10

A Russian Diplomat in

Bucharest:

S.A. Poklevski-Koziell and the

‘Bessarabian Cause’, 1919-1920

Svetlana Suveic�∗

ussia’s post-war history began while the rest of Europe was still at war’,

noticed attentively Alan Kramer on 1917 events and their role in the

Russian history:1 the empire collapsed, the Bolsheviks took power, the army

disintegrated and Russia signed a separate peace treaty with Central Powers at

Brest-Litovsk. In the meantime, a civil war broke simultaneously in different parts

of the country.

When the Peace conference opened its doors in Paris in January 1919, the

Allies did not have a clear politics toward Russia; nor the Bolshevik neither the

White forces were invited to represent Russia’s interests at the conference where

the European borders were to be re-designed. Nevertheless, they showed their

willingness to support the anti-Bolshevik movement inside Russia and recognize

the Kolchak government which intended to unify the dispersed White forces.

During the Peace conference, the Russian political émigrés and diplomats2 made

∗ Svetlana Suveic� is Ph.D. in History, currently Humboldt senior research fellow at the

Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg, Germany (2012-2014). She is

former Fulbright research fellow at CREEES-Stanford University and Carnegie CASE fellow. 1 Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction. Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War,

Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 285. 2 The Western literature on the Russian Whites in the immediate period after 1918 focused

mainly on the political, military and cultural domains. Among these, see: Mark Raeff, Russia Abroad:

R

STUDII

Svetlana Suveic�

11

efforts to persuade the Great Powers for an immediate and consistent support

against the Bolsheviks. On the other side, they considered the application of the

principle of self-determination of nations, including those that populated the

territory of former Russian empire, as an effective strategy for keeping Europe

away from the ‘Red menace’.

The cause of the Russian Whites, called “Russkoe delo”, also aimed at

postponing the delimitation of the status of the former Russian territories, until the

freely elected Constituent Assembly sent delegates to Paris. The task of the

Russian émigrés – not an easy one, considering that Russia was not allowed an

official delegation at the conference – was to find a formula which fitted both the

Russian interests and the principle of self-determination. The plan to preserve the

former Western Russian borderland regions also included Bessarabia. In December

1917, after Ukraine declared independence, Bessarabia followed the same path, but

a few months, on April 9 1918, the Bessarabian parliament Sfatul Tarii voted for

the union with Romania. At that stage, neither the Romanians nor the Russians

considered the issue closed, both parts expecting a final decision of the Peace

conference in that regard.

At Paris, while Romania’s interests were defended by an official delegation,

Russia’s interests were brought across mainly through ‘hidden diplomacy’ and

propaganda means. The Russian representatives, appointed by Kolchak

government, teamed up with the Bessarabian ‘delegation’, led by the Former

Marshal of Bessarabian nobility, Alexandr N. Krupenskii, in order to persuade the

Great Powers that Romania did not have any historical rights over the territory

which, from the ethnical point of view, comprised mostly non-Romanians,

unsympathetic to the new regime. The idea to have a plebiscite in Bessarabia was

brought up as the solution in line with the much acclaimed Wilsonian principle of

self-determination.3 Rejected by the Romanian delegation, the idea of plebiscite

A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990;

Karl Schlögel (Hsg.), Der große Exodus. Die russische Emigration und ihre Zentren, 1917 bis 1941,

Beck Verlag, München, 1994; Russische Emigration im 20. Jahrhundert. Literatur, Sprache, Kultur,

München: Sagner, 2005. Among the works of the Russian authors produced in cooperation with

Western historians, see: Rossiia v izgnanii. Sud’by rossiiskikh emigrantov za rubezhom, IVI RAN,

Moskva, 1999; Rossiia i rossiiskaia emigratsiia v vospominaniiakh i dnevnikakh: annotirovannyi ukazatel’ knig, zhurnal’nykh i gazetnykh publikatsii, izdannykh za rubezhom v 1917-1991 gg.: v 4-h

tomakh, Nauchnoe rukovodstvo, redaktsiia i vvedenie A.G. Tartakovskogo, T. Emmonsa, O.V.

Budnitskogo, ROSSPEN, Moskva, 2003; Oleg Budnitskii, Terence Emmons (Eds.), “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel’no!” B.�. Bakhmetev – V.�. ���lakov. Perepiska, 1919-1951, V 3-h t., ROSSPEN,

Moskva, 2001; A.V. Tribunskii, P.A Makushin, Pavel Nikolaevich Miliukov: Trudy i dni (1859-1904), Riazan’, 2001; Oleg Budnitskii, Alexandra Polian, Russko-Evreiskii Berlin, 1920-1941,

Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, Moskva, 2013. 3 On this subject, see our recent study: Svetlana Suveica, ‘Russkoe Delo’ and the

‘Bessarabian Cause’: The Russian Political Émigrés and the Bessarabians in Paris, 1919-1920, IOS

Mitteilungen, Arbeitsbereich Geschichte, No. 64 February 2014, 53 p., at: http://www.dokumente.ios-

regensburg.de/publikationen/mitteilungen/mitt_64.pdf, March 20 2014. The activity of the Russians

in Paris with the aim to counterbalance the efforts of the Romanian delegation at the Peace conference

was briefly discussed in: Marcel Mitra�c�, Moldova: A Romanian Province under Russian Rule.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

12

neither found support among the conference’s delegates who, motivated by a

variety of factors, postponed the final decision up to the spring of 1920. The

postponement deepened the dispute between the parts, tensioned the situation

inside Bessarabia and lowered the population’s trust in the new administration.

For the Russians in Paris, who tried to persuade the Great Powers to take

into account Russia’s interests as well counterbalance the activity of the Romanian

political rivals, to have a trustworthy person in Romania was crucial. It was

necessary to stay well-informed on the political and military developments in

Romania and its new Eastern province, perceive the moral state of the elite in

relation to the Bolshevik danger, understand Romania’ relations with the Allies and

foresee its future moves in relation to the anti-Bolshevik movement. The present

study aims at throwing light on the activity of the Russian ambassador to

Bucharest, Stanislav A. Poklevski-Koziell, and the role he played in this complex

Russian-Romanian post-war equation. The primary sources from the Hoover

Institution Archives (Stanford, California) reveal that during 1919-1920 the

diplomat made efforts to decongest the tensioned relations between the Romanian

and the Kolchak governments, while considering that the Bolshevik danger could

motivate the parts to overcome the dispute over Bessarabia. Poklevski supported

the “Bessarabian cause” and believed in the return of the region back to Russia;

nevertheless, in the immediate post-war period he concentrated on persuading both

parts to work together toward defeating the common enemy while leaving aside the

territorial dispute. Until Russia recover to become again strong and powerful and

claim Bessarabia back, there were other priorities that obliged it to build

constructive relations with Romania, believed the Russian diplomat.

On Duty

Prior to his appointment as ambassador to Bucharest in 1916, the former

chamberlain and state counsellor, Stanislav A. Poklevski-Koziell served in the

diplomatic missions to Japan, United Kingdom and Persia. He was of Polish origin

and his family owned land and a spirit factory in Ural.4 While in Romania,

Poklevski had his merits in negotiating the 1916 Romanian agreement of entering

the war and up to its end made a good reputation in the allied country. In

November 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd and called for the

dissolution of the diplomatic corps appointed by the Provisional Government,

Diplomatic History from the Archives of the Great Powers, Algora Publishing, 2002, p. 143 and the

foll.; Emilian Bold, R�zvan Ovidiu Locovei, Rela�ii româno-sovietice, Demiurg, Ia�i, 2008, p. 55-75. 4 On the history of Poklevski-Koziell family, see: T.R. Mosunova, Poklevskie-Koziell –

vydaiushchie predstaviteli pol’skoi diaspory Sibiri i Urala, in Poliaki v Rossii: istoria ssylki i deportatsii, St. Petersbug, 1995, p. 25-28. On Poklevski-Koziell family business in Ural, see: S. Fil’,

“Poklevskie-Koziell – vladel’tsy vinokurennogo zavoda”, Lukich (Avgust 2003): p. 56-64. According

to Oleg Platonov, S.A. Poklevski-Koziell belonged to the mason order: Oleg Platonov, Ternovyi venets Rossii. Istoriia Russkogo naroda v XX veke, T. 2, Moskva, 1997, p. 574.

