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LE Student #149035246AR7354May 19, 2015

Adrianople: Failure in Action or Inability in Response?

I. Introduction

The battle of Adrianople has long been seen as one of

history’s most decisive battles, becoming the symbolic event

heralding the Roman Empire’s fall and even seen as a turning

point between antiquity and the Middle Ages (Bang 1924, p. 214;

Oman 1959, 1.14; Lenski 1997). It is only natural that such a

crucial battle attracts intensive scholarly investigation, which

tends to fall under two broad foci: the nature of the conflict

itself, and the consequences following the loss. The first camp

argues that the Roman army’s defeat was due to a decline in the

military system, and the loss was simply the manifestation of

that decay. The second group sees the effects of the battle

itself as accelerating the decline causing irreparable damage.

Another argument which is intimately connected to this concerns

the following question: How did such a disaster come about? Was

it the failure of empire, or an inability to respond to the

situation? Was it caused by individual blunders, or were there

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constraints that prevented Rome from adequately handling the

situation as it might have in the past? I will argue that it was

a combination of the two: the Empire was unable to respond to the

Gothic problem properly, and thus the errors made by individuals

caused more damage than the Empire was capable of mending. I will

argue this by looking at the implications of three areas:

tactical errors and mismanagement of policy by the authorities,

manpower shortage in the Roman military, and the presence of the

Goths within the Empire. I begin with a summary of the battle,

drawing from Ammianus Marcellinus’ account.

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Fig. 1 Map of Valens’ Gothic campaign, 378 AD. 1 Valens’forces march from Constantinople towards Adrianople; 2Valens sends a force under Sebastianus ahead to attack asmaller group of Gothic raiders (3); 4 Sebastianus ambushesthe Gothic party and returns to Adrianople to rejoin withValens; 5 Fritigern’s Goths move south towards Nike – Valensreceives news of their approach; 6 Valens (with forces underRicomeres) marches towards the Gothic camp; 7 The Gothiccavalry arrives once the two armies are engaged.

II. The Battle

Having gathered his forces together from the east, Valens

arrived at Constantinople with the eastern field army on May 30

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(Amm. 31.11.1), then marched towards the road station at Nike.

Having learned of the presence of a raiding band of Goths heading

north from Adrianople to join the main Gothic army, Valens sent

his general Sebastianus ahead with a force of two thousand

legionaries to pursue them (31.11.2). Sebastianus launched a

successful ambush of a Gothic detachment near the river Hebros,

returning to the city with large amounts of plunder recovered

from the barbarians (31.11.4). He sent word back to Valens of his

success, which Ammianus claims prompted the emperor’s envy.

At this juncture, Fritigern thought it wise to recall the

various groups of his followers who were scattered throughout

Thrace in smaller raiding bands. He gathered them at the town of

Kabile, about seventy miles north of Adrianople, then withdrew to

the open plains where they were less vulnerable to Roman attack

(31.11.5). Meanwhile, Valens continued on to Adrianople, and on

August 6, Roman scouts informed Valens that the main group of

Goths under Fritigern were fifteen miles from the city, moving

slowly and numbering only about ten thousand (31.12.3). The next

day, Ricomeres arrived with the advance western guard, carrying

word from Gratian. Valens’ nephew detailed his recent victories

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as well as the reasons for his delay, promising to arrive soon

(31.12.4). Valens called a council to discuss his next step,

during which his generals became divided on the best course of

action. Sebastianus urged Valens to attack at once, with victory

certain against a force of ten thousand. Ricomeres and Victor, a

cavalry commander, suggested Valens await the arrival of Gratian

and his troops, thus making victory a certainty through sheer

force of numbers (31.12.6). Yet Valens, supposedly envious of

both Sebastianus’ recent victories against the Goths and

Gratian’s success against the Alamanni, opted for immediate

action “in order that Gratian might not have a share in the

victory which…was already all but won,” confident that his

numbers would easily overcome Fritigern’s force (31.12.7).

