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A REEVALUATION OF XUNZI’S MORALTHEORY FROM THE ASPECT OF MIND

I. Antonio S. Cua’s Focus on Xunzi

In his Human Nature, Ritual and History: Studies in Xunzi andChinese Philosophy, Professor Antonio S. Cua defends the legitimacyof ritual rules (li) ( ) in Xunzi as moral principles and practicesfrom three aspects. First, contrary to arbitrary requirements as someKantian scholars view it, li embodies social distinctions as value dis-tinctions, and thus it is more than a set of formal requirements if theprerequisite of a rule to be moral is that it embodies social or moralvalue. In compliance with li, society becomes orderly and individualsbehave humanely among one another. Therefore, li is said to have a“moral dimension” meant to maintain the social order and thus avoidconflicts. Based on these arguments, Professor Cua disagrees withthose Kantian scholars who “think of moral theory as a critical enter-prise rather than a rationalization of moral tradition, and consignritual rules to the non-moral domain” (Cua, 45).1

Second, li has aesthetic and religious dimensions as well. It not onlyfunctions as a means to improve morality, but also beautifies humanbehavior. It elevates human beings to a height of both morality andaesthetics.

In this light, a good person is also a beautiful person. For a Confucian,it is not sufficient in a moral performance for one to be charitable,benevolent or considerate in helping a man in distress, he must alsorender his aid with sincerity and in seemingly or well-manneredfashion. (Cua, 56)

Consequently, Professor Cua insists on evaluating a moral tradition interms both of its content and of its form, and pays close attentionto the aesthetic and religious dimensions of li besides its moraldimension.

One finds no independent normative ethics, nor normative aesthet-ics, nor a philosophy of religion; but rather, with the moral, alongsideaesthetic and religious values, an interesting and challenging view inaxiological ethics. (Cua, 60)

TAN MINGRAN, PhD, PhD Candidate, East Asian Studies, University of Toronto.Specialties: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. E-mail: mingr.tan@utoronto.ca

© 2008 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

This insight is important for it not only justifies the moral character-istic of ritual rules, but also explains the fact that Confucian ethicscould act as a quasi-religion and satisfy the religious need of Chinesepeople.

Third, li, as a rationalization of moral tradition, is always subject tothe evaluation of human mind in practice and does not imply that it isa set of authoritative requirements or custom with no reason. Insteadof a passive compliance with rules, the li-performance is subject to themotivation and judgment of the mind (xin) ( ). It has to take human-ity (ren) ( ) as its aim, respecting the situation and thus avoidinginflexibility in practice. In other words, human mind can choose orreact against li and make it more feasible to the situation. It is thejudgment of the mind or reason that confers li their moral valueand vitality. The judgment of li to a situation is called righteousness(yi) ( ). Together with ren and li, it dictates the moral characteristicof Xunzi’s li-theory.

According to Professor Cua, li focuses primarily on normal orfamiliar situations of human intercourse, whereas yi focuses primarilyon the exercise of our rational capacity to deal with abnormal orexigent situations in life. Thus, li depends on yi for assessing therelevance of rules to particular cases; yi depends on li for its exerciseand concretization (Cua, 130–31). Moreover, li as normative rulesprevents yi from subjective or random wills and maintains moralembankment for a society. Compared with li and yi, ren focuses on thelove and care for the well-being of one’s fellows and the prevention ofharms (Cua, 126). In this sense, it is ren that renders intelligible therespect for the authoritative import of li and the imperative of yi.After elucidating the relations among these three terms, ProfessorCua summarizes them with Xunzi’s words:

Only after the gentleman has dwelt with humane principles throughjustice/yi and morality is he truly humane/ren; only after he con-ducts himself with justice and morality through ritual principles/li ishe truly just and moral; and only where he regulates with ritualprinciples, returning to the root and perfecting the branch, is hetruly in accord with ritual principles. Only when these three havebeen made comprehensive has he reached the Way. (Xunzi, 27.22,863–65)2

Professor Cua’s account makes the role of li in Confucianismmuch clearer and, at the same time, he shows us the holistic char-acteristic of Confucian ethics. However, on the interaction betweenli and xin or mind, he seems not to give enough discussion althoughyi-practice presumes the activity of the mind. He is unclear aboutwhether the mind is endowed with yi innately or acquires it throughthe process of learning. In regard to the reason to choose rituals as

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rules of conduct, he implies that yi is inherent in one’s mind becausethe mind can make a distinction between intrinsic honor and extrin-sic honor and regards the former more honorable (Cua, 46). But hedoes not explain how human mind can make such a difference, thatis, where the origin of this preference of intrinsic honor to extrinsichonor is.

We note Professor Cua also shows the tendency to endorse yi as thecalculation of a cognitive mind.

For Xunzi, a decision to adopt the Dao as the guiding ideal of thegood human life as a whole crucially involves the weighing of benefitsand harms. In fact, Xunzi explicitly recommends the prudentialmethod of choice or, in his words, a balancing scale for evaluating orweighing the relative merits and demerits of desires and aversions, aswell as alternative options in terms of their beneficial and harmfulconsequences. (Cua, 228)

If this is the case, it is contradictory with his statements when hedistinguishes Hume’s remark on social virtues from Xunzi’s li system:“Hume would ground social virtues in utility, while Xunzi would focuson the nonutilitarian character of moral beauty” (Cua, 55). Thus,Professor Cua falls into the trap of his own distinction.

