57 Ethnicities Hans-Jörg Trenz integration Reconciling diversity and unity: Language minorities and...

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Reconciling diversity and unityLanguage minorities and European integration

HANS-JÖRG TRENZ

University of Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT Language minorities can be found as evidence of unfinished nationbuilding in relatively closed territorial settlements all over contemporary Europe.From a comparative perspective, different paths of accommodating linguistic diver-sity can be followed, resulting in very dissimilar regimes of legal, political andcultural recognition. In recent years, standardization of minority protection hastaken place, with a new emphasis on the values of linguistic diversity, non-discrimi-nation and tolerance. As will be argued, the expanding rights of language minori-ties must be understood in relation to a re-structuration of nation states in Europeand a re-evaluation of difference in the course of European integration. Theconfrontation with internal diversity and the confrontation with a Europe of deepdiversity are closely interlinked, setting the conditions for the unfolding of a newpolitics of recognition towards language minorities. This changing minority–majority relationship and the related processes of Europeanization of opportunitystructures for the political and cultural mobilization of language minorities will beanalysed with reference to specific case studies from Germany, France and Spain.

KEY WORDS ethnic mobilization ● Europeanization ● minorities ● recognition● regionalism

INTRODUCTION: EUROPEANISATION AND THE RIDDLE OFETHNO-REGIONAL MOBILIZATION

Existing research on ethno-regional mobilization within the nation state hasfocused primarily on the micro-conditions of ethnic mobilization, but doesnot pay sufficient attention to the changing macro-context linked toEuropean integration. Ethnic mobilization of language minorities is a prime

A R T I C L E

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example of how Europeanization (i.e. the penetration of national andsubnational systems of governance, the formation of an encompassingEuropean political order and the promotion of shared norms and interests)interrelates with nation-state transformation and the new salience of ethnicdiversity. First, Europeanization can help to understand the riddle of ethnicmobilization, i.e. why relatively integrated groups within the nation statemake use of the apparently irrational strategy to mobilize ascriptivecategories of collective identity and difference, which are partially detachedfrom their economic interests (Eder and Schmidtke, 1998). Second, Euro-peanization helps to understand the riddle of legal and political recognition,i.e. the question why the state is increasingly willing to recognize minorityrights which, at first sight, do not coincide with the majoritarian interest andcontradict egalitarian principles. As a matter of fact, the article will be ableto show that the new salience of minority politics and the extended politicsof recognition is not so much a causal effect of an intensified ethnic struggleor a rational response to ethnic mobilization, but rather is the result of asymbolic re-evaluation of ethnic difference in the course of Europeanintegration, with effects on the self-image of the minorities as well as on thecollective identity of the majoritarian society.

This study into the relationship between minority nationalism andEuropean integration will investigate, first of all, to what extent ethnicgroups make use of European opportunities to mobilize their claims andconcerns. Second, it is also an attempt to understand how discourses ofbelonging and identities are framed and reflected upon in a Europe of deepdiversity, affecting majority–minority relations and patterns of mutualrecognition. If we talk of Europeanization, we thus do not only refer to theefforts of policy coordination at the European level and the impact ofcommonly agreed policies at the national and subnational level, i.e. to directinteractions and strategic interchanges as an effect of the formulation andimplementation of European Union (EU) policies. In a wider sense, Euro-peanization will also refer to processes of cultural diffusion of meaning,opinions and expectations about whether and how to achieve commongoals and interests (Olsen, 2002; Soysal, 2002).

Thompson and Rudolph (1989), nearly two decades ago, called for thenecessity of macro-explanations for the understanding of ethnic conflicts.Our approach to Europeanization will help to understand these changingmacro-level conditions of ethnic mobilization in contemporary Europeannation states. Our empirical investigation confirms the difficulties of causal(micro-)explanations to explain the ebb and flow of ethno-territorialpolitics in the western world. A firm collective identity and the emergenceof an ethno-territorial movement that fights for recognition are notsufficient causes for explaining the changing framework of minority politicsin Europe. On the contrary, as will be shown, the German and French casesprovide examples of extended recognition, despite the fact that the ethnic

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groups concerned are increasingly disintegrated; and in the Spanish case,strong regional identities and their mobilization against the central statewere for a long period also rather counterproductive in achieving thedesired cultural and political autonomy of the regional entities.

This European riddle of expanded recognition, in absence of consistentethnic mobilization and in spite of increasing disintegration of the respec-tive ethnic groups, can only be explained by referring to the changingmacro-context of European integration. Europe (and not only the EU, butalso the wider European political and institutional context) helps thesegroups to discover new opportunities for political mobilization and tocreate new identities. The success of such strategies related to a ‘new politicsof difference’ correlates with a change of majoritarian attitudes and is thusrelying on a ‘new politics of recognition’, which includes the attempt of are-balancing of the ‘unity and diversity’ of the nation state and itstraditional way of defining belonging. The case of language minority recog-nition can contribute to such an understanding of how European integra-tion is related to the transformation of national integration and theconfrontation with internal and external diversity.

LANGUAGE MINORITIES AND THE NEW POLITICS OFRECOGNITION IN EUROPE

Language is a sociological artefact. The use of language is not a question ofindividual preferences, but a collective act that transcends the private realmand affects every user in that particular language community. Languagethus helps to define collectivities which, in most cases, can be territoriallycircumscribed. At the same time, the use of language as a marker of collec-tive identities is a relatively recent phenomenon. Efforts for the standard-ization of vernacular languages have been undertaken only after the rise ofprint capitalism, the downfall of Roman-Latin Europe and the politicalsegmentation of the continent in sovereign state entities (Anderson, 1991).As described by Rokkan (1999), the establishment of standardized writtenlanguage has to be understood as a genuinely political process that hasdetermined the fate of state and nation building in Europe. In the courseof modernization (and some would say as a counter-movement to modern-ization), language has become a principal focus of collective mobilizationand identity formation. This process was closed in the late 19th and early20th century, resulting in the ‘freezing’ of nation states. But it has left openthe question of the many victims of the standardization of nation-statelanguages.

To be clear, the process of standardization of nation-state languageshas brought very different results all over Europe and language has

TRENZ ● RECONCILING DIVERSIT Y AND UNIT Y



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always remained a hotly debated issue within established nation states(Blommaert, 1999). The success of language nationalism in constructing thenational community went hand in hand with the construction of its enclosedlinguistic minorities (May, 2001: 82). Several patterns have been developedto accommodate these linguistic minorities. In contemporary Europe, rela-tively successful centres with only one hegemonic and exclusive language(e.g. France and Germany) continue to coexist with many multilingual statestructures such as Belgium, Switzerland and, recently, also Spain.

In recent years, the established language hegemony of ‘frozen’ nationstates has come under increasing pressure. As noted by May (2001: 7) theongoing re-contextualization of language nationalism relates to globaliz-ation and external constraints to national sovereignty, as well as to internalcontestation of the established language hegemony by increasingly self-conscious minority groups. In this present article, the resurgence andamplification of the struggle for recognition of language minorities will bediscussed within the framework of two interrelated processes that havebrought about the ‘de-freezing’ of the monolithic language infrastructure ofEuropean nation states: first, the new emphasis on identity politics that hasimproved opportunities for mobilization and increased public attention forminority affairs; second, Europeanization that has turned language from aquestion of recognition within the nation state to a question of recognitionin Europe.

