A closer look at education as epideictic rhetoric

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A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric Dale L. Sullivan Late in 1993 and early in 1994 lively discus.sions of the relationship between leaching rhetoric and teaching values appeared on the Internet and Bitnet listservs H-Rhelor and Purtopoi. On Il-Rhetor the discussion wa.s carried on under the heading of "Ethos and Authority" in the clas.sroom. and on Punopoi it was earned on under several headings, but mostly with a subject line titled "rcification." On H- Rhetor, the conversation tended to revolve around the question of how to grade papers the teacher finds offensive. Dcbra A. Combs initiated the discussion by describing a colleague who argued, "if a student argues a political position that we. Ihe teacher, find ethically repugnant, then we. as teachers have ari ethical obligation to nunk the paper" (November 19. 1993). Don McCloskey opined, "...we teach virtue in the classroom, and should.. .But virtue does not mean. say. the Baltimore Catechism and the nuns to enforce it. My Lord, if we don't teach intcUectuai virtues, which have some connection with other virtues (though not so tight that the others merely follow from them), we are doing bad by tlie world" (December I. 1993). On the Purtopoi listserv. the issue tended to be the teacher's ideological stance. Chuck Pctch was accu.«itory: "I wonder what we are doing in a society that sponsors academics...who shirk the responsibility to teach students how to succeed in their culture and teach tlicm instead to undermine their culture at every tum" (Dccetnber7.1993). Comments along these line.s are not re.stricted to fleeting electronic conversations. For instance. Alan France comments in a College English article. "Wlicn we teach students to con.struct an 'authentic' .self and to subordinate that .self to the rules of a dominant discourse, we are reprcMlucing ideological formations of truth, whether we intend to or not" (593). Lester Faigley points to the political undercurrents in the writing ebssroom when he says. "The freedom students are given in some classes to choo.se and adapt autobiographical assignments hides the fact that these .same students will be judged by the teachers' unstated cultural definitions of the selP (410). Susan Miller characterizes traditional methods of texhing composition as a means of regulating and mapping individuals according to "well-constrained subjectivities" of the dominant culture (90). Atid Carl Herndl suggests that by exploring the "relationship between discourse, teaching, and social reproduction, we may he able to discover ways to intervene and initiate cultural critique within our rcsear:h and pedagogical practice" (350). Objecting to what she perceives as leftist radicalism in the classroom. Maxine Hairston says. "By the logic of the cultural left, any teacher should be free to use his or her classroom to promote any ideology" (188). She then goes on to list a series of belief systems she assumes her readers wish to restrict. Her article, in turn, elicited several rebuttals, containing, among others, this comment by William Thelin. "Hairston would better serve our profession by foregoing the pretense that any classroom can be apolitical and concentrating on ethical ways to negotiate race, class, and gender in a politically overt classroom" (253). RSQ, Vol. 23, Numbers 314. StimmcrlFall

Transcript of A closer look at education as epideictic rhetoric

A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric

Dale L. Sullivan

Late in 1993 and early in 1994 lively discus.sions of the relationship betweenleaching rhetoric and teaching values appeared on the Internet and Bitnet listservsH-Rhelor and Purtopoi. On Il-Rhetor the discussion wa.s carried on under theheading of "Ethos and Authority" in the clas.sroom. and on Punopoi it was earnedon under several headings, but mostly with a subject line titled "rcification." On H-Rhetor, the conversation tended to revolve around the question of how to gradepapers the teacher finds offensive. Dcbra A. Combs initiated the discussion bydescribing a colleague who argued, "if a student argues a political position that we.Ihe teacher, find ethically repugnant, then we. as teachers have ari ethical obligationto nunk the paper" (November 19. 1993). Don McCloskey opined, " . . .we teachvirtue in the classroom, and should.. .But virtue does not mean. say. the BaltimoreCatechism and the nuns to enforce it. My Lord, if we don't teach intcUectuaivirtues, which have some connection with other virtues (though not so tight thatthe others merely follow from them), we are doing bad by tlie world" (December I.1993). On the Purtopoi listserv. the issue tended to be the teacher's ideologicalstance. Chuck Pctch was accu.«itory: "I wonder what we are doing in a society thatsponsors academics...who shirk the responsibility to teach students how to succeedin their culture and teach tlicm instead to undermine their culture at every tum"(Dccetnber7.1993).

Comments along these line.s are not re.stricted to fleeting electronic conversations.For instance. Alan France comments in a College English article. "Wlicn we teachstudents to con.struct an 'authentic' .self and to subordinate that .self to the rules of adominant discourse, we are reprcMlucing ideological formations of truth, whether weintend to or not" (593). Lester Faigley points to the political undercurrents in thewriting ebssroom when he says. "The freedom students are given in some classesto choo.se and adapt autobiographical assignments hides the fact that these .samestudents will be judged by the teachers' unstated cultural definitions of the selP(410). Susan Miller characterizes traditional methods of texhing composition as ameans of regulating and mapping individuals according to "well-constrainedsubjectivities" of the dominant culture (90). Atid Carl Herndl suggests that byexploring the "relationship between discourse, teaching, and social reproduction, wemay he able to discover ways to intervene and initiate cultural critique within ourrcsear:h and pedagogical practice" (350).

Objecting to what she perceives as leftist radicalism in the classroom. MaxineHairston says. "By the logic of the cultural left, any teacher should be free to usehis or her classroom to promote any ideology" (188). She then goes on to list aseries of belief systems she assumes her readers wish to restrict. Her article, inturn, elicited several rebuttals, containing, among others, this comment byWilliam Thelin. "Hairston would better serve our profession by foregoing thepretense that any classroom can be apolitical and concentrating on ethical ways tonegotiate race, class, and gender in a politically overt classroom" (253).

