The [Oxford] Encyclopedia of the Bible and Law

Entry term: Legal Rhetoric No. of Line Art: 0

Final No. of Words: 7844 No. of Tables: 0

Characters (including spaces): 49656

Contributor Name (as it will appear): Dale Patrick

Contributor Affiliation (as it will appear): Department of

Philosophy and Religion, Drake University, Emeritus

Contributor email: dale.patrick@drake.edu

Co-Contributor Name (as it will appear):

Co-Contributor Affiliation (as it will appear):

Manuscript Is Final and Ready for Production

Comments:

______________________________________________________________

___

The contributor name and affiliation in the Access Databasematch the manuscript.

Requests to the contributor for revision or additions have been addressed and finalized.

All major content queries to the contributor have been addressed and finalized.

Art files (line art, maps, etc.) have been removed from theWord document. (If art needs specific placement, instruction <Insert Figure [?] Here> is included in text.)

Tables are final and included.

The word count is acceptable.

Cross references/End references are included.

For all new entries track changes have all been accepted and manuscript is clean.

Submitted by: Jennifer Carlson Submitted Date:

2/3/14

BL 1743

Legal Rhetoric

For the purpose of this article, “rhetoric” is the means by

which any form of discourse establishes and manages its

relationship to its audience (Patrick and Scult, 1990, p.

15). One might substitute “means of persuasion” except not

all discourse means to persuade; one might want to

entertain, for example, or offend. “Law” for present

purposes means rules of conduct established and enforced by

the authority, legislation, or custom of a given political

body. “Legal rhetoric” thus specifies how a text of laws

establishes and manages its relationship to those governed

in order to achieve justice.

The Analysis of Rhetoric. (Why the

period?)

The definition of rhetoric offered above clashes with

another used by “rhetorical criticism,” the method of study

4

James Muilenburg proposed in 1968. (The address was in 1968;

it was printed in JBL in 1969) His method focuses on

stylistic features as indicators of intended emphasis. Form

criticism, Muilenburg asserted, was too fixated on

describing generic structures dictated by tradition;

rhetorical criticism would attend to particulars. Muilenburg

left it to his students and sympathetic colleagues to work

out and apply his method. A rhetorical school sprang up

which followed his interest in stylistic or artistic

features of texts. Unlike Muilenburg, they detached

rhetorical criticism from form criticism and sought the

structure of the “final form” of the text. These scholars

subject texts to “close readings” familiar to the new

literary criticism.

Classical Rhetoric. (Period?)

The classics scholar George Kennedy opposed reducing

rhetoric to style (1984:, p. 1). Discourse intends to

accomplish a purpose; style is only one means of achieving

that purpose. Hellenistic and Roman philosophy and education

5

have left a wealth of works on rhetoric and effective public

speaking and writing. Rhetoric is divided into three

occasions and types of discourse: judicial (forensic),

deliberative, and epideictic (praise, blame, commendation).

Persuasion entails producing arguments of three types: ethos

(moral character), pathos (emotional appeal), and logos

(rational cogency).

(Paragraph indent?) Kennedy and W. Wuellner applied

rhetorical analysis to New Testament texts, and one of

Kennedy’s students, Y. Gitay, applied the method to

prophetic texts of the Hebrew Bible, taking categories of

Greek and Roman rhetoric to be applicable to cultures

innocent of Greco-Roman philosophy and pedagogy.

The New Rhetoric.

Various works set forth a revival of rhetorical study

without the particular categories taught by the Greeks and

Romans (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). D.ale

Patrick and A.llan Scult and Patrick (1990) belong to this

6

latter category. They do not propose a method, but a

hermeneutic: a practice of reading and interpretation that

assumes every text is designed to have some particular

effect on its audience. The scholar must listen for clues to

what prompted composition and be alert to levels of appeal.

Scholarly interpreters stand in an odd relationship to

the biblical text. It intends to address the hearts of

readers; scholars remain aloof from truth claims, however,

prizing “objectivity” instead. This scholarly stance may

foreclose discovery and engagement with the truth a text has

to communicate. To be the audience the text needs to

accomplish its task, task (don’t delete!); (Comma [,] not

semi-colon [;]) scholarly readers need to interpret the text

as the best text it can be (see Dworkin, 1985, p. 149).

Locating Biblical Law. (Period?)

This study of legal rhetoric is restricted to the Hebrew

Bible or Old Testament. Jewish tradition accorded the first

five books the name Torah, translated “law” or

7

“instruction.” Although lessons can be learned from other

parts of the canon, law or moral instruction is not thought

to originate there; Torah is revealed through Moses, whose

words are in the Pentateuch.

In the exegetical tradition of the synagogue, legal and

moral teachings were derived from narratives as well as the

collections of law: in Genesis 1 “be fruitful and multiply”

is a command as well as a blessing. In what follows, I do

not follow the practice of the synagogue, but restrict my

attention to the collections of explicit rules of law found

in Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. I omit the

narratives of law-giving in Numbers.

Law in History. (Period?)

Pentateuchal law collections (or codes) are thought by

critical scholars to be composed and put into the public

domain at different times in Israel’s history. In each case,

they were accepted as legitimate divine law because they

were (narratively) ascribed to Moses. The issues of dating

8

and attribution raise questions: Should should historical

context and exigency be included in analysis of the codes,

or should we adopt a “final form” position similar to the

Muilenburg School? Since dates and exigencies of the

collections are highly disputed, adopting a final form

position would avoid giving hostage to fortune. However,

knowing the context of composition of each code would be

very helpful for understanding the original rhetorical

transaction.

Can we find a middle ground? Since all our legal corpora

are part of an historical narrative which that ends with the

exile, we can read them as an “exilic” audience, looking

back at laws which that purport to have been revealed at the

beginning of the nation’s history, but aware of accounts of

how those works became public in national assemblies and

what they mean for us. We must “fuse these horizons” (see

H.-G. Gadamer, 1986, pp. 273-4, 337-8, 358).

Rhetoric in Law. (Period?)

9

There are several levels of rhetoric in legal texts. Legal

statements have force provided by style and mood,

supplemented by motive clauses that are pure rhetoric. The

arrangement of codes has both conceptual and motive force.

Codes themselves are embedded in narratives and rituals

which that solemnize their authority. A theological scheme

known as covenant links narrative, prescription, and

sanction. Finally, stories of legal assemblies give us an

idea of the importance of law in national history.

In the sections that follow, each level will be examined,

but in an exemplary, not exhaustive fashion. Our object is

to teach the reader how to recognize rhetorical shaping in

biblical legal texts.

