36 Chapter 2 Signalling and Telecommunication in Indian ...

Report No. PA 26 of 200809 (Railways)

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Chapter 2 Signalling and Telecommunication in Indian Railways

Executive summary Modern signalling is vital for safe and punctual movements of trains. In the Indian Railways the Signalling and Telecommunication Department is responsible for providing modern, efficient and reliable signalling systems as well as telecommunication systems. In keeping with this, the Corporate Safety Plan (20032013) of the Railways lays down policy, provision of new technology, asset upgradation and renewal, maintenance, inspection and human resource development for Signalling and Telecommunication Wing. The progress in achieving the objectives of the Corporate Safety Plan between 200308, planning and execution of Signalling and Telecommunication works and the progress in achieving the targets under Special Railway Safety Fund were reviewed in this performance audit. Study revealed that none of the zones could achieve the targets in full for provision of all works such as Block Proving Axle Counters, Track Circuiting, Mobile Train Radio Communication, Solid State Interlocking, Route Relay Interlocking, Panel Interlocking etc. The final capital grant in all of the last five years except for 200405 was less than the budget grant and the actual expenditure even lesser. This indicates that the utilisation of funds could be improved through better planning and monitoring from the top. There are large disparities in the performance of various zones in achieving their targets. While South Central Railway, Southern Railway, South Western Railway, Western Railway, Central Railway, West Central Railway and Northeast Frontier Railway reported 75 per cent or higher achievement of targets for most works, other zones such as South East Central Railway, East Central Railway, South Eastern Railway and North Central Railway reported less than 50 per cent achievement for most works. This needs review because a geographical disparity is being created with some areas lagging behind others in the introduction of new technology. Maintenance and inspection were to be the cornerstones for ensuring efficient functioning of equipment. Study indicated that there was a need to review this aspect as in all zones except five, maintenance schedules were not adhered to and in all zones there was shortfall in inspections. Staff shortage was a commonly cited reason for the above shortfalls. Contrary to the pronouncement of the Corporate Safety Plan, in all 16 zones there are shortages in safety category staff. The Corporate Safety Plan required meticulous measurement of the life of equipment and standardisation of equipment. However, the study found that zonal railways were unable to provide standard expected performance parameters for Signalling and Telecommunication equipment in use. Active service for each hour of down time, mean time between failures and the time taken to repair varied vastly from zone to zone and make to make. Variation in meantime between failures for the same make of equipment ranged from


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thousands of hours to lakhs of hours across zones. There are large variations in the number of failures for the same make of equipment across zones and also the time taken to repair equipment ranges from few minutes to thousands of hours. Thus there is a need to study the performance of equipment, define the expected performance parameters and disseminate these to the zones for better monitoring of the performance of the equipment. A test check of 642 out of the 2,153 works/contracts showed that only 18 could be completed within schedule. The common causes of delays were civil works remaining incomplete, changes in scope of works, delay in/ non supply of material, delay in approval of plans/drawings, delay in finalization of tenders and award of contracts. This indicates a need for better planning and coordination as all of the above mentioned causes are well within the control of the organization. In several of the completed works, completion reports were not drawn up. Several works were taken up in contravention of orders and circulars of the Railway Board. These included, among others, works on rehabilitation of lines identified for gauge conversion; the total cost involved in cases detected in audit was about 52 crores. Railtel Corporation of India Ltd was formed in 200001 for exploiting the telecommunication network of the railways for commercial purposes. A part of the revenues was to be shared with the railways. However, till 200708 the railways have not received any money. While the decision to transfer all communication lines to railways medium has been taken, all the identified circuits could not be shifted away from Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. leading to avoidable payment of Rs.3.70 crores approximately. In the execution of works under Special Railway Safety Fund, in six zones while nearly all the funds have been used up during the period under study the physical progress of works is under 33 per cent. This indicates that money may have been spent/ advanced to parties without corresponding progress on the ground. In three zones over Rs.5 crore of Special Railway Safety Funds were diverted to other purposes. There was also a need to work towards providing similar standard equipment on all sections of a route in all the zones; reassess line capacity in routes where line capacity utilisation reported exceeds 140 per cent and to work towards ensuring that inter block distances are in the range recommended by the Railway Board in all the zones. Thus the railways need to take stock of the achievements of the goals of the Corporate Safety Plan. The planned mid term review should focus on charting a path for achievement of goals in full by the completion of the plan period. The works need to be closely monitored to avoid delays as the benefits of modern Signalling and Telecommunication can be realized only with the completion of works on the ground.

2.1 Highlights

• Final grants were consistently less than the budget grants and the actual expenditure was still less. The physical progress of woks did not


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match the progress of expenditure. None of the zones could achieve full targets for provision of works.

(Paras 2.9.1 & 2.9.6) • Indian Railways could not achieve the target of provision of modern

signalling such as SSI, RRI, PI, Data Loggers, BPAC, Track circuiting etc. in all the zones as planned for the period 200308. There was idle investment of Rs.132.94 crore on provision of Anti Collision Device

(Para 2.9.3.1) • There were cases of delays in adhering to the maintenance schedules

and in inspections. (Para 2.9.3.2)

• Benchmark for meantime between failures and repair was not fixed for monitoring the efficiency of modern signalling.

(Para 2.9.3.3) • Due to non provision of similar standard equipments on all the

sections of a route, the desired results of augmenting the line capacity could not be achieved.

(Para 2.9.3.4) • Ten zones could not achieve the target of reduction in signal failure

incidents to below 7.91 as fixed by the Corporate Safety Plan. (Para 2.9.3.5)

• There were many vacancies in safety category staff strength on all zones.

(Para 2.9.3.6) • Indian Railways incurred avoidable expenditure of Rs.9.63 crore due

to bad planning which led to foreclosure of several projects or changing the scope of work midway.

(Para 2.9.4.1) • Time overrun and consequential cost overrun occurred in many

works resulting in avoidable extra expenditure of Rs.39.84 crore. (Para 2.9.4.2)

• Indian Railways incurred avoidable expenditure of Rs.20.11 crore on improvement of signalling on MG sections where gauge conversion was planned.

(Para 2.9.4.5) • There was delay in transferring the communication channels to

Railway’s own channels thereby incurring avoidable lease charges of Rs.3.70 crore payable to BSNL.

(Para 2.9.5.1)


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• In six zones while utilisation of funds under SRSF was close to 100 per cent or more in most of the years, the physical progress is between 40 per cent and 17 per cent.

(Paras 2.9.6.1 and 2.9.6.2) • Items worth Rs.12.17 crore have been lying in stock for more than

three years. (Para 2.9.7.1)

• Railways have incurred extra expenditure of Rs.13.32 crore on manufacture of items which are available in the market at cheaper price.

(Para 2.9.7.3)

2.2 Gist of recommendations

• Indian Railways should utilise the full allotment of funds economically and productively, while ensuring that the physical targets are also achieved.

• Indian Railways should explore the cheaper options of providing the modern Signalling systems where line capacity utilisation exceeded 100 per cent prior to undertaking work of additional lines etc. for increasing capacity.

• Indian Railways needs to make special efforts in provision of modern Signalling systems, as planned, for achieving the results of enhanced line capacity, better operational efficiency and safer movement of trains.

• Benchmark for the MTBF and MTTR should be fixed so as to monitor the efficiency of working of modern Signalling equipments and their maintenance.