In the Gothic camp, Fritigern was awaiting the arrival of

the remaining Gothic and Alannic allied cavalry under Saphrax and

Alatheus. On August 8, he sent an embassy to the Romans, led by a

Christian elder bearing a letter from Fritigern in which he again

outlined his terms: the Goths would make peace with Rome if they

were allowed the land of Thrace, with all its crops and flocks

(31.12.8). A private message was then relayed to Valens from

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Fritigern, in which the Goth expressed concern over his own

ability to control his followers and persuade them to accept

peace. Only a display of force on Valens’ part would cow the

barbarians into compliance. Valens dismissed Fritigern’s terms,

sending the envoy back and continuing preparations for battle

(31.12.9). The following day, August 9, the Romans marched

seventeen kilometers northeast in the heat to meet the Goths,

arriving at “the eighth hour” – two in the afternoon. The march

was over rough ground and the heat began to tell on both man and

beast, but they drew up their line opposite the Goths, with

cavalry on each flank and the infantry positioned in the center

(31.12.10-11; see Fig. 2).

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Fig. 2 PHASE 1 – Romans deploy from marching columns withcavalry on wings and infantry in the center. 1 Gothic laager;2 Gothic light infantry; 3 Roman light infantry; 4 Romancavalry (sagitarii and scutarii); 5 Roman heavy infantry; 6 Romancavalry on left wing (still in marching order); 7 Romanauxiliary in reserve (Batavi) (images recreated fromhttp://britishbattles.homestead.com/balkans.html).

The Goths had massed on a low ridgeline in front of their wagon

circle, or laager, but did not engage the Romans. The expected

cavalry support had still not appeared, and Fritigern sent yet

another envoy to sue for peace, hoping to allow time for the

horse to arrive (31.12.12). Meanwhile the Goths began to burn

piles of dry brush and wood on the plains, further aggravating

the already hot and parched Roman soldiers (31.12.13).

Fritigern, “fearing the uncertainty of war,” continued to

delay the engagement, requesting an exchange of high-ranking

hostages between sides, to which Valens agreed, and Ricomeres

voluntarily went with the Gothic envoy (31.12.14-15). At this

stage of the proceedings, two units of elite scholae palatinae – the

scutarii under Cassio and the sagitarii under Bacurius – advanced

prematurely and engaged the Gothic line, disrupting the transfer

of Ricomeres and throwing the imperial line into disorder as they

were driven back by the laager defenders (31.12.16).

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Fig. 3 PHASE 2 – While Fritigern delays engagement, the armycomes to blows. 8 Gothic infantry withdraws to laager duringnegotiations; 9 Sagitarii and scutarii engage prematurely and arerepulsed; 10 Main Roman infantry force attacks laager; 11Part of Roman left cavalry wing attacks laager; 12 Gothiccavalry under Saphrax and Alatheus arrives and slams intoRoman left wing; 13 Roman left wing still forming up.

Peace proceedings were immediately abandoned, but fortunately for

Fritigern, the long-awaited cavalry of Saphrax and Alatheus and a

band of Alan riders “dashed out as a thunderbolt does near high

mountains,” slamming into the left wing of the Roman horse

(31.12.17; see Fig. 3). The left flank of the infantry had pushed

too far beyond the Gothic line, almost to the wagons. Cut off and

without cavalry support, they were quickly overwhelmed by the

laager defenders. The line of foot soldiers was compressed in upon

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itself, so that movement was restricted and many injuries were

sustained from their own comrades. The Goths had driven off the

Roman horse, and the infantry were compressed between the Gothic

wagons and cavalry (31.13.2-6). By late afternoon the Roman line

broke under continued pressure from the Goths, and as they turned

to flee the inevitable pursuit and massacre took place (31.13.7;

see Fig. 4).

Fig. 4 PHASE 3 – Romans put to flight and a rout begins. 14Most Roman cavalry is driven from the field; 15 Romanauxiliary reserves withdraw; 16 Roman infantry trappedbetween Gothic laager defenders and Gothic cavalry.