The Rhetoric of Legal Forms. (Period?)

Muilenburg suggested that his method supplement form-

critical analysis. Though that has not been typical of

rhetorical criticism in the Muilenburg School, there is a

lot great deal to be said for his position. Herrmann Gunkel,

10

who pioneered form criticism, did not set out an

authoritative account of law (Buss, 1999, p. 393). (Should

Buss be included in the bibliography?) Albrecht Alt

synthesized pre–-World War II form criticism of law,

subsuming all biblical legal statements, with the exception

of cultic rules, under two categories: apodictic and

casuistic. Apodictic law included addressed commandments,

impersonal death penalty law, and legal curses.

Addressed Commandments.(Period?)

The Decalogue consists of eight (traditional count)

prohibitions and two prescriptions. According to Alt’s

analysis, addressed prohibitions in their purest form are

short and unconditional, e.g.for example, “You shall not

kill” (Exod 20:13), and they occur in series, some short

and concentrated, some long and wide ranging. The Decalogue

is the prime example of the longer series.

Addressed commandments sound as though designed for

public proclamation. Alt understood the provision for

11

reading Deuteronomic Law (henceforth, D) every seven years

at the Feast of Tabernacles (Deut. 31:10–-13) as an old

practice designed for apodictic law.

The Decalogue was peculiarly suited to such a use,

since its wording reflects much more clearly the

actual situation in which [YHWHYahweh] and Israel

entered into a covenant... . . . . Only the

Decalogue precedes its series of prohibitions with

a clause of quite a different type, in which

[YHWHYahweh] himself takes the initiative, and

speaks in his own person... . . . (1966, p. 130).

With its preamble (Exod 20:2), the periodic recital of

apodictic law in the Decalogue becomes a covenant renewal

ceremony, giving apodictic law a specific liturgical

function in Israelite religion and an essential role in the

theological conceptual scheme known as covenant. Alt thought

this type of apodictic law was unique to Israel (1966, p.

131).

12

Erhard Gerstenberger (1965), the prime critic of Alt’s

apodictic category, argued that the Decalogue was a later,

rather artificial document. Original series, scattered

through the legal corpora, were short and centered on one or

a few related subjects. Gerstenberger also disputed the

uniqueness of apodictic commandments, finding the presence

of such material in extranonbiblical sources, and deeming

the ascription to YHWHYahweh late and artificial. Such

language originated instead in the family (cf. Jer. 35:6–-

7); parallels in Akkadian literature are not in legal codes.

A philosophical objection can also be raised to Alt’s

form criticism. Martin Buss (1999, pp. 392–3-94) questions

the assumption derived from Gunkel that form criticism

should seek “original” forms—short, simple, and unmixed.

Without assumptions about how forms evolve, such

reconstructions prove idle speculation. The Ten Commandments

may have been composed in the form of Exodus 20:1–-17 or

Deuteronomy 5:6–-21, or may have been more fluid.

13

If we doubt the value of recovering an “original,” and do

not assume such originals were always short, simple, and

pure, we can pursue instead the rhetorical import of the

actual wording.

The Rhetoric of Addressed Commandments.(Period?)

If we assume style of formulation is designed to have a

particular impact on an audience, the question becomes how

to discover that intended impact. The answer is by careful

attention to formal and material features of discourse. The

match between subject matter and presentation must be

interrogated. (Read instead: Thus, we will examine the match

between subject matter and presentation.)

Addressed commandments belong to an oral setting, as Alt

recognized. Verbs are second person, often singular, and not

imperative (“don’t x”), but the more formal imperfect

indicative (“you shall not x”). Since the authority of the

speaker, YHWHYahweh, has been established by context,

addressees become responsible to God for comportment. Broken

14

commandments violate the addressees’ relationship with the

speaker. The argument embedded in biblical apodictic

prohibitions and prescriptions is known in rhetorical

analysis as “argument from ethos.”

The Ten Commandments are a perfect match of personal

address, authority, unconditionality, and weighty subject

matter. It is not accidental that it is one of the most

influential legal documents in human history. The

alternative, “ritual Decalogue” of Exod.us 34:10–-26,

dictated to Moses to inscribe on the second tablets of stone

after the first set was broken in the Golden Calf debacle,

lacks the sharpness and gravity of Exodus 20:1–-17. Both

form and content contribute to the Decalogue’s premier

status in biblical law.

Other addressed commandments lack the prestige of the

Decalogue, however; how much rhetorical force does the form

have in those cases? Three examples from the Book of the

Covenant suffice to affirm the thesis that the commandment

form has a particular rhetorical force, which lends

15

authority to the prohibition and delineates how it should be

applied.

(1) At the beginning of the laws in Book of the

Covenant, a pair of prohibitions (Exod 20:23)

formulated in the second second-person plural concern a

communal act and probably prohibit images at the

Yahwistic altars in the following commandment.

(2) All the actions in two clusters of prohibition,

Exodus 23:1–-3, 6–-8, have to do with trials, at the

beginning of which one can imagine commandments being

proclaimed. The clustering of prohibitions carrycarries

rhetorical weight.

(3) A pair of prohibitions (Exod 22:21–-22) beginning

the addressed portion of the Book of the Covenant

forbid oppression and affliction. Protection of the

vulnerable, poor, outsiders, etc.and so forth, is an

important function of Israelite law; indications are

that such people relied on divine intervention to

punish victimizers.

16

(Indent?) The Holiness Code (H) contains two chapters in

which addressed prohibitions set the tone. Leviticus 18 has

one prohibition (<Lev>18:7) with various listed objects.

Leviticus 20 specifies punishments for many of these

forbidden sexual liaisons, forming a chiasm with Lev.iticus

19 at the center. Leviticus 19 is a beautifully crafted

comprehensive code of behavior constructed of clusters of

prohibitions along with a few cultic and case laws. The

commandment form fits perfectly the serious content of this

chapter. Each cluster concludes, “I am YHWHYahweh (your

God),” planting each prohibition directly on the addressee’s

conscience by divine authority. Leviticus 19:2 holds the

whole community to the obligation to be holy in imitation of

YHWHYahweh’s holiness.

Deuteronomy repeats the Ten Commandments with some

relatively small variations in wording (Deut. 5:6–-21). In

the Deuteronomic code proper (chapters 12–-26), a human

speaks but authority still resides with YHWHYahweh. The

change of speaker weakens the force of the addressed

commandments; they become sermonic admonitions not divine

17

address. Perhaps this fact explains the comparative rarity

of addressed prohibitions in DDeuteronomic Law.

The Môt Yûmāt Legal Formulations. (Period?)

