tempted to revert to 1st image ideas of reformation of human nature; but all the old objections to such anapproach remain valid. To have any chance of succeeding, one wouldhave to think in terms of genetic modification of behavioral dispositions. The modifications would have to be made globally, monitored carefully, and corrected globally for unforeseen consequences. This would require a world government: we are back to the 3rd image as prerequisite. And behavior modification might well lead to disaster more rapidly; its unforeseen consequences might not be correctable in time. Nor would it do anything about scientific accidents that could destroy the world unintentionally:that would require strict global regulation of technological development and information across a broad front, and in some areas it might require a roll-back of information. If technology

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has raced ahead of the techniques of humans for managing its consequences on either 1st, 2nd or 3rd image levels, then perhaps it is the technology that needs to be changed, not the 1st, 2nd and 3rd images of humans and their social orders. But it would be futile to stop certain technological developments in one country; it would have to be done worldwide. This would require, again, a world government, and a highly intrusive one at that: we are back yet again to the 3rd image.

So before we throw up our hands in existential despair, let us seewhat progress we can make on peace theory on the levels of the 2nd and 3rd images -- the levels of DP and FP -- in some combination.

There is one major FP theorist, Clarence Streit, who combined the theories, recognizing the phenomenon of the Democratic Peace from the start. He observed in a 1934 article that the Western democracies have not been to war against one another since about 1830.54 This striking fact, later used by Doyle as the baseline forDP theory, was used by Streit, not as a basis for extrapolating directly to world peace, but as one of the many indicators that the objective criteria were satisfied for a federal union of the Western democracies, in turn seen as a foundation for a more effective world order. As New York Times correspondent at the League of Nations for a number of years, he made another striking observation: when the three major Western democratic powers, Britain, France, and the U.S., were agreed on policy, the League of Nations “worked”, more or less; when they weren’t, it didn’t. He calculated that, if they combined their forces consistently andefficiently, they held overwhelming economic and strategic predominance in the world. He deduced that a federal union of the Western democracies could lend far more coherence and efficacy to the policies of the League than it had enjoyed in the interwar years; thereby they could maintain world order, sufficiently if imperfectly (specifically, avoiding deepening recessions by mutualeconomic conflict into a Great Depression, and deterring German

54 Most of the material from this article, which appeared in the New York Times,was incorporated into Streit, Union Now, ch. 5, “Why Start with the Democracies”, and can be more easily found there. The point about the peace among the Atlantic democracies since 1830 appears on pp. 66-67 of the 1949 edition.

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aggression in advance rather than fighting it after the fact); andcould meanwhile lead the world along its lengthy course of modernization and democratization, welcoming new democracies into the Union as they matured sufficiently, until the whole world would someday be a part of it. At that ultimate point the Federalist Peace and the Democratic Peace would merge: there wouldbe a Democratic World Federation.

Looking at the phasing of his proposal, it becomes evident that Streit presented a perspective on the development of the world as a whole toward peace, not a theory of repeatable events that couldbe tested empirically. His perspective is informed by both DP andFP theory, but is not reducible to them either singly or in combination. He recognized, like Madison, that representative democracy is the foundation of successful federalism; thus world federalism must depend on the global spread of representative or democratic governmental culture. He also quietly recognized, like Hamilton and Madison in their discussions at the Constitutional Convention about the North-South divide, that a substantial degreeof homogeneity of societies is needed for a successful union and common citizenship, and observed that the North Atlantic countriesmet that criterion. Building on ideas of a core democratic union loosely formulated by a little-known wing of the League of Nationsmovement -- the League of Free Nations Association -- in 1918, he developed in detail the conception of a “nucleus union”. By this he meant an initial federal union of experienced democracies, designed to be open for others to join later. He argued that this would provide a consistent attractive force, creating a dynamic sufficient to motivate and bind together the complex developments needed for getting across the evolutionary minefield to an ultimate consistent world order. It would transform the dialectical twists and turns of international geopolitics into a cumulative trend of democratic and integrative development. It would, so to speak, get us from here to there -- from what was possible now in the form of viable federal unification, to what was ultimately necessary for world peace.

Streit was familiar with the ideas of Fiske in the late 1800s on aglobal trend toward sophisticated government and federalism that would proceed by the usual non-linear pathways of evolution with

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its conflicts and twists and turns. His perspective retained this dialectical structure. He did not, however, fully repeat the Fiskean expectation of reaching the blessings of peace and sophisticated organization through a long phase of learning from conflict. Rather, he hoped his “nucleus Union” could render the evolutionary process more rapid and peaceful, learning from the conflicts already endured in order to set in motion a cumulative convergence, one based on creating a centripetal force so strong that it could overcome radical dictatorships by deterrence of the dictators and attraction of their people rather than having to go again through full-scale wars. Still his perspective remained dialectical in the sense of multi-phased and passing through seemingly contradictory orientations -- the Union starring sometimes in roles of armed adversary of authoritarian powers, sometimes in roles of integrator of those same powers once free ofauthoritarianism. At the same time, there would be a linear element in the maintenance and gradual enhancement of such global organization as was as yet possible -- a reformed League of Nations, with the nucleus Union serving as an essential source of strength for it, and the global League in turn serving as an essential supplement for matters beyond the Union’s capabilities.

Such a perspective on the totality of world development can never be verified, at least not until after the totality has been completed. Streit’s perspective was widespread in the 1940s and ‘50s but was virtually forgotten in the later Cold War decades, when peace discourse took a different turn; it came to be generally accepted that the term “peace” was the property of movements opposed to Western power and to central power generally,and seeking a neutralist form of ending the global conflict. A perspective such as Streit’s, which reinforces the West and creates a meta-central power internationally, was treated in thoseyears as part of the problem. The Streit perspective received a surprise validation – surprise to nearly everyone in the West, given the trends in discourse ever since the 1960s -- in the peaceful dissolution in 1989-91 of the Soviet Communist empire, with the successor states all wanting into a “common European home” uniting them with the West that they saw as already well along the way toward Union. The element of surprise was not without consequence. The West was morally and intellectually

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unprepared for this eventuality; it only belated and incompletely developed policies for consummation of the portion of the Streit perspective that had suddenly come into view as an immediate issue, and reconstructed only part of the perspective itself. The perspective nevertheless proved its value for the countries that proceeded to gain EU and NATO membership. It remains today relevant for the countries in the eastern reaches of the Greater European space that have not yet made it into the EU or NATO.

It is an open question to what extent this perspective is relevantfor the rest of the world, where modernization has much farther togo. In this broader space, there would have to be a greater stresson the element of patience in Streit’s perspective and on the long-term global leadership responsibilities of the Western powersuntil the time when human development levels had more closely converged and the societies were sufficiently homogenous to be united at the level of equal citizenship.

This patience in turn would come at a cost of raising the questionof whether the means of destruction aren’t already too developed and widespread to be able to afford to wait. Then the question would become whether other peace theories are also needed for supplementation, in addition to the Federalist and Democratic onesthat Streit used as components for his perspective. Alternatively,we would have to look to other perspectives within the general FP framework, such as the World Federalist one -- faster reinforcement of the United Nations -- to make up for the lengthening of the delay in integrating volatile areas of the world into the nucleus Union.

One could draw hope here from the fact that the proposals of WorldFederalists have become increasingly realistic and compatible in recent decades with those of the Inter-Democracy Federalists, calling for practical strengthening of global functional institutions and for, as the maximum proposal, “triadic voting” onthe UN level. By this is meant a system that, while avoiding national vetoes, uses wealth as well as population as a factor in calculating voting weight, thereby preserving for the OECD democracies (or any substantial fraction of them) a collective veto. Such a voting system would interface well with an OECD

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nucleus Union. But it would yield only a more efficient global confederacy, not a genuine World Government; would it really suffice to manage the burgeoning problems? The answer would have to be no, at least not by itself; but it would mean also a more efficient interface with the inner NATO-OECD grouping, which wouldhelp fill in for its gaps. The interface between the two levels ofinternational organization, Atlantic and Global, was anticipated by Streit; it finally began in practice after 1991 in the form of UN-NATO cooperation. The UN spoke of NATO’s positive role as a “regional organization”, something it would have never done duringthe Cold War when the UN milieu treated NATO as an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact55; the UN gave NATO a mandate in Bosnia, where NATOrescued the UN mission from failure; the cooperation and organizational links gradually advanced from there. Transformationof either level or both into a more efficiently voting confederacywould serve both to upgrade that level and to streamline the interface.

While this certainly makes the prospect seem brighter, it too might not suffice in face of the scope of problems. In the end, wehave to ask whether there is any adequate solution at all. It is already nearly a century since the League of Free Nations Association originally came up with an idea of a nucleus Union. Perhaps the delay has been too long, despite some progress made informing a confederal nucleus union; in the same period, the means of mass destruction have grown from old fashioned chemical and biological weapons to nuclear weapons, global warming, and emerging biotechnologies and nanotechnologies. Perhaps humanity, with its tendency always to be too little too late with new political construction, has already let the means of destruction spin too far out of control ever to retrieve them. Perhaps it is no longer possible to reduce the curve of probabilities of annihilation to one whose sum converges on a figure substantially less than 100%.

55 The quarrels between proponents of these two levels of international organization, Atlantic and Global, have something in common with the quarrels between 2nd and 3rd images: good for a debate between models, but serving to obscure the ways in which each needs the other and the world needs both.

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I do not know if it is possible to refute these gloomy thoughts. Looking at nanotechnology, with its arguable potential to destroy all life on earth and eliminate all possibilities of evolutionary regeneration of life56, it would seem there is cause for pessimism about our ability to get the means of destruction under control. In that case, it would have been better for humanity to have annihilated itself earlier, by more primitive means such as nuclear weapons. One might at least hope a nano-apocalypse would leave the rest of the universe intact. But then, if we survive long enough, theoretical physics might find a unified field theorypowerful enough to understand the entire universe and provide the means to destroy it; and once it is known how to do it, it will behard to prevent it from happening. In that case we would have beenmuch better off to have destroyed ourselves with nanotechnology. It would be as if Man, through technology, was a constantly mutating universal supervirus, the destroyer of worlds in a literal sense, not just the metaphorical sense in which Oppenheimer used that phrase for the atom bomb he was developing, always reaching for new worlds to destroy. One could still hope that there might be alternative universes. But what if we survive until we learn enough to destroy them, too? One begins to wonder if Man was a mistake on the part of God. Even if we come to understand the thoughts of God in structuring all possible universes, it might be too great a leap to think we would learn how to destroy God; but here I may be unduly complacent, and one must assume God exists in order to say God would survive.

Putting aside these metaphysical doubts, I will assume, perhaps irrationally, that it is a good thing for humanity to survive. I will argue that some combination of the replicable elements of DP and FP theories, linked organically by a perspective on their application and evolution in time, and on their supplementation bymeans taken from other theories, and by a focus on particular

56 There are those who argue that nanotechnology, which restructures molecules using miniature nano-robots, will destroy the world: the nano-robots must self-replicate many times in order to do any efficient work, and one mistake or failure in the shut-off command on the replication process would mean gobbling up the whole world. And if it could happen, then it inevitably would, given the temptations of research and use of nanotechnology for an almost endless series of benign intentions.

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functional applications such as regulation of technologies of destruction, give us the best prospect of getting through57.

One advantage of perspectives is that they can be linked across a span of many generations as a shared project, over and above the continuities in the replicable testable correlations posited in their sub-theories. There can be a profound sense of continuing the same project, despite dramatic changes brought about through the evolution of the project and of external conditions.

FP has in fact had strong continuity as a project, not just as a theory. Hamilton was first and foremost a painter of perspectives,even while drawing upon empirically replicable events and testabletheories. The perspective he painted was a grand one: America’s development as a vast, free and industrious Union. As is generallyacknowledged, it turned out to be spectacularly vindicated, while history left behind Jefferson with his static states rights and agrarianism based on past empirical democratic theory. The same may be said of Streit: he extended the picture of the development of the democratic Union onto the international plane. It is not surprising, in view of this, to know that Streit identified personally with Hamiltonianism as Project. So did Streit’s precursor, John Fiske, the missing link in the development of the Federalist perspective from Hamilton to today, whose Darwinian evolutionism gave a deeper meaning to perspectives on societal development. Streit, Fiske and Hamilton were all baroque in the sense of theorists of dramatic directional development, not classicists in the sense of theorists of equilibrium and eternallyreplicable empirical experiences. This was not for any lack of 57 Much of the reformulation of DP theory by Prof. Russett, in Grasping the Democratic Peace, serves to facilitate the theory-bridging that I am attempting here. This reformulation contained theoretical qualifications, practical cautions (among them, that DP might face hard tests if democracy came to countries where there are strong popular sentiments against existing Western democracies), and explorations of combining the democratic factor in DP with economic interdependence and cooperation among democracies. It seems that awareness of the extent of the reformulation or amending involved in this has been hindered by the easy popularity of the simpler formulation that “democracies do not go to war against each other”. It has perhaps not helped that continued use has been made of that as the main formulation, along with continued argumentation for a 2nd image against 3rd image approach, even in workswhere the amendments are quietly made as well.

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respect for empirical science; they were greatly impressed by the progress that empirical science was making possible, and they pointed to it as evidence of the need and possibility for vast dynamic perspectives. They proceeded to paint vast perspective pictures. The pictures proved right, not in all details, but in the sense providing the orientation that proved the most useful for moving the cause of democracy forward. Their pictures were alllinked in the same broad evolving perspective; together they constitute a Hamiltonian panorama spanning the centuries and extending well into the future. It would be fair, then, to say that today, in combining DP with FP within an overarching perspective, we can end up with the Hamiltonian Peace Theory brought into the world of the present and future.

Democratic Peace theory has always had a deep inner connection to Union of Democracies theory, yet the connection has been somehow murky and barely known. Clarence Streit was well aware of the phenomenon of democratic peace among the industrialized democracies, using it as an argument for both Democracy and for Union, but many readers thought he was arguing that only the Unioncould provide peace. DP theorists in turn were mostly well aware of Streit’s work. Proponents of DP have always supported mutual organization and cooperation among democracies, but the thrust of DP theory has seemed to many readers opposite: to argue that all effort should be focused on getting democracy inside each country.

The major exponents of DP have been supportive of “3rd image” international cooperation and institutions, despite the formally “2nd image” nature of their theory, and have been sympathetic to such federal trends as have existed in international institutionaldevelopment; some have also sympathized with the goal of international federation, particularly in the form of inter-democracy federation. The founder or pre-founder of today’s DP theory, Dean Babst, joined Clarence Streit’s Association to Unite the Democracies (AUD) in the late 1980s, sending in with his checka copy of his main theoretical article58 and adding in a note that

58 Dean Babst, “Elective Governments--A Force for Peace”, The Wisconsin Sociologist 3, 1:9-14, 1964, and “A Force for Peace”, Industrial Research, April 1972, 55-58. At AUD I read his note with interest; it provided a counterexample to the usual opposition between 2nd image DP argumentation, already popular by that time in

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it buttressed AUD’s political conclusions. R.J. Rummel, the next early theorist59, is sympathetic to Union of Democracies60; in this regard he advocated a worldwide alliance of democracies, mostly limited however to carrying out democracy promotion and defense, that is to say, a subset or fraction of the work of global leadership for which Streit felt a Union was needed61. He has also showcased the extent of 3rd image cooperation among independent countries, even if for the purpose of arguing that a 3rd image

governmental circles, and the 3rd image FP argumentation mostly prevalent in AUD. 59 DP theory can be said to have reached its “take off” point with Rummel’s voluminous writings and studies on it, published in Understanding Conflict and War (5 volumes, 1975-81).60 Rummel has written, “On world government, I'm a federalist in classic, Hamiltonian-Streit terms. I believe the only effective and desirable world government should be made up only of democratic states. Thus my proposal for an Alliance of Democracies. There are many good reasons for this... I hasten to addempirically, creating a DP is not one of them. But deepening, solidifying, and securing/defending DP are reasons, as well as the collaborative and cooperative strength of the organization helping to foster democracy where it does not exist.” (email to present author, 3/18/2006)61 R.J. Rummel, “Eliminating Democide and War Through An Alliance of Democracies”, International Journal of World Peace, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, p. 55ff, 2001 (also at http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/ALLIANCE.HTM). Rummel’s article mentions that what he is advocating is, in institutional terms, the same projectas the “Community of Democracies” (CD) that was officially inaugurated at the Warsaw conference of the world’s democracies in the late 1990s; he simply adds to it a program of global democracy promotion and enforcement of basic human rights against democide (regime-sponsored mass murder). This is akin to the program of spreading democracy and ending all dictatorships within two decades that is advocated for the CD by Mark Palmer, former Ambassador to Hungary and anearly CD promoter. The idea of CD was invented by CCD, the Committees (now renamed Council) for a Community of Democracies. CCD argued that a CD was neededto fill in a gap in the international organizational order, which had all kinds of organizations but no organization of all democracies. It was also to serve asan intermediate wheel -- in some formulations, a transmission belt -- between the core inner Atlantic institutional system that was CCD’s original concern andthe looser outer UN system. CCD was formed by James R. Huntley in 1978-9 as a gradualist-functionalist outgrowth of Streit’s Federal Union/AUD movement. (As amatter of full disclosure, I should acknowledge that I edited its initial newsletters in 1983-4 and did a bit of the preparatory work for its 1984 international conference which put the goal of CD on the map.) The main basis for CCD was Huntley’s book explaining the growth and institutions of the Atlantic system and projecting its prospects, Uniting the Democracies: Institutions of the