Svetlana Suveic�

13

Poklevski decided to remain on duty and continue to serve Russia, despite its

indecisive future. Together with his counterparts, V.A. Maklakov in Paris, B.A.

Bakhmetev in Washington, M.N. Girs in Rome and other Russian “diplomats of a

non-existent country”5, Poklevski worked toward diminishing the consequences of

Russia’s weakness and instability, which he considered a temporary state, and for

the restoration of a “new” Russia, also strong and powerful.

In a note to S.D. Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign affairs dispatched

by Kolchak to Paris, Poklevski ensured his chief that after the war “the Romanian

government continues to treat with great courtesy and attention the representation

of the Russian Mission and recognizes the full power of all the documents

emanating from the Mission and from our Consulates in Romania”.6 In his duty,

Poklevski kept a constant reach correspondence with the Russian officials in Omsk

and Paris, his counterparts in other capitals, as well with other political figures in

emigration. In detailed reports, to which often excerpts from the Romanian

newspapers and other printed materials were attached, Poklevski reflected on the

political, economic, social and cultural developments in Romania, the military

affairs between the two former allies that complicated after the dissolution of the

Russian army and Russia leaving the war, as well on the moral state inside the

country, considering the evolution of the events in Paris. Another issue Poklevski

worked on steadily and with dedication was the issue of the Russian refugees, a

topic which deserves a separate study.7

According to a source, “the Russian Consulate in Bucharest is very ill

informed about what is happening in Paris. While twice a week here arrive

special trains from Paris, it is necessary to regularly send all the materials and

information”.8 The multiple traces from other documentary sources allow to

believe that there was a constant exchange of information between the Russian

legation in Bucharest and the Russian representatives of the Kolchak government

in Paris. The information was flowing back and forth using the train connection,

as well through regular post and diplomatic or private curriers that travelled from

Bucharest to Paris and back. The role of Poklevski in this regard was

indisputable.

5 Quoted from O. Budnitskii, Diplomaty nesushchestvuiushchei strany, in Introduction

to: “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel’no!” B.A. Bakhmetev – V.A. Maklakov, Perepiska, 1919-1951, v

3-h tomakh, ROSSPEN, Izdatel’stvo Guverovskogo Instituta, Moskva-Stanford, Tom 1, 2001.6 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, January 4, January 21 1919. Hoover

Institution Archives (HIA), Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42 Subject file, Folder 42.5 Romania,

conditions and events, 1918 October – 1919 March. 7 On the Russian refugees in Romania after the war, see the recent contributions: Vadim

Guzun, Indezirabilii: aspecte mediatice, umanitare �i de securitate privind emigra�ia din Uniunea Sovietic� în România interbelic�, Argonaut, Cluj-Napoca, 2013; Idem (Ed.), Chestiunea refugia�ilor de peste Nistru: documente diplomatice �i ale serviciilor române de informa�ii, 1919-1936, Argonaut,

Cluj-Napoca, 2012. 8 Kr. Krovopuskov – G.E. Lvov, March 4 1919. HIA, Russia. Posol’stvo (France), Box 6

Correspondence, Folder 6.26 L’vov, Prince Georgii Evgen’evich, 1918-1919.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

14

Between Berthelot and Denikin

At the beginning of 1919, when in Paris the Peace conference just started,

Poklevski seemed convinced that “in Russia’s present situation, and with the

created present conditions Russia cannot be saved without the help of and the

closest cooperation with the Allies”.9 In this context, he viewed the establishment

and maintenance of a contact between the heads of the Allied and Russian armies,

Gen. Henri Berthelot and Gen. Anton Denikin, as crucial. At the end of 1918, when

the Romanian government and the Allied representatives moved temporary from

Bucharest to Iasi, he introduced himself to the latter as “the representative of the

voluntary army formed by Alexeev, at present under the command of General

Denikin”. The subsequent efforts were made to convince the Allied representatives

that “it is absolutely necessary for the Allied troops to be sent to Russia, and

especially to Ukraine, as quickly as possible after the departure of the German

troops, in order to check the spread of Bolshevism. The Ukrainians are in deadly

fear of this element”.10

In several bilateral meetings with Poklevski which were mentioned in his

diary, Gen. Berthelot exposed his opinion on the recent events in Russia and the

evolution of the relations with the Allies.11

According to the Russian diplomat, the

news about the acceptance of a conference in Prinkipo12

was met with

disappointment by Berthelot. Being against any compromise with the Bolsheviks,

he expressed the hope that “the failure of this attempt will convince the public

opinion of the Allied countries of the need of an active action of the Allied forces

against the Bolsheviks”.13

The French general was disappointed by the Allies’

confusion on the events in Russia and concerned with the lack of a common

political program in relation to it: “they cannot decide yet - apparently, based on

the considerations of their own internal policy – on the active attack even against

the Bolsheviks”.14

Poklevski informed later his counterparts in Paris that the

prolonged hesitation of the Allies was consequently diminishing their interest to act

“for the restoration of the united and indivisible Russia”. Another consequence

related to his efforts was that the Allies remained passive observers in the stringent

issue of the Russian refugees.

9 Kopiia s pis’ma Rossiiskogo Poslannika v Rumynii i.d. Zavedushchego Diplomaticheskim

Otdelom pri Dobrovol’cheskoi Armii, D.S.S. Neratovu, February 19 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.5. 10 Notes of November 6 1918. Charles J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans. Seven Years of a

Diplomatist’s Life in the Storm Centre of Europe, Rand McNally & Company, Chicago, 1921, p. 277-278. 11 The original of the Memoirs de Gen. Berthelot is kept at HIA. Here: 26 Fevrier 1919. 2ème

Mission en Roumanie. 7 Octobre 1918 au 5 Mai 1919, Memoirs de Gen. Berthelot. 4e partie. 12 It was an unsuccessful attempt to arrange a meeting between the Allies’ delegates, the

Whites and the Bolshevik representatives on the Prinkipo (Princes’) Island on the Marmara Sea. 13 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, January 21 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.5. 14 Ibid.

