HOW THE TIMES OF LONDON COVERED AND INTERPRETED

RUSSIAN EXPANSION INTO CENTRAL ASIA

IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

by

MEMET YETISGIN, B.A., M.A.

A DISSERTATION

IN

HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved

/?;.;^.^<^ra

Copyright 2000, Memet Yetisgin

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1 would like to thank Dr. Idris R. Traylor, Jr., for directing my work as the

chairperson of my doctoral committee. I also want to thank Dr. Otto M. Nelson, Dr. John

Howe, Dr. Alwyn Barr, and Dr. John Barkdull for serving on the committee. Moreover, 1

am grateful to Sutgii Imam University for providing a scholarship that made it possible

for me to come to the United States to pursue two graduate degrees. I also wish to thank

Dr. Allan Kuethe and the Department of History of Texas Tech University for financial

assistance. Finally, 1 would like to express appreciation to the personnel of the Texas

Tech Libraries who provided great assistance during my research.

1 also would like to thank my wife, Pakize, and my handsome sons, A. Alp and E.

Emin Yeti§gin, who suffered as much as 1 did during long months of separation because

of my research and studies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii

ABSTRACT vi

LIST OF TABLES vii

LIST OF FIGURES viii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION 1

Background of Russian Expansion into Central Asia 1

The Times as a Recordkeeper 9

Usage of Some of the Geographic Terms 17

II. MOTIVES FOR THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF CENTRAL ASIA.... 20

Personal Ambition 23

Land Hunger 30

Desire for Commerce 36

Revenge: Protection against "Predatory" Nomads 41

Alleged "Mission of Spreading Civilization" in

"Uncivilized" Regions 47

The Quest for Natural Boundaries 55

Spreading Christianity 56

Lack of Modernity, Enlightened Leadership, and Social

Cohesion in the Khanates 59

Loneliness and Isolation from the World 68

Imperialist Race among the Big Powers 70

Aggrandizement of Russia 75

To Reach Warm-Water Ports 77

i l l

III. THE COVERAGE BY THE TIMES OF LONDON OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN KHANATES AND TURKMENIA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 80

First Contacts with the Khanates 80

TheFallofAkMescid 85

The Fall of Turkistan (Yesse), Chimkent, Aulie Ata 91

The Fall of Tashkent 96

War with the Khanate of Bukhara 100

Establishment of the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan 105

War against Bukhara and the Annexation of Samarkand and Zerafshan 106

Peace Treaties between Russia and the PGianates of Khokand and Bukhara 109

Expedition in the Turkmen Country and the Construction of the

Fort Krasnovodsk (Kizilsu) on the Eastern Caspian Sea I l l

Khivan Expedition and the Submission of the Khanate of Khiva... 114

Massacre of the Yomud Turkmens 127

Annexation of the Khanate of Khokand 133

War against the Turkmens and the Fall of Geok Tepe 141

Incorporation of Merv 157

Incorporation of the Sarakh Country and the Penjdeh Incident... 161

IV. THE TIMES' VIEW OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 165

Russophobia and Sources of the Rivalry 167

Security Concerns for India as a Source of the Rivalry 172

Possibility of Perceived Threat to India 177

Economic and Commercial Concerns of Great Britain 183

Stages of the Rivalry during Russian Expansion into Central Asia.. 186

Final Settlements 224

IV

The Settlement ofthe Pamirs in 1895 234

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 235

V. IMPACTS OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION ON CENTRAL ASIA.... 240

Effects on Industry 244

Effects on Population 246

Environmental Impacts 251

Administrative and Judicial Effects 257

Cultural Effects 268

Tax Collection 273

Economical and Commercial Effects 277

Effects on Agriculture 283

Rising Security in the Country 290

Effects on the Social Structure ofthe Society 297

VI. CONCLUSIONS 300

BIBLIOGRAPHY 309

APPENDIX

A. CHRONOLOGY 323

B. RULERS AND STATESMEN 327

C MAPS 329

ABSTRACT

Russian expansion into Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century

had a major impact on British foreign policy. The British had long begun to view

Russian expansion toward the Balkans, the Near East, and the Caucasus as a very

dangerous development to their imperialist interests. They thought that Russia would one

day attempt to invade India, the crown ofthe British colonial possessions. This perceived

threat was hotly debated among almost all educated segments of British society. In this

debate. The Times of London played an important role by providing fresh news,

commentaries, and discussions ofthe subject. Though The Times often supported the

official policy ofthe British Government, it did not fail to provide a wide variety of

opinions. It offered a forum to two major political groups, the "alarmists," or the

supporters of an active and militarist policy, and the "masterly inactivists," or the

advocates of a rather passive policy. Besides its journalistic and popular approach to the

issue. The Times presented a well-balanced discussion for possible solutions ofthe

problem. In a sense. The Times became a popular organ for politicians, historians,

researchers, military strategists, and journalists to reach the public through insightful

debates.

Besides its enormous contribution to reporting and interpreting Central Asian

politics and to shaping public opinion. The Times closely monitored Russian social,

economic, political, military, and commercial development in the region. By doing this,

it created a history of Central Asia during this period. Yet, judging from the imperfect

knowledge that the contemporary journalists, politicians, and historians had about Central

Asia, and again judging from Eurocentric and pseudo-scientific concepts held by many of

these people, the history presented in The Times must be careflilly scrutinized with the

aid of other historical sources. However, in the final analysis. The Times' coverage ofthe

Central Asian question created insightful day-to-day accounts of important historical

events.

VI

LIST OF TABLES

2.1 Income and Expenditure in Russian Turkistan between 1868 and 1873 40

5.1 Changing Demographics 250

5.2 Increasing Trade in Central Asia 278

B. 1 Russian Tsars 327

B.2 Prime Ministers of Great Britain 327

B.3 Rulers ofthe Central Asian Khanates 327

B.4 Russian Foreign Ministers 328

B.5 British Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs 328

B.6 Russian Governors General of Turkistan 328

Vll

LIST OF FIGURES

3.1 Khi-va-la? 117

3.2 Kibitka 150

3.3 Turkmen Fortress 151

3.4 "Peacefully" Annexed Merv 159

4.1 Temptation 177

4.2 Anti-Temptation 178

4.3 The Bullying Bear 228

4.4 Playing with the Persian Cat 237

5.1 Bridge over Amu Daria 243

CI Central Asia Before Russian Invasions 330

C.2 Central Asia During Russian Invasions 331

C.3 Central Asia After Russian Invasions 332

Vlll

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background of Russian Expansion into Central Asia

Russian expansion in the Turkic lands, especially in the Volga (Etil) basin,

Siberia, and the Kazakh steppes started in the mid sixteenth century. This was Russia's

"inevitable" destiny because she had power and because the Turkic khanates against

which she expanded were relatively weak and technologically inferior.' This expansion

gained a character of continual forward movement, and was symbolized by the

incorporation of large territories into the Russian Empire. The territorial location, huge

human and material resources of Russia on the one hand, and the demographic, social,

military, and technological weaknesses ofthe Turkic people on the other hand, greatly

eased this process. As General M. N. Annenkov, who was in charge of constructing the

Transcaspian railroad in the 1880's, stated, many Russians considered gaining more lands

identical with becoming richer.

The Central Asian khanates, namely Khiva, Bukhara, and Khokand, as well as

Turkmenia, stayed free from foreign domination until the second half of the nineteenth

century. These khanates preserved their freedom not because of their powerful state

structures, but because of their isolated geographic location. This region commonly

called Turkistan, or Central Asia, is surrounded not only by geographic barriers such as

the Hindi Kush and the Pamir mountains in the south, Thienshan (Tanri Daglari)

mountains in the southeast, Kopet Dagh in the west, and the Kazakh Steppes in the north,

but also weak or decadent countries, namely China and the Kalmik Mongols in the east,

the Kazakh tribes in the north, Persia in the west, and Afghanistan and some mountain

tribes in the south. As far as the geographic barriers are concerned. Central Asia consists

of large arid lands such as Kizil Kum, Kara Kum and Batak Kum, as well as densely

' Engin Deniz Arkali (ed.), Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanli Sadnazamlarindan .4li ve Fuad Pafalarm Siyasi I'aliyyetnameleri. Istanbul; Bogaziti Universitesi, 1978, 4.

" Charles Marvin, The Russian at Merv and Herat, and Their Power of Invading India. London: W. H. Allen & Co.. 1883,34.

populated oases. Life mostly concentrated in and around the oases, such as Akhal and

Merv in Turkmenia, and river valleys, especially Amu Daria and Syr Daria. For an

invading army coming from any direction there were great geographical barriers.

Although the actual invasion of Central Asia took place in the second half of the

nineteenth century, the Russian interest in gaining these lands dated back to the reign of

Peter 1 (1682-1725). The reign of Peter 1 marked the beginning ofthe westernization of

Russia and of a rapid expansion in both Europe and Asia. "The Russians began to gain

the upper hand in their dealings with Asiatic nomads long before the reign of Peter the

Great. Yet it was only the process of Westernization promoted by the tireless reformer,

and bequeathed by him to his successors, that made the Russians, at least, essentially

secure from the peoples ofthe steppe." Peter I not only aimed to strengthen Russia

against outside enemies, but also desired to make Russia one ofthe strongest empires in

the world. He believed in the value of invading the Kazakh steppe in Asia because he

thought that world supremacy lay in these lands."̂ When he visited Western Europe he

witnessed how the colonial possessions ofthe western countries had made them rich and

prosperous. Since he knew he could not compete with them in the West, as well as

overseas, he concentrated his attention on Central Asia, which had not yet come under the

control of any imperialist power.^

Peter the Great dreamed ofthe legendary wealth of Central Asia, of mysterious

gold mines, and ofthe silk trade route. He wanted to capture India, which he considered

one ofthe richest countries in the world. He was the first Russian monarch who sent a

' A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Tiirkili Haritasi ve Agiklamalar. Istanbul: n.p., 1943, 1-5.

'' Nicholas V. Raisanovsky, "Asia Through Russian Eyes." In Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian People. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972, 7.

' M. Veniukof Valikhanof, The Russians in Central Asia: Their Occupation ofthe Kirghiz Steppe and the Line ofthe Syr Daria; Their Political Relations with Khiva, Bokhara, and Khokand: also Description of Chinese Turkestan and Dzungaria. Trans, by John and Robert Michell. London: Edward Stanford, 1865, 295.

^ Alton S. Donelly, "Peter the Great and Central Asia." Canadian Slavonic Papers 17, no. 2&3 (Summer and Fall 1975): 208.

regular army, led by Alexander Bekovitch-Cherkasski, a Circassian from the Caucasus,

against Khiva to establish a Russian protectorate over Central Asia in 1717. Yet, this

attempt was a total failure because the Russian army was defeated and destroyed by the

Khivans.^

Though Peter 1 did not succeed in establishing his authority over the khanates, he

allegedly left a will directing Russian expansion into these territories. The will was

believed by many to be a false document created in France toward the end ofthe

eighteenth century.^ However, it greatly inspired Russian policy in Asia. That

expansionist policy showed that most Russian monarchs and statesmen appreciated

Peter's dream of conquering the whole ofthe steppes and Central Asia in order to create a

true world power. Ivan Kirilov, one ofthe most outstanding Russian statesmen ofthe

eighteenth century, and a pupil of Peter I, "regarded the Kirghiz [Kazakh] horde as the

key to all Asiatic lands... and dreamed of picking up the provinces of Bukhara and

Samarkand.""^

Despite Peter I's genuine desire to establish a Russian protectorate over the

khanates, and to control the trade with China and India, he could not achieve any solid

ground in Central Asia because Russia had to deal with her European foes. Starting in

1695, Russia committed herself to the Holy League, which was created by Austria,

Poland, and Venice to continue fighting the Ottoman Turks after the failure ofthe

Ottoman armies to take Vienna in 1683. Russia intermittently fought the Turks to control

the fortress of Azov to have an access to the Black Sea. She succeeded in capturing this

fort, only to lose it again in 1711 after the defeat at the Pruth. Besides her commitment in

' Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Russian Penetration ofthe Caucasus." In Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution. Ed. by Taras Hunczak. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974, 243-244; Geoffrey Wheeler. "Russian Conquest and Colonization of Central Asia." In Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution. Ed. by Taras Hunczak. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974, 267.

* Marvin, The Russian at Merv and Herat, 53; Blerzy, H. "Les Revolutions de I'Asie Centrale." Revue des DeuxMondes 50 (1874): 130.

' N. A. Khalfin, Russia's Policy in Central Asia 1857-1868. London: Central Asian Research Center, 1964,6.

the south, in the north, Russia had to fight the so-called Great Northern War (1700-1721)

with Sweden. Her decisive defeat at the Narva battle in 1700 was soundly revenged at

the Poltava battle in 1709. At the end ofthe war Russia emerged as a victor and gained

strategic places in the Baltic region. Whether the will of Peter I was a genuine document

or not, the Russian foreign policy created during the Peter I's reign always had an

aggressive tone regarding the Turkic lands in Asia.

After Peter 1, Russia continued to concentrate her attention on Europe and the

Near East. She took part in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) in order to secure her

interest in Poland, and fought a victorious war against the Turks (1768-1774). Besides

these wars, she, in alliance with Austria and Prussia, succeeded in destroying Poland and

annexing a large part of this country. Her struggle with the Turks in the south ended with

her incorporation of Crimea in 1792.

The Russians did not have difficulty finding reasons or pretexts to cover their

aggression and incorporate the Turkic lands.

Thus, one country is swallowed up because it is too strong, another because it is too weak, a third because it constitutes Russia's natural boundaries, a fourth because Russia's neighbours beyond those boundaries are unsettled; one people is favoured, protected, and absorbed on the strength of common religious interests: another is insulted, attacked, and so on.""

Erecting forts, founding towns, creating lines of defenses were all part ofthe Russian

policy of strengthening annexed lands and adding new territories in Asia, especially in

the Kazakh Steppes. The Russians started their conquest as robbers and bandits ofthe

steppes. They attacked poor tribes who had been suffering enough from the realities of

life cast on them by harsh climate and barren territories. This casts doubt on the claim of

Peter I that the steppes were central for world supremacy. If Peter I really meant what he

wrote concerning the steppes, it would be his understanding ofthe historical role of these

territories whose inhabitants had established many world-shaking empires throughout

'" George Vemadsky, A History of Russia. Philadelphia: the Blakiston Company, 1929, 105.

" "A Former Resident in Russia," "Some Truth about Russia." The Fortnightly Review 52 (July-December 1889): 279.

history, such as the Hun Empire in the fifth century and the Mongol Empire in the

thirteenth century.

Though the Russians claimed that they were saving merchants, travelers, and

villagers against the raids ofthe nomads, Russian forces, began to make more harm to the

peace and security ofthe steppes than the nomads themselves. Russia deployed the

Cossacks, who had always been the most troubled segment ofthe Russian empire in

European Russia, to defend against and to raid neighboring states. In most cases, the

Cossack cavalries had superior weapons and better tactics to defeat and loot isolated

Kazakh tribes. They generally sustained few losses, but the tribes lost many people and

large amounts of their worldly possessions, especially livestock.'^

The first step beyond the old Yekaterinburg line of outposts was made by Bronefski. With a rabble soldiery and a promiscuous band collected on the border, he penetrated into the steppes, so congenial to his nature by their very wildness, roamed about, constructed forts, and in his exuberant spirits occasionally fired at Russian settlements with as little compunction as at Khirgiz huts. His martial triumphs were dully celebrated at Omsk. No wonder that this savage, whose characteristic trait was indulgence in Homeric invective, found himself most comfortable in the lawless waste.'^

The Cossacks made incursions into the Turkic lands for the aim "partly to patrol and

partly to plunder. This was their idea of combining the usefiil with the agreeable. By the

Khirgese these apostles of culture were soon regarded as the worst robbers.... Wherever

patrols appeared caravans disappeared."

The incorporation of large Turkic lands into the Russian Empire starting in the

mid sixteenth century brought hundreds and thousands of Turkic and Muslim peoples

under the tsarist government. These people preserved their religious, cultural, and social

way of life despite all pressures from the Russian authorities. They were permitted to

live freely their own communal life. But, during the reigns of Peter 1, and especially

'̂ Gerald Morgan, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810-1895. London: Frank Cass, 1981. 45.

'̂ The Times of London, November 20, 1868.

•'' The Times, November 20, 1868.

Tsarina Anna (1738-55). the Muslims were subjected to worst discriminations. It was

Catherine II who eased the strict control, and discrimination against them. In 1789. a

leader {kadi or kazi) for Islamic practices was appointed. The Russians permitted the

Muslims, especially Kazan mullahs, to construct new mosques, and to preach the Islamic

creed to other tribes, especially to the Kazakhs.'^

There had always been intensive communications between the Central Asian

rulers and the Sultan-Caliph of Istanbul. The former usually expected to be delivered

from the menacing Russian advance by the latter. There was a notion carried by most

Central Asian rulers about the strength ofthe Ottoman Turks. They believed that they

would stop Russian advances if the Ottomans helped them. But Ottoman invincibility

had been broken since the defeat before Vienna in 1683. In the Russo-Turkish war of

1768-74, the Russian armies had won great successes over the Ottoman forces in the

Balkans, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. Even a Russian fieet defeated and burned the

Ottoman fleet in Cheshme on the Aegean Coast. After the defeat, the Ottomans sued for

peace. The Russians accepted the peace offer because ofthe Pugachev rebellion, which

broke out during the war, and forced Russia to divert large armies to suppress it. The

Treaty was signed at Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774. According to the treaty, the Turks ceded

important forts, including Azov, Kerch, and Kilburun to Russia. These forts ensured

Russian access to the Black Sea. The Ottomans renounced their suzerain rights, except

for religious authority over the Crimean Tatars. Crimea was defined as a free state.

When the Russians began to annex Crimea in the 1780's, the Ottomans tried to save it,

and went to war with Russia again in 1787. The war lasted until 1791 and ended with

Russia's total incorporation ofthe Crimea, consolidated by the treaty of Jassy (Yash).

signed in January 1792.'^ In these difficult times, the Ottomans sent envoys to the

Central Asian khanates to ask them to open new fronts in Asia against the Russians. In

the reply to the Ottoman demands, the Amir, Muhammed Masum, stated that he had sent

'̂ Alexandre Benningsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, 16; Vemadsky, A History of Russia, 106.

'* Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A Short Histoiy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1969, 219.

decrees to all Kazakh and Kirghiz leaders to fight against the Russians.'^ Yet, they never

succeeded in establishing a political and military co-front against the enemy.

The Russians were not only incorporating Turkic lands in the northern Black Sea

region and in Central Asia, but also were gaining new territories in the Caucasus from the

local chieftains and Persia. Their gains in this front culminated in the Turkmenchai

treaty signed between Russia and Persia in February 1828, which incorporated present-

day Armenia, Georgia, Nahchivan, and Azerbaijan, into Russia.'^ The only power that

hindered the easy victories ofthe Russians was the Muslim guerillas led by Sheik

Shymil. For a period of over twenty-five years, they successfully stopped the Russian

expansion. The Russians had to spend a great deal of money, men, and effort to subdue

them, which finally happened in 1859.'^ Feeling humiliated in the Near East by the allies

in the Crimean War, and overcoming difficulties in the Caucasus after the capture of

Sheik Shymil, the Russians finally concentrated their power in Central Asia to subdue the

khanates in the 1860's. It was in Central Asia that Russia hoped to recover its political

and military prestige at slight expense.

Once the Russians started expanding their lands eastward, they never stopped.

One conquest became the stepping-stone to the next one.' Turkic lands ofthe Volga

basin, the Urals, Siberia, the Kazakh Steppes, and Kirghizia had been conquered one after

another. By the mid-nineteenth century, there were only three khanates left, namely

Khiva, Bukhara, Khokand and the independent tribes of Turkmenia. These last free

Turkic states knew their end was coming, because they were already surrounded by the

'̂ Mehmet Saray, Rus Ifgali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti lie Tiirkistan Hanliklan .Arasindaki siyasi miinasebetler, 1775-1875. Istanbul: n.p., 1984, 18-22.

'* Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1967, 290; Terentyef, vol. 2, 24.

" Akdes Nimet Kurat, Rusya Tarihi: Baslangigtan 1917'ye Kadar. Ankara: TUrk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1948, 332; Saton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 291.

