Risk Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 12, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01637.x

A Cross-Cultural Study of Perceived Benefit Versus Risk asMediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship

Nicolas C. Bronfman1,! and Esperanza Lopez Vazquez2

Several recent studies have identified the significant role social trust in regulatory organiza-tions plays in the public acceptance of various technologies and activities. In a cross-culturalinvestigation, the current work explores empirically the relationship between social trust inmanagement authorities and the degree of public acceptability of hazards for individuals re-siding in either developed or emerging Latin American economies using confirmatory ratherthan exploratory techniques. Undergraduates in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile and the UnitedStates and Spain assessed trust in regulatory authorities, public acceptance, personal knowl-edge, and the risks and benefits for 23 activities and technological hazards. Four findingswere encountered. (i) In Latin American nations trust in regulatory entities was stronglyand significantly (directly as well as indirectly) linked with the public’s acceptance of anyactivity or technology. In developed countries trust and acceptability are essentially linkedindirectly (through perceived risk and perceived benefit). (ii) Lack of knowledge strength-ened the magnitude and statistical significance of the trust-acceptability relationship in bothdeveloped and developing countries. (iii) For high levels of claimed knowledge, the impacton the trust-acceptability relationship varied depending upon the origin of the sample. (iv)Confirmatory analysis revealed the relative importance of perceived benefit over perceivedrisk in meditating the trust-acceptability causal chain.

KEY WORDS: Acceptability; Latin American economies; Mediation analysis; Social trust

1. INTRODUCTION

Interest in conducting studies to help understandpublic attitudes toward risk and levels of social trustin the face of varying technology rose to prominenceduring the course of the 1980s. During that time,a number of industrial disasters resulted in publicoutcry to ensure better ways of monitoring, control-ling, and managing risks in order to protect ordi-

1Engineering Sciences Department, Universidad Andres Bello,Santiago, Chile.

2Faculty of Psychology, Universidad Autonoma del Estado deMorelos, Mexico.

!Address correspondence to Nicolas C. Bronfman, Engineer-ing Sciences Department, Universidad Andres Bello, AvenidaRepublica 237, Santiago, Chile; tel: 00-562-6618644; fax: 00-562-6615833; nbronfman@unab.cl.

nary citizens. Notable examples in Latin America in-clude the explosion at the gas storage and distribu-tion plant in San Juan Ixhuatepec (Mexico, 1984)—600 deaths, 2,500 injured—and the oil spill and sub-sequent fire at Cubatao (Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1984) thatcaused 508 deaths and destroyed the entire city.(1)

These events attracted the attention of the world atlarge(2) because they highlighted deficiencies in LatinAmerican countries’ safety systems. Shortly after-wards, what are probably the biggest industrial disas-ters on record occurred: the chemical leak at Bhopal(India, 1984) and the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl(Ukraine, 1986).

Industrial accidents are no longer the exclusivepreserve of undeveloped countries. Social trust in nu-merous technologies and their respective regulatoryorganizations is now being questioned, and as public

1919 0272-4332/11/0100-1919$22.00/1 C" 2011 Society for Risk Analysis

1920 Bronfman and Vazquez

acceptance of such technologies diminishes, new riskmonitoring, control, and regulating techniques aredesigned and implemented. Progress in safety sys-tems does not advance at the same pace around theworld, however. Less developed countries usuallylack the financial resources and political will to im-prove their safety systems and thereby minimize thesocial vulnerability of those most exposed.

The current study explores similarities and dif-ferences between developed and emerging LatinAmerican countries concerning acceptability levelsof numerous activities and technologies, and the ex-tent of social trust conferred on the regulatory bodiesinvolved. The goal is to shed light on the public’s so-cial and psychological response mechanisms regard-ing the differing activities and technologies they face.

1.1 Trust, Perceived Risk, and Acceptability

Several researchers argue the case that trust inregulatory entities is strongly linked with the pub-lic’s risk and acceptability judgments of numeroustechnologies.(3#13) The most commonly cited inter-pretation explaining relationships between trust, riskperception, and acceptability is the causal model oftrust,(12) which Eiser et al. (14) labeled the “causalchain account of trust.” This stance assumes accep-tance of technology (particularly of new technology)is, by and large, based on public perceptions of asso-ciated risks, and that these perceptions of risk are,in turn, influenced by public trust in entities pro-moting and/or regulating the technology in ques-tion.(5#7,14#18)

An alternative position is that trust in regulatoryinstitutions could be a consequence rather than thecause of public attitudes to the activity or technologyin question. Eiser et al.(14) called this interpretationthe “associationist’s view of trust.” Here, “perceivedrisk is not so much a cause as an indicator or ex-pression of attitude . . . Individuals opposed to certaintechnology or an activity regard it as more dangerousthan those who support its development . . . Likewise,people with more favorable attitudes toward a cer-tain piece of technology might be more inclined totrust safety assurances, compared to individuals whohold negative attitudes.”

To compare the two trust models, Eiser et al.performed secondary analyses of three previous pub-lic perception studies covering a range of food tech-nologies. The first study considered 184 participantsfrom Reading, United Kingdom; the second study in-volved 160 U.K. residents; while the third study can-

vassed 260 respondents from Manchester, England,and Cardiff, Wales. Their results found more supportfor the associationist view, in that controlling accep-tance of technology tends to eliminate or markedlyreduce positive correlations between trust and riskperceptions.

Poortinga and Pidgeon(12) devised three studiesspecifically to test whether perceived risk mediatesrelationships between trust and acceptability, or if ac-ceptability dictates trust and perceived risk of GMfood. Data from the first study came from a large-scale British survey (1,547 respondents), but only a296-respondent subsample was used and interviewedon GM food. For the second study, the data sourcewas 396 participants living in Norwich, the countytown of Norfolk (United Kingdom). Data for thethird study came from a large-scale British survey(1,363 respondents) designed to measure attitudestowards GM food. The findings offered greater sup-port for the associationist view than for the causalmodel of trust because the indirect effects of trustand acceptability (via risk perception) were muchless than the direct effects. The authors did pointout, however, that the causal trust model cannot beignored entirely because relationships between trustand perceived risk retained statistical significance ineach of the three studies when controlled for accept-ability.

1.2 Social Trust and Emerging LatinAmerican Economies

Eiser et al.(14) and Poortinga and Pidgeon(12)

compare causal and associationist models for foodtechnologies, but they overlook the impact of per-ceived benefit. Indeed, neither of these studies ben-efited from possible insights the relationships couldprovide from the four variables: risk, benefit, trust,and acceptability covering a heterogeneous group ofhazards in terms of country development.

