Eisenhower: Win the Peace or Win the Propaganda War?

Sean Flaherty

May 13, 2014

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President Eisenhower was one of the most popular presidents

in the 20th century, leading the nation into a completely new and

uncharted era both for the nation and the world. In a global

sense, the damage caused by World War II as well as the dramatic

changes in the global balance of power was fully realized. Third

world nations were aligning with one of the two theoretical

perspectives of power: the free market capitalism of the west or

the communist structures of the east. Back in the United States,

major changes were taking place. The homefront had to adjust to

the end of the largest mobilization of troops in history, a

beginning to the civil rights movement, and Communism and the

threat of nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower who came to

office in 1953 needed to reassert a sense of calm for the

American populace. Eisenhower had to focus the energies of the

country toward accepting its new role in the world, and in

accepting the new threats Communism and nuclear weapons posed.

When historians address President Eisenhower, they have

taken several angles to his leadership of the nation and his role

in the world stage. Historians such as Robert Griffith argued

that President Eisenhower was a well read and intellectual man

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who sought to limit the greed of American enterprises because

unrestrained business practices would lead the U.S. to fall into

a socialist revolution. Griffith suggests Eisenhower was a

strong leader who took charge of domestic programs. He is

complimented by Fred Greenstein who approaches Eisenhower's

presidency through the lens of an instrumental revisionist.

Greenstein proposes that Eisenhower was an active president fully

in the loop and heavily involved in the running of the

government.  Another angle often argued is that President

Eisenhower took a back-seat in his role as leader. David Tal

addresses negotiations between the United States and Russia

regarding nuclear disarmament.  Tal shows how Harold Stassen, the

Secretary of Peace promoted partial agreements on disarmament

versus John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, who originally

sought an “all-or-nothing” approach, but grew to accept and

promote Stassen’s views.   Eisenhower, Tal would suggest, was

heavily influenced by Dulles. This essay in line with promoting

Eisenhower as a strong leader who guided domestic policy and

sought to control worldwide opinions of the United States and

Russia through media and propaganda campaigns.

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The perception in the United States that there were real

threats to world peace required leaders capable of containing

those threats to maintain a sense of calm. The greatest asset to

the president was the idea of Communism. Communism would serve

the president in two folds: one, the president could enhance the

image of the United States around the world as a world power

fighting for the rights of all nations. In this area, Eisenhower

attempted to guide the international discussion and he showed his

leadership skills. Controlling the message Eisenhower wanted

repeated around the globe was a challenging arena for the

president, as Russia would undermine Eisenhower with gestures of

peace or offers to limit the nuclear threats, or in simple

cultural fairs that expanded the ideas of Communism. The United

States and Russia rapidly learned how to harness the media for

their own ambitions, but they also needed to learn how to rapidly

and appropriately react to the unanticipated actions and words of

the opposing power. Eisenhower would repeatedly alter his

messages to maintain the image as the leader of peaceful

negotiations.

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The threat of Communism at home also aided the President in

rallying the support of the American citizenry. This was a much

easier situation for the President to regulate and control. The

President had the support of the Advertising Council, a

conglomerate of media moguls who controlled the nation’s media

sources and advertising centers. Their support of the President

was significant in promoting the idea of a strong economy, anti-

communist messages and the president’s leadership through the

changes to the new world order. President Eisenhower is said to

have used two approaches to lead the nation against Communism.

The first was “an emotional appeal advocating disarmament and

decrying the arms race. The second was a ritualistic affirmation

of the true virtues of American traditional values, our spiritual

strength, our devotion to peace, our frontier heritage of

resolute heroism.”1 To address the threat of Communism outside

U.S. borders, Eisenhower would use the Voice of America to

promote the image of the United States as a supportive friend,

1 Vandercook, W.M. Making the Very Best of the Very Worst: The Human Effects of the Nuclear Weapons Report of 1956. 186.

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while at home he would use the Advertising Council to promote a