Valens was left without protection, his imperial bodyguard

and the scholae palatinae presumably having deserted or been

destroyed. He fled to the ranks of the mattiarii, a regular unit

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that stood its ground as the rest of the Roman line ran. With him

was Trajanus, who “cried that all hope was gone, unless the

emperor, abandoned by his bodyguard, should at least be protected

by his foreign auxiliaries” (31.13.8). Victor, the Sarmatian

cavalry commander, sought to rally the auxiliaries who were held

in reserve behind the main army, but they had all deserted and

Victor opted to follow suit. Ricomeres and Saturninus also fled

from the field as the slaughter continued (31.13.9). “To these

ever irreparable losses, so costly to the Roman state, a night

without the bright light of the moon put an end” (31.13.10-11).

Valens died in the midst of the carnage (31.13.12), though the

exact manner of his death is disputed and several stories

circulated at the time. What was certain was the utter defeat of

the Romans and the establishment of Gothic control in the

Balkans.

III. Failures in Management

Such an unequivocal and unexpected defeat begs the question

of who was the blame. Surely it was due to the blunders of an

incompetent general, as Ammianus would have his readers believe,

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though his judgement is questionable, as we shall discuss later.

By analyzing the events of the battle as well as the context in

which it took place, it is possible to identify a number of

factors that culminated in such a significant defeat.

Valens. It is unsurprising that Valens is often blamed for

the defeat, partly for the mere notoriety of being one of the few

emperors killed in battle, and also in the tradition of putting

all blame or credit of an engagement’s outcome on the commander

(cf. Veg. 3.9: “For when any misfortunes happen to those under

his command, they are considered as public losses and imputed

entirely to his misconduct”). Contemporary authors criticize him

for waiting too long to respond to the Gothic problem after its

first outbreak in 377 – it was a full year before Valens decided

to act against Fritigern and his followers (Jerome, Chron. s.a.

378; Amm. 31.11.1; Prosper, Chron. 1164; Soc. Hist. Eccles. 4.38.3).

Rome’s precedent for dealing with rebellion was one of quick and

often preemptive action, but Valens did not react quickly enough

and the situation escalated to a legitimate crisis. But when one

looks at events occurring in the rest of the empire, it seems

likely that Valens was simply unable to respond quickly to the

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situation. Only a decade earlier, Valens had put down a revolt

orchestrated by the usurper Procopius – a conflict in which the

Thervingian Goths, under Athanaric, had aided Procopius

(Ammianus, Books 26-7). After several engagements, Valens and

Athanaric reached a peace agreement, which resulted in the

discontinuation of Gothic contributions of soldiers to Roman

service (Heather 2005, p. 74). Valens accepted rather mediocre

terms in order to deal with troubles developing on Rome’s eastern

border.

The Sasanid ruler Shapur II had deposed the king of Armenia,

and his son fled to Valens for aid. Despite the 363 AD treaty

preventing the Romans from interfering in Armenia, Valens sent a

force to reinstate the deposed king’s son. The campaign was

successful, and ended in a truce in 371 AD, as Shapur II was

faced with problems on his own eastern frontier. Soon after,

Valens, suspecting the newly established Armenian king of

plotting with the Persians, replaced him with a more favorable

Arsacid ruler (Amm. 30.1.18-23; Daryaee 2009, p. 19). Relations

with Persia were tense, however, and by 375 (the same year the

Goths initially crossed the Danube) Valens thought it wise to

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begin preparing for a major expedition eastward. The same year

saw a major revolt in Isauria, forcing Valens to send some of his

eastern troops to western Cilicia. By 377 yet another revolt

broke out among the Saracens under Queen Mavia, and though Valens

was able to end both rebellions, his preparations for the eastern

campaign were continually postponed. Because he had already

committed to aggressive action in the east, it is not surprising

that it would have taken him a long time “to extract his forces

diplomatically, or even just to turn them around logistically”

(Heather 2005, p. 161). Once the situation in Thrace escalated,

Valens had to recall garrisons stationed at Isauria, settle a

hasty truce with Persia and the Arabs, withdraw his army from the

east, and petition Gratian to send troops from the west (Lenski

2002, p. 356). It would seem that Valens had not necessarily

ignored the Gothic problem, but had seen it as less pressing than

the troubles breaking out in other regions of the empire.