Bronfman et al.(10) addressed this oversight byconducting a survey employing data from 539 un-dergraduates in Chile. The author assesses whethertrust in regulatory authorities is the cause (causalmodel) or a consequence (associationist model) ofpublic acceptability for a heterogeneous group ofhazards (covering both technological and environ-mental hazards), adopting the methodological frame-works developed by Eiser et al. and Poortingaand Pidgeon.(12,14) Using a web-based survey, par-ticipants rated the risks, benefits, trust in regu-latory entities, and degree of acceptability across

Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship 1921

30 environmental and technological hazards. With-out considering the magnitude of perceived risk orbenefit surrounding a given hazard, or how muchthe public claims to know about it, trust held inregulatory entities will generate or be the conse-quence of public attitudes towards a hazard. Regard-less of whether data fit either the associationist orcausal trust models, the trust-acceptability relation-ship, when controlled for perceived risk and bene-fit, remained strong and statistically significant for all30 hazards addressed. It is an interesting divergencefrom findings and models proposed in earlier stud-ies,(6,12,14,17,19) especially concerning the causal chainaccount of trust.

Two important differences arise between ear-lier works by Eiser et al.(14) and Poortinga and Pid-geon,(12) and the recent investigation of Bronfmanet al.(10) in regard to the relationships among vari-ables within the two trust models. In the firsttwo studies, the relationship between trust andacceptance in the causal model is indirect and me-diated by perceived risk, whereas in the associa-tionist view the relationship between trust and per-ceived risk is indirect and mediated by acceptance.In Bronfman et al.,(10) adding the perceived ben-efit variable to the models, the relationship be-tween trust and acceptance is both direct and in-direct (mediated by perceived risk and benefit)in the causal model. However, in the association-ist view, the relationship between trust and ac-ceptance is only direct because all the indirectmediated links between acceptability and trust arestatistically nonsignificant. Under these premises,their results revealed that whereas data for techno-logical hazards fit the causal model of trust well,data for environmental hazards fit the associationistmodel of trust particularly well.

Based on the above studies, Bronfman andLopez-Vazquez(20) developed a questionnaire forresidents of three large cities in Mexico. The primeobjective was to empirically assess the relationshipbetween social trust in national regulatory entitiesand the degree of public acceptability of hazards,considering a heterogeneous group of hazards andthe interaction between the four core variables (risk,benefit, trust, and acceptability). From the method-ology adopted in Bronfman et al.,(10) the main find-ing was that social trust retained a direct as wellas an indirect causal link (mostly through perceivedbenefit) with the degree of a hazard’s public accept-ability, independent of hazard and the magnitudeof the hazard’s perceived risk, and benefit.(20) Once

again, the relationship between social trust and ac-ceptance remained strong and each item remainedstatistically significant after controlling the relation-ship for perceived risk and benefit. One interestingresult of this study was the leading role of perceivedbenefit (rather than perceived risk) in the indirect ef-fect of trust on acceptability. This same role had beenpreviously observed by Frewer et al.(18) By explor-ing the psychological constructs underlying attitudestowards various applications of technology, and byobserving the inverse relationship between risk andbenefit judgments, these authors concluded that “aslong as a risk is not so large as to be completely intol-erable, public acceptance will be driven by perceivedbenefits.”(18)

Another interesting result of the Bronfman andLopez-Vazquez(20) study was the role that knowledgeplays in the trust-acceptability relationship: the gen-eral public relies on social trust for making accept-ability judgments when lacking information. A simi-lar role had been previously reported by Siegrist andCvetkovich.(19) They found that trust was stronglylinked to perceived risk and benefit for hazards peo-ple knew little about. However, no significant cor-relation was detected when respondents did claimknowledge of a hazard. These researchers concludedthat laypeople rely on social trust for making risk andbenefit judgments when they lack information.

In view of the above results, we wish to testthe hypothesis that in emerging Latin Americaneconomies, public trust in regulatory entities essen-tially influences acceptance of an activity or technol-ogy directly, whereas in developed nations this in-fluence is strongly mediated by perceived risk andbenefit and is, thereby, indirect.

1.3 Partial Correlations and Mediation Models

The main studies cited in the previous sectionemployed the partial correlation procedure to testtheir causal hypotheses. Using this method, threetypes of relationships were checked: (1) direct rela-tionship, when the partial correlation between vari-ables was significant, even after controlling for thirdvariables; (2) indirect relationship, when the partialcorrelation between variables was mediated (com-plete or partially) for third variables; and (3) spuri-ous relationship, when, controlled for third variables,the previous correlation considerably loses statisticalsignificance(10,20) or its magnitude.(12,14,19)

Partial correlation procedures are an efficientway of exploring any direct and indirect effects an

1922 Bronfman and Vazquez

independent variable exercises over a dependentvariable. Nevertheless, Lawrence and Jeanne(21)

point out that while partial correlation analysis cantest causal hypotheses, providing there are no over-riding specification errors, complementary confirma-tory analysis (such as path analysis and SEMs) oughtto be used to estimate causal parameters and indirectmediating effects.

Popularized by Baron and Kenny,(22) the causalsteps strategy is the most commonly used method fortesting mediation hypotheses among confirmatoryanalysis techniques. A generalization of this strategyto multiple mediators is represented by the followingequations:(23)

Y = cX + v (1)

M1 = a1 X + !1

M2 = a2 X + !2

......

Mj = a j X + ! j

(2)

Y = c$ X + b1 M1 + b2 M2 + . . . + bj Mj + v. (3)

Equation (1) represents a simple mediator estimat-ing the total effect of X on Y (path c). The effect ofX on each mediator Mj (paths ai, with i = 1, . . . , j)can be estimated from Equation (2). Both X and Mjare included in Equation (3) when they are signifi-cant predictors of Y (paths c$, bi %= 0). Unexplainedvariability for each equation is denoted by ", !i, and#, respectively. Intercepts are not shown to simplifypresentation.

1.4 Overview of the Present Study

Using the partial correlation procedure, severalresearchers have detected that trust in regulatory en-tities, perceived risk, and perceived benefit exercisestrong influence upon the public’s acceptance of dailyactivities and technologies. Some aspects have yetto be assessed, however: (i) a comparison of publicjudgments in different countries; and (ii) the mag-nitude and statistical significance of the indirect ef-fect trust has on acceptability (through the media-tors’ perceived risk and perceived benefit).