RSQ, Vol. 23, Numbers 314. StimmcrlFall

A Clo.ser Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric

The list of such comments could go on and on, but this selection is enough for mypurpose. As these brief exceipts from much longer conversations show definingthe teacher's role in a pluralisuc society has become a major preoccupation amongthose who teach rhetonc and composition. In this paper, I take a closer look atpedagogy from a rhetorical persTJective. describing education a.s a form of epideicticrhetonc. After the theoretical section. I will apply the theory to the pedagogies of(Juinuhan and Hugh Blair as reflected in their respective texts. Finally in theconclusion. I will speculate about what has happened to education as epideictic.

Epideictic RhetoricMy thesis is straight forward: Education is a form of epideictic rhetoric that relieson the rhetoncal acts of praise and blame (1) to teach reasoning appropriate toprofessional and public practices, and (2) to instill in the student sentiment.s oremotions considered appropriate within tlie orthodoxy which the teacher representsWhen the student has become completely habituated in appropriate forms ofreasoning (logos) and in just senliments (pathos), he or she may be said to havetaken on or internalized Ihe eihos of the culture.

Edueational Epideietie and Epideictie EducalionA brief stirvey of epideiclic theory will help us understand the linkages betweeneptdeictic and education. As Theodore Burgess points out. epideictic rhetoric,though practiced in a variety of fomis before the fourth century B. C. did notemerge as a distinct theoretical genre unUI Aristotle, with his instinct forclas.sineation, carved out a separate category for all speeches that were ceremonialin nature (105). In his Rhetoric. Aristotle divides oratory into three genres on thebasis of audience. "The hearer," he says, "must be either a judge, with a decision tomake about things past or future, or an observer" (1358b 1). If the hearer is ajudge, the genre is either forensic or deliberative rhetoric, the first being the rhetoricof the courtroom, the second of the as.sembly. But if the hearers are merelyobservers deciding on the skill of the orator, then the genre is epideictic orceremonial, rhetoric (1358b 5).i This distinction points to an essential differencebetween epideictic and the other two genres, namely that epideicUc does nol aim ateliciting action: ratlier. it aims at affecting the general attitude of the audiencetoward a particular person or behavior.

Each of the genres is characterized by its purpose, its time, and its method ofdevelopment. Deliberative, or political discourse, "aims at establishing theexpediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action" (1358b 22)- it isconcemed with tlie future (1358b 5): and it depends primarily on the example as a

1 From eaHiesI tintei epideiciic has been chaucleri/^d in one of two ways: it was considered citherUle Htttonc of display or of praise and bUme (Cliase 299). When viewed as mere dispUy. epideicticcan be considered a fonn of declamation. Ihat is. an exercise with no true rhetorical exieence orPi»£niaIIC numCMr. Snctirlim^* ^ntAt^irilf >< VI»IL.A^ nn<n*^T.. . . .J:.._I _. .•_ - .

of display:, --— -.™. ~ — —, >.Ai[;i.iiks. la iai>iiuiu;u as iiicans loward the end of

enabling the student lo produce discourse" ("Conversation." I60J. Other discussion of epideictic asdisplay or pcrfomiance include Michael Caner's "ITic Ritual Functions of Epideictic" andScholarship al Rhetoric of Display." and Walter Beale's "Rhetoncal Perfomiative Diicourv: "

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method of argument (1368a 29). Forensic accuses or defends someone (1358b 10).is concemed wilh the past (135Bb 17). and depends on the enthymeme as a methodof argument (1368a 31). Epideictic prai.ses or blames someone (1358b 12), isconcerned with the present (1358b 19), and depends on heightening, oramplification (1368a 10), leading to ideali/^ition.

This movement toward idealization became an integral part of epideictic and v/asnot considered an escape from reality. Instead, as George Kennedy says, "the oratoris presenting Ihe world as it ought to be rather than as it is. and making theignoble seem noble is not quite the same as making the worse seem the bettercause, for public morality may thus be improved" (Persuasion in Greece 160).Nicole Loraux claims that the funeral orations as practiced in Greece "abolished thefrontiers that separate reality from fantasy." and substituted for the real city, "aphantom of an ideal polls, a Utopia" (267).^ Therefore, epideictic rhetoric came tobe considered a form of political oratory, educating the people, giving them animage by which they could apprehend their own identity (Loraux 336), and callingthem to emulate the virtues of those being praised. As Richard Weaver says,"rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions ofthemselves, links in tliat chain extending up toward the ideal, which only theintellect can apprehend and only the soul have affection for" (25).

Epideictic, then, has an educational function in that it brings the audience into theethos, or dwelling place, of a culture.' Indeed, it is a function of epideictic socommonly accepted that most theorists at lea.st comment on it. Nicole Loraux. forinstance, .says that the Greek funeral oration called auditors to imitate the virtues ofthe deceased and was therefore part of Athenian paedeia (144). Bemard Duffy .saysthat. "Unlike deliberative and forensic discourse, which have limited practicalpurposes in view, epideictic must fulfill a broad and timeless educational function"(86). Christine Oravec argues that Aristolle's depiction of epideictic auditors asrtcorta (observers) entails judicial and educative functions (163). The audience, shesays, "is educated by the praiseworthy or blameworthy objects [presented forcontemplation]" (169). Takis Poulakos says epideictic serves an "educationalfunction, seeking to instruct auditors about the means thai lead to excellence"(So).

