PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM

DAVID A. CURTISa class and state analysis of henry

sidgwick's utilitarianism

1. INTRODUCTION

I would like to examine, from the perspective of a class andstate analysis, Henry Sidgwick's work of moral theory, TheMethod of Ethics. As a class analysis of this text, we shallencounter little difficulty employing Marxian terminology tostudy the perceptions and biases that inform Sidgwick'sethics. At most, we will need only to pause briefly and marvelat the ease with which he manages to inscribe his Utilitariandoctrine within the boundaries of his contemporary bourgeoisenvironment. When we go beyond the economic realm ofSidgwick's class biases in order to examine his politicalphilosophy we encounter difficulties of interpretation with theMarxian schema for understanding Utilitarianism, firstsketched out in Marx/Engel's The German Ideology. Ananalysis of the statist features of The Methods of Ethics willlead to a revision of certain aspects of this view of Utilitarian-ism. From an enlarged perspective on the class and statistcharacter of his brand of Utilitarianism we shall be able toassess the nature of Sidgwick's achievement.

2. INTERPRETING THE TEXT—IDEOLOGY ORSCIENCE?

Thought, at the very level of its experience, in its verydawning, is in itself an action—a perilous act.

—Michel Foucault^

david a Many ethical critics consider Sidgwick's The Methods ofCurtis Ethics a very significant work. John Rawls unequivocally

calls it "the outstanding achievement of moral theory."2 C.D.Broad equivocates only slightly when he claims this text is"on the whole the best treatise on moral theory that has everbeen written."3 While we may agree The Methods of Ethicsrepresents an important milestone in the development of

., , "moral theory," our task will not be to praise Sidgwick f o r - s>/r -J'--^ -. -^ss.v achievement by means of a class and state analysis o* - s

' A , :,_K-,\^' text. ^V.-i'-ovHLx*'->--'

Rawls. however, is helpful in pointing out how this "first r_>academic work in moral philosophy, modern in both ^erccand spirit"4 differs from earlier theories. The Methods Pa*-sexplains, "treats the subject as a discipline to c-e s:-c ec *eany other branch of knowledge.'5 Indeec. Sog.vcx an-nounces in his "Preface to the First Edition that Eros s :cbe analyzed and criticized in the same way D--S *•&-<:examine and explain Geometry. He says he w.i exani-e tre"actual condition" of "Ethical Thought" and not *ts h stort(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics. 7th Edition. O-cago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. p. 264. A pagereferences to The Methods will appear hereafter as nuTioe-sin the text.) Differing with the "Kantians," he denies the neecto study a so-called "moral faculty;" and unlike some mora -ists, he declares that he seeks to comprehend "not Practice.but Knowledge"; "not practical results to which our methodslead, bu t . . . the methods themselves." (vi)

Sidgwick's intent here is admirable when compared to that ofhis Utilitarian predecessor, John Stuart Mill. He will notentertain any kind of psychologism; and he will refrain frommaking doubtful enquiries into the "Origin of the MoralFaculty" or the "historical antecedents of this cognition." (v)Sidgwick thus champions a conception of scientific theorizingover any crude form of anthropologism or historicism as wellas psychologism.

How are we to interpret Sidgwick's philosophical work: asScience encumbered by Ideology or as Ideology dressed upin scientific jargon? Marx has employed both these methodsin criticizing moral theorists concerned with political economy.

•fc1 Since Sidgwick wrote on the latter topic (Principle^of Politi-cal Economy) and since Utilitarianism concerns itself withboth political economy and moral theory, it is useful to makea short critical examination of Marx's thought here.

260 One of Marx's most extensive exegeses of texts appears in

sidgwick'sutilitarianism

261

the first two chapters of the Manuscripts of 1844. After aclose reading of the primary texts of Smith, Say, Ricardo, etal, including several quotations of long passages, he seemsto imply at the beginning of the third chapter ("EstrangedLabor") that political economy is a scientific discipline thathas failed merely to think out the logical conclusions of itsdiscourse:

We have proceeded from the premises of political economy.We have accepted its language and its laws. We havepresumed private property, the separation of labor, capitaland land... On the basis of political economy itself, in itsown words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the levelof a commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched ofcommodities.6

"Accept(ing) its language and its laws." Marx complains heremerely that "political economy starts with the fact of privateproperty; it does not explain it to us:" and that it "does notgrasp the way the movement is connected."7 At most, hecriticized political economy for going "back to a fictitiousprimordial condition . . . to explain" rather than proceeding"from an actual economic fact,"8 thus faulting this scientificdiscipline for a flight of ideological fancy.

We could fault Marx's scientific materialist analysis for itsfailure to notice the underlying assumptions of politicaleconomy's 'scientific' discourse. The young Marx, flush fromhis critique of Hegel—where he asserted the primacy of civilsociety over Hegel's idealized State—accepts the politicaleconomists' ideological, laissez-faire view that, in capitalistsociety, the economic realm is a self-subsisting province. Therole of the absolutist, monarchical State is downplayed in hisstudy of the rise of capitalist society; and the increasinginterventionism of today's state capitalism is not anticipated inthis early work.

Marx highlights the ideological and historically-conditionedaspects of political economy in The German Ideology,written with Engels two years later. There he sketches thedevelopment of Utilitarianism as its growth parallels the riseof the bourgeoisie in England and France. The Englishbourgeoisie—which had gained power earlier and more de-cisively than its French counterpart—was able to elaborate aUtilitarian theory with real economic content, thus expressingboth the concrete desires and the future plans of this risingclass. The French bourgeoisie, on the other hand, could onlydevelop Utilitarianism on a "positive economic content"9

' ./-f" >••*-// _i >-

a because this national class still was trying to create thecurbs ' general economic conditions for a market economy in the

face of feudal and monarchical resistance.

Marx continues: when these conditions came to be realizedand as the bourgeoisie in each country changed from a risingclass to a secure ruling class, Utilitarianism altered its stanceof militant self-justification. Instead of continuing its critique ofprevious conditions, Utilitarianism retreated to the posture ofideological rationalization of the contemporary system ofexploitation—(the bourgeois) man's (mis)use of man.

The economic content gradually turned utility theory into amere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt toprove that under existing conditions the mutual relations ofpeople today are the most advantageous and generally useful.It has this characteristic among all modern economists.™

In criticizing the ideological aspects of Utilitarian doctrine,Marx makes no reference to specific texts. Unlike the carefulreading devoted to the political economists' 'scientific' dis-course, Marx here offers the throw-away pronouncementthat Utilitarianism ends in a bourgeois apologetics informedby political economy.

The characteristic that the Manuscripts and The GermanIdeology interpretations have in common is a concentrationon the economic aspects of political economy. Just as Marx'sscientific critique of Smith et al ignores the hidden role of theState, so the ideological critique of Utilitarianism, with itseconomic-centered schematization of class-based Utilitarian-ism, disregards the more political aspects of Utilitarian theory.

In contrast to Marx's view, C.B. MacPherson11 suggests thatUtilitarianism continued to develop in such a way as to com-ment on the political struggles between the bourgeoisie andthe proletariat. John Stuart Mill introduced his distinction be-tween the higher and lower pleasures—in contrast toBentham's equation of "poetry" and "pushpin"—at a timewhen the working class was demanding full suffrage. Theworkers could no longer be used by the middle classes—aswhen the latter had threatened that popular violence woulderupt unless the 1832 Reform Bill were passed—nor couldthese middle classes contain the workers' political and eco-nomic demands as before. It was necessary to assert that notall desires or pleasures are equal, that some are more properthan others, and that only the 'proper' education and experi-

262 ence could guide one in making 'correct' choices.

MacPherson makes reference here to a specific text and injrfitananism doing so advances our understanding of Utilitarianism be-

yond Marx's general and questionable pronouncement. Hisinterpretation contains no sterile treatment of this doctrine asjust' science or 'just' ideology, but rather a close reading ofhow a philosophy comments upon and theorizes about socialreality. As such, this analysis shows how philosophical textsthemselves are integral parts of actual political struggles.

Let us be guided here by Foucault's existential conception ofthought as a species of action. Thus acknowledging the effi-cacy of thought and recognizing the significance of the inter-penetration of what is variously called "base and superstruc-ture" and "civil society and the State," we shall come to viewSidgwick the Utilitarian philosopher as a type of author entirelydifferent from a great moral theorist or a mere political pam-phleteer and bourgeois apologist. Indeed, we shall observehow Sidgwick develops an active, conservative-reformist, bu-reaucratic and statist response to challenges from below at atime when the working class was demanding a voice in politicallife by means of the recently-enacted extension of the suffrage.

3. UTILITARIANISM AND COMMON SENSE

The Philosophers have a certain amount of difficulty in seeingclearly into these ethical problems, because they feel theimpossibility of harmonizing the ideas which are current at agiven time in a class, and yet imagine it to be their duty toreduce everything to a unity. To conceal from themselves thefundamental heterogeneity of all this civilized morality, theyhave recourse to a great number of subterfuges, sometimesrelegating to the rank of exceptions, importations, or surviv-als, everything which embarrasses them—sometimes drown-ing in an ocean of vague phrases and most often, employingboth these methods the better to obscure the problem. Myview, on the contrary, is that the best way of understandingany group of ideas in the history of thought is to bring allthe contradictions into sharp relief.

—Georges Sore/, Reflections on Violence

In order to examine how Sidgwick the philosopher engageshimself in the political world let us first consider his notion ofthe "Morality of Common Sense." This aspect of Sidgwick'sphilosophy is crucial for the exposition of his Utilitariandoctrine as it serves as both a foil and a limit point for that

263 doctrine. By exploring his conception of the role of Common

david a Sense in discourse and in action, we can begin to observe theCurtis point at which and the manner in which, his Utilitarianism

asserts itself.