Svetlana Suveic�

15

After meeting Berthelot on February 26 1919, Poklevski tried to explain to

the Russian officials in Paris why the “good-natured and very friendly towards

Russia” French general already twice postponed the meeting with Gen. Denikin,

first in February then in March 1919:15

first, there the motive of the “threatening

position of the Donetsk Basin” was invoked, then the necessity of “the final

clarification of the Allies’ policies and plans toward Russia” was formulated.16

In

fact, Berthelot was more concerned over Denikin’s “dictatorial authority” in

Southern Russia as well in Odessa.17

On his turn, Berthelot was suspected by the

Russian Stavka for the excess of loyalty toward the Romanians. Indeed, the

Russians were aware of the fact that in 1916-1917 Berthelot led successfully the

French military mission to Romania, this giving him the “acceptance and authority

among the Romanians that went beyond respect and bordered on worship”.18

On the other side, the hesitation of the Allies toward Russia disoriented the

Romanian government, which also avoided formulating a clear position toward the

issues Russia was concerned with. In this sense, Poklevski wrote: “The Romanian

Government and the public opinion are definitely in an anti-Bolshevik mood, but

they are here little familiar with the situation inside Russia, and if the serious

Romanian statesman do not doubt the future restoration of Russia, the others, on

the contrary, nourish the hope which from time to time appear in some Romanian

newspapers, that Russia will disintegrate into smaller states and will thus cease to

be a threat to Romania […]”.19

Apparently, the Romanians were sympathetic to the

Volunteer army, at the same time showing awareness toward the fact that “the

same Volunteer army is against of leaving of Bessarabia to Romania and that it is

ready to even contribute to the returning of the latter to Russia by force”.20

Apparently, the Romanians were saying: “We do not fear Bolshevism, we are

15 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, March 25 1919; Kopiia s pis’ma

Rossiskogo Poslannika .., February 19 1919; Kopiia doveritel’nogo pis’ma I.O. Nachal’nika

Upravlenii Inistrannych Del na imea Rossiiskogo Poslannika v Rumynii, March 3 1919. Mikhail N.

Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.5. 16 Kopiia Sekretnoi telegrammy Rossiiskogo Poslannika v Rumynii. I.o. Upraviaiushchego

diplomaticheskim Otdelom pri Dovrovol’cheskoi Armii D.S.S. Neratovu, January 20 1919. HIA,

Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.5. 17 Compte rendu d’une mission exécutée auprès du General Denikine par le Captaine

Berthelot de l’Etat Major du General Berthelot, February 14 – March 1 1919. HIA, Vasilii A.

Maklakov Papers, Box 20 Subject file, Folder Russian Embassy. Franco-Russian Relations. Report. –

Capt. Berthelot. 18 Glenn E. Torrey, Romania and World War I. A Collection of Studies, The Center for

Romanian Studies, Ia�i-Oxford-Portland, 1998, p. 350. See also: Generalul H.M. Berthelot: 80 de ani dup� misiunea francez� în România, 15-16 octombrie 1996, Editura Universit��ii din Bucure�ti,

Bucure�ti, 1996. 19 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, January 21 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.5. 20 Ibid.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

16

convinced in the reasonableness of our people, but we fear the restoration of Russia

which will again snatch from us Bessarabia”.21

Poklevski who proved to keep stable relations with the Romanian officials

and build a good reputation before the Allies, proposed to the Kolchak government

to act as a mediator in political matters between Gen. Berthelot and Gen. Denikin.

He suggested that the head of the White Russian special military mission to Great

Britain, Major-Gen. Boris V. Gerua, could assume the same duty in military

matters. A clear answer in that regard did not follow.22

Nevertheless, Poklevski

seemed determined to contribute to the building of closer relations between the

Russian Whites and the Allies, and perceived the support given at Paris by the

American delegates, as well the French hesitation, as a clear sign that the Russian

interests in the province were not ignored by the Allies.23

Between Denikin and Br�tianu

In April 1918 the Bessarabian parliament Sfatul ��rii declared the union of

the region with Romania. The Russian Ambassador attentively followed from the

Romanian capital the subsequent events in the region, as well the activity of the

Romanian delegation in Paris toward the recognition of Bessarabia as the

Romanian territory. According to Poklevski, the mission of the Romanian prime

minister Ion I.C. Br�tianu to Paris was marked by “his stubborn character,

intransigence, complaints and reproaches, with which he showered the Allies, [and

which] brought the reversed results and made him extremely unpopular among the

conference’s circles”.24

Poklevski was also aware of the fact that Br�tianu’s

activity in the French capital, determined by complex circumstances, was perceived

contradictory at home: while some interpreted his intransigence as egoist behaviour

aiming to raise the prestige of the Liberal party in power, others were willing to

admit that his stubbornness would bring Romania in conflict with the Allies, and

thus wished for a compromise.

In relation to Russia, which was not an imperial power anymore, but which

political future remained unclear, Romania showed its sympathy toward the White

movement, but remained confused on the division of power between the White

forces inside Russia as well waited for the Allies’ position in that regard. Romania

21 Polozhenie v Bessarabii, by Lt. Baranovskii, July 25 1919. HIA, Alexandr N. Krupenskii

Papers, Box 2 Subject file, Folder Bessarabian question. 22 Kopiia s pis’ma Rossiiskogo Poslannika ..., February 19 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.5. 23 On the “up-s” and “down-s” of France’s position on the Bessarabian issue at the Peace

conference, see: Traian Sandu, La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920: une reconnaissance dificile, in Christian Baechler, Carole Fink (Eds.), The Establishment of European Frontiers after the Two World Wars, Peter Lang, 1996, p. 369-389.

24 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, December 15 1919. HIA, Mikhail N.

Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.7 Romania, conditions and events, 1919 November – December.

Svetlana Suveic�

17

expressed the willingness to build good relations with the Whites, but conditioned

these by the recognition of the status of Bessarabia, the fact being met without

surprise by the latter. According to a secret telegram of September 20 1919, sent to

Bucharest by A.A. Neratov, the head of diplomatic section of the Volunteer army,

Gen. Denikin also expressed the interest to establish relations with the Romanian

military leaders, in order to ensure the common fight against the Bolsheviks.

Unlike the Romanians who wanted to clarify Russia’s position toward Bessarabia,

Denikin wanted to avoid discussions on political matter, including the issue of

Bessarabia. Moreover, Denikin declared that namely in relation to Bessarabia he

was not willing “to consider for himself the decisions of the Conference as

compulsory, taken without our participation and acceptance […].”25

Poklevski was of a more moderate opinion. He made attempts to convince

Neratov that Denikin should use the opportunity and accept the proposal of the

Romanian government: to leave for the Peace conference the decision on the

Bessarabian status and declare compliance to it in the future. Poklevski considered

that at that moment Denikin was not able to fight Bessarabia back; as for the future

actions, it did not seem yet clear whether Bessarabia will be recognized by the

conference as a Romanian territory. Even so, once Russia will be restored, Denikin

will not be bound to the conference’s decisions, reflected further Poklevski in a

letter to Omsk.26

That was the time of hesitation and uncertainty: after July 2 1919 hearings

on Bessarabia the ‘Council of Four’ issued no decision in relation to the status of

the region. Claiming that that the only principle based on which Romania could

aspire to posess the region was the principle of self-determination, the Russian

Ambassador to Paris, V.A. Maklakov, challenged Sfatul Tarii’s decision of the

union of Bessarabia with Romania as being taken by a non-representative body. He

emphasized that besides the Moldavians27

in Bessarabia also lived the Russians;

moreover, he claimed that “parts of the country were completely Russian”, with the

exception of the four central districts, in which “a plebiscite should be held and if

the population decided to join Romania, Russia would agree with the decision”.28

The Russian representative concluded that a “free plebiscite” was required to find

out the will of the people, and “if there were any Russian subjects of Romanian

25 A.A. Neratov – S.A. Poklevski-Koziell. Secret telegram. September 20 1919. HIA, Mikhail

N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6 Romania, conditions and events, 1919 April – October. 26 Based on the note written by A.N. Krupenskii who have seen the copy of the letter of S.A.