Perhaps the most direct statement focusing not on the educational function ofepidetctic but on the epideictic nature of education is in Perelman's and Olbreclhts-Tyteca s The New Rhetoric. They sketch the basis for their claim, but do not fullydevelop It. Epideictic speeches, they say, "appeal to common values, undisputedthough not formulated, made by one who is qualiHed to do so, with the con.sequentsu-engthening of adherence to those values with a view to possible later action"(53). This descnption of epideictic underscores several elemenLs of the genre- it is

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rhetoric that draws on implicit, commonly held values; it is practiced by maturemembers of a culture; its purpose is to strengthen adherence to values and todispose those who hear to act in accordance with these values. Given thesecharacteristics of epideiclic, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that educationis a form of epideictic because, "the educator has been commissioned by acommunity to be the spokes [person] for the values it recognizes" (52). In otfierwords, education is epideictic rhetoric, because the teacher represents commonvalues and teaches students a way of seeing held by the larger community. By sodoing, the teacher strengthens the students' adherence to common values. Thepurpose is to equip studenLs for future action by training iheir reason and theirsentiments. Part of the ethos of the society is its definition of participation insociety, its definition of citizenship, and its definition of what it takes toparticipate effectively — that is, its definition of virtue.

Epideictic Education and VirtueWhereas we tend to associate virtue with personal morality, the ancient Greeks sawvirtue as the foundation for society. A virtuous person was one who was able tomanage his or her own affairs well and to enter into public affairs successfully. AsG. B. Kerferd says, "the virtue denoted by areie comprised all those qualities in aman which made for success in Greek society and which could confidently beexpected to secure the admiration a man's fellow-citi/.ens, followed in many casesby substantial material rewards" (131). Whatever else it meant to be virtuous thisstatement clearly indicates that being virtuous meant being practical. As AlasdairMaclntyre says, at one level virtue is "an acquired human quality the possessionand exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internalto practices and the lack of which prevents us from achieving any such goods'"(emphasis in original, 191).

Practical Knowledge and Reason. For most of the history of the Western tradition,practical knowledge (which is largely a matter of reason, logos) and culturalknowledge (which is largely a matter of aesthetics or emotions, pathos) wereinseparable because virtue had both practical and cultural meanings. The classicalartes liberalis education involved teaching excellence in practices, but it did sowithout moving toward specialization as the later "liberal-free" education tended todo (Kimball 13). Thus, practical knowledge was taught in dialectics and rhetoric,and any required specialization was picked up during an apprenticeship. By teachingreasoning and arrangement, the teacher was grounding the student in the culture'sorthodox fonn of reasoning and thereby giving practical knowledge.

At the heart of this kind of training was the study of the topoi, a system ofcognitive "places" that prompt the thinker to view the subject from a variety ofperspectives. In Lawrence Prelli's words, topical thinking is the process of"viewing X in the perspective of Y, to reveal provisional aspects of X that mightotherwise be overlooked" (69). The t(^ics were (and are) considered by some to beuniversal categories of thought: Edward Corbett says they are the "natural way inwhich the human mind reasons or thinks" (47). and Blinn and GarTet have exploredtheir utility as universal thought processes for cross-cultural studie.s. The commontopics in particular were considered the forms of thought appropriate for publicdiscourse. The Greek for "common" is koina, that which is held in common, andGeorge Kennedy suggests that the koina were the source of lines of argument for

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"civic space" (Aristotle, 45). Vico said Die lopics were lines of argumcnl, and thaithose who know them, "grasp extemporaneously the elements of persuasioninherent in any quesUon or case" (15), Although teaching practical knowledge asthe art of reasoning involved more than teaching the lopics — for instance, thesystem of stasis was also considered a universal proeess (Prelli 57) — still teachingllie common lopics was a way of leaching the common places or the commonsense of a culture by imparting Uie cuhure's characteristic logos.

Cultural Knowledge and Emotion. Learning lo think as the culture thinks is half oftaking on the culture's ethos, the other half, still tied to vinue or excellence, has todo with pathos. Virtue was considered to he more than excellence in a practice; itwas also excellence in chardcter:

The virtues therefore are lo be undenitood as those di,spositions which willnot only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal lopractices, but which will also sustain us in the nslevant kind of quest forIhe good, hy enabling us to overcome harms, dangers, temptations anddistractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us withincreasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good,(Maclntyre 219)

Teaching character, wisdom, and moral virtue was a way of humanixirig the studentand bringing the student into the lifeworM of his or her culture. It was theconstruction of one half of the student's ethos, that half compofscd of culturalknowledge. A,s Robert Kastcr puts it, classical educational theory wai! based on ihebelief that "excellence and humanity nol only could be derived from the literaryeducation but could even be defined by it" (15), Unlike eertain modem eonceptionsof cultural literacy which suggest that it consists of being able to name names andcite dates, cultural knowledge in the classical world was largely a matter ofaesthetics, .sentiments, passion or pathos.^

Plato indicates that the human child is not bom with the correct response,s, andeducation is mostly a matter of inculcating appropriate habits and respon,ses (Laws653), To be human, in this view, is to be trained in human rcspon,ses, or whalQuintilian describes as the "instinct which we call common feeling" (I,ii,20), AsC. S, Lewis says, "Every virtue is a habitus — i.e. a good stock response" (24).Arislolle confirms the importance of habituated rc.spon,se when he says "a goodman will go right and a bad man will go wrong.,.when pleasure is involved";therefore, "it is not unimportant for our actions whether we feel joy and pain in Iheright or wrong way" (Nicontachean Ethics 1104b 33 and 1105a 6), Giving .students

' Riilunl tjnhaiii alucki E. D. Hirsch's Cullara! Ultraef hecsnsc tliiwh Jtcros lo ihitik civic vinuc-comes from ihe cilianry-s sharing Ihe samt bo<ly lit f«c1s-(671). tjnham poinls oul lh»l lliisch'sposition IS a raatai igiinsl roraaiuic (ommlism; iherefote, vinoe ends up beine associiled nol even»Hl. logos bul wilh nomencUlure. Conversely, aolhe.ic judgmenl is . -a»inSisei.nhip." Thai i

ancmp; lo deKnbc conditions or fomiulale rales, mil content oureelves wilh sivins only some veivgeneral .ccoiinl of the comepl. making reference to umples o, €>«> ot pieceSents" (430). ll i.

rf t ^ I ^ •e.lhelic. Allhough effon. to Inn.plam »:,lhe,ic j»ipn,™ts to the domainor losoj have often been altemplcd, they naiiain hy nalnie al least partially under the domain ofpalhos. Of affcaion.