• Indian Railways should aim to provide similar standard of Signalling on all sections of a particular route, instead of scattered provision, so as to achieve the desired result of speed and enhanced line capacity etc. on that particular route

• Indian Railways needs to do proper planning with a futuristic view before undertaking a work on a route where change of alignment etc. could be possible in the near future so as to avoid the expenditure becoming infructuous.

2.3 Introduction The primary requirement of train transportation is to ensure safe, speedy, reliable and punctual movement of passengers and goods to various parts of the country. The role of the Signalling and Telecommunication Department of the Indian Railways is to provide a modern, efficient and reliable signalling system for speedy, smooth and safe running of trains, as well as an effective and reliable mode of telecommunications. Modern signalling and telecommunication systems also enable reduction in train operation cost by


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eliminating the role of human beings in various activities of train operation and improving capacity utilisation of existing lines. In keeping with the above, signalling and telecommunications is a key area covered in the Corporate Safety Plan (20032013) of the Railways (CSP). The CSP covers areas of policy, new technology, asset upgradation and renewal, maintenance, inspection and human resource development. Several works have been provided for under the Corporate Safety Plan and Special Railway Safety Fund.

2.4 Organisational structure

At the Railway Board, the Member (Electrical) heads the Signal and Telecommunication Directorate which is responsible for taking policy decisions. The Member (Electrical), is assisted by an Additional Member (Signal) and an Additional Member (Telecommunication). At the zones, the Chief Signal and Telecommunication Engineer (CSTE) heads the department under the over all control of the General Manager. The CSTE is assisted by a Chief Signal Engineer and a Chief Communications Engineer/Chief Telecommunication Engineer. Major construction activities are under the administrative control of CSTE (Construction and Projects).

2.5 Scope of audit

This performance audit covers the period from 200304 to 200708. A sample of 390 stations (102 on ‘A’ category routes and 288 on other routes) and 619 works (247 works costing above Rs.10 crore, 132 works costing Rs.5 crore to Rs.10 crore, 119 works costing Rs.2 crore to Rs.5 crore and 121 works costing below Rs.2 crore) was selected for the review. All the S&T workshops and stores depots were covered in the review.

(Annexure–II)

2.6 Audit objectives

The performance audit seeks to assess: (i) Progress in achieving objectives of the Corporate Safety Plan (CSP) as

planned for the period upto 200708. (ii) Planning and execution of Signalling and Telecommunication (S&T)

works (iii) Progress in achieving the target under the SRSF

2.7 Audit criteria and methodology

The criteria adopted in audit include provisions in the Signal Engineering Manual, General and Subsidiary Rules (GSR), Corporate Safety Plan and recommendations of the Standing Committees on Railways, relevant guidelines and instructions issued by the Railway Board.

The methodology followed was examination of records and analysis of data collected at the Railway Board, offices of the Chief Signal and


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Telecommunication Engineers and Divisional Signal and Telecommunication Engineers and at selected stations.

2.8 Acknowledgement

The audit objectives, scope, methodology and findings were discussed by the Principal Directors of Audit in the zones with the respective General Managers/concerned departmental heads in entry and exit conferences. The input provided on various aspects including suggestions and support provided by railway officials while conducting the audit is acknowledged with thanks. The cooperation extended by Railway Board during the course of audit is also appreciated. The findings presented in this review were discussed with the Railway Board in an exit conference held in December 2008.

2.9 Audit findings

2.9.1 Fund management

Details of funds allocation and actual expenditure in respect of Signalling and Telecommunication (S&T) by IR for the period from 200304 to 200708 are given below:

(Rs. in crore) Year Budget

Grant Final Grant

Actual Expenditure

Saving Percentage of Actual

expenditure to Final Grant

200304 649.28 608.82 602.86 5.96 99.02 200405 751.37 790.26 686.78 103.48 86.90 200506 1255.73 1037.48 988.77 48.71 95.30 200607 1569.00 1240.92 1194.22 46.70 96.24 200708 1800.56 1375.64 1284.96 90.68 93.41

Under Capital grant, review of allotment of funds to the zonal railways and actual expenditure incurred by them during the period 200304 to 200708 showed that the final grants were consistently less than the budget grants during the last five years except for 200405 and the actual expenditure was still less. There was nonutilisation of funds although there were shortfalls in provision of almost all types of works viz, Block Proving Axle Counters (BPAC), track circuiting, Mobile Train Radio Communication (MTRC), Solid State Interlocking (SSI), Route Relay Interlocking (RRI), Panel Interlocking (PI) and Data Loggers. This highlights poor planning and inefficient utilisation of funds on the part of Zonal Railways and lack of monitoring at apex level.

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that fund utilisation was increasing progressively each year, it was close to about 94 percent and this was due to close monitoring and effective planning. They further informed that constraints have been removed to utilise all the funds in current year and also in future.


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Recommendation The budget allocation is made with a specific objective of achieving the expected results. IR should therefore gear up their resources for utilizing the full allotment of funds economically and productively. At the same time it should also be ensured that the physical targets are also achieved.

2.9.2 Line capacity utilisation and proposals for augmentation Signalling is required for safe movement of trains. Technological improvements in Signalling systems not only ensures safe movement of trains by minimising human involvement but also has the potential of ensuring better path utilisation. Line capacity statements based on the conventional charting method are being prepared annually by the Operating Department indicating the charted capacity (number of trains that can be run), utilised capacity (number of trains actually run) and percentage utilisation of the section. Line capacity denotes the maximum number of trains that can be run on any given length of the track during a calendar day, i.e., 24 hours. Working of signalling system and block operation are the important elements in deciding line capacity of a section. Capacity enhancement can be achieved with comparatively lesser investment on modern signalling systems as against conventional methods like provision of additional lines, crossing stations etc. which require huge investment. A review in audit revealed that: • there are about 201 major and minor sections on IR where the utilisation of

line capacity is above 100 per cent. Of these, 53 and 61 sections lie on ‘A’ and ‘B’ routes. Of the above, only 15 sections on ‘A’ category routes and seven on ‘B’ category routes have been provided with automatic Signalling. Only in SER all ‘A’ route sections where line capacity utilisation exceeds 100 per cent have been provided with automatic Signalling.

(AnnexureIII) Understatement of line capacity: Board (February 2003) had commented that the charting method of assessing the line capacity traditionally followed on Railways tended to underestimate the capacity by 15 to 20 per cent. A review in audit revealed that: • on more than 200 sections, the percentage of utilisation was more than 100

per cent for the period 200506 to 200708. In 53 sections particularly the line capacity utilisation was above 140 per cent, maximum of which was 218 per cent on a ‘D’ route section of SWR indicating that there was under assessment of capacity.

Inter block distances: Long inter block distances adversely affect section capacity and prevent efficient utilisation of the section. Railway Board, in its guidelines, had directed that converted sections and new lines, with anticipated level of traffic of more than 10 trains per day, are to be provided with block stations in the range of 8 to 9 kilometres. A review in audit revealed that:


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• on 21 Sections across 10 Zonal Railways on Route “A” with line capacity of more than 35, the inter block distances were more than 10 kilometres. Similarly on 46 sections on Route B spread across 12 Zonal Railways, the inter block distances ranged from 10 kilometres to 18.75 kilometres, which was far above the recommended inter block distances.

• on certain sections, the inter block distances were less than two kilometers, resulting in signal overlaps.