The new emphasis on ‘identity politics’ has sustained a trend within(post)modern societies to blame not only the violation of individual rights,but to call for justice also with regard to the recognition of group rights andcultural differences. To the extent that such claims for the public recognitionof collective identities are raised within or across existing nation states, wecan speak of the culturalization of social conflicts that substitute or supple-ment the traditional focus on distributive struggles between differenteconomically defined strata of society (Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1992).

This process of the ‘culturalization’ of conflict has been mainly describedas the discovery of new categories for claiming identity, difference and self-determination. The literature has focused on the so-called new social move-ments and has illustrated how particular groups such as homosexuals orwomen have discovered culture as a category of recognition and used it forthe reconstruction of their collective identities, for instance, the culturallydefined gay communities (Adam, 2001; Hobsen, 2003). Considerable atten-tion has been further devoted to the formation of new ethnic minoritiesdefined by race, immigration and religion, which began to change thetraditional cleavage structures of western societies (Wrench and Solomos,1993; Joly, 1998; Modood, 2000).

As emphasized by more recent research, this cultural turn has also givennew impetus to the so-called old cultural minorities in Europe that havebeen suppressed in the 19th-century process of nation building and that

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now survive as relics of pre-modern, multicultural and fragmented empires.In contrast to ethnic immigrant minorities, these so-called national minori-ties are distinguished by their desire to become or to survive as a separateentity alongside the larger society and to demand various forms ofautonomy and self-governance in cultural and political terms (Kymlicka,1995: 10).

Mainly inspired by Canadian writers such as Charles Taylor (1992) andWill Kymlicka (1995, 2000), European authors have started to rethink the‘Europe of deep diversity’ (Fossum, 2001). Multilingualism became theobject of fierce ideological debates over the last decade in which the culturalhegemony of the nation state and the subordination of its national minori-ties was challenged (Blommaert, 1999). This has further opened the agendaof minority language rights and the promotion of ethno-linguistic democ-racy as a way to reconcile cultural differences according to common stan-dards (May, 2001: 236ff.).

The second shift that has favoured the resurgence of minority politicsin Europe can be broadly described as transnationalization and morespecifically in our case as the Europeanization of collective action (Marksand McAdam, 1999). In the case of language minorities, an intermediaryspace of contention has emerged that involves European institutions,governments and local actors and that has intensified interaction andcommunication processes within the European multilevel system (Nelde etal., 1996: 4; Hogan-Brun and Wolff, 2003). More specifically, Europeaniza-tion has facilitated the diffusion of common orientations and particularpolicy models of minority protection. It has further led to transnationalagenda setting and it has taken organizational forms in the expression ofcommon preferences, the shaping of political opportunities and thedevelopment of mobilization strategies.

In the following, I will first describe the changing framework of identitypolitics and struggles of recognition in France, Germany and Spain. At afirst glance, these three countries have little in common. The belonging toa particular minority culture has assumed quite different meanings andthere are different institutional responses as well as different degrees ofpolitical mobilization linked to claims for justice and recognition. Majori-tarian attitudes and policy responses range from strong assimilatory pres-sures in an egalitarian framework (France), federalist accommodation(Germany) and authoritarian repression (Spain). In spite of this historicaldiversity, a shift in recent strategies and institutional responses can beobserved, which, with some reservations, can be linked to the framework ofnew identity politics in Europe. To understand the changing framework forminority mobilization in the three countries of analysis, I will turn, secondly,to the Europeanization of minority mobilization that has endorsed thesearch for a modern expression of language nationalism. Based on theevaluation of interviews,1 the Europeanization of language minority




activism can be traced back in the following dimensions: enhanced cooper-ative efforts and networking, the impact of commonly defined policies andstandards of protection, the development of common understandings,patterns of transnational solidarity and the redefining of collective identi-ties of the formerly fragmented minority communities.

THE CHANGING FRAMEWORK OF MINORIT YMOBILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY AND SPAIN

France: The marginal minorities

The story of language minorities in France goes from complete marginal-ization and suppression to slow but steady incorporation and recognition ofrights of difference. The recent changes in attitudes must be explainedwithin the historical context of French nation building and its recontextu-alization in the European context.

According to the dominant perception of French political nationalism,the French language has an ideational dimension. The use of Frenchlanguage is perceived as an identification with the civilizing force of theFrench revolution and the unitary state is needed to guarantee equality,liberty and fraternity of all citizens. Assimilation is thus perceived as theprecondition for the granting of individual, political and social rights. To beFrench is to be speaking French. The use of minority languages has there-fore for a long time been perceived as anti-revolutionary, anti-republicanand consequently also anti-democratic.2 Accordingly, French citizenship isnon-discriminative, it applies equally to all people living on the territory,independent of their cultural or ethnic status.3

There is thus no political status granted to regional minorities in France.‘Speaking a regional language is viewed as a private matter, in the same wayas religion is’ (Judge, 2000: 46). Even the linguistic status and the numberof regional languages in France are unclear since no public authority willever recognize them or contribute to their institutionalization. There canalso be no official census on the number of speakers of minority languagesbecause any question of this kind would be considered as discriminatory.The standardization of Occitan, Provençal and Corsican is hotly debatedamong linguists and cultural activists to this day. In the case of Basque,Catalan, German (Alsatian) and Flemish, only external standards havebeen adopted. Breton is the only minority language that has been success-fully standardized through genuine efforts within the country.

The privatization of minority affairs has also been deeply internalized bythe minorities themselves. The majority of them (with the exception ofCorsica) did not mobilize significant opposition to their assimilation into

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French society. Similar to Germany, the depolitization of the language issuehas given birth to mainly cultural associations. Small political parties thatwere founded in the Basque Country, in Brittany and in Alsace were soonmarginalized as right wing and did not find substantial voter support. Onlyin Corsica is separatism clearly linked to political and not cultural nation-alism and the Front de libération national corse (FLNC) has opted for aviolent strategy against the French central state.

This peaceful and non-militant strategy comes as a surprise whenconfronted with its limited success in the minority struggle for recognitionover the last decades. Until the early 1990s, recognition was almostcompletely denied and the notorious opposition of the French politicalsystem to regionalist claims contributed to the increasing marginalizationof language minorities with declining figures of native speakers all over thecountry. The denial of recognition of minority languages was also not aquestion of the political left or right since both understand themselves asthe heirs of the French revolution, defending the assimilatory Republicantradition. This elite consensus made political mobilization of the minoritieseven more difficult, since there was no proper space for defending thelegitimacy of their claims.

It was only in the 1990s that the French central state began to turn itsattention to minority affairs. At that point, the depoliticized, mainly culturalassociations had clearly the better starting position. In all regions, recog-nition began to expand in schools where bilingual educational curriculafound, for the first time, governmental support (Judge, 2000: 54). Theframing of minority politics as educational politics is strikingly similar to thenew approach towards minorities chosen in Germany, and previously alsoin Spain, which developed new educational models of bilingual educationimmediately after the death of Franco. As a late comer but still in adapta-tion to its European neighbours, France stepped forward in the late 1990swith the official recognition of regional languages, which were nowreframed as a component of the French national heritage, as part of Frenchculture.4 Behind this new official rhetoric, we can clearly identify the ideaof unity in diversity, which informs EU cultural politics but has been largelyunknown to the French tradition so far.