Alt also included two other types of legal formulation under

apodictic law. One describes the doer of a criminal act in a

participle which that becomes the subject of a Hophal verb

and infinitive absolute (môt yûmāt) of the root √mwt, “to

die.” The entire construction means “to be certainly put to

death.” Exodus 21:16 is an example: “whoever kidnaps a

person... . . . shall surely be put to death.” It is a part

of a series, Exodus 21:12, 15–, 16, 17. Given the

punishment, these laws cover serious offenses. This

formulation can be called môt yûmāt law for its

characteristic Hebrew apodosis.

Gerstenberger rejected Alt’s bold effort to simplify the

legal categories by locating the môt yûmāt form within the

came same category as addressed commandments. He classified

the môt yûmāt formulation as a by-form of casuistic law

18

because it is not addressed to a specific party and

specifies a penalty. Others have followed Gerstenberger’s

lead (see Liedke, 1971, pp. 104–1-20).

The Rhetoric of môt yûmāt Formulations. (Period?)

Alt had good rhetorical reasons for distinguishing môt yûmāt

from casuistic law. Not only are they gathered in series

like addressed commandments, and cover the same offenses

(see 1966, p. 121), but also the “apodosis” does not

designate how the penalty is to be administered or who will

do so, and it varies from law to law. I see this type of

formulation as meant to grant permission for, and even to

require, the execution of an offender. It is God, the

Creator and the law-giver, who authorizes the killing of a

human, and only God can do so. The killing is thus a divine

act: avengers, the court, or parents are the divine agents.

Within (The?) HHoliness Code, Lev.Leviticus 24:15–-22

diverges somewhat from Exodus 21:12–-17. The unit has a

chiastic structure, contains several echoes of môt yûmāt

19

formulations, and also contains the famous lex talionis. The

rhetoric of this passage has been brought to scholarly

attention by Jonathan Vroom (2012, pp. 27–-44). He terms

these legal formulations mišpāṭîm, not distinguishing them,

as I would, from casuistic law. Vroom’s argues that the

issue is whether a foreigner or sojourner (gēr) is under the

same law as the native (ʾezrāḥ). This accounts for the

principle formulated twice ([Lev] 24:16b, 22) and

constitutes the innovation being proposed in the unit as a

whole.

What is rhetorical about LevLeviticus 24:15–-22? Legal

formulations in the Book of the Covenant are cited and

echoed so the audience is persuaded that innovation

continues tradition, in this case, tradition concerning who

is accountable. Vroom sees the need for this innovation

arising from a theology of the land—namely, that the land

becomes unclean when a crime takes place on it, no matter

who did it.

20

There are no classic môt yûmāt laws in the Deuteronomic

code; instead of the Hophal passive with infinitive

absolute, there are legal statements with a participle in

the protasis and stipulation of death in the apodosis.

Deut.eronomy 22:22 and 24:7 have a participle as the object

of a passive construction, “If there is found a man (ʾîš)

who...” . . . .” In the apodosis, a Qal perfect of √mwt,

with the noun (e.g., the thief) as subject, replaces the

Hophal imperfect. The wording is impersonal. The community

is addressed personally in the motive clause attached to the

apodosis. As it stands, these two legal formulations stress

the duty of the people to maintain a just, righteous

community.

Casuistic Law. (Period?)

Casuistic law has a characteristic impersonal style: a

hypothetical case is offered in the protasis with the legal

consequences in the apodosis. The carefully reasoned

statements of legal consequences for particular actions or

occurrences resembles the laws of the Mesopotamian and

21

Hittite legal codes (see ANET, 159–-198); Roth, 1997), which

HammurapiHammurabi said would benefit a person who had a

legal claim (Laws of HammurabiLH, reverse xxv lines 4–-19).

Casuistic laws thus seem designed as paradigms for

judicial application. Alt thought the ancient Near Eastern

codes were indicative of legal traditions throughout the

Middle East, preserved by previous inhabitants of Canaan,

and adopted by Israelites along with a corresponding

judicial practice. Several features of this picture have

been disputed, but it is still feasible to derive the

mišpāṭîm of Book of the Covenant from these royal codes,

particularly the Laws of HammurabiLH (see D. Wright, 2003:,

pp. 11–-87)8).

The Rhetoric of Casuistic Law. (Period?)

Case law would not seem fertile ground for discovering legal

rhetoric. This is law at its most dry. But dryness too can

be a form of persuasion. The paradigms are ordered

logically, designed to elicit legal reasoning; in terms of

22

classical rhetoric, they appeal to logos. Insofar as they

reflect the moral values of society, such rulings also

appeal to ethos.

The wording of the Book of the Covenant indicates it was

proclaimed orally, although it is written as well (Exod

24:3–-8). Portions of Book of the Covenant are direct divine

address to Israel, and even the impersonal mišpāṭîm

occasionally slip into second person (Exod 21:2, 13–-14,

23–-25;, 22:18 ([Eng.]). One may surmise that the mišpāṭîm

instructed judges in the enforcement of the law, and men of

means in the duties of good citizenship.

The responsibility of such exemplary citizens appears in

a distinctive type of casuistic law, namely, laws governing

primary rights and duties (sometimes classified it (strike)

as “if-you” law). This type of formulation describes a legal

transaction or social situation in the protasis, and spells

out rights and duties in the apodosis. Exodus 22:25–-27

(Eng.) governs lending to the poor. According to Exodus

23:4–-5, the addressees owe duties of assistance, even if a

23

stray animal’s owner is an enemy. Such law seeks to persuade

citizens to care for all neighbors (despite ineffective

legal enforcement).

Lev.iticus 25:8–-55 institutes a “sabbath of sabbaths,” a

year of Jubilee which that restores citizens and land to

their original status. If It functions as the framework for

a set of laws concerning landownership, labor for wages, and

slavery. As for style of formulation, these laws are

casuistic laws governing primary rights and duties. Personal

pronouns and motive clauses run through the chapter, urging

those with means to respect the needy and vulnerable. The

formality of impersonal case law has been reshaped into a

homily.

The Deueteronomic code has a collection of casuistic

remedial law on marriage and adultery (<Deut>22:13-–21, 23-–

27, 28-29) and two other isolated casuistic formulations

(<Deut>24:1-–4;, 25:11-–12). Deuteronomy 24:1-–4, a case of

primary law, provides motive clauses that threaten the

holiness of the land (<Deut>24: 4). The case of an unsolved

24

murder (Deut( 21:1-–9) has a similar rationale and sense of

urgency. In each instance, the case itself is presented in

impersonal style, but the people are addressed corporately

in motive clauses as enforcers of the law.