An explanation of this confusion may lie in the fact that ProfessorCua wishes to defend the nonutilitarian character of li-morality, but atthe same time to regard Xunzi as an externalist (Cua, 37). Put differ-ently, he follows the popular thinking of Xunzi’s doctrine that humannature is bad, excluding the possibility that man may have inherentmoral capacity, but he neglects the fact that Xunzi could ascribe theinherent moral capacity to the mind. On this point, it is regretful thatProfessor Cua does not offer us enough discussion of the role of mindin Xunzi’s li-morality. Although he insists that human minds have thepower to choose and adapt rituals to new situations and regardsConfucian rituals more than a habituation of moral codes, he reluc-tantly gives mind moral capability except cognitive capability. As aresult, the nonutilitarian characteristics of the aesthetic and moraldimensions of li find no basis in human beings in his explanation ofXunzi’s system, and his apologetic arguments are thereby weakened,for he has a hard time explaining the choice of natural moral actionexcept to give an explanation from the point of view of a calculationof interest.

Based on Professor Cua’s contribution to the study on Xunzi, thisessay will make an investigation of the role of mind in Xunzi’s moraltheory, insisting that Xunzi endows mind or xin an innate moralcapacity, so as to hopefully solve the arguable inconsistency of Cua’sinterpretation.

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II. Reinvestigating the Concept of Mind/XIN in Xunzi

Generally, people regard the mind in Xunzi as a purely cognitivemind. This view has been prevalent for a while, especially in Westernacademic circle. There are two reasons supporting this view. The firstis Xunzi’s emphasis on the cognitive ability of mind in grasping dao orthe Way; the second is that Xunzi’s bad-nature theory excludes thepossibility of innate moral ability in human beings, and thus mind isnot likely to have moral ability besides a cognitive one. However,after critical review, these reasons cannot stand up for scrutiny,neither can they lead to the conclusion that Xunzi denies the fact thathuman being has innate moral ability. What is special for Xunzi isthat, as opposed to Mencius’ equalizing of moral mind and nature(xing) ( ), Xunzi separates mind from nature, endowing it with bothcognitive and moral ability.

In order to elucidate this point, it is necessary to know that theacknowledgment of the moral capacity in mind does not contradictwith Xunzi’s doctrine that “nature is bad.” To Xunzi, mind and naturebelong to two different domains.The former refers to the rational andmoral function of humans; while the latter refers to the instinctiveimpulses inborn in humans as he defines in the chapter “Xing-e( ).” The former dictates what an individual should behave, whilethe latter is driven by animal desires and lack of self-restraint. It is forthis reason that Xunzi regards the relation between mind and natureas similar to that between craftsman and his material, and he proposesthe transformation of nature by mind through complying with ritualsand following the instruction of teachers.

From this unspoken division, Xunzi is free to discuss moral virtuessuch as righteousness and ritual propriety as innate abilities inhumans, and this is confusing for many scholars. Xunzi regards theliking of righteousness and the desire for profit (li) ( ) as two innateabilities.

A sense of righteousness and a sense for profit are two things humanspossess. Although they were unable to get rid of the desire for profitin people, Yao and Shun nonetheless were able to cause them not toallow their desire for profit to triumph over their love of moralconduct. Although even Jie and Zhou were unable to get rid ofpeople’s love of moral conduct, they could nonetheless cause theirdesire for profit to conquer their love of moral conduct. (Xunzi,27.67, 889–91)

He further considers yi or righteousness as the innate capacity todistinguish humans from animals.

Fire and water possess vital breath but have not life; Plants and treespossess life, but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but

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lack a sense of morality and justice/yi. Humans possess vial breath,life, and awareness, and add to them a sense of morality and justice.It is for this reason that they are the noblest beings in the world.(Xunzi 9.19, 237)

Like other three qualities, righteousness or justice is innate in humans,and thus is not a learned ability, otherwise the distinction would beinvalid.

Based on the premise that righteousness is innate, Xunzi seeshumans naturally have a due measure in their mind to distinguishright from wrong, or to approve of right and disapprove of wrong. Inpractice, this measure tells one whether to follow or not a ritual ruleaccording to a specific situation. More importantly, it can decide whatan individual should do where there is no ritual rule to follow.“Ritualprinciples use obedience to the true mind of man as their foundation.Thus, all those without record in the Classic of Rituals (lijing) ( )but according with mind are rituals too” (Xunzi 27.20, 861). At thispoint, Xunzi comes closer to Mencius, but the difference betweenthem lies in the fact that Xunzi puts this innate ability in mind insteadof in nature.

