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A Cultural Explanation for Early Broadcast Policy: Professionalism,Voluntarism, and U.S. Broadcast NetworksTim P. Vos a

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Online publication date: 21 May 2010

To cite this Article Vos, Tim P.(2010) 'A Cultural Explanation for Early Broadcast Policy: Professionalism, Voluntarism,and U.S. Broadcast Networks', Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 54: 2, 179 — 193To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/08838151003737972URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08838151003737972

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A Cultural Explanationfor Early Broadcast Policy:

Professionalism, Voluntarism,and U.S. Broadcast Networks

Tim P. Vos

This study explores the theoretical, methodological, and empirical challenges

that come with forging a cultural explanation for a particular policy outcome.

By theorizing culture as a toolkit of discrete values, two specific cultural

values were explored for their role in bounding the agency of various actors in

constructing broadcast policy and regulation that favored broadcast networks.

The study challenges realist stories that explain policy or regulatory outcomes

based on the power of particular interests.

This study offers a cultural explanation for the favorable frequency allocation to

broadcast networks in the early years of broadcast policy and regulation. Several

historical studies (e.g., Benjamin, 2001; Bensman, 2000; Haines, 1999; Krasnow,

Longley, & Terry, 1982; McChesney, 1993; Rosen, 1980) examined broadcasting

policy in general, or the favored place of broadcast networks in particular. Most

accounts of early broadcasting policy are constructed as narratives heavy on descrip-

tion. Elements of explanation enter into these stories, typically to provide closure

to the narratives. The present study focuses on explanation and the theoretical and

methodological challenges that come with cultural explanation.

Media policy history, like most media history, is dominated by realist stories; i.e.,

stories in which powerful agents achieve outcomes that reflect their intentions (e.g.,

Barnouw, 1966; Benjamin, 1998; Garvey, 1976, all cite the centrality of Commerce

Secretary Herbert Hoover in explaining early broadcasting policy) or where policy

reflects dominant American values (Rosen, 1980). A realist approach may be flawed

as historical explanation for at least four closely related reasons: 1) Realist stories

typically carry pluralist assumptions, explaining a policy outcome based on the

demands of the most powerful interest. Pluralism begs the question of how those

demands are reflected in policy. As Horwitz (1989) notes, pluralism ‘‘slights the

structural importance’’ of institutional and material factors. 2) Realist stories can be

tautological, e.g., identifying which interest is the most powerful by whose policy

Tim P. Vos (Ph.D., Syracuse University) is an assistant professor in the School of Journalism at the Universityof Missouri. His research interests include media policy history and media sociology.

© 2010 Broadcast Education Association Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 54(2), 2010, pp. 179–193DOI: 10.1080/08838151003737972 ISSN: 0883-8151 print/1550-6878 online

179

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position triumphs. 3) Realist stories often come with actor-centered functionalism,

i.e., ‘‘the claim that a particular [policy] exists because it is expected to serve the

interests of those who created it’’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 105). 4) A realist approach can

be ill-equipped to explain unintended consequences, such as appear to be the case

in the emergence of policy favoring the two broadcast networks, NBC and CBS.

This study represents a departure from realism by offering a cultural, historical

explanation for a policy outcome. A cultural, historical explanation has theoretical,

methodological, and empirical challenges. Hence this study takes up a modest

empirical study as a means of exploring the difficulties that come with cultural

explanation. Attention to historical origins is an important step in understanding

subsequent media or regulatory operation. This particular historical outcome, how

policy created a dominant on-air presence for the NBC and CBS networks, had

important implications for the emergence of advertising-supported broadcasting and

for the relative narrowness of broadcast political viewpoint diversity (see Benjamin,

2001).

Cultural Explanation

Much changed in the 35 years since Carey (1974) argued that media historians

needed to take culture more seriously. Although Hardt concluded 20 years ago that

media histories were still largely ‘‘devoid of social, cultural, or political contexts’’

(1989, p. 116), that assessment is less true today. Nevertheless, how media historians

should invoke culture remains an unsettled question. In fact, some resisted the

theoretical turn that cultural historians represent (McPherson, 2005). The cultural

studies tradition emphasized culture as context, as a web or system of meanings, or,

as Williams (1958) put it, culture is a whole way of life. Notable social or cultural

histories of media emerged from this tradition. For example, Schudson’s (1978)

history of the rise of objectivity as a journalistic norm, and Marchand’s (1985)

history of the ascent of advertising located their objects of study within cultural

systems—culture does not simply create objectivity or advertising, objectivity and

advertising help constitute culture.