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world government is unnecessary62. Michael Doyle, the third theorist in sequence and the one most often cited, has not just supported international organizations but worked for them, both onthe UN level and the inter-democracy level. He too has been sympathetically aware of Streit. Doyle mentioned in his early papers it is important for old democracies to help new ones stabilize and avoid Weimar-type situations; it is unclear whether was meant to imply only 2nd image or also 3rd image work63. Bruce Russett, who has done careful later testing of the theory to deal

Emerging Atlantic-Pacific System (New York, NYU Press, 1980) Huntley is an admirer of Rummel’s work, citing it in his latest book, Pax Democratica. Since Rummel is the most anti-governmental of the major DP theorists, it is impressive that he too in practice rises well above the pure 2nd image to something around perhaps a 2.3 image, and that his work has ended up intertwined in significant ways with the movement for inter-democracy Union.62 This may be an instance of how the propensity to polemicize against government and against the 3rd image leads to results that may confuse readers about the actual views of the DP author. Rummel counterposed the option of cooperation among independent states to the option of world government. His argument was structured simply by contrasting these two options, skipping any mention of the third term -- the federative integration of the industrial democracies at the core of the world order -- that has (as Streit anticipated) provided an evolutionary bridge between the two. From the opposite end of the same polarity -- support for world government -- Ronald Glossop has given an answer to Rummel, recognizing the supportive evidence for DP but providing his own logic and statistical references to support the conclusion that central government, albeit democratic central government, is the main thing needed to prevent war (Ronald J. Glossop, World Federation? A Critical Analysis of Federal World Government, Jefferson NC and London:  McFarland, 1993, p. 130; also see Glossop, Confronting War:  An Examination of Humanity's Most Pressing Problem, 4th ed., Jefferson NC and London:  McFarland, 2001, p. 271). Glossop cites for this purpose Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Pittsburgh: Boxwood, 1960 (pp. xi, 189-90, 295-96, 312-13). Richardson found that a number of proposed peace-making factorsdo not really correlate with peace, but the existence of common government does,particularly if long-established. “Half of the revolts against a government or the outbreak of a civil war broke out after less than 23.5 years under a common government.” (p. 190); his editors Quincy Wright and C. C. Lienau summarized hisresults this way: “the longer groups have been united by common government, the less has been the probability of war among them.” (p. xi). This does not answer the classic anti-federalist argument about the potentially destabilizing effectsof forming a sudden new Union among societies that do not trust one another -- aproblem similar to the potentially destabilizing effects of rapid domestic democratization in a society lacking trust among its segments. However, it does indicate that, if an international Union is formed by negotiation among countries, which presumably work out the terms for it with a careful eye to

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with complicating factors and counterarguments, has written extensively in support of 3rd image international cooperation and on economic interdependence as a factor supplementing 2nd image democracy as a force for peace. In the 1990s, trying to avoid a Weimar situation in Russia, he wrote in support of a more sincerely open door on the part of NATO for Russia, even though Russia was not likely to become domestically a good quality democracy for some time to come64.

whether they can trust one another and/or can trust the balance among them in the Union, and if it survives long enough, it will become an inherently pacifying factor. Glossop’s work upholds the predominant view among world federalists that the rudiments of a democratic world government can be set up byconsent of the national states prior to achieving democracy in a good many of its member state units; it argues that democratic progress on the national and global levels is interactive, each level promoting the other, rather than proceeding in separate phases. Accordingly, he allows for gradualism of a functionalist sort in building a world government. However, the gradual expansion of a nucleus democratic Union is the one form of gradualism that he explicitly refuses -- in this respect skipping over the same missing third term.This may be because global federalists and inter-democracy federalists split in the U.S. in 1945, in an organizational divorce; ever since -- in keeping with Georg Simmel’s observations on the sociology of divorce -- some on each side have felt that rejection of the other’s approach was vital as a matter of defining and preserving their group identity. Nevertheless there has been a gradual rapprochement between the two movements in the last quarter century. Forthe last several years the World Federalist organization, recently renamed Citizens for Global Solutions, has endorsed the semi-global Community of Democracies and participated in its NGO functions, even though CD grew out of the Streit movement for a Union of Democracies (see note above) and is forging one of the links that Streit anticipated between the Atlantic and global levels of international organization. Rummel’s recent writings on an Alliance of Democracies also endorse the CD, thus also coming part-way to the missing Streitian term for mediating between the alternatives of independent states and world government.63 The distinction depends on whether it was meant to encompass the fact that the help for German stabilization after 1945 included not just support for domestic reform or improving the quality of German democracy, nor just Marshall Plan money, but an entire battery of international organizations through which Germany regained its status in the world without ever having to regain separate sovereignty: NATO, EU, and all the ancillary structures of the Euro-Atlantic system. 3rd image FP theorists would argue that this was what provided a solid democratic international identity for Germany, by embedding its democracy withina common democratic home; it is why Germany would not again feel humiliated internationally by democracy as it had in the Weimar years. Critics of an

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The producers of 2nd image DP theory, evidently, do not intend it to the exclusion of other, 3rd image factors conducive to peace, and certainly not to the exclusion of inter-democracy organizationbut rather in support of it. One can only wish that the consumers of their theory -- the general public and governments -- had the same propensities. This has not happened; their theory has insteadbeen used often for the opposite, anti-institutional purpose. In light of this, one can wonder whether something more might be needed, in order to communicate better the intentions of its authors. For example, it might serve the authors better were they to expound the theory with both pro-2nd image and pro-3rd image argumentation, rather than primarily 2nd image argumentation directed against the 3rd image. The exposition of the theory might also emphasize more centrally the qualifications to the summary line about democracies never fighting one another, as that line has become an influential slogan deployed usually without awareness of the qualifications.

The personal practice of the DP theorists, in the sense of their personal advocacy on international issues and their application oftheory to practice, has been fairly balanced, located somewhere inthe range of the 2-½ image, not rigidly limited to the 2nd image. It would seem reasonable to think that a 2-½ image theory, one that combines elements of 2nd and 3rd images into a larger whole,

idealistic democratic 2nd image approach can also argue that it was less becauseof oft-cited technical constitutional improvements, such as a threshold of votesfor a party to enter parliament, that domestic German democracy worked better after 1945 than after 1918, and more for reasons that are decidedly unideal and impure from a democratic standpoint: first because Hitler had slaughtered the Communists, second because the Allies banned the Nazi party, leaving the moderate parties finally with a stable sustainable hegemony.64 For full disclosure, I should acknowledge that I feel some reluctance about publishing criticisms of some of the formulations of Professors Doyle and Russett, as both have been supportive of my practical work since 1991 on adaptation of NATO to become a wider and deeper confederacy incorporating as much of the OSCE space as possible. Their support has been generous, even if we differ on some theoretical points, and I can only hope the present critical exposition of issues on the theoretical plane does not affect the friendship on the practical level. In any case, they are the major exponents of DP theory in the contemporary form in which it has come to be generally accepted, and no analysis of it could bypass their work.

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would be needed to put this practice on a solid foundation and communicate it consistently.

Modern DP Theory: Gaps and use of 3 rd Image Supplements

DP, understood as a strictly 2nd image theory and 2nd image practice, has several weak links. The weak links in the theory correspond to practical gaps in its applicability, or to put it otherwise, risks in its application.

Expositions of DP sometimes fill these gaps with ad hoc suggestions for 3rd image international cooperation. Such “fillers”are helpful, indeed necessary on the practical level. The questionhere is whether they are sufficient; the argument made here is that, in order to become sufficient, they would have to be expanded and given a status as part of the theory.

DP is strong in demonstrating that there have not been wars among the stable industrialized democracies, beginning with the democracies in northwestern Europe and North America in 1830 and spreading by stages to today’s OECD area. This space is the classic space of the democratic peace. It is this space whose experience motivated the revival of DP theory. It is at once an historical space and a geographical one: an expanding space over the course of nearly two centuries, and a concrete geographical space today, definable both in sociological terms (the “industrialdemocracies”) and in terms of the international institutions that join its members. We can call it “the Atlantic space” to indicate its historical source and its original countries; we can equally well call “the OECD space” to refer to its current expanse. Both meanings are relevant to DP, which covers the span of this space both in its time dimension since 1830 and in its geographical dimensions in the present; the actual body subsists in the four-dimensional space-time continuum. Accordingly, we will use both terms and call it “the Atlantic-OECD space”.

In this Atlantic-OECD space, the correlation posited by DP theory is found to be a strong one indeed. The space presents a

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cumulatively enormous pool of pairs (“dyads”) of democracies rubbing up against one another year after year since 1830 yet practically never going to war.

DP is weaker, however, on matters not limited to the Atlantic-OECDspace: the far from perfect peace among pre-modern democracies; again, among democracies from different civilizations or with different moral codes; again, between 1st and 3rd World democracies.It is also weak along the frontiers of the Atlantic-OECD space: the tenuous peace among Atlantic democracies prior to 1830; again,among or with new democracies; again, with former enemies recentlyconverted to democratization; and the stabilization of new democracies. We shall argue below that DP theory has an underlyingweakness in explaining the sources and methods that were used for reaching the peace that currently pertains between the great powers within the OECD area -- the Franco-German peace, the Japanese-American peace, the Anglo-French peace, the Anglo-American peace -- which constitute the core intra-OECD dyadic relations without which there would not be a space of Democratic Peace at all.

These gaps raise a series of questions. Are there limits to the democratic peace as long as deep civilizational and socio-economicdivides persist in the world? Is work on the 3rd image level more useful for dealing with these problems? Are there normative differences between ancient and modern democracies that make the latter more mutually peaceful and cooperative than the former? What is the democratic ur-norm that makes for peace among democracies: is it one of mutual cooperation or one of non-violence in dispute resolution? Which is chicken, which egg: has inter-democracy cooperation been the cause of inter-democracy peace or has the peace been the cause of the cooperation?

We will deal with these questions by examining the gaps one by oneand considering their implications: how they affect the causal explanation for the peace among democracies; how they affect the policy implications of DP theory; whether sufficient practical policy “fillers” have been offered to supplement the theory; and whether the fillers ought to remain ad hoc and practical or becomesystematic and an organic part of the theory.

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We will do this by way of analysis of the way these problems are dealt with in the work of Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace65.This in certain respects has been the most ambitious exposition ofDP theory.

Russett’s book has a number of virtues that make it worthy of special attention66. It makes an effort to look carefully, with quantification where possible, at most of the gaps or weak points in the theory and see to what extent they can be closed. It recognizes that DP risks overextending itself by democratizing adventures outside the OECD area; it notes, parenthetically, that new democracies in Mexico and in the Mideast could bring dangers to peace with neighboring established democracies. It distinguishes normative from structural explanations for the DP phenomenon; and after weighing quantified evidence, it finds that the normative explanation is the greater operative cause.

The timing of the book could not have been better: it appeared just after the Cold War ended, when it really did seem within the reach of the West to “grasp the democratic peace”. That is a situation to which one can only look back with nostalgia; picking it up today, one can hardly help but sigh and wonder why we failedto grasp and consolidate the peace that seemed so close at hand. The title itself was activist, as might befit a mix of 2nd and 3rd image approaches to consolidating the closure of the Cold War rather than a pure 2nd image approach. The title suggested a perspective not just a theory: a perspective of using elements of DP theory in order to grasp the concrete post-Cold War peace. It was as if to say that the practical need was to focus on realizinga perspective on contemporary international development at a 65 Bruce Russett, with William Antholis, Carol Ember, Melvin Ember, and Zeev Maoz, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993). All subsequent citations of Russett are from this book.66 I should acknowledge the drawback that it was written more than a dozen yearsago, and itself gave rise to a wave of further research that could lead it to some updating. Nevertheless it remains extraordinarily valuable in that it covers both the full range both of the mainstream consensus DP theory and of thedifficult issues for the theory. A bibliography of DP writings, which shows the extraordinary extent of the literature, has been collected by Rummel and is at http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/BIBLIO.HTML

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moment of strategic flux, something that entailed dealing with thehighest strategic contingencies, not limiting oneself solely to replicable 2nd image work for democracy and believing that the theory would guarantee the rest on the 3rd image level. However, the bulk of the book left a different impression; it was devoted to empirical testing of theory, dealing chapter by chapter with specific problem areas for DP theory, and concluding with a strongperoration enjoining belief in the theory.

We will take up the book’s effort to deal with the problems of DP theory and practice in no particular sequence, but with cumulativeimplications.

The imperfect DP among Greek democracies: federative norms were less well developed

The classical Greek democracies present a problem to which Russettdevotes a full chapter (chapter 3, co-authored with William Antholis), entitled “The Imperfect Democratic Peace of Ancient Greece”. The chapter undertakes to reconcile the evidence with thetheory that they should not have had wars with one another, an aimin which is partly succeeds, while in the end acknowledging that this is one of the less satisfactory links in the theory. Let us not examine each argument to reconcile deviant cases with the theory, although some are problematic67. More significant for our analytical purposes here is the fact that the democracies were largely allied or confederated within a somewhat supranational Athenian empire in the period of their peace-dyads -- prior to andduring the Peloponnesian war -- so the dyads may be instances not so much of non-war between genuinely independent democracies as ofsuccess of alliance and of supranational organization in achievinginternal peace.

Given that the DP in the classical democracies was quite imperfect, this raises a question: Are the norms of modern

67 E.g., it is pointed out that eight of the war-dyads among democracies were essentially a single case, Syracuse, so do not really add up to a multiple-case rebuttal to DP theory. The point is true, but nearly all the war-dyads with non-democracies could likewise be counted as essentially a single war and thus a single case, namely the Peloponnesian War, so they do not really add up to a multiple-case confirmation of the theory.

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representative or federal democracy different from the norms of classical democracy? And does this difference explain the change in the quality of the Democratic Peace between the two eras?

Russett devotes some attention to the evolution of democratic norms from classical to modern times. He presents erudite, balanced evidence on the long-standing debate over to what extent there is a clearer public-private distinction and clearer sphere of individual rights in modern than in classical democracy. The upshot is that a significant difference or accentuation does exist, but not as much as is often implied. The difference is in quantity: it is more a continuity and forward evolution in democratic norms than an alteration of direction.

However, this does not mean that the differences should be minimized or treated as unimportant for the theory. Quantitative differences can have qualitative implications. These in turn couldhelp explain the flaws in the democratic peace in classical times.

This may become clearer if we shift the discussion from the usual public-private distinction to a somewhat differently worded one: that classical direct democracy was more exclusive or uni-level, while modern democracy is more federative and multi-level. This too is not an absolute distinction; multiple levels of political life existed in classical times and a primary level continues to exist in modern times. It too is simply a major accentuation or progressive evolution.

The accentuation of the public-private distinction in the passage from classical to modern times was arguably an underlying cause ofthe relative shift from uni-level democracy to multi-level federative democracy. The latter in turn is a positive causal factor for Democratic Peace, since the ability to cooperate on multiple levels makes both for peace externally and for moderationand stability internally. It provides a causal link between the public-private distinction and the difference in quality of DP in the two eras.

To elaborate: Classical direct democracy favored a single level ofloyalty, the city-state. Modern representative democracy is more

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cognizant of multiple levels -- the individual with a sphere of defined rights, the local government, province, nation, federation(in the case of federal democracies). Generally there is, among the several political levels, one that is the locus of primary political loyalty and gets called “the government”; the other levels are generally thought of as supplementary and helpful in maintaining its good order and capacity for managing problems, despite there also being chronic low-level competition between thelevels over the division of powers between them. The mutual compatibility of the levels is facilitated by the fact that democracy on each level is mostly representative not direct. Modern democratic government is run more by a professionally employed stratum of society, classical democracy more by the people en masse (again the term “more” is critical here; in both eras there were elements of both). “The people” appear in modern democracy in full force as general purpose political actors only during revolutions; otherwise they appear in the guise of the “citizenry” acting out defined and limited part-time roles (voters, party members, members of committees and organizations, recipients of media information, participants in discussion) that can be readily articulated to accommodate multiple levels of governance -- as can the roles of professional politicians and administrators. The difference also correlates with modern post-Christian norms -- universalistic, individualistic and partially de-mystifying the state -- in contrast to pre-Christian pagan norms, with the deification of the tribe or polity which is associated with a special god of its own.

The very existence of a sphere of codified individual rights givesall modern democracies, even the unitary ones, an inherently “federal” aspect, harmonizing two autonomous spheres of authority -- the individual and the state. The modern theory of the social contract codifies this; it is a theory of the state as a federation of individuals. Again, this intrinsic federal characteristic also existed in classical democracy, but in considerably weaker, incipient form. The difference helps explain why modern society gave birth to new forms of representation and federalism far surpassing those of the classics.

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If modern democracy is in these ways more freely “federative” thanclassical democracy, then for the same reason it is also more prone to a norm of cooperation beyond its borders68. This norm is highly relevant to the propensity for peace among democracies. This norm -- and the evolving practice of cooperation among democracies, which has come to grow in a cumulative and increasingly institutionalized fashion in the Atlantic-OECD space -- is one of the causes of the peace among democracies. It is possible that it is the primary cause.

This would have serious implications for the theory: for the cooperation of democracies is an incipiently 3rd image factor, and becomes explicitly 3rd image when it arrives to the point of institutionalization.

Thus, one of the major causal paths for the Democratic Peace passes from 2nd image democracy through 3rd image international cooperation and organization in order to reach the dyadic peace. The cause of DP is thus not limited to the two paths that Russett outlines. Both of the latter pass, or seem to pass, from 2nd image democracy to DP without touching the 3rd image, by way of national democracy creating limitations on national practices and perceptions which, when paired, serve to prevent the rise of Hobbesian-style mutual suspicions among democratic states. However, Russett’s normative explanation can, as we shall see, be reformulated to encompass the 3rd image factor.