The goal of the current work is to assess thetotal direct and indirect effects social trust in reg-ulatory entities has upon public acceptability, once

ATR

PR

PB

a1 b1

b2a2

c'

ATRc

A

B

Fig. 1. Causal model hypothesized for trust-acceptability relation-ship. TR = Trust, A = Acceptability, PR = Perceived risk, PB =Perceived benefit. (A) TR affects A. (B) Multiple mediation withtwo mediators. TR is hypothesized to exert indirect effects on Athrough PR and PB.

the relationship is controlled for perceived risk andperceived benefit, across a heterogeneous set of ac-tivities and technologies from a sample of residentsin developed nations or emerging Latin Americaneconomies. Fig. 1 depicts the main model hypothe-sized for the trust-acceptability relationship.

Early works(10,20) show that data for technolog-ical hazards fit the causal model of trust well. Sincethe current work will consider essentially technolog-ical hazards, only the causal model of trust will beconsidered in the current study.

2. METHODS

2.1 Participants

For the purposes of this study, we chose univer-sity students from three emerging Latin Americaneconomies (Mexico, Chile, and Brazil) and from twodeveloped nations (the United States and Spain).

We decided to work with samples from Mex-ico, Chile, and Brazil due to ease of access to con-duct the study and because they all fall into the cate-gory of emerging economies having a “high” HumanDevelopment Index (HDI). The Human Develop-ment Report (HDR) published by the U.N. Devel-opment Programme (UNDP) cites eight Latin Amer-ican economies with high HDI: Argentina, Chile,

Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship 1923

Uruguay, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, andBrazil.(24)

The vast majority of research in this area of studyhas been conducted on samples of American citizens.For this reason, a sample from the United Stateswas also included. For a sample from the EuropeanCommunity, and taking advantage of close ties withSpanish colleagues, a sample from Spain was can-vassed for the present study.

We opted to interview university students in anattempt to obtain a homogeneous sample in terms ofage, marital status, employment situation, and per-sonal income.

A total of 539 Chilean university students wereinterviewed in late 2003. One sample involved 318students from the Chilean capital, Santiago. A sec-ond sample involved 221 students from Concepcion,Chile’s second largest city. The average age from thetwo samples was 22 years old (SD = 2.2 years) and31% were women.

A sample of 332 participants (64% women), av-erage age 21 years old (SD = 2.7 years), were sur-veyed in Mexico from January to March 2004: 132students from the city of Xalapa (Veracruz, Mexico),and 200 from the city of Puebla (Puebla, Mexico).

A total of 303 Brazilian students residing inCampina Norte (Paraıba, Brazil) were surveyed inmid-2005. The sample’s average age was 22 years old(SD = 3.7 years) with 43% women.

For the samples from developed nations, 123 stu-dents from Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania, United States)were interviewed in early 2004. The average age ofthe sample was 21 years old (SD = 3.4 years) with53% being women. Finally, a total of 129 Spanish stu-dents (64% women) from Valencia, whose averageage was 25 years old (SD = 5.8 years), were surveyedin mid-2006.

2.2 Materials

The original questionnaire listed 25 to 31 haz-ards, but only 23 were common to all countries.Differences arose from specific researcher needs.Hazards were selected from a list of those most recur-rent in risk literature or for being of specific authorinterest. Hazards common to all questionnaires werecommercial aviation, bicycles, railroads, motorcy-cles, motor vehicles, handguns, alcoholic beverages,smoking, nuclear power, solar energy, biotechnol-ogy, surgery, x-rays, cellular telephones, microwaveovens, food coloring substances, food preservatives,

chemical disinfectants, chemical fertilizers, herbi-cides, pesticides, asbestos, and antibiotics.

The Chilean survey added six environmentalhazards (climate change, greenhouse effect, ozonelayer depletion, UV radiation, atmospheric pollu-tion, and suspended particulate matter) and one localhazard (water fluoridation). The Mexican survey in-cluded, in addition to the six environmental hazardsmentioned, one natural hazard (volcanoes). Ques-tionnaires used in the other three countries featuredsome of these issues but none was common to allsamples.

The questionnaire was based on one presentedin Bronfman et al.;(10) that is, we asked participantsto make five judgments (perceived risk, perceivedbenefit, trust in national regulatory authorities, ac-ceptability, and personal knowledge) regarding the23 common activities and technologies.

Degree of social acceptability was measured byasking participants, “In general, how acceptable doyou consider each of the following items to be for so-ciety as a whole in (name of the country),” on a scaleranging from (1) “unacceptable” to (7) “acceptable.”Public trust in risk regulatory authorities was eval-uated through the following question: “In general,how much trust do you place in the national regula-tory authorities for the following activities and tech-nologies?” The scale ranged from (1) “no trust at all”to (7) “complete trust.” For social risk, participantswere asked: “In general, how risky do you considereach of the following activities and technologies forsociety as a whole in (name of the country)?” Thescale ranged from (1) “not at all risky” to (7) “veryrisky.” The following question was asked for socialbenefit: “In general, how beneficial do you considereach of the following activities and technologies tobe for society as a whole in (name of the country)?”The scale ranged from (1) “not at all beneficial” to(7) “very beneficial.” Finally, we asked participantsto declare their personal knowledge of each activityand technology by means of the following question:“In general, how much do you know about the risksand benefits associated with the following activitiesand technologies?” The scale ranged from (1) “knowalmost nothing” to (7) “know a lot.”

2.3 Procedure

Students from Chile and the United States an-swered a web-based survey. Students could an-swer the questionnaire from any computer avail-able at their university or home. From the moment

1924 Bronfman and Vazquez

interested participants agreed, they were given 1week to complete the web-based survey. On average,the questionnaire took just 20 minutes to finish.

University students from Mexico, Brazil, andSpain were contacted in person at their respec-tive universities. These participants were to file apaper-based survey. From the moment interestedparticipants agreed, they had 1 week to answer thepaper-based survey. On average, the print question-naire took 30 minutes to complete.

2.4 Data Analysis

A multiple mediator model was used to estimatethe magnitude and statistical significance of directand indirect effects that trust in regulatory authori-ties has on public acceptability of hazards. Two me-diator variables were considered: perceived risk (PR)and perceived benefit (PB). Fig. 1 depicts a causaltrust-acceptability chain model.

Simple mediation (Fig. 1A) can be expressed as:

A = cTR + v, (4)

where path c represents the total effect of trust (TR)on acceptability (A), and " the unexplained variabil-ity. The intercept is omitted to simplify presentation.