As we think about culture in these ways a number of related issues arise: How

systematic or coherent is this culture? While it may indeed be context, might culture

be understood as an autonomous dimension of social life, and thus as a causal factor

in other aspects of social life? How does culture relate to others dimensions of social

life, and subsequently to other explanatory factors? While some might insist on a

cultural studies orthodoxy that precludes serious consideration of culture as cause,

Bonnell and Hunt (1999) argue that such questions make a valuable contribution

to the study of culture and society.

Culture is frequently understood in terms of its coherence—as a system of shared

meanings (Geertz, 1973), or a ‘‘system of patterned values, meanings, and beliefs

that give cognitive structure to the world’’ (Smelser, 1992, p. 11). For example,

political historians refer to the ‘‘American creed’’ as a uniquely American set of

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values, ideas, and attitudes regarding, among other things, democratic participation

in public life. Thus, according to Huntington, political actors’ perceptions are shaped

‘‘by the ideological climate and the common political values and purposes that they

all recognize as legitimate’’ (1981, p. 11). Huntington conceptualizes culture as

relatively coherent—a coherence based on an underlying ideology. An examination

of the relationship between ideology and culture brings into focus what sort of

claims can be made about the systematic, coherent nature of culture, and the

methodological challenges inherent in positing a cultural explanation.

Swidler refers to ideology as ‘‘explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning

systems’’ (1986, p. 278). Culture, on the other hand, is ‘‘not a unified system.’’

As Swidler argues, ‘‘all real cultures contain diverse, often conflicting symbols,

rituals, stories, and guides to action’’ (p. 277). For Swidler, diversity depends on

cultural settledness. In a settled period, an ideology won out and became intertwined

with cultural practices and institutions. Because active efforts to establish a cultural

system faded and were never particularly successful in articulating a fully systematic

culture in the first place, cultural practices may become more diverse and thus less

closely in line with an ideology. Here, according to Swidler, culture provides a

toolkit of various ‘‘cultural elements’’ to ‘‘construct diverse strategies of action’’

(1986, p. 281).

Swidler’s definition of culture has important implications for cultural explanation.

Culture is not understood as a national or system-wide phenomenon often invoked

to round out historical narratives. For example, Rosen’s (1980) account of why

policy came to support a commercial broadcast system in the 1930s and not a

government subsidized system, such as the BBC in Britain, concludes that American

exceptionalism explains the outcome: ‘‘Any attempt to criticize or challenge the

arrangement represented a direct assault on the larger society as well as a rejection of

the nation’s past. The favored sons rejected demands by noncommercial broadcast-

ers for special privileges and government intervention because these modifications

stood outside the American heritage’’ (Rosen, 1980, p. 181).

Rosen’s explanation is problematic for at least two reasons. First, invoking cul-

ture in this way requires ignoring relevant empirical details. The U.S. Navy, the

Agriculture Department, the Education Department, and the Post Office, were all

broadcasters in the early years of radio. State and municipal governments were

also broadcasters. At the First and Second National Radio Conferences chaired by

Commerce Secretary Hoover, government broadcasters received favored status, and

commercial broadcasters were relegated to the lowest status (see Second National

Radio Conference, 1923, pp. 9–13). Not only was government subsidized broad-

casting within the American heritage, the eventual favored position of commercial

broadcasting represented a complete reversal in policy positions. Second, if culture

is system-wide, if it is a constant, it has little value in explanations that are not

explicitly comparative across systems. The point that culture is context is used to

argue that culture cannot be abstracted from the social world and then posited as a

causal force (Carey, 1989). As Geertz argued, ‘‘Culture is not a power, something to

which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed;

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it is context’’ (1973, p. 14). Other social theorists disagree, and show how Geertz

does not escape offering causal explanations (Biernacki, 1999; Schneider, 1993).

Sewell argues that culture is indeed autonomous from other dimensions of social

life, but that these social dimensions ‘‘mutually shape and constrain each other’’

(1999, p. 48). Cohen (1974) argues that the quarrel with causation is based on a

mechanical, rather than a dialectical, notion of causation. In positing a dialectical

form of causation, Cohen argues for the autonomy, but also the interdependence, of

politics and culture. Thus, while the political and cultural orders are autonomous,

they ‘‘are interdependent in such a way that a change in the one is likely to affect

the relation between the two’’ (Cohen, 1974, p. 36). Sewell argues that if culture’s

coherence is ‘‘thin’’ and culture is an autonomous dimension of social life, then

historical, cultural studies may provide both interpretation and explanation, and

concludes that ‘‘culture is not a coherent system of symbols and meanings but a

diverse collection of ‘tools’ that, as the metaphor indicates, are to be understood

as means for the performance of action. Because these tools are discrete, local,

and intended for specific purposes, they can be developed as explanatory variables

in a way that culture conceived as a translocal, generalized system of meanings

cannot’’ (1999, p. 46). Culture, therefore, provides important variation that can

explain alternative policy positions within a nation or system. Thorny theoretical

issues remain once culture is accepted as cause.

