A Great Philosopher’s not so Great Treatment of Great Virtue: Aristotle’s Treatment of Greatness...

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A Great Philosopher's Not so Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotle's Treatment of'Greatness of Soul'Author(s): Howard J. CurzerReviewed work(s):Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 517-537Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231712 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 517 Volume 20, Number 4, December 1990, pp. 517-538

A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotlds Treatment of Greatness of Soul'

HOWARD J. CURZER Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX 79409-4530 U.S.A.

I

Once again it is becoming fashionable to ask 'What character traits are virtues?' Naturally, it behooves us to try to recapture the insights of our predecessors, as well as forging ahead on our own. In this paper I shall examine one such insight. From Homer onwards the Greeks have admired a character trait which Aristotle calls megalopsychia (liter- ally 'greatness of soul').1 Megalopsychoi (people possessing megalopsychia) are somehow larger than life.' They are big, powerful people, aware of their own excellence, moving through life with grandeur, and

seemingly destined for greatness. Aristotle's treatment of megalopsychia in Nicomachean Ethics IV 3 is particularly interesting for two reasons.

First, megalopsychia seems somehow to be a central virtue in Aristo- tle's ethics (1124al-2). Yet megalopsychia has been relatively neglected and even disparaged by commentators. The modern prejudice against megalopsychia may stem from taking honor to be at the core of megalopsychia. In part II of the paper I shall present an account of NE IV 3 which takes greatness and self-knowledge to be the main components of megalopsychia. My account portrays the megalopsychos (person possessing megalopsychia) more favorably, and thus makes Aristotle's suggestion that megalopsychia is a central virtue more intelligible.

1 Other translations of megalopsychia include high-mindedness, pride, self-respect, dignity, and magnanimity. Of course, the Greek concept of megalopsychia, like their concepts of other virtues, fluctuated significantly. See R A Gauthier, Mag- nanimite (Paris: Bibliotheque thomiste 28 1951).



518 Howard J. Curzer

Second, Aristotle's treatment of megalopsychia constitutes a particularly interesting juncture in the history of ideas: the point at which the vestigial, Homeric values of greatness and grandeur seem to clash with the newer value of moderation and the mean. Aristotle tries to reconcile these two apparently incompatible values by formally defin-

ing megalopsychia as a combination of greatness and self-knowledge. The megalopsychos, Aristotle says, is a mean between two extremes. He or she claims just what he or she deserves, unlike the humble person who claims too little and the vain person who claims too much.

In part III of the paper I shall argue that Aristotle's move fails.

Megalopsychia, defined as greatness plus self-knowledge, is not a mean between humility and vanity. Moreover, Aristotle's move spawns several serious problems concerning the relationship between megalopsychia and the other virtues. Despite these problems Aristotle almost succeeds. I shall propose certain modifications in Aristotle's treatment of megalopsychia which will clarify and rectify the relationship between

megalopsychia and the other virtues. I shall also show that greatness is actually compatible with Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.

II

It is difficult to see, at first glance, how Aristotle's statements about

megalopsychia and the megalopsychos fit together. Exactly what virtue is Aristotle talking about and who is the megalopsychos? It helps to note that almost all of the statements about megalopsychia and the megalopsychos in NE IV 3 fall into two classes. They relate megalopsychia to the external goods, especially honor, and to greatness or grandeur.

1. Honor and the Other External Goods

Aristotle's architectonic of virtue demands that every virtue have a sub-

ject matter (peri ho), a sphere of its own. Honor is the subject matter of megalopsychia. 'Honors and dishonors are the objects with respect to which the megalopsychos is as he should be' (1123b21-22. See also 1124a4-5, 1124al2-13,1125a34-35, 1107b21-22).2 The megalopsychos claims

just the right amount of honor, from the right people, at the right time, etc. But I shall show that this right relationship to honor arises from

2 All quotations from Aristotle are taken from The Complete Works of Aristotle: Re- vised Oxford Translation, J. Barnes, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1984) except that I use 'virtue' rather than 'excellence' to translate arete and 'adornment' rather than 'crown' to translate kosmos.



A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of Great Virtue 519

more fundamental traits of the megalopsychos. To describe the megalopsychos as a person with the right relationship to honor is misleading insofar as it suggests that a right relationship to honor is at the core of megalopsychia. As Rowe says, this right relationship 'is surely only a consequence of his megalopsychia, not megalopsychia itself/3 An ex- amination of the actual role played by honor in Aristotle's account rev- eals that external goods such as honor are mainly used by Aristotle as vehicles to describe other aspects of megalopsychia.4

At the outset of his discussion, Aristotle formally defines megalopsychia in terms of external goods (wealth, power, beauty, honor, etc.). He defines the megalopsychos as the person 'who thinks himself wor-

thy of great things, being worthy of them' (1123bl-2). This definition connects megalopsychia to external goods in two ways, (a) The megalopsychos deserves external goods of the highest quality and/or quanti- ty. Aristotle uses this thesis about desert as a premise in the following argument.