In both these instances, the section capacity is adversely affected and prevents effective utilisation of the line. Railway Board, during discussions (December 2008), stated that steps were being taken to reduce block lengths, and it was expected that the position would improve considerably in future. Providing modern signalling equipment is a cheaper option for augmenting line capacity. A review in audit revealed that: • two zonal Railways (ECoR and SER) have sanctioned construction of third

line on two sections BarangKurda Road and GoilkeraManoharpur respectively. The total estimated cost for construction of third line on these sections was Rs.489.76 crore as against the approximate cost of Rs.22.67 crore for automatic signalling. The Railways have thus incurred an avoidable expenditure of Rs.467.09 crore.

(AnnexureIV) • in SCR the single line section between KakinadaSamalkot with line

capacity of 16 and utilisation of 100 per cent was proposed for doubling at a cost of Rs.78.11 crore on the ground of anticipated growth in traffic. However, it was observed from the working time table of July 2008 that the projected increase in traffic has not been achieved. In this case the possibility of increasing the capacity to 24 through modern signalling as per Railway Board’s guidelines (1993) was not explored.

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that provision of IBS was being taken up as a low cost solution for line capacity enhancement and that the recommendation of audit given below had been noted. Recommendation Before embarking upon the costly capacity enhancement works such as provision of additional lines, crossing stations etc., IR should explore the cheaper options of providing the modern signalling systems where line capacity utilisation exceeds 100 per cent. 2.9.3 Implementation of the Corporate Safety Plan for S&T Indian Railway Corporate Safety Plan (20032013) envisaged safety action plan directed towards continuous reduction in risk to customers, through a series of steps including system reforms, imbibing better safety culture and enhancing asset reliability. It involved continuous rehabilitation and modernization of assets and induction of appropriate technologies. The areas identified for action on the Signalling and Telecommunication front were as follows:


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(i) laying down maintenance schedules and their adherence for all types of signalling gears and equipments

(ii) timely overhaul of all signalling installations (iii) laying down safety tolerance of all Signal and Telecom gears and

equipments for Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR)

(iv) provision of Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) and Anti Collision Device (ACD) as a long term policy

(v) laying down a comprehensive maintenance policy for signal and telecom equipments to achieve zero failures of track circuit and axle counter equipment

(vi) introduction of continuous track circuiting on identified routes (vii) introduction of Mobile Train Radio Communication (MTRC) (viii) introduction of Solid State of Interlocking (SSI) (ix) provision of Train Actuated Warning Device (TAWD). The progress in some of these areas has been examined and the details are discussed in the paragraphs that follow:

2.9.3.1 Provision of modern signalling equipment The Corporate Safety Plan (CSP) makes eliminating collisions a mission area for the Indian Railways so as to move towards the ultimate goal of a collision free system. Provision of modern signalling equipment is one of the steps towards achieving this goal. Accordingly, the CSP lays major stress on provision of track circuiting on routes in a phased manner, provision of equipment for Block Proving by Axle Counters, introduction of Auxiliary Warning System, TPWS, introduction of ACD, continuous track circuiting on the golden quadrilateral and its diagonals and trials of MTRC. Audit reviewed the efforts of IR for provision of modern signalling infrastructure. The results are discussed in detail for some of the equipment: • Solid State Interlocking: During the period under review, the Railways

planned to install 446 SSI across the zones, however, only 227 could be installed, thus on the whole 51 per cent of the target was achieved. Five zones (SCR, SR, SWR, SECR and SER) completed more than 75 per cent of the planned installations with SWR putting in place more installations than planned. Two zones (ECoR and NR) completed more than 50 per cent but less than 75 per cent of their planned installations. Seven zones (WR, NFR, ER, ECR, NCR, CR and WCR) could not complete 50 per cent of the planned installations; in five of these (ER, ECR, CR, WCR and NCR) the achievement was below 25 per cent. Two zones NWR and NER, did not plan any SSI installation.

(Annexure–V1) • Route Relay Interlocking (RRI): During the period under review, the

Railways installed only 207 RRI as against 322 RRI planned for installation across the zones. Thus only 64 per cent of the target was


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achieved. Five zones (SCR, SR, WR, WCR and NFR) completed more than 75 per cent of the planned installations, with WR completing 96 per cent of the planned installations. Six zones (ER, ECoR, NWR, NR, NER and CR) completed more than 50 per cent of the planned installations and five zones (SWR, SECR, ECR, SER and NCR) could not complete 50 per cent of planned installations. Of these, ECR could not even complete 25 per cent of the planned installations.

(Annexure–V2)

• Panel Interlocking (PI): 4,225 PIs were planned for installation across the zones, however, only 76 per cent, i.e. 3191 PIs could be installed. Ten zones (SCR, ER, SR, SWR, WR, NWR, NR, CR, WCR and NFR) completed more than 75 per cent of the targeted installations and four zones (ECoR, NER, ECR and SER) were able to complete more than 50 per cent of their targeted installations. However SECR and NCR could not even complete 50 per cent of their planned PI installations.

(Annexure–V3)

• Block Proving Axle Counter (BPAC): During the period under review, the Railways planned to install 3592 BPAC across the zones, however, only 1212 could be installed, an achievement of only 34 per cent. No zone was able to achieve their target. Except for NR which achieved 73.85 per cent of its target all other zones could not even achieve 50 per cent of their target. In SR, number of stations planned for providing BPAC was not available, however, 35 were provided on B and D routes.

(Annexure–V4)

• Data Loggers:The Railways planned to install 4598 Data Logger across the zones during the period 200304 to 200708, however, only 2727 could be installed, thus 59 per cent of the target was achieved. Only NFR achieved its target. Four zones (SCR, WR, CR and WCR) achieved over 75 per cent of their target and five zones (SR, SWR, NWR, NER and NR) were able to achieve between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of their targets. The remaining six zones could not achieve even 50 per cent, of these ECoR could achieve only 14.45 per cent of its targets.

(Annexure–V5)

• Light Emitting Diode Colour Light Signalling (LED CLS):The Railways planned to install 18807 LEDCLS across the zones during the period under review, however, only 3483 could be installed, an achievement of 19 per cent. NFR completed all installation as planned and NER completed 78 per cent of planned installations. Three zones (ER, SWR, and NR) completed more than 50 per cent but less than 75 per cent of planned installation. The remaining eleven zones could not complete 50 per cent of the planned installation and five of these zones (SR, ECoR, WR, CR and SER) did not complete even 25 per cent of the planned installation.

(Annexure–V6)


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• Multi Aspect Colour Light Signalling (MACLS): The Railways had planned to install 5248 MACLS across the zones during the period 2003 04 to 200708, however, only 4648 could be installed. Thus 89 per cent of the target could be achieved. NFR completed all installation and SCR completed 98 per cent of planned installation. The other zones which completed ninety per cent or more of the planned installation were SWR (90 per cent), CR (94 per cent) and SER (95 per cent). In addition nine zones (ER, SR, ECoR, WR, SECR, NR, ECR, WCR and NCR) completed more than 75 per cent of the planned installations and NWR completed more than 50 per cent of planned installations. In NER though no MACLS installation was planned, 184 were installed.

(AnnexureV7) Analysis of the achievements of the zones shows that none of the zones have achieved their targets for all the seven items. Four zones (SECR, ECR, SER and NCR) have not managed to achieve 50 per cent of their targets for four or more of the items. The zones that report higher achievements (more than 75 per cent for three or more items) are SCR, SR, SWR, WR, CR, WCR and NFR. This mixed trend across the zones indicates that in parts of the country served by SECR, ECR, SER and NCR, the benefits of modern technology are not percolating fast enough creating a geographical disparity across the states/zones. The under achievement was on account of the fact that a number of works planned during the period under review and earlier had not been taken up, were delayed, had been abandoned or were frozen. As these works remained incomplete, the expected S&T infrastructure could not come up.