Besides the textual supports from Xunzi, the usage of the terms“mind” and “nature” in pre-Qin texts also gives us some inspiration.In pre-Qin texts, the meanings of “mind” and “nature” can overlap oreven be identical. From the formation of the word xing/nature, xing isregarded as something growing from xin/mind. Perhaps, it is in thisconsideration that Mencius regards the four virtues (i.e., humanity,righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom) which are based inhuman nature, as the full development of the respective four sprouts,which is regarded as xin.3 Mencius also takes mind and nature asidentical in some places. For example, he believes that if one exhaustsone’s mind, one will know one’s own nature (Mencius 7A.1, 182).4

This discussion of the closeness between mind and nature seemlyworks against our thesis, but not, because this closeness tells us thatmoral capacity can be put in either mind or nature in Chinese linguis-tic context without causing any misunderstanding. Therefore, it isreasonable that Xunzi ascribes the moral capacity solely to mind, justas Mencius regards only the moral elements as human nature(Mencius 7B.24, 198–99).

The moral capacity of mind is crucial in understanding Xunzi’smoral theory because it first justifies its coherence and keeps Xunzi inthe tradition of Confucianism. With this innate moral capacity, it isnatural that human beings will develop social institutions and moral-ity, as the formation of human community and the compliance withsocial hierarchy both depend on the innate capacity, yi or righteous-ness in the mind (Xunzi 9.19, 237–39). Also, it is on the basis of this

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moral capacity that the sage invents rituals and transforms humannature. Otherwise, the invention of rituals or institutions wouldbecome a creation from nothing or solely from experience.

Failing to give this moral capacity a proper place in Xunzi’s moraltheory will result in the misinterpretation of Xunzi. Not firmly believ-ing moral capacity as an innate element of mind, David S. Nivison isperplexed by Xunzi’s remarks on both moral capacity and bad nature,and he concludes that:

Xunzi must assume that human beings just have a sense of duty. Thissense of duty amounts to a capability of performing moral duty for itsown sake and not for self-interested reasons. . . . Nivison observesthat the sense of duty as an original feature of human nature need nothave any particular content.5

Undoubtedly, Nivison realizes the complicate relations among mind,moral duty, and human nature, so he insists a noncontent sense of dutyand tries to avoid committing contradictory with Xunzi’s doctrine,“nature is bad.” In doing so, he is faulted for using Kantian transcen-dental category to explain the sense of duty in Xunzi, which is unsuit-able to the character of Chinese Confucianism. David B. Wonginterprets Xunzi’s theory as instrumentalism, and claims, “For Xunzithe desire to do good and the sense of duty are not original to humannature but derived from calculation on what is in our self-interest.”6

D. C. Lau also insists that Xunzi is an externalist, and advocatesmorality as the habituation of human behaviors through mind’scontrol over desires. With this understanding, Lau goes so far as toclaim that Xunzi’s moral theory cannot explain that one ought to“forgo life in order to be moral” and thus the difficulty in Xunzi’stheory is acute.7 However, these accusations become invalid as Xunziinsists that moral capacity is innate to the human mind, and thehabituation of human behaviors is just a process of transforminghuman nature and of sharpening moral sense in the mind.

III. Mind and Nature

The division between mind and nature shows the uniqueness ofXunzi’s moral theory and distinguishes him from Mencius. It explainsthe difference between Xunzi’s statement,“human nature is bad,” andMencius’ theory, “human nature is good”; it also dictates Xunzi’semphasis on the roles of mind and rituals in the transformation ofhuman nature.

It is the different content in human nature that separates Xunzi’sstatement, “human nature is bad,” from Mencius’ theory, “human

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nature is good.” For Xunzi, human nature refers to instinctiveimpulses or desires without any rational restraint, and thus is poten-tially leading to strife and conflict. It is from this aspect that he regardsnature as bad and thus needs the regulation of mind. In contrast,nature in Mencius refers to the inherent tendencies toward the fulfill-ment of moral excellence. These inherent tendencies integrate moraland cognitive capacities, and will lead one to morality provided theywere not harmed. More importantly, contrary to Xunzi who regardsdesires or instinctual impulse as nature, Mencius does not regardthem as nature. “The way the mouth is disposed towards tastes, theeye towards colors, the ear towards sounds, the nose towards smells,and the four limbs towards ease is human nature (xing), yet thereinalso lies the Decree. That is why the gentleman does not describe it asnature” (Mencius 7B.24, 198). But, this does not say that nature inMencius has no instincts. In fact, when Mencius indicates the arisingof compassion when one sees a baby crawling near the edge of a well,he is also talking about instinct. Therefore, it may be reasonable tosay that Mencius selects moral instincts and feelings from humanresponse to external things and regards them as the content of nature,and thus insists that nature is good.

Together with the different contents of nature, the relation betweenmind and nature is also different between Mencius and Xunzi. ToMencius, mind refers to the mind of morality and is identical with ordevelops into nature.8 Thus, one can know his nature through exhaust-ing one’s mind. Mind and nature stand against biological instinctsor desires. Immoderate desires might ruin one’s mind and wipe outnature; therefore, he advocates “to cultivate one’s mind, nothing isbetter than lessening one’s desires” (Mencius 7B.35, 201).Although inthe process of lessening one’s desire and cultivating the mind ofmorality, the cognitive capacity of mind is implied, Mencius seldomallows it eclipse its moral capacity in his discourse. For Xunzi, mindand nature belong to two different domains. Mind refers to the cog-nitive and moral functions in humans; while nature refers to instinctimpulses or desires. In order to avoid the overflow of desires whichleads to strife and conflict, mind must restrain or regulate desires indue measure. It is in this aspect that Xunzi advocates “transformingnature through setting up conscious activity (hua xing qi wei)( ).” Although this regulation or restraint uses external ritualor normative rules, it can be regarded as mind controls desires inter-nally too, because these rules are the external manifestation of themoral capacity of the mind.