Biernacki (1999) sees a fundamental problem in how most cultural historians ex-

plain historical outcomes. On the one hand, they treat ‘‘culture as ultimate ground,’’

whereby all aspects of social life are part of the ‘‘all-encompassing’’ cultural world.

On the other hand, cultural historians often ‘‘leave the explanations of outcomes

in particular settings to other demographic, economic, or political logics’’ (p. 67).

But if culture is accepted as an aspect of the larger social world rather than the

‘‘ground’’ of that world, Biernacki’s assessment can be turned around. Culture can

be engaged ‘‘on the same plane as other elements,’’ and as a logic of explanation in

particular settings (p. 64). Demographic, economic, and political explanations may

invoke culture to answer particular questions. The study at hand attempts just such

an explanation—it complements other theoretically informed work. For example,

McChesney (1993) drew on political economy for a comprehensive history of how

corporate interests came to control U.S. broadcasting. It is a story of government

actors creating the broadcasting system that corporate interests demanded. In some

of the particulars, however, it may read as a realist story or as actor-centered

functionalism. For example, the story tells how the NBC network paid expenses for

national education leaders it courted with free airtime to come to Washington to

testify at FCC hearings. The leaders spoke of the efficiency of network broadcasters

and the seeming inability of educators to capably manage their own stations. But

why was this testimony so effective in helping the networks get what they wanted?

Cultural explanations, with their focus on legitimizing discourse, help answer such

particular questions.

Rosen (1980) is correct that culture is central to legitimation. In other words,

cultural values, attitudes, and ideas bound the agency of the central actors in the

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historical drama. As Dobbin concludes about the role of culture in policy debate,

‘‘Strong interest groups lose political battles all the time, and it is often because

political culture offers their opponents compelling arguments and offers them little

in the way of rebuttal’’ (1994, p. 221). Thus, a cultural explanation differs from

realism—as the 2003 defeat of a change in media ownership rules demonstrates

(McChesney, 2004) powerful interests do not always get their way. Unexpected

outcomes are possible.

The logic of culture’s influence on early broadcast policy is that the agency of

social actors is bound by their cultural environment. Some policy options appear as

the natural and correct way to proceed given prevailing cultural values, attitudes,

and ideas. As Geertz (1973) puts it, culture provides both constraints and opportuni-

ties. Cohen (1974) offers a slightly different take on the explanatory logic of culture.

‘‘The constraints that culture exerts on the individual come ultimately not from the

culture itself, but from the collectivity of the group’’ (Cohen, 1974, p. 85). Here,

culture is a tool used for persuasion or coercion. ‘‘Political entrepreneurs recognize

that through appeals to culture they can easily attract a mass following’’ (Laitin,

1986, p. 11). Cohen’s approach suggests that powerful actors are bound only in as

much as they are required to offer some persuasive cultural rhetoric to cover for

their own interests, and argues that political entrepreneurs can be as successful as

they are because ‘‘(s)ymbols have no fixed meaning’’ (1974, p. 84). For example,

every side in a policy dispute might invoke ‘‘the public interest’’ as a cultural value,

but since it has no fixed meaning it is really just rhetorical cover for powerful actors

to achieve their own ends. Not all actors have their agency bound in the same way.

Cohen’s approach to culture presents a methodological challenge. Is it possible to

discern when the invocation of cultural values or ideas is rhetorical cover, or when

culture is rewarding the most fit policy option? If powerful actors do not entirely

get their way, it suggests that their agency may indeed be bound. If some cultural

values, attitudes, or ideas prove fixed across time and across policy debates, then

they are obviously not as mutable as Cohen suggests. Likewise, if some cultural

values, attitudes, and ideas play a role in policy debates from the beginning of a

lengthy, perhaps even multi-year debate, and perhaps before clear battle lines are

even drawn, then it seems unlikely that they are mere rhetorical cover.