In view of these points, it would seem that the better way to reconcile DP theory with the facts of classical Greece is, not to minimize the discordant evidence from antiquity and claiming that period almost equally well for DP, but to emphasize the progress

68 Again the term “more” is central here. Federal cooperation beyond city-state borders existed already in classical democracy, too, but in forms that were either weaker or less legitimate than in modern times, since representation, a necessary foundation for federalism, tended to be seen as contradictory to the norms of direct democracy. The Athenian empire was also a confederacy; but not afederation; it was more imperial than federal, and was inefficient. “Confederation” is traditionally viewed as an achievement of of Greek city-states, although it arguably goes back farther to the Sumerians; but it is also traditionally viewed as weak, and “federation” is largely a phenomenon of moderntimes.

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in the structures and norms of democracy from Solon to Madison. Specifically, one would emphasize the more federative aspect of modern representative democracy, and the fact that the federative norm entails a greater readiness to extend the norm of cooperationbeyond national borders.

This in turn would change the way DP theory describes the norms that make for peace, and with them, the practical lines for implementing democratic peace norms. How far it would go would have to be a matter of further research and testing. Potentially it could go as far as to say that the norm of federative cooperation among humans is the main thing from which war-avoidance and democracy are alike derived, rather than one of the other ways around. This would be a reversal of how DP theory has been understood. On the level of practical policy, it would imply that organization of cooperation among democracies is primary, notsecondary or incidental, for grasping the democratic peace.

Great Power dyads: FP has been necessary for DP

The achievements of rapprochement and peace among major democraticpowers are the most important instances for the democratic peace. They have never come painlessly or passively. Democratic peace has in each case gone hand in hand with democratic alliance and integration, with the latter playing an indispensable causal role in the process. FP has been necessary to DP, and elements of FP have developed prior to DP, in the critical dyads among great powers that lie at the very core of the democratic peace -- Germany/France, France/Britain, Britain/U.S., U.S./Japan -- the dyads without which there would not be a space of democratic peaceat all.

This has decisive causal and practical implications for future dyads of great powers that are democratizing. It suggests that thebasic problem in the mishandling of Russia since 1989 is that DP has been given too much priority over FP.

Let us consider these dyads one by one:

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Germany and France. What reconciled this crucial dyad after 1945 was not German democracy per se -- that existed in the Weimar years, too, when the relation did not end well -- but integration with the West and pooling of key spheres of sovereignty. The economic integration with France, begun in 1950 in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), made it possible for France to regard German industrial recovery without anxiety, indeed to support it as a part of France’s own thriving; the ECSC has subsequently grown into the EU, a 3rd image institution that has risen uniquely high up into the supranational stratosphere long considered unreachable for international organizations, although still with some way to go before arriving at federation. France meanwhile gotprotection at the start from any threat of a revived militarily sovereign Germany: NATO provided France in 1949 the Anglo-AmericanGuarantee that had been negotiated at Versailles but left unratified by the U.S. Senate. In 1954, when Germany joined NATO, all German armed forces, apart from local militias, were placed under NATO with its American Supreme Allied Commander; there was no German General Staff, no separate planning authority to make new plans for war on the Western front. At the same time, the German military was given a respectable role in NATO, with plenty of posts of honor and importance. And Germany got a Western commitment to support the reunification of the country, on condition that Germany renounced the use of force for getting backEast Germany. In the end, Germany got the greater economic and military space that its leaders had been dreaming of when they launched the world wars, but this time without war or domination, apart from the mild American domination expressed in the asymmetrical integration that took place on the Atlantic level. Democracy stabilized cumulatively in Germany and to all evidence became permanent.

The absence of such a 3rd image integrative system in the Weimar years, by contrast, led to democracy’s correlating with national humiliation for Germany. France remained unreconciled to a strong Germany and its army marched back in on one occasion in the 1920s;Germany in turn remained less than fully reconciled to its democracy and marched back out of democracy in the 1930s.

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To put the matter more broadly (so that the theoretical implications become apparent and applicable to subsequent cases such as Russia): Continued strategic separateness of Germany from the older Western democracies after 1919 meant a continuation of implicit enemy relations in the plans of the French military on the one side and the skeletal remnants of the German one on the other. This meant that Western democratic strength was viewed at best with mixed feelings in Germany: from a nationalist standpointwhich could not be denied a grain of truth, it was a national loss. It compromised the identity of the regime, making it hard for it to stabilize as a democratic one. When the Weimar democracyran into crisis with a new Depression, it was natural for new elites to shift the regime back to an anti-Western orientation, ina radicalized ideological form since this was a counterrevolutionary restoration not a continuation of the authoritarian ancien regime. The consequence of the unsuccessful democratization of Germany was a second and more terrible world war. How to count this dyadically, for the causal correlations forDP, is a hard question: the immediate war dyads were with a completely undemocratic Germany, but they were a causal product ofa failed democratization.

Japan and the West. Like Germany in Europe, so Japan in Asia and the Pacific finally got its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere after 1945 -- but as a part of the still greater sphere of organized cooperation under American-Atlantic leadership, rather than by new wars for domination over its neighbors. This Atlantic-OECD space is one that Japan partakes of through the G-8, the OECD, the IEA, the U.S.-Japan mutual security pact, informal linkswith NATO and ANZUS, suppliers’ clubs, and a myriad of other arrangements. It has done much to enable Japan to reconcile itselfto the other democracies, and to the global cause of democracy as the vessel for its own national success and its future. The problem of Japanese national identity has not, however, been resolved as well as the German, because the integration with America is mostly bilateral in the field of military security, less based on integration through multi-member institutions like NATO in the case of Germany, and lacking an equivalent of the EU. It is fortunate for Japan that the G-8 and OECD exist; they

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provide a saving element of equitable multilateral dignity for therelationship.

France-Britain. France and British reconciled as allies against the rising German threat after 1900. Shared democracy was a cornerstone of their co-alignment against the relatively more authoritarian German power, but that co-alignment was the cornerstone of the ending of their feuds, which for a thousand years had risen to the level of force or threat of force, and continued in the 1800s to rise to that level over lesser issues around the world. The rapprochement was reinforced by fighting as allies in the two world wars, and was deepened and institutionalized on the 3rd image level with the Brussels Pact (later WEU) and NATO after 1945. It was further deepened, althoughwith some secondary tensions reintroduced, when Britain joined theEU of which France had been a founder; from the standpoint of the British identity, it would have been a happier deepening if it hadbeen made through the OECD.

U.S.-U.K. The Anglo-American peace had a strategic as well as democratic basis -- and of course a genetic or filial one as well.It began in the 1820s with the de facto strategic rapprochement ofthe Monroe Doctrine, disguised however by America’s unilateral promulgation of the Doctrine; this reflected the depth of continuing popular animosity toward Britain after the Revolutionary War, which drew a line of blood that Americans used thenceforth to define their very existence and identity. As of the1820s, Britain was neither more nor less democratic than it had been at the time of its wars of 1776 and 1812 with the Americans; the regime was the same liberal representative one that had been basically in place ever since 1689. The choice of 1830 as a starting date for DP is arbitrary. The actual concrete Atlantic-OECD entity in the space-time continuum dates back at least to 1689, and it suffered a civil war in 1776 and an international warbetween its two main entities in 1812. The latter war is a painfulfact for DP theory, showing that the objective status of being a liberal representative government is not enough without subjectivefactors, e.g. mutual recognition as democracies or a feeling of being on the same side against the enemies of democracy. What changed in the 1820s was this mutual perception, along with hard

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facts of changes in 3rd image strategic alignment. The Monroe Doctrine did not stand alone; it went hand-in-hand with a split ofthe Holy Alliance at the core of the European balance of power into two halves, authoritarian East versus democratically-inclinedWest. This realignment was the foundation for the subsequent spaceof Democratic Peace that is dated, a bit too conveniently, to 1830. Britain’s further domestic democratic reforms were a separate matter, coming after 1830. The public Anglo-American rapprochement came still later in the 1890s. It was accomplished with the help of advance promotional work by grand cultural intellectuals such as John Fiske and Henry Adams and by strategists such as Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, and no lesser equivalents on the British side -- intellectuals and strategists who thought in terms of an English-Speaking Union or an Atlantic System and a Federalist Peace. This heavy-duty 3rd image ideal provided the basis for them to orient themselves determinedly toward the rapprochement, despite a century of habits of enmity and constant temptations of renewing it -- with guaranteed domestic political benefits -- in quarrels over particular interests. The rapprochement started out as a diplomatic co-alignment or informal alliance. It deepened into a fighting alliance in World War I. American plans for naval war against the British Empire continued to exist however into the 1930s. With thestill deeper fighting alliance of World War II and the institutionalized peacetime alliance of NATO, including integratedcommand structures and channels for joint military planning, such internecine war plans seem to have disappeared entirely and a Deutschian “security community” been fully consummated. The peace and the alliance grew hand-in-hand, with the alliance if anything coming slightly prior to the peace (in the Deutschian definition of an end of fears and plans for mutual war); and the alliance wasbuilt with the help of far-reaching 3rd image ideals early on, partially but increasingly realized in institutions later.

Russia: an unfinished case. Russia today is in the condition of an earlier Germany and Japan, wondering whether it can regain its strategic security space and economic space through the Western sphere, or must do so on its own. The evidence has been ambiguous:the West has provided it with a hope and a chance of doing it through the Western institutions, but only half-hope and half-

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chance, at times seeming to push it away. In turn, every year since 1991, it has been widely declared that Russia has given up on democracy and it is already too late to integrate it. Fortunately these past predictions have thus far all proved wrong.

It would be dangerous to give up on Russia too soon. It would alsobe dangerous to fail to recognize a renewed enemy in time. With Weimar Germany, too, there were the dual dangers of punishing it when it was weak and willing in the 1920s, and appeasing it when it was already too late in the mid-30s.

To the extent that there has been hope, it has been along lines ofshowing that Russia could become a member of the more serious Western organizations, NATO and OECD, not just OSCE or IMF; that it could through them regain a common strategic and economic spacewith its lost lands, without renewal of domination and resentment;that valid Russian security interests in its southern underbelly would be noticed and supported by the Western institutions; and that the EU would develop its “common economic spaces” with Ukraine and Russia as a combined space, rather than separately in a manner so as to divide them further from each other. The one trans-Atlantic institution that did bring Russia in to near-equal membership and participation -- the G-7, now G-8 -- proved invaluable in preventing a collapse in the Russia-West relationship during NATO’s Kosovo war, enabling Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin a modicum of dignity as they turned Russian policy around from the Primakov approach of backstopping Milosevic to an approach of joining in imposing on Milosevic a Western-dominated end to the war.

Russia is not just any test case. It was, throughout the cold war years and in the decade thereafter, the main case for the relevance of any theory of how to achieve peace. It is still half of the problem. The other half is the newly mushroomed problem of peace with the Islamic world, where the dream of re-establishing the Caliphate and a great power role in the world might define this as yet another Weimar-type situation, with the same genus of anti-Western ideologies dating back to the interwar years, when they were developed among Islamist intellectuals in cooperation with German Nazis.

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The West has responded to the Russian question since 1991 by reaffirming that Russia should become a good quality market democracy, and then it will be brought into the OECD and possibly considered for membership in NATO. Stable democracies, after all, do not make war upon one another. The matter has been repeated thousands of times. It has begged the question of how Russian democracy is to mature and stabilize when democracy seems to Russians to have correlated, for them as for the Weimar Germans, with an unending string of defeats and humiliations for their country. To be sure, if Russia were finally allowed to join NATO, it would thereafter have a real voice in Western councils and might get some attention paid to its interests; but in the meantime, it is the numerous, bitterly anti-Russian states of Eastern Europe that have been brought into NATO’s central Council,with prospects of still more Russia-adverse states in the post-Soviet CIS space being brought in next. It is they who are gainingan enormous voice in NATO thinking (and in the EU as well), makingthe alliance even less prone to give a decent hearing to Russian views and interests, after decades of the cold war when NATO circles practiced the habit of dismissing any friendly attention to Russian interests as dupery in face of Russian efforts to divide and deceive the alliance. Every strengthening and extensionof NATO, in these conditions, takes on the character, in the not-entirely-irrational view of Russians, of the strengthening of an anti-Russian force and a gaining of positions encircling Russia from which to put pressure on the country without regard for or even rational understanding of its interests. Russia has been given compensation with a NATO-Russia Council, meeting externally to the actual North Atlantic Council; on most major issues and in crisis situations, the compensation has seemed inadequate, ineffective and inoperative to Russians. In the case of the EU, membership is impossible for a long time, arguably forever in viewof Russia’s size and the EU’s fragile balance. The question of theEU’s “common economic spaces” with Ukraine and Russia is more immediate, but the EU has not made much effort to develop its “spaces” with the two countries in a manner compatible with a common space between them. If Ukraine keeps moving closer to NATO and the EU, these questions will become more urgent.

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In this lack of a proactive integrative approach has lain the greatest single source of the dangers to Russian democratic development, and the West has been virtually unaware of it. Instead it has for the most part simply repeated the formula that Russia should first become a good democracy and then everything will be solved naturally. This formula translates in practice intoa requirement for Russia to accommodate endlessly to Western demands (and to neighboring state demands), the West being the locus that registers and recognizes qualification for democracy and membership in the zone of peace. In this manner, perhaps Russia might eventually be recognized as a good democracy and then, at the end of history, maybe get everything added back unto itself -- security, recognition, integration. Or might not get it back, if, despite all its retreats and reforms, some of those numerous neighboring states proceed to veto Russia’s entry into the Western structures.

The West, as long as it is operating under the pure 2nd image version of Democratic Peace theory, feels -- logically enough -- no obligation to resolve matters with Russia on the level of the 3rd image. Instead, everything is felt to depend on Russia’s resolving matters on the level of the 2nd image. However, in orderto do that to the satisfaction of the West and get considered “a democracy”, it turns out in practice that Russia must meet all kinds of demands on the level of 3rd image international policy. The numerous natural and inevitable Russian influences on its neighbors are often defined in the West as directed against Western and democratic influence and as evidence that Russia is not moving toward democracy. What we get in practice is a combination of Western passivity on the 3rd image, Western activismin demanding Russian democracy on the 2nd image, and Western 2nd image demands that spill upward into de facto 3rd image calls for further Russian concessions and retreats that are treated as criteria for being recognized as a democracy69. This in turn serves

69 To his great credit, Prof. Russett has fought against the passivity of Western policy and urged a more mutually adaptive process on the 3rd image level, including a more seriously open door in NATO for Russian membership. Thislast stance has required considerable courage. The theorist is more than his theory, and bigger than those who have mistaken the theoretical single-factor model for the sole factor worth dealing with.

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to undermine the prospects of strategic rapprochement on the levelof the 3rd image, and to discredit among Russians the 2nd image Western democracy-promotion as something directed in a hostile form against Russia and implemented by double standards for the sake of eliminating Russian influence in its former space and undermining Russian central authority at home. A worse set of unintended consequences could hardly be imagined from such good intentions.

The problem is that single-factor 2nd image DP theory is only a model, verified partly by empirical testing, but has been treated by the West as the sole relevant factor, and further, treated as something adaptation to which has to be achieved empirically by Russia on its own rather than as a part of an interactive process of Russia-West rapprochement. One-way adaptive effort fits 2nd image theory; interactive efforts fit 3rd image theory. It is not hard to see which one makes life much easier for the West; by the 2nd image approach it gets to export virtually all the burdens of adjustment eastward onto Russia. That might seem fair in view of the injustices Soviet Russia perpetrated, except when one remembers that Russia has already turned itself upside down in itsrevolutionary adaptations, eliminating its Soviet regime and social system, peacefully giving up two large layers of empire, and reducing itself to boundaries from several centuries ago. Perhaps it was time after 1991 for the West to meet Russia, not halfway since Russia had already come over 90% of the way, but at least somewhere. An old Soviet ideologist could legitimately step in and denounce the petty bourgeois empiricism that has failed to see the need for dialectical interaction.

In the cases where DP evidence is weak: can faith in the norm fill the gap?

In the spaces where evidence for DP is weak, should we rely on other methods of achieving reconciliation, whether it be FP or traditional diplomatic compromise and power politics, or on faith?In other words, should we proceed by empiricism or fideism?

Here it seems necessary to issue a word of caution, or at least a reservation, about Russett’s concluding admonition: that belief in

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and repetition of the Democratic Peace view can have a constructive effect as a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would, he argues, strengthen the norm that democracies should not go to war against one another and help them tide over the difficult transitional periods. “Repeating the norms as descriptive principles can help to make them true.” (p. 136) In short, thinking can help make it so.

It is indeed true, when there is a certain kind of normative belief, and when there is decent empirical foundation already in place for the belief, that the spread of the belief can add to itsprobability of success. But we still do not have an adequate empirical foundation for thinking that the democratic peace hypothesis applies with newly democratic great powers, or between First and Third Worlds. Or that it applies where there are fundamental differences of societal interest. Or between differentcivilizations and religions.

Where we don’t have enough basis for a belief, we cannot count on the hope that believing will make it so. Rather, in these conditions, insistence on a belief usually ends up a matter of enjoining people to hide their heads in the sand and suppress the evidence of their senses. The danger shifts from too much skepticism to too much of what Hume called the “contagion” of belief.

Russett perceptively observes that the democratic peace theory might be severely challenged if democracy were to spread in the Middle East, since fundamentalists or radical nationalists might be elected and make war with Israel even more likely (p. 134-5). Isay it is perceptive, because his book was published in 1993, longbefore the U.S. Government settled upon democracy as the universalsolvent for the problems of the Middle East. But isn’t the call for repeating the basic DP formulation in the hope of making it a self-fulfilling prophecy, without any of the qualifications that Russett here and there wisely adds to the theory, itself a prescription for falling into such a trap?