• Track Circuiting: Track circuiting is one of the most important safety aids provided at the station for preventing collisions in station area. The CSP proposed to cover track circuiting on all main BG routes having passenger traffic by March 2008. In all, 5307 locations were to be provided with track circuiting by March 2007. However, a review in audit revealed that: o there were shortfalls in items of track circuiting. Track circuiting in

respect of Fouling Mark to Fouling Mark was completed on 5037 out of 5233 locations, an achievement of 96 per cent.

o in SCR, the target of track circuiting was achieved in respect of four out of six items and in remaining two items 94 per cent and 91 per cent of the target was achieved.

o in the remaining fifteen zones, the achievement ranged between 60 per cent (in NWR – Fouling Mark to BSL St.) and 99 per cent ( SWR – Fouling Mark to Fouling Mark).

(Annexure–V8) • Installation of Anti Collision Device (ACD): The Konkan Railway

Corporation Ltd. (KRCL) developed the ACD to prevent collisions. When the CSP was being formulated, ACD had been sanctioned on about 3500 route kilometers on Southern, South Central, South Western, Northeast Frontier and Northern Railways. ACD surveys had also been sanctioned


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for another 10000 route kilometers. The CSP aimed at further extending ACD on entire BG section during the plan period on priority. It was observed that surveys were conducted in SCR and SR in 2003 and 2004 respectively at a total cost of Rs.2.77 crore, but no further work has been taken up. In NFR, provision of ACD was sanctioned in 2004 at an estimated cost of Rs.65.70 crore which was later revised to Rs.225.26 crore. NFR has incurred an accrued liability of Rs.130.17 crore as of May 2008, of which Rs.92.22 crore has been paid. The performance of ACDs installed is not satisfactory and these have not as yet been cleared by RDSO for NFR. Indian Railways stated (January 2008) that ACD had been successfully commissioned on trial basis on NFR and was due for installation on three other Railways within two years. However, in view of the audit finding that the ACD installed in NFR was not functioning satisfactorily, the working of the ACD and its utility across the Indian Railways may need a review.

(Annexure–V9) • Mobile Train Radio Communication (MTRC): The CSP recognizes

that MTRC system has an intrinsic potential of enhancing the safety and security in train operations, besides being a valuable aid in providing reliable and secure communication to all those engaged in different facets of railway operations and maintenance functions. The CSP seeks to introduce the MTRC as one of the new technologies for enhancing safety, on test basis. The Railway Safety Review Committee 1998 (RSRC), recommended that a reliable train radio communication facility between Driver, Guard, Station Master, Level Crossing gate and approaching trains should be provided as a first step within three years on A and C routes and in another three years on B routes. IR accepted the recommendations and agreed to give a very high priority to this item. A review in audit revealed that: o in ten zonal Railways (SCR, SR, SWR, ECoR, NWR, WR, SECR,

NER, SER and WCR) no work for provision of MTRC has been taken up so far.

o in three zones (NR, ECR and NFR), though the work was sanctioned way back in 200102, the same could not be commissioned so far due to various reasons.

o in ER, one work on HowrahPradhankhunta section (256 km) has been completed,

o in CR, the MTRC system is working satisfactorily on 52 route kilometers of Mumbai suburban section since January 2007.

o in NCR, the work is in progress. (Annexure–VI)

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that as MTRC was new technology, Railways took time to adopt it. Presently work was on 3400 route kilometers for provision of MTRC and the technology has been standardised by RDSO.


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While the Railways have embarked on introducing MTRC on a large scale more progress is needed before the goals set in 1998 can be achieved, and the ongoing works need to be monitored closely. Indian Railways (January 2009) further stated that increased emphasis was being laid on provision of modern signalling system as envisaged in CSP. The progress for most of the items was more than the proportionate target of 50 percent of the entire CSP period. As several technologies were new there were problems in adaptation and the Railways were gearing up for successful adaptation of new technologies. However analysis of data supplied by the various zonal Railways indicated that several items of work were lagging behind as discussed above. Recommendation Indian Railways needs to take special efforts in provision of all items of modern Signalling systems, as planned, for achieving the results of enhanced line capacity, better operational efficiency and safer movement of trains. 2.9.3.2 Maintenance and inspection The CSP lays stress on proper maintenance of assets and on the need to move from corrective maintenance towards preventive maintenance. The Plan envisages laying of maintenance schedules and ensuring adherence to the same for all types of signalling gears and equipment. It further stipulated that maintenance operations would be geared to preserve any equipment to fulfill functions, for which it has been designed. Corrective maintenance comes into play only after equipment becomes defective. Preventive maintenance on the other hand is applied when equipment is still operative and proactive treatment is given consisting of checks, examination and supervisory inspections. The adherence to maintenance schedules for block instruments, relay rooms, IPS, point machines etc. was test checked in some locations in all zones. In five zones (ECoR, NWR, NER, CR and NFR) no cases of delay in adherence to maintenance schedules came to notice. In all other zones the maintenance was not done as per schedule. The delays for selected stations in three zones WR, SER and SECR have been analyzed and are presented below:

(Figures show number of locations) Zone Delay of 0 to 30

days Delay of 31 to 60 days

Delay of 61 to 90 days

Delay of above 90 days

WR 7 1 3 SECR 8 6 5 12 SER 6 5 3 There were a few instances of failure in between the maintenance schedules in above three zones. The delay in adhering to the schedules ranged between one day and 249 days at Uslapur station in respect of IPS/Batteries, where failure during the intervening period was also reported. Similarly, in all zones there was shortfall in inspections. Staff shortage, staff being busy with attending to faults and other special duties were cited as some of the reasons for non adherence to maintenance schedules and shortfall in inspections.


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Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that there was a shortage of about 15 per cent in artisan and supervisory staff which was being filled up through special efforts and maintenance was being done. There have been isolated cases of delay in adherence of maintenance. However, during test check of few locations it was found in Audit the delay in adherence of maintenance schedule occurred in eleven zones, hence could not be considered as isolated cases. 2.9.3.3 Standardisation of signalling equipment CSP required that the life of equipment should be meticulously assessed and standardisation of equipment was to be ensured. Reports are prescribed to monitor the performance of new equipment installed and are communicated to Railway Board monthly. A key indicator in the performance of these systems is Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), which is the interval between failures and indicates reliability of the equipment. Another performance indicator is Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). During audit it was observed that zonal Railways were unable to provide standard expected performance parameters (MTTR, MTBF) for S&T equipment being used. An analysis in audit of the down time of Integrated Power Supply System (IPS), Data Loggers and SSI showed that the MTBF, MTTR and active service for each hour of down time varied vastly from Railway to Railway and from “make” to “make” as illustrated below.