In the empirical study that follows, the historical record is examined for the

specific cultural values, attitudes, and ideas that are raised in policy discussions in

the periods leading up to passage of the Radio Act of 1927 (‘‘Radio Act,’’ 1927) and

the Communications Act of 1934 (‘‘Communications Act,’’ 1934). Attention is paid

to when they are used and how consistently they are used. The primary sources

for the policy discussion are proceedings from four national radio conferences,

congressional hearings, the congressional record of debate in the U.S. House and

Senate, annual reports of the Federal Radio Commission, the trade press, and the

popular press.

A primary investigation of all values, attitudes, and ideas of the 1920s and 1930s

is impractical. Ultimately the researcher must admit to inference from and inter-

pretation of limited data. Nevertheless, some additional steps may be taken to

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help elaborate causal cultural factors. For instance, one can look for those causal

factors that are identified in other, contemporaneous policy and issue settings. Here,

an examination of secondary literature is important to compare the researcher’s

inferences and interpretations to those that have withstood scholarly, communal

cross examination.

Explaining Policy on Networks

Delegates at the First National Radio Conference in 1922 agreed that radio stations

should be licensed for broadcast to a limited geographical area. The delegates

specified that no station should ‘‘be allowed to use unlimited power because of

the fact that this will limit the number of services which can be rendered within

a given area to an undesirable extent’’ (To Amend the Radio Act of 1912, 1923,

p. 35). However, Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, among others, pushed for a

national broadcast capability as early as 1924. Hoover advocated interconnection

of broadcast stations to create a national radio audience. Hoover’s plan differed

from a plan put forward by RCA’s David Sarnoff, who saw a central role for

so-called superstations. Interconnection already occurred by 1924 without high-

powered stations, thanks to the efforts of AT&T. Hoover made little secret of his

support for the growing efforts at interconnection. His reaction to superstations was

guarded.

From the viewpoint of nation-wide broadcasting, the question becomes one as towhether we should aim to cover a large territory through a single powerful stationor through a number of interconnected smaller ones. We must not stifle progress,but there are vital reasons why we must not do anything that will interfere with theprograms of local stations. (Third National Radio Conference, 1924, p. 6)

By the time congressional committees discussed radio legislation in 1926, the

National Broadcasting Company already started delivering on the promise of a

national programming service. In fact, NBC, created after RCA bought AT&T’s

broadcast properties, was so successful in providing programming to the nation

that some in Congress questioned if national coverage was too expansive. Senator

Dill touted letters from radio listeners complaining that ‘‘the ordinary receiving set

that reaches out any distance is unable to get anything but that one [NBC] program’’

(Radio Control, 1926, p. 123). Policymakers voiced concern that the dominance of

networks limited the diversity of voices on the air. In the end, legislation said little

about the networks and their ability to dominate the airwaves.

Section 4 of the Radio Act of 1927 directed the Federal Radio Commission to

establish station classifications and zones of radio service. The same section gave

the FRC authority to deal with stations that were part of broadcast chains or networks

(‘‘Radio Act,’’ 1927). The FRC used its authority to license not only local stations, but

also to create clear channel stations, i.e., stations that broadcast to a larger region

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and, during the evening hours, broadcast without interference from the myriad of

smaller stations, which were required to go off the air. These clear channel stations

overwhelmingly were affiliated with NBC. Hence, the FRC helped create a de facto

national broadcast service.

One legislative attempt (H.R. 9108) to protect local and regional broadcasting

took the form of a proposal to guarantee at least one radio license for each state.

Later, lawmakers planned to divide the country into five broadcast regions and

specified that licenses should be evenly distributed among the regions. The so-

called Davis Amendment to the Radio Act, added in March 1928, also directed the

FRC to ‘‘make a fair and equitable allocation of licenses, of bands of frequency or

wave lengths, of periods of time for operation, and of station power to each of the

States’’ (Federal Radio Commission, 1928, p. 11). The amendment came in response

to the FRC’s actions, which many in Congress saw as favoring the network stations.

The FRC denied that chain stations were treated favorably or singled out for the

clear channel assignments. The commission said its criteria for assigning stations to

the ‘‘preferred positions’’ was ‘‘their individual history and standing, their popularity

with their audiences, the quality of their apparatus, and their faithful observance of

radio rules of the air’’ (Federal Radio Commission, 1928, p. 21).

Policymakers did not expressly intend to create a broadcast order dominated by

commercial networks. In fact, legislative attempts were made to limit the network’s

preferred position. So why did regulators ultimately create a preferred place for NBC

and CBS in America’s broadcast spectrum? No doubt, several factors played a role.