“Thinking can make it so” is an old proposition; the doctrine goesback to William James and is known as fideism. It was denounced by

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the Vatican in its time as a violation of the more objective scholastic criteria of knowledge and belief. Bertrand Russell argued that it was based on circular leaps in logic and that its emphasis on the power of faith was at the core of the emerging “power philosophies” of the twentieth century, fascism and Communism. What the world needed more of, he intoned, was not “thewill to believe” (the title of James’ essay) but “the will to doubt”. This was in keeping with the empiricist tradition from Locke to Hume to Mill -- the tradition of denouncing the demands for affirmation of beliefs alleged to be useful to society, seeingin this the first step down a slippery slope of vicious circles and mental repression. Thus Locke’s warnings against seeing “enthusiasm” as evidence of truth and imposing on the mind; thus Hume’s description of the slippage from Is to Ought; thus Mill’s reminder that the presumptions of the utility of faith and the danger of doubt are dubious because the truth of a view is a part of its utility70.

Russell’s solution -- to exclude all self-reference in his Theory of Types -- is no longer considered viable: self-reference often takes place naturally, and works like Godel, Escher, Bach have celebrated it. Social belief can in fact affect outcomes includingthe verification of the proposition that is up for belief. At the same time, some forms of self-reference are still vicious and needto be excluded. It is not easy to delimit this category, but amongthem surely are most of the calls for affirming a belief because it is useful, particularly those that call for repression of doubtas a threat to public enthusiasm, or that seek to build a level ofpotency high enough to overturn, through the force of faith and public unanimity, the otherwise predominant reality.

70 The reference here is to their standard works. John Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, chapter on “Enthusiasm”; John Stuart Mill, Essay on Liberty; Bertrand Russell, reply to William James in Philosophical Essays, written in the happier daysbefore the First World War when it was all speculative, and his book Power written at the apex of Nazism and Stalinism, when the results were in full bloom. In the work of all these writers, running like a red thread through the history of modern liberalism, can be seen a single affectionate wish: to free the human mind from the grip of the vicious circles of authoritarianism. At the center of all their philosophies lay the untying of one and the same mental knot, the ur-knot: the feeling of a compulsion to believe because of constantly hearing that society depends on the belief for its survival.

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Self-reference seems appropriate, on the other hand, for established normative system. A public legal or moral order requires consciousness of itself and public affirmation of its validity in order to sustain itself, to lead people to build theirexpectations around it, and to marginalize violations. Nevertheless, the evidence of the existence of a normative order needs to be strong empirically if the attempt to consolidate it through belief and affirmation is to be successful rather than an exercise in self-deception and mutual deception.

Where does this leave DP? The evidence for DP is indeed strong within the OECD space, but weak elsewhere. Affirmation of a DP within the OECD space is system-consolidating and does not stretchcredulity, particularly if one affirms at the same time the concomitant role of the inter-democracies institutions that have grown quite dense within the OECD space. Affirmation of DP elsewhere, however, often requires too much suppression of doubt and of competing policy considerations.

Another risk of the argument from the utility of belief is that its main appeal will be not to the great minds but the small ones -- the people who can handle only a few simple thoughts at a time and cannot manage contradictory considerations, who would rather believe something because they’ve heard that it’s “good” to believe it than to examine it in its evidence and its ambiguities.There are those who, when contrary evidence appears, hope to overwhelm it by professions of faith and will. This leads to embracing the method of suppressing doubt lest it undermine the desired self-fulfilling effect of belief.

The politics of faith has been known to lead to demanding belief ever more hysterically as the policies fail worse and worse; this was a part of the dynamics of the totalitarian dictatorships of the early 20th century. Lenin upheld the role of faith in achieving potency of Party will; even Trotsky upheld the importance of self-validating faith in his last factional debates,marking a conservative reaction against the more liberal Burnham-

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Shachtman wing of his movement in 1939-4071. In the totalitarian fascist ideology found on the opposite, Right wing, the role of potency and self-validation through faith was even greater; the spirit was captured in the classic Nazi film, “The Triumph of the Will”.

While the call for belief and repetition of norms can be authoritarian, it is not always so. Russett does not have an authoritarian bone in his body. Indeed, has himself expounded manyof the important qualifications to democratic peace theory. Yet I can only wonder: how many of the millions who nowadays believe in the theory -- or even of the thousands who (I hope) have read his book -- are aware of those qualifications? How many would rather repeat the simple DP formulation than understand the complicationsand make an effort to deal with them?

We have seen above how the repeated affirmation of belief in the Democratic Peace can, when dealing with a separate great power with a previously opposing strategic orientation, create a viciouscircle, or a cart-before-the-horse problem. It does this by offering a temptingly easy substitute for doing the hard specific work of rapprochement that is needed with that former enemy country in order to actually arrive at a democratic peace with it.This has been the situation with Russia for the last fifteen years; it may soon become the situation with some Islamic countries. Given the choice between simply repeating the DP formula, or doing the hard reconciliation work with Russia -- workthat would be criticized at each step, both by old bureaucrats andby the new Eastern European members of NATO and the EU, as kowtowing to malignant Russian demands -- it is easy to see what the default choice will be, and in fact has been. If the West fails to achieve the result of a perpetual peace with Russia, and even becomes an obstacle to achieving that result, it won’t have to feel bad about it; from inside its DP theoretical framework, it71 Trotsky argued that maintaining faith in the USSR as a “workers’ state”, evenif degenerated, rather than dismissing it as a new kind of class regime belonging to the managerial or bureaucratic class, would keep the thread alive and sustain its identity as a workers’ state, even if a regenerating political overturn was needed to justify that identity. The argument went hand in hand with a partial authoritarian turn in the leadership of his movement. His articles in this, his last faction fight, were collected as In Defense of Marxism.

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can simply deny its share of the responsibility, and put all the blame on Russia for not having met the standards and become a goodquality democracy.

We noted earlier that FP theorists analyzed how 2nd image reformative plans, when treated as a solution for 3rd image problems that exceed their grasp, can slide toward extremism and repression of doubts in face of initial failures72. It would be hard to avoid seeing a step in this direction, fortunately as yet a mild one, in the call for more faith in the currently most prevalent 2nd image plan, as a filler for the still considerable empty spaces in its grasp on 3rd image problems.

And so one could end up with a sense of disappointment when one notices that, at the end of the book, Prof. Russett reaffirms the Democratic Peace proposition in its simpler form rather than compiling the qualifications to it that he has demonstrated elsewhere, and calls for more belief in it rather than attention also to the hard work that needs to be done on other levels in order to make the democratic peace real. It surely reads better this way: it is a stirring conclusion, and a comforting one too. However, rereading it a dozen years later, after the misadventuresof the U.S. in the Mideast and elsewhere on the basis of faith in the DP, one might wish for a conclusion less stirring and more troubling.

Dyads extending outside the OECD: weak spaces for DP and FP alike

In the extra-OECD space, the evidence on DP is thinner. Here againProf. Russett makes a major contribution, in one of the most brilliant and innovative chapters of the book: “The Democratic 72 In addition to the theorists we have cited on this -- Streit and Reves -- we could add Lord Lothian, Bertrand Russell, and Leon Trotsky, all of whom analyzedtotalitarianism as flowing in part from attempts to solve the international problem through perfection of national socio-economic systems. The Italian school of European Federalists classifies this analysis as “the critique of ideologies”. It is not an entirely novel analysis; it is structurally similar tothe analysis of repression, sublimation, compensation and overcompensation in Freud; or the analysis in scholastic and dialectical philosophies of the consequences of plenary substitutions and reductionism.

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Peace in Nonindustrial Societies”. It shows that, in groups of non-modern societies, something like a democratic peace does tend to pertain among the relatively more participatory societies -- not, however, in their interaction with outside cultures, but onlywithin local groupings of them, studied by themselves, as tribes that have had long-standing interaction with one another and know one another’s ways, indeed essentially have the same ways.

Among the 10 criteria elaborated upon by Russett for defining one of the tribal cultures as participatory, 3 are of a quasi-supranational character; they are described with phrases such as “multilocal decision-making”, some “effective sovereignty above the local community”, and joint executive and legislative or consultative bodies (p. 117-8). The results of this chapter thus actually support a combined federative-democratic peace theory, with some of its criteria for peace lying on the level of the 3rd image as well as that of the 2nd image, not a purely 2nd image democratic peace theory as a cursory reader might suppose.

A further question is how much of our problem is covered by this chapter. Tribal warfare can be devastating but tends to stay local. It may affect our understanding of some subcategories of intra-Third World relations, but not of the inter-relations between First and Third worlds. The latter are more important for global peace.

In the category of First World-Third World relations, Prof. Russett points out that the U.S. sometimes used covert actions to overturn elected governments, but was restrained from overt actionagainst a democracy. This suggests that a norm of Peace with Democracies has existed. However, it seems more likely that this was a result of specific Cold War PR necessities, given that the U.S. was fighting a global struggle in the name of democracy, thanof a general DP-type trust in or respect for fellow democracies.

One might also look at the case of the U.S. and India. The U.S. never fought a war of its own against democratic India. However, it was during the Cold War often ranged on the opposite side from India, which was close diplomatically to Russia. The U.S. was on the side of Pakistan while the Pakistan was fighting a major war

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with India. This hostile situation, verging at times on indirect war, arose despite the lack of such opposing interests or proximity as could have led to direct war between the two major democracies. America felt no specific interest in damaging India, only in propping up Pakistan. The source of the hostile situation lay in opposing American and Indian global strategic concepts. This led logically to opposite conceptions of national interest and to distrust of the other’s power and influence. It was embarrassing: democracy was America’s slogan during the Cold War, and India was the great Third World democracy. Yet it was a realitythat persisted until the 1990s, when Indian and American strategicconcepts were finally set on a course toward reconciliation by virtue of the end of the Cold War. Even this reconciliation was not much consummated, due to the passivity of post-Cold War diplomacy, until after the 9-11 attacks and the rise of shared perceptions of Islamism and China as threats. If, in the earlier period, the general strategic opposition had been coupled with a direct conflict of specific interests, it could have led to war.

Dyads with deep divides between societal norms or interests: more problems for DP and FP

Prof. Russett brings up the case of Mexico as one where democracy might or might not further peace with the U.S. The relation was peaceful in the many decades when Mexico was a PRI partocracy. After Russett’s book appeared, a highly emotional pro-American leader, Vincente Fox, was elected freely. Relations at first were even better than before, but the U.S. had to discourage Fox in hisdreams of social integration and free movement of people across the border: it is precisely this pressure that the U.S. hopes to remove through trade with and modernization of Mexico. What if thedisillusionment leads to an anti-American party coming to power inthe future? In the last couple years, elections have brought an entire series of anti-American leaders to power in Latin America, creating some security fears including renewed proliferation risks; polls suggest that Mexico’s turn could come next. War seemsimplausible, given Mexico’s weakness, but a considerable increase in border tensions would be likely. And while the Mexican militarywould seem wise enough not to wish for armed clashes, organized

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groups of smugglers, if backed by elements in the government and military, might bring them on anyway.

The border between the U.S. and Mexico, with its recurrent tensions and clashes despite the long period of state-to-state peace, can serve as a symbol of the line of division that runs between the entire First World and the entire Third World. It is adivision of fundamental societal interests. The South has an interest in the human right of its people to migrate into the societies of the North. The North has an exact opposite interest: an interest in its existing citizenship rights, which entail preserving its society as a corporate entity and limiting the influx of migrants whose numbers could undermine the “ownership” of the society by its present citizens or depreciate the economic value of that ownership to its working classes. While North and South have many interests in common, this divergence in fundamental citizenship interests defines them as separate societies not susceptible to deep integration in any proximate timeframe. It also creates recurrent humanitarian crises, and a potential for strategic divergence.

The proposition of Democratic Peace suffers a particular kind of weakness all the way along the First World-Third World fault line:an unlikelihood of war, but a likelihood of tensions. These tensions can sometimes be increased by democracy in the Third World. Here perhaps is part of the explanation for the phenomenon,noted by Russett (pp. 120-24), of the multiple covert U.S. actionsagainst democratically elected governments in the Third World. Andit is not just the U.S. that intervenes in the Third World, usually without war; its post-imperial allies, Britain and France,do likewise, often to U.S. applause. The democratic or non-democratic character of the government seems to make little difference in the fact of intervention, although, as Russett argues, in the case of clearly non-democratic governments the U.S.feels freer to resort to overt warfare (and covert intervention isoften harder in these cases). As long as the U.S. has democracy asits slogan -- as it did throughout the Cold War, and does today inthe war on terror, due partly to the influence of DP theory -- it will not want to intervene openly against democracies. But if covert interventions are counted equally, then the primary factor

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in deciding on interventions seems to be not democracy but the diplomatic orientation of the Third World government in question and its compatibility with basic Western interests.

Let us recall how and why this contrasts to the situation among the OECD democracies. The latter have an almost homogenous transnational society among themselves. They have few mutually opposing societal interests. The homogeneity enables deep integration to be pursued without fear of negative consequences for any of the constituent societies if it turns into the “first step down the road” to still deeper integration or union. And thispossibility enables joint institutions to be constructed strong enough to sustain a conception of the common interest that subsumes the national interests. Thus the absence of opposing societal interests leaves space for federative methods to succeed in overcoming former oppositions between raisons d’etat. This fundamental societal homogeneity is missing in First World-Third World relations; and with it are lost all the subsequent stages inpotential for integration and reconciliation of national interests.

To be sure, the OECD countries did not start out in an earlier erawith entirely compatible national interests, but the interests nevertheless were, in the term of Leibniz, “compossible” due to the societal similarity. The interests were reconciled by several hard methods: world wars, democratization of the losers, intense diplomatic effort at subsuming the valid interests of the defeatedinto the new order, and construction of joint inter-democracy institutions under American leadership. The latter proceeded in keeping with the predominant Hamiltonian strand in U.S. foreign policy which was not only commercial, as depicted in Mead’s important book73, but also Atlanticist and Federalist -- one need 73 Cited above in note 1. Mead perceives that Hamilton, thanks to his enthusiasmfor commerce and for an enlightened form of self-interest that holds out possibilities of mutual advancement through practical accords, could not be seenas having realism as his primary identity, or a faith in a Realist doctrine of humanity’s eternal unimprovability. What Mead neglects, however, is that Hamilton’s commercialism was also not his primary identity. Rather, his core identity was as a government-builder, a builder of the Federal Government to be precise. This would have been at the core of any biography he would have writtenfor himself, as it is at the core of the works of his many biographers; his

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only mention the names of Henry Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan (with his approving citations of Fiske’s and Curtis’ international federalism), William Clayton, George Marshall, Theodore Achilles. It was thus that the peace among the OECD democracies was constructed, after terrible wars.

The OECD peace seems secure. It has not been challenged by the badattitude of France toward U.S. leadership, although that creates awedge that risks giving rise to an increasingly divergent perception of interests. The source of this wedge lies in the radical opposition by the U.S. to French and British interests in the Suez crisis, causing France ever thereafter to follow a contradictory policy of being primarily an ally but at the same time always seeking to carve out more space for itself and strengthen its multipolar options. This will probably never lead to Franco-American wars. But it may yet contribute to a nuclear-armed Iran, or a China or Russia that is readier to pose challenges to the U.S., with all the danger to world peace inherent therein. And it is possible that it will lead to an EU with divergent interest-perceptions and ideological self-descriptions from the U.S.

In theory this could in turn someday lead to mutual criticisms fornot being “real” or good enough quality democracies, with the result of degrading the mutual recognition of democracies that is essential for fostering the Democratic Peace. For example, Europeans might come to say that since all good democracies must do away with the death penalty (a position they have already staked out in their conditions for Council of Europe membership and for recognizing post-Soviet countries as legitimate democracies), America does not qualify as one. Americans might come to say that good democracies would not permit the holocaust of easy abortion (building on the positions they have already staked out in their conditions for funding international family planning programs). And either side might question the democratic

private complaint when he was sidelined in later Federal politics was that he had done more to build this government than anyone else. He went back to his lawpractice, not commerce; but this too was unsatisfactory for him. His party identity was, appropriately, as leader of the Federalist Party, not the Realist or Commercial party.

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legitimacy of the other’s electoral procedures, whether because offaulty vote counting, excessive role of money in elections, absence or presence of referendum and recall rights, too much or too little centralization, infringement of civil liberties when fighting terrorism, or other cause. It has happened in the past between great democracies: Britain and America did not regard one another as fellow democracies in 1812, when they went to war; today we do regard them as having been similarly democratic and wehave to explain away the mistake. In the future, if relations become strained, Europeans or Americans may turn to these or otherreasons, seemingly far-fetched yet already well-rehearsed, for ceasing to regard one another as democracies. These possibilities seem remote, and with a modicum of wisdom they will remain remote.But they remind us that the course of wisdom requires not only a calm management of crises when they arise but proactive construction of instruments for avoiding a frequent descent into crises.

Transitional societies

This category recapitulates some of the problematic spaces discussed above, in two different contexts:

a. Countries in course of democratization.

There is some evidence that countries in transition are more likely, not less likely to resort to war, including war with otherdemocracies. The evidence has been hotly debated. In general, however, it is agreed that instability makes for war in all kinds of government, democratic or authoritarian.

One contributing factor seems to be stasis of the government and weakness of the executive, which seeks a way to affirm its solidity through external war. In other words, institutional constraints, which form one half of the explanation given for democratic peace, can also be a cause of democratic war. In the case of Russia, arguably the executive has acted on this logic in the wars in Chechnya, which have been used as an occasion for reimposing some central authority federation-wide after the

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extreme decentralization in the 1990s; one has a choice of regretting the terrible suffering visited on the Chechen people, or being grateful that Russia took it out only on a rebellious internal nationality rather than starting any major international wars.