Deuteronomy has a host of casuistic laws governing

primary rights and duties: 15:1-–11, 12-18; 21:15-–17;,

22:1-–4, 6-–7, 8; 23:16-–17 (Eng.), 20-–21, 25-–26; 24:5–,

6, 10-–11, 12-13, 14-15, 19-–22; 25:5-–10, all personally

addressed to the stronger party of the legal relationship.

These provisions are central to the purpose of the legal

corpus, which is to create responsible persons.

Cultic Prescriptions. (Period?)

Alt’s categories did not include sacrificial and purity law

(Lev iticus 1-–16, etc.), rules governing priests (Lev

iticus 21-–22, etc.), or cultic prescriptions addressed to

all Israel. Economy requires restricting this study to

prescriptions for all Israelites.

25

The Book of the Covenant has a set of provisions on the

altar at the beginning (Exod 20:23-–26) and holy times at

the end (Exod 23:10-–19). These sections do contain

apodictic prohibitions (Exod 20:23, 25–, 26; 23:13b, 15b,

18, 19b), but prescriptions predominate. The idea is to

establish a practice governed by value-laden rules.

Each of the three corpora addressed to the laity has a

festival calendar: ExodExodus 23:14-–17;, Leviticus 23;, and

Deut.eronomy 16:1-–7. The Book of the Covenant highlights

three pilgrimages:, Unleavened unleavened Breadbread,

Harvest harvest, and Ingatheringingathering. These three

will remain central but the calendars change. Nothing

explicit was said in the Book of the Covenant about Passover

(though see Exod 23:18), a festival celebrated in the home

(Exod 13:11-–16), not at the pilgrimage site or sites

(<Exod>23:18). The calendars in the Holiness Code and the

Deuteronomic Law give the impression that practices have

remained the same across the centuries (though in fact there

are numerous innovations in the festivals of the H Holiness

Code) (correction: “both codes”).

26

What is rhetorically noteworthy is that the later

calendar texts with their innovations are presented as the

practice of the people of God from the beginning. The most

dramatic change occurs in Deuteronomy 16:1-–17. Since the

Deuteronomic law has reduced the places of sacrifice to one

sanctuary, Passover (which involves the sacrifice of a lamb)

must be relocated to the central sanctuary and combined with

Unleavened unleavened Bread bread (<Deut>16:1-–8), creating

a number of seeming contradictions or absurdities.

Similarly, Deuteronomic reduction of legitimate

sacrificial altars to one place, is worded so that it echoes

the Book of the Covenant, in particular, Exodus 20:24, “An

altar of earth you shall make for me and sacrifice on it

your burnt offerings (ʿōlôt) and your well-being offerings

(šĕlāmîm), your sheep and your cattle; in every place where

I cause my name to be remembered I will come to you and

bless you...” . . . .” The sites would be all over the

countryside, performing the function of claiming territory

surrounding the altar as belonging to YHWHYahweh.

27

Deuteronomy 12 retains the idea of a place chosen by

YHWHYahweh (<Deut>12:2-–3, 4-7 [8-–9], 11, 14). Now,

however, it is only one place. The wording for “wherever”

and the one place are similar. The one place is where the

worshipper sacrifices whole burnt offerings (<Deut>12:13,

27) and a series of other required or voluntary offerings

(<Deut>12:17, 26). Because local altars have been abolished,

provision must be made for slaughtering sheep, goats, and

cattle solely for food. Scholars call this “secular”

slaughter because the animals are not killed at the altar.

The Holiness Code has a law governing the altar in

Leviticus 17. It forbids non-sacrificial slaughter to avoid

encouraging slaughtering to demons (<Lev>17:2-–9) but

seconds Deuteronomy’s prohibition of eating blood (Lev.

17:10-–16).

In these cases, then, we have intertextual allusions to

legitimize innovations or to dispute teachings of other

texts. As Bernard M. Levinson observes about the

Deuteronomic hermeneutic, “Reading Deuteronomy brings to the

28

fore the dialectical interplay between tradition and

innovation” (2011:, p. 273). To quote Deut.eronomy 5:3-–4,

“Not only with our forbearers did YHWH Yahweh make this

covenant but with us....” . . . .” Viewed rhetorically,

Deuteronomy’s hermeneutic is a rhetorical enterprise of the

highest order.

Motive Clauses and Paranesis.(Period?)

Motive clauses and paranesis are rhetoric pure and simple.

B. Gemser defined motive clauses as follows: “grammatically

subordinate sentences in which the motivation for the

commandment is given” (1953:, p. 50). Independent sentences

that exhort, advise, or appeal to the audience can be

distinguished from dependent clauses designed to move the

audience to comply. Despite the overlap, no one would

classify short paragraphs like Lev.iticus 18:1-–5, 26-–30,

as clauses. These independent sentences are better called

“paranesis.”

29

Both mMotive clauses and paranesis are discourse whose

purpose is persuasion. They also teach theological concepts

and the worldview of the authorities and their intended

audiences. After getting acquainted with the types of

paranesis and motive clauses in the Ten Commandments, the

survey will next consider the presence of such items in the

Book of the Covenant, the Holiness Code, and the

Deuteronomic Law.

The Ten Commandments.

Within the commandments in Exodus 20:1-–17, Exodus 20:5-–6,

7b, 10b, 11, and 12b are paranesis or motive clauses. Exodus

20:5-–6 follows the prohibitions against recognizing any god

but YHWHYahweh and against making images. Exodus 20:5

prohibits worshipping (bowing down to) images, which can be

taken to supplement the prohibition of making images. The

plural object has no antecedent in Exodus 20:4, but seems to

refer to the “gods” in Exodus 20:3. The upshot is that

Exodus 20:5a combines the two commandments (as Jews, Roman

Catholics, and Lutherans do).

30

Like Exodus 34:14, 20:5a is supported by a declaration

about YHWHYahweh’s nature, namely that he is an ʾēl qannāh, a

jealous or zealous god, who positively insists on the sole

loyalty of any adherent. The love of YHWHYahweh will become

the positive version of the first commandment in

Deut.eronomy 6:4-–5.

The other persuasive clauses in the Ten Commandments

focus on the statement to which they are attached. Exod

20:7b, warns the audience that YHWHYahweh takes blasphemy

very seriously, speaking of the deity in the third person,

as God does in Exod 20:8-–11. In the Holiness Code,

blasphemy is a capital crime.

The injunction to observe the Sabbathsabbath is stated

bluntly in Exod 20:8, then is repeated in Exod 20:9-–10.