Active service for each hour of down time

.Equi pment

Make

Maximum Minimum

Lowest MTBF (hours)

Highest MTBF (hours)

Lowest MTTR (hours)

Highest MTTR (hours)

IPS Amar Raja

30,614 (WR)

26.84 (SER)

5,211.5 (NR)

94,217.26 (SCR)

1.39 (WR)

255.36 (SER)

IPS HBL NIFE

47,773 (SWR)

9.84 (NR)

3,326.25 (NR)

1,09,877.72 (SWR)

0.20 (NWR)

337.91 (NR)

IPS BSMC 2,37,240* (NER)

45.97 (NR)

4,126.6 (NR)

79,080 (NER)

0.21 (NER)

330.10 (SCR)

IPS Statcon 1,33,731 (NCR)

28.45 (NR)

2,819.54 (NR)

7,48,384.10 (SECR)

3.1641 (NWR)

239.95 (SECR)

Data Logg

er

HBL NIFE

3,751 (SCR)

8.2 (NR)

1,206.26 (SER)

88,272 (ER)

12.78 (SCR)

734.61 (SER)

Data Logg

er

EFFTRO NICS

2,123 ((SCR)

8.86 (SER)

5,915.51

(SER)

93,529.3 (ECR)

9.18 (SCR)

1,353.52 (SWR)

SSI US&S 28,890 (SR)

352.38 (WCR)

355.20 (WCR)

26,897.68 (SR)

0.56 (SCR)

1.78 (SER)

SSI AZD Praha

8,673 (SCR)

9,183.5 (SCR)

1.06 (SCR)

SSI Siemens 346 (WR)

245.44 (WCR)

189.51 (WCR)

667.51 (WR)

0.77 (WCR)

1.56 (WR)

(* projected – BSMC IPS have worked for a total of 79080 hours and have been down for only 21 minutes.)


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• The large variation in performance with the highest MTBF and lowest MTBF of the same make of equipment varying in thousands of hours or even lakhs of hours across different zones indicate that the life time of equipment and expected performance parameters need to be defined.

• It is also observed that similar large variations exist between different brands of the same equipment being used in the same zones (as also across zones), e.g. in NWR on an average,

o IPS of HBLNIFE make was down for only 12 minutes for 2,12,774 hours of usage and had an MTBF of 2,12,784 hours;

o IPS of Amar Raja make was down for one hour for every 12,631 hours of usage and an MTBF of 40,622.24 hours;

o IPS of Statcon was down for one hour for every 1873 hours of usage with an MTBF of 5926.22 hours.

This once more underlines the need to define expected performance parameters and also calls into question as to why equipment with such poor performance is being procured when much better performing equipment is available.

• The meantime taken to repair IPS varies from as low as 12 minutes (NWR) to 337.91 hours (NR).

• The mean time taken to repair data loggers ranged from 1353.52 hours (SWR) to 9.18 hours (SCR)

• The mean time taken to repair SSI ranged from 0.56 hours (SCR) to 1.78 hours in SER.

Thus the meantime taken to repair different equipment is varying from a few minutes to hundreds or even thousands of hours. In absence of a standard prescribed maximum down time the response time taken by the zones to repair are very different. It was seen that there was vast variation in the number of failures of same make of these installations on different zonal Railways.

• In case of IPS, while there was no failure reported in ECoR for the four IPS of Amar Raja, there were 581 failures on 16 IPS of the same make in SECR. In respect of HBL NIFE make IPS, while no failure was reported in NCR for four IPS, there were 511 failures for 82 IPS in NR.

• In case of Data Loggers, while no failure was reported in SECR for 46 EFFTRONICS make Data Loggers, in WCR the number of failures reported was 936 for 192 Data Loggers of the same make. While no failure was reported for 21 HBL NIFE make of Data Loggers in WR, there were 23 failures in SER for the two Data Loggers of the same make.

• In the case of SSI, while no failure was reported in NCR for 17 SSI (US&S), in SCR the failures reported were 428 in case of 12 SSIs of same make. Broadly similar trends are observed for other S&T equipment examined during audit.


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Assuming that the suppliers of the equipment are approved suppliers whose products are expected to be of high standard having consistent performance, the above trends are unusual. It is possible that the data collection and reporting needs a review in zones as during audit test check in SCR vast differences in the figures reported by the zone and the actual figures of MTBF and MTTR in respect of few installations was observed as detailed below:

Figures reported by the zone

As observed in Audit test check

Sl.No. Equipment

MTBF MTTR MTBF MTTR 1 Analog Axle

Counters (TC working)

63 to 698 hours

20 minutes

2 Analog Axle Counters (IB working)

124 hours 20 minutes

1095 to 16060 hours

74 minutes

3 BPAC/SSDAC 4513 hours

30 minutes 701 hours to 35040 hours

49 minutes

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that the audit recommendation given below has been noted and RDSO was being advised to study MTBF and MTTR of all modern and new technology signalling equipments.

Recommendation A benchmark for the MTBF and MTTR should be fixed and communicated to all concerned so as to monitor the efficiency of working of modern Signalling equipments and their maintenance better.

2.9.3.4 Provision of dissimilar standard equipment on same route

To ensure optimum utilisation of existing railway lines and ease of maintenance and operations, it is important that signalling infrastructure of the same standard is provided in all sections of a particular route. A review in audit on provision of modern signalling on zonal Railways revealed that none of the zones (except SWR) have provided similar type of signalling on all sections of a particular route. Though modern signalling was provided in many of the sections, it was noticed that they are provided on scattered sections on different routes, instead of providing the same on all sections of a particular route. A test check of 372 sections on IR revealed that the type of signalling was not uniform on 88 sections. Out of the above, 20 sections have above 120 per cent of line capacity utilisation. On such sections the Railways need to explore the possibility of upgradation of signalling system so as to avoid congestion/ detention.

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that as a policy, Indian Railways provide uniform signalling standard in the same section. However, there could be some cases of mismatch on account of replacement of signalling on age condition basis.


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However, during the test check of 372 sections it was noticed in Audit that around 23 percent of the sections were not having similar standard signalling equipment. Recommendation Indian Railways should aim to provide similar standard of signalling on all sections of a particular route, instead of scattered provision, so as to achieve the desired result of speed and enhanced line capacity etc. on that particular route. In case the mismatch is on account of replacement, the Railways may like to resolve it.

2.9.3.5 Signal defects/ failures

Corporate Safety Plan envisaged a consolidated target for all types of signal defects from the level of 13.19 incidents per thousand Zonal Integrated Signal and Telecom Units (ZISTUs) at the end of March 2003 to 7.91 by end of March 2008. A review of the details of defects/failures revealed that only six zones (SCR, SR, NER, NR, CR and NCR) have achieved the target envisaged by CSP. In other zones the incidents per thousand ZISTUs ranged between 8.56 (in WCR) and 34.39 (in ECR). Thus majority of the zones have to undertake further efforts to achieve the targets. The delays in maintenance and inspections and delay in provision of new infrastructure is contributing to signal defects and failures. Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that as envisaged in CSP, the signal failures per thousand workload of ZISTUs have come down to 8.82 by the end of March 2008. This was very near to a target of 7.91. Close monitoring of all levels was being done to improve it further and achieve the target by the end of plan period.

However, data furnished by the zonal Railways to Audit did not match the figure provided by the Railway Board. Only six zones could achieve the target and in remaining ten zones the ZISTUs ranged between 8.56 and 34.39.

(AnnexureVII) 2.9.3.6 Vacancies of staff in safety category

CSP envisages that all safety category staff vacancies would be filled on urgent basis. A review of man power provision in respect of safety category staff on zonal railways revealed that in all the 16 zones, there was shortage of staff in safety category. The shortage ranged from 2.63 per cent to 35.59 per cent in respect of gazetted officers, from 6.16 to 29.39 per cent in non gazetted signalling staff and from 2.44 to 76 per cent in respect of non gazetted telecommunication staff.

In a test check of few stations over all the zones it was further seen that there were shortages in prescribed inspections of safety installations on all zonal Railways except ECoR. The main reason attributable for the above was shortage of staff. Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that indents were placed on Railway Recruitment Boards in order to fill up the vacancies and zones were asked to


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accelerate the pace of selection to fill up gazetted vacancies. Consequently the vacancies have come down in both gazetted and nongazetted categories.