Fig. 1B shows both the direct effect of TR on Aand the indirect effects of TR on A via the mediators,PR and PB. Equation (5) estimates the effect of TRon PR (path a1) and TR on PB (path a2). Equation(6) is used to obtain the total direct effect (path c’)and to test whether the mediators PR and PB aresignificant predictors (paths b1 and b2). Unexplainedvariability for each equation is denoted !1, !2, and !,respectively. Once more, intercepts are not shown tosimplify presentation.

PR = a1TR + !1

PB = a2TR + !2(5)

A = c$TR + b1PR + b2PB + v (6)

The total indirect effect of TR on “A” via mediatorsPR and PB is estimated as the sum of its specific in-direct effects; that is, f = a1 b1 + a2 b2, while the to-tal effect of TR on “A” is the sum of the direct ef-fect and all the specific indirect effects, c = c$ + f .The total indirect effect can also be calculated (25) asc – c$. Preacher and Hayes(25) assert that multiple me-diation studies should embrace two parts: (1) inves-tigating the total indirect effect, and (2) testing hy-

potheses for individual mediators in a multiple me-diator model framework. Most methods for testingmediation hypotheses have focused on the sum ofall indirect effects, under the premise that the prod-uct is equal to the difference between the total anddirect effects. For simple mediation, the Sobel(26) z-test, also called the product-of-coefficients approachor Sobel test,(27) is the most common. It involvescomputing the ratio of ab to its estimated standarderror ($ ab). A statistically significant p value, calcu-lated in reference to the standard normal distribu-tion, supports the hypothesis of mediation. If eithera or b is not significant, there is said to be no medi-ation; therefore, all the variance in “A” attributableto TR is direct.

A multivariate extension of the z-test is availableto test hypotheses in a multiple mediator model forindividual mediators. As far as the current study’srequirements are concerned, the total indirect ef-fect for a model including two mediators is simplythe sum of the specific indirect effects—that is, f =a1b1 + a2b2. Using the method Bollen(28,29) describes,the asymptotic variance of the total indirect effect in-volving two mediators can be shown to equal the fol-lowing (for details see Bollen:(28)3

Var[ f ] = b21$

2a1

+ a21$

2b1

+ b22$

2a2

+ a22$

2b2

+ 2a1a2$b1,b2 + 2b1b2$a1,a2 , (7)

where the subscripts indicate the mediator withwhich each of the a and b coefficients is associated.The square root of the product is the standard errorof the total indirect effect in a two-mediator model,assuming normality for the total indirect effect.(25)

To test the mediation hypothesis we used the z-test(Equation (8)), and the variance as the variance of to-tal indirect effect involving two mediators as set outin Bollen:(28)

z = a1b1 + a2b2!b2

1$2a1

+ a21$

2b1

+ b22$

2a2

+ a22$

2b2

+ 2a1a2$b1,b2 + 2b1b2$a1,a2

.

(8)

Numerous studies have reported that perceivedbenefit returns a positive correlation with socialtrust and acceptability and a negative correlation

3 Complex mathematical expressions to determine the SE forthree or more mediating variables are beyond the scope of thisarticle. For more in-depth information refer to Bollen (1987);MacKinnon (2000); Preacher et al. (2007).

Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship 1925

Table I. Mean (and Standard Deviation) Country Values forEach Study Variable

Variable Country Mean (SD)

Risk Chile 3.41 (1.92)a

United States 3.70 (1.80)b

Spain 3.74 (1.72)b

Brazil 4.13 (1.85)c

Mexico 4.13 (1.75)c

Benefit Mexico 4.09 (1.93)d

Brazil 4.12 (2.01)d

Spain 4.22 (1.92)e

Chile 4.33 (2.02)f

United States 4.66 (1.92)g

Acceptability Spain 4.14 (1.84)h

Brazil 4.17 (1.97)h

Mexico 4.20 (1.81)h

Chile 4.32 (1.95)i

United States 5.01 (1.92)j

Trust Brazil 3.48 (1.80)k

Mexico 3.69 (1.76)l

Chile 3.94 (1.88)m

Spain 3.95 (1.76)m

United States 4.62 (1.77)n

Values computed from raw data. The mean value for each vari-able in each country has been sorted in descending order. Meansassociated with different letters are significantly different at thep < 0.05 level (Tukey HSD) for that dependent variable.

with perceived risk for many activities and tech-nologies.(10,18,30,31) Bearing this in mind, varianceinflation factors (VIF) were calculated to detectpotential multicollinearity issues in results fromEquation (8) onwards.

OLS regression analyses were performed withthe aim of exploring the influence personal knowl-edge has on the magnitude of the direct and/or indi-rect effect of trust on acceptability.

3. RESULTS

3.1 Global Trends

Mean scores for the perceived risk, perceivedbenefit, degree of acceptability of a hazard, and trustin regulatory authorities variables are detailed inTable I for each country. An ANOVA was con-ducted for each study variable (risk, benefit, trust,and acceptability) to evaluate the statistical signif-icance of differences among the five samples. Forthose cases where the F test was significant at p <

0.05, a Tukey test was conducted.The Mexican sample revealed the highest per-

ceived risk, followed by the Brazilian, Spanish,American, and Chilean samples. Mean values werestatistically different for almost all samples; there

were no statistically significant differences from sam-ple to sample for Mexico and Brazil, and for the U.S.and Spanish figures. This suggests that, on average,these sample-pairs judged the risks they faced fromactivities and technological hazards similarly.

As expected, and virtually the reverse of per-ceived risk, the Mexican sample returned the lowestmean value for perceived benefit. The United Statespresented the highest perceived benefit, followed byChile, Spain, and Brazil. Differences between samplepairs were statistically significant in each case, bar thesamples from Mexico and Brazil.

Hazard acceptability trends were less clear.Spain, Brazil, and Mexico exhibited the lowest meanvalues although the difference from one mean valueto another was not significant; that is, on averagethese samples returned practically the same degree ofacceptability concerning the activities and technolog-ical hazards they faced. Samples from Chile and theUnited States had, on average, the highest degree ofacceptability and the difference for the latter valueswas statistically significant.

The American sample claimed the highest so-cial trust in regulatory authorities followed by Spain,Chile, Mexico, and Brazil. Aside from Spain andChile, differences between all sample pairs were sta-tistically significant.

3.1.1 Personal Knowledge

For the sample from each country, Table IIshows the mean values of personal knowledge of the23 activities and technologies.

Spanish declarations revealed the least claimedpersonal knowledge about the activities and tech-nological hazards presented (4.01, SD = 1.80). Bycontrast, the American sample returned the highestmean values for personal knowledge, followed byBrazil, Mexico, and Chile, with respective mean val-ues of 4.76 (SD = 1.63), 4.65 (SD = 1.95), 4.25 (SD =1.87), and 4.14 (SD = 1.69). Differences between themean values for all samples were statistically signifi-cant.