With regard to the transformation of nature, Xunzi first has toanswer whether “human nature is bad” excludes the possibility of itschange. According to Xunzi, nature would lead to strife and conflict

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only in the case of desires not being controlled or becoming immod-erate. If desires are regulated properly, then nature will be good, atleast not bad. Therefore, “human nature is bad” does not exclude thepossibility of moral transformation. Now that human nature is trans-formable, there arises another question: Can it transform itself, or betransformed? Xunzi seems not to believe that human nature cantransform itself without the help of rituals and mind. Thus, he com-pares the relation of conscious activity (wei) ( ) and nature as that ofcraftsman and his material (Xunzi 23.12, 759–61). Unquestionably,conscious activity originates from mind. At this point, Li Disheng hasit right: “Because mind exists separately, human nature is bad buthuman being can still be transformed into good.”9

The transformation of nature involves both the cognitive and moralcapacity of mind. It is the moral capacity that determines whether adesire issues in due measure; while it is the cognitive capacity thatanalyzes the situation and chooses what ritual rules should be applied.Therefore, the clarity and reasonability of mind are crucial in theregulation of desires. In this respect, Xunzi claims:

When desires run to excess, actions do not reach that point becausethe mind stops them. If what the mind permits coincides with reason,although the desires be numerous, how could there be harm to order!Although the desires are not strong enough to motivate a person, hisactions may exceed his desires because the mind has ordered them todo so. If what the mind permits conflicts with what is reasonable, thenalthough the desires be few, how could it stop at disorder! (Xunzi22.11, 729–31)

Xunzi seems to be overoptimistic to mind’s regulative power overdesires, so he does not appreciate so much Mencius and Song Xing’s( ) proposal of “lessening desires,” and neither does he regarddesires as an obstacle to moral goodness. He would rather advocateconfronting them rationally and fulfilling them according to the situ-ation. However, his optimism cannot persuade other people, even hisown disciple, such as Li Si ( ), not to succumb to instinctualdesires. Li Si forsakes his teaching and seeks for high position andrank in Qin government after signing on poor living standard.

IV. Mind and the Invention of Rituals

To transform nature or regulate desires, the internal standard is therighteousness of the mind, and the external standard is ritual rules. Infact, the external and the internal are one, for ritual rules are themanifestation of righteousness. Xunzi states, “The sage is the keyof dao or the Way, . . . The Odes express the sage’s intentions; the

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Documents his official business; the Ritual or li his conduct; the Musichis harmoniousness” (Xunzi 8.14, 185). In this aspect, li and yi becomeouter expressions and inner discretions of the sage’s mind or dao,respectively. It is the sage who expresses his moral mind in the form ofrituals and then uses them to cultivate ordinary people and transformtheir nature. Then the question is whether the sage has such authorityto set up ritual rules, and why these ritual rules are accepted by allhuman beings.

As mentioned, Xunzi believes that all human beings share moraland cognitive capacities, but the sage is more perspicuous in thesecapacities and reaches the degree of perfection in dealing with natureor desires. For example, Shun claims, “It is only through following mydesires that I have become orderly” (Xunzi 27.14, 857). In otherwords, the sages are born to know the due measure when expressingand fulfilling their desires. The desires arising from instinct and thedesires regulated through morality are perfectly united in them.Theirbehaviors always meet moral principle or ritual rules spontaneously,and they themselves embody moral standard. In this sense, if humanbeings need regulation or ritual rules to restrain their desires, thesages are the best option. Therefore, Xunzi states, “. . . of such bound-aries, none is more important than that between social classes. Of theinstruments for distinguishing social classes, none is more importantthan ritual principles. Of the sources of ritual principles, none is moreimportant than the sage kings” (Xunzi 5.10, 107). If people want toelevate themselves or maintain a proper way of life, the best way is toemulate the sage-kings, and as a result, rituals or li invented by thesage-kings are taken to be the standard of conduct.

Through the use of analogy, Xunzi enhances his argument that thesage stands for the perfect state of moral capacity which all humanbeings share, and thus the ritual rules they invent should be applicableto every human being.

Although everyone in the world has his own individual ideas, thereare nonetheless points of common agreement. When discussingmatters of taste of food, the point of agreement is Yi Ya ( ); formusical tones it is Master Kuang ( ); for good government it is theThree Kings. The Three Kings had fixed their laws and standards,regulated rituals and music and transmitted them. If one puts themaside and insists setting them up by himself, then where is the differ-ence of this action from changing the harmony set up by Yi Ya andthe standard by Shi Kuang? (Xunzi 27.114, 923)

Now let’s turn to how the sages invent ritual rules. On one hand,Xunzi seems to endorse that sages invent ritual rules from their mindsspontaneously, as shown in the description of Shun’s perfect moralbehavior and in the claims that rituals describe the comportments of

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sages. On the other hand, he indicates that the sages perfect theirsageness through studying rituals with their teachers (Xunzi 27.14,857).Then it makes us perplexed, now that sages could behave at theirwill to the right point and invent rituals, why is it necessary for themto learn rituals?