(AnnexuresVIII & IX)

2.9.3.7 Training of Signalling and Telecommunication personnel

The CSP recognizes manpower as the most valuable asset for the highly labour intensive railways. It stresses that manpower skills have to be suitably developed, and recognizes that adequate attention to the training facilities is needed. In fact, as early as 1999, Railway Board had sent a communication to the zonal railways for improving not only the quality of training imparted in the training centres but also to improve their capacity utilisation to more than 90 per cent.

There are 10 zonal training centres on Indian Railways and the national level Indian Railway Institute for Signal Engineering and Telecommunication (IRISET) at Secunderabad, which caters to the training needs regarding signalling and telecommunication. All institutes have been equipped with facilities for training on modern equipments and technologies except those in CR and SCR, where facilities for training on some modern equipments like SSI, BPAC etc. have not been provided. In all 1,49,952 training slots were offered by these institutes collectively during the five years period of 200304 to 200708, the Railways could not utilise 23,353 slots (15.57 per cent of the total slots), which is below the target fixed by Railway Board.

The table below shows the percentage of shortfall in utilisation of training slots. Zone 200304 200405 200506 200607 200708 Average SCR Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil ER 34.96 36.71 4.33 Nil 38.97 28.74 SR 42.75 47.87 47.12 19.15 37.14 38.80 WR 17.38 19.91 3.10 27.16 28.35 19.18 SECR Nil 42.69 40.38 60.57 67.37 52.75 NER Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil NR 9.72 12.82 24.60 35.61 40.12 24.57 ECR 19.49 Nil Nil 47.02 32.36 32.94 CR 2.94 4.12 8.13 5.15 2.52 4.57 SER Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

Under utilisation of slots were noticed in seven training centres, except in SCR, NER and SER. While NER utilised more slots than offered in all the five years, ER utilised more slots during 200607 and ECR also utilised more slots during 200405 and 200506. On NWR, the Zonal Training Centre (ZTC) at Udaipur did not offer any slots for training during the year 200304 and 200506 to 200708. In the year 200405, one slot was offered which was also not utilised.

The shortfall in training was also reported in the audit review on Modernisation of Signalling and Telecommunication system which covered the period from 199697 to 200001 (Chapter 4 of CAG’s report No. 9A of 2002). There is appreciable improvement over the previous period in


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utilisation of slots for training which has increased from 65.26 per cent to 84.43 per cent but further progress is required before the target set by the Railway Board can be achieved. The IRISET was set up in the year 1957 for providing comprehensive training in railway signalling and telecommunication. A review of training slots offered and utilised during the period 200607 and 200708 revealed that while the overall utilisation was more than 90 per cent, the utilisation in respect of gazetted officers was 61 and 66 per cent and in respect of Non gazetted staff was 102 and 96 per cent. Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that increased emphasis on imparting training to signalling officers is already being laid in view of induction of new technology. There was progressive increase in the quantum of officers and staff trained in IRISET and in zonal signal training centres. The works to augment the infrastructure in training centres were also being periodically sanctioned within the available resources/constraints. Recommendations Since modern Signalling needs well trained staff to operate the system, IR should provide more infrastructure in training centres for imparting training to all the staff operating such systems. The ongoing efforts need to be sustained on a continuous basis.

2.9.4 Execution of S&T works

Signalling and Telecommunication (S&T) is an engineering activity, needless to say that its benefits can accrue only if the required infrastructure comes up on the ground on time as scheduled. Therefore timely completion of works becomes central for realization of goals set for S&T works. While ensuring timely completion, it is also important that relevant orders/instructions in force are kept in view so as to ensure adherence to organizational policy.

In all 2153 S&T works/contracts were being carried out on zonal Railways during the audit period, out of which, 642 works/ contracts pertaining to S&T were test checked. It was observed that several planned works were delayed or had not been taken up or have been abandoned. The common reasons for these were changes in scope of works, delay in civil engineering works, delay / non supply of material, delay in approval of plans/drawings, delay in finalisation of tenders and award of contracts. These are well within the control of the organization and could have been avoided through better planning and co ordination. It was also observed that there were cases where the instructions of the Board were not adhered to. Some of these cases are discussed in the paragraphs that follow:

2.9.4.1 Execution of works without proper planning

Rules provide for proper and careful planning at every stage from the divisional level to Railway Board, according to the size of investment, before undertaking any work so as to avoid the need for making any substantial modifications etc. Audit of selected works undertaken by zonal Railways


55

revealed that there were 133 cases over eleven zones where works were planned but either not taken up, abandoned, delayed or frozen.

• Out of the 133 cases, 55 related to Safety works which included track circuiting, BPAC, RRI works, point machines, SSI, PI, ACD, IBS, LED, AWS and MACLS works).

• the Railways have either foreclosed several projects midway or changed the scope of work after incurring substantial expenditure due to various reasons which could have been sorted out before executing such projects. In some other cases it was observed that after installing a particular system with substantial investment, the Railways decided to change the system. The total expenditure incurred by the Railways in such modifications, foreclosure, total replacement of system etc. was Rs.9.63 crore on three zones (NER0.35 crore, CR7.92 crore and SER1.36 crore).

(AnnexureX)

• A work of laying of Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) between Vijaipur Jammu and Jammu Tawi in NR was completed in March 2003 at a cost of Rs.66.80 lakh. While undertaking the track doubling work on the section, the OFC got buried under the embankment of newly laid track and could not be retrieved. Similarly in another case, the OFC laid between Pathankot and Vijaipur Jammu at a cost of Rs.1.78 crore was being buried under the embankment where doubling work was in progress. This led to waste of Rs.2.45 crore.

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that originally the alignment was to come on opposite side of the cable but due to certain engineering constraints the alignment as per survey report could not be followed and between VJPJ JAT alignment was kept on same side of the track. As a result cable already laid came under the embankment of proposed track. Recommendation Indian Railways needs to do proper planning with a futuristic view before undertaking a work on a route where change of alignment etc. could be possible in the near future so as to avoid the expenditure becoming infructuous.

2.9.4.2 Cost and time overrun on works

A test check of 642 works/contracts, out of 2153 works/contracts being carried out, on zonal Railways revealed that only 18 works could be completed within the scheduled date of completion.

• Thirty seven works were completed with a delay of upto six months with a cost overrun of Rs.2.47 crore in 25 of these 37 works.

• Forty works were completed with delay between six months and 12 months with cost overrun of Rs.21 lakh in three works;

• Ninety nine works were completed with delay between one and two years with cost overrun of Rs.2.82 crore in 19 works,


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• Fifty five works were completed with delay between two and three years with cost overrun of Rs.14.68 crore in 11 works

• One hundred and twelve works were completed with delay of over three years and cost overrun of Rs.19.66 crore in 29 works.

Rest of the works was still in progress. In many of the completed works, the completion reports were not drawn. This is detrimental to public interest as not formally closing a completed work can lead to current revenue expenditure being capitalized, advance remaining unadjusted etc. Even in works still in progress many are beyond the scheduled date of completion. In the work of replacement of lever frame by Solid State Interlocking [Estimate No. 3/CSTE of 199596) at Masagram, Baruipara and Janai Road on ER, the date of completion was March 1997, whereas the work is still in progress even after 11 years of its scheduled date of completion. The reasons were delay in sanctioning the estimate, delay in execution of work by contractor, delay in supply of stores by Railways, delay in completion of allied engineering works etc.