Exod 20:10b could be classified as a motive clause but the

list borders on welfare law protecting those who work at the

addressee’s command, affirming the equality of all, even

animals and sojourners, in sacred time. Deuteronomy 5:15

supports the list of persons that should rest with a

31

recollection of YHWHYahweh’s deliverance of enslaved

Israelites.

Verse 11 Exod 20:11 introduces another type of motive

clause, a recollection of a deed of YHWHYahweh (here,

creation), which sets apart the seventh day (Gen 2:1-–3).

Humans should imitate YHWHYahweh in resting.

Finally, the injunction to honor parents has a promise of

long life, or length of time in possession of the land,

attached to it. This promise is a classic motive clause. It

can be read as a conditional promise to individuals or to

the nation.

The Book of the Covenant.

There are no motive causes or paranesis in the mišpāṭîm (Exod

21:1-—22:20 [Eng.]). The scattered personally addressed

verses have a rhetorical tinge, particularly in Exodus

21:13-–14 and 23-–25, but both of these have explanatory

functions.

32

Motive clauses in the Book of the Covenant invariably

support addressed material (viz., Exod 20:23-–26;, 22:21-–31

[Eng.];, 23:1-–19). Those in Exod 22:21-–24 appeal to

pathos: 22:21b with a recollection of Israelites in Egypt;

22:23-–24 with a warning by YHWHYahweh of divine punishment,

in which punishment of the addressee will be grace to the

supplicant. Poetic justice also appears in 22:24.

The motive clauses and paranesis of Exodus 22:25-–27,

case law governing loans to the poor, sets the tone for the

other codes: the lawgiver cultivates a non-condescending and

compassionate attitude. Exodus 22:27b threatens lenders with

a promise to answer the poor man’s prayer.

Finally, Exodus 22:31 prefaces a prohibition of eating an

animal killed by a predator with a theological definition of

Israelites as holy by YHWHYahweh’s initiative.

There is no paranesis and relatively few motive clauses

in Exodus 23:1-–9, yet the two series of prohibitions

concerning judicial practice (<Exod>23:1-–3, 6-–8, 9) have a

strongly moral cast, and Exodus 23:7 contains a regular

33

motive clause and warning of divine sanctions. Exodus 23:8

explains how bribes pervert justice.

Cultic law at the end of Book of the Covenant (Exod.

23:10-–19) concerns sacred times: The the sabbatical year,

explained as a way for the poor and wild animals to benefit

(<Exod>23:11), and the Sabbathsabbath, for the worker to

rest (<Exod>23:12b). Exodus 23:13 is a paranetic

interruption, which probably has to do with worship. The

sentence “none shall appear before me empty handed,” in

Exodus 23:15b, could be classified either as a rule or a

warning. The latter would qualify as paranesis.

The Holiness Code.(Bold. Why a period?)

Motive clauses and paranesis in the Holiness Code tend to be

driven by subject matter. Each chapter has its own

distinctive rhetorical character. We can restrict our study

to the paranesis of Leviticus 18 and, 20, and the motives

clauses and paranesis of chapters 19 and 25.

34

Chapter Leviticus18 begins with a short homily against

imitating the sexual practices of the Egyptians or the

previous inhabitants of Canaan (<Lev>18:1-–5) and ends with

another (<Lev>18:24-–30) that blames the expulsion of the

previous inhabitants on their defiling actions. The people

should be warned that if they do the same, the result will

be the same.

Chapter Leviticus 20 has two paranetic statements

(<Lev>20:7-–8) in the midst of laws condemning mediums,

wizards, and harlotry (<Lev>20:6); and also contains a

homily at the end (<Lev>20:22-–26). Once again the subject

is imitating previous inhabitants. If Israel does the same,

the result will be the same.

Leviticus 19 begins with a paranetic sentence that has

given the code its name in modern scholarship: “You shall be

holy; for I YHWHYahweh your God am holy” (<Lev>19:2). This

commandment carries a good deal of theological weight. The

holy God is referred continually throughout the chapter in

appeals to authority (<Lev>19:3–, 4, 10, 12, etc.). Thus,

35

taking a false oath (<Lev>19:11-–12) becomes a religious

offense as well as an offense against one’s neighbor.

Leviticus 19 climaxes in the cluster on conflict among

Israelites: 19:17 forbids “hate” and suggests an alternative

with a motive clause redirecting the addressee’s attention

to one’s own behavior, “lest you bear sin because of him.”

The description of the offender is itself a motive clause,

“the son of your own people.” In Leviticus 19:18 the speaker

draws his commandments together in the positive injunction,

“You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” repeated at the

end of the chapter with the sojourner (gēr) as the object of

love.

The Year of Jubilee (Leviticus 25) provides a framework

for welfare laws. As one would expect, there are motive

clauses and paranetic sentences throughout the chapter,

Leviticus 25:12, 14, 17, 21, 39-–40, and 42.

The Deuteronomic Law.(Bold. Why the period?)

36

This corpus of law is more thoroughly infused with motive

clauses and paranesis than any other biblical law corpora

(read: corpus). We will examine motive clauses by type and

conclude with an example of a “paranetic law.”

A few motive clauses build upon human dignity or

Israelite identity, Deut 25:3;, Deut 24:10-–11;, Deut 14:2,

21;, Deut 7:6.

Deuteronomy also draws upon YHWHYahweh’s “attitude” to

support a host of prohibitions. A characteristic phrase is,

it is “an abomination (tôʿēbāh) to YHWHYahweh.” Some of the

things that offend YHWHYahweh are moral, some ritual (see

Deut 12:31;, 17:1;, 18:12;, 2:5;, 23:18 [Eng.];, 24:4;,

25:16). Deut.eronomy 16:22 characterizes the sacred post

known as an ʾăšērāh (perhaps related to the goddess Asherah)

as something YHWHYahweh “hates.” Deut.eronomy 21:23

characterizes the body of a person executed for a crime as

being “accursed.”

The Deuteronomic figure of Moses draws upon historical

memory, particularly the exodus, to motivate empathy for the

37

condition of the vulnerable ([Deut] 15:15;, 23:8b; and

24:18, 22). YHWHYahweh himself is identified by his

redemption of Israel from Egyptian slavery (13:6, 11; also

5:6).

The legal speaker is a firm believer in the deterrent

value of punishment. The people, through their courts,

should exact harsh punishment of wrong doers to teach the

people not to repeat the crime: Deut 13:12, etc.

Deuteronomy takes its rhetoric of corporate

responsibility even further in the recurring motive clauses

that call upon Israel to “purge the evil from your midst.”