20 David MacKenzie, "Tashkent-Past and Present." The Russian Review 2i {AYIXW 1969): 210.

"' Mary Holdsworth, Turkistan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History ofthe Khanates of Bukhara, Khokand and Khiva. Oxford: Central Asian Research Center, 1959, 46.

aggressive Russian power from the east, north, and west. In the first years ofthe

nineteenth century, the rulers of Bukhara, Khokand, and Khiva sent embassies to

Constantinople^^ formally to accept the Sultan's protection. In their decision to be

vassals ofthe Ottoman Empire, the Russian threat was the most important element. By

becoming vassals ofthe Sultan, they expected to get help from the Ottoman Turks against

the Russian aggressions, as well as against the opposition forces within their respective

states. The Ottomans, however, rejected their desires because ofthe distance and

unwillingness to have new responsibilities. In addition, as a decadent state herself, the

Ottoman Empire did not have enough power and organization to send help to these states

to resist the Russians. The best thing the Ottomans had done for these states was to

advise them to establish friendly relations, and combine their forces against the

Russians. Moreover, the only power capable of resisting Russia in Central Asia was

"'Muallim Naci, Lugat-i Naci. Istanbul: Qagri Yaymlari, 1987, 7; Edwin A. Grosvenor. Constantinople. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1895, 11, 48; Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo. Narrative ofthe Embassy ofRuy Gonzalez deClavijo to the Court of Timoiir, 1403-6. Translated by Clements R. Markham. London: the Hakluyt Society, 1819, 47. According to Muallim Naci, the Ottoman Turks generally called Constantinople as "Asitane," "Asitane-i Aliyye," or "Asitane-i Devlet-i Aliye." Moreover, when Clavijo visited Constantinople in 1403, fifty years before the Turkish capture ofthe city, he found out that "the Greeks do not call it Constantinople as we do, but Escomboli." Furthermore, Grosvenor wrote in 1895 that the Ottoman Turks called the Greek name "Stamboul" as Istanboul because of "their inability to articulate an initial s followed by a consonant." Istanbul comprehended "the Nova Roma, or Constantinoupolis of Constantine, and an additional territory of equal extent." Grosvenor also stressed in a footnote on page 48 that the name "Istanboul" drived fi-om Greek saying "ees teen polen" (to the city). "It is supposed that the Ottomans often overheard this phrase on the lips ofthe Greeks, and that from it they formed the word Stanboul. This derivation is untenable. The Ottomans often retained foreign names of places they had captured. In case the name was long, they dropped the first syllable, and constructed the last syllables. From Thessalonica they made Selanik; from Constantinople, Stamboul." Besides these records, the Ottomans often named Constantinople as "Constantinieh" on their coins, and "Pay-i That" in their official communications.

^' T. C. Bajbakanlik Devlet Arjivleri Genel Mudurlugii. Osmanli Devleti tie Kafkasya, Turkistan ve Kirim Hanliklan Arasindaki Milnasebetlere Dair .Ar§iv Belgeleri. Ankara; Osmanli Arjivi Daire Bajkanligi, 1992, 99-135; Mehmet Saray. Rus kgali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti lie Tiirkistan Hanliklan Arasindaki siyasi miinasebetler, 1775-1875. Istanbul, 1984,35-36. In 1813, the ruler of Khokand, Said Mehmed, send an envoy to Istanbul to ask Sultan's suzerainty. Though, the Ottomans discussed the matter, but refiised it on the ground that Khokand was indeed part of Bukhara, Said Mehmed rebelled against her. Another appeal came in 1870 from the Turkmen leaders of Khorazm. Again the Ottomans rejected it because ofthe distance and difficult transportation facilities between two countries.

"•* Mehmet Saray, Rus kgali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti lie Tiirkistan Hanliklan Arasindaki siyasi miinasebetler, 1775-1875. Istanbul: n.p., 1984,52-53.

Great Britain. But, from the start Britain considered the khanates, and Turkmenia, as

well as Kashgaria, out of her sphere of influence. She basically allowed Russia to erect

her own authority on these lands. Many statesmen, such as John Gladstone, Grant Duff.

Lord John Lawrence, most ofthe press, including The Times, The Pall Mall Gazette, and

The Daily News, as well as the official mentality ofthe British foreign office were

supportive of the Russian expansion as lone as British interests were not damaged in

Persia, Afghanistan, and India. They accepted similarities between Russia and Great

Britain in Asia as far as spreading civilization over "barbarian" or "semi-civilized"

communities. As far as Kashgaria is concerned, neither the Russians nor the British

really attempted to establish their influence. Kashgaria had been under the Chinese rule

until 1864, when a popular rebellion forced the Chinese to evacuate the country. Yakub

Bey, who was the commander of Khokandian forces during the defense of Ak Mesjid in

1853, became the king of Kashgaria after toppling Buzurug Khan, a member ofthe

ancient Kashgar ruling family, and successftilly ruled the country until his death in 1877.

In the same year, the Chinese reestablished their authority in the country.

The Times as a Recordkeeper

On January 1, 1785, a new newspaper was bom in England. It was first named

The Daily Universal Register, but it was changed to the less clumsy The Times exactly

three years later.̂ ^ John Walter, who was bom in 1739 and raised as a bookseller and

publisher, was the founder ofthe newspaper.^^ It became one ofthe long-lasting and

widely read newspapers in Britain and was innovative and inventive in regard to both its

physical aspect and its contents. The Times was the first to use logography, the use of

complete letters in publishing."

^̂ Philip Howard, We Thundered Out: 200 Years of The Times, 1785-1985. Maplewood, New Jersey: Hammond, 1985, 8.

^̂ H. R. Fox Bourne, English Newspapers. Vol. 1. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966, 254.

^̂ Howard, We Thundered Out, 8.

John Walter stated in the very first issue that the present newspapers were either

publishing long and tedious accounts ofthe parliamentary discussions or itemizing the

every move ofthe government ministers inside and outside the country. Some journals

even published only advertisements. The Times on the other hand was founded to cover a

variety of social, political, and intemational developments to better serve every class of

the society in Great Britain. "A newspaper, conducted on the tme and natural principles

of such a publication, ought to be the Register of The Times, and faithfiil recorder of

every species of intelligence. It ought not to be engrossed by any particular object, but,

like a well-covered table, it should contain something suited to every palate.""^ The

Register, it was claimed, would be ready for distribution every morning at six o'clock

with a price of two pence halfyenny instead ofthe three pence charged by most ofthe

other papers. All advertisements were to be published the next day upon their receipt

without making alterations. John Walter's ambition was "more than an advertising

medium. His ambition was to make it a complete chronicle of accurate and interesting

news, and a safe guide of public opinion."'

Until 1803, John Walter directed the newspaper. Then his son, John Walter, Jr.,

took charge. His father had succeeded in raising the quality and fame ofthe paper to the

second level after The Morning Chronicle. He himself made it the most influential

newspaper in Great Britain. John Walter Jr. believed in "a newspaper free from

government control, bribes, puffs, extortion, calumny and blackmail. He established this

principle in The Times as a precedent for later newspapers all over the world."^' His

clever choice in naming Thomas Bames as the editor ofthe paper helped The Times

achieve a place of preeminence among British joumals. When he received the office.

*̂ Howard, We Thundered Out, 8; Bourne, 257.

^' Bourne, 258.

^° Bourne, 268.

'̂ Howard, We Thundered Out, 24.

^^ Ibid, 21.

10

The Times was selling 2,000 a day; when he left the office in 1828, the circulation ofthe

paper had risen to 30,000.^^ In the period between 1800 and 1860, The Times became the

strongest paper, and the period was called "the age of The Times."" By the time ofthe

Crimean War. The Times ' circulation rose to 50,000. The Times paid great attention to

such popular events as the Peterloo victims,̂ "* the plight of Queen Caroline,^^ the need for

reform, and the unpopularity ofthe new Poor Law.'̂ ^ This coverage appealed to many

liberal-minded people. Thus, the number and popularity ofthe paper increased sharply.

After Bames' death in 1841, the new editor was John T. Delane (1841-1877). Delane

fiirther made the newspaper a more reliable source of information. "His outstanding

contribution to the paper lay in his ability to keep his ear to the ground; an untiring diner-

out, he was well supplied with political gossip which he could use to good effect in his

paper. The Times became required reading for the man of affairs." '

One aspect ofthe newspaper was to bring fresh news from abroad. For this

reason, The Times several times applied to the government to receive foreign papers

'Ubid,26.

^* Ibid., 27, 30. On 16 August 1819 at Saint Peter's Field in Manchester a large crowd numbering around 60,000 demonstrated for the reform of Parliament. During the demonstration, British cavalry attacked the demonstrators killing eleven and wounding hundreds. ''The Times printed seven columns of devastating blow-by-blow account, and many more later in the year when the inquests were held."

" Norman McCord, British History, 1815-1906. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 21; W. D. Rubinstein. British Century: A Political and Social Histoiy, 1815-1905, 14-15. Queen Caroline and King George IV were a couple until they lost their only child, Charlotte, in 1817. After this. Queen Caroline spent a long period of time in Europe, and during her stay, it was officially proved, she had adulterous relations. Upon her sexual misconduct, George IV determined to divorce her, and strip her all the titles she had. In 1820, Queen Caroline returned to England to fight for her rights, and for a while she gained popular support. Later she was granted £55,000 yearly subsidy, but she was not allowed to take part in the crowning ceremonies of George IV in 1821. Shortly after this event, she died. This event became a strange episode in the history ofthe royal family in Great Britain.

^^ McCord, 190-97; Howard, We Thundered Out, 28. Thomas Bames, the editor of The Times, was always on the side ofthe "underdog," and passionately opposed the Poor Law of 1834. The new Poor Law, which passed under the Whig government, and after conclusion of a royal investigation, reduced relief to the people, many of whom were believed to be able-bodied individuals who lived an idle and lazy life. The Law intended to increase efficiency ofthe people, and intensify the role ofthe central government in the handling ofthe distribution of relief to the poor.

11

through govemment channels. Yet, receiving news and other information through the

government channels was neither convenient nor easy. Therefore, The Times established

direct communications through its foreign agents to receive news and papers from the

European continent. The paper first appointed Henry Crabb Robinson, "Old Crabby," as

its first foreign correspondent to monitor events in Europe in January 1807.̂ * It gradually

developed to a very efficient level. "The news ofthe capitulation of Flushing in 1809 was

published in The Times twenty-four hours before any other report was received in

London." This type of close attention to the foreign affairs earned to the newspaper

fame in intemational relations. Its correspondent, William Howard Russell, "the greatest

war correspondent," covered the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, the American Civil

War. and the Franco-Prussian war in the field. Russell's letters created sensational

moods in Britain, and forced the Govemment to take necessary steps. Besides Russell,

The Times employed Thomas Chemery, the future editor ofthe paper, in Istanbul to

monitor political developments during the Crimean War. Delane himself went to the

Crimea to see actual troop landings. Besides its foreign coverage. The Times was quite

successfiil in intemal affairs. Its publications began to affect both the public and official

circles in Britain. Its role in the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829"" and the Reform

Bill of 1832 was undeniably strong. The editor, Thomas Bames, came to be called the

most powerful man in Great Britain."*^

^̂ Louise Craven, "The Early Newspaper Press in England." In The Encyclopedia ofthe British Press 1422-1992. Edited by Dennis Griffiths. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 26. *̂ Howard, We Thundered Out, 22-24.

•̂̂ Bourne, 282.

•*° Howard, We Thundered Out, 38.

**' McCord, 32-41; Howard, We Thimdered Out, 35. Howard states that The Times supported the Duke of Wellington in his "vehement struggle" over the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. Despite the severe oppositions from the Protestants and the King George IV, the Act passed, and the Catholics received political rights to elect and be elected in the Parliament.

*' Howard, We Thundered Out, 28; McCord, 138-39. According to Howard, The Times demanded "for the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill," during the discussions over the Reform Bill of 1832, which reduced the power ofthe Aristocracy in the Parliament, while clearing obstacles, such as high tax qualification for election right, and "rotten boroughs," on the path to a more advanced democracy.

12

Doubtless, the British press has played an important role in shaping public

opinion in intemational affairs, and the public opinion in tum affected the governmental

foreign policy. Because public opinion in Great Britain was a strong power and

indispensable element for the success of both intemal and extemal governmental policies,

the press enlightened the public to approve or disapprove them. Thus, knowing through

the complete coverage ofthe press of what was going on in the country's politics, the

public became informed supporters of their govemment. "The press was more of a

stabilizing than a galvanizing force and played a distinctively integrative role in Victorian

and Edwardian Britain."'*^ Furthermore, the coverage of The Times in intemational

developments was an essential source to inform many officials as well as the public about

developments taking place in faraway places. When the second founding editor of The

Times, J. T. Delane, died in 1877, the paper was selling 60,000 copies a day.̂ "*

The Times developed a very elaborate net of informers about prominent figures,

such as Benjamin Disraeli and John Gladstone, and about both intemal and extemal

affairs. Through these informers, most of whom were high govemment officials, the

paper gained "mortifying" and "humiliating" secrets. It used such power to create public

opinion "as a force in the govemment. and The Times as its loudspeaker." '̂̂

In Britain, almost all dailies had supporters among the politicians. Since Great

Britain was one ofthe most democratic states in the world, public opinion had dramatic

impact on political affairs. Politicians needed dailies to get pubHc support for their

political views. The Times started as an ally ofthe Tories, and received £300 from Prime

Minister William Pitt.'*^ Later, the paper rose as a liberal daily during the Bames

editorship because of his alliance with the Prime Minister Robert Peel. Prominent figures

such as Benjamin Disraeli and Henry J. T. Palmerston came to resent The Times while

^' J. O. Baylen, "The British Press, 1861-1918." In The Encyclopedia ofthe British Press. Edited by Dennis Griffiths. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 33.

^̂ Howard, We Thundered Out, 40.

^^ Ibid, 40.

13

William Ewart Gladstone and other liberals support it.̂ ^ Yet it somewhow came to

maintain its middle ground in British politics because of its extensive use of conflicting

views in its pages.

The role of The Times as a recordkeeper has made it valuable to historians. Since

Great Britain was a hegemonic world power, and had political, economical, military, and

diplomatic relations with most countries, the press in general and The Times in particular

was deeply involved with every intemational development. The Times tried to bring first

hand and fresh news about these developments. It thus not only played an important role

in shaping the public as well as official views of contemporaries, but also carefiilly

documented every intemational confiict in its long and somewhat tedious pages. It

inspired people then, and has continued to inspire historians, researchers, and others since

then.

The British press, in which The Times has taken the leading role, has always been

"a symbol of progress, a symbol ofthe spread of more open forms of govemment. For

these reasons, it has also always attracted its fair share of historians." "The status of

journalists and the press had risen since the mid [nineteenth] century to the point where

joumalists on such quality papers as The Times and The Daily Telegraph were ...

accepted as "gentlemen' in society, and in the parliamentary press 'Lobby'."'*^ The views

ofthe political parties found solid expression in the mainstream newspapers. The

distribution of newspapers in England, conservative and liberal, was quite strong until the

mid-Victorian period. Toward the end ofthe Victorian era, the political division ofthe

mainstream newspapers began to diminish their importance. The English newspapers

began to be more cosmopolitan in their views in national affairs, and more concemed

*''lbid,U.

*''lbid,4\.

** Bob Harris, Politics and the Rise ofthe Press: Britain and Press, 1620-1800. London: Routledge, 1996, 1.

*' Baylen, "The British Press," 40.

14

about freedom of speech idealism.-^° "Every newspaper carried an amount of political

coverage and comment, for the simple reason that politics made news. Yet not every

newspaper deserves to be classified under the heading ofthe political press.. .some

newspapers—like The Morning Post, The Daily News, The Westminster Gazette, and The

Times- consistently fell within the category." The Times initially distinguished itself "by

its full and prompt coverage of foreign news, on which the govemment no less than the

public relied."^'

The importance, or at least the fame of The Times in political, military, and

intellectual circles was undeniably strong in the nineteenth century. An incident shows

this quite perfectly. When Bumaby was seeking a way to visit Central Asia in the

1870's, one ofthe first things that he was asked when he was in Russia trying to get

permission was his relation to The Times. He was asked whether he ever sent any

correspondence to The Times. He stated that he had not written yet, but, if the

circumstances allowed, he would do so willingly. The Russian general then told him that

if he ever caught him sending dispatches to The Times, he would hang him on the spot.

The Times was received and read in many diplomatic and cultural centers ofthe world.

Its political and intellectual influence on both British and foreign statesmen and the

public was an undeniable fact.

By specializing in foreign affairs. The Times became heavily involved with the

Eastem Question. As a part of this question, The Times closely monitored Central Asian

affairs. It published a wide variety of articles, mostly written by specialists on the

subject, brought news from important capitals such as St. Petersburg, Constantinople,

Paris, Vienna, Calcutta, Teheran, Berlin, and politically involved places including the

Caucasus, India, Afghanistan, and China, and provided fresh commentaries on these

^° Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall ofthe Political Press in Britain: the Nineteenth Century. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981, 6.

' ' Koss, The Rise and Fall ofthe Political Press in Britain, 24.

^̂ Fred Bumaby, A Ride to Khiva: Travels and Adventures in Central Asia. New York: Harper & Brother, Publishers, 1882,32.

15

subjects. A. Vambery, who traveled to Central Asia in 1863, J. W. S. Wyllie, who served

in the Indian Govemment as political agent, Charies Marvin, who collected much

material from both British and Russian sources about Central Asian history. Grant Duff,

Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir John Lawrence, Henry Green, and many other specialists and

politicians who were directly involved in these events contributed greatly to both the

history and the political development ofthe Central Asian question. Throughout the

second half of the nineteenth century they all wrote to The Times, and they sometimes

discussed a development, sometimes commented on it. Most of these researchers,

historians, or politicians later wrote articles and books on these subjects. In the

nineteenth century standard. The Times provided a good share of conflicting views over

the issue in its long columns. Since most ofthe articles, letters, and news were inked by

specialists with a sort of academic mood. The Times came to present a much more

scientific viewpoint on the Central Asian question that went beyond joumalistic or

popular coverage. Not only the ordinary people, but also specialists, academics, and

politicians came to appreciate The Times for its representation ofthe event.

Besides its use of extensive specialists and politicians for the coverage of events.

The Times showed great interest in bringing to its public the opinions ofthe foreign press.

Its correspondents intensively monitored the Russian, Indian, German, French, Austrian,

Turkish, and Italian press to report developments and ideas from other countries. It

would be safe to say that almost every article relating to Central Asia in the Russian press

was daily translated, commented upon, and published in The Times. Such Russian

newspapers as Kafkas, Invalide, St. Petersbourg, and Golos were constant sources of The

Times in bringing more information about the Russian invasions in Central Asia.

The Times in regard to the Central Asian question was definitely supportive of

British governmental foreign policy. In this respect, it valued more the "masterly

inactivity" policy, whose leading supporter was Sir John Lawrence, than the "forward"

policy, which was valued by Sir Henry Rawlinson's group. Nevertheless, The Times

periodically showed a mixed attitude toward the solution ofthe question. In general, it

opposed British involvement beyond the Oxus River, and almost always supported

16

Russian subjugation of these lands on the ground of civilizing them. Like other

Eurocenteric press and publications. The Times believed that Russia was spreading

European civilization in "uncivilized" or "semi-civilized" places. However, during

critical moments, such as the Khivan expedition in 1873, the annexation of Merv in 1884,

and especially the Penjdeh incident in 1885, The Times presented a more hostile tone

toward Russian expansion perhaps due to the intense feeling of losing the game in the

region.

Whether its presented ideology was biased, Eurocentric, and conservative, or

objective and scientific. The Times acted as a somewhat responsible newspaper to help

enlighten both the officials and the public. It fostered more informed and detailed

opinion on the subject, both in Great Britain and abroad. As the events took place almost

the same way The Times had always supported, it would be said that The Times perfectly

served British foreign policy. After all, it left a great deal of information about the event

to help researchers in the future.

In short, this study examines The Times' coverage ofthe Central Asian question,

that is ofthe Russian expansion into Turkistan in the second half of the nineteenth

century. It primarily discusses how The Times viewed the question, and how it presented

it in terms of political, military, economic, diplomatic, and social developments, both in

Central Asia and among the big powers, especially between Russia and Great Britain.

Usage of Some ofthe Geographic Terms

Throughout the study, many geographic terms have been used to define the places

in which historical events occurred. These include Turkistan, Central Asia, Chinese

Turkistan, Russian Turkistan, Eastem Turkistan, Westem Turkistan, Turkmenia, the

Steppes, the Oasis, and the Turkic Lands. The meaning of these terms may vary through

history because of changing political, social, and cultural stmctures. They can also be

changed by the use of these terms by different historians from different parts ofthe

worid. It would take a long study to figure out different usages of these terms to define a

territory or a state.

17

Here these terms are used as follows. This work mainly concems the territories

roughly covering the present modem states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizistan,

Kazakhistan, and Tajikistan. Sometimes, Turkmenistan, and Central Asia were used to

mean the same thing. If a geographic place was not specified by its political aspects-

such as the Governor Generalship of Turkistan, the Khanate of Bukhara, or Turkmenia—

the use of these terms, namely Central Asia and Turkmenistan, meant to describe all of

these places. Furthermore, as far as terms such as the Steppes and the Oasis are

concemed, the former was used to express the territories of Kazakhistan, part of

Turkmenia and Kirghizistan, where the life style was generally nomadic and based on

raising livestock, while the latter explained territories located in and around the great

valleys and rivers such as the Amu Daria, the Syr Daria, Murghab, Akhal, and Zerafshan,

where the people were living a settled life based on agriculture.