3.2 Total Direct and Total Indirect Effects

Table III lists total, direct, and indirect effects(mediated for perceived risk and perceived benefit)of trust on acceptability for each hazard in eachcountry.

For Latin American nations, the total effect(path c in Fig. 1A) of trust on acceptability was

1926 Bronfman and Vazquez

Table II. Mean Values of Claimed Personal Knowledge byHazard and Country

Country

Hazard Chile Mexico Brazil U.S. Spain

1. Herbicides 2.98 3.75 3.74 3.49 3.202. Chemical fertilizers 3.16 3.88 3.87 3.56 3.183. Food preservatives 3.18 3.80 3.88 3.50 3.284. Chemical disinfectants 3.20 3.84 3.98 3.58 3.215. Food coloring 3.21 3.68 3.80 3.52 3.276. Pesticides 3.21 3.76 3.96 3.69 3.177. Genetic engineering 3.54 3.89 4.29 4.24 3.898. Asbestos 3.69 3.61 3.19 4.39 2.669. Nuclear power 3.72 4.26 4.33 5.02 3.9010. Solar energy 3.92 4.21 4.64 4.66 4.2811. Microwave ovens 4.14 4.15 4.45 4.84 4,0012. X rays 4.25 4.15 4.28 5.11 4.1813. Cellular telephones 4.45 4.28 4.97 5.08 4.1714. Antibiotics 4.57 4.32 4.76 5.07 4.4415. Surgery 4.72 4.45 4.51 5.11 4.4316. Handguns 4.74 4.40 5.76 5.53 4.1417. Railroads 4.86 4.03 4.64 4.90 3.9818. Motorcycles 4.92 4.41 5.61 5.15 4.4019. Commercial aviation 5.17 4.22 4.78 5.56 3.8520. Alcoholic beverages 5.29 4.57 6.03 5.91 5.1721. Bicycles 5.38 4.44 5.31 5.38 4.6022. Smoking 5.50 4.50 6.05 6.11 5.6123. Motor vehicles 5.71 4.63 5.83 5.85 4.76

Averagea 4.25 4.14 4.65 4.76 4.01Standard deviation 1.87 1.69 1.95 1.63 1.80

aValues computed from raw data.Hazards have been sorted in ascending order (from lowest to high-est degree of personal knowledge) against the Chilean sample.

statistically significant (p < 0.01) for every single haz-ard. Trust in regulatory authorities exhibited both di-rect (path c’ in Fig. 1B) and indirect effects (pathsab in Fig. 1B) on the degree of public acceptabilityof hazards when the trust-acceptability relationshipwas mediated by perceived risk and perceived ben-efit. Aside from “alcoholic beverages” in the Mexi-can sample, and “bicycles” and “microwave ovens”for the Brazilian sample, the indirect effects werestatistically significant (p < 0.01) for every single haz-ard. In each of these three exceptions, the influenceon acceptability attributable to trust was exclusivelydirect.

Table III also shows average values of the mag-nitude of the total direct effect social trust has onthe acceptability of an activity or technology for theMexican, Chilean, and Brazilian samples. Their re-spective percentages of the total effect were 78%,70%, and 70%. Such indicators suggest that amongthe Latin American samples, social trust essentiallyhas a direct effect on how acceptable an activity ortechnology is.

The total effect of trust on acceptability forthe two developed economies was significant for 16and 20 of the 23 hazards covered in the UnitedStates and Spain, respectively. Nevertheless, onlynine of the hazards in the United States and 12in Spain retained a statistically significant total di-rect effect when controlled for perceived risk andperceived benefit. Total indirect effects were signif-icant for 14 hazards in the United States and 18 haz-ards in Spain, thereby suggesting that the effect oftrust on acceptability in developed nations is largelyindirect.

In a result running contrary to our original hy-pothesis, taking into consideration only the hazardsfor which social trust retained direct and indirect sta-tistically significant impact on acceptability (six forthe United States and eight for Spain), the direct ef-fect was 62% of the total trust-acceptability effect forboth the United States and Spain.

Table IV displays the total indirect effect shownin Table III, but split into the indirect effect throughmediating variables perceived risk (path a1b1 onFig. 1) and perceived benefit (path a2b2 on Fig. 1).For the Mexican and Brazilian samples, perceivedbenefit mediated practically the entire indirect effecttrust has on acceptability. For the two nations, onaverage, trust engendered 99% and 90% of the in-direct effects’ magnitudes on acceptability throughperceived benefit (Table IV). Just two exceptions ap-peared in the Brazilian study: “nuclear power” and“solar energy,” whose indirect effects via perceivedrisk were also statistically significant.

In Chile, the perceived benefit-mediated indi-rect effect was statistically significant for every haz-ard, with the exception of “bicycles.” Unlike theother two Latin American countries, however, ac-cording to Chilean judgments almost half of the per-ceived risk-mediated hazards retained statistical sig-nificance. Even in light of this, on average, 83% ofthe magnitude of the total indirect effect social trusthas on acceptability was mediated through perceivedbenefit.

For Latin America, regarding the magnitude ofthe total average effect trust had on acceptability (seeTable III), the perceived benefit-mediated effect ac-counted for 22–27%, while perceived risk mediatedjust 0.3–5% (see Table IV).

In regard to the total indirect effect, theSpanish sample exhibited a similar trend, albeit notas decisive as that seen in Latin America. Justthree hazards—“alcoholic beverages,” “cellular tele-phones,” and “food coloring”—retained statistical

Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship 1927

Tab

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Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship 1929

significance for the indirect effect trust had on accep-tance when mediated for perceived risk. By contrast,65% of the hazards mediated through perceived ben-efit were statistically significant. All in all, in Spain,perceived benefit accounted for 31% of the total ef-fect and 75% of the indirect effect trust had on ac-ceptability.

The American sample returned a slightly dif-ferent profile from the other four. While media-tion through perceived risk retained statistical signif-icance for 30% of the hazards, perceived benefit wasstatistically significant in over 40% of the hazards.On average, the two mediating variables accountedfor similar amounts of the total effect trust had onacceptability: perceived risk mediated 21% and per-ceived benefit 24% of the total effect. The situationwas similar when explaining the indirect effect: per-ceived risk mediated 47% while perceived benefitmediated 53% (see Table IV).