To answer this question, it should be clear in what sense that thesages invent rituals. Do sages invent rituals from nothing or justsystematize them on the basis of human experience of the past? FromXunzi’s discussion, he seems to endorse the latter view. The fact thatsages could learn from their teachers is that there already has been aritual tradition despite its incompleteness.This ritual tradition was notso clear and complete in comparison with the rituals invented bysages, yet it dictated the direction or provided the basis for the devel-opment of a set of systematic rituals. On this point, Professor Cuainsightfully indicates, “the li are originally summary rules or generali-zations of ethical experiences, though in the course of time, becauseof general acceptance and/or blind conformity, they become practicerules” (Cua, 135). Therefore, the sages’ invention of rituals is only asummarization and refinement of a ritual tradition and makes ritualrules more feasible and clear. This explanation gets support fromXunzi’s belief that all human beings have innate moral ability, whichmust display itself in human behaviors and thus gradually developsinto a moral tradition. This tradition would not become completeand systematic until the sages refined it. Then, the purpose of sages’learning rituals in Xunzi would be to familiarize themselves withthe ritual tradition, and then to perfect it with their perspicuity inmorality.

In summary, although the invention of rituals can be regarded asthe manifestation of the sage’s inner moral sense or perspicuity, itnevertheless incorporates the ritual tradition as a whole. Therefore,rituals can be regarded as the universal expression of human moralcapacity. Sages only made this universal expression more standard-ized and feasible. With these invented ritual rules, people have a clearstandard to follow, decide, or evaluate what ought to do and whatought not, instead of resorting to the ambiguous and subjective moralsense. As a result, the order of society becomes more stable, andhuman welfares are thereby guaranteed.

VI. Mind and the Compliance of Rituals

Although the purpose of inventing rituals is to regulate desires, it ismind that applies them to desires, and desires are unable to chooserituals as their rules of issuance. Therefore, the crucial point of trans-

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forming nature or regulating desires lies in the degree of perspicuitythat mind has, for only a clear and sagacious mind can direct desiresproperly. This explains Xunzi’s optimism on the ability of mind tocontrol the issuance of desires, and also the importance of cognitiveability in his moral theory. On this point, we can say, the regulation ofdesires is mainly an improvement of the mind’s perspicuity in rituals.

In order to improve its perspicuity on ritual application, mind mustunderstand and comply with ritual rules. As Xunzi claims,

Off all the methods of controlling the vital breath and nourishing themind, none is more direct than proceeding according to ritual prin-ciples, none more essential than obtaining a good teacher, and nonemore intelligent than unifying one’s likes. (Xunzi 2.4, 31)

First, rituals can make the mind clear and reasonable. Rituals, as themanifestation of dao,10 are the best way to dispel obscuration (bi) ( )to which ordinary people are susceptible of suffering. Throughknowing dao, the mind will be able to protect itself from the influenceof different opinions and thus remain clear (Xunzi 21.6–7, 681). Xunzialso equalizes rituals with reason (li) ( ).11 To comply with rituals isto behave according to reason. It is the nature of the mind that noprohibition may be placed upon its selections, but

if you lead it with rational principles, nurture it with purity, and notallow mere things to “tilt” it, then it will be adequate to determineright and wrong and to solve any doubtful points. (Xunzi 21.11, 691)

Xunzi thus highly appreciates the significance of the compliance withrituals, and believes that if the nobleman is thoroughly acquaintedwith rituals, then he cannot be fooled by fraud and pretense. Afterbeing able to think and to stay steadfast, adds to them a fondness forrituals—this is to be a sage (Xunzi 19.8, 613–15).

Second, rituals keep mind in the direction of dao and restrain itfrom those against dao. On this point,Wang Fuzhi ( ) (1619–92)makes an excellent complement:

Now let a son wear his hemp clothes, eat plain food, live in a hutbeside his father’s tomb, then, it would be rare that he forgets hissorrow and longing upon his father through indulging in lascivious-ness and extravagance, for his ears and eyes are controlled so that hismind cannot be excited. Provided he wore bright and beautifulclothes, ate meat, lived in splendid house, then it would be rare thathe would not be swayed and forgot his sadness and longing to hisparents despite his sincerity of mourning, for his ears and eyes wereswayed and thus his mind were moved. Therefore, the former kingsestablished the mournful rituals by which to express the inner mindof the worthies so as to pacify his mind, and to restrain the behaviorsof mediocre people so as to move their minds.12

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In this paragraph, Wang Fuzhi connects desires and mind, proposingthe discipline of mind through the control of desires with rituals. “Ifone does not put his mind on the right, use rituals to govern it.”13