While Valens’ delayed response to the uprising in Thrace may

have been beyond his control, scholars are justified in

criticizing his handling of the situation once he took action.

Vegetius, writing his De Re Militari for Theodosius, drew directly

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from mistakes made by Valens and his generals (Barnes 1979;

Sabbah 1980; Milner 1993, pp. xxv-xxix; Veg. 2.3). After marching

from Antioch to Constantinople and then on to Adrianople, Valens

waited for Gratian’s promised reinforcements, leaving his men

inactive for two months – the soldiers were idle and morale was

low (Amm. 31.11.1; cf. Veg. 3.11; cf. Heather 2005, p. 181). One

can assume that Valens was not confident of victory without

reinforcements from Gratian, since it was only after his scouts

reported seeing only ten thousand Goths that he set out for

battle (Amm. 31.12.3; cf. Veg. 3.9). However, while he was not

quick enough before, he was too hasty at this juncture. Though

some of his generals cautioned him to await Gratian, Valens

considered a force of ten thousand easy enough to handle alone.

Scholars are divided on who is to blame for this particular

miscalculation: were the procursatores at fault for reporting an

incorrect number to Valens? There is evidence that Roman tactical

intelligence was still largely effective (Austin and Rankov 1995,

pp. 40-67, 214-43; Lenski 2002, p. 338n105), but what concerns us

here is Valens’ reaction to his scouts’ reports. Even if the

number had been faulty, Valens must have been well aware of the

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Goths’ tendency to break into smaller groups to go raiding

through the neighboring territories, having earlier sent

Sebastianus to intercept one such raid (Amm. 31.11.2). He ought

to have expected the absent cavalry to arrive at any moment.

Perhaps such considerations were what urged him to march against

the Goths immediately rather than wait for reinforcements from

the west: he wanted to strike at the main body of Goths while

their mounted support was away. But if this was his intention, he

executed it poorly. His men, who had been idle for two months,

were put on a lightning march seventeen kilometers in the heat of

August, so they arrived already wearied from the march (Amm.

31.12.10-11; cf. Veg. 3.10). Even then, if Valens had immediately

attacked the Goths, he might have been able to win the day. But

Valens inexplicably allowed Fritigern to delay the engagement,

dealing in lengthy negotiation procedures while his men continued

to roast in the noon heat, made worse by the Gothic fires lit in

the plains. This delay both tired his men further and allowed for

the return of the Gothic cavalry, which undoubtedly won the day

for Fritigern (Lenski 1997, p. 148). Valens allowed Fritigern to

determine the time and place for the battle, and the private

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message from Fritigern advising Valens to intimidate the Goths

with a show of force in the field might have been a ploy to draw

him into battle on another’s initiative, putting the Goths in

control of the situation. While ambuscades and attacks on small

isolated groups had proved successful against the Goths, Valens

opted for a large set-piece battle: “he had little to gain by

defeating them, while the consequences of his defeat were dire”

(Treadgold 1998, p. 202).

The Officers. The responsibility for the defeat, while

symbolically resting exclusively with Valens, was nevertheless

passed down to Valens’ officers, depending on the literary source

consulted (cf. discrepancy in the account of the council of

officers: Amm. 31.12.4-7; Zos. 4.23-4). The troops sent by

Gratian in 377 from Gaul (under Ricomeres) and Illyricum (under

Frigeridus) were of inferior quality, with many raw recruits

(Lenski 2002, p. 357). Frigeridus’ command did not make it to

Adrianople, as Ammianus claims the general feigned illness and

turned back (Amm. 31.7.5). Ricomeres, who receives a more

positive portrayal from Ammianus despite his Frankish origin,

fought a bloody and inconclusive battle against the Goths at Ad

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Salices and, having witnessed the severity of the crisis in

Thrace, sent word to Gratian with a request for further

reinforcements (Amm. 31.8.2). Extra troops were requested from

Valentinian II as well, but both he and Gratian were reluctant to

send men because, according to Zosimus, they did not have much

interest in the Danubian crisis, as it did not appear to affect

their own realms (Zos. 4.22.4; Lenski 2002, p. 357).