It is also striking that this change in official government rhetoric andattitude is not an effect of intensified claims making, but rather an indirectreaction to European adaptation and diffusion of new hegemonic modelsin the European framework. Since the early 1990s, the French governmentwas faced with the necessity of bringing its minority politics (or rather theabsence of minority politics) in to line with European standards. More thanin any other European country, the European Charter of Regional andMinority Languages required deep constitutional changes. AlthoughFrance still lags behind its European partners in adopting and implement-ing the Charter, most observers would agree that similar European




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initiatives had a clear impact on the change of government attitudestowards minorities.

Last but not least, France became itself the leading country in the EU inprotecting and promoting its national language against the dominance ofEnglish. This battle against foreign cultural domination in Europeconfronted the French government with claims put forward, for example,by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe to recognize therights of its own regional minority languages. The recognition of the culturaldiversity in Europe entails recognition of cultural diversity inside eachEuropean country. Improving its own regime of language protection thushelped the French government to pursue a more aggressive language policytowards its European partners and the outside world.

This change in governmental attitudes goes hand in hand with the re-orientation of minority organization. Similar to Germany, the politicalactivism of minorities has a rather restricted agenda. Most cultural eventsand initiatives are of non-political character, avoiding confrontations withthe authorities (with the well-known exception of Corsica). The self-limitation to educational and cultural politics is consensual among themembers who do not want to see the minorities become involved inpartisan conflicts. Furthermore, the dependence on external funding oftendoes not allow such groups to expand to political activism. Also Europeanumbrella organizations (in particular the European Bureau for Lesser-UsedLanguages (EBLUL)) do not support political expressions of languagenationalism.

Accordingly, the new cultural movements that represented minorities inFrance, for example in Brittany, Alsace or Roussillon, did not opt for anopen expression of nationalism, but rather defended their regionalistconcerns by reference to a new globalized or explicitly European vision.Bilingual education in Basque, for instance, should prepare the children ‘foradult life in tomorrow’s open-minded Europe’.5 Similarly, the revival ofOccitan in the French midi is clearly not linked to political nationalism butto cultural recognition of difference. The founding of small cultural associ-ations at the local level involves people from all strata of local society. Mosttypically, the question of language is not addressed in political manifestos,but in research projects for the promotion of the knowledge of regionallanguage and culture and for influencing teaching methods. The use of theregional language is not seen as a defensive weapon against dominantFrench but as the gate to the outside world, enabling open-minded studentsto more easily learn other European languages.6

European integration does also influence the new self-consciousness ofthe minority associations in France. Especially in the border regions(Alsace), our respondents expressed very positive attitudes towardsEuropean integration and European institutions. Europe makes regionalactors more powerful vis-à-vis the national government. Europe is

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perceived as the alternative that helps to overcome the blockage of nationalpolitics. At the same time, there is a deep scepticism that Europe will reallybe able to change deep-rooted French attitudes and a regret that not morecompetences are allocated at the European level.

Germany: The unobserved minorities

The story of language minorities in Germany goes from disregard andoblivion to increased attention and legitimacy to minority claims andconcerns. Similar to the French case, this change in attitude towards minori-ties indicates a change in the dominant perception of collective identity ofthe German nation state and the way of defining belonging in the newEurope. The acquisition of new rights of difference of the minorities wasaccompanied by a new positive evaluation of difference of the Germanmajority.

In contrast to French political nationalism, language in Germany was notlinked to an ideational-missionary attitude, but had a strong ethnical-cultural component. German language was considered as the soul of theGerman Kulturnation and not as something that could easily be acquired.In consequence, German cultural nationalism developed an exclusiveattitude towards outsiders (Brubaker, 1992).

The concept of the Kulturnation implied also that there was no need toerect a unitary state structure in Germany. Federalism encouraged pluralcultural practices and differences inside. This has allowed small minoritiesto survive with distinct cultures. In the case of Polish and Sorbian minori-ties in the eastern territories, these populations were simply not consideredas being part of the German nation and no need was felt to assimilate them.7

In the case of Danish and Frisian minorities in the northern territories,cultural practice was largely restricted to folklore and not to politicalactivism.8 Accordingly, no particular attention was paid to them beyondtheir local settlements. These unnoticed minorities were neither perceivedas a threat to the unity of the nation nor as something that had to beurgently assimilated.

In the post-war period, this traditional framework of German national-ism underwent substantial changes that slowly shaped a new attitudetowards minorities. An overall all-partisan consensus developed among thepolitical elites and among the general public that the residing languageminorities should benefit from special rights and protection (Heckmann,1992). This basic consensus can be explained as a relic of a consciousness ofcollective guilt of the past: it is well known and often remembered that theethnic minority population suffered from repression, prosecution and – asin the case of Sinti and Roma – even extermination during the Nazi regime.In the post-war period, the language minorities profited from this particu-lar moral obligation towards religious and ethnic minorities and the federal




structure of the newly established Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)allowed for special attention to be paid to the mainly localized languageminorities. This general consensus also included the socialist regime of theformer German Democratic Republic (GDR), which establishededucational, cultural and even religious autonomy9 rights for the Sorbianminority.

The recognition of language minorities has nevertheless only been anissue of minor contention in the FRG. Due to the federal structure of thepolitical system, language and minority policies are strongly regionalized andall major responsibilities and authorities of legislation and decision makingreside with the regional governments.10 Language minorities are officiallyrecognized in the regional constitutions of Brandenburg and Sachsen (theSorbs) and of Schleswig-Holstein (the Danish, Frisian and Sinti and Roma).So far, no federal law provides for the protection of national minorities inGermany and the claim for an amendment of the federal constitution(Grundgesetz) put forward by the minority organizations at the beginning ofthe 1990s has been rejected by the majoritarian parties.

Even so, Germany’s hidden agenda of minority protection includesspecial representation rights (in the exemption to the 5 percent clause forthe Danish Party SSW [Südschleswigsche Wählerverband] in the regionalParliament of Schleswig-Holstein), polyethnic rights (in the form of aguarantee of public subsidies), and even rights of political self-determination (e.g. the independent school system run by the Danishminorities).11 In contrast to France, where no infringement to the egali-tarian principle through the granting of such minority rights was conceiv-able, the German federal system allows for the accommodation of minorityclaims through decentralized and flexible policy measures and throughcooperation and partnerships between the minority organization and thelocal administrations.

As a common pattern for all minority organizations, political activism ismainly reduced to the promotion of educational and cultural policies at thelocal and regional level. Only the Danish population is represented by anideologically neutral political party in the regional Parliament (Landtag) ofSchleswig-Holstein. In all other cases, ideological neutrality is perceived asvital for upholding and strengthening the unitary structure of the minorityrepresentation. A stronger commitment to political campaigning beyondthe general consensus of promoting minority protection would meantransforming the associational structure into a partisan structure. Thisagain, would imply the high risk of internal conflicts and frictions and thusendanger the unitary structure of the minority representation. Neverthe-less, political activism of German language minorities has increased overthe last decade. Minorities have discovered a common agenda for politicalclaims making and have succeeded in institutionalizing new channels ofaccess to the political system, both at the regional and at the national level.