There are ten instances of this motive clause; the first is

at Deuteronomy16:6 (read:13:6 [Eng. 13:5]). The idea is that

execution of the criminal will remove the evil from the

nation along with the contagious guilt the nation contracted

by association with the evil. By ritual, guilt for unsolved

murder (Deut. 21:1-–9) could be forgiven without serious

consequences.

38

A set of motive clauses promises reward for obedience to

the legal provision to which it is attached. The

Deuteronomic version of the Decalogue has a pair of such

promises attached to the commandment to honor parents: “that

your days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with you

in the land which YHWHYahweh your God gives you” (Deut.

5:16b). Similar conditional promises are found throughout

Deuteronomy (e.g., 12:25;, 25:15, etc.).

The rhetorical nature of Deuteronomy has long been

recognized. Gerhard Vvon Rad spoke of the laws of

Deuteronomy 12-–26 as “paranetic laws” (1953, p.: 22) of

which Deuteronomy 12 and 13 are full-blown examples. A brief

analysis of chapter 13 is instructive.

Chapter 13 is somewhat redundant because Deuteronomy

17:2-–7 covers the case of apostasy sufficiently.

Deuteronomy 13:1-–5 and 6-11 (Eng.) are homiletic

expansions, addressing the responsible citizen who must

resist every temptation to apostasy and suppress it whenever

encountered. Each unit identifies a person who would

39

seriously tempt the addressee to adopt another god. To make

the temptation palpable, the protasis in each case describes

the person expansively (<Deut>13:1-–2, 6-–7). The apodosis

is delayed in each case. An exhortation interrupts

(<Deut>13:3) to explain the powers of a false prophet;

instead, one should listen to YHWHYahweh (<Deut>13:4) (why

add Deut?). The speaker adds another persuasive theme:

reference to the God “you know,” who delivered you from

Egyptian slavery (<Deut>13:5, 10b-–11) (why add Deut?).

The Framework of the Law.(Period?)

The topic of legal rhetoric may not suggest to the reader

the study of the legal codes within their narrative

settings. Yet it is the literary framework that invests

legal statements with their authority, the capacity to

command and expect obedience. It can hardly be doubted that

the ascription of the law to YHWHYahweh, the God of Israel

and Creator of the world, enhances the authority of the

legal statements of the Pentateuch exponentially. Biblical

40

law is unthinkable without the divine author/speaker of the

commandments. The narrative also clarifies that the “you”

addressed in biblical law is not every human, but a member

of the Israelite people. The motivational language derives

from the relationship of YHWHYahweh to this one people, a

relationship represented textually in the framework of the

law.

Codes, Narratives, Covenant.(Period?)

Things may have been presented differently. The law could

have been communicated, as it is in Numbers, entirely in

bits and pieces, with narratives of precedents or series of

specific rules interspersed. How, then, do the three main

legal corpora of the Pentateuch differ from piecemeal

revelations? Paradigmatic cases are grouped to suggest

principles in common, distinctions between categories, and

so forth. Students of the code in question thus learn to

construct a network of concepts and principles for deciding

any case. The addressed format (and literary framework)

41

draws the whole law together as the will of YHWHYahweh for

his people.

These codes could have been offered in books or

collections of legal formulations, analogous to prophetic

books. Instead, they are found in narratives and/or are

parts of narrated rituals. As noted above, these narratives

lend authority to the laws. The narrative of the events at

Sinai/Horeb (Exod us 19—Num bers 10) evokes a unique moment

in human history, a moment of theophany and revelation that

has defined Judaism ever since: no sooner do the people bind

themselves to YHWHYahweh and his law than they rebel. When

YHWHYahweh threatens to annihilate them, Moses negotiates

provisions for forgiveness. Then the Tabernacle is built and

YHWHYahweh takes up residence.

Deuteronomy comes the nearest to being a collection of

laws standing on its own, but it too is located within a

larger narrative. It is a speech of Moses as he approaches

death and Israel prepares to cross the Jordan. Deuteronomy

is not couched as a new law-giving, then, but as an

42

(re)interpretation of the law for life on the Promised Land

without Moses.

The narratives according authority to the three corpora

speak of “covenant” (bĕrît). That is not a new word, nor a

word used only for the bond between YHWHYahweh and Israel.

In the narrative framing of the law codes, however, the term

was used for the bond between God and people, a bond that

included divine law and the obligation of the human party to

obey it. The people were to “keep” the covenant (Exod

19:5). If they violated the law, they are said to have

broken the covenant (Lev 26:15, 44). If the breach were

serious enough, and unrepaired, YHWHYahweh would punish,

even destroy his covenant partner (Lev 26:25, 44). Yet

after judgment, YHWHYahweh could restore the status (and

health) of the partner (Lev 26:45). In these citations from

Leviticus 26, there are the beginnings of a “covenant

theology.”

Deuteronomy 5:3 uses the word bĕrît for the relationship

entered into at Horeb; the Ten Commandments seem to be the

43

constitution of this confederation. In Deuteronomy 28:69

(Heb.)/29:1 (Eng.), the present event in the land of Moab is

also termed a bĕrît, and is distinguished from the bĕrît made

at Horeb.

The texts that employ the word bĕrît are ritual texts and

homilies on theological topics, designed to enhance the

authority of the law and of its author. They succeeded: for

thousands of years Bible readers have seized upon the term

“covenant” and the theological concepts it articulates.

The Code Form.(Period?)

There was obviously a law “code” form in the ancient Near

East; we have more than a half dozen different instances,

with striking similarities between them. Evidently the Laws

of HammurapiHammurabi attained the status of a classic and

was copied (and studied) for more than a millennium. Israel

may well have taken over this form. But note how different

the Israelite legal codes are: they are personally addressed

by a deity to the people. No ancient Near Eastern law code

44

has that form, though HammurapiHammurabi credited Shamash

with commissioning him to write the laws. The content

differs as well: the ancient Near Eastern law codes were

mostly impersonal case law, but the biblical codes have

moral and cultic law as well. Indeed, impersonal casuistic

law has dwindled to insignificance in the Holiness Code and

the Deuteronomic law. The ancient Near Eastern collections

were for monuments and for scribal training; the biblical

codes for public proclamation.

Just how fixed was the biblical code form? All have

commissioning accounts: each begins with laws on the place

of sacrifice; each returns to cultic subjects at the end;

and each has a festival calendar, though they differ among

themselves. Otherwise, the content and order vary. The

mišpāṭîm cover many cases that are never covered again. On

the other handBy contrast, the moral and cultic laws in

Exodus 22:21—23:10 recur in the other codes. The Holiness

Code has a unique set of laws governing sexual intercourse

(Lev 18, 20); Deuteronomy also has a collection on sexual

intercourse, but its cases are not of the same type as

45

HHoliness Code. The Holiness Code introduces the Jubilee

Year and incorporates laws dealing with property, debt,

slavery, and the like—laws we find scattered in the Book of

the Covenant and in Deuteronomy. For its part, Deuteronomy

has laws governing customs no other code mentions.