Poklevskij-Koziell to A.A. Neratov of September 25 1919. Soderzhanie nekotorykh pisem i

dokumentov nachodeashchikhsea v Russkom posol’stve v Parizhe, imeiushchikh otnoshenie k

Bessarabii. HIA, Alexandr N. Krupenskii Papers, Box 2, Folder Russian Embassy, Paris, Documents

on Bessarabia from. 27 Today’s usual polemics on the ethnic origin of the Bessarabians/Moldovans cannot be

found neither in oral discourse nor in written sources we researched in relation to the subject, the

Romanian origin of the Moldavians being accepted as such by the protagonists of the story. 28 Secret. Notes of the Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers held in Mr.

Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 2 1919, at 3.30 p.m., F.M. Records

15-29, May 14 – July 2 1919, vol. 2, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, f. 3-4.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

18

nationality who wished to unite under one flag with the rest of their countrymen,

Russia would be well-advised to permit it. Russia was big enough to make a

sacrifice of this kind”.29

Maklakov seemed convinced that the results would prove

a “contrary different result” from that assumed by the Romanian side and insisted

on the fact that a decision of the conference favouring Romania would be “a source

of permanent grievance, and would do harm to Romania, which would not be in a

position to absorb an unwilling population”.30

While showing a map of

Bessarabia,31

he concluded that a plebiscite in the four Bessarabian districts where

a Romanian majority lived was the only concession Russia would have been ready

to make in the conditions of the advancement of Kolchak armies.

Being heard after Maklakov, Ion I.C. Br�tianu said that Russia took

possession of Bessarabia on its way to Istanbul and that it “owed Romania a great

debt, being largely responsible for her misfortune” during the war and after, and

that the debt could be paid by returning Bessarabia. His denied that the plebiscite

could be a solution for the dispute, arguing that the Bessarabians lived in the region

where the Bolshevik danger remained high and they should not be put in a position

to choose “between Bolsheviks and order”. Bessarabia was a borderland, and in the

case of withdrawal of the Romanian troops – which the Russian part claimed to be

a condition of the plebiscite - there would be an endless disturbance in the region.

To Lancing’s question whether a plebiscite could be postponed for two years or

even for a decade, Br�tianu responded with a denial, considering that it would only

bring endless revolutionary agitation.32

After Br�tianu quit the conference, Poklevski met him several times in

Bucharest. At the beginning of September 1919, after returning from a trip abroad,

Poklevski noticed a “big change in the attitude of the Romanian Government

toward the Ukrainians”. The Russian diplomat was aware of some of Petliura’s

earlier attempts to establish friendly relations with Romania, to which the

Romanians remained reluctant: apparently, they “could not get rid of the feelings

of antipathy and suspicion toward the Ukrainians, whom they do not hesitate to call

Bolsheviks with attached Ukrainian noses”.33

Another factor that boosted

Romania’s confidence of the international arena was the occupation of Budapest by

the Romanian troops. Since then, claimed Poklevski, the government “pays little

attention to their [Allies –n.a.] requests and advice and, in general, are in the stage

of megalomania, which could push them toward an imprudent and harmful step,

from our point of interest, inside Russia”.

29 Ibid. 30 Exposé de M. Maklakov a la Commission de la Conference de la Paix. Paris, le 2 Juillet

1919. HIA, Alexandr N. Krupenskii Papers, Box 2, Folder Maklakov, at Peace Conference

Commission, Paris. 31 Svetlana Suveic�, ‘Russkoe Delo’ and the ‘Bessarabian Cause’, Annex, at:

http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/mitteilungen/mitt_64.pdf, March 20 2014. 32 Secret. Notes of the Meeting .., 8. 33 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, September 10 1919. HIA, Mikhail N.

Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6.

Svetlana Suveic�

19

During the meeting of September 10 1919, Br�tianu told Poklevski that

initially the Romanians showed their compassion toward Denikin and helped him

with weapons and military supplies. The attitude changed only when they got

convinced “that Russia, on which restoration all the three factors work,34

will never

agree to the union of Bessarabia to Romania, and that especially Denikin’s army,

once it will become strong enough, will claim from Romania the return of that

province to Russia”. In such a situation, Br�tianu considered that helping Denikin’s

army was “against Romania’s interests”. On the other side, there was Petliura who

also fought against the Bolsheviks and seemed willing to recognize Bessarabia as

Romanian territory.35

In the condition that the Ukrainians could keep the

Bolsheviks far from the Dniester, helping the Ukrainians was a seen as Romania’s

‘duty’. Poklevski, who could not accept Bratianu’s arguments, “tried in every way

to prove before Br�tianu the folly of such a policy”, qualified as an ‘intervention

into Russian internal affairs, of which Romania will be hardly forgiven by the

Russian public opinion, especially if it ever comes to fighting between the forces of

General Denikin and the Petliurists”.36

The Russian Ambassador affirmed that the

Ukraine “which Germany and Austria dreamed to create” was a myth, so that

Petliura’s acceptance to recognize Bessarabia did not bear any importance.

Poklevski assured Br�tianu that Denikin was not willing to open the

discussion over Bessarabia and that he was willing to wait for the conference’s

decision in that regard. Moreover, he claimed that with the approaching of the

Russian forces toward the Dniester, Denikin was ready to make efforts for avoiding

any incidents along the Romanian frontier. He emphasized that the fact that

Romania was giving support to Petliura ‘painfully echoes in the Russian

consciousness’; offering military support to Denikin was suggested as an

immediate solution, so that Romania could argue that it supported every anti-

Bolshevik force. Poklevski acknowledged that his effort to persuade Br�tianu was

in vain, the latter firmly remaining on his position. In the same context, Poklevski

informed Sazonov that the Allied representatives, although being unhappy with the

support given by the Romanians to Petliura, would rather not interfere at that stage.

Otherwise, France was showing its sympathy toward the new Ukrainian state.37

Although unwilling to interfere, the Allied representatives in Bucharest were

concerned about the lack of progress in the Russian-Romanian relations and

considered that an eventual concession on behalf of Denikin would help. During

the discussion held at the beginning of October 1919, the British representative of

the Inter-allied military mission, Gen. H. Greeley, said to Poklevski that “if the

Chief Commander can give the Romanian government an assurance that he does

34 Br�tianu referred to the activity of the Russian émigrés in Paris, and that of Kolchak and

Denikin inside Russia. 35 Another fact which was important in relation to Petliura was that he was willing to let the

conflict with the Poles on Galitsia to the conference’s decision. 36 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, September 10 1919. HIA, Mikhail N.

Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6. 37 Ibid.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

20

not intend to attack Bessarabia, and on the contrary, he desires the most friendly

cooperation with Romania and that our [Russian – n.a.] troops were given a

specific order not to cross the Dniester and consider the Romanians as allies, then

that will signify a ‘huge step ahead in the Russian-Romanian relations”.38

The

Russian diplomat ensured Greeley that he thought the same way, and that

Denikin’s assurance would “ease” the relations between the two countries.

Nevertheless, Poklevski abstained from judging whether such assurance was

possible, given “the present Russia’s situation”.39

On October 20 1919, Poklevski received a letter from Paris, presumably

from Sazonov, in which the author expressed his satisfaction that “Br�tianu finally

understood the imminence of the revival of Greater Russia and acknowledged

Romania’s necessity to establish friendly neighbouring relations”. Br�tianu’s

request toward Russia to give up on Bessarabia was qualified as a “sacrifice”,

which was “completely incomparable” to what was seen as Romania’s “duty”: to

return the illegally kept military equipment, to cease hostile activities, such as

supplying Petliura, as well facilitate Odessa’s supply of firewood from Bessarabia.