The megalopsychos, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best man most. Therefore, the true megalopsychos must be good. . . . Honor is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered. (1123b26- 29)

Here Aristotle uses the fact that the megalopsychos is worthy of great honor together with the principle that honor should be distributed ac-

cording to virtue to infer that the megalopsychos is very good. The honorableness of the megalopsychos is not brought in for its own sake. Instead it is just evidence that the megalopsychos has great virtue. I shall

argue below that the greatness of the megalopsychos consists in the fact that he or she has great virtue. So the first relationship between the

3 C. J. Rowe, The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 3 [1971] 50)

4 The following commentators take megalopsychia to be primarily concerned with honor. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers 1947), II-II, Q. 129, A. 1, 1728; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett 1985), 326; N. Cooper, 'Aristotle's Crowning Virtue/ Apeiron 22 (1989) 195-9; H. H. Joachim, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon 1951), 124-5; T. Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight (Oxford: Clarendon 1983), 75-81. The following interpreters claim that honor is central to the EE account of megalopsychia, but virtue is central to the NE account. E. A. Schmidt, /Ehre und Tugend. Zur Megalop- sychie der aristotelischen Ethik/ Archivfur Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967) 163; D. A. Rees, '"Magnanimity" in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics,' in P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger, eds., Untersuchungen zur eudemischen Ethik (Berlin: 1971) 243; Rowe, 50.




megalopsychos and external goods plus Aristotle's principle of justice implies that (a) the megalopsychos is great.

The second part of the formal definition of megalopsychia is a matter of self-knowledge, (b) The megalopsychos has an appropriate opinion of what goods he or she deserves. The megalopsychos knows that he or she deserves great things, in particular, great honor. 'At honors that are great and conferred by good men he will be moderately pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own' (1124a5-7). Thus, to say that the megalopsychos knows himself or herself to be worthy of great things is to add to the definition that (b) the megalopsychos has a particular sort of self-knowledge, knowledge about his or her own level of virtue. The external goods here are just a vehicle for making this point.

So megalopsychia is formally defined essentially as greatness of virtue plus a certain sort of self-knowledge. A relationship to honor is not central to the formal definition of megalopsychia.

Some interpreters believe that one relationship between megalopsychia and external goods is that great wealth, power, and other external goods are necessary conditions of megalopsychia.5 Of course, some external goods are necessary for the practice of any virtue, but these interpreters believe that the megalopsychos needs lots of wealth and power, etc. They advance two arguments for this claim. First, the greatness of the megalopsychos involves spectacular deeds which, in turn, require great wealth and power. Second, Aristotle says that a person who has both virtue and external goods is thought to be more worthy of honor than a person who has virtue alone (1124a25-6).

As for the first argument, I do not agree that spectacular deeds require great wealth and power. Of course, great wealth and power are helpful, but a historical survey of poor, powerless, doers of spectacular deeds shows that great wealth and power are hardly required.

As for the second argument, 1124a25-6 may be merely a report of a vulgar opinion,6 but even if it is Aristotle's own view it implies only that megalopsychia is enhanced by great wealth and power. It does not imply that megalopsychia requires great wealth and power.

5 W. F. R. Hardie, "'Magnanimity" in Aristotle's Ethics/ Phronesis 23 (1978) 69, 73-4; N. Sherman, 'Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue,' Midwest Studies in Philos-

ophy 13 (1988) 103

6 Gauther-Jolif, Schmidt, and Stewart suggest this (R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, Aristote, L'Ethique a Nicomaque [Paris: Louvain 1970]; Schmidt, 161; J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle [Oxford: Oxford University Press 1892]). Hardie disagrees, but offers as evidence only the observation that Aristotle does not explicitly reject the opinion (69).




Indeed, the context of 1124a25-6 shows that megalopsychia does not

require great wealth and power. The passage follows a comparison between people of great virtue and people of great wealth, power, etc. Aristotle's point is that while the latter are sometimes thought to possess megalopsychia, in fact it is the former, whether or not they have the external goods in abundance, who are the megalopsychoi. Elsewhere, Aristotle remarks that megalopsychia enables people to bear with nobil-

ity many great misfortunes (such as the misfortunes of Priam) that crush and maim blessedness (1100b22ff.). This remark indicates that

people who have lost wealth and power can still possess megalopsychia. Finally, Aristotle says that the megalopsychos 'will possess beautiful and profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones; for this is more proper to a character that suffices to itself' (1125all-12). Here, Aristotle explicitly says that (c) the megalopsychos is self-sufficient. He or she requires only a few external goods.7

Some critics, probably prompted by Aristotle's numerous statements that megalopsychia is concerned with honor (1123b21-2, 1124a4-5, 1124al2-13, 1125a34-5, 1107b21-2), suggest that the megalopsychos is obsessed by honor.8

Aristotle explicitly addresses the extent to which the megalopsychos values honor and the other external goods. Lest the statements that

megalopsychia is concerned with honor give us the wrong idea, Aristo- tle hastens to inform us that (d) the megalopsychos attaches very little

importance to honor and the other external goods. For example, the

megalopsychos

will bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For not even about honor does he care very much. (1124al3-17)

Clearly, whatever 'the megalopsychos is concerned with honor' means, it does not mean that the megalopsychos is obsessed by honor.

Presumably the megalopsychos is not obsessed with the pursuit of honor and the other external goods because he or she realizes that these

7 At 1097bl4-20 self-sufficiency seems to be a characteristic of goods and there is considerable controversy over what Aristotle means by it. But at 1125all-12 it is clear that Aristotle is merely using self-sufficiency in a non-technical sense. A

person is self-sufficient if he or she requires only a few external goods. See also 1177a27-1177bl.

8 H. V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1952), 123-7




goods are not important enough to be obsessed about. The megalopsychos knows that he or she does not really need much in the way of external goods to be happy. A few external goods plus what the

megalopsychos has within himself or herself, the internal goods, are sufficient. In other words, (d) the megalopsychos knows that he or she is self-sufficient.