Before concluding the introduction, it would be appropriate to give a short

description ofthe content of this study. As far as geographic location is concemed, this

paper covers the Central Asian khanates, namely Khokand, Bukhara, and Khiva, as well

as Turkmenia. These places roughly make up the territories of modem Turkmenistan,

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirghizistan. As for the time period, the study concentrates

roughly from the 1840's to the 1900's. It was in this eventful period that Russia

successfully penetrated into Central Asia, annexed Turkmenia, Khokand, and large parts

ofthe khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, and finally established her protectorate over the

weakened khanates of Bukhara and Khiva.

As far as the sources cited in this work are concemed, the main source is the

British press in general and The Times in particular. Besides these popular organs,

British Govemment documents, and the Parliamentary debates, as well as Turkish

documents have primarily been consulted. Furthermore, because of political, academic,

and romantic interests of many researchers in both Great Britain and Russia, a wide

variety of travel accounts, diaries, and reports had been composed by many contemporary

people, including A. Vembery, D. I. Romanovski, M. A. Terentyev. J. Rawlinson, G.

Dobson, G. N. Curzon, C. Marvin, and A. N. Kuropatkin. As for the secondary sources

18

there have unfortunately not been many well-composed works in social, cultural,

environmental, and even political history ofthe region. Yet, historians, such as E.

Allworth, B. Hayit, Z. V. Togan, H. C D'Encausse, R. W. Seton-Watson, G. Wheeler,

and A. N. Kurat have contributed a great deal to the understanding ofthe history of

Central Asia.

19

CHAPTER II

MOTIVES FOR THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF CENTRAL ASIA

In a commentary on September 28, 1865, The Times drew a vivid picture ofthe

huge human and natural resources that made it possible for Russia to follow a policy of

aggression against her neighbors. She had gained large territories in the previous several

centuries. Her slow but steady encroachment in every direction created an empire

stretching from Alaska to Central Europe and the Baltic and from the North Sea to India

and China. The annexation of these large territories had formed "a part ofthe

hereditary policy of Russia."^^

In 1860, according to the Almanach de Gotha, she had 63,932,081 people in

European Russia, 7,300,812 in Asia, and 10,721 in North America. Her standing military

forces, including cavalry, infantry, and artillerymen, numbered 577,852. Along with

these forces, the Cossack cavalry consisted of about "136 cavalry regiments, 813

mounted "sotnies' [asotnia consisted of around 150 men], and 31 battalions."^^ A British

resident in Russia found that it was almost impossible not to gain new territories because

of her resources. He said, "Whatever we do Russia will remain and Russians will

continue to inhabit the whole Northem Asia and Eastem Europe. That we carmot prevent

though we bleed ourselves like veal in the endeavor to slaughter them into impotence.""^^

Because of her huge power, Russia bullied her neighbors, and invaded their territories

whenever it suited her. With each expansion, she succeeded in reorganizing newly

gained resources and creating a new point d'appui for the next move. She was successful

in mixing newly gained resources along with the old to strengthen her position. In this

" The Times, September 28, 1865.

^'^ The New York Times, October 19, 1869.

" The Times, January 12, 1860.

^̂ "A Former Resident in Russia," "Some Truths about Russia." The Fortnightly Review 52 (July-December 1889): 274.

20

way she employed the Cossacks, Tatars, Kazakhs, Germans, and many other ethnic

groups in the govemment and in the military ranks.

When Russia reached the borders ofthe Central Asian khanates, namely

Khokand, Bukhara and Khiva, as well as Turkmenia, there was not a strong centralized

state to stop her from incorporating them. Indeed, these khanates, far from uniting

against a common enemy, were feuding with each other. Even when united, they lacked

the technology and modem weapons to compete against Russia's military power. The

Russian task was easier in dealing with these weak khanates because they were not

helped by the big powers.

The Turkic elements, including the Tatars, Bashkurds, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz

inside the Russian Empire, indirectly played an important role in the Russian

incorporation of Central Asia. Their own successful incorporation into the Empire came

to somewhat affect their kinfolk in Central Asia, giving rise to a positive attitude toward

the Russians.

For Russia not only gained the consideration ofthe foe vanquished by her, but [Russia was] also looked upon by the adjacent khanates in a far better light than had been hitherto the case, since, according to Tartar notions, conquest was identical with murder, plunder and extirpation. Central Asia was really surprised to find mercy at the hands ofthe Christian victor."̂ ^

This positive feeling for the Russians in Central Asia would in the future help them face a

divided society rather than a united one. Moreover, since the Turkic native miers and

governments had ignored their peoples' cultural improvement, economic prosperity, and

education for centuries, the people did not show a consistent resistance to the Russians.

For many of them, the Russians represented just another cormpt mie. Furthermore, the

Turkic people who had come under the Russian mle were not troublesome subjects.

They generally presented no serious threat to the integrity ofthe Russian Empire.

Though from time to time they challenged the Russian authority under patriotic and

adventurist leaders such as Sadik Kanisari, and Izzet Kutebar, there was not a seriously

planned general rebellion against the Russians, at least until 1916 in the Steppes or the

^' Arminius Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India. London: Cassell & Co., 1885. 20.

21

Oases. Thus, the Russians found h more agreeable to incorporate these people than let

them be troublesome neighbors. After all, they showed some attention not to offend the

natives. Russia's "movements in Central Asia have been marked by great discipline and

humanity," stated Eugene Schuyler.^^

According to General M. A. Terentyef who was a military historian and who

wrote widely about Russia's expansion in the Turkic lands, the Russian had been forced

by the unruly and predatory tribes to take action. He denied any long-contemplated and

premeditated plan for the invasion of Central Asia. For him, constantly reoccurring

problems forced Russia to take action. He wrote.

Our movements in the East are not the result of any premeditated plan, but have been the immediate consequences ofthe necessities ofthe moment. Savage nomads, who recognize no law except that of might, have overmn our frontiers and have kidnapped Russian subjects, selling them by thousands in the bazaars of Central Asia. The retaliatory attacks by Russian detachments only produced further complications, and increased the mutual feeling of hatred. It thus becomes necessary to try another method for securing our frontiers, viz., the erection of forts on the steppes. This system was a partial success, but it was soon found essential to connect the one with another, and thus arose lines of fortifications. The necessity of connecting the Orenburg and Siberian lines led to the occupation of positions on the rivers Syr Darya and Chu, which paved the way for hostility on the part of Kokan, Bokhara, and Khiva, and a series of wars with these khanates resulted in a further annexation of territories."''̂

Despite Terentyef s denial ofthe fact that the Russian expansion resulted from a pre-

design and collaborative action, the subjugation of Central Asia was the final stage ofthe

Russian expansion against the Turkic lands. It was not an accident, but a part of long and

steady policy pursued by the Russian Govemment. As General D. 1. Romanovski

remarked, "As regards the actions and measures of our Govemment in relation to the

Kirghiz Steppes and Central Asiatic khanats during the last thirty or forty years, it may be

'* Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, and Kuldja. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, 38.

^' M. A. Terentyef, Russia and England in Central Asia. Vol. 1. Trans, by F. C. Daukes. Calcutta: The Departtnent Press, 1876, 153-154.

22

easily observed that they were persecuted with a firmness of purpose which has been well

defined for the thirteen years."^° The expansion was made possible by many social,

economic, political, military, and cultural elements. While some of these elements

originated from the Russian imperialist designs, some of them came from the weaknesses

ofthe Turkic khanates.

Personal Ambition

Russian expansion into the Turkic lands had always been organized, inspired, or

executed by many Russian prominent figures, including generals, statesmen, and

outlawed Cossacks. They sometimes acted as tme "tsars" of these places because of

lightly felt central authority and enormous military and civil power granted to them.

When Yermak, a leader of some outlawed Cossack bandits, first crossed the Urals

in the mid sixteenth century and started to fight against the Khanate of Siberia, the future

ofthe Russian activities was to be decided by people like him. Their actions were not

always in accordance with the central govemment. But, as they gained victories over

powerless and weak tribes, they were saluted in Moscow and later in St. Petersburg.

Almost all monarchs of Russia approved their efforts of subjugating the Asian tribes.

The subjugation of Asia gained momentum during the reign of Peter I, one ofthe most

ambitious tsars to support expansionist ideas in Asia, particularly in the Turkic lands, for

the purpose of controlling trade with China and India, to possess the legendary wealth of

the khanates, and ultimately to invade India.

Since the time of Peter I, the Russians had diligently been advancing with meager

sacrifices to reach the ultimate goal of authority over Central Asia.^' Most ofthe time the

Russian officials in St. Petersburg had no clear picture, and only elementary knowledge,

about Central Asia. They left the matter in the hands ofthe generals. Though they did

not know, or did not want to know, how things were being conducted on the frontiers.

^̂ D. I. Romanovski, Notes on the Central Asian Question. Calcutta: Office of Superintendent of Govemment Printing, 1870, 2.

*' Emile Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale." Revue des deux Mondes 67 (1867): 995.

23

they joyfully celebrated successful moves and new gains whenever their frontiers

advanced.^^

The nineteenth century produced many well-known Russian statesmen and

generals who were in favor of expansionism and aggrandizement. They adhered to a

dynamic policy in Asia. Their success paid them well. The more they achieved on the

battlefields the higher they rose in the military ranks.

We can not wonder at the Tzar's officers in Turkistan being so eager to continue in their line of conquest. Taken for the most part from poor but wellborn families, having no inheritance but the sword, no prospect save promotion, their thirst for war as the only means at hand for rapidly rising in the service. A life in Central Asia in time of peace is looked upon with contempt; and with every thing be gained by war and nothing by peace, we ought not to be surprised should every little pretext be sought for to provoke reprisals on the part ofthe native population. Europe then hears ofthe cruelties committed by the bmtal fanatics in Central Asia, of Russian magnanimity, and of Mohammedan intolerance.^^

As D. Charles Boulger put it, "The fever for crosses of St. Anne and of St. George is an

old disease among Russian officers."*' Central Asia was the best place for gaining both

of these decorations.

In a meeting at Baden, Germany in 1869, Prince M. D. Gorchakov, Russian

foreign minister, told the British foreign minister. Lord Clarendon, that the Russian

generals who wanted to gain distinction in the army, and the appreciation of their

sovereign, the tsar, sometimes acted on their own and upset the peace in the region.

Their sole aim was to prove that Russia was a strong, if not the strongest, empire in the

world.^^ The aggrandizement ofthe Empire through new invasions was their first

priority. The most well-known of these people were Prince A. 1. Bariatinski, General D.

*̂ The Times, November 20, 1868.

*̂ Fred Bumaby, A Ride to Khiva: Travels and Adventures in Central Asia. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1883,86-87.

^ D. Charles Boulger, Central Asian Portraits: the Celebrities ofthe Khanates and the Neighbouring States. London, W. H. Allen & Co., 1880, 103.

*' The Times, March 12, 1873.

24

A. Miliutin, military statesmen N. P. Ignatiev, General V. A. Perovski, General M. G.

Chemiaev, General D. 1. Romanovski, General K. P. von Kaufmann, and General M. D.

Skobelev.

Count Ignatiev, who had a "face denoting great capacity; although it is

occasionally spoilt by a bold and sinister expression,"^^ was an ardent supporter of an

active and aggressive military policy against the khanates. He believed that the best

policy in Central Asia was to establish an alliance with Bukhara, and to dismember

Khokand.^^ After his diplomatic mission to Khiva and Bukhara in 1859, he came to the

conclusion that these khanates were militarily very weak states. Thus, it would not be a

great problem to subdue or annex them by military means. Furthermore, he believed that

the establishment of a firm Russian influence over these khanates would give Russia an

upper hand to deal with both British and Turkish affairs in the Near East.

Prince A. I. Bariatinski, the Govemor General ofthe Caucasus, was one ofthe

first persons that offered a plan to the govemment to capture Central Asia. He alarmed

the Govemment about British designs in Central Asia, and wanted to take action before it

was too late.^^ He also suggested in 1852 that Govemment build a railway from the

Volga basin through the Ust Urt (Small Horde) to the Aral Sea. He knew that such a plan

would enhance Russian prestige as well as trade in Central Asia. Though this plan was

not accepted at that time. Prince Bariatinski continued to encourage an aggressive policy

in Turkistan. He believed that Russia should establish political and economic supremacy

before the British attempted to gain any solid ground in the region. If Great Britain had

succeeded in establishing her true interests, Russia would have lost her poUtical and

military superiority, and she would even have lost her prestige in the region. "By

' Marvin, Conversations, 219.

*' David MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent: the Career of General M. G. Chemiaev. Athens: the University of Georgia Press, 1974, 21.

** Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 441.

^' MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, 21.

25

exploiting the advantages vouchsafed by nature, [Russia] could easily strengthen her

influence in regions inaccessible to other European countries and which offered her new

sources of wealth and power," said Bariatinski.^'

Prince Bariatinski proposed that the Govemment send envoys to the khanates in

order to collect the information necessary to invade strategically important places such as

the eastern part ofthe Caspian Sea from the river Atrek to Gurgan. He thought that if

Russia did not immediately establish sole political and military authority over the

khanates it would become necessary to fight with the British.^^ In 1856, a special

commission discussed Bariatinski's opinion. Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) and many

high officials favored the plan. Nevertheless, Prince Gorchakov, Russian foreign

minister, opposed it because it would offend the British. Ultimately the plan was

postponed for another more suitable occasion.

Believing that erecting forts and employing men to occupy them was useless and

costly. General Perovski, Govemor General of Orenburg, intended to establish "peace"

on the borders by annexing all neighboring unstable states. He succeeded in isolating the

govemment of Orenburg from the strict control ofthe central govemment and followed

an aggressive policy toward Khiva. By this way he also aimed to end the British

intrigues in Central Asia. His expedition in 1839 was to execute such plans. Its failure

never stopped him. He succeeded in reaching the Aral Sea and establishing the first

Russian fort on the shores of this water toward the end ofthe 1840's. He created a small

fleet on the Aral. Perovski's dynamic and aggressive policy toward the khanates was

imitated by his successors. General A. A. Katenin replaced him in 1857 as the Govemor

General of Orenburg. Katenin launched an expeditionary force against the khanates. He

^̂ Baymirza Hayit, Tiirkistan Devleterinin Milli Miicadeleleri Tarihi. Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kummu Balimevi, 1995, 67; Khalfin, 25. According to Khalfin, Prince Bariatinski suggested the plan for constructing a Central Asian Railway in 1856.

" Khalfin, 25.

^̂ Khalfin, 25; Saray, Ruslann Orta Asyayi Ele Gegirmeleri, 4.

^̂ Mary Holdswoth, Turkistan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History ofthe Khanates of Bukhara, Khokand and Khiva. Oxford: Central Asian Research Center, 1959, 50.

26

died in Uralsk from "a too plentiful meal offish." In a brief period. General A. P. Bezak

filled the post. Yet, upon the Polish insurrection in 1863, he was transferred to Kiev.

Another dynamic general, N. A. Kryzhanovski, filled his place. Under Kryzhanovski's

auspices. General Chemiaev captured the city of Tashkent and sent to St. Petersburg its

golden keys of twelve gates. These keys were sent to the tsar not as "trophies of war. but

in the name ofthe inhabitants of Tashkent, as a token of loyalty to their sovereign, the

"white czar.'"''^

One ofthe most debated aspects ofthe Russian conquest of Central Asia is the

question of what motivated the Russian generals on this frontier. Many researchers

believed that these generals—including General Chemiaev. General Romanovski, and

General Perovski—were acting on their own, and were not obeying the orders sent from

the center. Because these generals knew the situation on the front much better than did

the officials in St. Petersburg, from time to time they produced their own policies. Yet,

the central authority never showed any remorse after a successful move. Rather than

chastising generals, the central authority awarded them with higher ranks and new

decorations. Lord Palmerston, long-time British premier in the 1850's and 1860's, very

well understood this policy ofthe center-frontier conflict. According to him, Russian

govemment, especially the foreign office, applied double-standard policies in their

dealings with foreign affairs by seemingly condemning their agents' "out-of-line" acts in

the field but heartily seeking opportunities to gain upper hands and new lands in

neighboring states.

Despite, the Foreign Office's status quo policy in 1864 to arrest Russian

expansion in Turkistan, Chemiaev was contemplating about making Tashkent the center

for future Russian expansion. ̂ ^ After the capture of Tashkent there were different

opinions in St. Petersburg about the future character of political mle. Some in the

'̂' The Times, November 20, 1868.

^' "B.B.B.," The Times, March 23, 1885.

'* H. C. D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884." In Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview. Ed. by Edward Allworth. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994, 133.

27

Foreign Office believed that it would be placed under a pro-Russian native khan. Some

others believed that it would be returned to Khokand. But General Chemiaev, D. A.

Miliutin, and some other expansionists decided to incorporate into the Empire. In a

commentary, the Journal de St. Petersburg stated that one sea could not contain two seas,

and two empires could not be one. Thus, the best solution was to annex it into the

empire. In order to cover up the policy of annexation, Chemiaev found some local

dignitaries who would sign a letter stating their desire to be loyal subjects ofthe "white

tsar."^^

Successful men such as Chemiaev and Kaufmann knew how to handle local

people. They were not only good soldiers but also astute statesmen and administrators.

When they captured a city or a territory, they tried to convince the people that the

Russian authority was much more profitable and advanced than their old cormpt system.

As an obvious example, when Chemiaev captured Tashkent in June 1865, the first thing

he did was to declare to the public that their lives and property were protected against any

danger, and they could perform their religious duties. He also abolished slavery and

exempted the public from taxes for five years. He showed respect for local practices and

helped the people to protect and promote their own cultures.^^ General Chemiaev's

actions in Central Asia played an important role in Russian imperialist development. He

first established the permanent Russian authority over the thickly populated part ofthe

Oasis.^ The people, at least a part, came to like the Russian mle. It was this mild and

somewhat patemalistic approach to the natives under Russian mle that led others often

only a rather weak resistance to Russian expansion in their territories. After all, the

Turkic people of Central Asia had always proved their ability to live an independent life

in their own quarters no matter who mled the state.

'''' Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 987.

' Sodhi Hukm Singh, A History of Khokand: From the Commencement of Russian Intercourse until the Final Subjugation ofthe Country by That Power. Lahore: Govemment Civil Secretariat Press, 1878, 11.

^' MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, xvi.

28

The Russian govemment promoted the ambitions of its generals by awarding

them with medals and raising their rank after every success over the native peoples.

After successful invasions. Generals Chamiaev and Romanovski were awarded imperial

medals. Moreover, at the end ofthe successful Khivan expedition, the govemment raised

N. P. Lomakin, the Commander ofthe Caspian forces, to Major-General, and knighted

General Kaufmann, the supreme commander ofthe Khivan expeditionary forces. It

awarded the cross ofthe Order of St. George to General N. A. Verevkin, the Commander

ofthe Orenburg forces, and N. N. Golowachev, commander ofthe forces that massacred

thousands of Yomud Turkmens just after the fall of Khiva in 1873. After his

successful battles during the Khokandian rebellion in 1875, General Kaufmann was given Q I

a golden sword, bearing the inscription "for the defeat ofthe Khokanders." The easy

success in Central Asia against weak khans was the best way for many military officers

to eam fame, rank, power, and distinction. "A positive fever for further conquest raged

amongst our troops—an ailment to cure which no method of treatment was effective,

especially as the correctives applied were freely interspersed with such stimulants as

honors and decorations."^^ Bumaby claimed that these officers were generally coming

from humble families with no great wealth and reputation. Taken for the most part from poor but wellbom families, having no inheritance but the sword, no prospect save promotion, they thirst for war as the only means at hand for rapidly rising in the service. A life in Central Asia in time of peace is looked upon with contempt; and with every thing to be gained by war and nothing by peace, we ought not to be surprised should every little pretext be sought for to provoke reprisals on the part ofthe native population. Europe then hears ofthe cmelties committed by the brutal fanatics in Central Asia, of Russian magnanimity, and of Mohammedan intolerance.^^

*° The Times, August 5, 1873.

*' The Times, October 12, 1875.

*- Terentyef, vol. 2, 66.

'̂ Bumaby, A Ride to Khiva, 86-87.

29

Besides the rank and honor-seeking generals, some Russian intellectuals such as

Feodor Dostoevskii also promoted the idea ofthe invasion of Asia. Dostoevskii said,

"This [the conquest of Asia] is necessary because Russia is not only in Europe, but also

in Asia; because a Russian is not only a European, but also an Asiatic. Not only that: in

our coming destiny, perhaps it is precisely Asia that represents our main way out." *"*

Moreover, Dostoevskii stated that the Russians had to eliminate their passive and

stagnant character by involvement in "acquisition and colonization of Asiatic lands....