strong unified nation.2

Rallying the American populace was best accomplished through

grassroots, private organizations. The Advertising Council was

successful at rallying groups of Americans. When North Korea

invaded the south in 1950, the United States ramped up propaganda

efforts under NSC-68. NSC-68 illustrated the reprioritization of

U.S. military engagements, with propaganda being promoted to the

same importance as military, economic and diplomatic

engagements.3 Under Truman, the USIA (United States Information

Agency) created a system that used United States based charities,

private corporations, and publishers to compile and disseminate

propaganda around the world.4 The incorporation of the public

sphere of propaganda into the military sphere enhanced the depth

and reach of U.S. propaganda. Publishers donated over 134,000

2 Voice of America began in 1942 and served as a means to inform people in war torn areas of Europe. It expanded to include nearly every language in Europe and Asia. Today the Voice of America continues to broadcast around the world in a multitude of languages. The Advertising Council was createdin 1942 with Theodore Repplier, serving as the first president. The work of the Advertising Council is well known, from Smokey the Bear preventing forest fires, saving bonds works, or the “Loose Lips Sink Ships” to name a few programs.

3 Cull, 54.4 Cull, 56.

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books that promoted a positive image of the United States for

other countries to consume. Public organizations such as Rotary

Clubs, Kiwanis and Lions Clubs were asked to aid in disseminating

knowledge to Americans. One program that was promoted was the

“Adopt a Foreign town” in which 128 U.S. communities would

promise to provide aid and knowledge about the American way of

life.5

The “Adopt a Town” line of thinking was in the same vain as

the total war concept of World War II, where each member of

society was recruited to show the real America to other nations.

This was coupled with the Letter from America Campaign which used

the “first and second-generation immigrant community (around

thirty-five million people)” writing over a billion letters

promoting a positive aspect of America to people around the

world.6 The United States under President Truman created a

complete system of promoting American ideals overseas and in

rallying Americans to support the government.

The systems set in place by Truman and expanded by

Eisenhower were all directed to win the hearts and minds of

5 Cull, 57.6 Cull, 57.

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Americans and the world community. When town’s names were shared

on national radio broadcasts, it empowered those already working

for the collective good of the nation, and it inspired other

communities to join the movement. Sending letters also had the

purpose of sharing with the world the positive attributes of the

United States. Both were effective campaigns, but to two

different audiences. The letters helped other nations interpret

the U.S. as a center of freedom and a place for opportunity.

This would lead people to work within their nation to strengthen

and support capitalism, democracy and to align with the United

States for future economic opportunities. Within the United

States however, the “Adopt a Town” was means of incorporating all

aspects of daily life into the government’s plans of

indoctrination and education. The administration did not need to

speak daily or even weekly about the threat of Communism,

McCarthy had accomplished that. The administrations did not need

to expend vast sums of money promoting capitalist ideas, the

Advertising Council accomplished that. What the administration

needed to do was organize the different groups and ensure that

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those who wanted to play ball towed the line that Eisenhower

dictated.

The many issues Eisenhower faced, he did so with what

appeared to be, a sense of calm. His speeches rallied the nation

to take ownership of the future. The president projected through

his speeches the ideal he wanted the American citizenry to live

by. In the famous “Fear Speech” in 1954 in which President

Eisenhower addressed the nuclear dangers facing the world, he

ended with:

There are risks, if we are not vigilant. But we do not have to be hysterical. We can be vigilant. We can be Americans. We can stand up and hold up our heads and say: America is the greatest force that God has ever allowed to exist on His footstool. 7

The president allowed the nation to be fearful, but he also, and

eloquently suggested the notion that as Americans, they are a

member of the greatest nation. The president maintained his

“ritualistic affirmation” of the country and promoted the

excessive nationalism that he should be known for.8 It would 7 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Address to the American People

on the State of the Nation," April 5, 1954.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10201.

8 Vandercook, 186.

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take the skills of leader to build up the confidence of a nation

that was undergoing significant changes and facing threats of a

communist menace.

When Eisenhower took office, the opportunities for peace

between the United States and Russia looked bleak. Stalin was

Chairman of the Council of Ministers and leader of the Soviet

Union, and there was little notion that the two powers could work

together. Stalin had been the target of propaganda for years

within the United States. He was portrayed “as the evil figure in

the Kremlin pulling strings behind every evil happening in the

world.”9 In 1950, Stalin had spent the equivalent of 2% of the

Soviet national income, or 1.5$Billion, which equated to sixty

times the U.S. propaganda budget.10 In 1950, Stalin also

initiated a “Hate America” campaign which spread anti-capitalist

and anti-American messages throughout Europe. The term “Coca-

Colonization” can be traced to Stalin’s propaganda machines in

France back to 1949, where the messages was of a United States

9 Kenneth Osgood. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad.  Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 57.