What do statements such as 'it is chiefly with honors and dishonors, then, that the megalopsychos is concerned' (1124a4-5) mean if they do not mean that the megalopsychos overvalues honor? The point of these statements is not that the megalopsychos is very concerned about honor, but merely that honor is the subject matter (peri ho) of megalopsychia as I have already noted. The traits which constitute megalopsychia are often exercised in connection with honor.

2. Greatness and Grandeur

Many of the statements in IV 3 relate megalopsychia to greatness and

grandeur. Aristotle says, for example,

Megalopsychia implies greatness, as beauty implies a good-sized body, and little

people may be neat and well-proportioned but cannot be beautiful. (1123b6-8)

Such statements are puzzling (and not just because our conception of

beauty no longer includes 'a good-sized body'). In what way is the

megalopsychos great?9 Some interpreters have suggested that the greatness of the megalo-

psychos consists in the fact that he or she performs spectacular actions. This turns out to be a left-handed compliment, for the implication is that the megalopsychos is a person (1) with a bloated ego10 (2) who treats

9 Could greatness be a consequence rather than a component of megalopsychia? Megalopsychia cannot be merely the belief that one is great plus the tendency to undertake great deeds because the vain person, from whom the megalopsychos is explicitly distinguished, also has this belief (1123b8-9) and this tendency (1125a27-9). Similarly, megalopsychia cannot be merely the knowledge of one's own abilities because the temperate person of small worth, from whom the megalopsychos is explicitly distinguished, also has this knowledge (1123b5-6).

Aristotle combines these two accounts. Megalopsychia is the knowledge that one is great. But greatness is built into this definition (and the tendency to perform great deeds is built into greatness). Megalopsychia turns out to consist in self-

knowledge plus greatness as we saw above. Thus, greatness is a component, not a consequence, of megalopsychia.

10 Joachim, 125




his or her inferiors snobbishly11 and (3) neglects the more mundane acts of kindness (1124b23-6)12 (4) because of a preoccupation with ob-

taining honor through intermittent spectacular action.13 The megalopsychos is a vain, priggish, cold, show-off. (5) Though possessing pizzazz, the megalopsychos lacks virtue.14

Let us examine this interpretation of the greatness of the megalopsychia and the associated bundle of criticisms.

(4) I have already argued that the megalopsychos is not obsessed with honor.

(1) Since 'great' is a relative term, not everyone can deserve great things. If some deserve great things, then others must deserve less. Since (b) the megalopsychos knows that he or she deserves great things, it follows that (e) the megalopsychos knows that he or she is better than other people. The megalopsychos does not overestimate the extent of his or her superiority. It is the vain person who does that (1123b8-9). But the megalopsychos does not underestimate the extent of his or her

superiority, either. The megalopsychoi are well aware of the gap between themselves and their inferiors.

(5) Their awareness of this gap, however, does not lead the megalopsychoi to mistreat their inferiors for the megalopsychoi have great virtue. Aristotle explicitly and forcefully rejects the assertion that the

megalopsychos is lacking in virtue (1123b26-1124a4, 1124a25-9). Indeed, Aristotle calls this assertion 'absurd.' If we consider him point by point we shall see the utter absurdity of a megalopsychos who is not good' (1123b33-4). (2) In particular, the megalopsychoi would not be haughty towards their inferiors.

It is a mark of the megalopsychos to [be] . . . unassuming towards those of the middle class; for ... a lofty bearing . . . among humble people is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak. (1124bl7-23)

(3) Nor would the megalopsychoi neglect actions towards their inferiors

required by virtue. The megalopsychos 'is the sort of man to confer benefits' (1124b9) and 'to give help readily' (1124bl8; see also Rhet

1366bl5). Overall, (f) the attitude of the megalopsychos toward his or

11 Cooper, 202; Hardie, 65; A. Maclntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Mao millan 1966), 78-9.

12 Engberg-Pedersen, 78; Hardie, 65; W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen 1923), 208; Sherman, 107.

13 Jaffa, 123-7

14 Engberg-Pedersen, 78; Sherman, 106-7




her inferiors seems to be one of noblesse oblige rather than rudeness or even indifference.

I suggest that the greatness of the megalopsychia is greatness of virtue. It is greatness of virtue which makes the megalopsychos worthy of great things. As Aristotle says, 'The megalopsychos, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest degree' (1123b26-7).

What does it mean to be 'good in the highest degree?' Does the

megalopsychos merely have more virtues than other people? No.

Greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a megalopsychos. . .

[Megalopsychia makes the virtues] greater and it is not found without them.

(1123b29- 1124a3)

At least part of what makes the megalopsychos great is that each of his or her virtues is greater than the virtues of other people. The megalopsychos, therefore, has a larger magnitude of virtue, a higher degree of virtue than the merely virtuous person.

The idea that virtues differ in degree suggests Aristotle's scheme of six ethical states at the beginning of Book VII. Vice, incontinence, and brutishness are there contrasted with virtue, continence, and 'superhuman virtue, something heroic and divine' such as the virtue of Hector (1145al8-20). I agree with Hardie that it is reasonable to equate the megalopsychos with the person of superhuman, heroic, Homeric virtue since both have a higher degree of virtue than the merely virtuous person and Homeric heroes are paradigms of both (Anal Post. 97bl5- 25).15 But whether or not the megalopsychos and the person of heroic, Ho- meric virtue are the same, let us call the virtues of the megalopsychos heroic virtues.