Another consideration is the failure of Lupicinus, Valens’

general in Thrace, in his handling of the Thervingi in 376 AD

which sparked the entire disaster. The grievances of the Goths is

seen as the reason for the outbreak of the war (Amm. 31.4.10-11),

but Lupicinus’ response to the crisis was clumsy and lacking in

foresight. When the Thervingi began to voice their discontent,

Lupicinus sent soldiers to ensure the quick and easy transport of

the Gothic refugees towards Marcianople (Amm. 31.5.2). The

Greuthungi, who had been refused entry into Roman territory,

“when they saw that our soldiers were busy elsewhere, and that

the boats that usually went up and down the river and prevented

them from crossing were inactive,” crossed over the Danube (Amm.

31.5.3). This was followed by the notorious banquet of Lupicinus

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– the attempt to assassinate Fritigern and Alavivus failed, and

worse, Fritigern was able to return to his followers and rally

them to resistance, triggering a plundering rampage through

Thrace (Amm. 31.5.5-8). Heather (2005) observes that “banquet

hijacks” were probably not uncommon as a means of frontier

management, and Lupicinus may have even been acting on Valens’

orders, direct or indirect, to disrupt the Gothic leadership and

render them vulnerable through disorganization (Heather 2005, p.

165; cf. Amm. 29.6.5; 30.1.18-23). When the assassination failed,

Lupicinus inexplicably waffled, allowing Fritigern to return to

his followers.

In Heather’s view, Lupicinus’ mistake was his inability to

fully commit to a course of action: “he went for that worst of

all possible worlds: first one thing, then the other, with

neither stratagem whole-heartedly pursued. Instead of a continued

if uneasy peace or a leaderless opposition, he found himself

facing an organized revolt under an established leader” (Heather

2005, p. 166). The severity of the crisis was fully revealed when

the force Lupicinus gathered together to fight the Goths was

handily crushed (Amm. 31.5.9). The garrisons in the area (23

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units in Scythia and 27 in Lower Moesia) had already contributed

to Lupicinus’ scratch force, and though generally unable or

unwilling to launch attacks on forts, “the Goths had already

neutralized the only mobile Roman force in the region, and the

remaining garrisons faced certain destruction if they ventured

out piecemeal. These installations posed no immediate threat to

the Goths and could be safely ignored” (Heather 2005, p. 172; on

forts: Scorpan 1980; Petrovic 1996; Not. Dig. Or. 39). This is

suggested by the lack of destruction layers for the period in

question at larger forts, though some are occasionally found in

smaller installations. What is certain is the widespread

destruction of the surrounding countryside, with late Roman

villas in the region, north and south of the Haemus mountains,

showing signs of abandonment and extensive destruction layers in

the archaeology (Poulter 1999; Heather 2005, p. 176). This

mismanagement of affairs, added to Valens’ sluggish response to

the crisis, appeared to result from a combination of faulty

judgement and inadequate means of dealing with the problem – “an

unforeseeable combination of factors” (James 2011, p. 262).

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IV. Manpower Shortage

The most devastating and significant consequence of the

battle was the destruction of two thirds of the eastern field

army (Amm. 31.13.18; Lee 2007, p. 78). Later recruitment patterns

reflected a greater strain on manpower resources, with annual

quotas increasing by almost fifty percent or more (Tomlin 1972,

pp. 264-65; Lenski 2004, pp. 101-3; Lee 2007, p. 78). The

Theodosian Code enacted several laws which reveal the

difficulties the Empire faced to recruit sufficient numbers, with

each law indicating a certain level of desperation to find enough

soldiers. In 380 AD, sons of Roman veterans were required to

enlist (CT 7.22.9). The next year saw the issue of a law

prohibiting mutilation to avoid military service (7.13.10), and

by 406 AD, slaves began to be accepted into the ranks (7.13.16).