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cultural knowledge by training iheir character, ihcn, is basically a matter of trainingUK pathetic judgment so that ihe passions come "into conformity wUh pursuit ofwhat theoretical reasoning identifies as the telos and practical reasoning as the rightaction to do in each particular lime and place" (Maclntyre 162). In the Laws. Platosays, "Virtue is the general cofK:ord of reason and emotion" (653).

Just as the topoi were considered leamed but universal forms of thought associatedwith the public and with practical reasoning, so too aesthetic judgments and justscnlimcnts were believed to be leamed but universal dispositions appropriate forpublic discourse. Smith and Hyde, exploring the significance of Aristotle's theoryof pathos and Heidegger's concept of being-with-others for public discourse,suggest that "emotion infom:is our communal character" (454).̂ Whal Is importamfor our purposes here is to recognize that emotion, though usually thought of asbased on an individual's disposition, is also socially constructed, and leaming tofeel about things the way the larger culture does is part of becoming enculturated,of coming to dwell within the ethos of tfie culture.

This effort to initiate the student into the ethos of a culture by way of trainingreason and emotion takes place coincidentally with the teaching of rhetoric; ihestudent "intcriorizes** sensus communis "along with language training" (Schaeffer77). A definition of ethos as habitude or as dwelling emerges: Ethos consists ofculturally sanctioned logos and palhoa. Lo^oa., in tum, can be associated wilhpractical knowledge, invention, and rhetorical production; pathos with cultura!knowledge, style, and reception. As the student learns to reason, she gains practicalknowledge, becomes adept at inventing sayables. and is empowered to produce herown rhetoric. As the student leams appropriate emotional responses, he leamsaesthetic standards that constitute cultural knowledge, develops a sense of style, anddiscovers ways to judge the rhetoric of others. As Richard Lanham puts it:

...a theory of reading and writing can become a training in moraljudgment. For what links virtuosity, the love of form, and virtue, isvirtu', power. Formal training in words models the balance of motivewhich creates power. (694)

The Epideictic Pedagogies of Two TeachersTlie theoretical perspective outlined above allows us to look at certain texts in anew way. Based on the theory, we expect two phenomena to emerge. First,educational treatises should manifest common elements, such as the use ofexamples and criticism to teach reason and lo form emotion. These arecharacteristics of the genre of epideictic education. Second, there should bovariations atBibutable to the societies they represent and the historical contexts inwhich Ihey are embedded. For the purposes of this study, I have selected the

^ Similarly. Mary Gatrcll explains the imponancc of emolion in Chinese cducaiion. although theclainis that ^lis cmnhasii distinguiiihcs Chinese itictoric from Western rhetoric. She says the object t^classical Chines rhetoric was not to gain assent lo a singile proposal but lo imprint deeply "particularattitudes, loyalties, and predileaions," thereby making persuasion unnecessary in particular cases(22). Another way of characterizing the phenomenon she describes is to say that ttie Chinese did notdevelop a theory of forcnsk and deliberative rhcloric txit in&lead focused alttnlion oii epideicticrhetoric which trained the movements of the heart to conform to moral principles, resulting in "atrained spontaneity of response in every life siiiiatiun, a response thai was immediate and unerringlyright" (29). Whereas Garrett characterizes this agenda as peculiarly Chinese, the same goals existedin cluiical Westem education, u cur earlier discussion indicates, but not perhaps to the same degree.

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educational trcalises of Quinlilian and Hugh Blair because each can be characlerizcdas epideiclic rheloric and because the writers represent different societies, addressdifferent rhetorical exigencies, and inhabit different historical contexts. Of the two.Quintilian cmphasires production over reception, whereas Blair emphasizesreception over production.

Quint i l ian 's Rhetoric of Produetion

Quintilian wrote his lasiiluiio Oraioria after the fall of the Roman Republic,during the Roman Empire. He began teaching in Rome during the relativelyenlightened rule of Vespasian, who paid teachers of rhetoric a regular annual salaryof 1,000 pieces of gold (Seutonius 288). Despite Vespasian's support, scholars areunanimous in claiming that rhetoric during this period was a ghost of its formerglory. H. I. Marrou says that with the coming of the empire and the los.s ofpolitical freedom, higher eloquence became "not political eloquence, but thedisinterested aesthetic eloquence of the public lecturer" (288); Harry Caplan .says"With the death of the Roman republic 'a hush fell upon eloquence'" (295):Prentice A. Meador. Jr.. says, "the social and political conditions productive ofcreative rhetoric no longer marked the Roman world" (152); and Le.stcr Thons.senand A. Craig Baird characterize the period as one when rhetoric was not a powerfulforce in public affairs, a time when rhetoric no longer served the purpose ofpreparing "the average man for active citizenship" (153).''

But there was a demand for certain kinds of rhetoricians in public life. and.therefore. Quintilian's pedagogy was intended to train people who could producediscourse. The day of political action by the average citizen and of the eloquentsenator had past, but there was still a need for advocates (Marrou 289). Becausepublic rtietoric was largely restricted to epideictic performances or displays and toarguing cases in the courts. Quintilian's official purpose as a teacher of rhetoricwas to supply advocates for the couH, but his own private vision of tJie ideal oratorwas larger than the scope allowed him by political conditions of his day, and hethought the "time was ripe for a rebirth of eloquence" (Caplan 311). As Lanhamsays, Quintilian believed the education he traced produced civic virtue, for it trainedpeople "in the skills needed to create and sustain a public, as against a privatereality. It not only trained, it created, the public person" (693).