How does a heroic virtue differ from an ordinary virtue? The Iliad and Odyssey suggest that a heroic virtue is great in three ways, (g) First, heroic virtue leads to ordinary virtuous actions performed under ex-

tremely trying conditions or to extremely virtuous actions performed under ordinary conditions. I shall call such actions noble.16 Second, (h) heroic virtue leads to virtuous actions which have great impact. I shall call such actions spectacular. Third, (i) heroic virtue leads to virtuous

15 Hardie, 71-2; see also W. Jaeger, Paideia, trans. G. Highet (Oxford: Oxford Univer-

sity Press 1939), 11-12.

16 Both types of noble actions are not always found in the context of every virtue. For example, we all have some idea of what counts as an ordinary temperate action under extremely trying conditions, but it is not at all clear what would count as an extremely temperate action under ordinary conditions.




actions which are performed in a grand style. I shall call such actions

grand. Noble and/or spectacular and/or grand actions are great deeds.17 The virtues of the megalopsychos are heroic in these three ways. (g) Aristotle does not show that all of the megalopsychos' virtues lead

to noble actions, but he considers a pair of typical virtues, courage and

liberality. He claims that the courage of a megalopsychos leads to noble actions. The megalopsychos 'will face great dangers [not merely ordi-

nary dangers], and when he is in danger he is unsparing [not merely generous] of his life . . / (1124b8-9). When someone does a favor for the megalopsychos, he or she does not just return the favor. The megalopsychos 'is apt to confer greater benefits in return; for thus the original benefactor besides being paid will incur a debt to him, and will be the

gainer by the transaction' (1124bll-12). (h) The actions of the megalopsychos have more impact than the ac-

tions of other people because

It is characteristic of the megalopsychos ... to be sluggish and to hold back except where great honor or a great result is at stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of great and notable ones. (1124b23-6)

The megalopsychos, like a homeric hero, undertakes large projects rather than small ones, and concerns himself or herself with important things rather than trivial things. Megalopsychoi tend to perform spectacular actions and undertake heroic quests; they do not merely do things or look for things.

(i) Aristotle does not say much about style, but what he does say is highly suggestive. The megalopsychos

will possess beautiful and profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones; for this is more proper to a character that suffices to itself. Further, a slow step is thought proper to the megalopsychos, a deep voice, and a level utterance; for the man who takes few things seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks nothing great to be excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry and excitement. (1125al2-16)

From the statements that the megalopsychos possesses useless, beautiful things, walks slowly, and has a deep, calm voice, it does not quite

17 A parallel account could be given for great passions. What shall we say about people who possess only one or two of these three dispositions? Aristotle says nothing, so anything we say will be speculative. I suspect that there are very few such people, for these three dispositions tend to occur together, but I shall not defend this view here.




follow that he or she acts in a grand style. But these details show that the tnegalopsychos has a sense of style and that two of the major obsta- cles to grandeur - preoccupation with efficiency and a tendency to

flurry - are absent. Thus, the greatness of the megalopsychos consists only partially in the

fact that the megalopsychos performs spectacular actions. It is especially important to keep in mind that the megalopsychos is virtuous and that his or her actions are noble as well as spectacular and grand.

3. Summary

The megalopsychos is great because he or she possesses a high degree of virtue. That is, his or her virtues are heroic, Homeric virtues. The

megalopsychos is great because he or she has dispositions to exercise virtues (g) in noble actions, (h) on a large scale, and (i) in a grand manner. Thus, megalopsychia consists partially in the greatness of the other virtues. In this sense, megalopsychia is a second order virtue.

Since desert is based upon merit, the greatness of the megalopsychos implies that (a) he or she deserves great external goods, especially honor. Yet (c) the megalopsychos does not need these goods, for he or she is self-sufficient.

The other component of megalopsychia besides greatness is a certain sort of self-knowledge. First, (d) the megalopsychos recognizes that he or she is self-sufficient. The megalopsychos does not overvalue external

goods, but instead recognizes that the internal goods (with which he or she is well supplied) are basically sufficient for happiness. Second, (b) the megalopsychos is aware of his or her own worth, his or her own

greatness. Together the greatness and the self-knowledge of the megalopsychos

imply that (e) the megalopsychos knows that he or she is superior to others. But the megalopsychos is not rude or uncharitable toward his or her inferiors. Instead (f) the megalopsychos adopts an attitude of noblesse oblige toward his or her inferiors.

Ill

Aristotle's treatment of megalopsychia in NE IV 3 is internally inconsis- tent. It also conflicts with Aristotle's doctrine of the mean and with his treatment of other virtues. First, I shall exhibit these problems. Then I shall speculate briefly about their origins. Finally, I shall propose in- terpretations, extrapolations, and modifications of Aristotle's text which would solve these problems.




1. Megalopsychia and the Doctrine of the Mean

For Aristotle, of course, moral virtue is a mean of actions and passions. But although Aristotle tries to portray megalopsychia as a mean, he is unsuccessful. Aristotle begins in the following way.