Checked... and humiliated in Europe, Russia would do well to concentrate for a time on

her mission civilisatrice in the East.... Asia.. .represented an ideal field for Russian

expansion and activity." "

Land Hunger

One ofthe most important motives for Russians to invade Central Asia was an

irrepressible hunger for strategic and fertile lands. They always claimed that they needed

to gain strategic grounds to establish both an effective defensive system to guard the

empire against outside incursions and to sustain large armies as well as settlers to create

permanent powers on the frontiers. Though by 1850 Russia pretty much reached its goal

of subduing the Kazakh and Kirghiz steppes, which provided its long-needed security

against nomadic societies, she now faced two new problems: to feed large armies

employed in the steppes and to prevent khanates from being a base and shelter of many

nomads who violated Russian territories. Furthermore, as mostly sedentary people

themselves, the Russians preferred to live among the sedentary people, and have lands to

work. ^

The Russians thought "the fertility of the soil in the three khanates would

guarantee a brilliant future to European colonists."*^ The climate, which showed a

Raisanovsky, "Asia Through Russian Eyes," 17.

^' Ibid., 17-18.

' Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 983.

30

variety of differences throughout the year, would enhance profitable agricultural produce

such as cotton, tobacco, indigo, sugar cane, silk, and opium. The rivers have gold, while

the mountains have deposits of iron and copper. The Emperor, Nicholas I (1824-1855),

had already ordered the constmction of better steamers and a ship factory on the Aral

Sea. If transportation were improved, a profitable economy would spring from it. A poet

already called the country "the garden ofthe East."^^

As the Empire was badly in need of raw cotton in the 1860 "s because the

American Civil War prevented importation of cotton, her desire to monopolize Central

Asian cotton production became a reality. Meanwhile, textile producers ofthe Empire

petitioned the tsar to seek better ways to get raw cotton from Central Asia. Thus, the

irrigated oases ofthe khanates were considered as perfect places to satisfy the need for

cotton. By conquest, the Russians believed that they could produce more cotton in

Central Asia to break their dependence on American cotton. They thought that the fertile

oases ofthe khanates would yield many times more cotton under their "scientific mle"

than the present condition. *̂

Besides cotton, many types of agricultural produce, such as wheat, barley, maize,

rice, cotton, fiax, hemp, tobacco, melons, watermelons, peaches, apricots, plums, and

grapes were growing with good quantity and high quality. These sources would be

developed to a satisfactory level to create great weahh for the people if a "secure and just

Govemment, and a far more enlightened administration than is to be hoped from a

Muhamedan [sic] mier such as are the ignorant despots ofthe petty States of Central

Asia—those of barbarism, iniquity, fanaticism and oppression that from the cmmbling

barrier between the civilized and Christien Governments of Great Britain and Russia."^"

*̂ Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 997

^^ Ibid, 991.

*̂ A. Z. Velidi Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili (Turkistan) ve Yaiin Tarihi. Istanbul: Akdas, Ibrahim Horoz ve GUven Basimevleri, 1942-1947,228. D'Encausse, H. Carrere. "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," in Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, .4 Historical Overview. Edited by Edward Allworth. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994, 131; Khalfin, 25.

'" The Times, January 11, 1876.

31

Almost all people, including A. Vambery, G. N. Curzon, R. G. de Clavijo, Seven Hedin,

Marco Polo, Henry Lansdell, and A. M. B. Meakin, who had visited Central Asia

produced accounts about the quality and flavor ofthe fmits and other edible products.

They agreed that the most delicious melons, watermelons, apricots, plums, grapes,

peaches, and pomegranates were produced in the gardens ofthe oases. The fame of these

orchards must have tempted the Russians to invade.

Despite rich irrigated lands ofthe oases. Central Asia contained large and endless

barren lands. As Shoemaker, who in 1894 traversed the region from the Caspian to the

Pamirs, reported.

The fertile and irrigateable portions form merely an oasis now and then, or fringe the banks of some river. All the rest, illimitable and vast, is sand—fine, yellow, drifting sand, changing every hour with the passing winds, so that the very features of a district familiar to you to-day are so utterly altered by the morrow that you know it not. Over these Russia, England, and France pour the life-blood of their best and bravest, battling ever with each other for the possession of countries over which wild nature does not intend that other than herself shall hold dominion; and their combined forces can not wrest this land from her unwilling hand. In all the nine hundred miles between here and Samarkand, there are but two or three towns of any size; the rest is desolation most profound; and yet Russia claims to have conquered it. Perhaps so, so far as the few wandering tribes are concemed; but the drifting waves of sand, the heat, and the cholera are the true monarchs of these desolate regions.

The first Russian invasions of territories belonging to the khanate of Khokand in

the Syr Daria region were motivated by the need to establish a direct line between Siberia

and Orenburg, over the territories lying around the Aral Sea and the Syr Daria. In 1851

Tsar Nicholas 1 (1824-1855) ordered the capture of these territories.^^ The Crimean War

delayed this. After the war, Russia followed a policy of reaching better borders,

capturing strategically important places to develop a profitable trade, finding gold beds to

exploit. When Ignatiev signed a profitable commercial treaty, the Treaty of Peking, with

China in 1860, the roads to take Russian products to China and Chinese products to

"" M. M. Shoemaker, Trans-Caspia: The Sealed Provinces ofthe Czar. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1895,76.

32

Russia became important strategic considerations. Russia had already invaded territories

in northem China up to the Chu River in the Hi Valley, but she needed better and shorter

trade routes to China. For this reason, the Syr Daria River and the Aral Sea became

inevitable places to be incorporated into Russia. When the Govemor General of

Orenburg, Bezak, offered a plan to capture these places, he openly stated the importance

of such a conquest in the region where the most important city was Tashkent, which was

established at an important strategic position to control trade between Russia and China,

and between Turkistan and China. Bezak said,

Tashkent is one ofthe most usable borders of Russia. If Khokand threatens Russia, the Russian military forces could get help from the line of Syr Daria and Siberia. If Tashkent is captured, h would be very helpful to establish and control harbors on the Syr Daria River, it would help us to conquer upper parts ofthe river... We could get more taxes from the region. We could reach rich mines... Tashkent is an important trade center and controls trade routes.'''

Bezak also stated that if Russia took Tashkent she would increase her pressure on the

khanates, and would create political supremacy over these states. "A Wanderer" wrote to

The Times describing physical, economic, and demographical aspects of some ofthe

important towns of Central Asia. According to his account, Tashkent, located on the

banks ofthe Jaxartes, was as large as Moscow and produced large quantities of cotton

goods. More than one Englishmen was employed in Tashkent's cotton manufactures.

Khokand, Bukhara, and Samarkand were also lively places of commercial activity.

Bukhara produced a great amount of cotton, and flimished Tashkent with this cotton.^''

There was a strong merchant class in Tashkent at the time ofthe Russian conquest.

These merchants valued their own economic well being over the freedom of their city.

They sided with the Russians during the war, and in this way they played an important

role in the fall ofthe city to the Russians.

'^ Hayit, 72.

'^ Hayit, 73.

'" The Times, November 22, 1854.

33

The capture of Tashkent was a crucial event for both sides because this city not

only had a large population and major industries, but also controlled the principal lines of

communication and trade in Central Asia. It was a turning point in the establishment of

Russian authority because the city had great influence on the commerce ofthe khanates

of Khokand and Bukhara. The Morning Post criticized the ambition ofthe Russians, and

stressed that such conquest would allow Russia to control the entire region between the

Aral Sea and Issik Gol, as well as the Kazakh steppes and the Syr Daria.̂ '̂ The Russian

official journal, Invalide, stated that these latest gains were greater than all the territories

lying between Chu and Syr Daria. Because ofthe importance of these lands to Russia, the

Russians had not hesitated to spend great resources to subdue the inhabitants.^^ After the

invasion of commercially and agriculturally important centers they allowed the Khan of

Khokand to mle his weakened khanate as a vassal mler. Khokand fell in 1875 when the

Russians took advantage of an intemal revolt against the khan.

Without subduing the Khanate of Khiva, and establishing permanent control over

it, the Russian invasion of Central Asia would not be complete. In addition to the

security concem, the Russians wanted to shift the Amu Daria River back to its ancient

bed to establish easy transportation lines over the water from the Caspian Sea to Central

Asia.̂ ^ With this objective, they subdued Khiva in 1873 with small sacrifices. Though

during Count Shwalov's mission to London in 1873 they had pledged the British not to

annex Khivan lands, but only to impose their will on the khan they annexed the right

bank ofthe Amu Daria River. The main reason Russia desired these locations was to

constmct forts, harbors, and factories to better exploit Central Asia by controlling its

most important river, the Amu Daria. As soon as they annexed these territories Russia

" Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale," 985.

''^ft/^.,983.

'^ Dominic Lieven (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Russia, 1859-1880. Series A, vol. 1. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1983,234-35.

34

began to erect Port Alexandrovsk, which became the center of its economic and military

operations.

Complete subjugation ofthe khanates by 1873 foreshadowed the invasion of

Turkmenia. As Turkmenia was located between the Russian dominions in the Caucasus

and Ural regions and Central Asia, its strategic importance for building new, easy, and

short caravan roads as well as railroads from the Caspian Sea to the Aral Sea or

Samarkand was undeniable. Furthermore, the restless Turkmens ofthe Transcaspian

region were threatening Russian economic and social interests. In addition, Turkmenia

was the key for possible Russian establishment of influence over Persia and Afghanistan.

Russia would reduce Afghanistan and Persia to positions of vassalage if the British did

not challenge Russian ambitions.

As a part of Turkmenia, Merv was annexed in 1884. The British recognized that

Merv "placed on the great caravan road from Persia to Central Asia, is the chief key to

the domination ofthe Turkmen steppes, being very important in commercial, political,

and strategical relations."^^ By the annexation of Merv, Russia had almost completed her

southward expansion in Central Asia. There remained only the Sarakh country, which

was located between Penjdeh and Merv and was mostly populated by the Sarakh

Turkmens. It thus was necessary for the Russians to invade all Turkic lands in Central

Asia, including Khorassan and the Afghan Turkistan, to stop any chances of Turkmens

finding safe territory to escape to after any incursion or conflict. Furthermore, the

Russians also wanted to unite under their mle these last free tribes with the other Turkic

peoples of Central Asia. It is certain that the Russians would not stop invading the

territories populated by the Turkmens within the Afghan state if the British did not make

diplomatic and political resistance after the Penjdeh Incident, which will be discussed in

larger detail in chapter four of this work. In order to keep the Russians out of Afghan

Turkistan in general and the city of Herat in particular, the British threatened to go to war

against them. Upon seeing the seriousness ofthe situation, the Russians, who needed

The Times, September 25, 1875.

35

British friendship in Europe because ofthe developing hostility between the Germans and

the Slavs, accepted the settlement ofthe problem through a joint-boundary commission.

Desire for Commerce

One ofthe strongest drives behind the Russian appetite to capture Central Asia

was to monopolize overland trade with the khanates and China since she did not have a

strong commercial fleet to compete with Great Britain, France, and other European sea

powers and to create a profitable trade overseas.'^'^ Moreover, the growing Russian

economy, which lagged far behind that of Westem Europe, needed to have backward

regions in which to dump its low quality merchandise and to obtain raw materials. The

approximate location of Central Asia made itself the best candidate for the satisfaction of

the Russian imperialist desires. In the mid nineteenth century sixty percent of her metal

products went to Asia, especially Central Asia."" V. A. Kokorev, a capitalist and

merchant, motivated by Prince Bariatinski, founded the Transcaspian Trading Company

in the 1850's. The primary aim ofthe company was to sell Russian goods to Persia and

Central Asia, and buy necessary products from these places.'°^

Cotton was one ofthe largest imported commodities. Until the 1860's it was

imported from the United States. At this time, the American Civil War (1861 -1865)

greatly affected the Russian textile industry. The Russians not only faced great

difficulties in obtaining American cotton because ofthe Union blockade, which

successfully prevented the Confederacy from selling its raw cotton abroad, but also had

to pay very high prices for it because ofthe scarce cotton and because of high prices

demanded by blockade-runners. Before the American Civil War, cotton prices were

seventeen to eighteen rubles per pud {a pud equals forty pounds), but they rose to around

Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 234.

100 The Times, January 21, 1873; The New York Times, March 21, 1869.

""Khalfin, 1-15.

'°- Khalfin, 26.

36

30 rubles per pz^t/during the war. Meanwhile, the Bukharan cotton was sold around 18 to

25 rubles per pud m the 1860's." '̂̂

The growing need for Central Asian cotton required safe and better transportation

with Central Asia. The famous Silk Road carried lively and profitable trade for the

countries located along the route. However, the change ofthe course ofthe Amu Daria

River to the Aral Sea, as well as the "fanatical" inhabitants of Central Asia greatly

reduced the volume of trade between the East and the West.'̂ "* By establishing its

supremacy in the region. Russia hoped to have a profitable trade.

Though changes in trade routes greatly reduced the importance of Central Asia in

the intemational trade, the trade between Russia and the Central Asian khanates

continued to provide riches to both sides. Merchants, especially from the khanates, were

selling and buying in important frontier towns, such as Orenburg, Baku, Astrakhan,

Tobolsk, Tinmen, and Nijni Novgorod.

Russia ... carries on a very extensive trade with Bokhara, Khiva, and Khokand, fumishing Central Asia with hardware, leather, and cotton and woolen goods, and receiving in retum raw cotton, silk, furs, and other produce. Supplied by Bokhara, the merchants of Kokan carry the manufactures of Russia to Kashgar and other points on the westem frontier of China in considerable quantities; and it is to this trade that I would direct the attention of our manufacturers, being fiilly persuaded that at no distant period the Russian scientific expeditions now exploring Central Asia will have laid Chinese Turkistan and the westem frontier of China entirely open to the enterprise ofthe now Trans-Caspian company. "̂ ^

Since the trade was already running with full power and without any restriction on the

side ofthe khanates, the claim of many researchers that Russia expanded its empire to

establish trade between the East and West did not reflect the whole reality. It was not the

'"̂ Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 128.

"*'* Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale," 970.

'"̂ Alton S. Donelly, "Peter the Great and Central Asia." Canadian Slavonic Papers 17, no. 2&3 (Summer and Fall 1975): 202-217, 205.

'°^ The Times, November 23, 1858.

37

lack of trade, but the desire to monopolize that trade that was the real goal ofthe Russians

in Central Asia. Up until the capture of Tashkent and the foundation ofthe Turkistan

Govemor-Generalship in 1867, the Central Asian merchants had better chances to come

into Russia and trade with the Russians without many perils,' ' because they had both

many familiar faces and a mass of population speaking their languages and believing

their creed. They conducted a profitable business. According to Curzon, "Native

merchants, traveling by Orenburg to Nijni Novgorod, taking with them silk, and cotton

stuffs, camels' hair, goats' hair, wool, and furs, and bringing back Russian commodities,

reaped the double profit." On the other hand, the Russian merchants lacked easy

access and comfortable travel in the khanates. First of all, the khanates had no population

of Russian origin. The Russians could not communicate with the local people easily

since they could not speak their language. Second, there were many fundamentalist

Muslims who did not want to see the Russian "infidels" infest their cities and bazaars.

Third, there were among Turkmen, Kazakhs, and other groups many bandits who were

attacking caravans. They were more hostile to the Russians since they considered them

as their traditional enemies and stealers of their territories. Fourth, though the Russians

kept a kind of Asiatic culture and mentality, they still had fears of Central Asians. Their

own xenophobic feelings prevented them from being relaxed and seeking their fortune in

foreign countries before their military had established for them a safe environment.

Finally, the governments ofthe khanates applied high imposts. Their custom officials

insulted the Russian merchants.'

Prompted by the desire to find markets for their low quality manufactured goods,

the Russians wanted to capture or at least establish their political supremacy over the less

developed regions. An article published in the St. Petersburg Golos rightly pointed out

that the Russians had given great importance to the trade with Central Asia because their

'"^ Khalfin, 24.

'°* Curzon, 190.

'"' The Times. November 19, 1872.

38

products had no chance to rival European products. The Russians had to find places to

trade their poor-quality manufactured goods for raw materials such as cotton. Then,

Central Asia was one ofthe best places for the Russians to trade because the inhabitants

ofthe region had not yet developed a taste for using the European better-quality

manufactures. They readily accepted the Russian products, and in retum they sold

cotton, silk, and other produce. Furthermore, Russia at this time was a source of raw

material for the European industrialized states, but she was a source of manufactured

goods for Central Asia. In addition, the Russians generally had no competition with

outside manufacturers because the region was pretty much closed to the merchants of

other European big powers. Thus, Central Asia played a special role in the Russian

exports and imports by giving them a competition-free market."°

Establishing a direct, short and easy route to China on the Amu Daria and Syr

Daria rivers was one ofthe driving motives in the Russian expansion in Central Asia.

The merchant class in Russia had a growing interest in Central Asian conquests. They

believed that they could have a profitable trade with the region and the surrounding areas.

"With the capture of Tashkent, the rapid penetration of Russian trade into Central Asia

began, and the merchants increased their demarches so as to pressure the govemment into

pursuing the work of conquest."

Though the Russians wanted to establish their monopoly over Central Asia to

exploit its wealth, they found out when they invaded the region that there was nothing

much to be exploited. According to Schuyler,

Central Asia has no stores of wealth and no economical resources; neither by its agricultural nor by its mineral wealth, not by its commerce, nor by the revenue to be derived from it, can it ever repay the Russians for what it has already cost, and for the rapidly increasing expenditure bestowed upon it. Had Russia known fifteen years ago as much about the countries of Central Asia as she does now, there can be hardly a doubt that there would have been no

"" The Times, Januaiy 6, 8, 1870.

' " r/ze Times, December 7, 1872.

"^ D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 141.

39

movement in that direction. Even the steps taken in 1864 would not for a moment have been allowed."''

As they finally reached their centuries old dream of capturing Khiva in 1873, they

confessed that they could not even get enough to pay off their loss for the invading army.

However, the Russians, claiming that they were not after the wealth, said.

The immediate consequences of our victory are not worth much. There are no treasures to be found in a little oasis, which scarcely maintains its scanty population. Not even the cost of war will it be possible to get out ofthe impoverished natives, who have hardly com enough to subsist on. But, were we to look only for direct and material advantages, we should not be deserving the name of a great nation. To us, as to all races that have a ftiture before them, the protection of our honor and dignity must be a worthier object than the acquisition of mere pelf Only States tottering to their fall look for pecuniary results in such a case as the present, and unmindfiil ofthe demands of self-respect, like old and avaricious misers, think of their cash-box rather than their reputation."^

Table 2.1: Income and Expenditure in Russian Turkistan between 1868 and 1873.

Year Income in Rubles Expenditure in Rubles Balance in favor of Income _ _ _ _ _

976,845

830,712

642,370

323,564

320,149

4,116,127

Although these sources claimed that the Russian occupations in Central Asia

created a negative effect on the Russian treasury, they failed to see two things: the

establishment of monopoly in economic and commercial matters and the character ofthe

1868

1869

1870

1871

1872

1873

Total

1,643,237

2,205,909

2,007,837

2,021,138

2,019,296

2,716,770

620,750

1,229,054

1,177,125

1,378,768

1,695,732

2,396,621

"̂ Schuyler, 283.

The Times, My 5, 1873.

40

expenditures. In the first case, Russia gained a relatively rich place for resources and

marketplaces. In the second instance, as Terentyef put it, Russia did not spend too much

money on the region. Most ofthe expenditures went to the maintenance of a strong army

in the region. The maintenance of such an army contributed to the defense ofthe Empire,

and the expenditures did not drive solely from the region. Furthermore, the tax collectors

were intercepting almost two thirds ofthe revenues. "No doubt these and other obstacles

will in time be removed, and the revenues ofthe Turkistan circle probably increased to as

much as Roubles 6,000,000 (£422,381).""^ As the table (2.1) above"^ shows, the

Russians economically gained more than they lost by the conquest of Central Asia.

Though from 1868 to 1873 Russian revenues were constantly reduced, they always left a

considerable amount of profit.

Revenge: Protection against "Predatory" Nomads

The Russians believed that they had suffered more than any other European

nation in defending Europe against the "Asian Barbarians." They assumed a kind of

"messianic" role in dealing with them."^ Wars between the Russians and the people of

the steppe continued for hundreds of years. Unlike wars in Medieval Europe, " the wars

between the Russians and the people ofthe steppe were waged on a mass scale with

tremendous effort and destmction." Moreover, Russians never forgot their humiliation

and suffering during the Tatar mle (1237-1480). They had always carried a kind of

inferiority complex because of their humiliations in this period. "For perhaps a thousand

years... the basic Russian attitude toward the people ofthe steppe, toward Asia, was that

of total apartness and extreme hostility."' '̂ This state of mind created a "deeply rooted.

'"Terentyef, vol. 2, 221.

"*/ZJ/<^., 221-222.

"^ Benningsen, 5.

"* Riasanovsky, "Asia Through Russian Eyes," 5.

'''Ibid.,1.