However, two cultural values, professionalism and voluntarism, are explored for

their explanatory import. Other values certainly played a role (e.g., values of national

unity and regionalism). Nevertheless, the values of professionalism and voluntarism

emerge in the analysis of policy discussion and, as the analysis will show, played a

role in the legitimacy claims of key actors. Both pro-network and anti-network

interests invoked these values from a cultural toolkit. In some arguments these

values seemed to conflict and in some ways, complementary. The following analysis

reveals how these values shaped the policy debate and were used to favor one

regulatory outcome over another.

Supporters of network dominance included the ‘‘Four Horsemen of the Air’’—

AT&T, General Electric, Westinghouse, and RCA. They were the same group who

eventually supported the commercial development of broadcasting and advertising

as radio’s means of financial support. The opponents of network dominance were an

amalgam of universities, schools, churches, civic groups, political organizations, and

newspapers. They typically saw broadcasting as an outgrowth of their mission and

often opposed advertising on the grounds that it diluted that work. From a distance,

the fight may appear skewed from the outset. While the corporations certainly

were powerful, many of the opponents of network dominance, particularly the

universities, political organizations, and newspapers, possessed power and access

to decision makers.

According to Tocqueville (Tocqueville & Reeve, 2000), America was a nation that

valued voluntary organizations and associations. The industrial revolution awakened

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in Americans an appreciation for and the practice of professionalism. Americans

valued both professionalism and voluntarism, and for the most part these two values

coexisted peaceably. However, when it came to broadcast policy, these same two

values pulled policymakers in different directions.

Professionalism. Policymakers valued professionalism whether in government ad-

ministration, in industrial management, or in broadcast operations. Professional-

ism as a cultural value gained in currency since the industrial age. Skowronek

(1982) associates professionalism with the industrial transformation of American life

following the Civil War. ‘‘New communities of intellectual competence—socially

differentiated and internally ordered—were heralded in broad-ranging movements

to establish formal professional associations, to upgrade standards of professional

recruitment and practice, and to build universities that would train specialists and

define expertise’’ (Skowronek, 1982, p. 43). The success of industry, or any pro-

fessional endeavor, required an intellectual workforce that prized efficiency and

rationality.

Secretary Hoover leaned on the so-called radio trust for advice and for govern-

ment-sponsored experiments by invoking their professionalism. McChesney (1993)

and Slotten (2000) believed that industry engineers brought recommendations to

policymakers that favored their own industry and employers. However, Hoover

and others needed to justify their deference to the broadcast manufacturers. Hoover

argued that if experts who worked for the regulated industries were not allowed

to confer with the Commerce Department, ‘‘some of the men best recognized for

their public interest and public enlightenment in the art should be precluded from

being consulted on problems connected to the industry’’ (To Amend the Radio Act

of 1912, 1923, p. 42). A year later, Hoover applauded the engineering contributions

of AT&T and Westinghouse in bringing about the interconnection of radio stations.

‘‘We owe a debt of gratitude to those who have blazed the way’’ (Third National

Radio Conference, 1924, p. 4).

The industry touted its own professional intentions. RCA described its goal as

fostering the ‘‘scientific development of the art’’ (To Amend the Radio Act of 1912,

1923, p. 59). The radio corporations also had some of the best university researchers

and engineers on their side. For example, Columbia University professor Michael

Pupin spoke strongly against government involvement in radio’s development and

strongly for the central role of radio’s ‘‘parents,’’ i.e., the radio corporations (Radio

Communication, 1917, p. 154).

As Slotten (2000) concludes, policymakers could defer to a technocratic ratio-

nale for policy decisions because of the professional status of broadcast engineers.

Whether invoking a cultural value of professionalism was a cynical means of cov-

ering for industry favoritism or whether it was a genuine belief in the dispassionate,

technical advice of professionals, the fact remains that professionalism carried cul-

tural credibility as a rhetorical strategy.

In fact, the commercial radio interests cultivated their professional status. The new

radio industry established professional associations such as the National Association

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of Broadcasters and the National Radio Chamber of Commerce in the early 1920s.

The latter organization described its membership as ‘‘manufacturers, as well as a

number of engineers and professional people’’ (To Amend the Radio Act of 1912,

1923, p. 23). Noncommercial broadcasters would also seek to form associations,

although not until later, e.g., the National Committee on Education by Radio formed

in late 1930 (Muller, 1932). This came after the time when broadcast policy had

already come to favor national networks.