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All minority activists interviewed agree that the public awareness ofminority issues is low, but only few would go so far as to presume a generalhostility of the German population towards the minorities. The generalpublic attitude is described as inadequate knowledge, ignorance and in-difference with regard to minority issues. The non-salience of the issue ofminority protection is also regarded as a major handicap for collectivemobilization and for securing public funding.

Confronted with this general indifference of the public, the need is feltto ‘sell’ a positive image of the minority. In many cases, mobilization islinked to information campaigns that strive at enlightening the Germanmajority. Minorities perceive themselves as ‘exemplary citizens’ who canteach cultural diversity and tolerance to the majority. Against stubborn‘Germanness’, language minorities feel authorized to transmit knowledgeand understanding of cultural diversity, making the Germans recognize thatbesides their own language, there exist other languages actively spoken intheir territory. In this context, a new image of Germany as part of a Europeof ‘unity in diversity’ is emphasized. Many of our respondents would like tosee minorities as examplary Europeans, as people who have learned toappreciate the values of difference and tolerance and now can communi-cate and teach their experience to the majority.

The success story of minority mobilization in Germany is reflected in theexpansion of the political opportunity structure from the local and regionalto the national and European level. This increasing openness and respon-siveness can be attributed to four intervening factors: (1) the supportiveinternational context and European initiatives (implementation of theFramework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities andagenda setting through the European Language Charter, the EuropeanYear of Languages etc.); (2) successful intermediation and channelling ofclaims making through the new offices of the Commissioner of MinorityAffairs established by the regional and federal governments; (3) improvedcooperation, solidarity and mutual support between the single minorityorganizations operating in Germany; (4) changing public attitudes andpositive attention towards minority issues.

Still, minority organizations are in a rather defensive position thatrestricts their opportunities for running an offensive claims-makingstrategy. Minority language communities are organized along the patternof internal conflicts and external closeness. They have centralized theirpolitical representations and try to speak with a unitary public voice. Thisis not so much a condition for the success of political mobilization than acondition for the survival of the community as such and for its visibilitywithin the German majority culture and society.

The general degree of success of organizational activities must thereforebe measured not so much in successful claims making than in terms ofprotecting the integrity of the language community and in terms of opening




opportunities for the modernization of its activities. All language groupsshare a generational problem. The major challenge is to look for themodernization of their internal structure and activity, which means definingnew contents and identities that keep the communal life intact and motivateparticipation of the young generation.

Beyond this general background, Europeanization and internationaliza-tion of community activism can be perceived as a chance for moderniza-tion. It is a way to overcome generational problems, to define new issuesfor mobilization and to motivate participation. It is a new image andidentity of the minority not as a localized, folkloristic element of Germansociety, but as part of a new multicultural life style. Similar to the Frenchcase, the Europeanization of minority politics has become a major conditionfor the success of minority activism. Europe supports claims making at thenational level, it fixes new opportunities for expanding activism and it offersnew identities to minority activists.

Spain:The resistant minorities

The story of language minorities in Spain goes from violent confrontationand resistance to enhanced cooperation, tolerated diversity and enforced,but not yet peaceful, coexistence. Instead of unilateral recognition of theminority through the majority, we can speak of a case of multilateralrecognition of different nationalities within the new framework of theSpanish multinational state, where all sides are involved in collectivelearning processes. Despite ongoing violent expressions of regional nation-alism and unresolved conflicts between the national governments and itsautonomous regions (comunidades autónomas), the consolidation ofSpanish democracy has contributed to a redefinition of majority-minorityrelations and the growth of civic virtues and trust in a multilingual Spanishsociety.

In contrast to France and Germany, where nationalism and thepromotion of a common language are directly linked to modernization andthe necessity to establish a unitary state structure, the Spanish state has beenformed by what can be called an old, pre-modern and pre-revolutionarynationalism. After the reconquista, Spain was inspired by the missionaryattitude of Catholic restoration on the inside and expansion towards theoutside. As a side effect of the discoveries, Spanish language was exportedto the New World, where a surprisingly high level of language standardiza-tion was achieved. In turn, the consolidation of their own state territory andthe political and cultural unification of the country were clearly neglected.Spanish nationalism was thus directed towards the outside with only limitedeffects of unifying the state territory on the inside.

The Castilian hegemony has to be understood, in part, as a result of theNew World American empire from which Mediterranian Catalans and

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peripheral Galicians and Basques were largely excluded. Only after the lossof the American colonies did the Castilian crown begin to look inwards inorder to consolidate internal Spanish territory. The political and adminis-trative centralization of Spain, for the first time, brought Castilian linguis-tic supremacy in conflict with the existing national languages in the territory.Early state building was followed then by late peripheral nationalismagainst the state (Linz, 1973; Mar-Molinero, 2000: 85ff.).

The castilianization of public life pushed by the central government wenthand in hand with the resurgence of language nationalism in the Spanishperipheries.12 The 19th-century political resistance against centralizing statestructures was related to what can be called the first Europeanization oflanguage nationalism. Its manifesto was written in the early 19th centuryby German writers such as Herder and Fichte, whose ideas of language asthe soul of the nation were enthusiastically taken up by the suppressedminorities in the peripheries all over Europe (Hobsbawm, 1990; Barbour,2000: 15).13

The permissive attitude of Spanish nationalism towards linguistic plural-ity on the inside was slowly replaced by a conflictual confrontation betweenthe political centre and the growing cultural and political self-consciousnessof the populations in the prosperous and industrialized peripheries. In theearly 20th century, deep cleavages cut through Spanish society, and thepeninsula increasingly fell apart culturally, linguistically, politically andideologically. The Spanish civil war was the violent manifestation of Spain’smultiple identity crises (Mar-Molinero, 2000: 97) and it was clear that theFranco regime could only bring about a temporary authoritarian stalemateof the unresolved language question.

It is well known, and needs no further explanation here, that the suppres-sion of language minorities during the four decades of the Franco dictator-ship laid the grounds for militant nationalism in the transition period. Ona first look, this validates the thesis of Spanish exceptionalism in Europe. Incontrast to France and Germany, language nationalism in Spain has alwaysbeen strongly politicized, with both sides being disposed to make use ofunconventional and violent means in the political struggle. At the sametime, language nationalism has been strongly institutionalized: it is notlimited to cultural associationalism, as the dominant organizational form oflanguage minorities in France, Germany and elsewhere in Europe, but hassucceeded in establishing influential regionalist parties which in Euskara(the Basque Country) and in Catalunya are also the majoritarian parties ingovernment. In the legal-constitutional framework of the comunidadesautónomas, regional nationalism has become executive nationalism ofstable and powerful governments that replace the minority movement fromwhich they originate. The defence of the regional language is thus takenover by the administrative apparatus of the region where citizens and theirassociations play only a minor and substitutive role. At the same time, this




leads to the persistence of a strong territorial cleavage structure thatcontinues to shape Spanish politics in Europe.