While this notion of Common Sense is crucial to his philo-sophical discourse, Sidgwick never clearly defines the idea.He appropriates the term from English-speaking moral phi-losophers who believed people have an intuitive moral un-derstanding or set of principles for decision-making. If such aCommon Sense morality were an adequate guide for action afully-worked out system like Utilitarianism would be superflu-ous. Sidgwick rejects this hypothesis concerning the suffi-ciency of Common Sense but continues to utilize the phrase,associating it with "Intuitionism."

Even associated in this way, the exact meaning of the"Morality of Common Sense" remains unclear. The word"common" indicates that this term has some sort of collectiveor universal connotation, as when Sidgwick speaks of thephrase "beauty . .. (is) objective" as commonly meant"(114). The word "sense," on the other hand, connotes'sensibility' in the sense of a sensuous or pre-reflectivejudgment, unencumbered by system or "method (85). It alsoseems to relate to the idea of 'sensibleness or the collectivewisdom of people through time. In this respect he associatesthe phrase with the conservative, or ••customary" (270)aspects of life: "for the ordinary actions of men proceed onthe expectation that the future will resemble the past" (270).Also, this intuitive morality tends to reject some ideas as"Utopian" (290) as in the case of "Ideal Justice." Finally, thisconservative, anti-Utopian stance may find an "absurdity"(410) in certain proposals or ideas, thus adopting a socially-judgmental attitude of ridicule.

This view of the "Morality of Common Sense" is notable asmuch for what it leaves out or distorts as for what it claims.Sidgwick is certainly right to identify it with intuitionism. Andone need not dispute that such an attitude is that of the massof men and women. Where Sidgwick falsifies the notion is inhis lack of an historical perspective. Common Sense intuition-ism, as an ethical and political doctrine of English-speakingwriters, is rooted in the thought of the Dissenters, asStaughton Lynd argues in Intellectual Origins of AmericanRadicalism. Lynd cites Dissenter James Burgh who arguesin his 1754 The Dignity of Human Nature that "self-evidenttruth is not collected, or deduced, but intuitively perceived."12

This Dissenter intuitionism, however, opposed itself not only264 to "environmental psychology"13 but also to "constituted

sidqwick's authority" as it championed "conscience."14 For the firstutilitarianism Dissenters the import of Common Sense intuitionism had

been merely religious; but eventually ethical, political andthen politically radical considerations came to predominateuntil Common Sense received its full revolutionary expres-sion in Thomas Paine's book by the same name.

Thus Sidgwick falsifies the radical form and content of adoctrine that relies on the liberating ability of the individual todecide for and to rule him/herself—rather than to be ruled byanother. Indeed, when he claims that Common Sense has aconservative and custom-loving character we witness thepower the philosopher has to define and judge the capabili-ties of the mass of men and women. In order to understandthe import of his imputations, however, we must now turn ourattention to the manner in which Sidgwick introduces Utilitar-ianism into the text. Let us continue our examination of hiscritique of Intuitionism.

Common Sense, though a form of collective wisdom, oftenbreaks down and thus results in disagreements. Becausesuch disagreements may arise, Sidgwick explains, CommonSense morality is not by itself an adequate guide on alloccasions. We are not sure for any particular occasionwhether Common Sense can be relied upon, or even whatprecisely it prescribes.

History shows us a time in which it was thought not only asnatural, but as clearly right and encumbent on a man, torequite injuries as to repay benefits: but as moral reflectiondeveloped in Europe this notion was repudiated, so that Platotaught that it could never be really right to harm anyone,however he may have harmed us. And this is the accepteddoctrine in Christian societies . . . But in its universalized formthe old conviction still lingers in the popular view of CriminalJustice: it seems to be widely held that Justice requires painto be inflicted upon a man who has done wrong, even if nobenefit result either to him or to others from the pain.Personally, I am so far from holding this view that I have aninstinctive and strong moral aversion to it: and I hesitate toattribute it to Common Sense, since I think it is graduallypassing away from the moral consciousness of educatedpersons in the most advanced communities: but I think it isstill perhaps the more ordinary view (281).

Sidgwick seems to be saying here that "Resentment"(281)—or retaliation for its own sake—cannot be a component of

265 Common Sense "since it is gradually passing away." Com-

david a mon Sense appears to be based upon agreement and thisCurtis agreement seems to be realized in time, i.e., historically.

We need to separate out here two components of Sidgwick'sviewpoint. First, we find the opposition between the "popular"classes, on the one hand, and a small but intensely moralclass of "educated persons," on the other hand. This lattergroup seeks to guide the "ordinary people" just as the"advanced communities" (England and the other 'civilizednations') seek to encourage the moral development of the'backward peoples' (the 'benighted' colonial subjects). Sec-ond, we find a ' development(al)" perspective on the processof "moral reflection" ironically quite contrary to Sidgwick'smethodological injunction to study only the "actual condi-tions" of Ethical Thought" and not the "history" of theseconditions.

These two elements combine at first in an uneasy fashion.An "old conviction," he says, "still lingers in the popular"consciousness. These "lingering" convictions are termed"old." as Sorel would point out, because Sidgwick finds itdifficult to reconcile such a conviction with his "personal""moral aversion" to "Resentment": the contemporaneity ofsuch a view is denied because, after all, it is "graduallypassing away."

Eventually, Sidgwick manages to express what we mightterm his elitist or 'trickle-down' theory of moral improvement.What is now only the "personal" and the "instinctive" "aver-sion" of an "educated person" will become the CommonSense intuitions of the "ordinary people," resentment cannottruly be a part of Common Sense and there must be someprocess of development in the realization of the content ofCommon Sense moral precepts.

Sidgwick is claiming much more than a simple historicalcoming-to-being of Common Sense morality; he implies thatit is the vanguard of "educated persons"—with their moralaversions already developed and preceding those of thepopular consciousness—who will bring about this moraldevelopment. Later, Sidgwick's elitism becomes even moreblatant, as he explains that

Whenever divergent opinions are entertained by a minority solarge, that we cannot fairly regard the dogma of the majorityas a plain utterance of Common Sense, an appeal is neces-sarily made to some higher principle, and very commonly to

266 Utilitarianism. But a smaller minority than this, particularly if

sidqwick's composed of persons of enlightenment and special acquain-utilitarianism tance with the effects of the conduct judged, may reasonably

inspire us with distrust of Common Sense: just as in the moretechnical parts of practice we prefer the judgment of a fewtrained experts to the instincts of the vulgar (466).

These oppositions are as stark as they are pejorative. "Thedogma of the majority" pales before the "enlightenment" of asmaller minority" and the "instincts of the vulgar" are nothing

compared to the "judgments of a few trained experts."

Yet even this vigorous elitism does not suffice for Sidgwick'spurposes. For the mere opposition between the confusedmany and the wise few might sanction a Morality of CommonSense based upon the "consensus of competent judges, upto the present time" (467). This would obviate Utilitarianismfrom arrogating unto itself the authority to act as the elitearbiter of conduct.

In order to comprehend the series of moves that lead to thetriumph of Utilitarianism as an elitist, specifically "Philosoph-ical Intuitionism (373). however, we must first place

^r.-^ .- •^•S~— -•- - Sidgwick shrank elitism with the militant egalitarianism of the_,T _ Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham. In An Introduction to the Prin-

_ ^ ciples of Morals and Legislations (1789), Bentham cham-pions Utilitarianism as the only ethical doctrine that system-atically avoids pressing the claims of any one person orgroup.

"This principle (of Utilitarianism) (said (Alexander]! Wed-derburn) is a dangerous one," Saying so, he said that which,to a certain extent, is strictly true: a principle which laysdown, as the only right and justifiable end of government,the greatest happineess of the greatest number—how can itbe denied to be a dangerous one? Dangerous it unquestion-ably is, to every government which has for its actual end orobject, the greatest happiness of a certain one, with orwithout the addition of some comparatively small number ofothers.^5

Now, Bentham was not the most radical egalitarian of his day;indeed, there is a certain de facto elitism in any form ofUtilitarianism since Utilitarians arrogate unto themselves thepower to define what is 'right' or 'good,' variously definedand measured by them as 'happiness' or as 'pleasure.' Andyet this element did not have to appear in any pronouncedfashion in Bentham's essay, for the bourgeoisie at that time

267 was the rising class in England, able to claim that it repre-

david a sented best — politically as well as economically — the interestof the nation as a whole.

When the working and lower classes saw that the middleclasses alone were enfranchised in 1832 these unen-franchised classes continued to press their own claims asthey began to demand an extension of the suffrage. It is atthis point, MacPherson suggests, that Mill accentuated theelitist elements of Utilitarianism. Now, Sidgwick's elitism iseven more blatant than Mill's. We should recollect that theConservatives had given workers the right to vote only eightyears before the publication of the First Edition of Sidgwick'streatise and that the Liberals had introduced universal malesuffrage the year of the 1884 (Third) Edition.

This historical sketch of the development of Utilitarianism inrelation to political events only tells us that Sidgwick's elitism,in responding to changing circumstances, differs in degreefrom Mill's brand of elitism. We must return to the text to seehow Sidgwick's position differs in kind. This recourse to thetext will enable us to complete our examination of the relationof Sidgwick's Utilitarianism to his conception of a "morality ofCommon Sense."

Given the class divisions that inform Sidgwick's elitism, let usnote a certain passage where he allows a mutual confrontationbetween Utilitarianism and Common Sense. In rejecting aMorality of Common Sense based upon the "consensus ofcompetent judges, up to the present time," Sidgwick suggests:

It would rather seem that it is the unavoidable duty of asystematic Utilitarianism to make a thorough revision of the

rules £of Common Sense '3 (467).