Broadcasters touted their own professionalism in managing their operations. For

example, the manager of WJZ told how programs needed to be prepared well in

advance and with great care, and concluded, ‘‘Great skill is required to arrange

properly balanced programs’’ (‘‘Radio showmen,’’ 1925, p. XX 15). Broadcasters

also cited their management expertise and their ‘‘sound financial and sales policies’’

(‘‘Opera stars,’’ 1925). Policymakers took note. During the Third National Radio

Conference in 1924, Secretary Hoover congratulated broadcasters for programming

more than just phonograph recordings. ‘‘Program directing has become one of the

skilled professions’’ (Third National Radio Conference, 1924, p. 3).

Secretary Hoover used the radio conferences to exhort broadcasters to deliver the

‘‘greatest music and entertainment’’ possible to listeners. When the large broadcast-

ing organizations later appeared at congressional hearings, the broadcasters pointed

to the professional quality of their entertainment programming. The broadcasters

claimed to offer ‘‘concerts broadcast by the great artists of our day’’ (To Regulate

Radio Communication, 1926, p. 143). The same broadcasters could claim that

smaller stations, or stations in rural areas, did not have the same ‘‘character of

service’’ (To Regulate Radio Communication, 1926, p. 144). One station manager

concluded that ‘‘few broadcasters could maintain a staff of professional entertainers

sufficiently good, large and versatile’’ without the support of advertising (‘‘Few

letters,’’ 1926, p. XX 18).

For the most part, policy said little about what or how broadcasters should

program. The Commerce Department acknowledged in 1924 that a station was

free to ‘‘entertain or educate a certain class of people’’ (Third National Radio

Conference, 1924, p. 19). But delegates to the Fourth National Radio Conference in

1925 agreed that the public interest was best served by ‘‘a meritorious program of

entertainment and educational nature’’ (Fourth National Radio Conference, 1925,

p. 18). The professional quality of stations’ broadcast programming was duly noted

by regulators. For example, the FRC stated it renewed licenses for those stations that

exhibited engineering excellence and ‘‘good programs’’ (Federal Radio Commission,

1928, p. 154).

Thus, when the Federal Radio Commission created a broadcast order through the

renewal or revocation of licenses, commissioners frequently invoked the broadcast-

ers’ professionalism or lack of professionalism. For example, the FRC lauded the

professional judgment of ‘‘program directors of broadcasting stations who, for the

sake of the popularity and standing of their stations, will select entertainment and

educational features according to the needs and desires of their invisible audiences’’

(Federal Radio Commission, 1929, pp. 32–33).

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188 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media/June 2010

Hence, when dealing with broadcasting, policymakers cited the professionalism

of industry engineers in lending advice on issues such as frequency allocations.

Policymakers cited the professionalism of commercial broadcast managers in ra-

tionalizing a business plan to support radio. And, policymakers cited the profes-

sionalism of commercial radio programmers in providing listeners with high quality

entertainment.

Voluntarism. Policymakers and regulators also prized the spirit of voluntarism

that was vital to American civic life. According to Kaufman, ‘‘Americans formed

and joined thousands of voluntary organizations in the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, thus creating a landscape of social and economic associations

without precedent’’ (2002, p. 3). America’s reliance on voluntary organizations, by

some accounts, was ‘‘the quintessential American contribution to the democratic

idea’’ (Hall, 1992, p. 13). Voluntarism also played a role in the development of

American broadcasting. So-called radio amateurs tinkered with radio when it was

a form of point to point communication and helped radio become broadcasting

by making ‘‘listening in’’ a fad (Barnouw, 1966). Later, voluntary organizations

acquired radio licenses and offered broadcast programming.

Secretary Hoover lauded those schools, churches, government agencies, and

civic organizations, ‘‘which may be said to operate from more altruistic motives’’

(Third National Radio Conference, 1924, p. 7). As was the case with voluntary

associations in general, the moral value of voluntarism rested on its perceived

altruism. Voluntary organizations were associated with brotherhood, mutual aid,

cooperation, and community (Kaufman, 2002). Churches and civic organizations

claimed they were not in broadcasting to get rich, but to help advance the public

good. For example, a noncommercial New York radio station announced at its

opening that its purpose was ‘‘solely for service of the public,’’ and that it had

nothing to do with ‘‘manufacturing or advertising interests’’ (‘‘New station,’’ 1925,

p. XX 14).

Advocates of noncommercial broadcasting laid claim to voluntaristic, and hence

American, values. The noncommercial broadcasters, as their name suggests, iden-

tified themselves in opposition to commercial radio stations. Commercial stations

were ill-suited to operate in the public interest given their role in extolling the private

interests of advertisers. Noncommercial broadcasters, on the other hand, claimed a

true affinity with the public interest (‘‘New station,’’ 1925).