Third, the compliance with rituals is an indicator of the sincerityof the mind. As rituals are the expression of the sage’s mind, theyare also the indication of the sincerity whether a person trulyfollows moral principles or has a moral virtue. Without judgmentfrom manifestation, everyone can claim himself as virtuous. Forinstance, if a person claims that he does not forget respect to hisfather, but arrogantly sits there to wait for him; he says that he doesnot lose love of his brother, but breaks his brother’s arm in anger;can this person really have filial piety and fraternal love in his mind?Therefore, the compliance of rituals at least displays a person’svirtues although there is the case in which one follows rituals pre-tentiously. On this, Wang Fuzhi commented, “if there is no distinc-tion outside, how can we discern whether a person has virtue or notin his mind.”14

The compliance with rituals depends on the sincerity of mind;without sincerity, the compliance will become a meaningless gesture.On the other hand, the sincerity of one’s mind needs to express itselfthrough rituals, and rituals are the indication of inner sincerity.However, Xunzi regards sincerity as being fundamental to the culti-vation of mind. “For the gentleman to nurture his mind, nothingis more excellent than sincerity. If a man has attained perfection ofsincerity, he will have no other concern than to uphold the principle ofhumanity and to behave with justice” (Xunzi 3.9, 59). However, sin-cerity is an internal psychological state; it is hard to be discerned inadvance. It is only a consequential discovery that a person is sincere ornot. On this point, Xunzi proposes self-examination through whichone realizes whether one’s behavior meets the rituals, and thusenhances one’s sincerity through correction.

When it comes to Wang Fuzhi, especially after he experienced thepretentious social atmosphere of the late Ming, Wang did not valueso much on abstract sincerity, and concerned more about the moralquality of a behavior. He was critical of his peers, “Nowadays, peopleall said, virtues such as loyalty of ministers, filial piety of sons, fraternallove of brothers, all depend on a person’s mind (the sincerity of themind). But (I would say) there are so many stuffs in the mind that areshameful of disclosure.”15 Thus, Wang Fuzhi put more importance onthe compliance of rituals, and advocated the mutual enhancement andsupport of mind and rituals.

The inner and the outer mutually enhance and support. After seeinga person beautify his behaviors, it is necessary to inspect his motive,this is what requires the nobleman to exhaust his sincerity. To move

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his mind, it is necessary to beautify his behavior; this is what directspeople under heaven to grow sincerity in their minds.16

Wang Fuzhi complemented Xunzi’s self-examination with a standardof behavior, and thus gave sincerity a rule to follow and express. Inthis way, the gap between psychological state and behaviors can bebridged through self-examination and the use of rituals. Rituals, aninvention and expression of the mind, then works back on mind.

In Xunzi’s belief, ordinary people can reach the prefect state of thesage’s mind and become sage in earnest compliance with rituals.A typical example is Confucius. Through persistent compliance withrituals17 since fifteen years old. Confucius could act at will withoutdeviating from rituals in his seventies. For the seventy-year-old Con-fucius, instinctual desires are completely transformed into moraldesires. Thus, he became a sage through learning. When explainingwhy many people cannot become sage despite their efforts, Xunziindicates that they are not willing to devote themselves to rituals tothe utmost: “Although it is possible for them to do so, they cannot beinduced to do so.Thus, although the petty man is capable of becominga gentleman, he is unwilling to do so; although the gentleman couldbecome a petty man, he is unwilling to do so” (Xunzi 23.15, 767).When he answers the question why Yao and Shun could not transformtheir wicked sons, he explicitly admits that there exist people whocannot be transformed (Xunzi 18.6, 581–83). At this point, he makesit inconsistent with his statement “everyone can become Yu ( ),” andpredicts the doctrine, “nature has three categories (xing san pin)( )” prevalent in the Han dynasty. Perhaps, it is after havingfound the impotence of Confucian doctrine in transforming humannature, that both Han Fei and Li Si become more confident in the badcharacter of human nature and completely endorse the legalist ideasto govern people.

VII. The Reinterpretation of Rituals

Different from human moral feeling, rituals are specific rules dealingwith specific situations. If they are applied to a new situation, a processof reinterpretation must be undertaken. In this sense, the emulation oflater kings in Xunzi is easily understandable because their times arecloser to Xunzi’s time and their rituals and institutions, compared withthose of earlier kings, are more practicable to the latter’s situationsand do not involve much reinterpretation.

In Xunzi, reinterpretation of rituals comes together with the under-standing of the thread of dao (dao guan) ( ). The thread of dao isregarded as the spirit of rituals; grasping it, one will be able to apply

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rituals at will; without grasping it, one can only blindly follow ritualrules and does not know how to adapt them to new situations. AsXunzi contends:

What has remained unchanged through the Hundred Kings is suffi-cient to be regarded as the connecting thread of the Way. With eachrise and fall, respond with this connecting thread, apply the connect-ing thread with reason, and there will be no disorder. If you do notknow the connecting thread, you will not know how to respond tochanging circumstances. (Xunzi 17.14, 551)

Based on whether or not one grasps the thread of dao, Xunzi sheds alot of criticism on many Confucian disciples, including Zi Si ( )and Mencius. In his opinion, Zi Zhang ( ) superficially imitatedShun and Yu’s comportments and did not know their true signifi-cance; Zi Xia ( ) wore clothes similar to the sages and pretendedto be as composed and serious as them, and Zi You ( ) distorted asage’s word, “a gentleman naturally would not engage in manuallabor,” and thus became evasive, greedy, and cynic (Xunzi 6.18, 143).None of them, including Mencius and Zi Si, knew the guiding prin-ciples of rituals, therefore they did not know how to adapt li to newsituations, and were also unable to grasp the unity of kinds so as topropose a reasonable and coherent theory.