"But," he then points out,

in thus stating the problem, we are assuming that the latterterm fc'a perfectly Utilitarian code of morality"} of this com-parison tyvith the Morality of Common Sense) can be satis-factorily defined and sufficiently developed (467).

Even though "Philosophical Intuitionism" — which finds its"final form" (388) in Utilitarianism — is an enlightened moralitysuperior to the intuitions and institutions of a Morality ofCommon Sense, this Philosophical Intuitionism as Utilitarian-ism finds that it must, nonetheless, reckon with CommonSense morality. Common Sense, composed of the "conser-

268 vative" attitudes of "ordinary people, would rebel against

siddwick's Utilitarianism as a Utopian scheme if the latter doctrine triedutilitarianism to arrogate all moral decision-making authority unto itself.

With such a debacle in mind, Sidgwick asks rhetorically,

could we reasonably expect to convert all mankind at once toUtilitarian principles, or even all educated and reflectivemankind, so that all preachers and teachers should takeuniversal happiness as the goal of their efforts...; and couldwe be sure that men's moral habits and sentiments wouldadjust themselves at once and without any waste of force tothese changed rules;—then perhaps in framing the Utilitariancode we might fairly leave existing morality out of account(468).

Common Sense, however, would denounce as an absurditysuch an idealistic undertaking and resist by "force" Utilitarian-ism's Utopian efforts in this direction.

The parallels and contrast are too striking to resist comment-ing upon. While Mill only had to deal with the prospect of anextended suffrage. Sidgwick is confronted by the fact of awide-spread and soon to be universal (male) suffrage. Indeference to the popular challenge, Sidgwick concedes thatUtilitarianism cannot rule alone by means of an internally-perfect doctrine, but must give ordinary Common Sense dueconsideration.

Despite this concession, Sidgwick still champions Utilitarian-ism as the "final form" of Philosophical Intuitionism over anyintuitive Common Sense morality. While he is prevented fromdeveloping a "perfectly Utilitarian code of morality" he stillreserves the right to define the distinguishing characteristicsof Utilitarianism and the Morality of Common Sense. Just as

' he defined Common Sense as "conservative^ order to serve^ as a foil for his progressive Utilitarianism^ Sidgwick now

describes the relationship between these two codes so that itno longer appears that the latter, challenged doctrine isaccommodating itself to the forceful claims of the former one.The tables are now turned as Common Sense becomes"inchoately and imperfectly Utilitarianism" (427). There is, forexample, a "latent Utilitarianism of Common Sense opinion"(435-6) in ordinary moral judgments on Family matters. Theelitist aspects of Utilitarianism return as Sidgwick discovers a"germ of unconscious Utilitarianism" (456) in the Morality ofCommon Sense; Utilitarianism must be seen as the mature

269 development of this passive, latently-Utilitarian attitude.

ft is therefore not as the mode of regulating conduct withwhich mankind began, but rather as that to which we can nowsee that human development has been always tending, asthe adult and not the germinal form of Morality, that Utilitari-anism may most reasonably claim the acceptance of Com-mon Sense (456-7).

Sidgwick thus has reversed the political power relationshipbetween these two codes. Common Sense, with its forcefulclaims comes to accept and follow Utilitarianism as this latter,challenged doctrine adopts an elitist, paternalistic stance,claiming to be the "adult and not the germinal form ofMorality." Sidgwick's deft reversal differs from Mill's straight-forward elitism since it entails an assertion of authority onthe level of power rather than it being a statement of choiceon the level of taste.

Indeed, as we complete this section on the relationshipbetween Utilitarianism and Common Sense we can see that,despite his pronouncements on the world-historical tenden-cies of all "human development," Sidgwick manages to limithis discussion most narrowly to the ideological level of thepolitical disputes of his time. He does this through an analysisof the political category of "Justice."

There is, Sidgwick asserts, a "discrepancy between the twoelements of the Common Sense notion of Justice." Thesetwo conflicting elements correspond to the two contemporarymiddle class parties of Sidgwick's late nineteenth centuryEngland, the Conservatives and the Liberals, as seen in thefollowing passage:

For, from one point of view, we are disposed to think that thecustomary distribution of rights, goods, and privileges as wellas burdens and pains, is natural and just, and that this oughtto be maintained by law, as it usually is; while from anotherpoint of view, we seem to recognize an ideal system of rulesof distribution which ought to exist, but perhaps have never yetexisted, and we consider laws to be just in proportion as theyconform to this ideal. It is the reconciliation between these twoviews which is the chief problem of political Justice (273).

If this opposition between the effort to maintain what iscustomary and the endeavor to realize an ideal distribution ofgoods does not convince us that Sidgwick is really talkingabout the split between Conservatives and Bentham-influenced Liberals, we may note an even more succinct and

270 clear statement of this political division. In the next paragraph

sidqwick's Sidgwick speaks of "the two elements of Justice as corn-utilitarianism rnonly conceived—one conservative of law and customs and

the other tending to reform them" (273).

4. SIDGWICK'S CRITIQUE OF NATURALNESS

Sidgwick manages to enlarge his definition of CommonSense to include both conservative and reformist elements.At the same time, he deftly narrows the purview of CommonSense to the political controversies of his era of bourgeoispolitical hegemony. We should not, however, dismissSidgwick as a simple bourgeois apologist, passively reflectingthe divisions within his class society, for we have seen acreative element in his thought when he articulates an elitismdifferent from Mill's in response to changing circumstances.While he identifies Common Sense with both conservativeand reformist viewpoints he does not act as a politicalpartisan—though he reduces Common Sense to politicallypartisan points of view, as he defines these stances. Rather,he rescues Utilitarianism from simple partisanship for onepolitical ideal over another. This sophisticated tack foreshad-ows Sidgwick's achievements, which we will examine in thenext section. First, however, let us study his critique of thenotion of 'naturalness' as an introduction to this examination.

We find a modern and sophisticated critique of "naturalexpectations" in Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics.

This notion . . . is worse than indefinite: the ambiguity of theterm conceals a fundamental conflict of ideas, . . . For theword "natural." as used in this connexion, covers and con-ceals the whole chasm between the actual and the ideal—what is and what ought to be (272).

Sidgwick notes that at least two "distinct" ideas are conveyedby the use of this term:

(1) the common as opposed to the exceptional, and (2) theoriginal or primitive as contrasted with the result of laterconventions and institutions (272-3).

In addition, the term "natural" can also be used "in more orless indefinite combination with one or other of these twomeanings, 'what would exist in an ideal state of society'"(272-3).

We can admire Sidgwick's attempt to clarify and criticize the271 much overused and abused word, "natural," since many of

david a his contemporary writers still appealed to this vague term asCurtis a supposedly self-evident point of justification. Yet, this

critique of "naturalness" only goes so far. He makes refer-ence to "the term . . ., as ordinarily used" (272) as if onecould revert to a direct, uncritical reliance on 'natural speech'and 'common usage' once this critique has begun. Indeed, itis by asserting that the notion of "natural expectations"ordinarily" includes an ideal component that he introducesthe Conservative (customary)/l_iberal (reformist) dichotomy inthe first place (271).

We begin to see the purpose for this selective critique ofnaturalness when Sidgwick searches for a "First Principle of

I Justice," assuming that it will be informed by an idea elementf^ of our "natural expectations." The two alternatives^ for this

First Principle are the "Individualistic" and "Socialistic Ideals"(289), both of which are rejected by him as contrary toCommon Sense because of the extremism of each viewpoint.The "Individualistic Ideal"—interpreted as a 'Free Market'principle—is seen as unfair while Common Sense woulddenounce the "Socialistic" one as impractical and "Utopian"since it lacks a workable account of "Good Desert" (290).Again, Common Sense is told to resign itself to an accep-tance of the Utilitarian viewpoint. Utilitarianism in its modifiedform cannot claim an absolute authority; here it reserves theright to dismiss Common Sense's ideal claims supposedlyarising out of "natural expectations." Upon "reflection"—i.e.,at the beginning of Sidgwick's philosophically intuitionalstandpoint—Common Sense is made to realize the impracti-cability of its own alleged idealizations.

Reflection . . . will show how very rough and imperfect are thestandards used in deciding the amount due. And ordinarilythe only kind of Justice which we try to realise is that whichconsists in the fulfillment of contracts and definite expecta-tions; leaving the general fairness of Distribution by Bargain-ing to take care of itself (290, emphasis added).

When ordinary Common Sense recognizes the wisdom ofthe reflective Utilitarian there is an 'agreement' between theMorality of Common Sense and a modified Utilitarianism.

This 'agreement' preserves two important concepts of bour-geois morality—Contract and Bargaining—and yet Sidgwickaccomplishes this rescue without resorting to dogmatic ideo-logical arguments. Avoiding extreme appeals to natural rightor natural expectations, Contract and Bargaining are salvaged

272 as useful conventions that both society and the Utilitarian wish

skJqwick's *° uPhold. ^us* as ne speaks of a practical and ordinary "ful-Lftilrtarianism fillment of contracts" instead of 'the sanctity of Contract,' so he

supports a belief that the Market, with its Bargaining, will on thewhole take care of individual choices fairly and in an orderlyway, without resorting to an extreme libertarian argument.Indeed, even more sophisticated is his rejection of any appealto 'naturalness' in his work on political economy.

In another work (Principles of Political Economy) I havetried to show that complete laisser (sic) faire, in the organi-zation of industry, tends in various ways to fall short of themost economic production of wealth (445, note 2).