The codes were probably related genetically. The Book of

the Covenant seems to have been the precedent for both the

HHoliness Code and DDeuteronomic Law. The Book of the

Covenant is itself related by narrative sequence to the

Decalogue. The latter is a unique type of document within

biblical law. It has the range of a code, but is something

like a digest of fundamental violations and duties. It

stands out because of its position as well as its content:

all Israelites heard it, or so it seems. Moses goes up to

YHWHYahweh to receive the Book of the Covenant

afterwardsward. Perhaps we are to regard the Book of the

Covenant, then, as an “exposition” or application of the Ten

Commandments. There does not seem to be any other exigency

driving it, though it does have a “social gospel” spirit in

Exodus 22:21-— 23:13.

46

The Deuteronomic Law has a particular exigency. Critical

scholars have associated it with Josiah’s Reform (2 Kings

22-–23). Josiah took it as a call to purge the nation of

non-Yahwistic institutions and practices, and decommission

all sanctuaries but the temple in Jerusalem. As Levinson has

cogently argued, Deuteronomy 12 is carefully formulated to

make a radical cultic innovation seem like a preservation of

the tradition in Exodus 20:24. DDeuteronomic Law also has

other innovations. According to Crüsemann, it empowers

laity, particularly heads of families to take responsibility

for the justice and welfare of the people.

The exigency of the HHoliness Code is not as evident as

DDeuteronomic Law. Paranetic paragraphs in Leviticus 18 and

20 warn the audience of trouble if they do not maintain high

standards of sexual morality. The brilliant moral teaching

of Leviticus 19 has a universal quality; no particular

social crisis is necessary to prompt its composition. The

Year of Jubilee, on the other handby contrast, could

represent an effort to reform the economic inequalities of

some period, whether pre-exilic or post-exilic. Since the

47

HHoliness Code was preserved as a part of the Priestly

source (P), its dating and rhetorical exigency should be

keyed to the Priestly strand of the Pentateuch.

Covenant.(Period?)

In the era dominated by form criticism, many scholars

believed that the biblical covenant was modeled on the

suzerain-vassal treaty, particularly the form used by the

Hittites. There are still scholars who adhere to this

thesis, but others are unsatisfied with it. Whatever the

case, we have no “treaty text” in the Pentateuch; we have

narratives and speeches. At certain strategic points in

these narratives the Hebrew word bĕrît is employed to

interpret what is going on between YHWHYahweh and Israel.

A survey of the occurrences of bĕrît can begin with Exodus

19-–24. Three uses emphasize the obligation of the human

party to YHWHYahweh. In Exodus 19:5, “my covenant” is a

troth or agreement that Israel must “keep”; the statement is

parallel to “obey my voice.” In Exodus 24:4, 7, bĕrît is the

48

name of a book into which “the words of YHWHYahweh and

judgments” are written. Later in the unit, the “blood of the

covenant,” sprinkled on altar and people, ratifies the

relationship, along with its obligations, between the

parties.

Another set of Exodus texts associates bĕrît with a

theophany. ExodExodus 24:9-–11, which is another ritual act

ratifying the relationship_ (insert comma [,]) does not

contain the word bĕrît, but ExodExodus 34:10 announces

YHWHYahweh’s act of “making a covenant,” followed by a

divine promise to do miraculous deeds. Covenant is again

associated with YHWHYahweh’s commandments in Exodus 34:27-–

28.

Leviticus 26 contains no less than five mentions of bĕrît .

bĕrît. LevLeviticus 26:15 (and <Lev>25 (this should read “and

26:25” or “verse 25”) speak of bĕrît as an agreement which

that can be broken by disobeying divine law. By contrast,

Lev.Leviticus 26:45 introduces covenant as promise of

relationship calling for mercy and salvation, which is a

49

radically different meaning of the word: “but I will

remember in their favor the covenant with their ancestors,

whom I brought out of the land of Egypt in the sight of the

nations, to be their God.” Here covenant is a promise of

relationship that calls for mercy and salvation. This is the

same covenant that earlier brought judgment.

Deuteronomy uses bĕrît for the relationship to which humans

are obligated. Deuteronomy 5:3 refers to the event at Horeb

as covenant- making, and distills this to the Ten

Commandments. In Deuteronomy, the Ten Commandments are the

revealed word of YHWHYahweh, and the other law corpora are

interpretations; Moses’s’s current word to some decree

s(read: degree) supplants the Book of the Covenant without

replacing it. As already noted, Deut.eronomy 28:69 (Eng.

/29:1) speaks of the covenant made in the land of Moab as

well as the covenant made at Horeb.

Deuteronomy 29:14 uses the expression “sworn covenant,”

as both promise and obligation. Thus, we read, “forsook the

covenant” in Deuteronomy 29:25; “forsake me and broke my

50

covenant” in Deuteronomy 31:16; and “despise me and break my

covenant” in Deuteronomy 31:20. Deuteronomy does not use

bĕrît in the promise of repentance and salvation, as Leviticus

26:45 does; nevertheless, Deuteronomy does not end in

judgment, but expresses the certainty that Israel will be

restored to YHWHYahweh after judgment (<Deut>30:1-–14). The

“retribution theology” (act-consequence; rewards and

punishments) thinking that is often associated with covenant

is not the last word in Deuteronomy. Once YHWHYahweh enters

into relationship with the people, he will not let them be

lost.

Reception History.(Why the period?)

While the present article has restricted its attention to

the Pentateuch, it is nevertheless important to make the

rhetorical observation that law must be received, adopted,

and applied before it can be said to have performed its

function. The various accounts of the proclamation of law to

the assembled Israelites lend authority and majesty to

51

Torah. One need only read the account of finding the book of

Mosaic law in the temple, and its authentication and

adoption (2 Kgs 22:10—23:3), to appreciate the impact of

legal reception. In this particular case, the law became the

charter of a dramatic reform (2 Kgs 23:4-–25) that laid the

foundation for a new piety.