A further risk is of a weak new democracy giving way to a totalitarian autocracy, using some of the counter-revolutionary anti-democratic arguments of the earlier ancien regime, but in radicalized form since “the Revolution” had already occurred and afull-scale counter-revolution or a new higher synthesis seemed necessary -- an outcome that would have been less likely had the authoritarian ancien regime survived and democracy never been attempted. This is the classic Weimar problem; it was also the problem of Kerensky’s Russia in 1917. The consequences for global conflict were in both cases devastating; the world could not afford one more such case in a major, nuclear power.

b. Developing, modernizing societies.

Here we face deep differences of interest with the democratic West. We also face an inherent Weimar-style situation in many parts of the world.

Almost all non-Western countries are modernizing. And all modernizing countries with aspirations to global power are arguably in a structural Weimar-style situation74.

However, the Weimar problem is usually mitigated in countries thatwere under full-scale, multi-generational colonial rule by Westerndemocracies. Totalitarian regimes have arisen mostly in countries like Germany, Russia, Japan, and China, that avoided long Western colonial rule; there are only a few ex-colonies gone totalitarian such as Cuba and Vietnam.

74 Alexander Yanov has argued this in his book, Weimar Russia, 1995, which appliesthe work of Theodore von Laue and Hans Kohn and develops a model of Weimar situations.

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Why Western colonialism has prevented new Weimars from arising75 issomething that remains to be studied. It was perhaps by puncturingthe sovereign romanticism of national elites and forcing them to adapt to the realities of the modern world before gaining independence. Not all national elites give rise to sub-cultures proposing a postmodern higher synthesis of Western modernity and national social solidarity; the propensity to this is strongest inelites in countries that have had maintained their independence and the full lineage of national pride and pretensions of connections to the original tribal gods, but tenuously under the pressure of a more dynamic and dominant West. The division of the West contributed greatly to the radical reactions against it: the West repeatedly discredited its own modernity, as long as it was competing internally for relative power and landed itself in worldwars76. It was World War I that gave rise to all the major totalitarian movements, even the Islamist one. Western unity, bothin the form of “democratic peace” and in the form of joint Westerninstitutions for coherent global policy leadership, give rise to other kinds of resentments, but not to new totalitarianisms; rather, it seems to have played a significant role in “re-crediting” the West after 1945: it was largely this winning of the“internationalism race” (as Christopher Jones, Daniel Duedney, andJohn Ikenberry have variously argued, as I have also elsewhere) that led the Communist version of postmodern ideology to give up the ghost in favor of the hope of peaceful reintegration into the modern West.

Incompatibility of major interests

Oil exporting countries have an interest in cartels and extortionist oil prices; the rest of the world has an interest in free and regulated oil prices (i.e. regulated by taxation among the consumer countries, not cartel or extortion). Will democracy 75 It may be that colonialism only delays Weimars until later, after the colonial-formed independence generation has died off; some India scholars suggest this, pointing to an indigenization of the Indian elite and a rise in Hindu fundamentalism. In this case we might be soon facing an awful situation ofWeimars all around the global South.76 This had been demonstrated already in the interwar and early postwar years inthe writings of Clarence Streit, Hans Kohn, Theodore von Laue, the latter developing the historical version of the theory of modernization.

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in Islamic countries contribute to peace with first world countries holding sharply opposed interests, or to more intense conflict than under the old undemocratic elites which often positioned themselves between their people and the West?

A similar consideration applies to labor forces. First World countries face immigration pressures along their borders from Third World countries, which have larger, poorer populations and growing youthful populations. From a purely economic point of view, it can be argued that the OECD countries sorely need these immigrants. However, there is a problem of social balance and lossof wages among longstanding low-paid citizens; after a tipping point is reached, immigration leads to too much social tension anddestabilization. When Puerto Ricans got a right to move to the continental US, a third of the population did so. This created only minor local tensions, because there were only several millionPuerto Ricans to start with. But one can imagine the consequences if it were Mexico, or all of the world, that got the right to movein freely -- or, in the case of Europe, Turkey. There is no good solution to this problem, except the modernization of Third World countries and stabilization of their populations. This is something that is happening, but not rapidly. It makes integrationof Third World democracies with First World democracies a very distant prospect77. And in the absence of integration, the numerousseparate raisons d’etat as well as the societal interests remain unreconciled.

First and Third Worlds: summary

As we have indicated, neither DP nor FP is sufficient to bridge the First World-Third World chasm and establish peace globally. Further: both could, if applied carelessly from First World to Third, increase the risks of conflict. The supplements they need here are not secondary but primary.

77 In the case of the Turkey, a country that straddles First and Third worlds, the question is whether it is happening rapidly enough to enable the EU to offerit membership without this serving as a form of suicide for the EU, or whether Turkish accession to the EU can be accompanied by sufficiently extended and sometimes indefinite transition periods.

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First World-Third World relations have at present two advantages: asymmetry and relative lack of intimacy. Traditional large-scale state-to-state war is rare across the divide. Asymmetrical war is increasing with the rise of global terrorism, but the main option is still the one that the two “worlds” have lived with for half a century: dual asymmetry, meaning that each is vulnerable to one another in a different way, leading to an equilibrium which, even if easily upset, would bring a asymmetrical response so that, in most cases, neither side could gain. This limits the extent to which either side is willing to try to impose on the other. It provides an element of stability. It is a case of good fences making good neighbors.

FP, if applied in the sense of a full-scale Federal State joining First and Third Worlds, would throw away these advantages: it would upset the equilibrium while putting the two worlds together into a sudden deep intimacy. This would raise the classic danger pointed out from Niebuhr to Bull: a new common State with the society beneath it divided into mutually distrustful segments. Each of the two major “parties”, First and Third Worlds, would fear that the other would get control of the State and use it to legislate its preferences, resulting in deep intrusions on fundamental interests. To avert this, each would struggle to get control of the State before the other could. If one succeeded, theother would secede. Such are the dynamics that could point toward civil war.

DP has another disadvantage: it can be read, or misread, as encouraging destabilization of moderate authoritarian regimes in the name of democratization, often in societies not ready to vote moderate and choose their governments in a stable fashion.

Thus, while both FP and DP have valuable uses if applied cautiously across the First World-Third World divide, both could do considerable harm if applied simply and broadly -- which is to say, if applied in keeping with the popular form in which they aremost often understood. FP’s dangers are the more far-reaching, butperhaps only theoretical since countries are unlikely to give up much sovereignty in unpropitious conditions. DP’s dangers, while

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less extreme, have greater probability of coming to fruition: hugerisks are already being run in the applications of DP in the Mideast.

When it comes to First World-Third World peace, DP and FP both need to be applied with caution, in carefully calculated and measured doses, every application examined empirically for its probable consequences. The expectations from them should be limited, even taken together. They should leave much -- probably most -- of the work of reconciling interests and sustaining peace to the methods of traditional diplomacy: communications, bargaining, pressure, power, compromise, and luck. A lot of luck will be needed -- fortuna as well as virtu -- until the day when the objective chasm between the two worlds is not so wide or deep and FP and DP can play a bigger role. There is no solid formula for getting from here to there: there have been many attempts at producing a formula, and many of them have value in addressing part of the problem, but none of them are definitive78.

78 As indicated earlier, there are many schemes for protecting achieved societaldevelopment through variants of “triadic” weighted voting that provide a dual veto for rich and poor countries respectively; this would mean, not a world government, but a strengthening of the existing world confederacy. There are also, however, schemes for gradually phasing out the weighting of the votes, so as to eventually arrive at a homogenous global citizenship and a genuine world government. The difficulty in all of these schemes is that equal citizenship means free movement, this in turn requires considerable homogeneity of labor forces if it is not to be socially destabilizing, and it is difficult to know inadvance when such a condition will arrive. On income equalization schedules, seenevertheless James A. Yunker, Rethinking World Government (Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 2005), who has run computer simulations for a gradual “world economic equalization program”; he finds that, if carried out over a period of decades, with rich nations annually paying a fraction of GDP into a capital distribution fund for the others, it could substantially reduce disparities without greatly reducing growth in rich countries. Yunker builds into his proposal some protections against corruption and against drastic income redistribution, among them, limiting membership in the global confederacy to democracies, triadic-type voting, guaranteeing each country the right to withdraw at any time, and leaving each country its full military sovereignty. Itis important to keep clear on the logic of this in regard to peace, which runs through several twists and turns: global economic inequality is a major tension but is one of the lesser causes of war in the present period; this tension wouldhowever be an obstacle to any form of consolidated peace that might be envisioned globally, and would need to be overcome in any global peace concept;

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Non-violence or Cooperation: which is the democratic norm that gets extrapolated internationally and causes DP?

Russett argues convincingly that democracy extrapolates its domestic norms to the international level, at least when it comes to relations among democracies, and that this can transform the international system. He distinguishes Structural (restraints on power) and Normative explanations for the phenomenon of peace among democracies, as follows:

A. Structural explanation: Democracies have domestic restraints ongovernmental resort to violence. This obstructs ever getting into war. This obstruction is mutually the reality and mutually known to be the reality when two democracies face one another. This knowledge greatly mitigates the Hobbesian situation (mutual fear of attack) between them.

B. Normative explanation: There is a domestic democratic norm of non-resort to violence when working out differences. This gets extended internationally to fellow democracies.

He proceeds to show, by detailed and multiply quantified regression analyses, that the Normative explanation seems to do better than the Structural one in explaining the evidence and accounting for instances of democratic peace. it would be a particularly sharp obstacle to a Federal or governmental peace on a global level; its overcoming is thus a necessary part of a full-scale World Federalism. There are many paths to overcoming the 1st World-to-3rd World disparity, not just a taxation path: globalization of normal trade has already been reducing the disparity in GDP for several decades; globalization of investment and outsourcing of production and services is overcoming the disparity even faster (raising fears of causing societal instability in the First World); reduction of third world population growth, if recent statistical curves continue, will soon lead the per capita income disparities to begin shrinking; education continues to spread globally; accelerating technological change favors equalization. Nevertheless, a world government, if established while gross inequality persisted, might need a “solidarity tax” along the lines of Yunker’s scheme, in order to soften resentments about second class citizenship and buy time for the other factors to work.

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It cannot be emphasized too strongly how important this is for prescription. Both mechanisms, to be sure, would prescribe the 2nd image spread of democracy as a factor making for peace. However, on the level of the 3rd image, the Normative explanation tends to favor international cooperation among democracies, while the Structural explanation has no particular implications.

However, the wording of the Normative explanation begs for clarification. When the democratic norm is described as “non-resort to violence when working out differences”, one is moved to ask: isn’t this put in too negative a manner? Is this really the basic norm of democracy (as at some points Russett comes close to saying)? Doesn’t democracy also have something to do with cooperation and providing mechanisms to facilitate people reachingagreement on collective policies? Isn’t the wording above too similar to the post-1960s ultra-Jeffersonian view that constraint on central power is the main virtue in politics, a view which in asense is identical to the Structural explanation?

To put the Normative explanation in a form more clearly distinctive from the Structural, and one that is truer to the heart of democratic theory and democratic norms, one might try turning it around and putting it in positive form, with formulations such as these:

Democratic Norm 1. Positive cooperation among people, based on mutual consent in transactions for mutual benefit (Adam Smith) andin the formation of joint entities in which they invest shared purposes (John Locke).

Premises: mutual sympathy and attraction among members of the same species (David Hume) who can perceive themselves in one another, identify with one another, and recognize themselves as equals (Thomas Hobbes), making possible the formation by mutual consent or “social contract” of joint corporations, including government as the primary public corporation, with decision rules facilitating the putting together of separate views and interests into a collective view.

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Corollaries: Cooperation has the result of leading to resolution of differences as a normal process in the course ofworking out cooperation. Society’s laws should set out a framework for cooperation to develop and accumulate within bounds of freely given mutual consent, while excluding coercion or fraud (John Locke, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Lionel Robbins). Any effective society functions primarily by doing things together, leaving law enforcement and prevention of violence as a residual, subsidiary tasks (David Mitrany). Government, as the public corporation that provides the underpinning and legal framework for other corporations and contracts, also superintends the peace and the prevention of violence.

Democratic Norm 2. Shared citizenship; mutual dedication; dedication to the Polity in the broad sense of the society and government taken together, not just obedience to the State as a separate entity (the idealist theory of the State, expounded in federalist form by Lionel Curtis); dedication to one another’s freedom (a libertarian version of or emphasis within the idealist theory, expounded by Clarence Streit).

These positive formulations of democratic norms ring truer than the negative one in the long tradition of democratic theory and inordinary perceptions of the meaning of democracy. It would seem more appropriate to use them for explaining the propensity among democracies for mutual cooperation rather than mutual conflict. They would be more helpful than the negative one in clarifying Prof. Russett’s argument for favoring Normative above Structural explanations, since they distinguish the two more clearly.

To be sure, the help they give to the scientific project comes notwithout a political price tag: they have far-reaching corollaries in the sphere of cooperation and joint institutional building. While for some this is welcome; and in any event it ought to be embraced if valid, no matter whether welcome or not. But it does come into conflict with the impetus for affirming a 2nd image theory. It points instead to a need for a substantial emphasis on 3rd image factors, elevating them into organic components of the

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Pax Democratica instead of just incidental gap-fillers for a 2nd image DP.

That the positive formulations are logically more sound can be seen from the consideration that it is not a specifically democratic norm at all for a government to enforce peace in its territory and require its citizens to resolve their differences peacefully. All modern governments try to do this, from the most democratic to the most totalitarian. What is specific to modern democracies, with their democratic citizenship, is that they encourage citizens to concern themselves with public purposes and work out their purposes and the government’s together; indeed, they treat the entire socio-economic as well as political system as one of mutual cooperation buttressed at the base by mutual dedication or “we-feeling”, with competition woven in to keep the terms of cooperation honest. They encourage the development of a myriad of autonomous cooperative arrangements among citizens on sub-national social and economic levels, regulating them simply sothat they will be honest and not cheat others directly or indirectly. From this norm of cooperation, the non-resort to violence flows naturally, not as cause but effect -- and with a central government embraced as necessary to enforce the effect against exceptions to the rule.

Non-democratic societies, by contrast, traditionally keep citizensout of politics, or in totalitarian societies require their involvement to add their energies and applause to the purposes dictated from above and to feign consensual development of the public purpose. They also severely restrict cooperation among their citizens, i.e. they restrict agreed behavior among mutually consenting adults, usually in the name of traditional morality albeit with an eye also to maintaining their own power against thedanger of people learning to get together too often and too freely. Adam Smith had to combat the residues of this false feudal“morality” when he advocated freedom of individuals to engage in transactions for mutual benefit by mutual consent. He did this by showing the greater benefit to the whole society, thereby pointing

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up the immorality of the allegedly moral restrictions of an earlier, more particularistic era79.

The representative form of democracy allows political consent and cooperation to be given in a relaxed, sometimes implicit manner rather than insisting on the need for its ever-immediate character. It permits the extension of democracy beyond the city-state, the development of federalism, and the building of every form of cooperation among democracies, loose or tight, without getting constantly entangled in charges -- as had existed in the Greek confederacies, whose representative methods were perceived as undemocratic given the direct conception of democracy -- that this is contrary to the free and democratic character of the country.80

79 Smith’s argument against particularist restrictions was not, it should be made clear, directed against later modern-style social or environmental regulation of the market. These regulations are, at their best, universalist notparticularist and operate on a basis of the assumption that there is already a general freedom of transaction. Lionel Robbins, the 20th century expositor of Smith, made clear the purport and limitations of Smith’s argument in Economic Planning and International Order (1937), The Economic Causes of War (1939), and essays that he later collected in Money, Trade, and International Relations.80 In saying this, I realize there is the irony that in the U.S., there was nevertheless a strong ideological aversion to cooperation with other (European) democracies until well into the 20th century. The mass aversion finally ended after 1941 although it could be argued that elements of it revived after the 1960s. The explanation for this anomaly is that the victory of modern, Madisonian-Hamiltonian democracy, while consummated institutionally after the Constitution, was never really consummated ideologically in America. The rhetoric and ideology of America remain primarily based on Jefferson and on the revolution of 1776 against Britain and against central government, sometimes deepened by reference to the Puritan “Pilgrim fathers” and their trek to find freedom in a virgin land not plagued by the corruption and tyranny of the Old World. Suspicions abounded ever after 1776 of “corruption” and loss of America’sfreedom through connections to British and other European diplomats. This heavy residue within the U.S. of the old ideology of classical republicanism has been one of the primary obstacles to the growth of the democratic peace, which nevertheless grew, in fits and starts yet cumulatively, with the slow-motion Anglo-American rapprochement that began in 1823 and reached fruition in the 1890s, and the subsequent slow-motion construction of the trans-Atlantic alliance and economic confederacy of democracies that began in 1917 and, despitea bout of renewed isolationism, reached fruition in 1949.

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The basic democratic norm of cooperation is one that is freely based but institutionally developed. It encompasses coercively empowered democratic states institutions without being limited to them. It is a positive, active norm and one that affirms legitimate force, not a negative, passive, force-refusing norm.