10 Nicholas J. Cull. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 52.

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attempting to colonize the world.11 Stalin had been an enigmatic

figure, the focus of much hate and vitriol, and with his passing

in 1953, six weeks after President Eisenhower took office, the

president was offered a significant opportunity to take the reins

and exploit the potential Russian transition. It was during 1953

where we see the most interesting documentation from the Oval

Office regarding US-Soviet negotiations. One may surmise this is

due to the rapid U.S. actions to take advantage of the

transition, as well as Eisenhower’s attempt to strike a strong

stance in the world and to show his leadership style to the

nation.

The need to retool the information campaign was heightened

when Georgeii Malenkov, Stalin’s heir apparent, appealed to the

Soviet leadership to begin peace negotiations and they accepted

the idea. The idea was broadcast to the world under the premise

of “Peaceful Coexistence.” Within five months, the Soviets

returned parts of Turkey, established communications with Israel,

negotiated with the U.S. over the Korean War and expanded

discussions with Greece and Yugoslavia.12 There were intelligent

11 Cull, 52. 12 Osgood, 56.

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and thoughtful words offering peace, and significant actions

being made by the Soviets. Eisenhower, however, was not moved.

He warned the American citizenry not to accept Soviet peace

overtures too eagerly, that the Soviets would have to make more

sincere and lasting peace signs to the world.

Many European nations jumped at the offer to limit the

posturing of the nuclear powers. This was seen by many as the

opening for the beginning of a new and peaceful era. Eisenhower

and the Central Intelligence Agency however, exhibited a high

level of contempt for the Soviet peace overtures. In a National

Intelligence Estimate dated October 1953, the CIA reported:

at present the Kremlin seems to be trying to give the impression that it has adopted a more conciliatory policy than that followed in Stalin’s later years. The Kremlin may hope by such tactics to relax the vigilance of some Western States, to encourage dissension between the US and its allies, andto delay progress of Western Rearmament…we believe that harsh courses of action similar to those pursued by the Kremlin in the past will reappear whenever the Kremlin deems themadvantageous.13

13 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-99, “Estimate of the World Situation Through 1955,” October 23, 1953, FRUS 1952-54. Accessed online via U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian.

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The estimate promoted a belief that the nuclear overtures were

nothing more than an attempt to break the relationship between

the U.S. and her allies, and to delay the U.S. manufacturing of

nuclear weapons. Eisenhower interpreted the Soviet overtures as

an attempt to promote the Soviets as the leaders of a peaceful

world, not the United States. In order to regain the edge of

being the peaceful leaders of the world and to denigrate the

Soviets as the occident seeking to destroy the world, Eisenhower

and his administration created propaganda campaigns to enlighten

the world as to who were the real leaders of peace.

For the Soviets, they were breaking with their past

Stalinist programs, one state department official stated: “this

startling event, perhaps more than any other, provides the most

concrete evidence thus far of the present regimes break with

Stalinism.”14 Yet another state department official is quoted

stating “it is necessary to assume that the peace offensive is a

treacherous stratagem of as yet indiscernible proportions.”15

The American leadership was at a loss as to the direction to move

the nation. Members of the Administration were forced to address

14 Osgood, 62. 15 Osgood, 62.

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the reality of the Soviet overtures. If the Soviets were genuine

and the U.S. ignored the requests for peace, then they could look

like the “bad guys” in the world. This could have pushed nations

reaching out into the folds of the Soviet’s sphere of influence,

and thus natural resources would leave the U.S. sphere. The

administration also had to contemplate whether the gestures were

a trap. If the Soviets made overtures and the U.S. refused to

acknowledge or support the moves, then the U.S. would again look

bad in world discussions and at home.