VIF were calculated to identify potential mul-ticollinearity problems in the models behind TablesIII and IV. VIF values were computed for socialtrust, perceived risk, and perceived benefit on the115 occasions (23 hazards & 5 countries) that theregression model defined in Equation (6) was ex-ecuted. Because no VIF value exceeded 1.56, thenthere is no linear dependence among the regressionvariables.(32,33)

To understand the underlying cause of lowindirect effect through risk perception (shown inTable IV), we analyzed the magnitude and statisti-cal significance of each relationship composing themediator effect through perceived risk (values dis-played in Table V): that is, the relationships trust-risk(path a1 in Fig. 1B) and risk-acceptability (path b1 inFig. 1B).

In Table V, each component’s magnitude andstatistical significance exhibits the indirect effect,through perceived risk (path a1b1), trust induces inacceptability. For all hazards in which mediation wasnot significant (see Table IV), the incidences wereentirely due to regression coefficient b1 not retainingstatistical significance in 74%, 75%, 65%, 54%,and 35% of the cases in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, theUnited States, and Spain, respectively. Moreover, in26%, 8%, 30%, 8%, and 59% of the cases neithercoefficient a1 nor b1 were significant. Therefore,the main reason that perceived risk loses statisticalsignificance as a mediating variable is because therisk-acceptability relationship is not significant. Thetrend is clearest in Mexico, Brazil, Spain, and Chile(see Table V).

3.3 Personal Knowledge and Mediation Hypothesis(Total Indirect Effect)

OLS regression analysis was performed for eachcountry with the aim of identifying the impact per-sonal knowledge had on the magnitude of the totalindirect effect of trust on acceptability. The meanpersonal knowledge (shown in Table II) was takento be the explicative variable and the total indirecteffect (shown in Table III) the explained variable.

For all samples, the model returned a statisticallysignificant fit, with a negative sign for the personalknowledge coefficient regression. The best fits wereobtained for the Chilean (R2 = 0.35, t-test = –3.36,df = 21), Brazilian (R2 = 0.32, t-test = –3.16, df =21), and Spanish samples (R2 = 0.31, t-test = –3.09,df = 21). The model fit was poor for the Mexicansample (R2 = 0.19, t-test = –2.19, df = 21). TheAmerican sample presented three atypical values(handguns, surgery, and asbestos), which preventedmodel adjustment. Overlooking these values,4 themodel achieved a good fit (R2 = 0.47, t-test = –3.97,df = 21).

The negative slope indicates that as personalknowledge decreases, the total indirect effect of truston acceptability (mediated primarily by perceivedbenefit) increases (Table IV).

Following the same procedure, no fit was ob-tained when OLS regression models were imple-mented with the total direct effect (shown inTable III) as the dependent variable and mean per-sonal knowledge as the independent variable.

When the total effect of trust on acceptabilitywas considered as a dependent variable, only theBrazilian sample achieved a statistically significant fit(R2 = 0.62, t-test = –5.88, df = 21), returning a neg-ative sign for the personal knowledge regression co-efficient. This suggests that the greater the personalknowledge, the lower the magnitude of the total ef-fect of trust on acceptability.

4. DISCUSSION

Trust in regulatory entities is assessed throughpublic judgments of a hazard’s risk and accep-tance in risk perception literature. Some studies ven-ture to explain the trust-acceptability relationship.However, assessment of the total effect (direct and

4 While other regression methods are available (such as robust re-gression methods) to overcome atypical values, we chose to elim-inate them as we were simply seeking the trend and not a fore-casting model.

1930 Bronfman and Vazquez

Table V. Regression Coefficients that Conform the Specific Indirect Effect Attributable to the Perceived Risk Mediator

Mexico Chile Brazil United States Spain

Hazards TR#PR PR#A TR#PR PR#A TR#PR PR#A TR#PR PR#A TR#PR PR#A

1 Commercial aviation #0.03 #0.01 #0.21 #0.17 #0.22 #0.05 #0.27 #0.15 #0.40 #0.032 Bicycles #0.13 #0.02 #0.14 #0.17 #0.20 #0.01 #0.17 #0.41 #0.13 #0.303 Railroads 0.00 #0.03 #0.20 0.16 #0.15 0.00 #0.26 #0.43 #0.15 #0.194 Motorcycles #0.25 0.07 #0.14 #0.16 #0.06 #0.03 #0.25 #0.07 0.03 #0.165 Motor vehicles #0.12 0.07 #0.08 #0.13 #0.06 #0.09 #0.15 #0.38 #0.06 #0.096 Handguns #0.24 #0.02 #0.18 #0.16 #0.05 #0.06 #0.25 #0.24 #0.13 0.027 Alcoholic beverages #0.32 0.14 #0.10 #0.09 #0.23 #0.03 #0.22 #0.29 #0.28 #0.358 Smoking #0.23 0.09 #0.13 #0.02 #0.09 #0.03 #0.17 #0.02 #0.17 #0.349 Nuclear power #0.25 #0.09 #0.33 #0.18 #0.17 #0.21 #0.48 0.02 #0.20 0.13

10 Solar energy #0.17 #0.09 #0.18 #0.16 #0.29 #0.13 #0.13 #0.58 #0.13 #0.3211 Genetic engineering #0.12 #0.05 #0.14 #0.22 #0.31 #0.11 #0.16 #0.26 #0.19 #0.2012 Surgery #0.07 0.01 #0.09 #0.05 #0.06 #0.03 #0.21 0.11 #0.17 #0.1413 X rays #0.13 #0.06 #0.13 #0.05 #0.26 #0.04 #0.18 #0.17 #0.33 #0.1514 Cellular telephones #0.21 #0.06 #0.26 #0.02 #0.26 #0.07 #0.10 #0.44 #0.33 #0.3415 Microwave ovens #0.22 #0.04 #0.17 #0.03 #0.23 0.04 #0.15 #0.35 #0.22 #0.0716 Food coloring #0.20 0.03 #0.32 #0.09 #0.18 #0.14 #0.29 #0.35 #0.53 #0.2417 Food preservatives #0.15 0.01 #0.27 #0.05 #0.11 #0.10 #0.19 #0.38 #0.35 #0.0718 Chemical disinfectants #0.16 #0.07 #0.22 #0.07 #0.30 #0.05 #0.24 #0.18 #0.25 #0.0419 Chemical fertilizers #0.15 #0.11 #0.17 #0.09 #0.33 #0.04 #0.42 #0.37 #0.29 #0.1720 Herbicides #0.18 #0.02 #0.19 #0.10 #0.31 0.00 #0.31 #0.26 #0.20 #0.1321 Pesticides #0.19 0.00 #0.24 #0.16 #0.21 #0.11 #0.39 #0.30 #0.29 #0.0922 Asbestos #0.05 #0.07 #0.04 #0.09 #0.14 #0.02 0.02 #0.10 0.12 #0.0523 Antibiotics #0.08 0.00 #0.17 #0.02 #0.17 0.00 #0.47 #0.13 #0.39 #0.12

TR = Trust, PR = Perceived Risk, A = Acceptability. Coefficient TR#PR (path a1) represents the magnitude of the linear relationshipbetween trust and perceived risk. Regression coefficient PR#A (path b1) represents the magnitude of the linear relationship betweenperceived risk and acceptability considering the influence of social trust and perceived benefit variables. Shaded values are not statisticallysignificant.

indirect—mediated by perceived risk and benefit) oftrust on acceptability across data on a heterogeneousset of hazards has yet to be undertaken.