From the perspective of Spanish exceptionalism, the framework of a‘new identity politics’ becomes problematic, since political mobilization wasdetermined by mutual non-recognition, by distributive rather than culturalstruggles, and by the striving for independence from, and not differencewithin, the majoritarian society. In contrast to France and Germany, thevery term ‘minority’ is ambivalent and contested, as it does not refer to alocally confined group at the margins of the majoritarian society, but to oneof Spain’s equal ‘nationalitities’ that successfully defends its political andcultural hegemony within the region.14 In practice, this means that thelanguage of the ‘minority’ is the official language of the region and regionallanguage politics create ‘minorities within the minority’, repressing the non-speakers of the minority language who, as in the case of Catalunya, Galiciaand the País Vasco (Basque Country), can be excluded from public offices.15

Nevertheless, three major trends over the 1980s–1990s confirm the slowtransformation of Spanish language nationalism. First, the marginalizationof left-wing radical nationalism in Catalunya and Galicia (less so in the PaísVasco), which corresponds to a turn from distributive struggles to moreculturally defined activities; second, the reconciliation with the Spanishcentral state and the acceptance of the idea of unity in diversity within thenew framework of administrative federalism and regional autonomy; third,Europeanization, which defines a new role for the Spanish regions aspartners in European governance, offers opportunities for transregionalcooperation (which is most advanced in Catalunya) and involves minorityassociations in European networking.

We thus find increasing evidence for the softening of Spanish exception-alism in the new Europe. The successful consolidation of the Spanish nationstate goes hand in hand with an increasing marginalization of militantnationalism and public indignation about and solidarity with the victims ofterrorism.16 Spanish federalism has offered a constitutional framework forthe still unfinished and open-ended appeasement of ethnic conflicts. Theoften purely functional need for cooperation replaces the traditionalconflict inclination among the autonomous regions. Learning also takesplace in the multilevel European framework, which offers new roles toregional actors as participants in European governance.

In contemporary Spain, the battle about the status of minority languageshas been won. In less than 20 years, Spain has passed from one of the mostrepressive regimes under Franco to a forerunner of bilingual education andlanguage rights in Europe. Under these conditions, nationalism is reducedfor most people to cultural and linguistic autonomy – that is regionalismrather than separatism. Whereas political nationalism is in decline, theimages of regional identity are improving and minority languages canstabilize their position.17

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However, it should also be noted that the recognition offered by thecentral state remains conditional: associations that accept the self-limitationof their activities to cultural regionalism are awarded with legal protection,affirmative action and public subsidies, while at the same time all activiststhat stick to political nationalism or separatism are marginalized. Thisdividing line between cultural regionalists and political nationalists is, ofcourse, blurred in the everyday political struggle.

The Spanish experience of language minorities’ activism thus remainsambivalent. In the European context, the emphasis of a new politics ofrecognition does not result from the rediscovery of the value of minoritylanguages (as in France and Germany), but from the slow and still in-complete transformation of traditional political nationalism and itsinclination to violent conflict resolution. Spain is also different in itsorganizational structure of minority activism. It is represented by region-alist parties, which raise territorial claims, and not by cultural associations.The partisan structure of Spanish language minorities is clearly a strengththat helps them to become a powerful player in Spain and in Europe.Minority activism in Spain experienced a late Europeanization but,supported by regional governments, was soon able to become a powerfulplayer in Europe. In contrast to minority lobbyists from other countries,the defenders of Spanish minority languages sit in the European Parlia-ment or participate directly in intergovernmental negotiations of the EU.On the other hand, Spanish minorities and their governmental represen-tatives have found it difficult to integrate with European associationalismand to develop European visions and patterns of transnational solidaritythat go beyond their particular interests. As agents of executive national-ism, they sit closer to the intergovernmental Europe of interest represen-tation than to the civil society Europe of enforced rights and sharedvalues.

THE EUROPEANIZATION OF LANGUAGE NATIONALISM

Our comparative overview of changing patterns of minority–majorityrelations in France, Germany and Spain has found important convergencesin strategies, attitudes and institutional responses within the minority fieldof activism. We thus find a clear trend towards more openness, legitimacyand benevolent attention to cultural difference within the framework of anew politics of recognition that is slowly replacing the traditionally sharpand exclusive cleavage lines of political nationalism. In this part, anadditional explanatory variable will be introduced that links the conver-gences of minority protection in Europe and the status of a new politics ofdifference to encompassing Europeanization processes that increasingly




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shape minority activists’ strategies of mobilization, institutional responseand public attitudes.

The emerging organizational field of language activism in Europe

Considering the fact that around 40 million EU citizens speak a languageother than the main official language of their country of origin, languageminorities have the potential to become an important player in Europeanpolitics. In total, 40 linguistic minorities reside in Europe, which are organ-ized in a few hundred different cultural and political associations, regional-ist parties, networks and umbrellas.18

For most of the long-established national minority organizations inwestern Europe, the extension of organizational activities, claims makingand networking in the European political sphere is not a new experience.In particular, German and French minorities have played a prominent rolein promoting European cooperation among language minorities in theframework of two major umbrella organizations: the ‘Federal Union ofEuropean Nationalities’ (FUEN) and EBLUL.

FUEN was founded in 1949 among western European minority organiz-ations who fought for regional autonomy and the protection of minoritylanguages. Formerly an organization of mainly ‘elderly Gentlemen’, thisEuropean network has experienced a rapid change since 1989. A newdynamic was given to the organization with the challenge of easternEuropean enlargement. FUEN has actively supported the integration ofmiddle and eastern European minorities into European networking struc-tures and has tried to develop policy answers to the burning question ofminority protection in these countries. FUEN has also contributed to theinternal democratization of eastern and south-eastern European minorityorganizations and to the pacification of conflicts in these countries.19

Eastern enlargement has further changed the framework of mutuallearning among language minorities in Europe. Traditionally, FUENspecialized in exporting know-how and organizational capacities fromwestern to eastern Europe. Now, minority organizations who cooperatewithin FUEN increasingly realize that new inputs and ideas for politicalmobilization are reimported from the East. In general, one can concludethat eastern enlargement has made European networking much moredynamic and has enlarged the scope of action and influence of westernEuropean language minorities.

FUEN has been traditionally associated with the Council of Europe,but apparently has problems in occupying the political opportunitystructure that is offered by the EU, first, because the EU has no genuinecompetences in protecting minorities and consequently cannot beapproached on such issues, second because EBLUL has been establishedas a competing organization at the European level. EBLUL is an

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independent non-governmental organization (NGO) that receives subsi-dies mainly from the European Commission’s (EC’s) Director General ofEducation and Culture. Established in 1982, it works for linguistic diversityand the preservation of minority languages in Europe. In contrast to theCouncil of Europe, the EU framework offers only limited opportunity forlanguage politics (i.e. via the avenue of cultural politics rather than minoritypolitics). EBLUL can therefore be considered as a ‘non-political’ organiz-ation and not fully representative of minorities’ issues and concerns inEurope. Although EBLUL was mostly obedient to this restriction ofpolitical activism, trying to evade all possible conflicts with the EC and thegovernments, its expanding activities in networking minorities all overEurope were still watched with suspicion by some of the governments. InAugust 2004, the EC unexpectedly withdrew its subsidies for the mainten-ance of EBLULs organizational infrastructure. After the closure of theBrussels’ offices and the dismissal of the staff, the situation of Europeannetworking is still unclear, but it can be expected that EBLUL will only beable to survive in larger and richer countries, whereas the fragile infra-structure in eastern Europe, where national committees of EBLUL wereestablished only recently, will collapse.