[See also AMNESTY AND REFORM TEXTS; ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW;

ANIMALS; BIBLICAL LAW, , SUBENTRY HEBREW BIBLE; BIBLICAL LAW, , SUBENTRY

NEW TESTAMENT; BOOK OF THE COVENANT; CALENDAR AND FESTIVALS; CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT; CIVIL LAW; COMMANDMENTS; COVENANT; DECALOGUE; DEUTERONOMIC

LAW; ETHICS; FOOD AND MEALS; GOLDEN RULE; HALAKHA/RABBINIC LAW;

HITTITE LAWS; HOLINESS CODE AND WRITINGS; JUSTICE; LABOR; LAW IN THE

PROPHETS; LAW IN THE WRITINGS; LAWS OF HAMMURAPI; LEGAL EXPERTS, ,

SUBENTRY ANCIENT NEAR EAST AND HEBREW BIBLE; LEGAL INSTITUTIONS;

METHODS IN STUDYING ANCIENT LAW, , SUBENTRY ANCIENT NEAR EAST AND HEBREW

BIBLE; NARRATIVE; PRIESTLY LAW; PURITY; RELIGIOUS OFFENSES; SCRIBES

AND SCRIBALISM; SOCIOLOGY OF LAW; and THEOLOGY OF LAW, , SUBENTRY HEBREW

BIBLE]

Bibliography

52

Alt, Albrecht. Essays on Old Testament History and Religion.,

tTrans.lated by R. A. Wilson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,

1966.

Baltzer, Klaus. The Covenant Formulary in Old Testament, Jewish, and

Early Christian Writings. Trans.lated by David Green.

Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971.

Buss, Martin. Biblical Form Criticism in its Its Context. Journal for

the Study of the Old Testament: Supplement SeriesJSOT

Sup. 274. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999.

Eichrodt, Walther. Theology of the Old Testament., 2 Vvols. Old

Testament Library. Trans.lated by J. A. Baker. London:

SCM Press Ltd., 1961.

Fishbane, Michael. Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1985.

Gemser, B. “The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old

Testament Law.” Vetus TestamentumVT Sup 1 (1953):, pp. 50–

66.

53

Gerstenberger, Erhard. Wesen und Herkunft des “Apodiktischen Rechts.”

Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen

TestamentWMANT 20. Neukirchen, Germany: Neukirkener

Verlag, 1965.

Gilmer, H. W. The If-You Form in Israelite Law. Society of Biblical

Literature Dissertation SeriesSBLDS 15. Missoula, Mont.:

Scholars Press, 1975.

Levinson, Bernard M. Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal

Innovation. Oxford and new New York: Oxford University

Press, 1997.

Levinson, Bernard M. _________. Legal Revision and Religious

Renewal in Ancient Israel. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2008.

Levinson, Bernard M. _________. “The Right Chorale”: Studies in Biblical

Law and Interpretation. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2011.

Liedke, Gerhard. Gestalt und Bezeichnung alttestamentlischer

Rechtssätze: Eine formgeschichtlich-terminologische Studie.

Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen

54

TestamentWMANT 39. Neikirchen-Vluyn, Germany:

Neukirchener Verlag, 1971.

Lohfink, Norbert. Studien zum Deuteronomium und zur

deuteronomischen Lituratur V. SBAB 38. Stuttgart: Katholisches

Bibelwerk, 2005.

Mendenhall, George. Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near

East. Pittsburgh: Presbyterian Board of Colportage of

Western Pennsylvania, 1955.

Milgrom, Jacob. Leviticus 1–-16. Vol. 3. Anchor Bible

Commentary, Vol. 3. New York: Doubleday, 1991. Vol. 3A

Leviticus 17–-22 (2000).. Vol. 3B.. Leviticus 23–-27 (2001).

Miller, Patrick. The Way of the Lord: Essays in Old Testament Theology.

Grand Rapids, Mich., and Cambridge, UK: M. B. Eerdmans

Publ. Co., 2004/07.

Muilenburg, James. “Form Criticism and Beyond. Journal of

Biblical LiteratureJBL 88 (1969):, pp. 1–18.

Otto, Eckart. Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments. Theologische

Wissenschaft 3.2. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994.

55

Otto, Eckart. Das Deuteronomium: Politische Theologie und Rechtsreform

in Juda und Assyrien. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die

Alttestamentliche WissenschaftBZAW 284. Berlin: De

Gruyter, 1999.

_________. Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments. Theologische

Wissenschaft 3.2. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994.

Patrick, Dale. Old Testament Law: An Introduction. Atlanta: John

Knox Press, 1985.

Patrick, Dale. _________. The Rhetoric of Revelation in Hebrew

Scripture. Overtures to Biblical Theology. Minneapolis:

Fortress Press, 1999.

Patrick, Dale, and Allen Scult., Rhetoric and Biblical

Interpretation. Sheffield, UK: The Amond Press, 1990.

Sonsino, Rifat. Motive Clauses in Hebrew Law. Society of

Biblical Literature Dissertation SeriesSBLDS 45. Chico,

CAalif.: Scholars Press, 1980.

56

Trible, Phyllis. Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method, and the Book of

Jonah. Guides to Biblical ScholarshipGBS. Minneapolis:

Fortress Press, 1994.

von Rad, Gerhard. Studies in Deuteronomy. Translated by David

Stalker. SBT 9. Chicago: Rignery, 1953.

von Rad, Gerhard. The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Studies.,

tTrans.lated by E. W. Trueman Dicken. Edinburgh: Oliver &

Boyd, 1965.

_________. Studies in Deuteronomy. Trans. by David Stalker. SBT

9. Chicago: Rignery, 1953.

Vroom, Jonathan. “Recasting Mishpatim: Legal Innovation in

Leviticus 24:10-–23.” Journal of Biblical LiteratureJBL 131, no. /1

(2012):, pp. 27–44.

Watts, James W. Reading Law: The Rhetorical Shaping of the Pentateuch.

Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999.

Westbrook, Raymond, and Bruce Wells., Everyday Law in Biblical

Israel: An Introduction. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox

Press, 2009.

57

Dale Patrick

Additional Bibliography: Works Cited

Crüsemann, Frank. The Torah: Theology and Social History of Old

Testament Law. Trans. Allen Mahnke. Minneapolis: Fortress

Press, 1996.

Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

Univ. Press, 1985.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. New York: Sheed and

Ward, 1975. (Paperback: New York: Crossroad, 1986).

Kennedy, George A. New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical

Criticism. Chapel Hill and London: Univ. of North Carolina

Press, 1984.

Perelman, Ch. And L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise

on Argumentation. Trans. John Wilkson and Purcell Weaver.

Notre Dame and London: Univ. of Notre Dante Press, 1969.

58

Wright, David. Inventing God’s Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible

Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi. Oxford/New York: Oxford

Univ. Press, 2008.