It is important, however, to note that Quintilian wa'i not a rebel; he did not practicesubversive rhetoric as a teacher.' Though he evidently saw rhetoric in a state ofdecline, as the title of his now lost treatise. On Ihe Causes of ihe Decline ofEloquence, indicates, nevertheless, he seems not to have attributed this decline tothe effects of poHtics. Harry Caplan has .sliown that Quintilian was not alone in hisappraisal; almost none of those who lamented the decline of eloquence at the timeattributed it to restrictive political institutions (309). Though it seems incredible tous, Quintilian actually approved of the empire as "a constitution which [had]removed many of the dangers to which a republic is subject" (Kennedy, Roman

' E .R- Cuniu! "y« 111"! Ihc (all of Iht Republic affcueil RomaTi cloaucncc in cwo wovj Fic«

diSi'y'?^S*?7']!'""''' ""' *"' '"" ''""'''•" •"' *"°"'='"™' '^'''^ "f *"i"'y '" P«"> ••"i 'Pidciaic

Quinlilim would h.ve Ihoughl a serious misukt" (Roman World 490).

A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric

World, 488: Quintilian. 23), Thus, he was an orthodox representative of hissociety, a stipulation which, as we saw earlier, constrains the teacher as epideicticrhetor. We are left to conclude that Quintilian believed a revitalized rhetoric wouldfind a sphere of action within the empire, that the orator-philosopher-statestnanwould achieve power to help regulate the state (Meador 175),

It is this kind of social action Quintilian ha,s in mind as he writes the InstitutioOratoria during his retirement. In order to create the orator-statesman, Quintilianengages in the epideictic rhetoric of education. His goal is to form habit (hexis), a•'deep-rooted capacity" which becomes pan of the personality or ethos of the student(Murphy, "Roman Writing," 68), To create such a personality, he recommends thatteachers pre,sent examples to their students and then praise and blame a.spects of theexamples, a common pedagogical practice in Roman secondary schools (Marrou279). For instance, he recommends that young students read such authors as Homerand Virgil, not only to leam what is eloquent, but also to discover what is morallyexcellent (I, viii. 4), Although Quintilian discusses reading, it is reading in the.service of .speaking, i.e., reception in the service of production. The teacher is to"point out what words are barbarous, what improperly used, and what are contraryto the laws of language" (1. viii. 13), In Book II, he says, "it is emphaticidly partof his [the teacher's] profession,.,to point out the meriLs of authors or, for thatmatter, any faults that may occur" (II, v, 5). Just a little later he says, "I wouldhave them read the best authors from the very beginning and never leave them" (II.V. 19), and in Book X he suggests that .students read widely for reading will providetliem with models. Because he is not interested in producing mere specialists(Whitbum 228), he rejects the formulaic approach based on rules alone (II, xiii).Students must not be ignorant of the rules, but it is even more important that theyknow how to apply them appropriately. And it is by presenting models that theteacher is able to give students a sense of appropriate rea.son and appropriateemotion.

To reason correctly, one must be able to see experience as one's audience sees it,and that means that reasoning is grounded in narrative logic, John D, O'Banion hasargued that Quintilian saw the ability to create narrative as being an indispensableaid in helping students in their search for discovering the communis locus of anargument (337), The ability to contextualize an event within a narrative is theability to move from abstract principles into reality and is thus a way of .seeingthat allows the student to come up with appropriate argument,s. And how is it thata student begins to acquire a sense of narrative? By interacting with models throughsuch exercises as paraphrasing (333). As Quintilian put it, "the student whohandles [paraphrase] successfully will be capable of learning everything" (I, ix, 3),

By working with narrative models in a variety of ways — from memorizing, toparaphrasing, to translating — students leam to see isolated events as parts oflarger contexts, which "were understood as the frameworks within which particularsmake sense" (O'Banion 336).' With increasing sophistication, students leam to seethe way society at large sees and are therefore able to di.scover the middle term, the

Modem narrative ttieorisls would probably agree, for they characterize narrative as suciatlycoflstruded interpretations of morat and political values (Turner 149; White 20; Mactntyrr 124).Likewise, John Schaeffer points out that vico's idea of sensus communis is tied to myth or fantasy("w, 76).

Dale L. Sullivan

link between the major and minor premise, but for Quintilian this middle term i.s acommunis locus, a commonplace (O'Banion 337). Though the details may bedifferent than Ari.stotle's concept of an enthymeme. the general concept is thesame. That is, jusi as Aristotle's enthymeme presumes on "what an audiencealready knows or believes" (Raymond 144). in Ihe same way Quintilian's middleterm is tied to the "common sense" of the audience, for it is a commonplace whichstudents Ieam through experience witli narratives.

Quintilian's emphasis on narrative knowledge helps explain both his support forand his reservations about the topoi. In Book V. he rehearses the common topics,exemplifying each. He says these are "the secmt places where arguments reside, andfrom which they must be drawn fonh" (V. x. 20). However, after his discussion ofsuch topics as definition, division, similarities, consequences, causes, andapposites, he .says that a mechanical checking of each topic would be an obstacle toprogress (V. x. 123). Theory, or art. must be supplemented with practice toproduce habit, so that "the thought of the orator should suffer no delay owing tothe variety and number of possible arguments, but that the latter should presentthemselves unclad...arguments should spontaneously follow the thought of Iheorator" (V. x. 125). Thus, training the student's reason involves teaching the rulesand precepts of an art, but it also involves intense and repetitive practice, not onlyin the topics but also in reading and writing narratives, creating over time apersonality or ethos tliat habitually and spontaneously sees the appropriate lines ofargument in a given case.