He seemed convinced that Bessarabia “has not ceased to be a Russian region” and

that Br�tianu was wrong while considering that good neighbouring relations could

be constructed “based on the totally unjustifiable Romania’s separation of

Bessarabia from Russia”.40

The issue of Bessarabia was not considered as

definitely solved, but “even if, because of our temporary weakness, with the help of

some of the Great Powers, Romania would manage to satisfy its desire, this would

not contribute to the establishment of good relations between us and would barely

create a solid border, as a stronger Russia would never reconcile with being ousted

from the Dniester line”, concluded Sazonov. Thus, the Russian Minister of foreign

affairs admitted that an unfavourable decision on the Bessarabian “question” was

possible, but to declare in advance that Russia complied with a decision of that

kind was seen as “extremely incautious” on behalf of Russia. The position of

acceptance of the plebiscite to be carried out in the four central districts of

Bessarabia was an optimal “sacrifice” Russia was ready to make. Bratianu’s denial

of plebiscite was, in opinion of his political rival, the proof that “even in this part of

Bessarabia the union with Romania encounters little sympathy”.41

The behaviour of Br�tianu both at the Peace conference and in Bucharest

convinced the Russians that there would be little hope for the improvement of

bilateral relation. Contrary to them, Br�tianu was not ready to accept the

development of the anti-Bolshevik cooperation without obtaining Russia’s clear

statement on Bessarabia. Poklevski wished that in such a situation the Allies played a

38 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov. Secret telegram. Bucharest, October 12 1919. HIA,

Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6. 39 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – A.A. Neratov. Secret telegram. Bucharest, October 13 1919. HIA,

Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6. 40 S.A. Poklevskomu-Koziell, Paris, October 20 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42,

Folder 42.6. 41 Ibid.

Svetlana Suveic�

21

role: in the condition of the handed ultimatum on the withdrawal of the Romanian

troops from Budapest,42

Romania could have been asked to act more energetically

toward the support of Denikin army as well. Poklevski also hoped that a new

Romanian “Cabinet, which would give up the politics of resistance toward the

Allies” will show more flexibility toward the collaboration with the Russian Whites.

Toward a Compromise over Bessarabia

The appointment of Gen. Arthur Vaitoianu as the new Romanian prime

minister was optimistically met by the Russian Ambassador in Bucharest who only

a couple of months earlier unsuccessfully tried to ensure Br�tianu of Denikin’s

friendly intentions. During the first meeting between the two, Vaitoianu praised

Denikin’s success against the Bolsheviks and insisted that the establishment of

friendly relations between the two countries was possible, again, in the condition

that Russia showed “a clear, friendly position in relation to Romania”. On its turn,

Romania was ready to “react in the same manner to his [Denikin’s –n.a.] work on

the restoration of the great indivisible Russia, if it could be assured of the fact that

Gen. Denikin has no intention to direct his weapons against Romania, or agitate on

the Bessarabian question, while leaving the resolution of the dispute on Bessarabia

between Russia and Romania to the Paris Conference [...]”.43

Acknowledging that the Romanian officials, as well as the diplomatic

representatives of the other countries, “probably do not want to admit the idea that

Russia could not agree with the decisions of the Paris conference”, Poklevski

confirmed before Vaitoianu the willingness of Denikin to establish good relations

with Romania, but without entering the negotiations on political matter.44

The

Russian Ambassador inclined to think that the state of tension between the sides

was due to the negative consequence of propaganda in the Romanian press and the

“unfriendly notes” on Russia, Kolchak and Denikin especially, and hoped that the

Romanian authorities will take action to stop it. On his turn, Vaitoianu noted that

the anti-Russian propaganda and agitation was nothing else but the reaction toward

the same actions coming from the Russian side, depicted especially in the border

regions. The meeting finalized with Poklevski’s assurance that Denikin was

42 In a telegram to Paris, Poklevski considered that the first draft of the answer to the

ultimatum, in which the Romanian government announced of its resignation and asked for the

prolongation of the term of withdrawal, was “dictated by Br�tianu, with the aim to provoke a rupture

with the Allies until a new Cabinet will be formed”. S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov,

Bucharest, December 9 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.7. 43 Soderzhanie nekotorykh pisem i dokumentov nakhodeashchikhsea v russkom posol’stve v

Parizhe, imeiushchikh otnoshenie k Bessarabii, undated. HIA, Alexandr N. Krupenskii Papers, Box 2,

Folder Russian Embassy, Paris ... 44 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell –A.A. Neratov. Secret telegram. Bucharest, October 13 1919.

HIA,Mihail N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

22

expected the decision of the Paris conference over Bessarabia, with which he

would definitely comply.45

Poklevski took thus the risk to express before the Romanian official an

opinion which, at least at that moment, contradicted the earlier instructions

received from Sazonov. In two subsequent telegrams to Neratov, he insisted on the

idea that a conference’s decision on the Bessarabian status would have a “very

disputable character”, and only a plebiscite could bring a definite solution to the

issue.46

Neratov, on his turn, wrote to Poklevski that the plebiscite was proposed as

the only solution on the Bessarabian issue, and that Russia would only accept it in

the districts with the majority of the Moldavian population, but only in an “extreme

case”.47

It was impossible to construct friendly neighbouring relations between the

two countries “on the ground of an unjustifiable take-away” of Bessarabia by

Russia because of Russia’s “temporary weakness”, considered Neratov. Once

becoming stronger, Russia ‘would never come to terms with her being pushed off

the Dniester line”. From this perspective, it would have been “careless” to

subscribe to the acceptance of a conference’s decision, especially that there were

chances that it favoured Romania.48

Later, Sazonov informed his subordinate in

Bucharest on the agreement between the representatives in Paris and Omsk that

only a plebiscite could bring a definite solution to the problem, with the condition

that Bessarabian population freely expressed its will.49

The same position was

expressed earlier by Gen. D. Shcherbatchev, who was well-familiar with the

situation inside Romania. Appointed in Paris as the Military representative of the

High commander of the Russian army before the Allied governments and Allied

Supreme command, he “entirely supported the idea of conducting a survey among

the natives of Bessarabia”.50

The issue of plebiscite was further discussed by the diplomats. On December

17 1919, in a secret telegram sent to Taganrog, Poklevski admitted that the

plebiscite was ‘the only solution for the real improvement of the extremely difficult

situation of the Bessarabian population, but, unfortunately, it is hardly feasible in

practice. We can be sure in advance that the Romanians will categorically reject

such a proposal and, based on the opinions received here from the Allies’ circles, it

is hardly expectable that the Allies will decide to use extreme measures toward

45 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell - S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, September 10 1919. HIA, Alexandr N.

Krupenskii Papers, Box 2, Folder Russian Embassy, Paris ... 46 The two telegrams, of October 13 (No. 2583) and October 17 (No. 2657) 1919, were copied

by A.N. Krupenskii by hand from the original. Soderzhanie nekotorych pisem ... HIA, Alexandr N.

Krupenskii Papers, Box 2, Folder Russian Embassy, Paris ... 47 A.A. Neratov - S.A. Poklevski-Koziell, Paris, October 20 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6. 48 Ibid. 49 S.D. Sazonov – S.A. Poklevski-Koziell, October 20 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girl Papers,

Box 42, Folder 42.6. 50 D. G. Shcherbachev – S.D. Sazonov, September 14 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs Papers,

Box 42 Subject file, Folder 42.6.

Svetlana Suveic�

23

Romania in this case, such as the recent ultimatum’.51

According to a private

source, “although there is no doubt on its favourable outcome in Bessarabia, a

fundamental decision for a plebiscite on the all outskirts of Russia is considered

dangerous for the future of Russia”.52

Thus among the Russian Whites the idea to

experiment with the plebiscite in its former borderlands was not entirely accepted.