The first in a series of campaigns created by the Eisenhower

Administration in reaction to the Soviet overtures was called the

“Chance for Peace.” In this propaganda campaign, the U.S. sought

to retake the reigns of peaceful negotiations. Eisenhower used

his role as leader to retake the high ground and offer peace, but

with requirements of the Soviets that many felt would never be

achieved. This placed the burden on the Soviets to fail. The

“Chance for Peace” program was the U.S. version of a peace

counteroffensive. Immediately after the Soviet overtures though,

the U.S. gave the PSB (Psychological Strategy Board) “Carte

blanche to pursue subversive propaganda activities” and retake

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the phrase “peace” from the Soviets.16 The PSB would print and

distribute three million copies of the “Chance for Peace” speech

and create a film called “Path to Peace.”17

With the creation of a counter-offensive program and a full

assault in print and film, Eisenhower was able to challenge the

Soviets propaganda machine. The Soviet overtures for peace and

Eisenhower’s refusal to even address the attempts can be viewed

as a failure on his part. His inability to even consider the

Soviet offers for peace guaranteed years of hostility. But, as

already addressed, the CIA and other administration officials did

not view the overtures as real, and Eisenhower in one quote to

his British counterpart Winston Churchill gave his real opinion

of the Soviet peace offer: “Russia was …..a woman of the streets

and whether her dress was new, or just the old one patched, there

16 Osgood, 59; and in the presidential directive by Harry Truman in 1951. “There is hereby established a Psychological Strategy Board responsible, within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.” Found at: Harry S. Truman: "Directive Establishing the Psychological Strategy Board," June 20, 1951. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13808.

17 Cull, 90.

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was the same whore underneath.”18 Nothing the Soviets could do

would essentially alleviate the disdain Eisenhower held for their

system of government. This statement can be the lens through

which the sincerity of Eisenhower administrations negotiations

were held.

In December 1953, President Eisenhower addressed the United

Nations. This speech was directed at the world, but also the

American public and covered peaceful uses of atomic energy. In

this address, President Eisenhower spoke of how the great nuclear

powers of the world could now work together to convert the

destructive power of nuclear weapons into a constructive,

peaceful purpose. In this meeting, the President offered the

idea of an “Atomic Bank” in which nations would deposit

destructive nuclear products which would be converted into

positive and peaceful products for use in education and research.

The UN address was Eisenhower’s opportunity to project the United

States as a nation “Against the dark background of the atomic

18 Miller Center: University of Virginia. American President: A Reference Resource: Dwight David Eisenhower. http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/5, accessed March 12, 2014.

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bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength,

but also the desire and the hope for peace.”19

Immediately however, the Operations Coordinating Board,

created a classified draft document to follow-up on the Atomic

Bank proposals. The document stated “the President’s speech was

not intended to suggest solutions to problems in the disarmament

field but sought to “open up a new channel for peaceful

discussion” and to “Initiate at least a new approach” to the

difficult questions of disarmament.”20 The discussion had been

initiated already by the Soviets, the U.S. however was not

interested in total disarmament, the U.S. simply wanted to lead

the discussion. The Atomic Bank proposal had a catch that each

power would have to allow foreign inspectors to confirm the

removal of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower and members of his

administration knew that the Soviets would not agree to

international inspections, and that is why the proposal was

perfect. Even members of Eisenhower’s administration failed to 19 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address Before the General Assembly of the United

Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City.," December 8, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9774.

20 Operations Coordinating Board, Washington D.C. “A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the Presidents UN Speech of December 8, 1953, in Domestic and International Public Opinion Fields”, February 4, 1954.

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believe in the idea promoted by the president. In a memorandum

to the President from the United States Atomic Energy Commission,

Lewis Strauss, the head of the commission stated “The proposal is

novel and might have value for propaganda purposes. It has

doubtful value as a practical move.”21 The U.S. offered a

significant opportunity to disarm the two powers, but the caveat

of inspections created a hostility the Soviets would not accept.

It is situations such as this that demonstrate the intent of

Eisenhower. He was not seeking the most rapid and peaceful

solution to Soviet overtures, but to maintain the upper hand in

controlling the message and international opinion that Americans

were leading the world for peace.

The Soviets did refuse the American plan. The Soviet

reaction to the President’s message was simple: “Eisenhower’s

plan, ‘would fail to assist the reaching of an agreement on the

banning of atomic weapons’ and would lead ‘to the production of

more and more destructive atomic weapons’ by lessening the

‘vigilance of the peoples regarding the problem of atomic

21 United States Atomic Energy Commission, Memorandum For the President, 17 September, 1953.

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weapons.”22 The Soviets replayed this message throughout their

sphere of influence, trying to gain the upper hand in worldwide

opinions.