All principal minority language organizations in France and Germanyare active founding members of both European networks. Spanish minori-ties have only recently become involved in European network organiz-ations. At the time of writing, they are still not a member of FUEN.20

European contacts are used for enhancing problem awareness, for improv-ing strategies of claims making and for raising additional funding throughEuropean projects. One respondent also mentions the possibility of insti-tutional isomorphism and learning effects as a side-effect of cooperation.21

Asked about their experience in collaborating with both Europeannetworks, most respondents answer that they prefer collaboration withFUEN, which is said to be more political, more independent and longerexperienced in networking. Asked about the relationship between FUENand EBLUL, there seems to be only limited cooperation between the twotrans-European networks: they neither cooperate nor compete with eachother.22

Europe as an arena of contention

These European activities have clearly gained importance in the early1990s. There is an awareness of European opportunities and all organiz-ations agree with the necessity to intensify European networking. Why haveminority rights become more prominent in the European context? In mostcases, the reasons for this growing European awareness are not furtherspecified. Most minority activists perceive Europe vaguely as a new oppor-tunity that should be occupied, although it is not quite clear what this new




opportunity stands for. Others refer to the efforts to support languageminorities from eastern Europe and to include them into Europeannetworking. And certainly everybody is attracted by the possibilities ofcampaigning and funding both in the institutional context of the EU (e.g.the European Year of Languages in 2002) and of the Council of Europe. Itis nevertheless deplored that European language policies and practiceamount to little more than thinly disguised rhetoric, given that the MemberStates have made it clear that their hesitant support for multilingualismdoes not mean the recognition of collective rights of the minority popu-lations (Kronenthal, 2003).

There is further a strong perception among many respondents thatnetworking and policy cooperation at the national level has improved as apositive side-effect of European networking. Europeanization is thus anopportunity to overcome fragmentation within the nation state. Evenwithin the nation state, different minorities were fragmented, as in the caseof Germany and France. In order to become an influential actor in theEuropean power play, minority organizations should first try to pool theirresources and to aggregate claims making at the national level. TheEuropean arena is an additional meeting point and, sometimes, preparatorymeetings or coordination of information flows at the national level are feltto be necessary. This potential of European cooperation as a promoter ofnational networks is further supported by FUEN and EBLUL, which bringtogether geographically dispersed organizations on various occasions, suchas general assemblies or special working group meetings.23

From the governmental side this new salience of minority issues is stillmainly restricted to the EU enlargement process (Sasse, 2003: 18). As is wellknown, the four Copenhagen criteria for accession explicitly mentioned ‘therespect for and protection for minorities’. The wording of the first criterionof Copenhagen is identical with Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the EuropeanUnion (TEU) defining the common value basis of the EU by reference to‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedomsand the rule of law’ (Sasse, 2003: 18). What cannot be found in the existingEU provisions, however, is any additional reference to minority rights.

The draft Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected in France and in theNetherlands, uses the minority issue mainly for window-dressing as part ofthe new rhetoric of ‘unity in diversity’. Article 1(2) speaks of the Unionvalues, including the formerly missing reference to minorities. Article 6evokes a ‘society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination’ and Part 2 of the draft Treaty stresses the EU’s respect forthe ‘diversity of the cultures and traditions of the people in Europe’. Insubstantial terms, however, the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty wouldnot have changed the EU’s rather cautious and diffident way of handlingminority issues. In spite of extensive lobbyism of the minorities themselves(e.g. through FUEN and EBLUL as members of the civil society forum),

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there has been no explicit legal commitment to the principles of minorityprotection. Similarly, the issue of minority protection has been omitted inthe previously drafted Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted by the NiceIGC (Nizza Intergovernmental Conference) in a legally non-binding form.In consequence, the EU (in contrast to the Council of Europe cooperation)still lacks any legal basis for a Community initiative in this area.24

In light of the present deadlocks of political integration of the EU andthe dismantling of its minority network (EBLUL), minority activism can beexpected to shift further to the framework of Council of Europe co-operation. Already in the past, the Council of Europe was experienced asmuch more open and responsive than the EU. Minority protection figuresprominently among the Council of Europe’s main activities. Minority repre-sentatives are invited for briefings and hearings on a regular basis wherethey meet with governmental authorities and MPs and where they areallowed to express themselves on political (and not simply cultural) issues.The implementation of the Language Charter foresees a strengthening ofthese working relations with the Secretary of the Council of Europe, estab-lishing partnerships with minority organizations at the local level andincluding them in monitoring activities as well as in the evaluation of theprogramme. Among our respondents, it is deplored that no similar activityunfolds at the EU level where routine contacts with the EC are upheldmainly to obtain funding or to resolve administrative questions, but not todiscuss policy contents.

Europeanization as modernization

The opening of a European arena of contention cannot be reduced to thesuccess or failure of European lobbyism. There is a further and deeperreason for the new prominence of minority issues in the wider Europe thatgoes beyond strategic thinking and the opening of new opportunities at theEuropean level. As will be argued, the turn towards Europe gives a newcultural meaning and adds a new identitarian dimension to minority region-alism. In this wider context, Europeanization must be understood as aprocess of horizontal diffusion of meaning and opportunities. Among theminorities themselves, Europeanization is experienced as modernization.While traditional regionalism is connoted with the negative image offolklore and still has to fight against the reputation of being backwards,traditional and even right-wing, the new image of representing a nationalminority in Europe clearly has positive connotations and is increasinglytaken up as a positive reference point for fixing personal and collectiveidentities.25

From this new perspective, the claim for regionalism and language diver-sity can be taken up progressively as a form of legitimate opposition againstmajoritarian nationalism, which becomes itself reflexive in dealing with its




internal diversity. In the new European framework, the periphery is re-discovered as an important source of European diversity (Nelde et al., 1996:52; May, 2001: 236ff.). Language minorities promote the positive experienceof diversity, which makes them appear more open minded and tolerantwhen confronted with the majority population. The new slogan ‘diversity inunity’ – officially propagated by the EU – thus grants new legitimacy tominority claims and concerns. It supports a new politics of differenceagainst traditional national cleavages and thus increases the reflexivity ofminority regionalism and of majority nationalism as part of the Europe ofdeep diversity (Fossum, 2001).

In the new European framework, the tension between language politics asinterest politics and between language politics as identity politics becomesblurred (Nelde et al., 1996: 32ff.). Detaching language politics from thenation state means also cutting them off from power politics, from redistrib-utive struggles and from partisan conflicts, thus increasing the chances ofrecognition through the majority. There is, however, a new ambivalence inthe new European discourse of justifying language protection that shiftsbetween universal rights and particular values. On the basis of universalrights, the lowest common denominator of language protection can beformulated that a free and fair context of language use should be createdin which nobody can be forced to speak a particular language that is not theone in which they feel most secure of expression (Kymlicka, 1995). In thisregard, the EU has erected a regime of linguistic tolerance that is unique interms of institutional design and expenditure (Kraus, 2000), but ambivalentwith regard to the recognition of minority languages that are not includedin the official programmes of promoting linguistic diversity. On the basis ofvalue particularism, the justification of minority language protectionfrequently resorts to aesthetic arguments, claiming that the survival of thelanguage assumes an absolute value and that European diversity ought tobe protected against globalizing and unifying trends.26 The value of linguis-tic survival would thus require taking measures for the sake of the languageitself and not in the interest of its speakers (or of the majority).