41

almost atavistic, hatred ofthe Russians towards the Muslims in general and toward the

Turco-Tatar Muslim in particular."'̂ "^ Many Russian officials including Markov Vtoroy

openly stated that the Turkic peoples of the Kazakhs and Kirghiz had been descendents of

the Chingiz and Timur Khans. They had inflicted great destmctions on the Russians.

Now it was Russia's tum to inflict the same type of destmction on these people.''^' As F.

Bumaby put it, "Russia in the days of her weakness, was overmn and dominated to a

great extent by her warlike neighbors, the Tartars. She is repaying them in their own

coin." "The movement of Russia towards the East, which began in the sixteenth

century, was the counterpart ofthe great Mongol irmption westward in the thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries."'^ However, the view that generally blamed the Turkic people of

Asia for the sufferings ofthe Russians in this period has not reflected the tmth because

the Turks of these regions suffered as much as, even more than, the Russians from the

Mongol westward movements in the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, it was the quickly

changing character ofthe Mongol Empire to the Turkic and Islamic form in the Turkic

lands that had produced such a wrong view. Indeed, "when the Russians appeared on the

scene, the peoples of Central Asia were just beginning to recover from long centuries of

foreign invasion, massacre and enslavement."' ''

Unlike the British, Spanish, French, and other imperialists, who were adventurers

and were working primarily to support their commercial interests, the tsarist armies were

in the East because ofthe centuries old struggle between the races. '̂ "It goes back to

the time ofthe Tartar yoke," said Gospodin Semenov, the vice-president ofthe Russian

Imperial Geographical Society, in an interview with Charles Marvin. He believed that

'̂ ^ Benningsen, 9.

Togan, "Tsarist Russia," 305.

122 Bumaby, 309.

'"̂ Demetrius C. Boulger, Central Asian Questions: Essays on .Afghanistan, China, and Central Asia. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1885, 2.

'"̂ Wheeler, The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, 43.

42

the struggle between the Slavs and the Turkic people had been continuing. The Russo-

Turkish war of 1877-78 and Russian invasions in the Turkic lands had originated from

this struggle. Yet the Russians employed many ofthe conquered people in their

service in the later stages of their expansion in Asia, and the empire increasingly included

foreign subjects. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian empire became

quite cosmopolitan. It was no longer a stmggle between the Russians and the Turkic

people, but a war between a colossal power and weak khanates. However, the Russians

still felt that their country was in danger as long as they left truly free states in Central

Asia.

According to the Russians, one ofthe main causes ofthe Russian expansion in

Central Asia, as well as Asia in general, was the violation of their territories by the

nomads. Russia had to take action to save herself from the "dashing onslaughts of

Asiatic horsemen." In his circular. Prince Gorchakov openly stressed this cause in

1864, after Russian forces had captured part ofthe khanate of Khokand. In order to

soothe the foreign reactions to their aggressive and expansionist policy in Central Asia,

Gorchakov stated that they had been forced to enlarge their territories by the "half-

savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization," "In such cases it

always happens that the more civilized State is forced, in the interest ofthe security of its

frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendance over those whom

their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbours."'^^

The Turkmen, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz all to some extent practiced banditry. They

obeyed no boundaries and liked to roam over the endless steppes without caring much

about the neighboring state borders. The Turkmen in the Transcaspian region were

especially famous for their forays against the neighboring communities and against

merchant caravans. Their unruly action was a great blow to the trade and security of

'"̂ H. Blerzy, "Les Revolutions de I'Asie Centrale," Revue des Deux Mondes 50 (1874): 128.

'^'' Marvin, Conversations, 142.

'^'Terentyef, vol. 2, 160.

'"̂ Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 287.

43

people. They attacked merchants and paralyzed communication and transportation

lines.'"'' Yet, as some sources including Boulger rightly stated, the Turkmens were

forced by the treachery ofthe Persians to continue their fight against them.'̂ '̂ In

addition to their treacherous and hostile neighbors, the Turkmens were not lucky as far as

the quality of their territories and their climate was concemed. In a sense they had to raid

the surrounding communities to survive. "We think of raids as robberies; to the nomads

they are an essential part of getting a living. To us such raids seem the antithesis of

hospitality; to the nomads there is no such inconsistency."'^' As G. Dobson stated.

As nomads are not necessarily robbers, it is very probable that the Turkomans did not become marauders and manstealers by choice or preference, but were gradually driven to these expedients by dire necessity and stress of circumstances. After the destmction ofthe great cities ofthe plain and their principal works of irrigation, the Turkomans found themselves restricted by the ever-spreading sands to the wretched patches of meager pasture and arable land at the foot ofthe mountain frontier of Persia, and were led to engage in

1 T?

brigandage and the slave trade as auxiliary means of existence.

The Russians, after becoming involved with these communities, had to work their

way to end such a chaotic state of life on their frontiers. They thought the violation of

borders by the nomads was a threat to the empire. This security concem forced them to

take one place after another in an ever-expanding conquest in Asia.'

'"^ Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 971.

'̂ ^ Boulger, The Portraits of Central Asia, 239-240. Noor Verdi Khan, a five foot ten inch good-looking man, the ruler ofthe Akhal Tekke Turkmens in the 1860's and 70's, offered a treaty to the Persians to cease the raids. The Persians accepted his proposal, and a state of tranquility ruled their border for years until 1872. In this year, because of treachery on the part of Persia, hostilities broke out again. The treachery was that the Persian govemor of Bujnoord accumulated many Turkmen prisoners taken by Persian military raids into Turkmenia. The govemor sent a letter to Noor Verdi to tell him that he would release these prisoners if he were paid the worth of their price. Noor Verdy collected almost half of the wealth of his people to redeem his fellowfolk. As the caravan with redemption money was sent to the govemor, another Persian govemor, Koochan, attacked the caravan and looted it despite their agreement and promise not to attack the Turkmens. Upon this breach of faith, the Turkmens again took their weapons in their hands.

" ' Ellsworth Huntington, Mainsprings of Civilization. New York: the New American Library, 1945, 185.

'̂ ^ George Dobson, Russia's Railway Advance into Central Asia: Notes of a Journey from St. Petersburg to Samarkand. London: W. H. Allen, 1890, 333.

44

The alamans or the forays were made by the nomads to capture man and animals

ofthe neighboring communities, especially the Persians. The men captured by these

forays were sold in the cities ofthe khanates. One ofthe most important causes ofthe

Khivan expedition in 1873, the Russians claimed, was the enslaved Russians in the

khan's domain. The Russians exaggerated the number ofthe slaves, claiming as many as

400 in Khiva alone, while in reality there were 28 of them, and they were employed

mostly in the gardens ofthe khan. It was a tribute to these Russian slaves that they did a

very good job of making the khan's gardens a work of art with their perfect order and

tasteful decoration.'^'*

Where and when were they going to end these confrontations with the so-called

"barbarous" or "semi-barbarous" tribes? The Russians employed even worse methods to

worsen the state of social life and peace in the region. Along the frontiers they employed

the Cossacks as well as raiding military units as raiding communities. The forces made

incursions into the Turkic lands "partly to patrol and partly to plunder. This was their

idea of combining the useful with the agreeable. By the Khirgese these apostles of

culture were soon regarded as the worst robbers,... wherever patrols appeared caravans

disappeared."' ^ Besides the Cossack destruction ofthe nomadic villages, the Persian

armies inflicted inhumane strikes on the Turkmen whenever it was possible. When

Captain H. Cunliffe Marsh was traveling from Persia to India in 1872, he saw three

Turkmen's dead bodies crucified on a wall in Meshed. He also reported that some eighty

chiefs ofthe Turkmens had been invited to have a friendly meeting, but the Persians had

treacherously caught them and mercilessly killed all of them some years earlier.''̂ ^

Moreover, Colonel Valentine Baker, who surveyed the Turkmen-Persian border in 1873,

reported that he did not see any foraying Turkmens. Yet, while he was visiting a Kurdish

'̂ ^ Mary Holdsworth, Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century: .A Brief History ofthe Khanates of Bukhara Khokand and Khiva. Oxford: the Cenfral Asian Research Center, 1959, 46.

'^''Boulger, The Portraits of Central Asia, 136-137.

' " The Times, November 20, 1868.

45

leader at Deregez on the Turkmen border, his Kurdish escort told him to make a foray

against the Tekkes just to please him. Only after his severe objection, they did not

attempt to take such an action.'"'''

The Russians successfully produced enough pretexts to justify their expansion. It

was unruly action ofthe frontier communities ofthe khanate of Bukhara that gave the

Russians their long-sought excuse to attack the khanate in 1868. ft was also the amir's

"bad faith" that forced them to take action. The Times always supported the Russian

theses of "bad faith." The native mlers, on the other hand, had always disliked and had

negative feelings toward the Russians. They considered them as usurpers, infidels, and

aliens. Thus, neither side had confidence in the other as an equal and friendly neighbor.

This state of anarchy and dishonesty between them was always prone to producing

military clashes. According to The Times,

It would be of little avail to question the sincerity of these representations, but in common candour we may remark that the case alleged for the Russians is precisely such as we times out of mind have alleged for ourselves. We have always declared that our conquests in India were forced upon us, for the most part, by political necessity. We have charged one native Prince after another with "bad faith," and we have expected the world to believe us. In short, what according to the Russian account, has now happened to them in Central Asia is simply what, beyond all question, has repeatedly happened to ourselves in India. This, however, is a point of no practical importance. The Russians, involuntarily or by design, have made, we must presume, a stride in advance.

Establishment ofthe Russian authority over Central Asia obviously reduced

punitive clashes between nomads and the settled people and between neighboring tribes

because ofthe Russian unification of small communities under a single empire. As far as

the security and safety ofthe people within the same tribe or urban center were

concemed, there had long been established a public mentality for protection of private

Charles Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia: Pioneering Adventures in the Region Lying between Russia and India. London: Swan Sonnenschein, Le Bas & Lowrey, 1886,65-66.

' " Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia, 88-89.

^^^ The Times, ixxm 10, 1868.

46

possessions. It was a fact that these communities showed respect to each other's

existence in the same community. Schuyler was surprised to see how safe it was to go

anywhere at any time ofthe day in Tashkent in 1873. Tashkent was a big urban center

and had around 120,000 people of all sorts including Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tadjiks,

Russians, Hindus, and others at this time. The Russian role in increasing security and

in reducing quarrels between the tribes and social groups cannot be denied.

Alleged "Mission of Spreading Civilization" in "Uncivilized" Regions

The prevailing notion among the westerners including politicians, statesmen,

joumalists and other researchers in the mid-nineteenth century was that the mlers of

Central Asia including the Ozbeks and Afghans were despotic, cmel, bratal, and not

capable of regenerating their nations. They had long ago destroyed ancient civilization in

their states, and currently existed in a state of backwardness, "Muslim bigotry," and

social unrest. Thus, many westemers including an overwhelming number of The Times'

correspondents viewed the Russian expansion into Central Asia as the substitution of

civilization and more humane social stmctures for "the groveling superstition, the cruelty,

the depravity, the universal misery."''"' The Russians successftilly exploited these

westem feelings and always stressed their task as profitable to the region. Under the

pretext of such high-sounding words as the increase of civilization and modemity in

"uncivilized regions," the Russians had always gained new territories. ' Russia as a

"representative" of Europe in Asia was. for many politicians, including Grant Duff and J.

Gladstone, spreading westem advanced civilization in backward places. They thought

that westem civilization was clearly more advanced than eastem civilization. The

inevitable destiny of advanced civilization was to replace backward civilization. Russia

was helping this advanced civilization to spread in Asia.'"*^ ft was inevitable, a matter of

"'Schuyler, 51.

"'"* "The Russians in Central Asia." The Quarterly Review 118 (July-October 1865): 533.

'•*' Arminius Vambery, The Times, February 23, 1884.

47

fate, for the backward nations to yield to the advanced civilizations. "The experience of

all times and countries, from the era of Roman money-lending in Asia Minor down to the

days of Ismail Pasha and the Bey of Tunis, proves that a barbarian who deals with a

civilized usurer is lost."'"*^ In performing a civilizing role. The Times' editorial

commentary declared the Russians were helping the modem states, including Great

Britain, by performing the same sort of duty in uncivilized, semi-civilized backward

places. It said, "It will be a benefit to the world that Russia should absorb the petty

Uzbeg States, where Mussulman fanaticism takes its most odious form. It must be a gain

to the world that in a few years the traveler will be able to visit at his ease Bokhara,

Samarcand, and find there a reasonable and civilized government."''*'* All who hope for

human progress should show respect to the Russian expansions.''*^ The British press

generally agreed that the mission of Russia among Asiatic tribes was without a doubt one

of civilization and order. Thus, everyone had to desire her success.

The high officials of Russia believed in their civilizing power. The tsar thought

that the sole aim ofthe Russians in Central Asia was to promote civilization and

commerce. Prince Gorchakov in a letter to the British Govemment suggested ending

their rivalry in the region and working instead on "the accomplishment of their mission of

civilization, each in her natural sphere, even lending, it may be, one to the other that

assistance which is the natural consequence in our days ofthe universal diffusion of

intelligence and progress."'"*^ However, the Central Asian Muslim khanates had always

had a notion that their Islamic civilization was older and more advanced than the Russian

civilization. They did not expect much from the "infidel" Russians. Starting in the early

times, the Muslims considered the Russians as "barbaric" and wild people. "For the

'"̂ The Times, February 22, 1869.

""̂ "Parliamentary Papers: Further Correspondence Respecting Central Asia." The Edinburgh Review 163 (April 1886): 2.

^'^^ The Times, My 12, 1869.

"•' The New York Times, April 16, 1866.

'•** Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 290-92

48

Muslims, the 'Rus' were wild and primitive natives, purveyors of rare blond slaves and

such precious raw materials as fur and ivory."

It was no wonder that the European intellectuals expressed an overwhelmingly

negative feeling towards the Turkic people of Central Asia. Some sources of this

undesirable notion lay in not only in a centuries-old Christian bias conceming the

Muslims in general but also in a lack of knowledge about the geography, culture,

ethnicity, and administration of Central Asia. Though some information could be leamed

from the writings of travelers in Central Asia, most ofthe time these writings provided

exaggerated and anti-regional information. For example, though the whole population of

Central Asian khanates including Turkmenia was around 3,000,000 to 3,500,000 in the

mid-nineteenth century. Major Abbott and Joseph Wolff presented very different figures

in the 1840's. According to Abbott, the Khanate of Khiva alone had a population of

2,468,500, of which 700,000 were slaves. Wolff claimed that the Khanate of Bukhara

had 2,500,000 people, of which 200,000 were in bondage.'"^ Although statistics like

these were absurdly wrong, they shaped the notions and feelings ofthe westem

politicians, historians, and researchers in the time period under discussion.

Although most ofthe letters, commentaries, news, and discussions in The Times

had represented Central Asia as a barbaric, uncivilized, backward, and semi-civilized

region. Sir Bartle Ferre, a member ofthe British Geographical Association, had tried to

show the other side ofthe coin. He stressed the role of Central Asia in world history. He

pointed out that the countries presently accepted as wild and barbarous once were "the

ruling regions ofthe world. From them came conquerors, kings, philosophers, prophets,

and other pioneers of civilization, insomuch that the modem states ofthe South and West

have been largely influenced by Asiatic thought."''*^ Again, Fred Bumaby, who traveled

""̂ Benningsen, 5.

'"* Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia, 13.

"" The Times, April 24, 1869.

49

to Khiva in 1876, stated that the Khivans had a degree of high civilization and their city,

Khiva, had broad and clean streets and nice houses. He said.

The impression being left on my mind that the Khan of Khiva is the least bigoted of all the Mohammedans whose acquaintance I have made in the course of my travels, and that the stories of his cmelties to Russian prisoners, previous to the capture of the city, are pure inventions which have been disseminated by the Russian press in order to try and justify the annexation of his territory.'^°

Despite the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia, The Times

approached the Russian invasion ofthe region with characteristic Eurocenteric bias.

When the Khivan expedition was impending in 1872, The Times' editorial commentary

fully supported the Russians taking action against "barbarous" Eastemers. It said.

For the last fifty years the Russians have been endeavoring to penetrate into the regions where Mussulman bigotry is fiercest and the Asiatic dread ofthe European is an ineradicable instinct. Individual travelers and traders have perished; expeditions have been attacked and cut to pieces; overtures for diplomatic commercial intercourse have been savagely repelled, and the cities whose names are so well known to us in Eastem history and romance have remained almost untrodden by European feet up to the present time. It has been the ambition of Russia to bring these regions into intercourse with the world. Is not this a legitimate ambition? There is Samarcand, the capital of Timour, and, according to the Mussulmans, situated in one ofthe four paradises ofthe world. There is Bokhara, almost as much favored by nature; there are tracts of fmitful territory as large as European States. Where the desert has invaded the soil the evil has been in a great degree brought on by Mussulman barbarism, and might be arrested by the efforts of civilized and industrious people. If the Russians have been obliged to use force, and if the use of force has ended in the occupation of more or less ofthe hostile territory, this ought not to surprise Englishmen, in whose dealings with Asiatics precisely the same phenomenon has appeared....'Manifest destiny' appears here, as in the conflict between the Anglo-American and the Mexican or the Indian, and it is certainly as grand an achievement to restore an Old World as to conquer a New.'^'

150 Bumaby, 268.

The Times, November 19, 1872.

50

The tone ofthe article shows that The Times' correspondent still had feelings of

humiliation about the First Afghan War and the execution of two British agents, Connolly

and Stoddard, in Bukhara in 1842. Even a generation later the Afghan syndrome

continued to produce negative feelings among the British toward the Central Asian

people.

Though the majority ofthe nineteenth-century sources and majority ofthe articles

published in The Times expressed belief in the genuine Russian effort to modemize

Central Asia, they failed to show the emotional and physical destmction inflicted on the

locals. In this respect, it was the Russian mthless military powers supported by the

outlawed and bandit Cossacks that had inflicted many incurable wounds on the people of

the Steppe and Central Asia. The tactics that the Russian forces used were as harsh and

devastating as those ofthe Mongol invaders in the thirteenth century. There seems to

have been only one difference: the Mongols quickly and deliberately destroyed villages

and cities, a coup de main, while the Russian destruction took longer. The Mongols, who

were only invaders and plunderers, later easily blended in and took the character ofthe

locals, whereas the Russians continued to remain as alien colonizers ofthe region.

The Russians thought that they were reversing history by repaying what they had

suffered in centuries before. But, the destmction that fell on the Russians in the

thirteenth century also destroyed the Central Asian Turkic people.

If one were to compare the destmction wrought by the Mongols in China, Iran and Russia in terms of cities destroyed and people massacred, China would easily take first place, Iran and Central Asia would come second, with Russia trailing far behind. If, on the other hand, the yardstick used were the scars left by the invasion, then Russia would come first.

The Russian invasion and insult of Central Asia in the nineteenth century was another

result of this victimization.

The Russians openly stated, "We need not concem ourselves to disguise the tme

character ofthe contest. It is civilization against barbarism, and barbarism of no tolerable

'̂ " Benningsen, 7.

51

kind." As supportive of this view. The Times stated during the Khivan expedition,

"The Russians are marching on Khiva with a sufficient cause. Their war is just in itself,

as we have publicly acknowledged. It is also beyond dispute that civilization and

humanity would gain by their success, and that nobody need lament the overthrow ofthe

Khan or the coercion of his subject into better ways of living."'^^ All the Russian press

celebrated the invasion of Khiva as the climax of two centuries of progress ofthe

European civilization that took place in the East.'^''

Since The Times had gotten most of its news about the developments in Central

Asia from Russian sources and from people who had previously visited the region, it was

hard for the paper to present an objective view. Russian sources tended to be quite

prejudiced, while people who had been in the region were generally Europeans and had a

Eurocentric bias toward the natives. Yet few sources actually appreciated and tried to be

bias-free in their treatment ofthe region. One of these sources was Lieutenant Stumm, a

Prussian Hussar who was allowed to join the Khivan expedition in 1873. He stated.

When the Russians entered the khanate, they were surprised at the scientific style ofthe fortifications encountered every now and then. Though antiquated in shape, somewhat clumsy in outline, and of insufficiently solid material, they supplied ample proof that the men who had planned and erected them were conversant with the rule of advanced art.

A comment of this sort was rare among the large publications. By hiding the

positive side of every sort of institution in the native lands and by exaggerating

weaknesses ofthe native culture and civilization. The Times and other European sources

tended to justify somewhat their empires' destructive and bullying practices in the East.

Though the Russians had always claimed that they were both champions ofthe

rising civilization in Asia and messengers of European manners, they acted as the worst

153 The Times, A^n\ 29, 1873.

''Ubid

^^^ The Times, My 2, 1873.

''* The Times, January 6, 1874.

52

barbarians on many occasions. When they had completed the invasion of Khiva in 1873,

they marched on the Yomud Turkmens and massacred hundreds of these poor people.