The importance of this cooperative norm indicates that democracy extrapolates a somewhat different norm is to the international level than is implied by the subsidiary norm of non-resort to violence. It suggests a “federative norm”: development of arrangements of cooperation on the international level, development of international institutions for cooperation, development of democratic participatory elements within existing international institutions, development where possible (as yet almost nowhere) of international institutions with democratically based coercive authority81. It implies the application of the federative norm on at least two levels: cautiously with all the world, or wherever there is interdependence that needs managing; more enthusiastically among democratic countries which have

81 More broadly, the federative norm is the norm of cooperation and mutual organization among people at all levels where they have sufficient interdependencies and commonalities, coupled with a conception that organizationon these multiple levels can be and ought to be mutually supplementary, mutuallybalancing, mutually restraining when necessary, but ordinarily mutually supportive or “subsidiary” (the mutual support among the different orders of society is the original meaning in Catholic social theory of this much misunderstood term). Transposed to the international level this translates, as we have indicated in the text, into construction of international organization, up to and including federation, as desirable in almost all cases where feasible,given the growth of interdependence and the relative lag of international institutions by comparison. Daniel Elazar has elaborated on federalism as a normin itself, rather than a merely technical arrangement, building on covenant theology -- also known in its time as “Federal Theology” -- in order to derive anormative foundation for politics. Transaction press has published four posthumous volumes of his on the development of the covenant in history. Elazar devoted an issue of Publius magazine to federalism and the covenant, another to “Federalism as Grand Design”. In the latter it was shown how John Dewey emphasized the norm of organizing collectively and democratically at every levelof “community”, i.e. wherever there is a constituency with substantial common interests. Dewey noted the global community as one such level. In this way, Dewey’s norm of democracy merged with the norm of federalism, each implying the other.

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sufficient compatibility of basic interests, i.e. the OECD countries.

And in fact, just as we have seen the “Space of Democratic Peace” emerge among the Western grouping that is usually counted in the literature as starting out on the two coasts of the North Atlanticaround 1830 and since has expanded to the OECD grouping, at the same time we saw emerging a network of cooperative and alliance relations developing in the same Atlantic-OECD Space. And, as we have seen, the Cooperation/Alliance has tended slightly to precedethe Peace in the sense of ending of fears of mutual war, although each has reinforced the other. To review the record: the Atlantic-OECD Cooperation-Alliance Space began with the 1820s Monroe Doctrine with its American reliance on the British Navy, followed by the Anglo-American rapprochement and diplomatic co-alignment ofthe 1890s, the Anglo-French rapprochement, the intimate trade and investment relations among these countries, the World War I Atlantic alliance, which was supposed to be further institutionalized after the war in the form of an Anglo-American Guarantee to France alongside the global League of Nations but instead was dropped when ratification of the League was defeated by a minority in the Senate, the off-and-on Anglo-American-French diplomatic cooperation throughout the interwar years which enabledthe League to function anyway even if haltingly, the unreliabilityof this de-institutionalized cooperation and its inability to integrate the fragile German democracy, the reversion to autocracyin Germany and world war, the revival of the Atlantic alliance in stronger form with a supranational Supreme Allied Commander in World War II, and the plethora of closely interconnected post-1945institutions that finally integrated Germany and Japan, beginning with the Marshall Plan and growing into the OEEC, EU, OECD, G-8, NATO, the U.S.-Japan and ANZUS alliances, NPC, EAPC, and a number of other structures and arrangements.

Which is chicken, which egg: the peace among these countries or their cooperation and mutual organization? Or a third factor, the solidity of their democracy? There is no final “original cause” among these three factors: the causality runs both directions along each line connecting them. Together they constitute a powerful triangle.

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At the same time, the record indicates that a cooperative reconciliation of strategic interests has a certain kind of autonomous role: it always tends to make for peace, no matter whatthe countries, whereas a failure to reconcile interests makes for conflict, even if among countries that for the moment are democracies.

Britain was, by our standards today, already a representative liberal regime, i.e. the kind of regime that fits democratic peacetheory, by 1812, and probably ever since 1689, but America fought a war with it anyway, and did not recognize it as a democracy until much later. Hamiltonians and Federalists quickly returned toregarding Britain favorably again after the Revolutionary War was over, and wanted a strategic alignment with Britain, but Jeffersonians abhorred Britain as the monarchical enemy and got America back into war with it in 1812. A de facto strategic co-alignment was formed by the two countries in the 1820s, under the Jeffersonian President Monroe but on the inspiration of the British Foreign Office and of a American Federalist progeny, John Quincy Adams. Subsequently came the gradual mutual recognition as democracies. In the 1890s came a broader strategic-diplomatic co-alignment and popular rapprochement. It was the embryonic co-alignment and sense of shared interests of the two countries that depressed the likelihood of their going to war after the 1820s, although it did not eliminate plans for or fears of war. The lack of such a shared strategic perception prior to the 1820s enabled the two democracies to go to war in 1812; indeed, in America therewas an opposite perception of Britain as the strategic enemy, a strategic concept inherited from the Revolutionary War. The changemost relevant for the peace was not in the quality of British or American democracy between 1812 and, say, 1892. It was in the fledgling development of cooperation based on a shared strategic concept and shared interest. The fact of being essentially similarrepresentative democracies helped, as an underlying enabling factor; the specific strategic rapprochement seems to have been needed to render this factor causally operational on war and peace.

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Gaps in Federalist and Democratic Peace theories compared and “filled”

Some of the gaps in contemporary Peace needs are filled better by the Federalist Peace theory, some by the Democratic. Some are not adequately filled by either.

The Federal theory has done better than the Democratic in the pastwith emerging or reforming great powers. It did better with Germany and Japan; their integration stabilized their democratization after 1945, whereas Germany’s democratization was unable to stabilize the non-integrative peace settlement after 1945. For similar reasons, FP could do better than DP with Russia if applied. However, it may not be able to do better or even as well as DP with India and China.

The Federal theory deals better with fledgling and unstable democracies within the range of reach of its present Euro-Atlanticintegrative structures, because it prescribes a home within which to anchor their identity and development. However, it suffers along with the Democratic theory when it comes to new and fledgling democracies elsewhere in the world.

This hole may be potentially filled by the formation of the global“Community of Democracies” (CD) in the late 1990s, but probably only in slight measure. This “community” has as yet little substance, consisting only of a few summit meetings; nor is it intended to ever become more than a very loose intergovernmental association of all democratic countries, for the perhaps good reason that the objective criteria for a deeply integrated community are lacking. Whether the CD is an FP or a DP idea is open to question; its rhetoric has been more DP, but it was FP proponents such as James Huntley and the late Robert Foulon who founded the Committee (now Council) for a Community of Democracies.

In one major matter the two theories have a very similar limitation and gap: they cannot resolve the problem of tension

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between First World and Third World. This is at the root of most of their other difficulties noted above.

The gaps in both theories are because of largely intractable realities in uneven global development, among civilizations whose roots go back millennia when they were in only slight communication and were developing largely separately. The disparity in development became quite sharp several centuries ago when Europe, as part of the same process as uniting the world in communications and commerce, developed modern science and technology. These are objective gaps. They will have to be overcome both by remedial effort and by objective processes. Some of the processes are in motion but which have a long way to go. Atthe present pace they would take many decades for completion, although unforeseen technological developments could change the timescale.

Nothing is helped by narratives that blame the disparities on Western exploitation, or argue that they are to be expiated by collective self-sacrifice of the wealthier societies. A substantial minority of intellectuals is able to convince itself by such argumentation, which has become a major cottage industry, but will remain forever in a cul-de-sac. Most people understand that it was the innovation, initiative, and scientific developmentof early modern Europe that made the difference; and the most relevant lines of remedial effort in the Third World have come from those who have recognized the reality and moved toward adapting to modern methods, not those who have wallowed in blamingthe West. In any case, societies will never sacrifice their fundamental collective interests, even if could be demonstrated that they were guilty and deserved it. It would only lead to civilwar, not to peace, if they seriously attempted it. The business ofDemocratic and Federalist peace theorists is to lead societies to where they should go from a standpoint of public policy, not to urge on them a destabilizing lunge at suicide as a moral gesture.

Third World economic growth has accelerated and outpaced that of the First World. Population growth has slowed. However, Third World populations continue growing and this swallows up a major portion of the economic growth; as a result, the per capita income

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disparity between First and Third worlds continues to widen. The population disparity between Third and First worlds also continuesto widen. It is a scissors that contains a huge amount of tension between its widening talons. We are not yet at a stage when these dual contradictory disparities are evening out; as yet they continue to grow, and the tension with it. A visible manifestationof this is seen along the borders of each First World country where immigration pressures are fended off.

If neither DP nor FP has a reliable comprehensive solution to thisproblem, each makes a contribution nevertheless. DP encourages expectations and norms of restraint in mutual conflict among democracies across the First World-Third World line; it also encourages support for stabilizing of weak Third World democracies. FP encourages such integration and institutionalization as is possible despite the divide. World Federalists resort to triadic (dual-veto) voting and de facto acceptance of a goal of confederation not federation in order to reconcile First and Third Worlds into a common scheme. This amounts to accepting that integration will not be deep or adequateto guarantee peace; nevertheless, it would serve to enhance substantially the joint global structures. Atlantic or “inter-democracy” Federalists offer a different tack: Union of the stableindustrial democracies on one side of the divide, in order to reinforce their global leadership role and render it more consistent and contributory to a more orderly world. This could domuch for global management, although it again cannot eliminate thefundamental divergence of interest.

An old logical conundrum: would DP/FP still work if it was the whole world?

Another shared problem between the Democratic and Federal theoriesis that of extending their Peace to the entire world. Democracies have not attacked each other while they have had major undemocratic enemies to face, but what if all the countries of theworld were democracies? Would not other differences of interest come to the fore and become grounds of conflict? And would not

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their Union -- if they were working by FP -- stop at the last lineof conflict with a non-democracy and then begin to break down?

It is akin to Russell’s Paradox (that the concept of “the totality” is inherently contradictory). It is what leads people tocomment that the world will unite only when it is attacked by extraterrestrials.

Russett acknowledges that the norm of democracies not attacking one another is one that has been developed in part with the help of alliances against enemies -- Sparta in classical Greece, Germany and Soviet Russia in the 20th century. This suggests it would better to use an active, positive, collaborative-federative definition of the shared democratic norm, instead of the more negative, passive, non-resort to force definition.

However, if the norm flows largely from wars against an enemy, howcan it ever extend to the entire world, when there would be no more enemy? The last countries -- probably quite a few of them -- would be joining the zone of peace without any enemy to push them in.

This is a clever argument, a logical conundrum long ago put forward by opponents of world government and equally serviceable against DP theory. It is made to sound like a strictly logical impossibility when the minor premise is inserted that people uniteonly against an enemy. But of course that is untrue; people unite for positive purposes as well as negative. Weren’t Americans united by the war against Britain? -- so asked Niebuhr in his polemic against world government. Yes, but they were united by that war only into a confederation in some respects weaker than the unity they had enjoyed earlier under British rule; they built their Constitutional Union only after the war was over, out of fear of losing their hopes of a great united country if they let their unity fray in the absence of an enemy.

The theorist who most brilliantly argued for the primacy of the enemy-relation in politics was a moderate Nazi, Carl Schmitt; he argued that friend is defined in relation to foe, Self to Other. It is a dramatic comment that has appealed to many a realist, but

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untrue to reality: humans have positive loves which stand by themselves as well as negative hates and fear; babies usually findtheir mothers and recognize them as friends before they find any enemies; others can be perceived as Other only because there is a prior inner sense of Self. Even Schmitt acknowledged some limitations to his point, such as the possibility of a constitutional order outliving its constitutive enemies. Inter-democracy federalists have taken this point one step farther, using it for a forward strategy: to unite first the democracies that are extant and objectively compatible, using any fact of actual enemies to concentrate the mind on union, give it a depth that can outlive the enemy-relation, and subsequently extend the union to former enemies when possible. This strategy has worked well. And the late-entering former enemies have not depleted the spirit of the inter-democracy confederacy; rather, they have sometimes revived it in moments of lagging internal enthusiasm82.

More broadly, the conundrum has always been answered in the FP approach as follows: (a) proceeding with such construction as is possible on the global level, such as the League of Nations and UNSystem, deepening this unity gradually over time on a basis of thepositive cooperative elements in human nature as well as the occasionally global rallying against entities such as al-Qaeda that almost every country recognizes as an enemy; (b) proceeding at the same time with the more intimate cooperation and institution-building that is meanwhile possible among democratic allies, starting with an initial core alliance and then widening and deepening it; and (c) encouraging these two levels to

82 The late-entrant ex-enemies -- Germany, Italy, Japan, the Eastern Europeans -- have been among the most loyal members of the Western democratic confederacy,perhaps because they feel they owe to it much of the credit for their success ofdemocracies despite their unpromising previous histories. In the 1990s, the Eastern Europeans renewed the spirit of NATO which, having long put aside its founders’ federative mode of thinking, was suffering in the West from a widespread argument that it was merely an enemy-defined alliance and ought to bescrapped in the absence of its defining enemy. U.S. President Bill Clinton, at first inclined to favor OSCE as substitute not supplement for NATO, credited Czech President Vaclav Havel, visiting Washington for the dedication of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993, with convincing him of the future relevance of NATO.

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collaborate and eventually grow together, like stalactites and stalagmites, until the world is effectively united.

In this way, it seems clear that, in principle, the conundrum can be bypassed and the world united. And the unity would have time todevelop self-regenerating capabilities. The question becomes, would these capbilities suffice to outweigh the disintegrative tendencies?

The Federalist theory has some advantage over the Democratic one in keeping the norms of unity alive even after extending itself toencompass the totality and losing the momentum of facing an external enemy. DP has learning and self-regenerating features that might sustain it in the absence of an enemy, but less than FP. For example, the common institutions of FP symbolize unity and provide a focus for shared loyalties. They provide offices devoted to unity and institutional memory of cooperative practicesand of a shared history of unity. Experience in times of enmity teach that cooperation brings rewards; the institutions continue thereafter to structure the incentives to favor cooperation and make it beneficial to the parties. Cooperative roles have been developed and practiced in the institutions; the spirit of cooperation has been exercised; there is a moral investment in union. Even when the enemy is gone, the channels for cooperation remain visibly available; they do not disappear of themselves, butwould have to be actively thrown away in order to escape the norm of cooperation.

Absent the shared institutions, the norms of cooperation are more fragile, less likely to gain a combined cumulative character, morelikely to get thrown from their track as the global geopolitical equations shift from one period to another. The space of Democratic Peace and Cooperation from 1830 to 1939, prior to its institutionalization, grew, but very slowly (apart from the internal growth of the US, which was based on institutionalizationin a Federal Union structure that made possible rapid expansion), and it was not always cumulative: reversals were seen in Weimar Germany and interwar Eastern Europe, and earlier several times with French democracy in the 1800s. The growth of this same Peace Space after 1947, when its permanent federative

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institutionalization began, has been considerably more rapid and almost uninterruptedly cumulative83.

A norm of purely negative peace or non-war among democracies, withneither a positive cooperation norm nor joint institutions to reinforce it, would be still more fragile, and harder to extend globally. In the absence of an enemy to unite against, it could easily get lost in the shifting sands of other interests. And interests would indeed once again behave as shifting sands, even among democracies, given the absence of cooperative institutions: unavoidable evolutionary changes in economic patterns would lead naturally to changes in national interests and geopolitical patterns.

It is the strong imbalance of cooperative interests over opposing interests that favors peace. The embodiment of cooperative interests in institutions gives them a focus of identity, commitment, visibility, memory, teaching, and reproduction. Institutions can extend their membership, as the EU and NATO have done in a series of stages ever since being formed, with the post-1989 stage being only the most spectacular. They can also deepen and democratize their methods, as the EU has done. They can extendand diversify their missions, as the EU and NATO have persistentlydone, thereby broadening their normative base. There is no logicalreason why this process could not go on to encompass eventually the entire world, with the institutions growing ever sturdier in the process, although there might well be sociological reasons whytoo wide a membership too fast could be self-destructive84. This was Streit’s answer to the conundrum of how to unite the whole world despite the lack of a common enemy: world government can be formed in seemingly contradictory stages, starting it as a Union among a group of countries with enough positive commonalities of ethic and interest to hold their reasons for unity invariant 83 However, it remains potentially susceptible to reversal in several countries,most notably Russia, where it domestic institutionalization is far from completeand its international institutionalization is only beginning.84 It is my view that EU-NATO expansion has to pace itself carefully once its gets outside the OECD-OSCE area, and in most other areas of the world wait untilthe societies and economies have converged much more closely with the West. Otherwise it would become destructive both to the legitimacy of the joint institutions and to the stability of the underlying Western society.

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through all the changes in enemy configurations, expanding it as others develop enough commonalities to join, and eventually spanning the world. If the jury is still out on whether it will ever become worldwide, it is for socio-economic reasons, not the enemy-dependence that Schmitt posited.

The future perspective

Russett calls for foreign policy in the future to be “carried out collaboratively by all the rich nations”, relying “heavily on international institutions” (1995 preface, p. x). This is a truly big filler for the gap in DP. It would help span the abyss betweenthe present and the future, by providing a long-term bridging factor, relying on the industrial democracies for global leadership. But isn’t this the same prescription as Clarence Streit’s? It was one of his two reasons for calling for a Federal Union of the Western democracies: their collaborative unity needed, he held, to be given a form sufficiently powerful and efficient as to be able to plan foreign policy together over the long term and remain reliable in its implementation together despite the separate vicissitudes of domestic politics. This meantforming a Union-wide “domestic politics” for joint business, freeing the common business from subjection to a couple dozen contradictory national trends which had hitherto served to tear apart any long-term, difficult, costly joint peacetime policy. With a Union holding the predominant forces and finances of the world and capable of planning policy together, it would be able tomaintain policies fostering global stability and convergent development.

The other reason for a Federal Union was so the matured democracies could proceed to expand the Union to new democracies, a feature that serves both as an incentive for other countries to democratize and an aid to them in stabilizing as democracies. We might call this the “attraction-and-stabilization function”. It has in fact proved a major factor in subsequent history.