When Quintilian trains the student in reasoning (logos), he does so to teachrfietorical invention. Turning to the training of emotions and aesthetics (pathos).we see that Quintilian's emphasis is .still on production rather than on reception.Students must be able to discover arguments that will persuade the audience, butthey must also learn to make sound stylistic choices, and that means being able tomake aesthetic judgment.s. to "feel" the right way. Appropriateness in style isrelated to a number of other concepts, such as pertinence (discerning what theoccasion requires [Cicero, De Oratore II. iv]). decorum (conformity and proportionwithin the order of nature [Baumlin 175]). and propriety (calling things by theirright names and employing metaphors appropriately [Quintilian VIII. ii. 1-111).As in his discussion of invention, here again we see Quintilian's dependence onmodels as a method of imparting a sense of ihe appropriate. For instance, when hedefines a form of propriety of speech deserving "highest praise." he points to Catoand Horace as examples.

In fact, without reference to examples it is impossible to teach students soundstyle, for propriety in style is tied to consuetudo (1. vi. 43). translated "usage" byH. E. Butler and "custom" by James Murphy (Quintilian. 57). Cassell's Latin-English Dictionary suggests the following words: custom, usage, habit, socialintercourse (130). Thus, a student, must learn common usage, being careful,however, not to appeal to "perverted tastes" (II. xii. 7). Since spectators in thetheaters will "often commit barbarisms in ihe cries which they utter as one man."Quintilian finds it necessary to define usage or custom a.s "the agreed practice ofeducated men. just as where our way of life is concerned I should define ii as theagreed practice of all good men" (1. vi. 45).

A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric

The epideictic pedagogy of Quintilian's Institutio Oraloria, then, is a rhetoric ofproduction characterized by the teacher's dependence on examples. His role is thatof a critic, who praises and blames tlie models, thus helping students discritninatebetween effective and ineffective reason and between appropriate and inappropriateaesthetic judgment.s. That is, the teacher makes the student at home in an ethos byteaching thought processes and language pattems. It is important to note, as weleave Quintilian, thai his view of society involves a tension between the values andlanguage of the general populace who wil l constitute the orator-statesman'saudience, and the practice of those who are educated. Robert Raster says, "Theeloquent man was nothing less than a distinct and artificial species" (17). "a breedapan" (15). As he prepares students for their roles within the empire, Quintiliancreates an elite that inhabits the empire's ethos, capable, at least in theory, ofappealing to the common people and yet remaining free of their "perverted tastes."

Hugh Blair's Rhetorie of Reception

Whereas Quintilian's main puipo.* was to train people to produce rhetoric, HughBlair seemed to be more interested in teaching people how to receive rhetoric,especially Ihe Belles Lettres. As was the case with Quintilian, the historicalcontext for Blair's Lectures is an important clue to the sort of social action Blairwas attempting to promote. A somewhat rebellious appendage of the BritishEmpire, Scotland in the mid Eighteenth century was considered provincial at best.However, at Edinburgh a group of moderate literati began to accept their conditionand to promote assimilation into English Society. Among the moderate literatiwere such men as Kames, Hume, Adam Smith, John Home, William Robertson,and Hugh Blair (Bator 42). Among other items on Iheir agenda were the goals ofacquiring a polite English accent and removing Scotticisms from practical discourse(41). Barbara Wamick .says. "The Scots' desire for acceptance by their English peerscaused...concem about being culturally and intellectually disenfranehised byScottici.sms and regional dialects" (66); similarly. Winifred Homer explains that "It

. . . „ ^ge __.could best be amehoated by the introduction of "polite culture" (Balor 42).

Thus, the type of social acUon envisioned by Hugh Blair is non-political; instead,social action is polite conversation, the ability to mix wilh educated people, to talkand write about literature and an without making a fool of oneself. In Lecture I. hesays;

Of those who peruse the following Lectures, some, by the profession towhich they addict themselves, or in consequences of their prevailinginclination, may have the view of being employed in composition, or inpublic speaking. Others, without any prospect of this kind, may wishonly to improve their taste with re.spect to writing and discourse, and toacquire principles which will enable Ihem to judge for themselves in thatpart of literature called the Belles Lettres. (4.5)

Though Blair suggests that some may be interested in pubhc speaking, the scopeof such speaking was usually restricted to the pulpit or the lectern. Even theserestricted spheres of rhetoric were not open to the majority, for them social actiotiwas polite conversation. Although diminishing opportunities for participation in

80 Dale L. Sullivan

meaningful rhetorical production can not be held solely responsible, this socialreality at lea.st contributed to a decline in interest in practical knowledge and itsassociation with teaching reasoning in the form of rhetorical invention. Theemphasis shifts, as Halloran says, "from persuasive to poetic discourse and fromthe rhetorieal virtue of eloquence to a new ideal of taste" ("From Rhetoric toComposition." 163, emphasis in original). Blair's intere.st in poetic discourse in atime when romanticism was an emerging force leads him to make comments .suchas, "Art cannot go .so far, as to supply a Speaker with arguments of every cause"(32:180). He does show a passing familiarity with the iopoi. saying that they are"general ideas applicable to a great many different subjects." but he also showsdisdain for them: "it is evident, that though this study of common places mightproduce showy academical declamations, it could never produce useful discourses onreal business" (32:181). All they can produce is "trivial" discourse.

Barbara Warnick has demonstrated tliat this shift away from rhetorical inventiontoward aesthetic sensibility was not coincidental. In The Sixth Canon, she arguesthat taste, or aesthetic sensibility, became the sixth canon of rhetoric (afterinvention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery), and that it largely replacedthe first canon. That is, "an amalgam of aesthetics and psychology...supplantedstandard treatments of invention and its commonplaces as contained in neoclassicalrhetorics" (6). Although psychological theories, such as faculty psychology,continued to have something to say aboul reason and invention (Larsen 185). theywere partieularly useful for inve.'stigating reception rather than production.