Upon hearing ofthe massacre. The Times ' leading article surprisingly condemned the

Russian rule in the region as being cmel and dangerous to civilization. It accepted that,

despite its European character and big-power appearance, Russia failed to present a

civilized culture to the Central Asian people. The Times suggested, "It is in the interest of

Europe and of civilization that we should have to deal in Turkestan, not with a deaf and

lawless force, but with a Power amenable to the voice of European remonstrance."'^^

Furthermore, under the pretext of spreading civilization, the Russians had many times

committed atrocities. When they captured the city of Khodjent, they massacred around

2,000 people without making any distinction of sexes and ages. The masterpiece ofthe

Russians" barbarous, cmel, and brutal actions was the massacre ofthe Tekke Turkmen at

Geok Tepe in 1881. More than half of the whole population ofthe Akhal country,

including women, children, and elderly, were killed either during the stmggle or after the

war by outright slaughter. General Skobelev told Charles Marvin, an English joumalist,

in an interview in St. Petersburg that "I hold it as a principle, that in Asia the duration of

peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you

hit them, the longer they will be quiet afterwards. We killed nearly 20,000 Turcomans at

Geok Tepe. The survivors will not soon forget the lesson." The civilization that The

Times and the Russian sources so loyally championed was actually erected in its

nineteenth-century form with horrifying scenes.

Yet in order to stay longer and win over the natives, the Russians explained to the

natives why they had applied such destructive measures. Just a short time after the

The Times, November 14, 1874.

''* Charles Marvin, The Russian Advance Towards India: Conversations with Skobeleff Ignatieff, and other Distinguished Russian Generals and Statesmen, on the Central Asian Question. Peshawar: Saeed Book Bank, 1984, 98-100. Marvin questioned Skobelev whether it was tme that none ofthe people were spared as far as the cavalry and infantty reached with the help ofthe artillery. Skobelev confirmed that his troops killed every one they caught. He also confessed that a Persian agent, Zulfagar Khan, came to camp to ask his permission to choose some so-called Persian woman slaves. Skobelev granted permission to him, and

53

Khodjent massacre, the Russians organized a big celebration and invited all the people.

Music, dance, drinking beverages, eating foods and enjoying this time with the public

lasted for eight hours. During the durbar. General Romanovski made a speech saying.

The General congratulates the people of Khujand on the part ofthe Emperor of Russia on their emancipation from Uzbeg oppression. All the rights and privileges enjoyed by Russian subjects have been extended to them, conditional on good behaviour. The General is sorry for the chastisement which he had been compelled to inflict on them for the hostile resistance they made on the entry ofthe Russian force into the city.'" 159

The prejudices that were carried by most European intellectuals limited their

ability to look at the issue from an angle of objectivity and ftall tmthfulness. Yet people

who had proper means to meet the natives found out that these people were not as bad as

they had thought. Indeed, most ofthe travelers came to admire the natives' honesty,

straightforwardness, simplicity, generosity, and above all their hospitality. They even

confessed, "On knowing them more intimately one cannot help liking and even

respecting them."'^^ Vambery who visited the region in 1863 as a false dervish drew one

ofthe best descriptions of Turkic life. He stated that the life was simple, yet happy, and

poor, yet not spoiled by greed and jealousy. He said.

Idleness is excused by allusion to human impotence; fanaticism explained as enthusiasm in religion; and slovenliness justified by the uselessness of poor mortals in struggling against fate. If the superiority of European civilization over that ofthe East was not so clearly established, I should almost be tempted to envy a dervish, who, clad in tatters and conversing in a comer of some mined building, shows, by the twinkling in his eye, the happiness he enjoys. What serenity is depicted in that face; what placidity in all his action; what a complete contrast there is between this picture and that presented by our European civilization!'^'

Zulfagar chose all beautifiil women, and took them into Meshed where he sold them to the harems ofthe Persians. Upon knowing this, Skobelev ordered him to take no more women.

'^' Singh, 24.

Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja. New York: Frederich A. Paeger, 1966, 22.

'*' Arminius Vambery, Sketches of Central Asia. London: Pall Mall, 1868, 1-2.

54

Along with humbleness, the khanates were almost discrimination-free toward different

segments ofthe society. In the social stmcture, "the dervish or beggar, though placed at

the bottom ofthe social scale, often enjoys as much consideration as the prince who 1 ^9

reigns over millions and disposes of immense treasures." The people had not yet

become spoiled by the greed, competition, and worldly gains, which were generally

promoted by advanced civilizations, at the time ofthe Russian invasions. Moreover, as

V. V. Barthold believed, the khanates were making their best efforts to improve the

quality of life in their states. "At the time ofthe conquest the economic welfare ofthe

greater part of Turkestan was much higher than it had been a century earlier. Khiva and

Samarkand were once more considerable cities."'^^ Moreover, the Turkic people of

Central Asia carried their own virtues that would likely be cormpted by the so-called

importation of westem civilization into the region. MacGahan observed, "Why talk of

the necessity of civilizing such people? The Kirghiz possesses to a remarkable degree the

qualities of honesty, virtue, and hospitality.... I should be sorry indeed ever to see these

simple people inoculated with our civilization and its attendant vices."

The Quest for Natural Boundaries

One justification that the Russians had always claimed was their desire to protect

Russia from dangers that had come from Asia many times throughout history. In order to

protect their frontiers from nomadic incursions, they believed that they had to reach

natural or "scientific" borders. For this purpose, they had determined to enlarge their

territories in Central Asia up to the Hindu Kush in the South and the Bolor mountains in

the East and the Khorasan Hills (Kopet Dag) in the West.'^^ These boundary lines also

roughly constituted the boundary lines ofthe Turkic people of Central Asia. As far as the

162 Vambery, Sketches, 5.

"̂ ^ V. V. Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia. Trans, by V. and T. Minorsky. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956,67.

'*'* Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia, 106.

'^' The Times, March 19, 1873.

55

mutual boundaries were concemed, for Russia it would be the Urals that would somewhat

make natural boundaries rather than the steppes, the khanates, or the Hindu Kush

Mountains.

Reaching natural boundaries would not only mean reaching boundaries were

marked by a mountain chain, or a lake, a river, or a sea. It also meant reaching secure

and workable boundaries. In an editorial. The Times stated that Russia had no choice but

to move forward to reach her natural boundaries, borders that she shared with states that

had the same degree of civilized life. It said, "Nor can Russia be blamed for thus

extending her territory. Touching the confines of half-civilized States, she cannot stop

even if she would, and she must go on until the way shall be barred by immense physical

barriers, or by a civilization equal to her own."'^^

Though it seems it was the right of an advanced nation to protect its frontiers

against neighboring unruly subjects, the Russians had not seriously contemplated solving

these problems through peaceful means or mutual understandings with the khanates. The

Russian imperial policy in dealing with the khanates was always aggressive,

expansionist, and hostile. It was constmcted to bully these weak states and push as far as

possible to reach its economic, military, and political goals. Furthermore, the Cossacks

who settled on the frontiers as military colonists and mercenaries of the tsar were not less

troublesome and unmly than were the nomadic subjects ofthe khanates. However, it was

power that always determined the borders.

Spreading Christianity

In the eyes of many Europeans, the Russians, as Orthodox Christians, would be

seen as the spreaders of Christianity in a Muslim world. At least, it would seem that it

was the victory of Orthodoxy over Islam in Central Asia. This notion arose from the

centuries-old stmggle between the Muslims and the Christians in places where the two

civilizations came into contact with each other. In the initial phases ofthe Russian

expansion against the Turkic lands in the Etil (Volga) basin and the Crimea between the

'*̂ The Times, March 16, 1876.

56

sixteenth and eighteenth centuries the religious motives would have been stronger than in

the second phase of this expansion in Central Asia in the nineteenth century. When Ivan

IV captured Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556, he ordered his engineers to erect

cathedrals such as the Cathedral of St. Basil to celebrate his victory over the Muslims.'^'

Yet "Muscovy's drive eastward was rapid and, contrary to Russian and Soviet

historiography, never took on the character of a crusade against Islam. Neither did

Muslim resistance take on the aspect of a jihad or defensive Holy War against the

advance of Christendom." Furthermore, as the Russians incorporated more Turkic

lands, millions of Muslim Turkic people came under Russian mle. The state felt the need

of gaining these subjects through peace and understanding. By this way, the Russians

aimed to mobilize a potential Muslim power to serve the Empire peacefully. Especially

during the reign of Catherine II, the Russians tried to improve the Islamic way of life

among the nomadic subjects ofthe steppes. Thus, Russian respect for Islamic religious

belief gained Muslim confidence in the Russian Empire.

Though the Russians did not openly express the aim of spreading Christianity,

they were fighting against the Muslims to end the Muslim mle and establish tsarist

authority that was symbolized by its adherence to the Orthodox creed. As the Russians

were invading the khanate of Khokand in 1875, their press and leading men in Central

Asia openly stated that the war would continue until there was no Muslim rule left in the

region. For many of them, it was a struggle between Europe and Asia and between

Christianity and Islam. Some of them also believed that when the borders of two

European and Christian nations, namely. Britain and Russia, were touched, then there

would be a peaceful existence in Central Asia backed by growing commercial and

'*̂ Ian Gray, The Horizon History of Russia. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1970, 87; Fred Mayor. The Orthodox Church in Russia: A Millennial Celebration. Paris: The Vendone Press, 1982, 129; Marvin Lyons. Russia in Original Photographs 1860-1920. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1977, 72.

'̂ * Benningsen, 11; Holdsworth, 47.

'*' Charles Marvin, The Russians at Merv and Herat, and Their Power of Invading India. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1883,31.

57

industrial relations.'^° Even many British came to believe that the Russians were

spreaders of Christian civilization. Bumaby sarcastically stressed such beliefs by saying,

Exeter Hall is quieted by the idea of a cmsade against the Mussulmans; the lust for conquest is cloaked in a garb called Christianity; the sword and the Bible go forth together. Thousands ofthe natives are mown down by that evangelical weapon, the breech-loader; and one day we read in our moming newspapers that a territory larger than France or England together has been

171

added to the Tzar's dominions.

Seemingly the Russian move into the Muslim lands represented a cmsading

movement. But there was neither a strong missionary activity nor were there "warrior

priests" to march toward the East with the regular armies. For the success ofthe

incorporation of these lands into Russia required less religiousness than encouragement

of religious freedoms. Since there were not many people willing to be converted to

Orthodoxy, and many more ready to resist this conversion, the Russian leaders

successfully either disapproved of Christian missionary activities or left these matters for

another time. The people ofthe region, on the other hand, considered themselves

champions of Islam in the East. For centuries they had defended the religion against the

Mongol Kalmuk Buddhists and the Orthodox Russians. Islam was deeply seated in the

daily life, culture, and custom of these people. In order not to offend these ftindamental

feelings, the Russians chose to minimize missionary work in their newly acquired places.

Yet despite all, the Russian existence in the region affected some. A report revealed that • 177

fourteen people were converted to Orthodoxy in Turkistan in 1875.

Mostly the military forces ofthe Russian Empire—not civilized, religious or

enlightened groups—carried out the invasion of Central Asia. The religious groups,

especially the Christians, did not directly play a noticeable role in these invasions except

perhaps by propaganda at home to agitate some political leaders and high officers toward

being harsh on Muslims, "ft would be more correct to say that the progress of Russia in

'™ The Times, October 27, 1875.

' ' ' Bumaby, 87.

58

the East is based upon the sword and the gibbet, rather than upon Christianity and

Bible." It was only following the military defeat ofthe local forces that Orthodox

missionaries or religious men began to move into Central Asia. Yet the harsh methods

employed by the Russian forces to subdue native resistance produced even more hatred

among the locals and did not develop any sympathy toward Christianity. "Whatever may

be the 'mission' of Russia and England in Central Asia, it may be safely predicted that

'Christian Civilization' will not be promoted by duplicity and violence."'^^

Russian Orthodox missionaries failed to impress the Muslim population. On the

contrary, the Muslim merchants, travelers, mullahs, and especially the Tatar Muslim

missionaries who were active after Catherine IPs provisions to them in the eighteenth

century played important roles in keeping the Muslim people within Islam. Furthermore,

the ages-old rivalry between the Islamic and Christian civilizations was an obvious

obstacle for the missionaries, and this rivalry entered the culture and daily life of ordinary

people. Yet efforts to convert the Muslims to Christianity or to keep the Muslims loyal to

their own creed by both the Russian and Tatar missionaries continued to be a part of

social life. Some small groups were converted to Christianity among the Turkic people.

For example, on the fiftieth anniversary ofthe Kazan Central Converted Tatars' School in

1913, h was revealed that just fewer than 900 persons had completed their training at the

school, and that just fewer than 400 had become teachers, which was not an "impressive"

achievement for fifty years' work.'̂ "̂

Lack of Modemity, Enlightened Leadership and Social Cohesion

in the Khanates

Not all causes ofthe Russian invasion of Central Asia should be blamed on

Russia's imperialist appetite. It was also the weaknesses and backwardness ofthe Turkic

'̂ ^ The Times, January 23, 1877.

'"Bumaby, 195.

'•'''"J.H.," The Times, November 20, 1878.

'^' Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 671.

59

khanates that tempted the invaders. At the time ofthe Russian invasion, these khanates

lacked political unity, strong and enlightened leadership, modem weaponry, technology,

and social cohesion. Disunity created a suitable platform for imperialist expansions.

For centuries the Turkic people ofthe Steppes and Oases had been known as

militarized predatory communities. They had succeeded in founding world empires

including the Seljukid Empire in the eleventh century and the Timurid Empire in the

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Even before they had founded these empires, they had

fumished military guards for Persian and Abbasid princes. When Genghis Khan's

Mongols moved into the West, the Kazakh and Kirghiz soldiers played a major role in

establishing and running the Mongol Empire. It was believed that the best light cavalries

had always come from these peoples. Nevertheless, sweeping successes of light cavalry

and archers became things ofthe past after the development of modem warfare.

Scientifically perfected regular soldiers included light artillery, rockets, mortars, educated

officers, and drilled regular armies. These first began to be perfected in Europe and as a

result gave the Europeans the power to subdue the rest ofthe world. No matter how

strong and courageous soldiers might be, the outcome of military clashes began to be

determined by superiority in firearms and by advanced tactics employed in the stmggle.

The Turkic people ofthe steppes and the oases failed to grasp the growing

importance of modem weapons, or at least were too late to achieve the level of weaponry

ofthe advanced countries. They could not even unite to create a big force against the

Russian invaders as the latter began to move into their territories toward to end ofthe

sixteenth century. They continued to quarrel among themselves, which greatly helped the

Russians to occupy large lands without big losses in men and materiel. Moreover, hatred

of their own rulers because ofthe mlers' oppression or ignorance combined with the

notion ofthe impossibility of resisting Russian modem military power induced many

people to side with the invaders. The Russians had considerable help from the natives

when they captured many cities, such as, for example, Ak Mescit.

"^ Singh, 4; H. C. D'Encausse, Reforme et Revolution Chez les Musulmans de I'Empire Russe: Bukhara 1867-1924. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966, 25.

60

The military structure ofthe khanates reflected the medieval feudal forces. The

rulers ofthe provinces, who were generally called Hakims or Begs, had to raise their own

military forces and support the khan at the time of war. The khans had at their disposal

cavalry units, infantry, artillery, local militia, and forces supplied by the begs. The

cavalry {sipahies) were generally raised by begs and during times of peace they worked

on the land. The infantry was drawn from the khan's regular army and local militias.

The artillery units were generally permanent forces, trained by professionals, and took

orders directly from the khan.'^^

When the khanates faced the Russian danger, they were caught totally

unprepared. They did not have large regular trained armies. If they had had trained

soldiers with modem equipment, they would not have given an inch of land to the

Russians from their states.'^^ When the Amir of Bukhara marched on the Russians to

reconquer Tashkent in 1866, 3,000 Russian forces soundly defeated his 40,000-man army

because the Bukharan regular forces consisted of convicts and non-noble persons. And,

the commander ofthe cavalry was a Russian renegade, Osman, and another Russian

headed the artillery. The majority ofthe army consisted of civilians who had had no

training in the art of fighting. Furthermore, the Amir had hired 2,000 Afghan soldiers to

fight against the Russians, yet this force led by Iskender Khan, an Afghan prince, 1 7Q

deceived the Bukharans and sided with the Russians.

Besides the lack of modem weaponry and drilled soldiers, there was no unity

within the same community. The defense of Turkistan would have been possible only if

the sedentary and nomad subjects had been united under a strong leader.'^" Yet neither a

complete cohesiveness between different segments ofthe society nor a strong leader of

that society was available at the time ofthe Russian invasions. Many merchants and

' ' ' Holdsworth, 11.

178 Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 233.

™ Ibid, 22%-229.

"Vfe/W.,230.

61

farmers came to consider the Russian invasion as a good thing because they had suffered

great deal from the nomad's destruction of their gardens and agricultural fields, and from

attacks on caravans and travelers. They hoped that the Russians would grant them a

better economic environment and more protection against nomadic destmctions. They

were mostly a "peaceful, industrious, artisan population utterly unfitted for war."'^'

While the sedentary people objected to the unmly acts ofthe nomads, the nomads hated

their khans and the official tax collectors. They felt cheated by both the govemment and

the settled people. Corruption within the social stmcture was doubled by hostilities 1 89

between the rulers and princes ofthe region, thus enabling the Russians to march on

Central Asia without making great sacrifices.

Another problem with the military forces ofthe khanates was that a large numbers

of native fighters on the battlefields gave misleading evidence ofthe real strength ofthe

khanates. At the time ofthe Khivan expedition in 1873, the khanate could raise 35,000

men, of which only 4,000 to 5,000 could be counted as regular army. Yet even these

forces were poorly constructed and were no match for the Russian armies. It is very tme that these men, mostly in bad equipment, and with still worse arms, more resemble a rabble than an army, and that they will be as feeble as Asiatics have proved hitherto. If you have witnessed the highly amusing scene of a shooting Oezbeg, you may understand why one Russian can fight////)' Tartars without the slightest difficulty. The Oezbeg, with the old-fashioned matchlock gun—and this is the weapon ofthe majority—will never fire his arm while in saddle. He must, before all, dismount, and after having found a fair level ground, he betakes himself to fasten the forklike lafetle (gun carriage), and then he begins to aim. When the latter object is obtained he will have to light the occasionally wet match, no easy matter indeed, and then only you will find him meddling with the powder pan a good while, until the explosion occurs, carrying the ball Heaven knows whither, at any rate, not in the direction the marksman desired. If you now compare the time needed by an Oezbeg with the speed of a European breechloader, the seemingly incredible superiority of a Russian soldier over his Tartar adversary will be easily conceived. Similar is the condition of Khivan artillery, consisting of scarcely more than 25 guns, without necessary carriages, and served mostly by

181 Curzon, 174.

'*" Romanovski, 6.

62

Persian slaves, who will run away at the first encounter. If you add to this 1,000 Serbazes, or regular infantry, drilled likewise by Persian slaves, you will have an approximate idea ofthe army the Khan of Khiva can dispose of'̂ '̂

The military structure ofthe khanates was backward and medieval. The Russian

armies were successful because they relied "for success upon the superiority, which the

arts of civilization give a modem army over vastly preponderating numbers of barbarous

warriors." Though they produced primitive quality weapons, they could not match the

European modem weapons. The training ofthe soldiers was also so primitive that they

could not show any tactical maneuver to defeat the enemy. A correspondent of The

Times reported that the native soldiers were carrying English, French, German, and

Russian rifles a century old. The Khan's military trainers and other officials even tried to

prevent the khan seeing his weak and sorry soldiers.'^'' As Ignatiev's report to the

govemment stated in 1859, the Russians decided to apply military means to solve the so-

called "Central Asian question" rather than deal with the khanates as equal sovereign

states. They were always known for making use ofthe weaknesses of their neighbors

either to impose their diplomatic and political will, as in China, or to capture new

strategic and rich places, as in the Near East and Central Asia. Though the khanates did

not easily give way to the Russian demands, their power was no match for that ofthe

Russians.

When Central Asian forces faced Russian forces, they found out that the Russians

had better firearms and better tactics. In order to develop their military power and

modemize their forces, there had been many embassies sent to Istanbul asking the Sultan

to send professionals to drill their soldiers and train their engineers to make firearms. Yet

because ofthe difficulties of transportation these efforts did not produce the desired

modemization. It was too late for them to show a real resistance to such formidable

power. Furthermore, contrary to the homogeneous appearance ofthe people, the

"^ Arminius Vambery, The Times, April 12, 1873.

'*" The Daily News, April 18, 1873.