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The posited Federal form of Union, interestingly, has not proved necessary for the attraction-and-stabilization function: the EU and NATO have performed it impressively in their present forms. The Federalism has not been irrelevant however. The Federal goal of the EU was important for maintaining expansive intentions and appeal. And in the absence of the Federal form, the process of expansion has at every point raised difficult widening-deepening tensions, forcing it to proceed slowly and sometimes with dangerous delays. Yugoslav analysts have pointed to their wars as avoidable had the West been readier institutionally in 1989 to throw an umbrella over them. In Russia, an even higher price may be paid for the unpreparedness of the Atlantic institutions for a full widening, given their lack of deepening in decision-making. Full federation has not been necessary for all parts of what FP theory promised; but taking “federalism” as a scale of federative integration ranging from zero to full federation, the extent of the fulfillment of the promises has correlated with the extent of the federative integration.

It is a necessity of maturity for Federalists to accept the inevitable watering down of ideal into policy and to welcome what can be achieved in practice, indeed to be glad to know when it is found that some portions of the ideal are not as necessary as had been anticipated; but one should not ignore the price that is paidfor watering down. It is a false maturity to equate the Rational with the Real and identify with the watering down as something allfor the better. Immediate full federation is not a prospect anywhere on the international level, and within the inter-democracy grouping only the EU comes close to having a chance of it. What can be achieved for world peace by inter-democracy integration short of federation has been proved enormous, overcoming the German and Japanese problems and peacefully ending the Cold War. What remains to be achieved is still more enormous. The Federal Democratic Peace theory, from Hamilton to Streit to the present, lays out an agenda that remains heavy, but is not unhopeful.

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ADDENDA

A.

Limits of the role of military hegemony in Hamiltonian peace theory

Hamilton writes in The Federalist, No. 29, that “the power of regulating the militia and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy.” His wording is careful: the role of regulation of force is not to “establish (create) peace”, but to “watch over” or superintend it. And not “peace” in general,but “the peace”, a phrase that Hamilton uses repeatedly; it recalls ‘the king’s peace’, the great accomplishment of the early modern sovereign state. “The peace” is a concrete thing, a positive order, not a generic condition such as the mere absence of war. It is a peace connected to a unified supreme political order in a defined territory, enforced as a substantive thing thatpervades the air of the kingdom and underpins its life, breach of the fabric of which is punished with a fair amount of regularity. Ideally, punishment serves to create a sense of the fabric being restored and justice having been done.

“The peace” is created by politics and societal power and influence; police and militia only “superintend” it and help sustain it from moment to moment. Government, whether formed by federal Union or by other means, does not “create peace” merely bythe fact of proclaiming a supreme power and unified military; rather, government establishes “the peace” if and only if it is able, by use of all the political and military arts, to establish itself as the sole and generally recognized sovereign political authority in its territory. The ability of the militia and police to sustain and superintend “the peace” is dependent on the ability

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of the government to sustain its legitimacy, i.e. the loyalty of the people to it as the bearer of “the peace”.

It has long been a verity of international relations theory that government does not in itself create peace, if only because government itself can be an object of contention for capture by factions, eventuating in civil war: it is the cohesion of the society that is the main guarantor of peace. Further: the people enforce the law on one another in ordinary conditions, through education and social pressures, resorting to the police for exceptions not as a rule. This is explained in refutation to the common optical illusion that, since one of the prime duties of anygovernment, after it has been established, is to superintend “the peace” that is proclaimed with its establishment, therefore the establishment of government ipso facto establishes peace. In reality,the main thing that establishes “the peace” in every stable country is the political will to be in a common society and state.What can be said for government is that, if adequately popular or legitimate, its existence serves to sustain this will on daily basis: by superintending the peace, it justifies its existence; and its power tends to head off the formation of thoughts and plans for operating on a different basis. However, if confidence breaks down between portions of society, particularly geographicalsectors, as to whether they belong together in a common society and polity, government may snap and fail to ensure the peace: the sectors may fight for control of the government and its power, exacerbating their conflicts; they may separate; or government mayhave to fight to suppress separatists, breaching the peace in the name of sustaining the peace. And such civil wars are usually far more brutal than international ones. The civil war in America was a case in point: if it had really been just a “war between the states”, as southern confederate theorists still prefer to call it, it would not have been nearly as bloody.

The issue that Hamilton and Madison foresaw between North and South was one of doubt as to whether there was sufficient will to be in a common society and state, and thus to have a condition of “the peace”, or whether interests diverged too much for that. The Constitution, thanks to its rules prohibiting State regular armed forces and providing for Federal training and federalization of

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the State militias, ensured that the power of the Federal Government would be sufficient to maintain “the peace” locally andamong and over individual States, whose conflicts with one another would never be profound, and accordingly would never rise to the level of a serious will to secede -- but not between regions representing half the Union. And it would not create this peace among the individual States ex nihilo; rather, the Federal Constitution would reinforce and reaffirm this peace, which was inFederalist legal theory inherited by the U.S. Congress on 4 July 1776 from the very “King’s peace” that was being divided. The Congress after 4 July did not have in practice sufficient power tosustain the lawful peace among individual States, whose governments held too much de facto power; fears were growing that the occasional minor breaches in the peace between States would become larger and more general. The Constitution gave the Federal Government the practical powers and structures to make good on itslegal sovereignty and put the peace among the individual States ona reliable basis.

Sustaining the peace across the borders of individual States was one thing; creating and sustaining the peace between the differentsocieties of the two great regions of the Union, North and South, was another. The Constitution would have been able to do that onlyif its social compact had provided a common perspective on the future development of slavery, i.e. on its future abolition, and if the consequent government had been able to sustain that common perspective. In fact it did neither. Too much of the time and energy of the Constitutional Convention was lost on debating the balance and social compact between Big and Small States. Hamilton and Madison tirelessly explained that this was a non-issue: it wasonly under the confederacy prior to the Constitution, with the inadequate federal power and excessive State powers, that issues arose of State versus State and oppression of Small States by Big;once adequate Federal power was established these issues would dissolve. They were right, but the Small States would not listen to them. The Convention nearly came apart on this question. When it was resolved in the compromises on representation, the shape ofthe political balance between North and South was also thereby mostly resolved; there was reduced space remaining for bargaining over what proved to be the real issue, just as there was reduced

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energy for deliberating on it. One way of finding space was to bargain over the extent to which slave states could get representation for the number of their slaves; the 3/5 clause was the result. But no formula for representation could by itself solve the problem of working out a common perspective or establishing a conviction of forming a common society; it could only provide a balance to sustain a common perspective after such a perspective had been worked out. There was, paradoxically, a shared perspective among many of the southern as well as northern founders: that slavery was on its way to eventual extinction. However, no real deliberations took place on this subject and nothing was done to enshrine the perspective in the Constitution. Whenever the issue arose in Federal politics thereafter, the element of shared perspective broke down; the debate revealed two separate societies confronting one another in the raw.

An argument can be made that it would have been better to form twoUnions, one for each society. The North would have been spared themoral degradation of being compelled to return fugitive slaves, orpermit slave owners to traverse the North carrying their human property with them qua property, or in other respects help enforceslavery as the price of having a Union with the South and giving full faith and credit to its laws -- and these were the specific issues the Union broke down over. The South might have eventually freed the slaves anyway. There would have been territorial conflicts as the two societies expanded westward, but perhaps no worse than the conflicts with Britain over the Canadian border, orthe conflicts with Mexico, all of which added up to far less than the costs and casualties of the Civil War. But this is speculative. Territorial conflicts between North and South could have been far more intense than with distant Britain or a weak Canada; a balance of power system, once established in the Americas and backed by clientage with multiple European powers, could have entailed major wars as well as border skirmishes; and the absence of the Constitution would more likely have led not to two Unions but to several, none of them very strong or coherent intheir identities, or to no Union at all, leaving a dozen States increasingly loose in their mutual connections as they expanded westward. The fact that the Union was reconsolidated so successfully after 1865 is a count in favor of its establishment

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trans-regionally despite the costs. One thing that is fairly safe to say is that it would have been better if the Constitutional Convention had made the effort of deliberation to establish a common perspective on the future of slavery and a plan for phased growth of Federal authority for superintending the implementation and sustenance of this shared perspective. But even without this, the Union of 1787 achieved an impressive record of Federalist Peace, not only within the limits of Hamilton’s cautious predictions, but in sum total compared to the likely levels of conflict in its absence.

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B.

Limits of government as pacifier; criteria for successful Union

As we have noted, FP is at first glance a simple statist statist proposition: government suppresses war, a common federal government is needed for peace. And federalists do indeed fully value government as an enforcer of the peace, as do most people.

Two things, however, were found missing from this traditional picture:

1. Hamilton did not deny that a confederacy would probably be sufficient to keep peace among the 13 states. What he argued in The Federalist No. 6 was that, if the confederacy were to fall apart and they became 13 completely unconnected sovereignties, or a group of 3 competing confederacies, they would fight wars. And he argued elsewhere that it was by reinforcing the confederacy into a genuine central government that it would be able to hold sufficient interests and attention in its hands, avoid dissolution, build loyalty, and discharge its functions.

2. Hamilton had a firm conception of the interests of societies. It can be seen, from the debates of the Constitutional Convention,that he and Madison alike held that a common government is

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appropriate when there sufficient common interests and commonalities of sentiment, and not sufficient deep opposing interests to drive them toward Civil War. Both he and Madison feared that, between North and South, there might be such deep interests; they were both meanwhile convinced that the main dispute at the Constitutional Convention -- between big states andsmall states -- was immaterial, as they did not represent a division of societies or of fundamental societal interests, and would dissolve upon forming a firm common government. Hamilton added, ironically, that those differences would remain material only if the small states succeeded in getting what they demanded -- equal, disproportionate representation -- and so thwarting the establishment of an effective national government; in that case the small states would continue to suffer being pushed around by the big ones.

We need to distinguish here between societal interests and raisons d’etat. The interest of separate states in remaining separate is indubitable but superficial if the national-societal interest dictates union; and once the union is formed, the states no longerhave their separate raisons d’etat for opposing the union. On the other hand, when two societies are deeply different, their separate states may represent enduringly different interests -- one cannot say permanent, but quite long-term. In these cases, theseparate raisons d’etat reflect separate raisons de societe, and throwing them together in a single society and state can grossly exacerbateconflict instead of easing it. This was pointed out in the 1940s by Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau and Crane Brinton, writing inopposition to the international federalist movements, even while acknowledging that world federation was ultimately necessary for peace and the inevitable goal of humanity; their arguments were later summarized elegantly by Hedley Bull85. However, they failed to distinguish clearly between objective unripeness of societies due to entrenched societal differences or raisons de societe, and

85 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, NY: Columbia University Press, 1977. Hans Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations, NY: Knopf, 1947. Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Myth of World Government”, The Nation, Vol. 162, March 16, 1946, reprinted in Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, eds., Principles and Problems of International Politics, New York: Knopf, 1952; “The Illusion of World Government”, Foreign Affairs, April 1949, Vol. 27 No. 3.

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subjective unripeness of national publics and governments due to habits of separate nationalism and separate raisons d’etat. Objective societal unripeness might change but usually only after a long time. Subjective unripeness, however, can often change more rapidly, as it often does in the very course of debates over forming a union, while the raison d’etat is changed by the very fact of forming a union. The neglect of this distinction made it easy for the anti-federalist writers to draw non-logical conclusions from their demonstration of the unripeness of the world as a wholefor federation: since the objective unripeness between First, Second, and Third Worlds was a big and convincing obstacle, and since they mixed this up almost indistinguishably with the subjective unripeness of all countries not matter in what combination, they were able to leap from a rejection of immediate global federation to a rejection of all federalism and a recommendation of favoring a reversion to traditional national diplomacy (sometimes supplemented by functionalism in Mitrany’s non-region-specific and apolitical form) as the primary method forbuilding international solidarity for an indefinite time to come. Clarence Streit was moved to write, in protest, that since it is surely true that not all societies are ripe for federation with one another, this means it behooves the political scientist to begin studying seriously which groupings of countries are so ripe.And which ones might mature into ripeness. And what would be the consequences of uniting societies that were indeed ripe. As he himself had done in preparing his proposal for union, with what was an impressive scientific-statistical effort for its time, using the fact of the long peace among the Western democracies as one of the criteria for their ripeness.

I have undertaken elsewhere to lay out relevant criteria for viability of Union, meeting the concerns and objections of Niebuhrand Bull (and Hamilton), and to apply them tentatively to groupings of countries to discern which would be viable as federations86. The result was to find Streit to have been mostly correct in his group selections, with due space for updating and modification at the margins. “Europe” in its various configurations meets the criteria for federation, with some 86 Ira Straus, Supranational Norms in International Affairs, Ph.D. dissertation, Universityof Virginia Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, 1992, ch. 4 and ch. 8.

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shortfalls in criteria as we move into the eastern edges of Europe. The industrial democracies, i.e. the Atlantic and OECD groupings, also meet the criteria for federation. Either federation would have major effects on the world order, primarily positive ones; this can be shown deductively as Streit did, and can be seen empirically in the consequences of the confederal integration in both spaces since 1946. Several other regions and subregions elsewhere around the world also meet the criteria for federation, or would meet them upon democratization, but show little propensity to make progress in this direction, despite decades of discussions about uniting and sometimes considerable encouragement from the U.S. and from Europe; and their Union wouldhave less impact on the world order.

The main criteria for successful federation are these: a heavy load of shared enduring societal interests, absence of “morally unbearable” differences in social behavior87, enough homogeneity 87 Differences, to be morally unbearable, have to be insisted upon by major or predominant groups in their respective societies, or highly susceptible to beingso insisted. India’s tradition of suttee might not be unbearable since no one islikely to insist politically on supporting it; in a wider Union it might be remain, as at present, an officially condemned practice sometimes tolerated locally. Female genital circumcision in Islamic countries might be found morallyunbearable by other societies. Various religions’ conceptions of blasphemy mightbe found mutually unbearable in societies that have not become deeply and stablysecularized. Islamic conceptions of blasphemy and the conceptions of secularism and free speech in the West seemed mutually unbearable, creating enormous tensions even without an international union, in the “cartoon crisis” of 2006. Deutsch’s prescription that such differences must be “depoliticized” is formallycorrect, but it implies that it is purely a subjective matter and that anything can be depoliticized. He cited slavery in the U.S., whose increasing politicization in the 19th century undermined the solidarity of the American Union; but slavery was never completely depoliticized and could not be, rather it simply grew increasingly politicized from the very start of the U.S.A. All the attempts to depoliticized it by ruling out discussion of it served in the long run only to exacerbate the tension, raising fears that the “gag rules” would degrade freedom in the North too. Some societal differences are so objectionable to entrenched and observable societal norms, or to objectively powerful evolutionary trends in societal norms, as to make their de-politicization impossible. Slavery was increasingly politicized in the loyal remainder of the British Empire in the same period, as the anti-slavery movementmounted in London; this particular subjective development was an objectively natural trend in both Anglo-American societies. The difference was that the Britannic area retained the norm of loyalty to a hegemonic Imperial central

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between the societies to ensure an absence of existential differences of societal interest88, and strong enough democratic political cultures in the member states89. In these conditions, federation (verb) makes for peace; a federation (noun), once formed, lays the foundations for cumulative integration and for peace that is “perpetual” i.e. self-sustaining and increasingly secure.

And that is the core positive proposition of Federalist Peace theory.

The inverse proposition is also valid: in conditions where there are some fundamentally opposing societal interests between the societies to be federated, federation raises a risk of civil war. This risk is serious even if the common interests are greater thanthe opposing interests, since any large-scale interest will defenditself, if necessary by force, if it finds itself threatened in its fundaments. If that interest spans a constituent society as a whole, it can readily mobilize the society for secession. And having a common federal government is something that could threaten fundamental interests among its constituent units, if the

power. This proved adequate for enforcing the evolving anti-slavery norm againstslave-trading and slave-holding interests without the latter developing their norms far enough or merging them deeply enough with local political power or local autonomy norms as to mount a great rebellion. 88 This closely relates to the preceding criterion, but can include instances ofdivergent fundamental interests not related to normative divergences.89 It can be debated whether this needs to be the case in all member states or most member states. Streit argued that it needs to be the case more in the initial member states than in states that join after the Union has been formed and consolidated a democratic political culture of its own; thus the Union, onceformed among long-standing democracies, could rapidly absorb new democracies. However, even among late joiners, instances of weak democratic political cultures have to be limited or space out to make sure not to weaken too far the overall balance (or rather imbalance) of the Union on the side of stable democratic culture. This has been an implicit issue in NATO and EU expansion, even in the absence of Federal Governmental structures. Simple balance calculations, based on a requirement of a 2/3 consensus, indicate that the EU cannot safely expand in this period much beyond the ten Eastern European states it has already accepted; NATO, with double the traditional democratic ballast, was able to define the entire OSCE area, including Russia and its neighbors, as potentially eligible to join in this era, and is presently looking also to the remainder of the OECD area, i.e. Australia and Japan.

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newly-enthroned majority has interests counter to those of some ofthe units or considers their interests illegitimate. Usually, whensocieties have some significant opposing interests, they avoid federation in the first place as too risky and limit themselves tobilateral diplomacy or to associating in a confederal league of nations.

The world as a whole already has a loose confederation: the UN together with its specialized agencies. There is plenty of space for strengthening this confederation, while remaining within the range of confederacy and avoiding a common government with enough power to threaten its constituent societies’ interests. In fact, most proposals within the World Federalist Movement nowadays are within the confederal range, not federal. Most World Federalists assume that national governments will remain in control of their borders for an indefinite future; there would not be common citizenship in the sense of free movement. Correspondingly, the proposals for strengthening the common legislative capabilities ofthe UN are almost all variants on the “Binding Triad”, i.e. based on voting that requires a triad of majorities (weighted by person,by state, and by GDP or budgetary contributions) rather than the usual Federal dyad (person, state). This recognizes that the distinctive corporate societies formed by centuries of separate development are not going to be fit to merge quickly, and preserves a special veto capability for each of the two major parties in the UN, the First World and the Third World, in return for reducing the role of individual national vetoes.