In this study, confirmatory methods (multiplemediation models) were used rather than an ex-ploratory procedure (partial correlation model). Us-ing multiple mediation models, it is possible to clearlyand easily obtain the magnitude and statistical signif-icance of the effects of partial mediation that trusthas on acceptability, through risk and benefit percep-tions of various activities and technologies. Earlierstudies used partial correlation analysis to explorethe direct and indirect effects social trust in regula-tory institutions had on public acceptance of severaltechnologies, especially genetic engineering. Partialcorrelation analysis, however, cannot determine themagnitude and statistical significance of the total(and partial) indirect effects trust has on acceptabil-ity considering multiple mediators.

The main goal of this work was to evaluatethe total direct and indirect effects social trust inregulatory entities has on public acceptability whenthe relationship is mediated by perceived risk andperceived benefit, for individuals residing in eitheremerging Latin American or developed nations, andcovering a variety of activities or technologies.

The study produced three major findings. Dif-ferences were encountered in the trust-acceptabilityrelationship between developed and Latin Ameri-can countries. The second discovery concerns the ef-fect self-proclaimed personal knowledge has on thetrust-acceptability relationship. Finally, and perhapsthe most important result, is that perceived benefit(rather than perceived risk) is easily the most signif-icant mediating variable in the indirect effects trustinduces in hazard acceptability.

Trust in regulatory entities in emerging LatinAmerican nations retained a direct as well as an

Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship 1931

indirect causal link—through perceived risk and per-ceived benefit—with the degree of a hazard’s pub-lic acceptability that was independent of hazard. InLatin America, trust in regulatory entities is stronglyand significantly linked to the public’s acceptance ofan activity or technology and in essence has a directeffect on the extent of public acceptability. The resultimplies that the causal model of trust (or causal chainaccount of trust Eiser et al.(14) and other researcherspropose) would have low explanatory power for thetrust-acceptability relationship and that acceptanceof a particular activity or technology will be mostlygoverned directly by public trust in regulatory enti-ties.

In the developed nations, the direct effect oftrust on acceptability disappeared (lost statistical sig-nificance) for almost half of the hazards when con-trolled for risk and benefit, leaving an indirect ef-fect between more of the variable pairs. Our find-ings are consistent with those of Eiser et al.(14) andPoortinga and Pidgeon.(12) For developed countries,then, trust in regulatory entities mostly brings about ahazard’s public acceptability indirectly (through per-ceived risk and perceived benefit). This implies that,in general terms, the causal chain account of trustwould have better explanatory power for the trust-acceptability relationship, where perceived risk andperceived benefit would mediate most of the effecttrust induces in acceptability. For certain technolo-gies, however, such as nuclear power, social trust hasa more direct, rather than indirect, effect on accept-ability.

In regards to the influence self-reported personalknowledge has on the trust-acceptability relation-ship, we found that for those claiming less knowledgethe magnitude of the indirect effect of trust on ac-ceptability was higher. This outcome was observedat both an individual and a national level, althoughits magnitude did vary according to sample origin.In our coverage of Latin America, higher knowledgeeroded the indirect effect of trust on acceptability,although the relationship always retained statisticalsignificance. In developed countries, however, whilethe trend regarding knowledge levels was similar, theindirect effect lost statistical significance. This impliesthat there are other factors at play influencing theindirect relationship between trust and acceptabilityassociated with a country’s level of development.

These findings are in line with Siegrist andCvetkovich,(19) who reported high correlations be-tween social trust and risk/benefit judgments involv-ing hazards people claimed they knew little about.

The authors suggested that when laypeople lackedknowledge of a particular hazard, they turned to so-cial trust when passing risk and benefit judgments.Using these arguments, and from our findings, wecan say that when people lack sufficient knowledgeto make reasoned appraisals of a given technology’srisks and benefits, the mediating effect the two vari-ables have on social trust’s influence upon a tech-nology’s acceptability increases. In simpler terms,the explanatory power of the causal trust model in-creases for lower personal awareness of a technology.

Notwithstanding, perceived benefit mediatedpractically all of the indirect effects social trust hadon hazard acceptance. For the Latin American sam-ples the result was decisive, and although the sametrend appeared for the two developed nations, the re-sult was less clear-cut. Largely previously overlookedin favor of perceived risk, perceived benefit plays thekey mediating role in the effect trust in regulatoryauthorities induces in public acceptance of a giventechnology, regardless of the origin of the sample.Moreover, the mediating value of perceived benefitwas strongest for citizens declaring a low degree ofknowledge about a given technology.

The results presented above were not so con-clusive for the samples from developed economies.The greatest difference was observed in the Amer-ican sample, whose perceptions of risk and benefitexplained similar proportions of the indirect effectthat trust has on acceptability. This represents a ma-jor contrast with the emerging economies of LatinAmerica, which may be owed to the degree of knowl-edge and experience of the Americans about theactivities and technologies considered in this study.While in emerging countries the public debate con-cerning the use and regulation of such activities andtechnologies is just starting to become relevant, inthe United States this debate has been ongoing andevolving for at least the last two decades. Americansdo not only declare to have a high level of knowl-edge on these issues but, objectively, they have moreexperience in developing and implementing controland regulation policies and programs.

Another possible reason for this difference is thehigher rate of corruption that affects political circlesin Latin American countries. Not only does this re-ality create public distrust of those in charge of de-veloping control and risk regulation policies, but italso creates distrust about the messages deliveredto the public about such policies. Furthermore, inLatin America there are greater private and politicalinfluences on the media, which translates to poorly

1932 Bronfman and Vazquez

informed societies compared to more economicallydeveloped societies.