Poklevski considered that the issue of the plebiscite should be left aside,

while acquiring back the ammunitions left on the Romanian territory by the

dismembering Russian army was the stringent matter. According to a note of the

Russian Ambassador to Paris, V.A. Maklakov, Romania retained around 277 000

guns and bullets53

, as well abstained from allowing the transition of the Russian

troops through its territory.54

Considering the military cooperation against the

Bolsheviks a priority, Poklevski believed - and tried to convince its counterparts in

Omsk and Paris - , that Romania was willing to release the ammunitions in

exchange of Denikin’s declaration of the compliance with the conference’s

decision on Bessarabia.55

Although foreseeing the possibility of a positive outcome of such a

compromise, Poklevski admitted that there were factors that worked against the

rapprochement between the parts. One was the moral state inside Romania, which

was not entirely optimistic in relation to the future of Russia and what it might

bring to Romania: “In Romanian political circles the distrust and fear of a united

and indivisible Russia as well toward the selfless leaders who are working on its

restoration are deeply rooted, the latter being personified in the eyes of the

Romanians mainly by General Denikin. The Romanians believe that the

Commander only from time to time tries to maintain friendly relations with

Romania, and that once Russia will get stronger, it will certainly use force to regain

Bessarabia”.56

On the other side, “here is spread the rumour on the approach of the

Russian Bolshevik forces toward Bessarabia, then the Bolshevik outbreaks will

begin in the whole Romania”.57

Although there were only rumours, Poklevski

pointed out that the disorders in the transportation system, food crisis and

devaluation of local currency could serve as motives for the Romanian peasants

and other social strata to show support for the Bolshevik ideas.

51 Poklevski-Koziell to Taganrog, Secret telegram, December 17 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.7. 52 V.N. Tverdokhlebov – A.N. Krupenskii, Odessa, October 20 1919. HIA, Vasilii A.

Maklakov Papers, Box 17 Subject file, Folder 17.5 Bessarabia. Correspondence – Krupenskii, 1919. 53 V.A. Maklakov – B.A. Bakhmetev, Paris, July 18 1919. HIA, Russia. Posol’stvo (U.S.),

Reel 22, Folder 21.9 South 1919. 54 S.D. Sazonov – B.A. Bakhmetev, Paris, March 19 and April 5 1920. HIA, Russia.

Posol’stvo (U.S.), Reel 23, Folder 22.6 Bessarabia, 1920. 55 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, December 15 1919. HIA, Mikhail N.

Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.7. 56 Ibid. 57 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov. Bucharest, March 25 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.5.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

24

Poklevski followed attentively the situation in Bessarabia and the moral state

of the population. According to him, the ‘difficult living conditions [as well the]

discontent with the Romanian rule led many Russians from Bessarabia to assume,

that the Soviet troops would encounter sympathy on behalf of the Bessarabian

population, who consider though, that the Bolshevik rule would not bear more

difficulties than the Romanian one’. Poklevski’s opinion on the raising sympathies

of the Russian minority toward the Bolsheviks echoed with that of the Russian

émigrés in other parts of Europe. Thus prof. Pavel N. Miliukov in London who, in

fact, considered not only the Russians, but the entire population vulnerable to the

Bolshevik threat, warned the Allies through a series of publications that the

Bessarabian case could serve as a precedent, if no urgent measures for the support

of the anti-Bolshevik fight will be taken.58

The Bessarabian issue being considered less stringent in the condition when

Russia did not have enough strength neither to keep nor to regain the region,

Poklevski insisted that a declaration of obedience to the conference’s decision

would please both Romania and the Allies. Thus it was in part Poklevski’s merit

that on November 7 1919 Denkin issued an order on Bessarabia, which stated that

until the Bessarabian question was solved peacefully by the Peace conference no

any hostile action against Romania will be taken. The Russian troops were

forbidden to cross the Dniester.59

A letter of Neratov of November 14 1919, sent to

the head of the Romanian military mission, Col. Partenie, in relation to the existent

anti-Romanian agitation in Southern Russia, also confirms the existence of

Denikin’s order. “This order should be perceived as lack of the hostile relations on

behalf of the Russian command toward Romania and the unwillingness to solve the

issue by military force […]. Thus, between the Military forces of the South of

Russia and Romania quite friendly relations should be established”, wrote

Neratov.60

The Russian representative emphasized that “in the interests of both

Russia and Romania, it is seem desirable to eliminate the insufficiently proven, and

sometimes clearly unfounded, claims and complaints that are only able to play on

the hand of the elements, interested in sowing discord between the two

neighbouring and friendly countries”.61

Even after the issuance of the order, Poklevski noticed that the Romanians

did not literally believe his assurances: one argument in this regard was the

addresses issued to the English and French military missions with the request to

support Petliura’s army. The files of the Russian Embassy in Paris show that

58 The Case for Bessarabia. A collection of documents on the Rumanian occupation, with a

preface by Prof. Paul Miliukov, Wilkinson Bros., London, 1919, p. 18. 59 Soderzhanie nekotorykh pisem i dokumentov nakhodiashchikhsia v Russkom posol’stve v

Parizhe, imeiushchikh otnoshenie k Bessarabii, Note No. 12 of November 7 1919. HIA, Alexandr N.

Krupenskii Papers, Box 2, Folder Russian Embassy, Paris ... 60 Kopiia s pis’ma I.o. Nachal’nika Upravleniia Inostrannykh del na imea Nachal’nika

Rumynskoi Voennoi Missii, Polkovnika Partenie, November 14 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs Papers,

Box 42, Folder 42.7. 61 Ibid.

Svetlana Suveic�

25

Romania actually offered the military support to both Petliura and Denikin; to the

latter, only after receiving the guarantees regarding Bessarabia.62

Nevertheless,

they believed that the military capability of Denikin’s army was inferior to that of

Petliura’s army.63

During the following months neither Petliura nor Denikin proved

capable to hold the situation in the fight against the Bolsheviks.

Political Changes inside Romania: What to Espect?!

Despite the opposition of the Russian representatives in Paris on the

measures taken by the Romanian administration in Bessarabia, the November 1919

parliamentary elections took place.64

In contrast to Krupenskii and other

Bessarabians who widely criticized them, the Bessarabian minister Ioan Pelivan,

who was the member of the Romanian delegation at the Peace conference, was

encouraged and determined to use the results of the elections as proof that the

population supported the new regime and argue that they can be counted as

plebiscite.65

On December 1 1919, in the condition of the imposed Allied ultimatum that

urged the Romanian troops to depart from Budapest, a new government led by Al.

Vaida Voievod was appointed. The Russian ambassador informed his counterparts

in Paris that, with the appointment of the new Cabinet, “considerable change in

today’s foreign policy toward Russia” could follow. It was expected to be “more

malleable toward the insistence of the Allies, comparing to Bratianu or Vaitoianu.

If in power was Take Ionescu or even Averescu, we could have presupposed that

they would have been helpful with respect to Russia and the Russians and would

even try to make significant favour to us, through that way being possible, in their

opinion, to ease the obtaining of a favourable solution for Romania on the

Bessarabian question“, reflected further Poklevski.66

In his opinion, such a

perspective would also bring changes in the behaviour of the Romanian

administration in Bessarabia which was not much acclaimed by the locals:

Romania would “interrupt the regime of administrative and police arbitrariness, in

order to get sympathies of the larger local population”.