The import of this selective critique of 'naturalness,' then, is topreserve certain ideological features of bourgeois society ona non-dogmatic and conventional basis suited to a modifiedUtilitarianism. Sidgwick rejects another favorite idea of bour-geois ideology—that of an invariant "human nature"—whenhe concedes that there can be no "perfectly Utilitarian code ofmorality" apart from the Morality of Common Sense.

It still has to be asked, What is the nature of the human beingfor whom we are to construct this hypothetical scheme ofconduct? For humanity is not something that exhibits thesame properties always and everywhere: whether we con-sider the intellect of man or his feelings, or his physicalcondition and circumstances, we find them so different indifferent ages and countries, that it seems prima facieabsurd to lay down a set of ideal Utilitarian rules for mankindgenerally (467-8).

This is a very modern and sophisticated statement, compa-rable to his views concerning laisser faire economics andthe concept of 'naturalness' in general. This denial of "humannature"—of any "essence" to "humanity"—however, occursonly within the context of Sidgwick's strategic concession thatUtilitarianism must respect Common Sense's forceful claims.When he departs from this strategic matrix of power con-flicts—or. rather, after he has, within this matrix, subordinatedCommon Sense to the dictates and definitions of Utilitarian-ism's Philosophical Intuitionism—Sidgwick is quite willing toutilize a very loose conception of what human beings are"capable of" as he begins to "prescribe" proper conduct for"most people."

And certainly all special affections tend occasionally to comeinto conflict with the principle of promoting the general

273 happiness; and Utilitarianism must therefore prescribe such a

culture of feelings as will, so far as possible, counteract thistendency. But it seems that most persons are only capable ofstrong affections towards a few human beings in certain closerelations, especially the domestic; and that if these weresuppressed, what they would feel towards their fellow-creatures generally would be, as Aristotle says, "but a waterykindness" and a very feeble counterpoise to self-love; so thatsuch specialised affections as the present organisation ofsociety normally produces afford the best means of develop-ing in most persons a more extended benevolence, to thedegree which they are capable of feeling it (434).

Sidgwick thus manages to defend the present familial andlove relationships as "the best!"

A,

5. SIDGWICK'S UTILITARIANISM AS A STATISTDOCTRINE

The scientist cannot make the rejoinder here that he thinkswithout ontological background. To believe that one is notdoing metaphysics or to want to abstain from doing it isalways to imply an ontology, but an unexamined one—just asgovernments run by "technicians" do not make politicalpolicy, but never fail to have one—and often the worst of all.

—Alphonse De Waelhens.16

We do not want to reduce Sidgwick's work to that of a simplepolitical apologist or partisan. This is especially true now thatwe have witnessed his sophisticated and non-partisan man-ner of preserving key bourgeois practice and beliefs and ofdelimiting the field of possible political choice and action. OurUtilitarian philosopher does not take sides and yet managesto ensure that the only sides to be taken are those he haspredetermined to be appropriate and within the confines ofhis 'scientific' examination of the "methods of ethics."

In order to begin to understand Sidgwick's achievement let usexamine his statement that "the chief problem of politicalJustice" is "the reconciliation of these two views" (which wefound to be the Conservative and the Reformist positions).We may start with his definition of the attributes of an"unprogressive society" (273, note 1).

It is not the general conservatism that Sidgwick imputes toCommon Sense thinking which constitutes an unprogressive

274 attitude. For Sidgwick admits in his conception of political

skiqwrck's Justice that the Common Sense viewpoint also may containirtilrtarianism some liberal and reformist tendencies. Rather, "an

unprogressive society" is established when these tendenciesare made "indistinguishable; the Jural ideal absolutely coin-cides with the Customary, and social perfection is imagined toconsist in the perfect observance of a traditional system ofrules" (273, note 1). A progressive society, we may extrapo-late, consists in an acceptance of Reformism, but not anyoutlandish, Utopian brand beyond the (alleged) limits ofCommon Sense's toleration. Utilitarianism, as the "mature"and balanced "philosophical" form of an often inarticulate andimmature Common Sense morality, is precisely this "progres-sive" doctrine. It respects the limits imposed by CommonSense (as Sidgwick defines them) and proceeds within theConservative/Liberal-Reform matrix of Common Sense(again, as defined by him)without becoming a partisan to

, the disagreement occuring therein. As the "progressive"^ doctrine par excellence, Utilitarianism survives and asserts

itself above the fray since it "reconciles" conflicts withoutbecoming involved in the attendant battles.

It is this impartial, non-partisan stance, as revealed in theallegedly "progressive" character of Utilitarianism, that fur-nishes us with the initial answer to our question aboutSidgwick's conception of "political Justice." The "chief prob-lem of political Justice" in his ethical system is the problem ofhow to "reconcile" the political conflicts between Conservativ-ism and Reformism in such a way that Utilitarianism canarrogate unto itself the authority to decide and to reconcilethese conflicts while still possessing a measure of legitima-

j _ . ,,.ition. In order to achieve a solution to this problem theA-c-r-y •_ ,-v-., - - • * • * . .-..V---; ~

, , ' - > . .- , Utilitarian.appeared as fair (impartial) and beneficial (in somes^.^r^j ••>.•*--- -*-, vague sense "progressive" and imbued with the duty of^ j -.-..^i.~.ji.---L• •+ ~'-~-: promoting the general welfare through an increase in thejt-^ <.^t^-t~<J-*'--• aggregate amount of 'happiness')..i^J.l'J r^-rrv T , - v ,--7> •. -,._, .I,,,,., ..-^.•^^ ----,^ jJ ' -'_ . ... ,.

• Now Sidgwick's stance is one of beneficent impartiality, not ofbenign neglect. Let us examine the ambiguous action in-

-, J volved in this impartial movement of distancing Detachment.

As movement, such impartiality is absolute in the sense thatUtilitarianism accomplishes an act of distancing from this orthat particular doctrine or political position. And yet, as an actof distancing it also retains a degree of relativity since itdistances itself from these particular attitudes and stances.

Utilitarianism at once supports the different reasons com-275 monly put forward as absolute, and also brings them theoret-

david a ically to a common measure, so that in any particular case weCurtis nave a Principle of decision between political arguments. (.11 <

Utilitarianism seems to be a non-involved and detachedmethod for establishing "political Justice" to the extent that itseeks a "principle of decision between political arguments."Utilitarian political justice utilizes this "principle of decision" inorder to "reconcile" political conflicts in an impartial manner.This impartial move is accomplished by inserting Utilitarianism"between" these so-called "arguments" without seeming tofavor either side. Such strategic impartiality, however, doesnot entail total non-involvement and detachment. The Utili-tarian only places himself above or between, not beyond,contemporary conflicts: the Utilitarian still "supports the dif-ferent reasons commonly put forward as absolute." The Util-itarian thus accepts Common Sense's reasons, but only aftertaking up the authority to define what Common Sense is (fairlyconservative, with only non-Utopian reformist tendencies) andhow it does and should act (Sidgwick claims that CommonSense may tend toward idealistic absolutism, but he alsomanages to convince Common Sense that it cannot accept theconsequences of this tendency).

The Utilitarian is politically involved through a pretendedstance of non-involvement. This absolute movement is alsoonly a relative distancing. We may describe this impartiality asvery partial indeed, in the sense that it is not wholly impartialnor absolutely distanced from and indifferent to the conflicts itnow seeks to define, decide upon and "reconcile." We un-derstand with DeWaelhens how the impartial Utilitarian maynot make specific political policies, but nevertheless has a

} j j'^ J' ) general one; for it is now up to Utilitarianism to define the~ / ^ L terms of political conflict (including the interpretation of

.„ '.. conflict in terms of debate, disagreement, and mere "ar-•- gument"). We saw before how Sidgwick inserts Utilitarianism

into the text whenever Common Sense threatens to proveitself in possession of a self-subsisting morality in order toassert Utilitarianism's elitist authority and to place the Utili-tarian above the Morality of Common Sense. Now we mayobserve how he inserts Utilitarianism between the poles ofpolitical conflict in order to assert the Utilitarian's authority todecide upon and to "reconcile" such conflicts while definingtheir parameters. Taking the side of neither party the Utilitariantakes up Common Sense's reasons in an "impartial" manner,thus taking over these reasons as his own.

Let us examine what this arrogation of authority entails. In this276 way we shall come to undertand how Sidgwick's Utilitarian

manages to "reconcile" conflict. This understanding will leadutiiitaiianism us *° an assessment of Sidgwick's achievement through an

analysis of the statist content and form of his ethical doctrineand method.

In considering this arrogation of authority, we may ask firstwho the author of this text is. One's immediate reply is:"Sidgwick, of course!" As is the habit in philosophical dis-course, however, we have used the name of the author-philosopher, "Sidgwick," almost interchangeably with theterm designating the philosophical doctrine ("Utilitarianism")and the viewpoint of that doctrine ("the Utilitarian"). Who/what is the author of this authoritarian text?17 And what ishe/it18 trying to say?

We have seen in Sidgwick's claim to impartiality an arrogationof authority. Perhaps John Harsanyi's phrase, "impersonaldecider," is a more accurate phrase to describe the Utilitarianpoint of view after the advent of universal (male) suffrage.Bentham, who died within days of the passage of the 1832Reform Bill, discloses a prospect of this "Impersonality's"viewpoint when he contrasts the happiness of the "greatestnumber" to that of "a certain one." This "number." however,implies more readily a group personality or a plurality of indi-viduals—a class—instead of a strict Impersonality. Mill pro-vides the spectacle of an extreme individualism of separatepersonalities with the apparent consequence of championingindividual liberty over authoritarian remedies. It is only inSidgwick that the implications of the Utilitarian's non-individualistic and authoritarian "Impersonality" begin to workthemselves out clearly.19

The Utilitarian Impersonality no longer makes use ofBentham's egalitarian rhetoric in order to further the positionof the bourgeoisie as a rising class. Nor can he/it champion aspecific ideology as Mill did with his brand of libertarianism.The Utilitarian must now seek to "reconcile" conflict insteadof declaring his/its doctrine to be a "dangerous" one becausechallenges to the bourgeoisie's authority are underwayalready. And one cannot promulgate unequivocally an elitistideology now that a popular suffrage has been enacted.