(AnnexureXI) Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that the basic reasons for delay in progress of works were due to non availability of capable contractors, sharp increase in price of the metals and shortage of signal engineers and staff for design and execution works. Steps had been taken to overcome all these issues.

2.9.4.3 Contract management

In works contracts, contractors are required to quote their rates according to the schedule of rates prepared by the Railway for executing a work where several items are to be procured from the market by the contractor for installation as a part of the work. The schedule of rates is revised periodically after an interval of few years according to the market conditions. In order to capitalize on the trend of reduction in prices of electronic items, Railway Board directed (July 2006 and October 2007) the Zonal Railways to procure Cables and LED signals through stores contract instead of works contract so as to avoid the higher payment to the contractor as per schedule of rates. A review of works contract in zonal Railways revealed that;

• the Railways incurred avoidable extra expenditure due to inclusion of certain items in works contract where the rate was higher than the market rate. Ten zones (SCR, ER, SR, WR, SECR, NER, NR, CR, SER and NFR) out of 16 zones had incurred extra expenditure of Rs.8.86 crore on this account.

• the work of enhancing safety and reliability of control block and LC gate on MysoreArsikere section of SWR had to be foreclosed due to delay in procurement of cables by the Railways and the refusal of the contractor to extend the validity of the contract. The balance work was carried out through a fresh contract at higher rate incurring extra expenditure of Rs.71.84 lakh. Further due to the delay in completing the work, Railway


57

had to retain the existing leased BSNL lines at a cost of Rs.8.43 lakh from September 2006 to March 2008.

• in NR, two works – provision of automatic signalling on Delhi Sabzi MandiPanipat section and provision of track circuiting and automatic signalling on PanipatAmbala section were started in February 2005 and October 2004 at an estimated cost of Rs.20.90 crore and 24.01 crore respectively. The works could not be completed so far due to non supply of cable, Signalling plan, non completion of engineering works etc. Thus the expenditure of Rs.17.83 crore incurred so far remains blocked.

2.9.4.4 Unfruitful expenditure

In SCR, review of works for provision of crossing stations on Gooty Dharmavaram section showed that the work of provision of four crossing stations was taken up with the aim of improving section capacity. The running time on four block sections prior to taking up the work was 25, 16, 19 and 14 minutes. After completion of works, the running time of 25 minutes on the slowest block of (GootyRamarajupalli) section was reduced to 20 minutes, the running time on other sections was brought down to less than 14 minutes. Since the running time of other three sections was below 20 minutes even before provision of crossing stations, the capacity enhancement work could not give a major gain after an expenditure of Rs.6.59 crore. The zone did not examine the Signalling alternatives before executing the work.

2.9.4.5 Replacement/improvement works on MG section identified for gauge conversion

Railway Board directed (June 2003) that at stations where gauge conversion work is sanctioned and is likely to be completed by March 2007, replacement of gears is to be taken up under gauge conversion. Keeping in mind the economy measures, financial interest of the Railway along with the safety parameters, heavy investment should not be made on the lines which have already been included in the Gauge Conversion Plan.

Audit observed that some zonal Railways undertook 15 works (in eight zones) of rehabilitation/renewal and modification works of Signalling systems on Metre Gauge sections planned for gauge conversion contrary to above instructions. Avoidable expenditure of Rs.20.11 crore was incurred on such works in six zones (SCR6.59 crore, SR1.74 crore, SWR0.21 crore, NER 0.49 crore, ECR2.69 crore, and NFR8.39 crore).

(AnnexureXII) 2.9.4.6 Expenditure on unjustified works

Railway Board decided (September 2005) that PI/RRI/EI will be provided on all A, B, C, D, D Special and E Special routes of BG on a programmed basis. Stations on E route will not be provided with PI/RRI/EI and only mechanical rehabilitation of the Signalling system would be carried out. In cases where work of providing PI/RRI/EI on E routes has commenced these would be completed but no new works on E routes would be taken up. A review in audit


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revealed that eight such cases taken up on five zones. Some of those cases are detailed below:

• in SCR, while 30 stations on “D” Route were operated with electro mechanical gears/lever frames to end of 3132008, Panel interlocking was provided at 19 stations on “E” route during the years 200607 and 200708 at a cost of Rs. 30.11 crore, contrary to the Board’s decision. Though the Railway administration justified that these works were carried out as part of Gauge Conversion, it is noticed that these were carried out subsequent to Board’s directions.

• in SWR, replacement of Signalling gears with centralised operation of points at Bhadravathi and Shimoga Stations (on E Route) was sanctioned in November 2004 at a cost of Rs.4.61 crore. The work was taken up during November 2005 and the same is in progress. An expenditure of Rs.2.06 crore has so far been booked.

• provision of MACLS with centralised operation of points along with PI in BirurShimoga and ChikjajurRayadurga Sections (E Route) of SWR was sanctioned (March 2007) at a cost of Rs.9.14 crore. The work was undertaken through three separate contracts in September 2007 and the same are in progress. An amount of Rs.52.57 lakh has been booked so far.

• in SECR, in 2006 a work of providing emergency control and block communication was taken up on a section (KalumnaKhaprikheda) in Nagpur division, citing passenger traffic needs and need to improve emergency control and block communications. This section was actually a siding with no passenger traffic. The work was later short closed, but material worth Rs.25.60 lakh was procured of which Rs.1.03 lakh still remains. In view of the above facts this work was unwarranted.

(AnnexureXIII) 2.9.5 Telecommunication

The telecommunication facilities of IR serve two main purposes (i) operational – for controlling and monitoring daily train movements and (ii) administrative – for collecting and transmitting data from various activity centres like passenger reservation system etc. The telecommunication activities earlier used infrastructure provided by the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL). The Railway Reforms Committee (1983) had recommended that IR should develop its own network of telecommunication system independent of BSNL for transmitting data. Accordingly IR started (1988) laying optical fibre cable (OFC). Railtel Corporation of India Limited (RCIL) was formed in 200001 to exploit surplus telecom capacity created due to introduction of OFC. Revenue generated was to be shared with Indian Railways.

2.9.5.1 Delay in transfer of data circuit on Railway’s medium

Railway Board decided that Railways should plan for switching over from leased BSNL circuits to Railway’s own OFC network. After deliberations held


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with the Chief Signal and Telecommunication Engineers in May/September 2006 during the meeting, the progress of these works was found to be unsatisfactory and the works were held up because of lack of last mile connectivity and it was desired (2006) that Railways should transfer as many circuits as possible to Railways’ medium. A review of the position in zonal Railways revealed that out of the 2666 circuits hired from BSNL, 708 were identified for transfer to Railways’ own medium. The IR could achieve this target partly. Retention of BSNL circuits and delay in surrendering some of these circuits resulted in avoidable payment of Rs.3.70 crore (approx.) as rental charges, as worked out in audit.

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that this was being monitored continuously and there had been substantial progress over a period of more than two years. Initially, 708 circuits were identified for transfer and as on date, 1200 circuits have already been transferred and the process is still on.