He who thinks himself worthy of great things, being unworthy of them, is vain . . . The man who thinks himself worthy of less than he is really worthy of is

unduly humble . . . [The megalopsychos] claims what is in accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall short. (1123b8-15)

So far this sounds good. Megalopsychia is a mean between vanity and humility. The megalopsychos' opinion of his or her own merits is not too high and not too low, but it is just right. Megalopsychia consists in claiming just the right amount.

claims more claims exactly claims less than he or she what he or she than he or she

deserves deserves deserves

vain person megalopsychos humble person

But Aristotle cannot stop here. So far, megalopsychia is an aspect of self-knowledge, and self-knowledge is an intellectual virtue. Yet Aristo- tle lists megalopsychia as a moral virtue. So far, megalopsychia is only indirectly related to actions and passions. Yet the mean is a mean of actions and passions. So far, the account of megalopsychia is incomplete. Aristotle says, 'he who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little is temperate, but not megalopsychia' (1123b5-6). This temperate person claims just the right amount, but lacks megalopsychia, so megalopsychia cannot consist merely in claiming just the right amount.

Thus, Aristotle goes on to say, 'for megalopsychia implies greatness as beauty implies a good-sized body' (1123b6-7). To be a megalopsychos it is not enough to get your claims right; your claims must also be great. As we have already seen, megalopsychia is self-knowledge plus greatness.

This combination creates two new, related problems. The first concerns the compatibility of megalopsychia and the doctrine of the mean. Only one of megalopsychia 's two parts lies between two vices. Megalo- psychia is located in the middle of the self-knowledge continuum, but at the extreme end of the greatness continuum.18 As Aristotle says,

18 Note that what is extreme here is not just the great claims of the megalopsychos, but also the great virtues of the megalopsychos upon which these claims are based.




The megalopsychos is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the lightness of them' (123bl3-14).

claims more claims exactly claims less than he or she what he or she than he or she

deserves deserves deserves

J. megalopsychos humble person

wor, Y? vain person temperate person humble person

W° 11 fh° va*n Person temperate person

The second problem concerns the compatibility of greatness itself (whether or not greatness is a component of megalopsychia) with the doctrine of the mean. Extremes are vices, yet greatness is an extreme. Consider courage, for example. In certain situations people who rush forward are rash, people who run away are cowardly, and people who stand fast are courageous. What do people of great courage do? If they rush forward, then they are rash. If they just stand fast, then where is the greatness?

It looks as if megalopsychia does not fit into Aristotle's architectonic. Insofar as megalopsychia is a mean, it is not a moral virtue and it is not concerned with passions and actions. On the other hand, insofar as megalopsychia is a moral virtue concerned with passions and actions, it is an extreme rather than a mean.

2. The Definition Itself

It is odd that megalopsychia is formally defined as two things rather than one. Why does Aristotle call self-knowledge plus greatness a single virtue?

Of course, to be truly great one needs self-knowledge, but one also needs self-knowledge to be truly courageous, truly temperate, etc. Aristotle says, 'it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence' (1144b30-2). Yet the interdependence of virtue and practical wisdom does not lead Aristotle to build self-knowledge or any other aspects of practical wisdom into the definitions of the other virtues. Instead, in NE VI 13 Aristotle distinguishes between natural virtues and proper




virtues. Roughly speaking, natural virtue + practical wisdom = proper virtue. This distinction enables Aristotle to define each virtue indepen- dent of practical wisdom without losing sight of the importance of practical wisdom to each virtue. So the observation that practical wisdom is part of the strict version of all virtues does not explain why self- knowledge is part of the definition of megalopsychia.

Again, why does Aristotle call the combination of self-knowledge and greatness a single virtue? They are not even constantly conjoined, after all. The humble person sometimes has greatness without self- knowledge and the temperate person has self-knowledge without greatness. Self-knowledge has no special relationship to greatness. It is not related to greatness more or differently than it is related to courage, temperance, etc. There is no law forbidding Aristotle from defin- ing a virtue as the combination of two, often separated, unrelated abilities. But it is an odd thing to do. Imagine Aristotle eliminating courage and liberality from his list of virtues and replacing them with one virtue consisting of the combination of both of them.

A second problem with the formal definition of megalopsychia is this: as we have seen, megalopsychia in the body of the chapter includes self- sufficiency. But the formal definition does not include self-sufficiency. According to the formal definition, the megalopsychos deserves and knows that he or she deserves great things, but this does not imply that he or she is self-sufficient. Thus, there is an inconsistency between the body of the chapter and the formal definition over whether self- sufficiency is a component of megalopsychia.

Which is right? Self-sufficiency, like self-knowledge, has no special relationship to greatness. Nor does it have a special relationship to self- knowledge. Thus, the implicit definition of megalopsychia as greatness plus self-knowledge plus self-sufficiency seems even more odd than the formal definition of megalopsychia as greatness plus self-knowledge.

3. Megalopsychia and the Other Virtues

The only remark Aristotle makes about the general relationship between megalopsychia and other virtues is this.

[1] Megalopsychia seems to be a sort of adornment (kostnos) of the virtues; [2] for it makes them greater, and [3] it is not found without them. (1124al-3)

The first phrase of this remark is not only cryptic, it is also triply hedged. Aristotle does not say that 'megalopsychia is an adornment of the virtues/ but rather Aristotle says that 'megalopsychia looks as if (eoike) it is like (hoion) a kind of adornment (kosmos tis) of the virtues/ Thus it is perilous to read too much out of this phrase lest we read too much




into it. But whatever Aristotle is trying to say here, he is implying at least that megalopsychia is a different kind of character trait than the other virtues.