While the “Chance for Peace” was designed for the domestic

audience, the Soviets were heavily investing and expanding their

propaganda efforts around the world. Russia had used Cultural

Fairs in their satellite nations to maintain support for the

overall program and goals of the communist system. President

Eisenhower must have presented a threat to the Soviet system,

from 1953 to 1954, the Soviet government expanded trade fairs

from twelve to over sixty, and by 1955, there were 170 fairs in

45 countries.23 Soviet trade fairs addressed the use of nuclear

power, they addressed the positive aspects of Communism and laid

out arguments against the United States systems. With the rapid

expansion, Eisenhower was backed into a corner and he approached

Congress requesting emergency funds in 1954 of $5 million to

bolster the United States trade fairs. In 1955, Congress passed

the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Act

22 Chi-Jen Yang. Belief-based Energy Technology Development in the United States: A Comparative Study of Nuclear Power and Synthetic Fuel Policies. Cambria Press, Google EBook, 2009. 87.

23 Osgood, 216.

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guaranteeing a steady budget and program to promote the United

States around the world. The Soviet expansion of cultural trade

fairs was seen by the administration as an attempt to undermine

capitalism, when in fact, there is strong reason to believe the

Soviets were trying to simply maintain their base or to

counteract the U.S. led Adopt a Town or Letter from America

campaigns or the constant bombardment of Voice of America signals

infiltrating Soviet lands. These cultural fairs on both sides

initially addressed positive aspects of each system of

government, but they grew rapidly to address the political issues

of the time, with the United States using the fairs to sell their

views about nuclear disarmament, or other Eisenhower proposals at

peace.

What has yet to be addressed in this essay is the

relationship between the President and the Advertising Council.

The Advertising Council began as the WAC (War Advertising

Council) that ran all propaganda efforts for the United States

government during WWII.24 This was a lucrative time for the

24 Robert Griffith, "The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics, 1942-1960." Business History Review (Pre-1986) 57, no. 000003 (Autumn, 1983): 388. http://search.proquest.com/docview/205513049?accountid=29121. 392.

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members of the media that participated in the effort but, with

the closure of the war, the WAC was ended and the members chose

to use their talents and experiences by starting the Advertising

Council as a private enterprise. The Advertising Council would

support President Eisenhower and his bid for the White House for

several reasons, primarily due to his opposition to the New Deal,

opposition to Communism and Eisenhower’s vast support for

propaganda and capitalism. Eisenhower would use the Advertising

Council as a “private vehicle for public information,” and his

right hand man in this operation was Theodore Repplier who ran

the Advertising Council.25 Repplier often offered ideas and

potential avenues to address topics such as how to advance the

cause of fighting Communism. A Confidential Memorandum from

Theodore S. Repplier who led the Advertising Council in 1955,

suggested that the President lead a “Crusade” and for the

president to take advantage of the times. Repplier stated: “We

cannot be merely against Communism; we suffer from a lack of a

positive crusade. We need to focus on a moralistic idea with the

25 Griffith, The Selling of America, 391.

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power to stir men’s imagination.”26 It was not only the President

who sought to lead the nation in a moralistic agenda, all the

people surrounding him had the same desire.

The Administration was consistently altering the talking

points. Eisenhower was opposed to total nuclear disarmament due

to the Soviets conventional weapons capacity, but in 1955, after

years of pressure from Britain, France and from members of the

United States Senate, Eisenhower finally accepted an offer to sit

face to face with his Russian counterpart. Eisenhower and

Secretary of State Dulles were both reluctant to entertain the

meeting, but worldwide opinion of the United States as a trigger

happy nation was growing and Eisenhower wanted to control the

international arena of propaganda.27 To retake the lead in

public opinion, the Administration created the “Open Skies”

program. This proposal was introduced to the Soviets at the

Geneva Summit in July 1955. Essentially, Open Skies was not a

disarmament program, but was a means of inspecting the other

powers military installations to create an atmosphere of peace,

26 Theordore S. Repplier. Memorandum from Theodore Repplier, Advertising Council, August 3, 1955 [DDE's Papers as President, Administration Series, Box 30, Nelson Rockefeller 1952-55. 