(AnnexureXIV)

2.9.6 Utilisation of funds under SRSF

2.9.6.1 Financial progress of SRSF

In pursuance of Railway Safety Review Committee’s recommendations, a non lapsable Special Railway Safety Fund (SRSF) of Rs.17,000 crore was created in October 2001 to clear the arrears in replacement/renewal of over aged safety related assets viz., tracks, bridges, S&T gears and rolling stock and to cater to certain safety enhancement works. SRSF was created for a six year period from 200102 to 200607. It was extended up to 200708. Percentage of utilisation of SRSF (on S&T) for the period 200304 to 200708 is given in the table below:

Zone 200304 200405 200506 200607 200708 SCR 98.70 84.95 104.93 99.30 106.31 ER 124.37 96.67 111.52 110.63 103.38 SR 111.25 102.49 105.20 95.90 97.19 SWR 100.58 101.50 101.28 74.79 95.84 ECoR 97.93 101.05 95.76 94.59 110.15 WR 72.36 84.63 101.27 112.78 122.44 NWR 88.40 92.37 93.86 117.61 108.16 SECR 100 85.88 91.67 89.05 79.81 NER 109.10 101.73 96.42 100 101.43 NR 109.25 79.83 94.58 101.28 96.65 ECR 107.74 81.89 90.37 101.70 115.48 CR 101.52 84.71 82.39 97.56 99.16 WCR 125.55 118.98 123.99 105.81 121.04 SER 104.93 99.70 96.94 97.68 98.47 NFR 116.32 100.67 154.20 82.82 69.65 NCR 98.03 41.51 107.22 103.24 99.53


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A review of the allotment and actual expenditure for the years 200304 to 200708 revealed that most of the zones could not utilise the full amount of funds allotted to them, however the utilisation was by and large 80 per cent and above in most zones for the period. A few of the zones utilised more funds than allotted under SRSF, some zones have not utilised the full allotment in all the years. It was also noticed that ER (Rs.10.40 lakh), SR (Rs.13.70 lakh) and SER (Rs.5.01 crore) diverted the SRSF funds for other than SRSF works.

2.9.6.2 Physical progress of works carried out under SRSF

A review of works being carried out under SRSF revealed that most of the zones were behind the target planned on March 2008. Percentage of shortfall in completion of S&T works under SRSF is given in the table. Railway Number of works

planned Number

completed to end of 31308

Balance to end of 31308

% of shortfall

SCR 216 216 0 0 ER 775 651 124 16 SR 27 18 9 33 SWR 19 17 2 11 ECoR 28 5 23 82 WR 23 18 5 22 NWR 5 2 3 60 SECR 13 5 8 62 NER 43 43 0 0 NR 49 16 33 67 ECR 331 96 235 71 CR 358 301 57 16 WCR 31 31 0 0 SER 62 47 15 24 NFR 19 19 0 0 NCR 29 5 24 83 Total 2028 1490 538 27

It is seen from the above table that only four zones (SCR, NER, WCR and NFR) completed all SRSF works by end of March 2008.

From the above it can also be seen that there is a huge mismatch between financial expenditure and physical progress in six zones (ECoR, NWR, SECR, NR, ECR and NCR). In these zones the fund utilisation is close to 100 per cent or more in more than four years but the physical achievement is disproportionate, viz. 18 per cent in ECoR, 40 per cent in NWR, 38 per cent in SECR, 33 per cent in NR, 29 per cent in ECR and 17 per cent in NCR. This indicates that monies have been spent /advanced to parties without corresponding progress on ground. Some of the reasons for SRSF works remaining incomplete were investigated in some of the zones. It was found in NR that lack of suitable contractors and sufficient staff with contractors for carrying out works at multiple locations; non availability of buildings, sleepers and turnouts; shortage of Signalling materials and staff; and lengthy


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procurement procedures were holding back the completion of works. While in SWR, works were delayed or could not be completed due to civil works remaining incomplete, delay in issue of approved plans, frequent changes in yard plans, changes in technology etc. Frequent change in yard plans is also the reason for the delay of a work in SER.

2.9.7 Miscellaneous

2.9.7.1 Stores management

Sound inventory control requires that optimum level of stock be maintained to avoid blockage of capital and idling of stores. Test check of surplus/non moving stores with some Senior Section Engineers on zonal Railways as on 31 March 2008 showed that items worth Rs.28.16 crore were being held in stock for over one year, out of which stores worth Rs.12.17 crore had been in stock for over three years. As the value of all stores items was not available with the stock holders, the value of entire surplus stores could not be quantified.

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that necessary instructions were being issued to zonal Railways.

(AnnexureXV) 2.9.7.2 Ineffective utilisation of workshop facilities

To meet the requirement of manufacturing/overhauling/repairing of various Signalling equipments and their parts, IR established several workshops over the zones. A review of the utilisation of workshop facilities revealed that the full potential of available man hours was not utilised in the workshops. The man hours utilised as per job cards were less than the man hours recorded in Gate Attendance (GA) cards. The loss worked out in audit due to idling of man hours was Rs.10.96 crore (Rs.2.83 crore in SCR, Rs. 6.48 crore in NER, Rs. 63 lakh in NR and Rs. 55 lakh in NFR during 200304 to 200708 and Rs 47 lakh in ER during 200607 and 200708).

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that zonal Railways were being advised for taking necessary action.

(AnnexureXVI) 2.9.7.3 Non compliance of Board’s instructions in discontinuing

uneconomical manufacture of S&T items in workshops

Railway Board directed (February 2004) that cost of each product manufactured in the workshop be compared with price received in the purchase orders and wherever the workshop costs are high, the production be discontinued or extensive and effective cost cutting measures be taken. A test check of unit costs of few items manufactured in S&T Workshops with the cost at which these were being procured from market on few zones revealed that manufacturing cost was much higher than the market price of the item. The extra expenditure amounted to Rs.13.32 crore (SCR – Rs.2.29 crore, SR – Rs.43.70 lakh, WR – Rs. 2.70 lakh, ER – Rs.4.29 crore, NR – Rs. 80.79 lakh, CR – Rs.17.88 lakh, NER – Rs.5.23 crore, SER Rs 0.88 lakh and NFRRs 4.77 lakh).


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Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that zonal Railways were being advised for taking necessary action.

(AnnexureXVII) 2.9.7.4 Blocking of funds

The CSP recognizes that policy decisions may be needed for interdepartmental coordination. Audit observed following cases of interdepartmental non coordination: • Electronic point machines have been procured on many zones by the S&T

department. The thick web switches required for their operation have not been provided by the Engineering Department so far. Electronic point machines procured at a total cost of Rs.6.51 crore were lying idle in six zones (SCRRs.3.60 crore, ECoRRs.5 lakh, WRRs.1.04 crore, NR Rs.1.08 crore, SERRs.15 lakh and NCRRs.59 lakh). While few of them were procured way back in October 2002 (in ECoR) most of the EPMs were lying idle since 200506 for want of thick web switches. It was further noticed that in SCR due to nonavailability of thick web switches, the zone has arranged for Universal Point Machines for running turn outs as interim measure at a cost of Rs.1.06 crore, which would be rendered waste once the electronic point machines are installed.

Indian Railways stated (January 2009) that implementation of any item requires interdepartmental coordination. As per laid down procedure, views/clearance are taken well in advance from concerned departments. Railways are being advised for taking necessary action.

(AnnexureXVIII)

• Codal provisions require that for any deposit work undertaken by the Railways on behalf of an outside agency, the estimated amount of expenditure has to be deposited by the agency before commencement of work. However audit observed that SWR executed four works incurring expenditure of Rs.6.51 crore on behalf of RCIL for which only Rs.50 lakh was deposited by them for one work. Though advance deposit was to be obtained before executing the work, RCIL has not yet deposited the amount with the Railway.

36 Chapter 2 Signalling and Telecommunication in Indian ...

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