62 A.N. Krupenskii was of the opinion that the support given to Denikin by the Romanians

was a more modest one than the one reported in the official accounts (Soderzhanie nekotorych pisem

... HIA, Alexandr N. Krupenskii Papers, Box 2 Subject file, Folder Russian Embassy, Paris ...). 63 Marcel Mitra�c�, Moldova .., p. 156. 64 On the first parliamentary elections in Bessarabia, see: Svetlana Suveic�, Basarabia în

primul deceniu interbelic (1918-1928). Modernizare prin reforme, Editura Pontos, Chi�in�u, 2010, p.

64-82. 65 In a letter, the Bessarabian minister Ion Incule� as well advised Pelivan “that in the elections

all the people participates and that it was a plebiscite”. I. Incule� – I. Pelivan and D. Ciugureanu,

Chisinau, November 15 1919. Arhiva Na�ional� a României, Fond 1449 Ioan Pelivan, dos. 129, f. 52-

56. The letter is reproduced in: Svetlana Suveic�, Basarabia .., p. 343-344. 66 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, December 15 1919. HIA, Mikhail N.

Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.7.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

26

Apart from Al. Averescu and Take Ionescu, other political figures were not

seen willing to implement any changes in the internal policy of the newly acquired

province. The main problem was seen in the “mistrust and fear toward the united

and indivisible Russia”, as well in relation to those that worked toward the goal.

Poklevski pointed out at the fact that the supporters of the restoration of Russia

continued to be personalized through Gen. Denikin, despite of the order issued in

relation to Bessarabia: “The Romanians are sure of the fact that the Commander

tries up to a point to support friendly relations with Romania and that when Russia

will get stronger, it will definitely try to bring back Bessarabia by force of arms”.67

Nevertheless, Vaida Voievod’s first speech before the newly elected Parliament

motivated Poklevski to believe that there were hopes for the advancement of

negotiations between the Romanians and Denikin army in the military matter. In

his address, the Romanian Prime minister avoided to characterize the relations with

Russia and only specified that “the main task of the Government and of the

Romanian delegates to the conference will be the definite solving of the

Bessarabian issue in the sense of the attachment of Bessarabia to Romania”.

To Poklevski, there were also signs for continuity in relation to Romania’s

position toward Russia. The Russian diplomat received the official invitation to

attend on December 27 1919 the opening of the first Parliament, in which all the

newly acquired regions were represented. He decided not to honour the invitation,

“anticipating that in this speech [of the king] the union of Bessarabia to Romania

will undoubtedly be mentioned”.68

Instead, Poklevski followed with great interest

the delivered speeches and the reactions to them, thus trying to depict the changes

in the moral state of the Romanian political elite. During the opening session,

besides Vaida Voievod, Bratianu delivered a long speech, in which he tried to

explain the decisions taken in relation to the war and the Peace conference. Then

Al. Marghiloman followed: he blamed Br�tianu for throwing the unprepared

Romania into the war and supporting the mistaken campaign plan, besides that,

Br�tianu was criticised for considering Greater Romania his own “creation”, in the

condition when the victorious Russia would have never cede Bessarabia. “Br�tianu

is to blame for that to the Peace conference he came alone – taking with him only

the 1916 convention – and not using other Romanian statesman, when Romania

should have been represented at Paris by the best forces of the country”, said

Marghiloman.69

The tergiversation of the final decision of the conference in

relation to Bessarabia was thus perceived as a failure, each former head of

government trying to place the blame on the shoulders of his predecessor. On the

67 Ibid. A copy of the letter was also sent to the Russian ambassador in Washington, B.A.

Bakhmetev. HIA, Russia. Posol’stvo (U.S.), Reel 23, Box 22, Folder 22.6 Bessarabia, 1920. 68 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, December 19 1919. HIA, Mikhail N.

Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.7. 69 He admitted that Romania was forced to sign the Treaty with Austria, but evaluated the fact

as crucial for keeping friendly relations with the Allies. S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov,

Bucharest, December 28 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.7.

Svetlana Suveic�

27

other side, the Russian representatives in Paris evaluated the postponement of a

final decision on Bessarabia as a success.70

Poklevski was attentive to observe and collect any critical stances toward the

Romanian administration in Bessarabia. Besides the continuous state of tension at

the border, the measures implemented by the new regime the province were not

met with open heart, neither by the majority nor by the minorities that enjoyed a

series of privileges under the previous regime.71

Thus the Russian ambassador

dedicated an 8-pages long report to a speech, delivered at the end of 1919 by the

Bessarabian minister Ion Incule� in the Parliamentary assembly,72

which was

intensively discussed in Bucharest and Chi�in�u73

and reached as well the French

press. Poklevski observed that the speech that was “dedicated to the Bessarabian

question and today’s situation in Bessarabia” was a contradictory one and created

animosity and critique. Incule� referred to the first Parliamentary elections of

November 1919, in which the Bessarabians also took part, and stated that “the

elections had the importance of a plebiscite and not to participate in these would

have been a crime against the Motherland”. On the other hand, he criticized the

behaviour of the Romanian administration in the “wonderful and reach region,

being the pearl on the Romanian crown”.74

There, apparently only former nobles

and landowners had the motives to be dissatisfied with the new administration:

they lost their land and goods, were annoyed on their precarious economic and

social situation and “they can no longer be advisers and courtiers of the Tsarist

Court, but must come to terms with the role of a mere mortal”. Nevertheless, other

strata of the population also showed their dissatisfaction toward the Romanian

administration, claimed the Bessarabian deputy. The future of Romania laid in the

“close unity of all social classes around the Dynasty and the implementation of

promised democratic reforms”, concluded the speaker.

70 Kratkii obzor zaiavlenii, sdelannykh Russkoi delegatsiei Mirnoi konferentsii, undated. HIA,

Nikolai A. Bazili Papers, Box 9 Subject file, Folder Paris Peace Conference, f. 21. 71 On the transition from the Russian to the Romanian administration, see: Svetlana Suveica,

Die Verwaltung Bessarabiens in der Transformation. Legislative Rahmen, Institutionen und Beamtenschaft (1918-1928), “Südost-Forschungen”, Band 71, 2012, p. 183-233; Idem, Basarabia ..., p. 204-260.

72 On the clipping of the speech, which appeared in L’Independance Roumaine of January 1

1920, Alexandr N. Krupenskii wrote: “The chatter of this traitor” (“boltovnia etogo izmennika” -

Rus.) (HIA, Vasilii A. Maklakov Papers, Box 17 Subject file, Folder Bessarabia. Printed matter.

Clippings). In a version of biography of Ion Incule�, sketched by A.N. Krupenskii, the latter

characterized him as “former Socialist, Democrat, Republican – actual Minister of the Royal

Romanian Government, who worked as well with Mr. Marghiloman, Arion, and Coand� and the

others”. He argued that Incule� was a “traitor”, in the end asking rhetorically “why the Bessarabian

population should trust him?” HIA, Alexandr N. Krupenskii Papers, Box 2, Folder Incule�, Ion. 73 H. Gad (Henri Fischman), Incule� Karamazov, in “Clopotul”, December 30 1919. A

summary of Incule�’s speech, Cuvântarea d-lui ministru I. Incule� rostit� în �edin�a Camerei din 27 Decembrie, was published in “Sfatul ��rii”, December 30 1919.