In other words, the bourgeois ideology and its readilyidentifiable personality or character must now be sup-pressed and made to disappear from public view—the betterto realize the aims of that ideology. These aims (Contract,Bargaining, etc.) can no longer be asserted straightforwardly

277 in the public arena since there is now doubt whether the

david a. bourgeoisie best represents the interests of society. Utilitari-curtis anism no longer advocates any specific form of government

(440-1) nor will it continue to favor any general principles ofbehavior or action.

Rather, from an authoritative and judicative position abovethe status quo, Sidgwick's Utilitarian can regulate the termsof political debate and can relegate to the status of mereuseless ideology such concepts as the Free Market, alaissez-faire economy or the alleged 'naturalness' of certainbeliefs, practices and institutions. As the Impersonalreconciler—in addition to his/its role as Impersonal decider—the Utilitarian's authoritarian Impersonality is oriented just asmuch toward control as toward his/its function of adjudica-tion. Therefore, bourgeois reformers must be kept in checkalong with their conservative counterparts. Utopianism—i.e.,any type of non-gradual reform—is a danger to the stabilityand continuing life of society.

Utilitarianism sustains the general validity of the current moraljudgments, and thus supplements the defects which reflec-tion finds in the intuitive recognition of their stringency; and atthe same time affords the principle of synthesis, and amethod for binding the unconnected and occasionally con-flicting principles of common moral reasoning into a completeand harmonious system (422).

Stability, harmony, the peaceful resolution of conflict—theseare the watchwords of the bourgeois State after it has attainedpower and while it is searching for ways to consolidate andsecure this power in the face of rising popular opposition.

Marx describes the bourgeois State's dynamics when hesketches the development of "governmental power" from theFrench absolutist monarchy to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

Every common interest was straightway severed from soci-ety, counterpoised to it as a higher, general interest, snatchedfrom the activity of society's members themselves and madean object of government activity. ... Finally in its struggleagainst the revolution of 1848 the parliamentary republicfound itself compelled to strengthen, along with the repres-sive measures, the resources and centralization of govern-mental power. All revolutions perfected this machine insteadof smashing it.20

In examining the bourgeois State's characteristic tendencies278 during a period of popular challenges to its authority, Marx

observes that the bourgeois period is characterized not orvryjdrtananism ^y ^e c'ass stnjggle between the bourgeoisie and the

proletariat, but also by the progressive strengthening of theState apparatus. The coup d'etat of Louis Bonaparte nd -cates that the dominant class need not always get its way: theweapons of its State may be turned against this bourgeoisclass itself when the stability and harmony of the bourgeoisState and society are threatened.

This bourgeois State arrogated unto itself the authority totransform common interests into its general one and todefine the terms of political debate. The aim of "reconcilingconflict, however, is not synonymous with an effort to elimi-nate conflict and thus the necessity of the State's role.Rather, the bourgeois State anticipates that conflict willalways be inevitable and therefore strengthens its own pow-ers—the better to manage the conflicting forces. Armed withthis increased power the bourgeois State suppresses theconflicting parties' members when need be, not the causes ofconflict; challengers to authority pose a danger to the bour-geois State, but this State never poses to itself the problem ofits own authoritarianism.

These features of the bourgeois State are also componentsof the Impersonal decider and reconciler with his/its "methodfor binding." Transforming the Morality of Common Senseinto the "general validity of the current moral judgments"(422), his/its attempt to "reconcile" conflict does not envisionthe elimination of conflict: the effort to attain a "complete andharmonious system" is not achieved in real life by society.Rather, enduring conflicts are anticipated and thenreinterpreted by the Utilitarian who greets such "permanent"conflicts as the necessary occasion for his/its assertion ofadditional powers and of authority to exercise such powers.

Utilitarianism furnishes us with a common standard to whichthe different elements included in the notion of Justice may bereduced. Such a standard is imperatively required: as thesedifferent elements are continually liable to conflict witheach other. The issue, for example, in practical politicsbetween Conservatives and Reformers often represents sucha conflict: the question is, whether we ought to do a certainviolence to expectations arising naturally out of the existingsocial order, with the view of bringing about a distribution ofthe means of happiness more in accordance with idealjustice. Here, if my analysis of the common notion of Justicebe sound, the attempt to extract from it a clear decision of

279 such an issue must necessarily fail: as the conflict is, so to

david a. say- Pe"ria"enf/y latent in the very core of Common SenseCurtis (447. emphasis added).

There will always be conflict. Sidgwick assures us. and alwaysan Imperative' need, therefore, for the Utilitarian as an Im-personal reconciler—who must on occasion employ a "certainviolence.'' This necessity for intervention, in addition, is due tothe faults inherent in Common Sense since the Conservative/Reform dichotomy (which we see here quite clearly is merelya generalization of contemporary political conflict) is "perma-nently latent in the very core of Common Sense."

Citing Common Sense's inconsistencies and conflicts asreasons for his/its arrogation of authority, the SidgwickianUtilitarian's peculiar form of "reconciliation and his itsunfulfilled promise of a "complete and harmonious system"are asserted simultaneously as a Will to Knowledge and as aWill to Power. His/its desideratum of a "tranquility of socialexistence" (287) is a theoretical notion which is divorced fromthe life of society and yet is imposed upon it. just as thebourgeois State imposes its will over the polity in the form ofan ever-expanding bureaucracy which surveys that polity andsuppresses its members and groups when need be. AsSidgwick himself admits, he seeks "not Practice, but Knowl-edge"; and he attains this alienated form of "Knowledge ashe concentrates "not on the practical results to which ourmethods lead, but on the methods themselves." Sidgwicklikens this procedure for studying Ethics to the methodologyfor studying Geometry. When Utilitarian morality is applied to"political Justice," however, this emphasis on method overpractice bears more resemblance to the ideal of bureaucracyin the modern State. This confluence and congruence of theWill to Knowledge and the Will to Power found in Sidgwick'sUtilitarianism is aptly expressed in the authoritarian/bureaucratic phrase quoted above: "a method for binding."

Our analysis has not yet established that Sidgwick's Utilitar-ianism, with its "Impersonality" or ambiguously impartialdecider and reconciler, has the same structure as the modernState during the period of the first challenges to its authority.The results obtained so far show only that Utilitarianism'sequivocal ideals parallel those of the modern bourgeoisbureaucratic State—where common interests become gen-eral ones and Method as an end in itself replaces practice—and that the Utilitarian manages to reinterpret bourgeoisnotions on a non-dogmatic basis, the better to legitimize andpreserve their practical features. Bourgeois notions and State

280 power, however, do not by mere juxtaposition constitute the

sidqwick's structure of a bourgeois State, let alone that of a specific kindutilitarianism of bourgeois State. We have yet to discover how the Utilitar-

ian Impersonality combines bourgeois notions with Statepower in order to form a particular type of bourgeois Statestructure.

We should recollect that Utilitarianism developed in thenineteenth century as a relatively "progressive" doctrine. Oneof Bentham's main concerns, for example, was the reform ofprison conditions. And Sidgwickian Utilitarianism rejects allconservative dogmatism in favor of progressive reform. It istrue that Sidgwick is often willing to accept traditions andcustoms; he yields to tradition, he assures us however, onlyin order to fulfill his progressive aim: the overall and continualincrease of general felicity or "desirable consciousness."Thus, his principled and reserved support of the status quois not a form of quietism. He admits, for example that

if, when we turn . . . to history, and examine the actualmorality of other ages and countries, we undoubtedly findthat, considered as an instrument for producing generalhappiness, it continually seems to exhibit palpable imperfec-tions,—there is a strong assumption that there are similarimperfections to be discovered in our own moral code, thoughhabit and familiarity prevent them from being obvious.

As a progressive doctrine, Utilitarianism is quite willing to takeup the banner of Reform in order to improve on today's"imperfect morality."

Sidgwick's Utilitarianism seeks to control these reforms fromabove, disallowing anything that is dangerously "Utopian."The admission here that "imperfections" presently exist isundermined by his previous relegation of such "imperfec-tions" to the status of "lingering" and "old convictions." And,the only type of reformism that he/it will allow will be a form ofgradualism.

However completely adapted the moral instincts of a commu-nity may be at some particular time to its conditions ofexistence, any rapid change of circumstances would tend toderange the adaptation, from survival of instincts formerlyuseful, which through this change become useless or perni-cious (465, emphasis added).

At a time when the prospect of rapid change threatens tobecome a reality Sidgwick's Utilitarian reformer attacks "any

281 rapid change" as potentially injurious to society.

david a. Let us examine further the assumptions behind this gradualistcurtis reformism. The above statement assumes that "adapta-

tion"—as opposed to more "rapid change"—is of itself a"useful" process with beneficial results. Perhaps this viewrelies on Sidgwick's idea that the "moral instincts of acommunity" are primarily conservative. Sidgwick also claimsthat these "formerly useful" "instincts" "survive" but canbecome "useless or pernicious" due to "rapid change." Thisassertion implies that Common Sense is primarily passive;that it cannot respond creatively to social change; that, as"instinct," it has little presentiment of what to do if changesoccur, but must be led around in order to prevent it from goingastray.