Hardie says that there is nothing problematic about the third phrase, 'for it is Aristotle's doctrine in NE VI (EE V) that the ethical virtues are all inseparable from each other and from practical wisdom.'19 In NE VI 13 where Aristotle distinguishes between natural virtues and

proper virtues he also states that existing in separation from each other 'is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect of [the proper virtues]' (1144b35-1145al). But this is irrelevant. Aristotle never claims that megalopsychia and the other virtues are inseparable. Indeed he provides a counterexample to that claim, the temperate person who lacks megalopsychia. Aristotle must be talking about natural virtue rather than proper virtue in IV 3. His claim is that the natural virtue of megalopsychia is not found without the other natural virtues. But that is a

problematic claim. Why should possession of the other virtues be neces-

sary for the possesion of megalopsychia? No natural virtue except megalopsychia presupposes other natural virtues.

The second phrase, 'it makes them greater,' indicates, as we have seen, that megalopsychia is not just one virtue among others, but rather megalopsychia involves a degree of virtue. 'Greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a megalopsychos' (1123b29-30). Los-

ing your megalopsychia is not like losing your courage. If you lose your megalopsychia, you will not be just as you are now except with one less virtue. Instead all of your virtues will be lessened. That is, you will lose the disposition to perform noble, spectacular, and grand actions.

Thus, the second phrase clarifies the first and third phrases. Megalo- psychia (or at least the 'greatness' component of megalopsychia) is a different kind of character trait than the other virtues because it is a degree of virtue. And, of course, it presupposes the virtues of which it is a

degree. The problem is that Aristotle lists megalopsychia as just another vir-

tue rather than as a degree of virtue. Megalopsychia appears in the midst of his catalogue of virtues without any indication of its special rela-

tionship to the other virtues. Another problem concerning the relationship between megalopsychia

and the other virtues arises out of Aristotle's doctrine in VI 13 that proper virtures are always inseparable from one another. If the proper version of megalopsychia is always present along with the proper versions of the other virtues, then every virtuous person is a megalopsychos. But

19 Hardie, 63




megalopsychia makes the other virtues greater. Thus every virtuous person has a high degree of virtue, heroic virtue. This will not do. Great and high are relative terms. Just as not everyone can deserve great things, so not every virtruous person can have great or high virtue. There must be people of ordinary virtue for the concept of great virtue to make sense.

Certainly Aristotle cannot maintain both that the proper version of megalopsychia is always present along with the other proper virtues and also that the megalopsychos is the person with heroic, Homeric virtue mentioned at the beginning of NE VII. For the person with heroic, Homeric virtue is explicitly distinguished from the merely virtuous person.

In book II, Aristotle makes the following statement.

As we said liberality was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state similarly related to megalopsychia being concerned with small honors while [megalopsychia] is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire small honors as one ought, and more than one ought and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short un- ambitious, while the intermediate person has no name. (1107b24-30)

This passage suggests that the virtue of appropriate ambition consists in desiring large honors to the right extent.20 But as we have seen, megalopsychia is not a mean between desiring large honors too much and too little. Instead, megalopsychia consists in self-knowledge plus greatness. Insofar as megalopsychia is a mean at all, it is a mean between believing one deserves more and less than one really deserves. More- over, when Aristotle discusses appropriate ambition in IV 4 he says, 'honor [not 'small honor'] may be desired more than is right, or less, or from the right sources and in the right way' (1125b7-8). Here appropriate ambition seems to consist in rightly desiring honor of all degrees from small to great.

The difference between megalopsychia and appropriate ambition does not seem to be the degree of honor with which they are concerned.

20 How are we to spell out the distinction between great and small honor? Hardie

suggests that great honor is honor from good people while small honor is honor from ordinary people (Hardie, 76, n. 1). Aristotle does say,

at honors that are great and conferred by good men [the megalopsychos] will be moderately pleased . . . but honor from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise .... (1124a5-ll. See also EE 1232bl7-19)

But in this passage Aristotle is clearly separating in thought, though not in fact, great honors from honors 'conferred by good men/ Moreover, the analogy to small and large sums at 1107b24-30 suggests that the distinction between great and small honor is simply the distinction between lots of honor and a little bit of honor.




Rather it seems that the appropriately ambitious person desires honor

rightly, whatever he deserves and thinks he deserves, while the

megalopsychos deserves and thinks he deserves great honor, whatever he desires.21 Thus, although magnificence is a large scale version of liberality, megalopsychia is not a large scale version of appropriate ambition at all.

4. Speculation About the Source of These Problems

As usual, Aristotle wants his account of megalopsychia to incorporate what is right about the beliefs of the many and the wise (endoxa), and

reject what is not. Moreover, he wants his account of megalopsychia to fit his architectonic of the virtues. My rather speculative suggestion is that with respect to megalopsychia Aristotle begins with the follow-

ing two clusters of endoxa. Homer portrays the megalopsychos as (1) being relatively self-sufficient, (2) doing great deeds, and (3) having great desires for external goods. The Homeric megalopsychos especially desires honor, since honor is the greatest of the external goods. Aristotle's con-

temporaries picture the megalopsychos as (4) knowing his or her place and desert, (5) acting moderately, and (6) having only moderate desires for all external goods including honor. These two pictures seem to conflict over whether the actions of the megalopsychos are (2) great or (5) moderate and over whether the megalopsychos (3) longs for or (6) is in- different to external goods especially honor. Additionally, the Homeric

picture seems self-contradictory, for the megalopsychos can not be (1) self-sufficient if he or she is (3) dependent upon others for honor (1095b22-26).22