This reveals the apparent reluctance of many eligible men to

serve in the army, which seems to prompt Ammianus’ digression on

historical exempla of similar catastrophes in Rome’s past (e.g.

the Teutones and Cimbri against Marius: Amm. 31.5.11-17; see

discussion of comparisons to Cannae below). These examples

constituted precedents for setbacks from which the empire had

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recovered, and Ammianus’ hope was that a similar “reinvigoration”

would occur (Lenski 1997, p. 162). However, it seems that his

hopes were misplaced.

The casualties resulting from Adrianople, though universally

accepted as being on a grave scale from both a human and a

statistical view, have nevertheless sparked mild debate that

calls into question just how severe the losses were in relation

to other Roman military disasters. Different estimates of the

Roman army size has led to different casualty lists: Heather

suggests losses numbering 10,000 (Heather 1991, p. 147), while

others have subscribed to Hoffmann’s estimate of up to 26,000

(Hoffmann 1969-70: 1.444; Lenski 2002, p. 339). Hoffmann’s

estimate is based on his study of the Notitia Dignitatum, from which

he determined that many infantry units were completely destroyed

and never reformed following Adrianople (Hoffmann 1969, p. 452).

The losses were severe enough to prompt contemporary writers to

compare the battle to the debacle at Cannae almost six hundred

years before (Them. Or. 34.22; Amm 31.13.18-19; Veg. 1.28). But

the losses at Cannae numbered between 40-75,000 (Polyb. 3.117;

Livy 22.49; App. Hann. 4.25; Plut. Fab. Max. 16.8; Quint. Inst. Or.

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8.6.26; Eutrop. Brev. 3.10). As with the aftermath of Adrianople,

Rome resorted to desperate measures to recruit sufficient

soldiers, and while they were never able to field as large a

number against Hannibal again, they nevertheless managed to

reform the soldiery and eventually avenge the defeat with a

decisive victory against Hannibal, driving him out of Italy

forever. By contrast, Adrianople saw losses numbering between 10-

26,000, significantly less severe than those at Cannae. Similar

desperate measures were taken by Theodosius to restore the field

army’s numbers, but the Empire was never able to fully rebuild

its forces, nor was it ever able to claim a decisively

retributive victory against the Goths (James 2011, p. 263).

In terms of pure numbers, the military paralysis that

prevented Rome from ever making up the losses has significant

implications about the empire’s internal structure, but this

paper is not the place to discuss them (see James 2011, p. 263).

Instead, in keeping with this paper’s focus, it is important to

note two observations made by Southern and Dixon:

…the losses of Adrianople were not to be counted simplyin numerical terms of manpower. What had been lost were

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experienced men, disciplined and trained to Romanstandards. (Southern and Dixon 1996, p. 53)

Those units still attested by name in the Notitiapresumably escaped complete destruction, but there mayonly have remained a small cadre of experienced menaround which to reconstitute the units. Efficiency andeffectiveness may have been much impaired… (ibid. pp.45-6)

The sources record the deaths of the generals Traianus and

Sebastianus, the tribune Aequitius, and thirty-five senior

officers (Them. Or. 16.206d; Amm. 31.13.18-19), and one may

assume most of the “large number of veterans” Valens had brought

with him to Adrianople were lost as well (Amm. 31.12.1). It was

not the mere loss of men that was so devastating, but the loss of

well-trained and experienced soldiers, which could not be

replaced by a simple levying of new recruits. Rome did not have

the time, in what Southern and Dixon call “the decades of

exhaustion…without respite” (Southern and Dixon 1996, p. 52; see

Fig. 5), to cultivate a new generation of officers and veterans,

nor were there many left standing after Adrianople to draw upon

actual war experience. The expertise of the Roman army had

seemingly been wiped out as a result of Adrianople.