27 Osgood, 189.

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to protect against a surprise attack, provide intelligence about

the opposing power and to help the United States break down the

Iron Curtain. 28 When President Eisenhower introduced the plan,

he not only informed Khrushchev, but his systems in the

Advertising Council went on a public relations blitz. Eisenhower

was hardly surprised when Khrushchev soundly rejected the plan,

but since it was the first concrete plan toward addressing

Nuclear weapons, the United States had taken the upper hand and

promoted themselves as the leader for peace. Khrushchev’s

refusal also showed the world that Soviet overtures for peace

were insincere. This was a major victory for President

Eisenhower in terms of public relations.

It must again be asked, why was the administration hell bent

on winning the propaganda war? By showing the world that the

United States was leader of the modern world, and was a leader in

making the world safer for peace, the administration was able to

28 In the video, there is a short text that sets the stage. “In July 1955 at Geneva, Switzerland, President Eisenhower proposed to the world a plan for controlled disarmament and peace. As a first step toward disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union would exchange information on military establishments, and verify this information by means of aerial inspection. The validity of aerial inspection was tested successfully by the Italian Air Forces in 1956. Located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIGJw-h0F-U on 5/5/2014.

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gain support from third-world nations, gain friendly relations

from nations with natural resources the U.S. wanted and offered

the U.S. markets to sell goods. Each positive aspect for the

United States also meant that the Soviets were unable to attain

those resources or have markets for their products, thus ensuring

the growth of capitalism and a detrimental impact on Communism.

There was another issue that the United States had to address

regarding nuclear weapons. The U.S. had far more advanced and a

much larger stockpile of nuclear weapons then their Soviet

counterpart therefore the Soviets would be more inclined to end

nuclear weapon manufacturing, but the Soviets had a far grander

stockpile of conventional weaponry, meaning the United States

would require that to be limited if nuclear weapons were to be

limited. The size and type of weaponry required the opposing

nation to enter negotiations with different needs.

In 1955, there were a multitude of propaganda programs

working to enhance the image of the United States as well as

denigrate communist theories. The “Atoms for Peace” initiative

promoted using atomic knowledge to enhance scientific advances.

Atoms for Peace as well as Open Skies were both promoted in

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video, pamphlets, feature stories in magazines and newspapers and

community organizations. The United States Information Agency,

the governmental organization that oversaw all information

programs, “arranged for 266 U.S. firms to distribute 300,000

translations of Eisenhower’s speech” along with a dramatic

increase in films supporting “Atoms for Peace.”29 The

information war was complex and the message supported the United

States, and this was needed after a poll from before and after

the Geneva Summit found that Western Europeans opinions of the

USSR as “bad” or “very bad” declined from 54% to 37%. While in

the U.S. the public relations blitz was working efficiently, it

had actually worked for the Soviets better in Western Europe.30

The multitude of programs did portray the United States as

willing to work for peace, and the only nation offering real

proposals to end the nuclear issue.

In 1957, the chance for peace was as close as ever. In

1955, Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen, a former governor as a

special assistant on Disarmament policy. Stassen was dubbed the

Secretary of Peace, and worked often times as a voice against

29 Cull, 106. 30 Osgood, 194.

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Secretary of State, Dulles. In 1957, Stassen ventured beyond his

authorized mandate from the President and nearly negotiated a

deal to end the deadlock over nuclear disarmament. The Soviets

stated they were finally close to an agreement with the United

States. Eisenhower was forced to scuttle the plans by adding

some wording that forced the Russians to withdraw. The potential

agreement angered the British because it would limit nuclear

weapons manufacturing worldwide, meaning the British, who were

not as far along as the Americans and Soviets, would have to

cease their programs.

Outside of Eisenhower’s control was international opinion.

After two U.S. led nuclear tests in 1957 that left many people

sick from radioactive fallout, worldwide opinion changed and

calls grew demanding an end to all nuclear testing. 1957 also

saw the success of the launch of Sputnik, the Russian orbiter.