Sidgwickian reformism never envisions an end to its role asarbiter; rather, the Utilitarian insists that he/it must concernhim/itself with methods for better, more efficient, more effec-tive "reconciliation" of what he/it admits is in principle irrec-oncilable. Focussing now on the "moral instincts" of the massof men and women the Utilitarian takes up an attitude oftechnical and behavioral control. The adoption of this attitude,however, does not inaugurate a "total administration," atotalitarian government directing and ordering all actions.There is certainly a form of activism, as opposed to quietism,present in Sidgwick's "progressive" doctrine. For, with thisattitude of control, the Utilitarian State will take positive stepsto eliminate challenges to his/its authority: among the "use-less or pernicious" effects of "any rapid change" are "rebel-lion" and an attempt to compel the forces of custom andtradition to comply fully with their promises and prospects.

The Utilitarian must repudiate altogether that temper ofrebellion against the established morality, as somethingpurely external and conventional, into which the reflectivemind is always apt to fall when it is first convinced that theestablished rules are not intrinsically reasonable. He must, ofcourse, also repudiate as superstitious that awe of it as anabsolute or Divine Code which Intuitional moralists inculcate(475).

Sidgwick's Utilitarian seeks not total control over all aspectsof every point of view, but rather performs two specificoperations of definition and delimitation. First, he/it definesthe spectrum of possible action as that of the Conservative/Reformist dichotomy. He/it then actively and equanimously"repudiate(s) altogether" a "superstitious" and conservativebelief in a "Divine Code" along with any "temper of rebellion"

282 beyond the pale of a proper gradualist reformism.

The Utilitarian further narrows the grounds for debate so thatutilitarianism neither form of resistance will succeed or even be attempted.

Again in the form of a concession, Sidgwick allows that

(t)he Utilitarian .. . cannot possibly construct a morality denovo either for man as he is (abstracting his morality), or forman as he ought to be and will be. He must start, speakingbroadly, with the existing social order. . . : and in decidingwhether any divergence from this code is to be recom-mended, must consider chiefly the immediate consequencesof such divergence, upon a society in which such a code isconceived generally to subsist (473-4).

We observed above that his critique of naturalness engen-dered a selective denial of human nature, thus affording himwith the means of preserving certain ideological conceptionson a non-dogmatic basis. Sidgwick's Utilitarian now extendsthis method of selective denial in order to ensure a conser-vative reformism, a gradualism oriented toward maintaining'social tranquility' as it considers only non-rapid changes in"the existing order" and the "established morality." TheUtilitarian will respond favorably only to immediate andnarrowly-formulated demands for change as he/it limits his/itspurview to that of the "immediate consequences" of thesechanges. Sidgwick admits that he cannot force through a denovo morality acceptable to the Morality of Common Sense.The Sidgwickian Utilitarian transforms this concession, how-ever, into a method for preventing both radical changes andextreme conservative reaction. Any protest or point of viewwhich posits a long-term perspective is dismissed as rebel-lious or uselessly Utopian. If such a viewpoint challenges thestatus quo by calling for rapid changes, it will have to besuppressed as potentially injurious to the "tranquility of socialexistence." Normally, however, popular demands can beinterpreted narrowly with the placation of immediate desiresin mind.

Again, Sidgwick places the blame on the Morality of CommonSense. Because this inconsistent morality resists total reformfrom above, Utilitarianism must assert the right to settle itsconflicts for it. In fact, Utilitarianism inserts itself into thearena of conflict precisely at this point where a particularconflict occurs.

Utilitarianism is normally introduced as a method for decidingbetween different conflicting claims, in cases where Common

283 Sense leaves their relative importance obscure.

david a. The Sidgwickian Utilitarian's entrance onto the political andCurtis judicial stage retains the partial sort of impartiality analyzed

above: the Utilitarian inserts him/itself ambiguously "betweendifferent conflicting claims." His/its real aims, however, arerevealed by the timing of his/its entrance. He it claims toreconcile conflict; but he/it really waits for conflict to arise sothat he/it has a reason to take up for him/itself the authority tomanage these anticipated outbreaks of conflict. And theseconflicts that he/it comes to consider as he/it inserts him/itselfprecisely into the conflict situation are thereby limited andnarrowed to their immediate import.

To summarize, Sidgwick's Utilitarian actively inserts him/itself into the fray of class conflict in order to manage andcontrol those conflicts. His/its response, therefore, is a form ofactivism and not conservative quietism. Since this insertion isan insertion into this realm of conflict at precise (exact)points (the number of which is finite) we must conclude thatthe Utilitarian's statist perspective and operations are nottotalitarian either. Indeed, he/it accomplishes this insertioninto the realm of class conflict by inserting him itself betweenthe parties to the conflict. Favoring only gradualist reforms ofthe "existing society" as formulated from above, the Utilitar-ian orients him/itself toward the placation of immediate de-sires while disregarding or suppressing long-term demandsand perspectives, We may therefore describe his its activistresponse as a step-by-step approach of narrowly-reactiveconflict management.

Within this narrowly reactive method of conflict managementoperations, Sidgwick's Utilitarian must make choices. He/itmust decide how to decide between conflicting claims andthereby to prescribe provisional solutions to these irreconcil-able conflicts. Confronted by this "self-reflexive need to findways to manage conflict the Sidgwickian Impersonality re-verts back to Utilitarianism's predilection for elitist solutions,but in new and modern ways.

At first glance, Sidgwick merely seems to restate in familiarphrases the class biases and prejudices which inform hiselitism. The Utilitarian has a "duty," Sidgwick says in hisprogressivist voice, to work actively for the general andcontinual increase in the aggregate amount of happiness.

As this actual moral order is admittedly imperfect, it will be theUtilitarian's duty to aid in improving it; just as the most orderly,law-abiding member of a modern civilised society includes

284 the reform of laws in his conception of political duty (476).

sidqwick's ~^'s ac*'ve response of moral reform also pertains to theutilitarianism "political duty" of the Impersonal Utilitarian's social counter-

part: the well-behaved ("most orderly"), middle class ("law-abiding"), European ("modern civilised") citizen.

Sidgwick applies a different standard to other people: thoseimmersed in the popular consciousness of Common Sense.Instead of taking an active role in the transformation of actualsocial conditions, these other persons are themselves theactual social conditions that/who must be reformed. Talk aboutmoral improvement and self-reform as well as actual partici-pation in the active reform of social conditions is replaced hereby a manipulatory language that describes the "moral habits,impulses, and tastes of men" as "material given us to workupon" (468). As mere "impulses," the Common Sense moralhabits and sentiments" of "existing morality" cannot be left"out of account" (468), but rather must be "work(ed) upon" bythe Utilitarian and his/its allies, the middle class reformers.

This restatement of Sidgwick's class judgments elaboratesthe perspective and operation of a method of technical controland manipulation as it develops further Utilitarianism's elitismand establishes an alliance between the Utilitarian and themiddle class reformers who share his its viewpoint and goals.The Sidgwickian Utiilitarian's behaviorist language construescommon people in passive, non-participatory terms conso-nant with his its selective denial of human nature and thuscompleting the reversal which began with a remterpretation ofthe active and forceful claims of Common Sense. A morethorough-going elitism is developed here which advances theSidgwickian Utilitarian's narrow efforts of gradual reform fromabove as it confirms his its definitions and limitations of theMorality of Common Sense.

This new elitism also can be found when Sidgwick introducesa hierarchical conception of human or moral development. Inconceding the impossibility of achieving an "ideal communityof enlightened Utilitarians," he admits that

all conflict of moral opinion must.. . be regarded as an evil,as tending to impair the force of morality generally in itsresistance to seductive impulses. Still such conflict may be anecessary evil in the actual condition of civilised communi-ties, in which there are so many different degrees of moraldevelopment (490).

With this concession, the Impersonal reconciler accepts285 conflict as a "necessary evil" and seems to speak in contra-

david a diction to his/its ideal of a "complete and harmonious system"curtis (unless one construes this 'complete harmony narrowly.

along with Sidgwick's methodology, as pertaining only to the"system" and not to its "contents," the people material whothat are these contents).

The concept of "moral development" used here serves toarticulate an hierarchical division between the popular con-sciousness of Common Sense and the "most orderly, law-abiding" citizens. We saw above that Sidgwick's Utilitarianendeavors to control, manipulate and subordinate the lowerclasses, admitting only the middle classes as legitimatepartners to his/its efforts at gradual reform from above. The"development(al)" perspective introduced here restates theideas behind these efforts, but in elaborate hierarchical termsso that the simple division between the law-abiding and thenon-law-abiding citizens (all males are now citizens with fullvoting rights) becomes the more complex spectrum of the"many different degrees of intellectual and moral develop-ment." Mill's subjective dichotomous elitism—which contrasts"higher" and "lower" pleasures—is transformed into an 'ob-jective' hierarchical arrangement of all human creaturesarrayed upon a great chain of being comprehending all levelsof mental and ethical abilities. One is left only to wonderwhether Sidgwick considers the unenfranchised and subju-gated peoples of colonial societies to be at the zero degree of"intellectual and moral development" since he speaks in theabove quotation only of "the actual condition of civilisedcommunities."

Sidgwick's Utilitarian seeks not jusyefcontrol in general, buta specific kind of control: he/it wants to ensure that inevitablereforms and changes will happen gradually and thus will besubject to control from above. In addition, he/it seeks not justa gradualist form of control (elitist reformism), but he/it seeksthis form of control for a specific end: to discipline and surveythe popular morality so that this morality of the mass of menand women will become amenable and subordinate to thegradual reforms which the Utilitarian and the "most orderly,law abiding members" of society will institute. The hierarchi-cal view of "moral development" which Sidgwick now intro-duces ensures this alliance between the Utilitarian and themiddle classes in the form of a coalition of activist butgradualistic reformers.