Aristotle considers the possibility of synthesizing these pictures in Post An 97bl5-25. In EE III 5 (1232bl4-20) Aristotle poses the conflict between (3) and (6) and tries to resolve it by distinguishing two sorts of honor. The Homeric megalopsychos greatly desires great honors from

good men while the contemporary megalopsychos disdains small honors from the masses. In the NE, however, Aristotle abandons the attempt to preserve both (3) and (6). He simply rejects (3) as I argued earlier. 'For not even about honor does [the megalopsychos] care very much' (1124al7). But rejecting (3) allows Aristotle to incorporate (1) into his account which he could not do in the EE. Since the megalopsychos

21 Of course, the megalopsychos desires honor rightly too, but only because he or she has all of the other virtues, including appropriate ambition.

22 This way of characterizing Aristotle's procedure owes much to Cooper (Cooper, 193-9), although my view is somewhat different from his.




attaches little importance to external goods, it is now possible for the megalopsychos to be self-sufficient.23

The conflict between (2) and (5) is less explicit, but seems both more intractable and more important. Aristotle cannot give up (2). As he says, 'Megalopsychia seems even from its name to be concerned with great things' (1123a34). On the other hand, Aristotle cannot give up (5) either, for a modified version of moderation (i.e. the mean) is the basis for his architectonic of the virtues.24 Thus, Aristotle must somehow reconcile the vestigial, Homeric, heroic value of greatness and grandeur with the newer value of moderation and the mean. How can Aristotle fit greatness into his virtue-is-a-mean architectonic? How can greatness be a mean?

Aristotle tries to solve the problem by appealing to the belief that (4) the megalopsychos has a certain sort of self-knowledge. The megalopsychos knows that he or she is great and deserves great things. Aristotle combines greatness with this self-knowledge so that after he admits that, 'the megalopsychos is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims,' Aristotle can add that the megalopsychos is 'a mean in respect of the Tightness of [his claims]' (1123bl3-14). The first part of the sentence preserves (2) while the last part of the sentence preserves (5). That is, Aristotle combines greatness with self-knowledge and calls the combination megalopsychia, so that he will be able simultaneously to describe megalopsychia as (5) a mean between vanity and humility and also as (2) greatness of virtue. In this way Aristotle incorporates the older value system into the newer one, taming the older one in the process. Thus, Aristotle achieves a partial synthesis of the Homeric and contemporary conceptions of megalopsychia. But he does not just

23 Cooper finds the tension between (3) and (6) explicit in the EE but 'underneath the surface' in the NE. He suggests that 'the fact that the EE offers a solution of the tension is further evidence that EE is the later work' (Cooper, 1%). Since I think there is no tension between (3) and (6) in the NE I suggest that the fact that the EE offers a solution of the tension is evidence that EE is the earlier work. Consider the following scenarios. (A) Aristotle formulated the distinction between the two sorts of honors in order to solve a problem in the EE. Then in the NE he decided to drop (3), thereby eliminating the problem. He retained the distinction, however, because it seemed intrinsically important. (B) Aristotle formulated the distinctign in the NE to solve no problem. Then in the EE he discovered a problem for which the distinction happened to be a solution. Obviously (A) is a more plausible scenario than (B).

24 I do not mean to imply that the doctrine of moderation and the doctrine of the mean are the same (J. O. Urmson, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean/ in A. O.

Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics [Berkeley: University of California Press 1980] 160-3). But I do think that the latter is an outgrowth and generalization of the former.




conjoin the two conceptions. Instead he goes beyond them. Aristotle uses the endoxa as raw material for a new conception of megalopsychia.

5. Suggested Resolution of Most of These Problems

There is clearly a tension between the values of greatness and the mean which cannot be resolved by fusing greatness and self-knowledge. These two characteristics have nothing in particular to do with each other, and their fusion creates the problems mentioned above. Is there some other way for Aristotle to resolve the tension between greatness and the mean?

I suggest that Aristotle begin by delinking greatness and self- knowledge. He should redefine megalopsychia as greatness alone. That is, he should define megalopsychia as the disposition to perform noble, spectacular, and grand actions. Note that if Aristotle defines megalopsychia as these three dispositions (a) the megalopsychos still deserves great external goods. The megalopsychos might or might not (b) have self-knowledge and he or she might or might not (c) be self-sufficient.

Aristotle's second step should be to abandon the idea that megalopsychia is a virtue. The megalopsychos is not a person with a virtue called a megalopsychia, but rather the megalopsychos is a person who has a high degree of the 'other' virtues. As Hardie cautiously says,

So there is a suggestion [in NE IV 3] that to say of someone that he has [megalopsychia] is to say that his practice of the virtues generally is on a grand scale and in a grand manner.25

Interestingly, if Aristotle removes megalopsychia from the virtue roles, then magnificence will also cease to be a virtue in its own right and will become greatness-of-liberality. That is, magnificence will be the disposition to perform noble, spectacular, and grand liberal actions.

6. Greatness and the Doctrine of the Mean

These moves would eliminate most of the previously mentioned problems, but the task of reconciling the values of greatness and the doctrine of the mean remains. I shall argue that Aristotle need not make further modifications. His doctrine of the mean is already compatible with greatness of virtue as I have defined it. As Aristotle says, 'in respect of its substance and the account which states its essence virtue is a mean, [but] with regard to what is best and right it is an extreme' (1107a6-8).