63

khanates had different social and economic groups. The town dwellers, the nomads, and

the seminomads were struggling with each other for political power. Besides these large

groups, the khanates had agriculturalists and merchants from the Sarts and the Tadjicts,

who had rulers from the nomadic Uzbeks. An intensive feud among these groups to gain

the upper hand in politics and administration destroyed any prospect for cohesion among

the population.'^^

The ignorance of both rulers and mled about developing a better and more

advanced life in Central Asia brought their end when the imperialist powers came with

their modemity in every aspect of life. The idea of "nation-state" was almost absent from

the minds ofthe natives. Their mlers did not see the need to unite or help each other to

resist the common enemy. Though some strong anti-Russian sentiment appeared here

and there, symbolized by "the Kenesary rising in the steps, at Ak-Mechet, in the defence

of Andizhan and Namangan, at Geok Tepe," there was not a sufficiently strong unity in

action to have decisive results.'^^ "The Rulers show all the indolence and fanaticism of

Mahomedianism [sic] with not a single one of its virtues. They have succeeded in

reducing what were once fertile plains and wealthy cities to dreary deserts." The Times'

article stressed that even the Russians would be of benefit to the people of Central Asia in

developing a better life.

Most ofthe people in the khanate had no hopes of really stopping the Russians.

Their only hope was that the Russians would stop one day, exhausted from invading new

territories at a quick pace. When they were asked what they were thinking about the

Russian expansions, they naively answered with a proverb "tez giden, tez yomlur" (fast 1 8Q

walker, first tired). Yet as the Russians had new victories, they wanted more, and they

never showed exhaustion.

'*̂ The Times, June 6, 1884.

'̂ * Holdsworth, 7.

' " Holdsworth, 3.

'** The Times, December 6, 1869.

64

According to Baron von Kaulbars, who represented the Russians in the signing of

a treaty with Yakub Bey of Kashgaria, the public was not actively resistant to the Russian

expansion. It was the ulemas, mullahs, privileged beys, and mling families that tried to

stop the Russians because they were most likely to be the first to lose their privileged

positions when the Russians incorporated these places. The enemy successfully exploited

mixed feelings ofthe natives to divide them and destroy any prospect for unity. "Having

been no more than seven or eight years in Central Asia, the extraordinary confidence the

inhabitants repose in us reflects not a little credit on the forbearance of our policy. Of

course, the more the people begin to incline towards us, the more hostile are the Begs,

and their associates, the priests."'^'^

Many British observers, including M. Bellew, a medical officer, who traveled into

Kashgaria in the 1870's, portrayed the native governments of Central Asia as disordered,

oppressive, and despotic. According to their view, the Russian invasion ofthe region

was a blessing to its people. "Between the influence of civilization and barbarism, who

can wish to deny to the oppressed States of Central Asia the blessings of good

govemment which are pressing upon them, whether they receive them from the north

[Russia] or from the south [Britain], or from both in their just proportions."'^' However,

such blessing would not have to come through military invasions, destructions of towns,

and establishment of greedy administrations to exploit the resources ofthe region.

The Turkic people ofthe steppes and the oases might have shown their adherence

to a leader if they had found a really courageous, strong, intelligent, and generous one.

They were quite a faithful people as long as they tmsted their mlers. In this respect,

Timur represents an exceptional character and well-adapted leader in the hearts ofthe

Central Asian People. During Timur's reign, "the policy they see worked out in the

conqueror's hands is that ofthe tradhions of Islam, a synthesis of Turkish valour with

^^"^ The Times, March 18, 1873.

"° Von Kaulbars, The Times, January 21, 1873.

' ' ' The Times, January 11, 1876. B. W. Bellew was "a medical officer, an experienced traveler, a good Oriental Scholar, a keen observer, and an interesting writer," says The Times. He accompanied Sir Douglas Forsyth's mission to Kashgaria in the 1870's.

65

Arab-Persian civilization."''*' Yet the nineteenth century raised none leader of such

quality among the khanates of Central Asia. Furthermore, the people, especially the

Uzbeks, did not like the Mangit amirs who were raised to the throne after Nadir Shah's

invasion of Central Asia in the 1740's. They considered the Mangit mlers as imposters

who could not create strong administrations. The begs and other social dignitaries began

to have more power in the ruling ofthe country. The administration became more feudal

than autocratic. The communal begs and other dignitaries did not wholeheartedly support

the Mangit rulers. Some even thought, "Their country was taken by the Russians because

ofthe Mangit mle." Lack of unity among them, weakly organized state institutions,

corruption among the state servants, and incapable leadership created an attractive

environment for outside invaders. "Turkistan was in eclipse and seclusion.... Here was a

political vacuum which would in the end be filled from without."'^'*

During the invasion ofthe Russians, the khans of Khokand, Bukhara and Khiva—

Khudyar, Muzaffar, and Muhammed Rahim, respectively—were weak personalities.

They lacked the determination of Timur or the intelligence of Genghis Khan. They did

not care for the people's well-being, other than having a throne of their own. Khudyar

Khan was "self-willed and tyrannical, delighting in wanton, cmel and indecent sports,

and caring little or nothing for the affairs ofthe State."'^^ He murdered many good

members of his court including Musulman Kul, a Kirghiz, who was his prime minister

and had extraordinary ability. They could not see what their subjects needed.

"Compared with the aspirations ofthe bold people of Khokand, ... the figure of their

mler must appear to be slight and insignificant."'^^ In their vanity these rulers obtained

large harems, fancy palaces, and weak but unreasonable faithful courtiers. Enlightened

"^ Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. London: MacMillan, 1967, 63.

"^ Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 256; Caroe, 68.

194 , Caroe, Soviet Empire, 69.

195 Singh, 4.

"* Boulger, Central Asian Question, 178.

66

westem political ideologies and respect for individual rights were absent. The rulers

treated their subjects as kul, sirfs, slaves, and herds, and themselves as God's people

chosen to rule.

After subjugation, Khudyar Khan tmsted in the Russians more than his own

subjects for establishing authority in the khanate. Rather than trying to find solutions to

the economic and social problems, he became a more absolutist monarch, and dragged

the khanate to its ruin. Furthermore, reduction of taxes to the Russian merchants by the

treaty of 1868 created an unequal competition in trade in favor of foreigners. The native

petty merchants and villagers who suffered most from new economic policies faced great

difficulties and lost their economic power to the well-organized capitalistic merchants.'^^

His already poor people became even poorer. A growing segment ofthe population

began to hate his rule. The people rose against him under the leadership of Abdurrahman

Avdobashci, a Kipchak. Even some ofthe people who disliked Khudyar's impotent and 1QR •

despotic mle sought asylum from the Russians. The consequent social and economic

unrest resulted in the outbreak ofthe 1875 rebellion that led to Russian intervention and

the end of the Khokandian khanate.

When the Russians gained their initial victories over the Bukharan forces in 1868,

the Amir, Muzaffar, did not show any determination or courage to unite his forces against

the Russians. He acted totally as a submissive leader. For example in Samarkand the

public was angry because of his timidity and wanted to depose him during struggles

against the Russians. He escaped, disguised as a sheep, to save his life from angry

mobs.'̂ "^

The cormpt mles ofthe khans, begs, and other less important leaders ofthe

khanates of Central Asia gave a great opportunity for the Russians to propagate their

slightly more advanced administration among the people. Many people came to think

Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 219.

''* Ibid., 229.

" ' Ibid, 229.

67

that they would be better off under Russian rule than under native mle. As the Russians

were annexing the Khanate of Khokand in 1875, most ofthe population did not resist

strongly. They did not wholeheartedly support their rebelling subjects against the khan

and the invaders. As The Times stressed.

The native population in the Russian possessions remained perfectly tranquil. Some apprehensions were felt at Tashkent, Aouli Ata, and Takmak, at which places some precautions were taken, but eventually it was found that there was no real cause for those apprehensions.. .There may be a few partial disturbances fomented by old families, who, although they have enriched themselves by Russian commerce, will ever regard the Russians as the enemies of Mahomet, and still cherish the belief that the Mussulman [sic] sword will again strike down the infidel.

In short, ignorant mlers caused the people to ignore foreign invasions. Thus, the

patriotic spirit that rallies people behind their leaders to overcome every difficulty was

somewhat absent among the many Central Asian peoples. This chaotic state of things

within the khanates combined with the absence of modemity and advanced technology

helped the Russians to gain large territories.

Loneliness and Isolation from the World

Turkistan had been living a solitary life at least since the sixteenth century. In this

century, the Russians captured Kazan and Astrakhan, and, in Iran, a hostile politico-

religious power, Shia, was bom. Though the sect of Shia had always existed in the

Islamic world, it was Shah Ismail who made it a political power and a strong state

religion. It played a destructive role in the centuries-old and intensive interrelations

between the Central Asian and the Ottoman Muslims. Furthermore, in this centtiry, the

European explorers, namely, the Portuguese and the Spaniards, began to control the

Indian Ocean along with its coastal lines. This last development proved to be quite

destructive for Central Asia both commercially and politically. Because of its central

position between the East and the West, Central Asia had played an important role in

controlling the Silk Road since time immemorial. The Silk Road was not only providing

"̂̂ The Times, October 27, 1875.

68

trade and material prosperity, but also bringing techniques and developments from both

the East and the West. Thus it played an historical role by transporting many technical

inventions such as printing and paper from the East to the West. After great explorations,

the importance ofthe Silk Road began to disappear. Central Asia then lost its role as a

meeting place of distant cultures.

The other destmctive effect ofthe European discoveries ofthe sea roads was the

closing ofthe Indian Ocean to the Muslim merchants or at least making it harder for the

Muslims to travel in this ocean. Along with this difficulty, the Central Asian people

began to lose their privileged position in trading and traveling in India as the Muslim

Turkic mle began to be weakened by the British and French imperialists. Consequently

Central Asia after the sixteenth century was forced by hostile powers to become isolated

from the rest ofthe world. When the Russians began to push their way into the Oases

region in the nineteenth century, there was no one to help these secluded states.

As the Russian invasion became accelerated by the Khivan expedition and the

annexation of Khokand, many Khokandian leaders asked Yakub Beg of Kashgaria to

send them help against the Russians. But Yakub Beg refused to involve himself in the

Central Asian affairs. Again when the Russians massacred the Turkmens in 1873, the

Turkmens sent emissaries to Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand, and Kashgar to seek help to stop

the Russian massacres invariably committed against their men, women, and children.

Even in such a desperate time, these people did not do anything to help their relatives.

Along with the unwillingness ofthe neighboring states to help each other, the

European Powers had shown little or no attention to the Russian manipulation of Central

Asia.̂ "^ The Ottoman Turks wanted to help but they had neither the easy transportation

nor the rich resources to help the khanates. The British, although they frequently stressed

the Russian danger to India, did not send any solid help to the Turkic khanates. Their

only objective was to keep Russia away from Afghanistan. They never had any clear

policy toward the Turkic khanates.

^°^ Sir Douglas Frosyth, The Times, July 26, 1876.

'"' Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 280.

69

Imperialist Race among the Big Powers

European imperialist powers spent great quantities of money and send thousands

of soldiers to faraway places in order to establish authority over alien territories. Greed

and jealousy created appetites for conquests. European powers constantly struggled with

each other over the lands that their forefathers had never known. Despite their efforts,

spending, struggles and sometime failures, the imperialist countries saw this race as a

source of a dignified power and the filling up of a high ground in the worid. When they

conquered a backward tribe, or a weak state, or when they destroyed a race, they proudly

considered it a way of life, sportsmanship, spread of European high culture, and gaining

higher power. Once they had tasted the sweetness of conquering tribes and territories,

they continued to do so as long as there were more tribes or states to be captured. With

the help ofthe press, the public wholeheartedly rallied behind home govemment and

carefully followed the developments with high emotions. For example, Russia's Khivan

expedition was followed by the Russians with an emotional state of mind similar to that

ofthe British public when Lord Napier "was leading a small but gallant army through the

valleys of Abyssinia.""^''

The Turkic lands from the Volga basin to China and from Persia to Mongolia

were large enough to give satisfaction to Russian imperialism. The Russians, starting in

the sixteenth century, saw it as their natural backyard, and colonized gradually. By the

mid nineteenth century they had incorporated without any serious interference from other

imperialist big powers large parts ofthe Turkic lands. In the second half of the

nineteenth century, there were left only the Oases region, which belonged to three

khanates and Turkmenia. Everyone knew at that time that sooner or later the Russians

were going to annex these territories. Nonetheless, another imperialist power. Great

Britain, began to challenge Russia's long-established tradition of conquest in Asia. In the

1850's Prince Bariatinski, the viceroy ofthe Caucasus, repeatedly wamed the central

govemment about the British designs to establish their economic and political control

over the khanates and even capture the Caspian Sea to make it the center for their control

^" The Daily News, April 18, 1873.

70

of these lands." A power vacuum was an obvious fact in Central Asia in the state

mentality ofthe imperialist countries in the nineteenth century. Resulting from the

imperialist notion of struggle over backward territories for establishment of imperialism,

"Russia [was] extending her dominion and filling up the great vacuum of Central Asia"̂ *̂ ^

in the second half of the nineteenth century trying to succeed before that vacuum was

filled by Great Britain.

The British interests in Central Asia arose mainly because of concem for the

safety of their most beloved possession, India. But behind the British desire to protect

India against possible invasion from the North lay their real desire to establish economic

and political authority in Central Asia. They always appreciated having more markets

and sources of raw materials. Central Asia was a good candidate for being the next

British market. The Times and other press venues stressed the bright future of Central

Asia in becoming a rich source of raw materials and a profitable market for European

industries. Indeed, the British had already established a lively trade with these regions

through their Indian merchants. They feared losing this profitable trade totally after

Russia's annexation ofthe region. Furthermore, the extensive and easy conquests by the

Russians naturally annoyed the British and made them envious.

Not only on the Black Sea and in the direction of Turkey and the Mediterranean have the Russian movements been jealously watched, but her advances along the eastem shore ofthe Caspian and into Turkistan and Bokhara have been looked at with much uneasiness by Great Britain, as being dangerous military approaches toward the northwestem boundary of her Indian Empire, and the line ofthe Hindoo Kosh, the great bulwark of that boundary, has been sedulously guarded."

The myth of "Russian menace," said N. A. Khalfin, a Soviet historian, was created by the

British "in order to obscure the policy of aggrandizement exercised by the imperialists of

Britain, the USA and other powers." He continued, "British troops were invading Persia

""' Holdsworth, 54.

°̂̂ "Parliamentary Papers: Further Correspondence Respecting Central Asia," 2.

°̂̂ The New York Times, March 21, 1869.

71

and Afghanistan; British agents were conducting subversive activities in Bukhara, Khiva,

Khokand and Shinkiang (Eastem Turkistan). At home parliament and press covered up

these things with absurd talk about 'the Russian menace' to India." They knew that if

the Russians occupied Central Asia, British trade would stop entering these regions.

Eventually, this expectation came true. After the Russians had subdued the khanates, and

annexed strategically important places, they began to restrict and even prohibit British 7nR

products from entering their dominions. When the Govemor General of Turkistan, von

Kaufmann, erected customhouses and raised duties on the British goods to make it too

hard for the British to trade with Central Asia, the British could do nothing because they

had already lost the race undertaken in the Central Asian khanates. General M. G.

Chamiaev's reasoning for such a restrictive policy toward British products was the

protection ofthe Russian merchants and merchandise from unequal competition with

British merchants and goods.^"^ By 1889, Russia had already succeeded in establishing

her monopoly over the Central Asian trade. Almost all European goods sold in the

bazaars ofthe region came from Russia. The Russian monopoly ofthe trade not only

pushed British products out of Central Asia but also destroyed local manufactures.

Russian prints, calicoes, and cottons are successfully competing with the far more beautifiil native materials, and hideous brocades from Moscow debouch the instinctive good taste ofthe East. Russian iron, hardware, and porcelain have driven out the native manufacture of these articles. European ink, pens,

9 1 1

writing-paper, and note-books are exposed for sale.

The rivalry between the two great imperialist states ofthe nineteenth century not

only sparked and accelerated the partition of lands and the establishment of spheres of

influence, but also stopped just short of ambitious designs over the whole of Central Asia.

"̂̂ Khalfin, 1.

•"* Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 193.

-"' The Times, February 27, 1882.

210 Marvin, Conversations, 131.

^"Curzon, 189.

72

In this respect, while Russia successfully incorporated Turkistan into its empire, she

could not go farther to invade Persia and Afghanistan because of British opposition. The

overwhelming notion among the natives in Persia was that Russia would annex Persia at

any moment if the British did not resist that action. Major Napier, who was a secret

agent of Britain and was appointed to survey the state of political and military affairs

along the borders of Turkmenia, Persia, and Afghanistan, was told by Kazi. Sayid

Ahmed, of Astrabad in 1874 that "we know ... for certain that Russia would take

Astrabad and all Persia to-morrow if it were not for the British Minister's flag which is

planted in Teheran.""'^ After all, the fierce fight over the domination ofthe Middle East

ended satisfactorily to both sides. While Russia totally established her domination over

the Turkic lands and the northem part of Persia, England kept Afghanistan, southem

Persia, and the Persian Gulf.

One ofthe overwhelming views among historians, politicians, and researchers on

the causes ofthe Russian advance in Central Asia was that of Russia's desire to force

Great Britain in Central Asia to ease her strict policy of restricting Russia from gaining

political and economic privileges in the Near East and Europe. When the MOSCOM'

Gazette for the first time stated the acceptability of Afghanistan as a neutral zone between

the two empires, it demanded that the British sacrifice in the Near East by giving the

Russians a freer hand to deal with the Turks. The Times criticized this proposal, stating

that Russia's approach could mean only her ill-defined desire to create a revolt in India

against British rule.

The Times overwhelmingly shared the view that Russia would not have any

success in an attempt to invade India. Nonetheless, it intensively covered every move

that the Russians made in Central Asia. This dramatic attraction to the Russian moves in

the region resulted not only from regional but also from global political aspects. It was a

rivalry between two imperialist empires intent upon increasing their influence in the

Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia, 143.

The Times, September 25, 1869.

73

world. Besides gaining large territories, the Russians played an important role by giving

the British politicians hard times in Central Asia.

By taking up a position on our North-Westem borders, by accumulating troops, cultivating alliances, distributing subsidies and fostering intrigues, Russia would acquire a formidable engine to be employed against us in questions of European policy. To be brief, she could play for Constantinople by cards manipulated in Afghanistan, and might make us glad to purchase her forbearance abroad by connivance at her encroachments at home. '̂'*

"As early as 1858, Ignatiev, the Russian military attache in London, was writing 'In the

case of a conflict with England, it is only in Asia that we shall be able to stmggle with her

with any chances for success and to weaken her."""'^ Many Russian statesmen including

Tcharykow, who served for a long time in Bukhara as the Russian resident, had always

shared a similar notion." The notion that the Russians were making themselves strong

in Central Asia to threaten India and, as a result of such threat, to gain political

advantages in the Near East was shared all throughout the period. M. M. Shoemaker

believed that Istanbul was the end and aim of Russia's ambitions. "She knows that she

can never conquer India, and she knows that nature, in the shape ofthe Pamirs and the

almost impassable deserts, guards her eastem possessions better than all her armies can

do it. To my thinking, any war movement she makes in that direction is but a blind to

cover her advance on the city of Constantine." Archibald R. Colquhoun found a

parallel strength between Russia's power in Central Asia and her influence in Europe.

He said, "The more powerful Russia becomes in Central Asia, the weaker does England •510

become in India, and, consequently, the more amenable in Europe.""

^"' The Times, November 28, 1872.

'̂̂ D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 150; Khalfin, 30.

'̂* Tcharykow, 160.

'̂̂ Shoemaker, 301.

'̂* Archibald R. Colquhoun, Russia against India: the Struggle for Asia. London: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1900,202.

74

In a leading article. The Times stated that the Russians had seriously contemplated

attacking India during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 in order to prevent the British

from helping the Turks. They made it clear that if the British forces landed in Istanbul,

they would send expeditionary forces into India. They prepared for this goal, and forced

the Amir of Afghanistan to obey their demands. The Russian mission to Afghanistan in

1878 was aimed to send a message to the British waming them not to deprive then of

their latest gains in Turkey. Lord Argyll believed that it was necessary for the British to

send military forces into Afghanistan to stop the Russian menace in both Asia and

Europe."'^ According to the Novoye Vremya, the Russian concentration of military units

in Bukhara in 1878 was not an ordinary act. The size and attention paid to this army

were greater than was generally assumed. The Russians were not playing games when

they were carefully planning to attack India.

Aggrandizement of Russia

The Russians always found a pretext to attack the khanates. Their excuses in

capturing new lands were most ofthe time not tme. The same results could have been

achieved without going to war with these khanates. For example, prior to the Russian

attacks on the Khanate of Khokand there was not a serious provocative action on the

khan's side to make them angry. Yet the Russians tried to justify this activity as

establishing a better line of defense between Orenburg and Siberia up to the Chinese

frontiers and thus creating a profitable trade route. Again when the Russians attacked

the Khanate of Bukhara, they cited the amir's "bad faith" as an excuse to their aggressive

policy. And finally, when they attacked Khiva, they again accused the khan of being

hostile to the Russian interests in the region.