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Fig. 5 Map showing the various external threats facing theRomans in the late 4th/early 5th century AD. The defeat atAdrianople, in the broader context of the Empire, “marked afundamental shift in the global balance of power, which, nowinvolving potent enemies on multiple fronts, was no longerweighted decisively in Rome’s favour” (James 2011, p. 262).

V. Dealing with Defeat

Perhaps the most glaring result of the battle of Adrianople

was the presence of the Goths within Roman territory – not as

auxiliaries incorporated into the Roman system, or even as

subdued refugees, but as a semi-autonomous group living in a

space of their choosing, and for the most part on their own terms

(Thompson 1966, pp. 22-3). The northeastern frontier had

collapsed, and the Roman government was forced to negotiate an

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embarrassing and disadvantageous treaty in 382 AD to buy some

respite. However, this also allowed the Goths breathing room

(Heather 2010, p. 181). The concept of the limes as a boundary-

line was irrevocably changed, and the almost sacred delineating

nature of rivers such as the Danube, more effective as a symbolic

than physical marker, was undermined. Graham (2006) interprets a

passage from Jerome as indicative of the ideological significance

of the barbarian incursion:

For thirty years the barbarians burst the barrier ofthe Danube and fought in the heart of the Roman Empire…Yet who will hereafter credit the fact or whathistories will seriously discuss it, that Rome has tofight within her own borders not for glory but for barelife; and that she does not even fight but buys theright to exist by giving gold and sacrificing all hersubstance? (Jerome, Ep. 123.17)

In imagining what was at one time at least ademarcation between Roman land and that of others,Jerome sees a crucial moment of transition to be thedestruction of the Danube frontier. The problems haveeven gone from periphery to center, and the loss of theDanubii limites has brought catastrophe throughout theRoman Empire. (Graham 2006, p. 67)

The significance of the Goths’ continued presence may have been

augmented by the unchecked raiding and plundering that took place

throughout Thrace after the break with Lupicinus, and the

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Thracian garrisons’ inability to protect the interests of Roman

provincials. To the Roman landowner, seeing his villa razed to

the ground by marauding barbarians, it must have been painfully

apparent that the local soldiery, the representatives of the

imperial administration, were powerless to help him. Then to see

these same barbarians allowed to remain within Roman territory,

without having been subdued by imperial vengeance – one can

imagine that the faith in Rome’s power began to fail (Heather

2005, pp. 184-85; James 2011, p. 263).

The ideological damage of the Empire’s situation must have

been significant, and one wonders how the imperial authorities

would have dealt with the damage done to the image of Rome’s

power. Ammianus’ account, characteristically scornful of Valens,

claims that Valens was quite happy to allow the Thervingi entry

into Roman territory because he saw the refugee population as a

fresh resource of manpower for his upcoming eastern campaign

(Amm. 31.4.4). This was a mere seven years after the negotiations

with Athanaric had discontinued levies of Gothic warriors into

the Roman army, and Valens indeed might have begun to ruefully

note the loss. However, one must take into account Ammianus’ bias

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against Valens as well as the realities of the historical context

of the Gothic refugees’ arrival at the Danube. Heather (2010)

convincingly argues that several details do not sit well with

Ammianus’ account. The Goths appear to wield more power in the

negotiations than would be expected of barbarians, proactively

requesting territory in Thrace and being granted it without the

customary division and resettlement throughout the empire (cf.

the Carpi in 318: Amm. 27.5.5; 28.1.5; Eutrop. 9.25; and the

Sarmatians in 330s: Origo Constantini 6.32). Valens, if he was still

fully in control of the situation, most likely would have settled

the barbarians where he wanted them, not where they had

requested, and certainly not in one unified group. In addition to

this, the fact that Valens only allowed the Thervingi entry

suggests that he was not as eager to bring the barbarians in as

Ammianus would have us believe. Instead, it reflects a careful

policy to let in only a portion of those who sought asylum, which

does not fit with Ammianus’ account. The placement of all

available troops in the Balkans to keep the Greuthungi out also

indicates Valens’ reluctance to let the barbarians in, as well as

emphasizing his inability to keep them all out (Heather 2010, p.