What, then, is the thread of dao and how can we grasp it? Accord-ing to Xunzi, the thread of dao should be righteousness and humanityshown in li. In more specific words, it is the good intention that thesages save the world from conflict and chaos through using li toregulate desires. When manifested, it becomes the unity of kinds orcategories (tonglei) ( ) running through all rituals. This explainswhy Xunzi insists that once one grasps the unity of kinds, one is ableto go beyond any fixed frames and deal with new situations throughanalogy.

Where the model covers an affair, use it as the basis for action; wherethere is no provision in the model, use an analogical extension of theproper category as a basis of proceeding. Use the root of a thing toknow its branches, use its left to know its right.As a rule, the hundredaffairs, though different, have a rational order that they mutuallyobserve. (Xunzi 27.61, 885)

The great Confucians follow the model of the Later Kings, hold tothe guiding lines of ritual and moral principles, and unify rules andregulations. They use the shallow to handle the deep, the ancient tohandle the recent, the one to handle the myriad. . . . When they meetwith extraordinary things and bizarre transformations that havenever been seen or heard of before, by brusquely picking up onecorner, they are able to state its guiding principle and proper cat-egory, and can respond to them without cause for hesitation orembarrassment. (Xunzi 8.18, 195)

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Through grasping the unity of kinds and applying analogical pro-jection, li of the past is connected with the future.Thus, understandingthe thread of dao is integrating the past experience and the creativeconstruction. In Professor Cua’s terms, it is the unity of retrospectiveand prospective use of historical evidences.

While the retrospective use of the historical appeal is conservative,the prospective use implies a creative form of ethical judgment,though essentially contestable, in response to exigent and changingcircumstances. Its argumentative value lies in laying the ground for apossible reasonable acceptance rather than invoking the support ofan established framework of ethical justification. (Cua, 97)

For Professor Cua, it is in this way that Xunzi avoids the tyranny oftradition and pathological attachment to the tradition, and thereforethe vitality of rituals is maintained.

With regard to how to obtain the thread of dao or the unity ofkinds, Xunzi recommends two approaches. The first is learning, bothof the rituals from teachers and from books, though the former isdeemed more valuable because its aim is to grasp the spirit of ritualsand their application to social interactions. The experience of practic-ing rituals cannot be obtained from books, but only from people whosincerely practice them and possess extensive knowledge of the exist-ing li and its history of application. Therefore, Xunzi claims that “Inlearning, no method is of more advantage than to be near a man oflearning,” and feels it a pity that Confucian classics are too terse andimpertinent (Xunzi 1.11, 17). In this regard, ethical experience is farmore important than abstract knowledge.

The second approach is through the perspicuity of the mind.Without a clear and impartial mind, one could fall into partiality andbe unable to grasp the wholeness of things, let alone the connectingthread of dao. In regard to correcting the partiality, Xunzi proposesthat mind should be “empty, unified and still (xu yi er jing)( )”:

What do men use to know the Way? I say that it is the mind. Howdoes the mind know? I say by its emptiness, unity, and stillness. Themind never stops storing; nonetheless it possesses what is calledemptiness. The mind never lacks duality; nonetheless it possesseswhat is called unity. The mind never stops moving, nonetheless itpossesses what is called stillness. Men from birth has awareness.Having awareness, there is memory. Memories are what is stored, yetthe mind has the property called emptiness. Not allowing what haspreviously been stored to interfere with what is being received in themind is called emptiness. The mind from birth has awareness. Havingawareness, there is perception of difference. Perception of differenceconsists in awareness of two aspects of things at the same time.Awareness of two aspects of things all at the same time entails

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duality; nonetheless the mind has the quality called unity. Not allow-ing the one thing to interfere with the other is called unity. When themind is sleep, it dreams. When it relaxes, it moves of its own accord.When it is employed in a task, it plans. Thus the mind never stopsmoving; nonetheless it possesses the quality called stillness. Notallowing dreams and fantasies to bring disorder to awareness iscalled stillness. (Xunzi 21.8, 683–85)

Through keeping the mind “empty, unified and still,” Xunzi avoidsobsession and prejudices in the process of seeking dao. He creativelyconverts the passive state of mind in the Zhuangzi into an active statein understanding dao. By contrast, the Zhuangzi recommends empti-ness and nonattachment of mind, and admonishes people not to pre-serve any knowledge. The mind should be like a mirror which reflectsthings but does not hold them. Xunzi inherits the Zhuangzi’s non-attachment of mind, but insists that mind can hold some knowledgewhich does not affect its receiving new knowledge.