Nevertheless, policy and radio leaders offered a variety of visions for the role of

voluntary organizations and the voluntaristic spirit in American broadcasting. In the

end, policymakers could embrace voluntarism without embracing noncommercial

broadcasters and the broadcast order the noncommercial stations advocated.

Radio stations made their facilities available to publicly minded, civic organiza-

tions. For example, Rotary clubs used radio broadcasts in 1923 to spread information

about citizenship to audiences around the country (‘‘Editorial,’’ 1923). Political

and civic groups used radio, and other media, to carry out a ‘‘get out the vote’’

drive (‘‘Get out the vote,’’ 1924). This history of service to voluntary organizations

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Vos/EARLY BROADCAST POLICY 189

was duly noted by the Federal Radio Commission, which favored general interest

stations and argued that such stations provided time to special interest or civic

organizations. Indeed, in granting a license renewal to WGL in New Jersey, the

FRC commended that station for extending ‘‘its facilities to the American Legion,

the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the National Surety League, and similar organizations.

During the year, it also made a showing of support from various civic organizations.’’

Likewise, WBBW in Virginia was lauded for providing airtime to ‘‘various clubs

and organizations’’ from local high schools (Federal Radio Commission, 1928,

p. 159).

As Kaufman points out, voluntary associations claimed interest in the common

good but were also exclusivist. Voluntarism ‘‘was motivated by the desire for ex-

clusive social outlets that would allow individuals of different genders, races, eth-

nicities, and birthplaces to socialize in private, self-segregated groups’’ (Kaufman,

2002, p. 8). This exclusivist character of voluntary organizations became a factor in

the debate over frequency allocation. For example, noncommercial station WHAP,

which claimed to be non-sectarian and non-political, was later called before the

FRC to account for its anti-Catholic and anti-Governor Al Smith broadcasts (‘‘Tells

of fighting Smith,’’ 1927). The FRC labeled these noncommercial broadcasters as

propaganda stations—the opposite of the favored general interest stations. ‘‘(T)here

is no room for the operation of broadcasting stations exclusively by or in the private

interests of individuals or groups so far as the nature of the programs is concerned’’

(Federal Radio Commission, 1929, p. 34).

As early as the Second National Radio Conference in 1923, delegates saw that

small organizations with limited resources faced challenges in employing profes-

sional engineering, professional management, and professional entertainers. The

delegates suggested a solution by ‘‘consolidation in each locality’’ (Second National

Radio Conference, 1923). In other words, voluntary organizations should pool their

resources as a means of better achieving professional standards. The FRC came to

similar conclusions, but was less optimistic about the positive role of the voluntary

organizations.

While political organizations were a form of voluntary association, they claimed

little of the positive, altruistic spirit of voluntarism in the 1920s. Political parties

and groups were seen as divisive factions that put their own partisan goals ahead

of the public good (Skowronek, 1982). The Progressive movement saw parties as

the problem, and professionalism, in the form of bureaucracies, as the solution. The

FRC saw it much the same way—politically oriented broadcasters were propaganda

stations, ill suited to serve the public interest (Federal Radio Commission, 1929).

The uniquely American character of voluntarism lay in its opposition to gov-

ernment initiatives. Voluntarism did not just supplement government; it supplanted

government. Voluntary cooperation was a form of social organization and self-

government achieved outside of government. One of the foremost advocates of this

brand of voluntarism was Herbert Hoover. In his 1922 book, American Individ-

ualism, Hoover championed the role of voluntary associations in community life,

based on the altruism and mutual cooperation of enlightened leaders and managers.

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190 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media/June 2010

Government’s role was to foster or nurture such associations. Hoover argued that

government should be ‘‘committed to nourishing individualism and local initiative

rather than supplanting them’’ (Hoover, 1922, p. 143).

When Hoover repeated his vision of voluntarism in his inaugural address in 1929,

much of what he said could have been describing his dealings with radio: ‘‘Progress

is born of cooperation in the community—not from governmental restraints. The

government should assist and encourage these movements of collective self-help

by itself cooperating with them’’ (Hoover, 1929). What was notable about Hoover’s

idea of voluntarism was its close ties to professionalism. The legitimacy of vol-

untarism required professional managers who embodied ‘‘a spirit of community

responsibility’’ (Hoover, 1922, p. 38).