Our results are consistent with those of Freweret al.(18) Following Frewer’s logic, our findings in-dicate that while “the risk is not so large as to beintolerable,” public acceptance of hazards could beincreased by stressing benefits and reinforcing trustin every institution involved in regulating or over-seeing use of the technology. Acceptability will risefurther for little-understood technologies and in lessdeveloped countries.

Regulatory authorities wishing to achievegreater acceptance of a given technology shouldfocus their efforts on shoring up public trust. Anumber of studies have identified that compe-tence, care, commitment, predictability, objectivity,fairness, faith, honesty, accountability, and vestedinterest all exercise strong influence on trust in riskregulation and communications authorities.(4,11,34#38)

Addressing each of these issues would not only helpto improve public trust (and thus increase the levelsof acceptance of many technologies), but also wouldallow such institutions to develop more efficient riskcontrol, regulation, and communications policiesthat laypeople support. Trust in regulatory author-ities is the most influential factor determining thelevel of public acceptance of any given technologicalhazard. This may be due to the public’s general lackof knowledge about the specific risks faced, so deter-mining the correct communications policy takes ongreater importance for hazards fitting the causal trustmodel. Moreover, people have greater confidence inmessages that fit with what they already know.(39,40)

Our findings indicate that perceived risk appearsto have little value as a mediator in the causal ef-fects of trust in regulatory authorities regarding ac-ceptability, irrespective of the degree of knowledgepeople claim to possess about a particular technol-ogy. The trend is clearest among Latin American res-idents. Perceived benefit rather than perceived riskoffers a better fit in the causal model of trust. Hence,as acceptance of a technology is by and large basedon public perceptions of associated benefits (ratherthan risks), it is perceptions of benefits that are, inturn, influenced by public trust in entities promotingand/or regulating the technology.

Poor perceived risk-mediating power could berooted in the weak objective knowledge laypeoplehave of science and technology.(41#43) Modern tech-nologies generate significant benefits but also har-bor risks and provoke doubts that may alarm andconfuse the public at large. People find it difficult

to comprehend the technologies behind contempo-rary daily life (for their highly technical nature, de-gree of advancement, and their increased coverage);laypeople tend to rely on social trust as a mecha-nism to reduce the complexity of risk managementdecisions.(6,44) Thus, lacking knowledge, people areforced to rely on information experts and regula-tory institutions provide. Siegrist and Cvetkovich(19)

found trust was linked strongly to perceived risk andbenefit for hazards people knew little about. How-ever, no significant correlation was detected when re-spondents did claim knowledge of a hazard. These re-searchers therefore concluded that the general publicrelies on social trust for making risk and benefit judg-ments when they lack information.

Recently, studies by Midden and Huijts(45) andTerwel et al.(46) have revealed similar results whenstudying the relationship between social trust andpublic acceptability for carbon dioxide capture andstorage technology (CCS). The first found that pub-lic attitudes to a new, unknown technology are in-fluenced by affective assessments and to a lesser ex-tent by the technology’s perceived benefit rather thanperceived risk.(45) Meanwhile, the Terwel et al.(46)

study shows trust (measured as competence-basedtrust) retains both a direct and an indirect effect (me-diated by perceived benefit and not perceived risk)on acceptability of a technology. In regard to the nullpredictive value perceived risk had on a technology’sacceptability, the authors suggest that, possibly, “layattitudes toward new technologies are more stronglyrelated to perceived benefits than to perceived risks.”

Rather than focusing on a specific hazard, as inMidden and Huijts(45) and Terwel et al.,(46) the scopeof the current study included a broad range of tech-nologies and activities, ranging from the highly fa-miliar to the less well-known and poorly understood.Since our results are conclusive in that perceived riskhas little mediating power in the effect trust has onpublic attitudes towards different activities and tech-nologies, the proposal of Terwel et al.(46) would notbe solely applicable to new technologies.

The present study found that the main rea-son perceived risk loses its power as a mediatingvariable is because the perceived risk-acceptabilityrelationship was not significant against perceivedbenefit and social trust. Several studies have demon-strated empirically the influence perceived riskexerts on public acceptance of a technology or ac-tivity.(5,20,31,47#50) However, taking the effect of so-cial trust and perceived benefit into account, whencalculating perceived risk-acceptability, in the latter

Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust-Acceptance Relationship 1933

relationship most of the hazards surveyed lost statis-tical significance. This result clearly shows that theexistence of a correlation does not denote causality.A relationship between risk and acceptability doesnot necessarily mean risk is the cause and acceptabil-ity the consequence or vice versa because other vari-ables (such as perceived benefit and social trust) maymediate the correlation.

A number of studies have identified a significantrelationship between public acceptance of a technol-ogy and social trust in its corresponding regulatoryentities. In an attempt to establish public perceptionof associated technology risks, most of these studiesoverlooked the potential influence perceived benefitmay have had on such relationships, either becauseit was deemed outside the scope of interest or be-cause exploratory methods simply are not able to dis-cern the statistical significance of direct and indirecteffects. Using confirmatory analysis has unmaskedthe mediating role perceived benefit plays and shedsmore light on the mechanism of the overall causalchain.

Some limitations of the present study should bepointed out. First, since solely undergraduate stu-dent perceptions were assessed, care should be takennot to extend these results to other specific groupswho are unlikely to possess the same type of knowl-edge. Nonetheless, the authors believe that no ma-jor changes should occur in the obtained trends if thegeneral public’s perceptions were assessed. More-over, for a general public sample, we would expectthe strength of the mediating effect of perceived ben-efit on the trust-acceptability relationship to be evenhigher because they generally have less informationand knowledge about technological hazards. Second,over the four years it took to collate informationfor the five countries studied, a number of local andglobal events occurred that may have had an impacton the public’s perceptions of the risks faced andof their trust in the corresponding regulatory insti-tutions. Finally, the aim of this work was to iden-tify specific trends, yet, due the reduced number ofcountries studied, the results reported here shouldnot be extrapolated to other developing or devel-oped countries. Studies involving more countries anda greater number of representative samples shouldbe employed in future research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was partially funded through a re-search grant from Universidad Andres Bello, for

Project DI/30/05/R, “Causal Acceptability Model ofTechnological Hazards.” Additional support camefrom Chile’s Conicyt program through the Na-tional Fund for Scientific and Technological Re-search (Fondecyt), grant 1090577. We extend spe-cial thanks to Gabriel Dorantes Argandar (Mexico),Itziar Fernandez (Spain), Roberto Mendoza (Brazil),and Ana Isabel Dası (Spain) for their support in thedata collection process, and to Alex Crawford for hisvaluable discussions over the course of this researchproject.

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