74 S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov. Bucharest, undated. HIA, Alexandr N. Krupenskii

Papers, Box 2, Folder Russian Embassy, Paris ... The integral speech was published in the Romanian

press, and later reached the Bessarabians and the Russian émigrés in Paris.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

28

Incule�’s speech was met with critique especially on behalf of the Romanian

conservative leaders. Poklevski observed that the critique was directed toward the

speaker, not the content of his speech: Incule� was blamed for the unstable political

views and often “fluctuations and political jumps leftward and rightward”. The

former social-democrat who became the president of Sfatul ��rii and gave his vote

for the union of Bessarabia with Romania, continued to build his career in

Bucharest; first acting in the name of the revolutionary pro-Russian interests, then

“for the Bessarabia’s autonomy, but not for its union with Romania”, and at last

“pretending” to support the unionist pro-Romanian claims on Bessarabia.75

He was

also criticized for gaining personal benefits from different regimes. In the same

line, was criticized the speech delivered in the Parliament on February 10 1920 by

Vasile Stroescu, the Bessarabian deputy and honourable chairman of the

Parliament. The speech of a “truly Romanian nationalist” who protested against the

“sad Bessarabian reality” was less expected than that of Incule� and sparked much

discontent of the parliamentary majority, considered Poklevski.76

The Russian Ambassador was right in pointing out at the fact that the reaction

of the Romanian officials toward the critique of the Bessarabians was far from being

constructive: it was often perceived as a sign of separatism and lack of ingratitude

toward Romania that saved Bessarabia from the Bolshevism. On the other hand, the

Russian official as well his counterparts often interpreted the critique directed toward

the Romanian regime as a manifestation of support toward the return of Bessarabia

back to Russia, which was not always the case. The same position was taken by the

members of the so-called “Bessarabian delegation” at Paris, led by Alexandr N.

Krupenskii. Krupenskii was occasionally in touch with Poklevski, but was given

access to his correspondence by Maklakov and Sazonov.77

Conclusions

In the tumultuous time after World War I, when the Russian empire

collapsed and the existence of the “new” Russia was questioned by the Civil War,

75 “Adev�rul”, December 30 1919. 76 Copies of the letter were sent to Washington, London and Rome, as well given to A.N.

Krupenskii to make use of them in the press. S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest,

March 5 1920. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.8 Romania, conditions and events,

1920, January – August, HIA. 77 Krupenskii felt in debt to Poklevski who played an important role in the liberation from the

prison of his brother, Pavel N. Krupenskii. Apparently, the former second secretary of the cabinet of

the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pavel N. Krupenskii, reached Bucharest from Odessa while having

the intention to travel further to Prague. The Romanians influenced the Inter-allied Bureau to refuse

him a pass, as motive serving “the hostile attitude of the Romanian Government toward all the

Krupenskii, as a result of the activity of A.N. and P.N. Krupenskii in Bessarabia and Paris”. Pavel N.

Krupenskii was then detained, and “only due to the intervention of his Romanian relatives and my

intense efforts,” he was liberated under the condition that he will obtain immediate pass and leave the

country. S.A. Poklevski-Koziell – S.D. Sazonov, Bucharest, April 28 1919. HIA, Mikhail N. Girs

Papers, Box 42, Folder 42.6.

Svetlana Suveic�

29

the former ambassador of the imperial court S.A. Poklevski-Koziell continued to

act in Romania on behalf of the White forces. He performed his duty in the time of

complex internal and external circumstances that marked, challenge as well

confused the relations between the former war allies. Russia and Romania seemed

to agree on the necessity to unite forces against the Bolshevik threat, but were on

totally different positions in regard to the status of Bessarabia. The dispute between

the parts attained its highest point during the Paris Peace conference, when the

swords were crossed mainly through propaganda means.

The Russian political émigrés, diplomats and members of the Kolchak

government in Paris worked toward persuading the Great Powers to support the

anti-Bolshevik cause and take into account Russia’s interests while re-designing

the new borders. S.A. Poklevski-Koziell attentively observed, thoroughly analysed

and systematically informed his counterparts on the situation inside Romania and

Bessarabia, the twists in the relations between Romania and the Allies, as well on

how the Romanian elite perceived the political and military steps taken by the

Russian Whites in Paris and inside Russia. Being convinced that the Allied military

support was crucial for the defeat of the Bolsheviks, Poklevski tried to act as

mediator between Berthelot and Denikin, although with little success. In order to

ensure Romania’s support against the Bolsheviks which he considered a priority,

Poklevski acted to lessen the tensions between the Romanian officials and the

Russian Whites over the issue of Bessarabia. While trying to assure the Romanians

of Denikin’s recognition of the future status of Bessarabia in accordance of the

decision on the Peace conference, he insisted that Denikin issued a written

confirmation in that regard. Although a temporary compromise was achieved - and

that not without Poklevski’s efforts -, the bilateral relations did not achieved

significant progress, neither at the end of 1919 nor in the next year, when the

chances for the recovery of the White forces diminished dramatically. In the spring

of 1920 Bessarabia was recognized as part of Romania, the Treaty of Paris between

Romania and the Allied countries being signed on October 28 the same year.

S.A. Poklevski-Koziell managed to keep his reputation in Romania high, his

efforts on the refugees issue playing a central role. In 1932 the Romanian

government recommended Poklevski to be appointed as the Representative of the

Nansen Office in Romania. Although the appointment of the “former ambassador

of the Tsarist Russia” who apparently promoted “an occult backstage activity of the

Russians that are part of Nansen Office” was criticized in Romania,78

he served in

that position up to 1937.

78 The critique was coming from the representatives of the Ukrainian organizations that dealt

with refugees’ issue. They claimed that Poklevski would not support the interests of the Ukrainians.

See, in this regard, two documents (Ministrul României la Geneva, c�tre Secretarul General al

Oficiului Interna�ional Nansen pentru Refugia�i I.I. Johnson, Geneve, June 24 1932, no. 536;

Comitetul de Asisten�� a Emigra�iei Ucrainene din România, c�tre Centrul Emigra�iei Ucrainene din

Paris, November 4 1932, no. 564), published in: Chestiunea refugia�ilor de peste Nistru ..., p. 697,

722-723.

S.A. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL AND THE ‘BESSARABIAN CAUSE’, 1919-1920

30

The former Russian diplomat was certain that Russia will claim Bessarabia

back. In 1936, he mentioned to a Romanian journalist that “Russia cannot be

beaten by anyone. Do you want an honest opinion? You extended too much

behind your moral powers [...] And in order to keep this extremely heavy legacy,

you should have other people, and you do not have them”.79

Abstract: A Russian Diplomat in Bucharest: S.A. Poklevski-Koziell and the ‘Bessarabian

Cause’, 1919-1920

The article sheds light on the activity of the Russian ambassador to Bucharest, Stanislav A.

Poklevski-Koziell, in the immediate period after World War I. The diplomat considered

that the Bolshevik danger was a priority which should motivate the former war allies

Romania and Russia to support each other, despite the dispute over Bessarabia. Poklevski

believed in the return of the region back to Russia and, in the period when at the Paris peace

conference the fate of the former Russia’s Western borderlands was decided, supported

with materials the Russian political émigrés and diplomats as well the Bessarabians who

propagated for the “Bessarabian cause”. At the same time, Poklevski opted for a more

pragmatic behaviour of the Kolchak government in Romania. He believed that Denikin’s

declaration on abstaining from any act of hostility toward Romania and compliance with

the future decision of the Peace conference in regard to Bessarabia will ensure the support

of Romania in the fight against the Bolsheviks.

Keywords: Borderland, Bessarabia, Russian Whites, Romania, S.A. Poklevski-Koziell.

79 Gh. Buzatu, George Rotaru, Stalin, Hitler, Antonescu, Rottarymond, Pite�ti, 2007, p. 13-14.