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C.

Neither Mars nor Venus, but Earth: Hamilton as the common ground between the “Hobbes” of “America” and the “Kant” of “Europe”There is a contemporary slogan that “Europe is from Venus, Americais from Mars”. Robert Kagan, who popularized it, explains it as meaning that Europe lives in a Kantian idealist world of international law and multilateralism, while America lives in a Hobbesian realist world of power politics and military force.

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The actual reality is different than in this picture, whose heavy stereotyping belies its rhetorical claim to realism. Europe and America both live in the same world -- a primarily Hamiltonian world, not a Hobbesian or Kantian world. Hamilton is the missing link between Hobbes and Kant. America and Europe both have Hobbesian and Kantian wings; these wings at times have more influence in the one or the other; but to define either continent in terms of one of these wings is to make a caricature of it.

Further: Hobbes is not the pure Martian “realist” he is used to symbolize, and Kant is not the pure Venusian “idealist” he is depicted as. These, too, are caricatures. All these terms deserve to be put in quotation marks. But since they are in wide usage, wecan perhaps indulge them for a few moments, in order to clarify the Hamiltonian middle term.

The real Hamiltonian world of Europe and America is to be found neither on Venus nor Mars, but here on Earth, the planet in-between. It is a planet to whose ways both sides of the Atlantic have adjusted quite successfully -- more successfully than most other countries and continents. In Earth politics, law is built incombination with power: thus did Hamilton in building the AmericanUnion on a basis of popular voting not state vetoes; thus have done Europeans in building the European Union on a basis of legislation through proportionately weighted voting, which reflects the realities of power and population, not consensus or abstract law as would be done among sovereigns that remain separate and equal. This defines the EU as a union of powers, one that constructs a common power in an almost “Hobbesian” sense of the social contract, not a mere confluence under “Kantian” law or multilateralism. The latter, highly reductionist view of the European construct is one that Kagan has promoted, or rather presupposed without troubling to check against reality. So -- symbiotically -- have some of his European opponents, who have often answered him in a crude polemical manner, taking up the cudgels for a Venusian-Kantian banner that has been attributed to them but is not properly their own. Actual European federalists have looked to Hamilton, not Kant, as their model for practice. This puts the spirit of their union in the same world as the

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American one. What differs in the respective unions is primarily the incompleteness of the European one, not its nature.

In neither continent has the Union been built by worshipping law in abstract disembodied form, as would be implied in the rhetoric about a Venusian Kantianism in Europe. This needs to be emphasized, because the myth has become widespread, after Kagan’s little book appeared, that the European Union is a construct basedon power-free law and multilateral consensus. Journalists and scholars alike have repeated this. It is a mistake. The accusationwould make more sense when lodged at other, veto-ridden international agreements and organizations, such as the OSCE and the UNSC, but not the EU. Venusian “Kantianism” is a grossly over-idealized depiction of what the Europeans have built. The Kagan argument and the entire Venus-Mars construct collapse once this depiction is corrected.

What remains to be understood is what are the actual roles of Hobbes, Kant, and Hamilton in Europe and America.

In both Europe and America, Kant is sometimes invoked for purposessupplementary to Hamilton, aiding in the elaboration of some implications of law (universal law) and democracy (democratic peace theory). Kant subsists in solitary glory as a philosopher. However, he does not stand alone in his politics. The Kant-Hamilton connection, with their primary convergence and secondary divergences, provides the necessary context for understanding Kant’s real-world role. It is a role far removed from the Venusianattitudes widely attributed to Europe.

Hamilton’s world is not that of a mere realist, glorifying power politics disembodied from any notions of law and right, but the world of a realistic federalist. His theoretical roots lay in the Enlightenment. When he expounded realism or power politics it was of a highly enlightened sort, replete with appeals to commerce, law, mutual benefit, and enlightened self-interest -- not the 19th to early 20th century brand of realism, with its romantic nationalist organicism and its melodramatic dogmas, which constitutes the point of reference for Kagan’s argument. As WalterRussell Mead has shown, it is an Anglo-American realism, less dark

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and insecure than the continental brand, skeptical of human perfection but free of dogmatic pessimism about the human condition being incorrigibly dark and beyond improvement. It is leavened by the opportunities offered by a relatively safe insularsituation, where greater risks can be taken in the way of trustingpotential partners abroad, undertaking transactions for mutual benefit, and giving others a chance to prove themselves fair and productive partners. Mead accordingly points to the commercial aspect of Hamilton’s enlightened realism, indeed he emphasizes this almost too much in his book, Special Providence; he fails adequately to appreciate the related and deeper federalist aspect of Hamilton, and the incipient Atlanticist geopolitical aspect.

Hobbes himself, while not fully in the enlightened style, laid thefoundations for Enlightenment political theory, including federalism, empiricism, and an idea of cumulative progress. Ironically, he did this in a sharp dialectical style similar to the scholasticism he was refuting rather than a modern empirical form. He gave a radical, ultra-realist portrayal of the power politics contradictions in the state of nature, and proposed the social contract as an equally radical way out of the contradictions, combining the powers of formerly separate humans to put an end to the contradictions of power politics. His logic had two facets or moments: first he set forth the contradictions, next their transcendence. Somehow the second moment, which is unmistakably prominent in Hobbes, manages to be overlooked by those who speak of Hobbes as a mere power politics realist.

This dialectical logic was softened by Locke and Hume, yet preserved in its essence by them. The former recognized multiple interests -- in liberty and property not just life -- enabling himto present a more careful and balanced formulation of the content of the social contract; the latter restored elements of the Aristotelian picture of man as a social being. Yet they both preserved Hobbes’ recognition of the core egotism of the individual, given the fact of individual agency and individual perspectives, and the need for a dialectical transcendence of its power politics consequences. The social or mutual sympathy side ofhumanity enabled Hume to explain better the possibility of transcending the egotism through social contract, as well as give

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a deeper justification for Locke’s balanced picture of its content. It also created space for a more gradual approach to the establishment of common government, in contrast to the single-moment, almost orgasmic union portrayed so dramatically by Hobbes in which separate conflicting powers are merged into a single overawing power. The dialectical element was softened but not eliminated.

It was this dialectical logic, combining the fear that sees all the dangers of mutual conflict with the hope that sees all the opportunities of mutual solidarity, that motivated the formation of the American Union. The same dialectical logic motivated the formation of the European Union, after the bitter experience of two world wars. These unions are not in two different worlds, not even two different modes of thought; they are very much in the same world.

The American Union is more complete than the European, more consolidated; it is based more on voting and the underlying consensus to be together, less on a requirement of daily consensuson specific policies; it can accordingly be considered more fully Hamiltonian. The gaps in Hamiltonian structure in the EU lead someEuropeans to compensate with a caricatured “Kantian” style of rhetoric. This has engendered a difference of diplomatic style. Itis a difference of rhetorical emphasis more than of substance. As to what genus the two Unions belong to, it must be kept in mind that, in its intention, the European Union is Hamiltonian like theAmerican one, and this intention has been a teleological motor force of its development, mediated through political interests andcompromises.

The main differences in European and American behavior derive fromsomething else -- the Leader-Led situation, which has unhealthy consequences for the mentality on both sides -- not from the nature of their societies which are primarily the same. The European Federalist theoretician Mario Albertini warned, in the classic language of Machiavelli, of degenerative consequences for the mentality of the European political classes if, as perpetual Followers, they never could practice the role of Lion and always compensated by posturing and playing the role of Fox. On the other

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end of the stick, constant Leadership -- always playing Lion, always feeling a need to show confidence in order to get the allies to follow -- also enfeebles the collective mind of a country, putting a premium on posturing as tough and strong and sure, and turning criticism and correction of course into something that must be avoided lest it undermine the trust of the allies in American Leadership. These differences are bad enough; the attempt to deepen them, by tracing of them to differences in societal nature or institutional structure, are worse, a tendency of debaters’ tactics that flow from the very posturing that arisesout of the Leader-Led tensions. It is, particularly, a rhetorical exaggeration used for bashing the other side, often favored by those who seek to gain a reputation for “realism” by hitting at the other side. Thus the peculiar quality of a realism that, in opposing a “Hobbesian realist” America to a “Kantian idealist” Europe, has done more to obscure than illuminate reality.

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D.

DP’s contributions and overextension. Its problems in the Mideast;saving the baby from the bathwater

DP has made contributions to living history, in addition to its academic contributions. It revived belief in the importance of domestic democracy for international relations and peace. It strengthened the confidence of democrats everywhere in the validity of their cause as something good for peace as well as forfreedom. In the Soviet bloc East it reinforced the claims of reformers as promoters of peace. In the West it renewed confidencemore generally, after the relativism and moral depression following the Vietnam war. In these ways, it helped the West win the Cold War peacefully in its final round. It also helped lay thegrounds for creating public structures such as NED for promoting the spread of democracy.

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On the negative side, its polemic against the 3rd image was too emphatic. Given the previously established academic bent for an exclusively 3rd image approach, based on polemics against the 2nd image, this was a natural retort. Nevertheless, the result was to encourage a return to an exclusively 2nd image approach at the expense of the 3rd image. This has led to serious misfirings in practice, e.g.:

(a) It has encouraged negligence of things that can be done and need to be done for peace on the level of the 3rd image, i.e. diplomacy and international organization. By restricting idealism to the 2nd image, it has contributed to the contempt of international organization which was always a temptation in America and has made a comeback in recent years. These were decidedly unintended consequences; the main theorists of DP are strong supporters of international organization. Nevertheless, since the polemic was one-sided, its logical effect was also one-sided.

(b) It laid the grounds for the adventurism in demanding DemocracyNow in the Middle East. After 2001 this took the form of the U.S. pressing for free elections in Egypt and among Palestinians -- andfurther, for full rights of extremist and pro-terrorist organizations to participate in these elections. The results heightened the strength of extremism and the danger of war.

These results were entirely predictable. It took a strong faith ina simplified theory to blind the U.S. government to the evidence and proceed with its demands. After the results were in, a half-retrenchment occurred; influence passed to realists in the government, but no replacement theory was found. Democratization institutions continued on autopilot to promote the democratic undermining of moderate regimes in Egypt and elsewhere in the Mideast. The Tunisian and Egyptian regimes succumbed in 2011, initially to the general applause of American political actors andmedia, subsequently with consequences that have disquieted the supporters of the revolutions.

Democracy, it turns out, is sometimes a necessary condition for peace, but it is not a sufficient condition. Making the world safe

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for democracy is only half the equation. Making democracy safe forthe world is the other half -- the neglected half.

DP has left an impression that democracy is always safe for the world. It is not. It is usually safer than other regimes, but not always: the transitional period is often less safe; and where public sentiment is inflamed, elections can pour oil on the fire.

The second half of the equation -- making national democracy safe for the world -- is where international organization comes in, particularly in the form of integration among democracies.

It is also where the international federalist movements come in. While weak politically, these movements offer the one thoroughgoing theoretical solution to the problem: by raising democracy to the international level, with transnational elections, they would complement and contain the role of democracyon the national level, achieving a balance of democratic passions on the two levels. This would prevent the exclusive capture of democracy by the nation-state with all the nationalistic consequences that flow from such a capture, and enable the democratic sentiments of “we-feeling” in one state to blend with those in its neighbors rather than turning against them.

There was, on the surface, a severe discrediting of democratization in face of the Bush Administration’s adventurism in demanding free elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories. The U.S. had argued from DP theory to say that this was a necessity in each case and could not be backed off from no matter what the consequences. The consequences were dangerous for peace in every case: sharpened sectarian divisions in Iraq, sweeping Muslim Brotherhood victories in the contested seats in Egypt, a Hamas landslide among Palestinians. Americans grew increasingly restive about the policy.

However, most major media in America spoke in favor of staying thecourse. It seems they knew of no alternative theory or practical policy. They openly worried about being called hypocritical if theU.S. changed its policy in face of the election results; they seemed more concerned with saving face than with saving peace and

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basic human freedoms. They repeated the story that the terrorist hatred was the result of America’s frequent past support for moderate authoritarian regimes in the region, and that the U.S. could escape the hatred only by expiating this sin. They seemed unaware that the U.S. had a more relevant sin to expiate in the fact of its frequent past support for Islamist movements against the secular Left. [Author’s note: this paragraph, originally written in 2003, creates in 2011 a sense of déjà vu. The few moderate, decent, peaceable regimes in the Mideast were consistently depicted in the global media in 2011 -- falsely -- asWestern puppets, as created by the West, and as surviving only because propped up only by Western support; leading to a logicallycompletely accurate, and factually completely inaccurate, deduction: that, if they were still around, it meant the Western denunciations of them were insufficient and the West was in reality still guilty of propping them up. The Western “hypocrisy” of dealing constructively with non-democratic regimes in the region, while speaking of democracy and its virtues, was used as adecisive argument for getting the West to employ whatever means ittook to get these regimes overthrown. It is too early to draw clear conclusions about the consequences of the overturns for peace and for liberties, but would be wrong to avoid a preliminarymention of the strength of Islamist parties, the increasing violence against Coptic Christians, and the damage done by popularpressures and violence to Egypt’s peace with Israel.]

The idea that democracies do not spawn terrorism is a non-logical extrapolation from DP theory, but psychologically it has flowed from the U.S. embrace of DP as a solution to international problems. A related argument has been that democracy among Palestinians and Arabs will lead to peace with democratic Israel, and it is only corrupt dictatorial elites in the PA and neighboring states who have been fanning war with Israel. This hasled to the feeling that democracy and DP are our only salvation from terrorism, and unless we get everyone in the region to try democracy in a hurry we are doomed to see them spawn more and moreterrorists. From this it leads to calls for holding ourselves in effect hostage to the results of immediate free elections in more and more Islamic countries, and letting the Islamists come to power wherever they win since that is the only way they can be

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weaned off of terrorism. Some people have observed that the ultimate success of this policy would be, logically, the unification of the Islamic world under an Islamist caliphate -- the goal of bin Laden, welcomed on the grounds of its being done without him.

Under Bush, after the painful election outcomes in Egypt and Palestine, the U.S. Government, while continuing to proclaim its pro-democracy theory without modification, became more cautious inpractice, demanding that Hamas renounce terror and recognize Israel before receiving international acceptance and funding. Thisbrought a chorus of cries throughout the Islamic world about Western double standards. The cries were not without foundation infact; and, like most arguments from bitterness about the double standards of higher authorities, they fed into a rejection of all external norms and authority, including the main international norms extant. They also fed into a chorus of cries of hypocrisy about Western affirmations of free speech rights when it was noticed that cartoons of Mohammed had been published in Denmark. These complaints laid a foundation for a reverse double standard in 2011, in which the West took pains to welcome the overthrow of its allies.

It would have been better if the normal and necessary double standards of democracy were remembered and applied prior to Mideastern elections, whether in Iraq or Palestine or Egypt:

1. A democracy should not permit terrorist and insurrectionist movements to participate in elections. 2. Even if extremist movements restrict themselves to peaceful tactics for winning power, sometimes they should be banned anyway,e.g. if their ideologies are incompatible with democracy or with minorities or with neighbors. 3. The goal of Western democracy-promotion should be a democracy that is compatible with the cause of democracy globally, not a democracy hostile to the global interests of democracy.

These double standards are particularly important in hostile societies, such as former enemy countries, that need to be reconciled to the mainstream world order: free electoral venting

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of hostility is generally not the safest path to reconciliation. Thus the banning of the Nazi Party in postwar Germany. It was an abridgement of pure democracy that, alongside the Nazis’ earlier decimation of the Communist Party, was one of the foundations for the success of DP after 1945: thanks to it, and to Germany’s loss of sovereignty except on terms of its pooling through Euro-Atlantic integration, German democracy finally became compatible with the Western democracies and with peace in Europe. This was the core instance of DP in the Western world, the instance that --alongside the similar success with Japan, achieved under somewhat similar constraints -- transformed the OECD space into a space of peace, whose remarkable record of peaceful dyads forms the main quantitative basis for DP theory.

The achievement did not come by applying democracy after 1945 in adoctrinaire fashion, as has been done in the Mideast after 2001 with the help of a misreading of DP theory. Rather, it came by taking every precaution to avoid another miscarriage of democracy as had happened in the Weimar years. There could be few things more dangerous than to abstract DP theory from the specific cautionary steps and causal factors that enabled it to succeed in its central OECD space after 1945, and then apply the abstracted theory in a linear fashion to hold elections in which it is predictable that enemies of democracy and of peace will win.

The events of the Bush years were bad news both for Democratization and for DP. The natural reaction was to retreat onboth counts. However, it would have been better to have an adjustment in the practices and theories rather than a simple retreat from them. There was, after all, a basis for DP theory. Ifpeople got it wrong, what was needed was not to hunker down and ignore it, nor to retreat on everything, but to figure out where they got it wrong and clearly change that part.

Mere retreat means throwing the half the baby out along with half the bathwater. Comprehension means separating the baby from the bathwater, and fully throwing out what is wrong in the bathwater.

More specifically, what is needed is to figure out what was wrong with the contextualization of DP and of democratization: that is,

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what was left out in the way of causal factors and constraints formaking DP “work”, and what additional cautionary conditions and supplements need to be factored in to provide greater assurance that it will work in the future. We should wish neither to repeat the record of the occasions in which the elections promoted in theMideast on DP grounds have backfired, nor to repeat the record of millennia of realpolitik without higher goals.

If this paper is helpful in indicating the needed adjustments, or some of them, it will have been well worth the trouble that went into it.

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