In addition, Xunzi discusses methods that help realize the thread ofdao. He pays much attention to linguistic and logic, such as definitions,naming, dialectics, and explanations. In order to understand dao andapply it to real situations, one should grasp the correct meanings ofnames and their reality. One should also broaden his/her knowledgeso as to situate a name or a principle in a right place.Then, one will beable to grasp the unity of kinds, to discern different situations withoutmistake, and to reason by analogy without error. Otherwise,

If the legal model is not fully deliberated, then points not explicitlycovered by it are certain to be left unresolved. If the duty is carriedout but not connected to other duties, matters not specifically underthe scope of the duty are bound to be botched up. (Xunzi 9.2, 213)

The application of models and the extension of knowledge pave theway to the future of li, and keep the ritual tradition alive.

Through grasping the thread of dao, a dialectical movementbetween mind and rituals is established. Like Confucius, a person canbecome a sage through practicing rituals and grasping the connectingthread of dao; he can in turn refresh rituals with new elements andvitality. Thus, under the creativity of mind, Xunzi puts rituals in acontinuously refreshing process, and thereby keeps Confucianismalive.

VIII. Conclusion

Xunzi can be regarded as the first philosopher who has elevated therole of mind to its highest degree. Mind plays an undefeatable role incontrolling desires. Here one may find the weakness of his doctrine.

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He exaggerates the power of reason in controlling the issuance ofdesires and neglects the influence of external circumstances on humanbehaviors. Compared with reason which aims to the welfare ofhumans as a whole, desires include those instincts for the survival ofindividuals, which can be regarded as good in most cases. To somedegree, reason has its content to compromise people’s interests ordesires so as to avoid conflicts and maintain the welfare as a whole.Therefore, the relation of reason and desires is not so simple as“control” as Xunzi and later Neo-Confucians supposed, for reasonhas to change itself according to the degree of the fulfillment ofdesires, on the one hand, and would very likely become invalid infront of the urgency of survival instincts, on the other. Thus, Menciusobserves:

In good years of plenty, the young men are mostly good; in years offamine, the young men are mostly bad. It is not that the endowmentwhich Heaven sends down is different. It is that which drowns theirheart being so. (Mencius 6A.7, 164)

Therefore, in hard times, failing to sufficiently accommodate people’ssurvival desires, but urging them to follow moral principles, will leadpeople to hypocrisy or rebellious behavior instead of morality.

In summary, through endowing mind with moral capacity and dis-tinguishing it from nature, Xunzi’s moral theory complements, ratherthan contradicts with Mencius’ doctrine. It thus stands as the thirdstage after Confucius’ virtue ethics and Mencian theory of moralnature and moral government. Unfortunately, “scholars after Xunzisee only antagonism between Mencius and Xunzi and let thisrestricted view mislead them to an odd discrepancy between theoryand practice. It is now a high time to recognize the unity of Mencius’moral naturalism and Xunzi’s political institutionalism as both areintended in the classical views of Confucius.”18

Endnotes

1. Antonio S. Cua, Human Nature, Ritual and History: Studies in Xunzi and ChinesePhilosophy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 45.References to this book hereinafter will be parenthetically indicated in the main textwith the author’s name and page numbers.

2. Here and throughout, I quote from John Knoblock’s Xunzi (Changsha: HunanPeople Press, 1999), vols. I–II, but have made some adaptations according to myunderstanding of the original Chinese text of Xunzi. And references to this bookhereinafter will be parenthetically indicated in the main text with the numbers ofchapter and section in the works, followed by page number, as displayed in thecontext.

3. Meng Peiyuan, Zhong Guo Xin Xing Lun (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1990), 30.

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4. Here and throughout, I quote from D. C. Lau’s Mencius (Harmondsworth: Penguin,1970), but have made some adaptations according to my understanding of the originalChinese text of Mencius. And references to this book hereinafter will be parentheti-cally indicated in the main text with the numbers of chapter and section in the works,followed by page number.

5. David B. Wong, “Xunzi on Moral Motivation,” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency inthe Xunzi, ed. T. C. Kline, III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis and Cambridge:Hackett, 2000), 147.

6. Ibid., 145.7. D. C. Lau, “Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi,” in Virtue, Nature, and

Moral Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T. C. Kline, III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis andCambridge: Hackett, 2000), 211.

8. “What was novel about Mencius’ views on xing is that he regarded xing as constitutedprimarily by the development of the ethical propositions of the heart/mind.” Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1997), 198.

9. Li Disheng, Xunzi Jijie (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1979), 471.10. Ritual principles are the ridgepole of the Way of Man. See Xunzi 19.8, 613.11. Further music embodies harmonies that can never be altered, just as ritual embodies

reason that can never been changed. See Xunzi 20.3, 661.12. Wang Fuzhi, “Du Tongjian Lun,” in Chuanshan Quanshu (Chuanshan Complete

Works) (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 1992), 10:422.13. Ibid.14. Ibid.15. Ibid.16. Ibid., 423.17. Confucius teaches his son, “Without learning rituals, one will not know how to act.”

Yang Bojun, The Analects of Confucius (Jinan: Qi Lu Press, 1993), 202.18. Chung-ying Cheng, “Virtue and Law: A Confucian-Kantian Reflection on Mutuality

and Complementarity,” in Rechtsdenken: Schnittpunkte West und Ost: Recht in dengesellschafts- und staatstragenden Institutionen Europas und Chinas, ed. Harald Holz,Konrad Wegmann (Hrsg.) (Münster: Lit, 2005), 291–333.

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