Corresponding to the diminution of attention to practical knowledge necessary forproduction is an expanded preoccupation with cultural knowledge necessary forenlightened reception: "taste was viewed as a Ciipacity of the recipient" (Wamiek 5),as a tool useful for "class mobility and respectable cultivation" (Bazerman 209).Blair was clear about it:

In an age when works of genius and literature are so frequently thesubjects of discour.se. when every one erects himself into a judge, andwhen we can hardly mingle in polite society without bearing some sharein such discussion; studies of this kind, it is not to be doubted, willappear to derive part of their importance from the use to which they maybe applied in furnishing materials for those fashionable topics of discourseand thereby enabling us to support a proper rank in social life. (1:9)

Blair's concept of "taste" is related to Quintilian's "appropriateness." However,whereas Quintilian taught students how to develop a sen.se of appropriate eriticaljudgment that would allow them to discover argumenLs and make sound stylisticchoices. Blair taught critical judgment so that students mighi develop receptivecompetence and skills in polite conversation.

Blair's interest in taste was, of course, thoroughly orthodox. It was also a topic ofcurrent interest, a topic which had occupied, and would eontinue to occupy, theminds of many leading thinkers, including Hobbes, Shafte.sbury, Samuel Johnson.Reynolds. Hume, and even Kant."> Blair didn't add anything new to the theory of

10 For background informarion on discussions of taslc. sec Bale's From Classic 10 Romantic-Gadamci'. Truth and Mclhod. espcciaUy 19-39; Hooker's -The Discussion of Tasle"; Jefferson's"Tlleories of Tasle in Ihe Highleenlh Ccntuiy"; Schacffer's Stnsus Communts. Ai-Mt.

A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric 81

taste a-s it then existed, except that his Lectures were the first British work to applytaste to rhetoric (Cohen 26,5), Instead of creating a new theor>', he simplyappropriated concepts from various theorie,s, synthesized tliem, and applied them torhetoric as he understood it. Wamick says, "Blair's theory was not original, but itwas probably not objectionable to his peers and contemporaries, either" (115),Ehninger and Golden go further, arguing that "the complete orthodoxy" of Blair'sLectures accounts, in part, for their great popularity for nearly a century ("IntrinsicSources" 24); and Vincent Bevilaqua says that Blair counted on the reader's"orthodox eighteenth-century notions" to make his own ideas understandable andacceptable (151),

Despite this seemingly broad consensus about the nature of taste, there was onepoint of contention that is important to my analysis of the places occupied bylogos and pathos in epideictic education. Some theorists, such as Hutclieson,believed that aesthetic judgments were "not reasoned but felt" (Clark 61), Othernotable rt;pre.sentatives of this position were Hume and Gerard, empiricists whobelieved that sensation rather than cognition was the source of taste (Wamick 97-106), Those who held the "commonsense" view opposed the empiricists, and theprimary spokesperson for the commonsense view was Thomas Reid. He believedthat taste was an innate response to a quality in .something outside the perceiver.Therefore, it is possible to have a deviant taste that does not coincide with there.sponse appinpriate to the object being observed. Reasoned judgment becomes theartiiter between conect and incorrect emotional re.sponses (Wamick 107-11),

As Barbara Wamick has shown (115), Bbir ,struck a compromise po.sition betweenthe empiricist and the commonsense positions, saying in a footnote that thedisagreement between those who think taste is based on reason and those who donot "is more an apparent than a real difference" (1:32). He lays out his view of therule of reason and emotion:

For nothing can be more clear, than that taste is not resolvable into anysuch operation of Reason,..Such objects [prospects or poems] often strikeus intuitively, and make a strong impression when we are unable toassign the reasons of our being pleased, (2:16)

He qualines his position, however, sayitig "Though taste, beyond doubt, beultimately founded on a certain natural and instinctive sensibility to beauty, yetreason,,,assists Taste in many of its operations, and serves to enlarge its power"(2:16-17),

Even though Blair allowed a limited role for reason in establishing aestheticjudgments, taste, for Blair, was primarily a matter of the emotions. Taste, he says,is "The power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and of art" (2:16), Itis a "faculty common in some degree to all men," even in the "deserts of America"(2:17), Even though taste is a natural faculty, it can be improved by education(2:19), the primary method being the study of "tlie most approved models...thebest authors" (2:20), As did Quintilian, Blair believed tliat continued experiencewith models, especially when the teacher describes qualities which he then "praisesor blames," would give students an improved perception: "Taste becomes bydegrees more exact and enlightened" (2:21),

Not only could an individual's emotions be improved by education, but societycould be improved as the populace became educated, Blair's epideictic education

82 Dale L. Sullivan

with its emphasis on aesthelics was an education in a public rheioric, designed toimpart virtue: "A cultivated taste increases sensibility to all the tender and humanepas.iions, by giving them frequent exercise; while it tends to weaken the moreviolent and fierce emotions" (1:12). He acknowledges that ta.ste i.s an asset to theorator — "He must feel what a good man feels, if he expects greatly to move or lointerest mankind" (1:13) — but Blair's discussion of la.ste is clearly tied primarilyto reception rather than lo production. Because fine literature was thought to becapable of imparting moral virtue, Ihe public funclion of tasle "was developed lopreserve moral community in the emerging individualistic cuilure of anincreasingly secularized and commercialized Scotland" (Clark 62).