This second "between" position which the Impersonal Utili-tarian institutes through an act of insertion is as ambiguous as

286 the first one. While an alliance is formed with the middle

sidqwick's classes, the establishment of this hierarchical arrangementutilitarianism provides a privileged position for the Utilitarian vis-a-vis both

the popular and the middle classes. For, even as he/it affirmsthat the middle class exhibits responsible behavior analogousto the "Utilitarian's duty"—so that its behavior forms the stan-dard by which all members of society are to be judged—theUtilitarian, as Impersonal decider and reconciler, reserves forhim/itself the official right to sanction this hierarchy and thefinal prerogative to judge where or whether each person ofwhatever class or society stands on this complex spectrum of"intellectual and moral development." The Sidgwickian Im-personality neither creates the moral standard nor allows him/itself to be judged by it. Immune from judgment and normallyabsent from direct involvement with the enforcement of thisstandard he/it instead sets up an overall framework withinwhich class dominance will be allowed to continue. Unlikeearlier ideological conceptions of the bourgeois State's rolesuch as laissez-faire, state intervention is explicitly sanc-tioned here. Such interventionism, however, is limited to spe-cific applications at specific times for narrow purposes: eitherfor the placation of immediate desires and for the integrationof these desires into a precariously "harmonious" system orfor the elimination of fundamental challenges to this overallsystem.

These specific goals and methods encompass the aims andhidden ideology of the bourgeois State at the time of the firstchallenges to its previously-established authority. Sidgwick'sUtilitarian does not seek to control all conflict—let alone toeliminate the causes thereof—but only to manage it. Anideological belief in laissez-faire economics and appeals tothe 'naturalness' of certain social relations as well as theconcept of "human nature" are not necessary for the Imper-sonal decider in Sidgwick's version of Utilitarianism. Thesebeliefs served their purpose when the bourgeois was anaggressive, partisan class willing to assert a "dangerous"doctrine inimicable to the old social order. Utilitarianism takeson an impartial or impersonal, bureaucratically-orientedstance now that the bourgeois has wrested the reins of Statepower from its predecessors. The old, overtly-ideologicaljustifications disappear and are replaced by non-partisan andnon-dogmatic demonstrations of the efficiency of Contractand Bargaining, the optimality of present familial relationsand the pragmatic advantage of treating events and con-flicts step-by-step without appeal to Utopian concepts orabstract conceptions of Right or "Human Nature." The oldideology is thus re-encoded in a Statist rationalization of the

287 status quo and raison d'etat replace any particular princi-

david a. P'es sucn as egalitarianism, libertarianism, the Free Market,curtis etc-

The bourgeoisie retains practical if not fully formal controlover the State and there is no need felt by this class to reformitself despite challenges now surfacing to its hegemonic rule.Rather, the State—an entity with its own independent inter-ests and apparatuses and its own ability for autonomousaction—concentrates its efforts on strengthening its controlover the people, checking popular challenges to its authorityand making the masses of men and women amenable togradual change within the present political framework asdirected from above.

We arrive finally at a conclusion concerning Utilitarianismquite similar to Marx's pronouncement in The German Ide-ology: Utilitarianism leads to a remarkably uniform andconfident defense of the status quo. While Marx interpretsthis process primarily on the level of a discourse concerningeconomics and class relations, stating that Utilitarianism'sfinal apologetical and conservative position results from "theeconomic content gradually turn(ing) utility theory into a mereapologia for the existing state of affairs," we have interpretedSidgwick's Utilitarianism, in contrast, in terms of the creationof an expanded form of discourse that is elaborated on anessentially political and statist level of power relationships.Analyzing this statist form of discourse, we have examinedthe specific sort of conservative and gradualistic activism thatthe Sidgwickian Utilitarian develops, defends, and details.

Only by means of a class and state analysis of this text canwe understand why Sidgwick's Utilitarian does not seek totalcontrol, significant social change or even substantial reformswithin the confines of the present social system, and yet stillremains an effective activist. Sidgwick describes the realaims of the statist Utilitarian:

It should be observed, however, that a great part of the reformin popular morality, which a consistent Utilitarian will try tointroduce, will probably lie not so much in establishing newrules (whether conflicting with the old or merely supplemen-tary) as in enforcing old ones (484).

In making the "popular morality" amenable to the aims of thebourgeois State—to those of the Impersonal decider andreconciler—the problem for Sidgwick's Utilitarian is how toconvince this morality to observe the practices of the morally

288 more advanced members of society—the middle classes

sidgwick's wno' as the "most orderly, law-abiding" citizens, maintainutilitarianism most effectively the "tranquillity of social existence." At this

stage in its development, the bourgeois State seeks theenbourgeoisement of the lower and working classes so thatthese classes' demands will become 'reasonable' (i.e., con-trollable because gradual). The search for "harmony" thusconsists in an effort to homogenize the popular morality intothat of the standard, but now less dogmatic and overtlyideological, middle class morality.

The key new notion is that of a moral and intellectualhierarchy among voting equals wherein the popular moral-ity is subordinated to that of the middle classes in a complexway. Armed with this 'objective' method of classification andmeasurement the bourgeois State can take up an authorita-tive and judicative position above the fray while prescribingtemporary solutions amidst the continuing conflicts of societywith the primary purpose of "enforcing old" "rules" and"work(ing) upon" the "material" of the mass of men andwomen. No one person or group—including the bourgeoisieitself—stands above the Imperson who/that is Sidgwick'sUtilitarian State, so that it subjects some to a regimen of moralimprovement and ensures that others will maintain the stan-dards they are expected to uphold.

6. SIDGWICK'S ACHIEVEMENT—AND A FEWWORDS OF CAUTION

Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. If infact they are intelligible, this is not because they are theeffect of another instance that "explains" them, but ratherbecause they are imbued, through and through, withcalculation: there is no power that is exercised without aseries of aims and objectives^But this does not mean that itresults from the choice or decision of an individualsubject:. . . the rationality of power. . . is perfectly clear, theaims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one isthere to have invented them, and few who can be said tohave formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the greatanonymous, almost unspoken strategies which coordinatethe loquacious tactics whose "inventors" or decisionmakersare often without hypocrisy. . . It is in this sphere of forcerelations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms ofpower. In this way, we will escape from the system ofLaw-and-Sovereign which has captivated political thought forsuch a long time. And if it is true that Machiavelli was amongthe few who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of

289 force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further,

0° without the persona of the Prince, and 0ecc*"er

mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that >s <—<^anentforce relationships.

—Miche- =~~:£uT2~

In this essay, I have employed certain techniques of -e'a'ytheory and criticism in order to read in the text the play anddevelopment of specific dichotomous structures—e.g.. com-mon/general, many/few, working class/middle class. Con-servative/Liberal-Reformist. I have also raised the questionof authorship in such a way as to bring to light the statistand authoritarian features of Sidgwick's brand of Utilitarian-ism as it engages and transforms these dichotomousstructures.

I have treated The Methods of Ethics as a philosophical textwhose near-contemporaneity makes us realize that the ques-tions it raises—and the way it raises these questions—arewith us still.

I have not reduced Sidgwick's text to a form of myth orideology, on the one hand, or of pure, ahistorical science, onthe other hand. Nor have I presumed the existence of someKantian/Levi-Straussian "invariant structures" in order toexplain the dichotomies mentioned above. Rather, I haveexamined the way in which Sidgwick has creatively re-sponded to these historically-realized structures of whichboth he and we remain only partially aware. I have hadrecourse to both the text and to a perspective on the historicalantecedents of the terms Sidgwick employs. And yet, thiscritical reading of The Methods of Ethics can not becompared unequivocally with Sarte's "progressive-re-gressive" method either, since I have also put into questionSidgwick's "authorship" of this text instead of examiningstraightforwardly "his" project.

Following Foucault's statement that thinking is itself a "peril-ous act" we have traced certain thoughts as they thinkthemselves out ambiguously in Sidgwick's writing. By stayingclose to the contradictions in those thoughts and by bringingthem into sharp relief, as Sorel suggests, we have exploredthe real and theoretical conflicts and struggles that areexpressed in Sidgwick's dichotomies. Left at the level of aclass analysis of his personal biases, however, we wouldmiss the achievements he accomplishes through a creative

290 transformation of these dichotomies.

ln order to assess adequately Sidgwick's achievement, wejBH»Tianism must analyze the statist aspects of "Sidgwick's" thought.

Here the question of authorship brings out the active compo-nent of "his" Utilitarian thought. We see that at each pointwhere conflict occurs, the Utilitarian author responds byintroducing him/itself into the text at precisely that point. Weuncover an intimate connection between authorship andauthority: the Utilitarian author asserts a simultaneous Will toKnowledge and Will to Power as he/it defines, delimits anddetermines the terms both of his/its philosophical discourseand of society's political life.