The Soviet propaganda apparatus expanded significantly. The

Soviets unilaterally offered to reduce their military size to

300,000 troops, they offered to suspend all nuclear tests for two

years and to again open dialogue to disarm the major powers of

the world. The United States was unable to keep up with the

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Soviet overtures and was often caught agreeing with the quality

of the offers, but unable to agree to the offers. Eisenhower and

his administration however did not want total disarmament due to

the conventional warfare capabilities of the Soviets. He

therefore expanded the budget of the United States Information

Agency, the international wing of the Advertising Council to

promote the American negotiating programs that in his view, were

the “surest road to durable peace”31 By March 31, the Soviets

had publicly announced a unilateral ban on all nuclear testing.

Again, the Soviets were leading the discussion about who was

actually invested in a peaceful future for the world.

After months of internal discussions, and calls around the

world for a moratorium on nuclear tests, the administration

finally agreed on August 22 to suspend nuclear testing for one

year. The ban was not to go into effect until October 31, and in

the time between the call to ban and the implantation of the test

ban, the U.S., British and Russians all detonated massive amounts

of nuclear weapons, with the British and American testing thirty-

seven bombs and the Russians testing fourteen.32 All the tests

31 Osgood, 203.32 Osgood, 207.

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had significant implications on the health of people around the

world. In 1959, the magazine Consumer reports covered a story that

addressed heavy doses of strontium-90 in milk.33 This led to a

panic across the United States, but Eisenhower who initially was

listening to the calls to end all testing chose instead to limit

testing in the Atmosphere and underground.

Negotiations were going forward with a significant chance at

success, but in the weeks before the Paris Summit to finalize

plans for a nuclear test freeze, the Soviets shot down the United

States U-2 spy plane. When President Eisenhower refused to

apologize to the Soviet for violating their airspace and for

trying to cover up the plans, the summit ended without any

accomplishment. It would be 1963 before there would be a ban on

underground nuclear testing, and not until 1968 would an

agreement be reached that set out a roadmap for peaceful uses of

nuclear energy, and disarmament.

While the president was in office for eight years, there

were really only a few significant opportunities for securing a

treaty limiting nuclear weapons; one in 1953 after Stalin died, a

33 Osgood, 208.

28

second opportunity with Harold Stassen’s negotiations and the

other in 1959 to limit nuclear testing in the atmosphere. In

these instances, it was Eisenhower that failed to complete the

deal. Eisenhower was always willing to use the Voice of America

and the Adverting Council to promote the United States as the

leader of peace, but his actions do not support his sincerity.

In Eisenhower’s farewell address he warned the nation against

allowing corporations to gain too much power in the military

realm of the nation, but evidence would suggest that Eisenhower

was a leading cause for the required expansion of the military

industrial complex. It was Eisenhower that helped build up the

Soviets as a menace to the world and nation, and it was

Eisenhower who escalated the tensions with the Soviets in terms

of propaganda. The U.S. military complex had to have physical

systems to support or back up the actions of the president. The

President wanted to appear as a leader of the free world, to show

the strength of the U.S. economic system and the strength of

democracy. Eisenhower escalated the stalemate between the United

States and Russia when he could have used his strong leadership

abilities to end or at least draw down the Cold War.

29

In the future, historians will need greater access to Soviet

era documents to complete the picture of Eisenhower’s presidency.

Questions to answer are how sincere were the Soviets in their

overtures for peace? While they spent large sums of money on

propaganda, were they doing so to spread their ideology or was

the cultural fairs and peace overtures tools to promote the

Soviets as the leaders of peace negotiations the way Eisenhower

wanted to be viewed? The propaganda programs such as Atoms for

Peace, Open Skies, Chance for Peace, or the Voice of America

broadcasting into nations around the world, the millions of

leaflets and movie screenings, the letter writing campaigns or

the adopt a town programs, the cultural fairs all had a goal of

spreading the strengths of the United States as a leader in the

world. Yet with all those programs, the President could have

achieved more by negotiating with the Soviets. Eisenhower did

not appear to be sincere in negotiating until 1959, his final

year in office as a lame duck president. It is hard to believe

he was sincere then as well. Eisenhower did not win the Cold

War, he did not win the propaganda war, he did not help the world

with nuclear negotiations or in deescalating tensions, but he did

30

rally the nation to accept their role in the world, to accept an

era of nuclear weapons and nuclear energies, and the nation did

not succumb to the McCarthy fear campaigns of communists taking

over the nation.

31

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