The risk of the European ‘unity in diversity’ framework is that Europeaninstitutions evoke a new fundamentalist and mainly symbolic rhetoric of thevalue of linguistic diversity without enforcing the rights of its speakers.More promising in this regard has been the approach followed within theCouncil of Europe framework where language protection is linked to theenforcement of individual (but not of collective) rights, as laid down inthe Charter of Regional and Minority Languages.

The new European dimension in minority protection has clearlycontributed to changed attitudes towards minorities and has increased theopenness and responsiveness of political institutions. As a direct effect ofcommonly agreed standards of language protection within the Council ofEurope framework (although notably not within the EU legal framework),

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the national governments in France and Germany were forced to set theissue of minority protection on the agenda. National and regional policyactors have to take new forms of European monitoring into consideration.Europe is a kind of external moral authority that supervises the nationalperformances in minority protection. Positive feedback and approval fromEurope increases the legitimacy of national policy actors.27

The major challenge is now to expand this Council of Europe frameworkof rights to the EU and to use language and minority rights as a track forthe democratization of the EU. Are language minorities thus forerunnersof a European civil society? Many of our respondents would like to seeminorities as exemplary Europeans, as people who have learned to appreci-ate the values of difference and tolerance and now can communicate andteach their experience to the majority. In this context, a new image ofEurope as one of ‘unity in diversity’ is emphasized that finds much reso-nance among European institutions and becomes part of the official imagepolitics of the EU. The knowledge that ‘Europe does not only consist ofnations but of many different cultures’ could further be used to promotethe democratization and the constitutionalization of the EU.

In this new context of meaning, Europeanization and the search for amodern expression of language regionalism has clearly contributed tosharpening the consciousness of a sense of transnational solidarity amongthe minority groups in different parts of the continent. Notably, thecommon European engagement has also contributed to overcoming gener-ational conflicts that threatened the integrity of the local communities inFrance and Germany and obstructed new political activism. The youth canbe inspired and enthused by modern regionalism and internationalism atthe same time. This change in attitude within the younger generation isreported by most of our respondents. Although generational problems arefar from being resolved, nobody would claim any longer (as in the 1970s)that language minorities are threatened by rapid extinction. The new inter-ests of the young people and their turn towards modern, ‘European’minority regionalism is also reflected in the relative success of the Youth ofEuropean Nationalities, (YEN), which organizes common activities at theEuropean level.

CONCLUSION: SOLIDARIT Y ACROSS BORDERS ANDPAT TERNS OF TRUST OF A NEW POLIT Y

The changing framework of European integration implies a trend fromdeep diversity of ethnocultural movements and respective policy responsestowards a common policy of recognition coordinated at the European leveland implemented in the different national and regional settings. In the




original framework, diversity existed (1) in terms of intranational differ-ences, experiences of nation building and state–society relations (e.g.different conceptions of national identity in France and Germany); (2) interms of intraregional differences (e.g. between Sorbian and Danish minori-ties in western and eastern Germany); (3) in terms of intracommunaldivisions (i.e. divisions within one minority group, such as those betweenpro-German Frisians and pro-Danish Frisians); (4) in terms of policyresponses (i.e. the rejectionist approach chosen by the French government,the representative approach chosen by the Spanish government and themanagerial approach chosen by the German government); (5) in terms ofpolicy outcomes (e.g. marginalization in the French case, accommodation inthe German case, incorporation, participation and representation in theSpanish case); and (6) in terms of policy dynamics (the conflict-drivenapproach in Spain and France and the consensus-driven approach inGermany).

The hypothesis that has been tested out in this article is further thatEuropean integration offers a pathway to the accommodation and consoci-ational management of minority affairs. As noted by Thompson andRudolph (1989: 231), the politics of difference always involves twoelements. The first is ethnoterritorial sentiment and mobilization. Secondly,they involve the readiness of the majority to recognize cultural differenceand to grant special rights of protection to minorities. As pointed outthroughout this article, there is no clear causal link between ethnic mobiliz-ation of the minority and recognition from the majority. The German mana-gerial approach is certainly closer to the European framework of enforcedintraregional cooperation and solidarity than is the French repressive or theSpanish political-representative and participative model. In the Spanishand French (Corsica) case, the confrontation of the central state with strongseparatist movements has for a long time blocked the expansion of regionalautonomy. More recently, we find a growing readiness of the majority inFrance and Germany to recognize difference and to accommodate ethnicconflicts that is not reflected in an increase in organizational capacities andmobilizing potential of the minorities.

If these insights hold true that no clear relationship between ethno-territorial mobilization and policy responses can be found, it is better tospeak of an encompassing process of policy transformation that shapesinstitutional choices and mobilization strategies. The alternative hypothesisthat has been tested out in this article refers to Europeanization understood(1) as the effort of policy coordination at the European level and the impactof commonly agreed policies at the national and subnational level; (2) as aprocess of enforced societal interactions and communicative exchangeswithin the new politically and institutionally defined space; (3) as thediffusion of meaning and understanding, the convergence of expectationsand the formation of a collective will about whether and how to achieve

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common goals and interests. Our findings with regard to these interlinkedprocesses can be summarized as follows:

1 Minority politics are a prime example of the effects ofEuropeanization outside the institutional framework of the EU. Thecase of minority protection has been promoted almost exclusively bythe Council of Europe. Europeanization in this case takes placethrough the direct effect of European Conventions in national lawand the necessity of policy adaptation. Minorities themselves usuallymake a sharp distinction between these two institutional paths ofEuropeanization. The more positive experiences with Europeancooperation in the Council of Europe framework are translated intheir readiness to support international law, universal human rightsand the transfer of authority to supranational institutions bysafeguarding subsidiarity and regional autonomy. The more negativeexperiences with European cooperation in the EU framework aretranslated into a general mistrust of intergovernmental agreementsand in the dominant role played by national governments. The newConstitutional framework was seen as a major improvement, but stillonly as a partial solution to the problem of re-empowering diversityin Europe.

2 Europeanization is not a steady and one-way process. There is norule of expanding minority rights in Europe. National governmentsand the EC remain ambivalent with regard to the formulation ofgeneral objectives of minority politics and the transfer of authority tothe European level. Instead of deepening integration, we might alsoexpect major backlashes in the implementation of the Council ofEurope standards or in the delay of the EU-constitutionalizationprocess. Europeanization in terms of building organizationalcapacities, promoting transnational exchange and interactions isfurther largely dependent on the good will of governmental actorsand can be easily manipulated. The future of European minorityactivism and networking is jeopardized by the EC and othergovernmental bodies’ withdrawal of funding. European activistssuddenly became aware that their organizational structure is muchmore fragile than they thought and can be easily put at risk byarbitrary administrative practice.

3 Europeanization understood as the opening of a European arena ofcontention cannot be reduced to the success or failure of Europeanlobbyism and networking. There is a further and deeper reason forthe new prominence of minority issues in the wider Europe that goesbeyond strategic thinking and the opening of new opportunities atthe European level. As has been argued, the turn towards Europegives a new cultural meaning and adds a new identitarian dimension




to minority regionalism. In this wider context, Europeanization mustbe understood as having unleashed a process of horizontal diffusionof meaning and opportunities and refers to the encompassingmodernization of ethnic nationalism in which regional belonging andtransnational solidarity are interlinked.