The ambiguous "self-insertion of the Impersonal Utilitarianphilosopher into the text—which is also an insertion of thephilosopher into his social, economic and political world—accomplishes an assertion of authority that constitutes thespecific achievement of Sidgwick's work. Instead of readingSidgwick as a—or the—great moral theorist, we can now seethat the Sidgwickian Utilitarian succeeds in developing abureaucratic conception of the bourgeois State as an imper-sonal, basically amoral conflict manager. The outlook ofSidgwick's Utilitarian is consonant with the modern method-ology he/it employs and this outlook conforms to the needsthe bourgeois State has in responding to challenges frombelow. Furthermore, with this conception of the State he/itachieves a number of remarkable double movements.Sidgwick's Utilitarian Impersonality eliminates certain dog-matic ideological notions as he/it retains these practices on aprovisional, conventional basis; he/it subordinates commonneeds and desires as he/it identifies him/itself with thegeneral ones; he/it creates a new method of short-termreactive conflict management as he/it frees him/itself fromadherence to particular practices, principles and forms ofgovernment; he/it asserts for him/itself the duty and necessityof applying a "method for deciding" between the variousclaims of a conflict-ridden polity and of employing a "methodfor binding" the parties to irreconcilable conflicts as he/itbestows upon him/itself a measure of legitimation for his/itswork in "reconciling" these conflicts and in promoting 'socialtranquillity'; he/it accommodates him/itself to the forcefulclaims of an unpredictable Common Sense and a jealouslyself-reliant and self-righteous "educated few" and he/it ar-rogates unto him/itself the authority and the power to treat allpersons and groups as morally imperfect "material" to be"work(ed) upon"; he/it allies him/itself with the middle classand defines the moral behavior of this class as the standardby which to judge conduct as he/it places him/itself above this

291 class, relegating its members to positions on a moral /intel-

david a. lectual spectrum he/it establishes and surveys: and finally,curtis he/it promises an ever-expanding and ever-increasing pro-

motion ofjegitimacy as he/it sets his/its aims most narrowlyas the enforcement of old rules through the embour-geoisement of the working class and a monitoring of themiddle class—in order to keep both classes in line. This"progressive" doctrine results in a bureaucratic-statist ap-proach to conservative, gradualistic reform from above. Theactivist element in this brand of reformism differs from "mereapologia;" and Sidgwick's Utilitarian elaborates his/its dis-course without a primary concern for "economic content."

A few words of caution are in order. While Sidgwick'sachievement lies in his elaboration of a certain conception oftne State during the first real challenges to its authority, weshould not confuse this conception of the State itself duringthis period of time. We have carefully avoided a reduction ofSidgwick's philosophy to either ideology or science whilespeaking of an Impersonality comparable to the fictitiousnature of the modern State's 'personality.' This congruencydoes not mean, however, that the State and Sidgwick'sconception of it are coextensive or identical. Sidgwick saysnothing, for example of the Utilitarian's position regarding theinternational system of competing nation-states (though hedoes speak obliquely of Europe's colonial possessions whenhe mentions in contrast the "more advanced communities").The British Empire, we may note, was quite concerned withinter-State rivalries and conflicts.

Sidgwick's Utilitarian State Impersonality differs from bothSidgwick's personality and the 'personality' of the actualState. Perhaps one might cite Henry Sidgwick's marriage tothe sister of Alfred Balfour (a British Prime Minister, andConservative Party leader for twenty years) if one wished toattempt a social-psychological reading of The Methods. Onewould be hard-pressed to explain how this text's statistcharacter developed out of the personal concerns of aprofessor of moral philosophy who took up the study of ethicaltheory in order to quell certain religious doubts.22 Similarly,there is no evidence to suggest that the actual British ImperialState imposed itself upon Sidgwick or otherwise influencedhim in the ideas he elaborated.

We should also beware not to generalize too much fromthese findings now that we have distinguished Sidgwick'sUtilitarian from both Sidgwick's individual moral concerns andthe actual concerns of the State. Despite some resort to an

292 intertextual analysis, this essay does not purport to be a

sidqwick's definitive study of all stages of Utilitarianism, let alone theutilitarianism Sta9e from Bentham to Mill. A more complete examination of

these two 'authors' would have to be undertaken. Our presentstudy also lacks a comparative analysis of Sidgwick's textwith other moral-philosophical texts—both Utilitarian andnon-Utilitarian—of the same period, so that we have probablyfailed to elucidate some additional statist features of this textthat such an intertextual analysis would reveal. In this re-spect, lacunae in this text—for example, Sidgwick's silenceon inter-State relations—have only been noted in passing, ifat all, without any systematic analysis of such inevitableabsences. Additionally, no reference has been made to morerecent Utilitarian writings so that this further aspect ofintertextual analysis also remains to be done. In the presentessay, we have concentrated on establishing that it is possi-ble to attempt a class and state analysis of philosophical textwithout falling into either psychologism or scientism.

Let us make one interesting observation that this text allows.There is a fundamental conflict and contradiction in theSidgwickian Utilitarian's view of the process of lower-classembourgeoisement. On the one hand, we have been struckby the Impersonal reconciler's technological and behavioristiclanguage that construes the workers as "material" with baseand manipulate "instincts." On the other hand, the StatistUtilitarian tries to achieve an integration of the workers into thesociety as a whole in such a way as to convince them tobehave in a middle class fashion. Efforts at fostering educa-tion and "responsible" political conduct through the ballot,however, imply that the State is seeking to allow the membersof the working and lower classes to think and decide forthemselves (within authoritarian limits set by the State). Thelatter, efforts—which allow communication, discussion andmost importantly, a measure of self-determination—cannot bereconciled with the view that the masses of men and womenare dumb creatures that must be led. A crisis in State legiti-mation looms on the horizon for the Sidgwickian Utilitarian, forhe/it seeks both to manipulate people into beingself-determining and to limit the field of possible political actionby threatening to suppress the self-determining behavior thusfostered. Participation and the self-constitution of the subjectbecome both the goal to be realized and the greatest dangerto the Impersonal reconciler's conservative brand of reform-ism.23

While we find that Sidgwick's text develops and reveals thevoice of an Impersonal author and an authoritarian Imperson-

293 ality, we need not assume that the solutions he/it proposes to

david a tne Pr°b'ems of legitimation and governance « oortical jus-Ctirtis tice") are authoritative. Here the text reenters ttie world that

helped to produce it, the contradictions of the tex: 'eproducethe contradictions in the practice of the modem State, thoughnot in an idealistic or materially-reflective fashion. F^aliy. wemay judge that Sidgwick manages to articulate the paradoxesof modern political life in such a way that they are s^entlyimplemented.

David A. Curtis

NOTES

I. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. SelectedEssays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F.Bouchard and Sherry Simon, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. p. 5.

T2. John Rawls, "Remarks on Kantls (sic) Ethics," (Unpublished Spring,

1979, Harvard University course handout), p. I, 5.

3. Quoted on the back cover of the Dover Edition of The Methods ofEthics, (1966).

4. Rawls, "Remarks . . . ," p. I, 5.

5. Rawls, "Remarks . . . ," p. I, 5.

6. Karl Marx, (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844) inMarx/Engels: Collected Works, v. 3, New York: International Publishers,1975, p. 270 (numbered by Marx: XXII).

7. Marx, Manuscripts of 1844, p. 270 (XXII).

8. Marx, Manuscripts of 1844, p. 271 (XXII).

9. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C.J.Arthur, New York: International Publishers, 1970, p. 112.

10. Marx/Engels, The German Ideology, p. 114.

II. C. B. MacPherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, NewYork, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 52.

12. James Burgh, The Dignity of Human Nature, London, 1754, quoted inStaughton Lynd, Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism, New York:Vintage Books, 1968, p. 27.

294 13. Lynd. Intellectual Origins, p 27 ,

SidaWJCk'S ' Lynd, Intellectual Origins, p. 26.

Utilitarianism 15. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals andLegislation, Oxford, 1789, Chapter I, Section XIII, note 5.

16. Alphonse De Waelhens, "A Philosophy of the Ambiguous (Foreword tothe Second French Edition)," in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure ofBehavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher, Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, p. xxviii,note 15.

17. Foucault's essay, "What is An Author?" (in Langauge, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F,Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1977, pp. 113-138), neatly complements our analysis ofthe "Impersonal" author with his discussion of the "disappearance of theauthor." (See especially pp. 116-118.)

18. Most readers will observe that the use of the masculine/impersonaldichotomous pronoun ("he/it") parallels that of the masculine/femininedichotomous pronoun ("he/she"), but fails to incorporate the avoidance ofsexism that characterizes the feminists' neological construction. This iscorrect. My neologism, "he/itl is intended to have the same sort of gratingpolitical effect as the anti-sexist "he/she": as somewhat awkward neologicalexpressions, "he/she^'freshperson," and so on not only correct the one-sidedness of previous usages, but also serve (at present) to remind thelistener or reader of such past injustices. Despite the intention of having asimilar effect, my purpose in constructing this neologism is different. I wantto examine and highlight the statist features of Sidgwick's Utilitarianismalong with the "Impersonality" of the Utilitarian's statist point of view. Thetask of analyzing and challenging the sexist aspects of the State throughhistory is a different, though no less important, theoretical and practicalenterprise. In addition. I would point out that the paternalistic aspects of theState, the fiction o* the personality of the State (Hobbes' "Leviathan" ispictured as a giant male warrior-king i. and the conflation of the "person" ofthe King with the (fictitious! personality" of the State (e.g., the claim byLouis XIV that L'etat, c'est mof form a constellation of concepts that owemuch to the period when the absolutist monarchy developed, a time notknown for its sexual egalitarianism.

19. While Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Pressof Harvard University. 1971). objects that "(t)he fault of the utilitarian

/' doctrine is that it takes impersonality for impartiality" (p. 190), he also'•' Observes there that "there are only hints of the doctrine in The Methods of

'Ethics, (p. 188, n. 37) In this essay, we have tried to follow the leadsprovided by those "hints" instead of making a moral judgment. In this way,we have discovered that the claim to impartiality has an intimate connectionwith the development of the Utilitarian "Impersonality."

20. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in SelectedWorks in One Volume, New York: International Publishers, 1968. pp.170-1.

295

21. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction,trans. Robert Hurley, New York, Vintage Books, 1980, pp. 94- 97.

22. J.B. Sneewind, "Henry Sidgwick," in The Encyclopedia of Philoso-

a phy' v 7' ed' Paul Edwards> New York: Ttle MacMillan Company & TheC(jrtjs ' Free Press, 1967, p. 434.

23. I am indebted to Nathaniel Berman for helping me to develop this point.

1

296