Voluntarism and professionalism were not inherently at odds. However, as radio

developed in the 1920s, competing visions of broadcasting emerged. Churches,

civic groups, and other voluntary associations entered into broadcasting to provide

a forum for everything from speeches and talks to local music and entertainment.

In most cases, radio was like any other platform, stage, or tree stump—it was

a venue for doing what the voluntary associations did (‘‘Preaches to 500,000,’’

1922). Meanwhile, radio manufacturers and retailers put forth radio, not just as

a technology, but as a new and unique social institution. An important social

institution required professionalism—professional management, professional talent,

and a professional character.

When the FRC weighed which stations should be favored in the broadcast hier-

archy and which should be edged out of existence, the most professional won out.

The FRC made an important association: network stations were more professional

than stations run by voluntary organizations. The FRC concluded: ‘‘By and large,

furthermore, propaganda stations do not have the financial resources nor do they

have the standing and popularity with the public necessary to obtain the best

results in programs of general interest’’ (Federal Radio Commission, 1929, p. 34).

Meanwhile, the FRC disputed noncommercial broadcasters’ exclusive claims to

voluntaristic values. The FRC concluded commercial stations could and did support

those very voluntary organizations that many believed made America so strong. The

FRC may be faulted for being less than rational in its arguments. For example, it

does not give a clear answer as to why advertising should not also be considered a

form of propaganda, inconsistent with the general, public interest. But rationality is

beside the point—by embracing the value of professionalism, regulators embraced

commercial, general interest broadcasting, whether it was rational or not. And by

embracing commercial, general interest broadcasting, regulators cleared the way

for a broadcast spectrum dominated by the two broadcast networks.

Conclusion

This study explored the challenges that come with forging a cultural explanation

for a particular policy outcome. By theorizing culture as a toolkit of discrete values,

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Vos/EARLY BROADCAST POLICY 191

attitudes, and ideas, two specific cultural values were explored for their role in

bounding the agency of various actors. The ability of the ‘‘Four Horsemen of the

Air’’ to embrace both professionalism and voluntarism helped lead to a policy that

favored broadcast networks. The inability of opponents of the networks to appeal

early on to the value of professionalism limited their legitimacy. Their appeal to

voluntarism exposed the dual character of the value—when seen as altruistic it

advanced their cause, but it could also be understood as exclusivist.

As noted at the outset, cultural explanation addresses particular questions, and

thus is best for supplementing institutional or material arguments. There can be

little doubt institutional and material factors amassed to put networks in a powerful

position; e.g., the federal government had a hand in RCA’s command of broadcast

patents, and the Commerce Department’s choice to fund early experiments by RCA

and AT&T helped establish their professional credentials, which became valuable to

their later legitimacy. There were no doubt additive effects from other legitimizing

cultural values. Tapping into values of national unity, network advocates pointed to

the network’s penetration of provincial and sectional barriers, and the FRC noted that

its allocation plans helped craft a ‘‘national’’ service (Federal Radio Commission,

1928, p. 17).

Realist explanations see a powerful interest—the radio corporations who later

founded the first networks—getting their own way. But, it should be noted that

they faced real opposition from other powerful interests. The universities, schools,

churches, civic groups, political organizations, and newspapers involved in broad-

casting opposed the radio corporations and a policy that came to favor networks.

Lawmakers expressed skepticism about the emerging networks and sought modest

legislation to limit their reach. Hence, a realist explanation begs the question of

why one group proved more powerful than others, and how it came to get its

way. In the face of this opposition, the corporations invoked the cultural values

of professionalism and a voluntaristic spirit to support their legitimacy. They did

this early and often—their opponents did so late and infrequently. Proponents and

opponents of networks both stood within the American heritage, but ultimately both

did not have the same access to the legitimating power of the American cultural

toolkit.

The value in a cultural approach is that it offers another layer of historical expla-

nation and thus aids in the larger project of theory building. How did cultural factors

enter into other policy outcomes? How did equal access provisions of the Radio Act

of 1927 pass in face of the opposition from the same powerful groups that seemed

to get their way in the case of network dominance? Answers to those questions help

us see more clearly how the agency of actors is bound. Future research will need to

explore other values, attitudes, and ideas, such as nationalism and regionalism, and

how they may have interacted with the values of professionalism and voluntarism.

A longer narrative could also better account for the ways in which professionalism

and voluntarism were invoked in contemporaneous policy debates. Nevertheless,

this study put forward a cultural explanation for an important policy outcome and

represents a tentative step forward in the project of building theory.

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192 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media/June 2010

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