28

169). Heather argues that Valens was cornered into accepting the

refugees into Thrace, unable to fortify the Danubian frontier due

to his preoccupations with Persia. However, in order to maintain

the façade of unquestioned imperial power and initiative, the

Roman public would need to see this as a deliberate and conscious

choice on the part of the emperor (Heather 2010, pp. 168-69).

Valens publicly feigned enthusiasm to project an image of

authority and control to the public, while in reality he was

making do with less than desirable circumstances.

Once the situation deteriorated, Valens set out with the aim

of crushing the Goths in a decisive battle that would reestablish

Roman control and military supremacy. This would explain why he

was marshalling such a number of forces for a joint campaign:

“Imperial invincibility would be seen to be re-established, and

of those Goths who remained on Roman territory some would die in

amphitheaters across the Empire, some would be drafted into the

army, and the majority widely distributed as unfree labour”

(Heather 2005, p. 176). However, the opposite happened, and the

image of Roman supremacy on the battlefield was destroyed in a

single afternoon. Valens’ successors were evidently aware of the

29

need to rebuild the image of Roman military success for the

public, even if it was a misrepresentation of reality. Gratian

and Theodosius deliberately celebrated numerous triumphs over the

Goths, Alans and Huns, despite the lack of any truly decisive

victories (Cons. Const. s.a. 379), and the psychological need for

an outward façade of military success is reflected in the sudden

proliferation of triumphs celebrated in the ten years following

Adrianople (six celebrations between 379 and 389: McCormick 1986,

pp. 41-46; contrast with twelve triumphs in the preceding seventy

years: ibid. pp. 306-78; Lenski 1997, p. 140). A similar trend

can be seen in contemporary literature, especially when comparing

what was written immediately following the disaster to writings

after the treaty of 382. Imperial authors like Themistius seemed

to minimize the effects of the catastrophe, predicting vengeance

and ultimate victory under Theodosius (Wolfram 1977, pp. 243-47;

1988, pp. 128-30; Lenski 1997, p. 140). Following the treaty with

the Goths, these same authors began to emphasize Adrianople and

the damage it brought to the Empire (e.g. Them. Or. 16.206d-

207a). Peace with the Goths had been bought with humiliating

concessions rather than decisive military victory (Rome “buys the

30

right to exist”: Jerome, Ep. 123.17). Imperial propaganda needed

to account for the “uncomfortable compromise” of the peace, which

had been reached only when military force proved insufficient to

deal with the problem – thus the battle of Adrianople had to be

magnified: “Because Theodosius had failed to achieve a decisive

victory and because the concessions he offered in 382 reflected

the military stalemate, Themistius chose to paint the disaster as

especially grim and intractable” (Lenski 1997, p. 143).

VI. Conclusion

Lenski (1997) argues that Ammianus’ account ends on a

hopeful note, convinced that Adrianople “was not, as

contemporaries had come to believe, a unique event or turning

point in history, nor were the difficulties it posed

insurmountable” (Lenski 1997, p. 161). However, because the

Empire was never given the opportunity to fully recover, and

because the mistakes made in previous years had caused

irreparable damage to the image of Roman power, Ammianus’ hopes

proved somewhat empty. Rome was able to reassert some of her

dominance in the following years, but she had been unable to

31

adequately solve the Gothic problem, and was never given a chance

to avenge the defeat at Adrianople (Heather 2005, p. 190; James

2011, p. 262). Unlike Cannae, Adrianople had occurred at a time

when Rome was unable to respond similarly to a setback, and

combined with the administrative and tactical blunders made by

imperial officials, it caused lasting damage to the Roman world.

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