25 Hardie, 64




Presumably, there is no incompatibility between the doctrine of the mean and spectacular or grand actions. The problem is to reconcile noble actions with the doctrine of the mean.26 Remember that I defined noble actions as (x) ordinary virtuous actions performed under extremely trying conditions or (y) extremely virtuous actions performed under ordinary conditions.

Noble actions of type (x) are not incompatible with the doctrine of the mean. They are just ordinary virtuous actions, after all. Are there any noble actions of type (x)? Aristotle writes,

On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one could withstand. (1110a23-6; see also 1115b7-8)

In other words, there are situations in which vicious actions are so difficult to resist that a person who performs such actions should be pardoned. Surely such situations constitute 'extremely trying conditions.' Do the phrases 'overstrains human nature' and 'no one could withstand' indicate that resisting the vicious actions in these situations is impossible? If Aristotle actually meant to say that these situations involve unwithstandable pressures, then (1) Aristotle would not have classified the action of succumbing to such pressures as doing what one ought not to do, (2) Aristotle would have classified the action of succumbing to such pressure as involuntary, not mixed, and (3) Aristo- tle would not go on to say that 'some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do. . .' (1110a26). So Aristotle's claim here must be that there are some pressures so strong that only extra-ordinary, heroic persons can withstand them, and that no one should be blamed for succumbing to them.27 Thus, Aristotle acknowledges that there are noble actions of type (x).

The remaining problem is to reconcile noble actions of type (y) with the doctrine of the mean. When Aristotle says that 'it is possible to fail in many ways ... while to succeed is possible only in one way...' (1106b29-33) he seems to be claiming that (T) in any situation there is only one virtuous option. All of the other options are vicious, though perhaps some are almost virtuous. Under ordinary conditions people of ordinary virtue hit the mean. They act (and feel) in the right way.

26 I shall restrict myself to consideration of actions. A similar account could be given for passions.

27 I am assuming that instead of performing the tempting vicious action the person performs a virtuous action rather than some other vicious action. See Jaffa, 104ff . for an interesting alternative interpretation.




So what do people of great virtue do? If they do 'more' than the mean then they are acting in an extreme way, a vicious way. If they do not do 'more' than the mean, then their virtue seems ordinary rather than great.

Losin argues that 1106b29-33 does not really imply (T) and that Aristo- tle does not really believe (T).28 1 shall just add to Losin's textual arguments the remark that (T) is such an absurd thesis that it would be uncharitable to attribute it to Aristotle unless we have no alternative. It is obvious that in most situations there are several virtuous actions available. For example, it is not the case that, for a given person in a given situation, 2 scoops of ice cream is temperate while 2 scoops plus 1 teaspoon is intemperate.

It is equally obvious that in many situations some actions are better, more virtuous, than others.29 Thus, in many situations a range of virtuous actions are available.

Aristotle has already acknowledged the existence of pressure which overstrains human nature. There is no reason to think that such pressure always pushes us toward vice. Surely in some situations such pressure might push us away from the best virtuous action without inhibiting us from performing other virtuous actions. That is, there are some situations where performing the best virtuous action would 'over- strain human nature,' but performing lesser virtuous actions would not. In these situations the best virtuous action would be an extremely virtuous action performed under ordinary conditions. So Aristotle has no reason to deny the existence of noble actions of type (y).

Let us work through an example. Suppose daring Dirk and his side- kicks Dwork, Dreck, and Darth set out to rescue the damsel Daphne. Whenever they encounter danger, Dwork charges forward and Dreck runs away. Darth stands his ground and fights as long as they are fac- ing lions and tigers and bears, but runs away whenever they encounter a dragon. Dirk never runs away and often takes a step forward so as to take the brunt of the attack upon himself.

What shall we say about this rescue team? Dwork is rash and Dreck is cowardly. Darth is courageous. He gives way only 'under pressure which overstrains human nature.' Dirk has heroic courage. Not run- ning from the dragon is a noble act of type (x), and stepping forward is a noble act of type (y).

28 P. Losin, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean/ History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987) 331-2

29 Notice that this thesis is not undermined by Hursthouse's objections to the thesis that vicious actions are too much or too little of something (R. Hursthouse, 'A False Doctrine of the Mean/ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 [1980-81] 60-2).




Therefore, if heroic virtue is defined as a disposition (g) to perform noble actions (h) on a large scale (i) in a grand manner, and if noble actions are defined as (x) ordinary virtuous actions performed under extremely trying conditions or (y) extremely virtuous actions performed under ordinary conditions, then noble actions and heroic virtue exist and they are compatible with Aristotle's doctrine that virtue is a mean. In general, the person with heroic virtue does not go to excess, but rather his or her actions remain at the high end of the intermediate range. He or she performs actions which require an extraordinary degree of virtue, but he or she does not go beyond virtue and into vice.

7. Summary

Aristotle defines megalopsychia as greatness plus self-knowledge. This is odd because these two items have nothing in particular to do with each other and because neither of them is a moral virtue. Moreover, this definition spawns several other problems. I have suggested that this definition is an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the values of greatness and the mean. I have proposed an alternative method of reconciliation by redefining megalopsychia as greatness alone and by interpreting the doctrine of the mean in such a way as to allow for noble actions.30

Received: November, 1988 Revised: August, 1989 Revised: June, 1990

30 I have benefited from suggestions by A. Epstein, W. Schaller, T. Seung, R. Smith, and the editors and referees of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.



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