In this last sense, the accommodation of ethnic difference can also be seenin global terms as a process of democratization, opening new participatorychannels and modes of representation for formerly marginalized groups.Europeanization is thus embedded in the global framework of a ‘newpolitics of recognition’ that grants legitimacy to subnational groups andactors (Keck and Sikking, 1998; Fraser and Honneth, 2003). In the long run,Europeanization goes hand in hand with improving patterns of trust andenforced cooperation at the nation-state level. To the extent that minoritiesbecome competent players in the EU and active combatants of a Europeancivil society, the state-minority relationship is undergoing substantialchanges. It is not only the minority that adapts to the new Europe of unityin diversity, it is the self-image of the nation state within Europe that isslowly changing.

Acknowledgements

The empirical part of this paper is based on the results of a research project on thechanging role of organized civil society in Europe (civgov) coordinated by CarloRuzza (University of Trento) and funded within the Framework Programme 5 ofthe EC. Case studies on language minorities in Spain and in France were carried outby Margarita Gomez-Reino (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela); PedroIbarra, Iñaki Barcena, (Universidad del País Basco) Elisabeth Dupoirier; AnneMarijnen CEVIPOF, Paris. I wish to thank John Erik Fossum, Álvaro Morcillo-Laizand the three anonymous reviewers for Ethnicities for helpful comments onprevious versions.

Notes

1 Interviews were held with leading minority activists, supporters and institutionalactors (members of government, parliamentarians) at the regional, national andEuropean level of activism between September 2003 and December 2004.

2 This is the message expressed in Renan’s famous writing, but Renan was onlyvaguely aware that there may be different layers of common practice andidentification within a polity. For the construction of the French unitarylanguage regime, see May (2001: 156).

3 See Brubaker (1992) for a comparative view on the development of citizenshipin France and Germany.

4 The full documentation of this change of governmental rhetoric is given in theunpublished report of our French project partners (see Acknowledgements).

5 Quotation from a booklet of the Basque pedagogical movement SEASKA, an

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organization for the promotion of Basque languge schooling active in Franceand Spain, cited in Judge (2000: 54).

6 For examples see Judge (2000: 65). Identical claims are made by languageminorities in other European countries.

7 In the case of Polish minorities, assimilation took place through emigration tothe industrialized West. After the territorial re-division in 1919, most Polishsettlements were included in the new Polish nation state. In the case of Sorbianminorities, small populations survive in the rural areas of Lausitz (Sachsen andBrandenburg).

8 Frisian minorities survive in different settlements in the north-western parts ofNiedersachsen (close to the Dutch border) and Schleswig-Holstein (close to theDanish border). Their language status is clearly different from Danish, Dutchand German. Danish minorities settle in the northern part of Schleswig-Holstein.

9 Although these basic rights, and, particularly among them religious rights (e.g.the right to held services in Sorbian language) were rather restricted byarbitrary administrative practice (Heckmann, 1992: 26f.).

10 So-called Kulturhoheit of the Länder, which have full sovereignty in culturalaffairs and educational policies.

11 For the distinction of these three types of minority rights and the normativeargumentation that these should complement the majority principle withinliberal democracies see Kymlicka (1995).

12 The ‘renaissance’ of Catalanism has to be understood as a reaction against theattempts to establish Castilian supremacy and a unitary state model accordingto the French model. Similar to the Catalan Renaixença, also the Galiciannationalists speak of their rexordimeto. In both cases, the idea of the rebirthof national language can be grounded in the long tradition of vernacularliterature and written culture. In contrast, the standardization of the Basquelanguage took place only in the 20th century. (For an overview see Mar-Molinero, 2000.)

13 Especially the Catalans discovered their language as the spirit that defines thenation. Instead, the emphasis of Basque nationalism was rather on race and noton language. Reasons for this difference might be seen in the rather fragmentedcharacter of the Basque language which, in contrast to Catalan, has no writtentradition and is spoken only by a minority of the Basque population (see Mar-Molinero, 2000: 92ff.). Both cases are similar to the German experience wherecultural nationalism developed as a counter movement to the political nation-alism of the French Revolution (Giesen, 1993).

14 Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution speaks in this regard of the ‘indissolubleunity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible country of allSpaniards’; and it ‘recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of thenationalities and regions of which it is composed, and solidarity amongst themall’.

15 The Spanish-speaking non-regionalists form a typical case for a minority withinminorities. As speakers of the state-wide majority, they live within an ethniccommunity with a strong ‘we’-feeling that forms a territorially concentratednational minority, which is at the same time a regional majority (Patten,2005: 136).




16 See the citizens’ movement ‘Basta Ya’, which organizes huge street manifesta-tions and spreads public indignation against the adherents of violent nationalism(http://www.bastaya.org/).

17 See the study of Thomas J. Miley (2004), who analyses the exemplary consoli-dation of regional autonomy in Catalunya and the imposition of Catalan as amajoritarian language in the region through Catalan political elites andentrepreneurs.

18 Full documentation is given by EBLUL. http://www.eblul.org/. See also theEuromosaic report published by Nelde et al. (1996).

19 The goals of FUEN are defined broadly with preserving the identity, language,culture and history of national minorities. This requires member organizationsto support democratic ideals, to pursue its goals only by peaceful means and, inparticular, to reject separatism and the violent moving of national borders.

20 There are several reasons for the late Europeanization of Spanish minorityactivism: first, and most obvious, the repression in the 1950s–1960s and the latemembership in the EU; second, the dominant partisan structure of Spanishactivism, whereas in the European arena preferential treatment is given toassociationalism; third, as reported by one observer, Spanish activists who moveat the European level sometimes face serious language problems and cannot adapteasily to the dominant use of English or even German at European meetings.

21 As one activist of the Danish minority in Germany put it: ‘for us, it is alwaysinteresting to see how other minority organizations organize their interests andwhat kinds of strategies are successful in other countries’.

22 This and the following information is given by privileged witnesses of minorityactivism in Germany.

23 For example, FUEN organizes an annual meeting of German-speakingminorities.

24 In the 2003 IGC, claims from minorities have only been taken up by theHungarian government which, at one point in the negotiation, proposed toinclude an explicit mentioning of minority protection in the ConstitutionalTreaty. Others, like the German government, did not support this proposal,fearing to overburden the negotiation and assuming that the inclusion of theCharter of Fundamental Rights would be difficult enough to achieve.

25 This observation holds in particular for France and Germany. In Spain, too, thelink between regionalization and Europeanization is perceived as one ofmodernization, yet it means overcoming traditional (often left-wing) politicalnationalism and turning from a separatist movement to the reconciled vision ofa European unity in diversity.

26 From a Canadian perspective, Réaume (1991) distinguishes in this regardbetween the survival model and the security model of language protection, theformer defending language as a cultural value and the latter securing theequality of its speakers.

27 The expectation of such external plaudits has even encouraged the Germangovernment to invite international experts directly to Germany in order tomonitor and verify the high standards of minority protection and compare themto the benchmark of international standards. See press release of theCommissioner for National Minorities of the Federal Republic of Germany(Welt, 2004), Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren).

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HANS-JÖRG TRENZ is Research Professor at ARENA, Centre forEuropean Studies, University of Oslo. Address: Arena, P.O. Box 1143,Blindern, N-0317, Oslo, Norway. [email: [email protected]]




57 Ethnicities Hans-Jörg Trenz integration Reconciling diversity and unity: Language minorities and...

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