As this brief survey of Blair's rhetoric shows, his was a rhetoric which emphasizedaesthelics over reason, reception over production. Whereas Quintilian wa.sattempting to produce practicing orators who could serve Ihc stale as legaladvocates, Blair was preparing students for polite society. Wherea.s Quinlilianemphasized rea.son and trained llie emotions primarily as an aid lo improving style,Blair de-emphasizi;d reason and trained Ihe emotions .so thai Ihe reader might morereadily appreciate the style of others. These differences are largely a funclion of Ihehistorical context of each author and Ihe rhetorical exigencies of the times.Alongside these differences, however, are several similarities. Both taught rhetoricwithin an empire, Ihe powerful Roman Empire of the first century and theexpanding British Empire of the late Eighteenth Century. Both ser\'ed the interestsof the slate, in Quintilian's ca.se by providing advocates for the courts, and inBlair's by integrating the Scots into the larger social system. Both relied on theteacher's act of criticism, ihe use of praise or blame in conjunction with literary'models. These similarities are reflections of their common rhetorical genre,epideictic pedagogy.

Conclusions: Professionalism and PluralismConlours of epideictic pedagogy emerge from this study. The teacher assumes Iherole of an orthodox representative of a more or less monolithic culture, and, byemploying praise and blame and extended practice, cultivates practical knowledgeconsisting of logos and cultural knowledge consisting ol pathos, thereby impartingvirtue, those qualities necessary for success in the culture. Epideictic pedagogyproduces hexis (habit), and hexis produces ethos.

How can this description of education in a monolithic society be of relevance loour modem pedagogical situation? I believe this study provides the theoretical andhistorical background neces.<Kiry for underelanding modem debates about the role ofthe teacher. In traditional cultures, virtue consisted of excellence in pmclices and inmorai character — both pan of the public .sphere and both unified in a single publicpersona or ethos — but with the emergence of professional culture a rupturebetween these two aspect.s of vinue occuned. As Clark and Halloran have shown,professionalizalion tumed pracUcal knowledge into a neutral commodity (.strippedof Its traditional linkages with a unified concept of vinue). The resultingspectalizaUon "relocated public knowledge., .to the separate and diverse territories ofthe vanous professional specialisLs" (20). Education in modem state schools hasbecome largely an educaUon that imparLs practical knowledge: logos has becomeprofessionalized knowledge rather than puhlic knowledge, and Ihe telos of educationIS expenise rather Ihan vinue. Specialization, funhermore, has fragmented practical

A Closer Look al Education as Epideictic Rhetoric 83_

knowledge: logos, divoreed from pathos, has been distributed across a widespectrum of disciplinary knowledge fields. What we call the technological societyis a professional society amsisting of domains of knowledge, "the embodiment ofrationality," a .society in which the traditional moral-aesthetic function of pathoshas been replaced with the sterile elhic of expediency and "objective detachment"(Katz, "Aristotle's Riietoric," 54, and "The Ethic of Expediency," 264).

As practical knowledge and logos have been migrating out of the public sphere toprofessional spheres, cultural knowledge and it.s linkage with pathos has similarlybeen migrating out of the public sphere, but not to professional spheres; in.stead, ithas been distributed across a landscape of subcultures. However, that migration hasbeen gradual. For .some time emphasis on the humanizing effects of the BellesLettres continued in lilerary studies (see Lanham's excellent study of this issue inthe "Q Que.stion"), a project that is really an extension of Blair's attempt to formtaste, or appropriate sentiments. C. P. Snow's The Two Cultures, viewed from theperspective outlined here, is really a description of the culture of logos in scienceand Ihe culture of pathos in literature facing off against each other. However, radicalchanges in the pasi half cenlury have led literary studies into a critical stanceagainst the Westem cuilure from which it sprang, as is apparent in the canonicalwars of the last couple decades. No longer viewed as a collection of the finestsentimenLs and moral judgments of humankind, the canon of Westem literature ismore often subvened Ihan prai.sed. With no unified canon to replace the old, pathoshas fragmented into emotions of individuals against the system or of interest orethnic groups against a monolithic culture. Thus, just as logos is distributedamong several knowledge fields, so pathos is distributed among severalsubcultures, many in opposition to each other and therefore having significantlydifferent emotional dispositions.

Traditional epideictic education's purpose wa.s to teach vinue and thus equipstudents for participation in public discourse. If the foregoing analy.sis is accurate,it lends suppon lo claims that Ihe public sphere no longer exists, at least in itstraditional form (Goodnight), that in its place are a culture of professionalism and aculture of plurali.sm, the first lieing Ihe extension of logos into expertise and Ihesecond being the extension of pathos into diversity. In the apparent vacuum left inIhe wake of Ihese transformations, discourse about public policy came to bedominated by tlie technical sphere which denies "any appropriate role for pathos inscience-policy fomialion" (Waddell 381), and is usually characlerizx;d as masculine.As Judy Wajcman says, sexual stereotypes identify men with reason and womenwith emotion. Engineering, Ihe engine that drives the modem technologicalsociety, "seems to be the very epitome of cool rea.son, the antithe.sis of feeling" andtherefore closed to Ihe feminine (145). Similarly, both Craig Waddell and StevenKatz have shown thai arguments based on emotion are usually disregarded in publicdiscourse (Waddell 382; Kalz, "Aristotle's Rheioric," 57).

Just as education and its epideictic aspects were adapted lo new cultures, and thoseadaptations are apparent in the pedagogical treatises of Quinlilian and Blair, so wefind ourselves in a new cultural environment, and much of what we experience asuncenainty aboul our role as teachers is the unrelenting tug of the epideicticfunctions of education: We are reluctant to give up on Ihe ancient marriage ofrhetoric and ethics, to acknowledge the divorce of logos from pathos, to recognize

Dale L. Sullivan

the disappearance of the public ethos, or to let rhetoric become nothing more than atechnology of composition.

Dale L, SullivanWriting Center

University of Nebraska at Keamey

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