These pretexts had indeed no real ground because, in all three incidents, the

demands ofthe Russians had been more or less already accepted by the khanates prior to

the invasion of their territories. When Ignatiev traveled through Central Asia for a

219 The Times, February 11, 1879.

75

"diplomatic" mission in 1858, he met with the Khan of Khiva and the Amir of Bukhara.

Though the khan did not accept his proposals on the ground of Ignatiev's insincerity, the

Amir accepted almost all ofthe Russian demands including reduction in duties on

imports from Russia, opening the Amu Daria River to Russian ships for transportation,

and granting a right to the Russians to open a trade house in Bukhara.^^' The khan of

Khiva also tried hopelessly to avert a military confrontation with the Russians in 1873 by

sending embassies to both St. Petersburg and Orenburg, promising to accept all Russian

demands including freeing of all Russian slaves in the khanate. Indeed, the khan always

stated that there was no Russian slave in his kingdom except the men hired to work in his

gardens. Nevertheless, Russia used her colossal power to crash the khanates. This could

be interpreted only as joyftal satisfaction in the aggrandizement of her empire.

Russia had been quite successful in expanding her lands in almost every direction.

She was quite talented in hiding her tme feeling of joy in every gain and in creating

pretexts to cover up her expansionist appetite. She tended to show her gains as

unimportant ones to avoid arousing the jealousy ofthe world. By the time ofthe Khivan

expedition, the Russian press often asked what good it would do for Russia to invade a

strip of an impoverished territory. "When a Russian calls anything "unimportant,' you

may safely infer it to be his main object for the time being."

Despite all the prospects for peace, the Russians insisted upon invasions,

annexations, and subjugations ofthe khanates. This could be justified only on the ground

of trade, economic gains, and protection against unmly tribes. She had captured states

and lands including Poland in Europe with or without justification of spreading

civilization. It was the Russian hunger for "aggrandizement, or ... dictated at best, solely

by considerations of national expansion and military glory" to enlarge her territories at 99^

the expense of her neighbors.

"" The Times, October 6, 1879.

^̂ ' Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 228.

^̂ ^ 7776 Daily Telegraph, May 16, 1873.

^" The New York Times, April 18, 1873.

76

The so-called will of Peter I had been one ofthe most powerful policy tools for

Russian foreign relations. Though its credibility was controversial, the will had inspired

the Russians to capture Asia in order to be the most powerful nation in the world. It had

reflected a notion ofthe Russians' extreme fondness to enlarge their empire. As an

Ottoman newspaper, Vakit (the Time), stated, the Russian ultimate goal was to continue

interfering in the affairs of neighboring states, and if possible to conquer those states.

The Russian mentality and the core of Russia's intemational policy were based on

expansion because Russia had always wanted to be a world power.̂ "̂* Nothing would

stop the Russians except either the total absence of any type of weakness in the

neighboring states or the power of a stronger state to deter them from further interference

with neighboring countries.

To Reach Warm-Water Ports

Since the reign of Peter I, Russia had painstakingly developed policies and fought

for its ways to reach warm-water ports. Russia with her enormous land mass and many

rivers had no easy access to the most profitable and lively seaports ofthe world. Her

rivers, including the Don and the Dnieper flow into the Black Sea; Volga (Etil) and Ural

(Yayik) flow into the Caspian Sea. While the former sea was controlled by the Turkish

Straits to reach the Mediterranean, the Caspian was an inland sea. In order for Russia to

have an easy outlet to the rich markets ofthe South, she had to have control either over

the Turkish Straits, or over the Persian Gulf, and finally over the Indian Ocean from

Afghanistan. "As the great highways of westem commerce are the Mediterranean, the

Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean, and as she possesses very inadequate means of reaching

any of them, the great problem of Russian statesmanship must continue to be, as it has

^^* Mehmet, md. Vakit, April 17, 19, 1877. The Turkish version reads: "Hi? jiiphe yok ki... Rusya devleti butiin kitaat-i hamse-i malumeyi zabt etmege muvafik oldugu halde dahi ifsad ve istila ifin bir takim iktar-i mefhule arayacaktir. Bulamadigi halde derakib-i inkiraza yiiz tutacaktir. Zira Rusya hayati istila ve cihangirlik ile kaimdir. Yani Rusya devleti oyle bir makinedir ki miicerred-i ifsad ve istila istemiyle hareket edebilir. Rusya nm efkar-i istilakaranesine hadd-u payan yoktur... Rusya devleti komjulanm isad ve memleketlerini gasb ve zapt itmekle akhni bozmujtur dense sezadir.... Rusyanm icra-i merkebiyesi ve hayati umumiyesi cihangirlik ile kaimdir.

77

been for the last two hundred years, how to obtain for her a southem seaboard."^^^ For

them the most attractive access to open seas was the Turkish Straits. Russia had

attempted to establish her control on these straits many times. For this goal, she fought

many wars including the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774, the Crimean War (1853-

1856), and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 with the Ottoman Turks. Each time, she

found the European Big Powers, especially Great Britain, as a helper ofthe Turks to

oppose her aims in the Straits. Seeing it as too difficult to establish her control over the

Turkish Straits not only because of firm British opposition, but also because ofthe

objections of other European big powers, including France, Austria, and German, the

annexation of Central Asia loomed very important for getting closer to the Indian Ocean.

When the time and the condition were right, she hoped to have an outlet to this sea.

Furthermore, she had more chance of reaching warm-water ports on the Indian Ocean

than on the Mediterranean because Russia's real rivals in this part ofthe world were

Great Britain and two weak and corrupt states, namely, Persia and Afghanistan. The

other big powers most likely would not interfere in the stmggle between Russia and Great

Britain as long as this struggle was limited to Central Asia.

In a leading article, "Russia Stmggling for Water." The Pall Mall Gazette claimed

that the Persian Gulf was one ofthe most attractive places for Russia to satisfy her thirst

for an open port. Persia, whose army was nothing and would "vanish like smoke before a

European force,"""^ was not strong enough to stop Russia from gaining access to the

Persian Gulf Nevertheless, Great Britain with her enormous sea power was again a real

obstacle to Russian goals in this water. Initially, it would be a disastrous action for the

Russians to invade Persia directly and thus reach the Indian Ocean. But if she gradually

made her way behind Persia and Afghanistan in Central Asia, and if she erected a strong

enough force in Central Asia to deal with Persia, Afghanistan, and, most importantly.

Great Britain, she would not hesitate to annex either Persia or Afghanistan, or even both,

to deal with the British in India and thus reach the Indian Ocean.

^̂ ^ The New York Times, January 29, 1873.

--^ The Pall Mall Gazette, July 5, 1895.

78

Many letters and articles published in The Times mentioned a sinister plan ofthe

Russians behind their annexations in Central Asia. According to these letters, the

conquest of Central Asia was not an end to Russian politics, but a means to new ventures.

Russian acquisitions in Central Asia have not hitherto proved remunerative. They involve no motive of self-defense, of expansion, or of material development on the part of a nation already possessed of vast territories unpeopled and untilled, and, save as the mean to an end, they must be too exhaustive and ruinous to be persistently prosecuted. They are prosecuted, nevertheless, in despite of every economic disadvantage and in defiance ofthe most solemn engagements.^^^

If Russia were to be left unchecked, she

Would lead the subjugation of Europe by Asia. The danger is clear to any one who will take up the map. Russia already becoming a paramount power in Northem China; Russia with a port on the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean treated as right beyond question; Russia connecting Central Asia with Persian Gulf by railways, from Askabad southwards, and from Tiflis by Kars and the Turco-Persian frontier, thus making herself independent ofthe Dardanelles and the Suez Canal, and cutting into the direct Indo-European line of overland communication. A conflict between East and West for the dominion ofthe old world is imminent. Slav and Saxon must contend for supremacy, even for equality, and upon the skill and determination ofthe two opponents hangs the fiiture of Asia, and not only of Asia but of Europe.̂ ^^

All throughout the period under scmtiny, the Russians and the British rivaled one

another in the Near East and Middle East not only for regional imperialist interests, but

also supremacy in world affairs. In this respect, the Russians thought they were not only

deprived of easy access to warm waters, but also bullied by British diplomacy to keep

them weaker as a continental power rather than as a world-dominating hegemonic one.

Yet, the Russians carefully and skillfully manipulated opportunities offered by both its

ovm resources and weaknesses ofthe Central Asian Turkic states to establish a

protectorate over large territories.

"^ A. B. Kemball, The Times, January 30, 1879.

^̂ * Colquhoun, 231-32.

79

CHAPTER III

THE COVERAGE BY THE TIMES OF LONDON OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN KHANATES AND TURKMENIA

IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTRURY

First Contacts with the Khanates

Russian expansion in Asia had been going on for many centuries when The Times

started to show intensive interest in the Russian southward expansion against the Central

Asian Khanates, namely Khokand, Bukhara, and Khiva. It was already in the 1840's that

the Russians directly began to menace the khanates, which was a new development that

held major significance for Britain because ofthe perceived threat to India.

In The Times on September 29, 1851, excerpted from the German Constitutional

Gazette, was an article summarizing Russian expansionist history prior to actual contact

with the khanates. According to this, in 1839 the Russians undertook a fatal expedition

against Khiva (Khorasan) to erect Russian authority in Central Asia to counterbalance

British designs in Afghanistan. In this respect, the British had sent their Indian armies

into Kabul to end Russian intrigues. Thus, both ofthe imperialist powers undertook these

military expeditions to check each other in the region. However, both undertakings failed • 990

and cost many men and much money to both empires.

Though their jealousy and fear of British encroachment into Central Asia were the

main reasons for the Russian expedition of 1839, the Russians held responsible the "bad

faith" ofthe Khan of Khiva. They believed that General Perovski aimed to strike the

Khanate of Khiva to end intrigues nested there, and to save money and manpower by 9^0

erecting new forts against the Kazakh incursions. These failed military expeditions

showed that jealousy and conflicting interests of two imperialist big powers were going ^ '̂ 7726 Times, September 29, 1851. According to The Times of March 19, 1873, Perovski's forces consisted of 5,000 men and 10,000 camels. Though the expeditionary force marched into the territories ofthe khanate, because ofthe exfreme cold and lack of provision many of them died. Then the Russians had to retreat. The article stated that the refreat could only be compared with the horrors ofthe French retreat from Moscow.

-̂ ° M. A. Terentyef, Russia and England in Central .Asia. Vol. 1. Trans, by F. C. Daukes. Calcutta: The Department Press, 1876, 43.

80

to determine the fate ofthe Central Asian Khanates as well as Afghanistan and Persia in

both Moscow and London in the decades to come. Thus, Central Asia became a new

strategic area for both Russian and British political and diplomatic efforts, a theater for

fierce rivalry between these imperialist powers.

Russia's expansion in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century

was directed toward Europe, the Near East and Asia. Since Europe and the Near East

were more important for the great powers than Asia. Russian expansion in the Kazak

steppes received very little attention in both the press and the politics of Europe.^^'

Furthermore, the Crimean War of 1853-56 temporarily checked Russian aggressive and

expansionist policies in the Balkans and in the Near East. Humiliated and contained in

these regions, Russia began to quench her expansionist thirst in the east. Thus, she

intensified her attention on Asia in general and on the Turkic khanates in particular in the 9^9

second half of the nineteenth century. Though Russia's successes gained in Turkistan

were not as satisfactory and great as her successes in the Balkans, Europe, or the Near

East, Russia did not stop working toward new territories and new places in Central Asia.

Since three cormpt, backward, and impotent governments mled this region, and since

these were unable to unity against possible outside invaders, the Russians could gain easy

victories and swallow large territories without spending much money and losing many 233

men.

Russia surveyed the military, economic, strategic, and social stmctures of targeted

areas.̂ "̂* Under the guise of scientific explorations Russians had familiarized themselves

with the region. In 1829, two Germans, Alexander von Humboldt and Carl Ritter. were

supported by the Russian govemment to discover the lands in Thian-Shan (Tanri

- '̂ Mehmet Saray, Ruslann Orta Asyayi Ele Gegirmeleri. Translated by Erkut Goktan. Ankara: Orta Dogu Teknik University, 1984, 3.

^" Khalfin, 24.

233 A. Nimet Kurat, Rusya Tarihi, 346-47.

^̂ '' Baymirza Hayit, Tiirkistan Devletlerinin Milli Miicadeleleri Tarihi. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kuramu Basimevi, 1995, 65.

Daglari), Lake Balkash, and Eastem Turkistan. And in 1834, M. Vasily Fedorov traveled

through these countries for more detailed research on the landscape and geographical

features ofthe region. In addition, in 1835, Vitkevitch visited Bukhara and brought

valuable information about military and economic strength ofthe khanate.̂ '̂ "'' Between

1836 and 1843, many embassies were exchanged with Bukhara. Among them was a

well-known Russian mission led by Colonel Butenev, accompanied by N. Khannikov,

that reached Bukhara in 1843. Its political aim was to reach an agreement with the amir

to reduce trade dues, to protect Russian merchants, and, if possible, to free two British

captives, Stoddard and Connolly, who had been imprisoned by the Amir Nasmllah in

Bukhara. Though the mission retumed empty handed as far as the signing of an official

treaty and the saving ofthe British subjects were concemed, it had succeeded in

surveying the khanate.^^^ These expeditions were initial steps for future Russian military,

economic, and political activities.^^'

By the 1840's, Russia succeeded in establishing herself firmly beyond the

Orenburg- Siberian line, which was a cordon of fortified Cossack outposts.^^^ After

completing the invasion ofthe Kazak steppes in the late 1840's, Russia began to apply

'̂ ^ H. Zalesoff, "Diplomatic Relations between Russia and Bokhara." In The Russians in Central Asia. Trans, by John and Robert Michell. London: Edward Stanford, 1865, 437.

"* "The Russians in Cenfral Asia." The Quarterly Review 118 (July-October 1865): 543-547; H. Zalesoff. "Diplomatic Relations between Russia and Bokhara," 437. Kahannikof wrote Bukhara, Its Amir, and Its People in 1843. According to The Quarterly's article, the Russians called Kazakhs as Kirghiz, and the Kirghiz as Kara-Kirghiz or Buruts. Humboldt who visited the region in the 1830's, claimed that the population of all Kazakh and Kirghiz fribes was around 2,500,000. Russians also did not made distinction between the Kiptchaks and Kara-Kirghiz. They treated all tribes in Khirgizia as the Kirghiz tribes because Kiptchaks, Naimans and Kitais ofthe region basically blended into the Kirghiz.

^̂ ^ Frederick Von Hellwald, The Russians in Central Asia: A Critical Examination down to the Present (1874) Time ofthe Geography and History of Central Asia. Translated from the German by Theodore Wirgman. London: Henry S. King & Co., 1874, 63.

"* Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. 219 (April 1873), 327; "The Russians in Cenfral Asia." The Quarterly Review 118 (July-October 1865): 530. The Orenburg Siberian line commenced from Guriev on the mouth ofthe Yayik (Ural) River, followed up the left bank ofthe river to Orenburg and Orsk, and then crossed by the head streams ofthe Tobol River to Troitska. From there it followed through Pefro-pavlovsk on the Ishim and Omsk on the Irtish, and reached to Semipolatinsk and Bakharatminsk on the Chinese border.

82

aggressive policies toward the Central Asian khanates.'̂ ^^ She began to strengthen her

position in the Syr Daria and the Caspian Sea regions. At first her aim was to surround

them in the east, the north and the west, to weaken them, and to eliminate any chance of

them receiving outside help.

In order to make decisive attacks on Khokand, Russia constructed new fortresses

along the Irgiz and Turgay rivers. In 1847, Russia constmcted Kopal fortress and

established Kazachik military station at Sergopal. In the same year, Russia built two

naval bases, Kara-Butak and Kos Aral, as well as fort Aralsk on the Aral Sea. She

brought two steamers into this sea to use against the khanates in her future attacks.^^"

She was ready to capture Khokandian territories lying in the east ofthe Syr Daria River.

These regions were important places for trade and communication between Eastem

Turkistan and Westem Turkistan, as well as between Russia and China. The strategic

importance ofthe region and the preparations ofthe Russians created an impression on

the local people that a Russian invasion of Central Asia was pending in the 1850's. '

While preparations were underway in the east ofthe khanates, the Russians also

attempted to create another center for complete subjugation of Central Asia in the

Transcaspian region. The Caucasus was the center for the future military expeditions

against Khiva and Turkmenia.̂ "*^ It would have been a great blow to the Russian

expansion in Central Asia if a plan drawn by the commander ofthe Turkish forces, Omer

Pasha, during the Crimean War, was put under execution. The plan aimed to make a

joint-attack by the British, French, and Turkish forces on the Russian armies in the

Caucasus, freeing the region from Russian influence. By this way, Russia would have

lost her supremacy over not only the Caucasus but also over Persia and the Caspian Sea.

^ '̂ Akdes Nimet Kurat, "Tsarist Russia and the Muslims of Central Asia." In The Cambridge History of Islam. Vol. 1. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970, 507.

'̂ ° Hayit, 63; Singh, Sodhi Hukm. A History of Khokand: From the Commencement of Russian Intercourse until the Final Subjugation ofthe Country by That Power. Lahore: Govemment Civil Secretariat Press, 1878, 3. Singh was the Mir Munshi at Penjub Secretariat.

'̂" Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 228.

-*- Angus Hamilton, Problems ofthe Middle East. London: Eveleigh Nash, 1909, 73; Kazemzadeh, 251.

83

Yet because of rivalry between two partners, France and England, the plan did not

work."̂ "*

The Caspian Sea was an important strategical place for exerting pressure on

Persia, and Turkmen lands. This sea also provided an easy access to the Russian military

forces in the Transcaspian region because of its water connection with the Volga (Etil)

River. Conscious ofthe strategic importance ofthe Caspian Sea, Russia already operated

three hundred steamers on this water in the 1850's.̂ '*'*

General V. A. Perovski, Govemor General of Orenburg (1833-42 and 1851-57),

who was responsible for the fatal expedition of 1839 against Khiva, sent an army under

the pretext of a response to an incursion ofthe Turkomans against the southem coast of

the Caspian Sea."^" Yet the expedition did not produce a sound result other than

reconnaissance ofthe region. For the time being, the eastem coast ofthe Caspian stayed

free from military and political undertakings. The time had yet to come to find a point

d'appuie in this region against the Turkmen tribes.

Despite her interests in capturing the Transcaspian region and attacking the

khanates from the west, Russia faced two important difficulties on this front. First, the

distance between the Caspian Sea and the oasis ofthe Khanate of Khiva consisted of

mostly barren and desert region with extreme cold in the winter and scorching heat in the

summer: it was much longer than the distance between the Russian outposts and the

Khanate of Khokand in the east. Second, the warlike Turkmen tribes were not willing to

make Russia's desires any easier. Even though the Russians had gained unchallengeable

power over the Caspian Sea and established military harbors on the westem shores, the

eastem sides stayed free from Russian control for a long time. Thus, the Russians chose

"'*' Saray, Rus Ifgali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti, 57.

-•*̂ "The Russians in Cenfral Asia." The Quarterly Review 118 (July-October 1865): 531.

^*^ The Times, September 29, 1851; Blerzy, H. "Les Revolutions de I'Asie Cenfrale," Revue des Deia Mondes 50 (1874): 133; The New York Times, April 22, 1873. According to Blerzy, the Russian forces consisted of 6,500 men, and 12,000 camels. The New York Times stated that Perovski's forces were 20,000 sfrong, and after the failed expedition, he retumed with a handfiil of survivors.

84

to attack the khanates from the most vulnerable side of Central Asia, the Khanate of

Khokand.'"*^

Invasion ofthe territories lying in the east of Syr Daria River was seriously

contemplated by General Annenkov at the time of General Perovski's attack on Khiva in

1839. Yet because of Perovski's unwillingness to prosecute such a plan, the attack in the

east was postponed. '*̂ In 1851, when General Perovski was for the second time

appointed as the Govemor General of Samara and Orenburg, the Russians intensified

aggressive policies against the khanates. By the 1850's, they fully established their

authority over the Sea of Aral.̂ '*^ Yet these preparations were not considered as hostile

steps against Khokand, since these places did not really belong to the Khokandians. The

Kirghiz and the Kazakhs who had already become Russian subjects generally lived on

this region.̂ '*^ However, in 1852 the Russians acquired a footing in the vicinity of Ak

Mescid by purchasing it from Yakub Khan of Tashkent. It was a tract of land containing

a small lake, Balick Gol. Though the khan objected to selling of a part of his kingdom,

he could not reverse the agreement reached between the Russians and Yakub Bey, future

king of Kashgaria.^^"

The Fall of Ak Mescid

The first serious Russian attempt to take Ak Mescid was in 1852. In the attack.

Colonel Blaremberg stormed the fortress but his forces, consisting of some 400 men,

were badly defeated by the defenders.^^' The Khokandians again in the same year

-"'*' Emil Jonveaux, "L'invalide Russe, 1865-66." Revue des deux Mondes 67 (1867): 972; Von Hallwald, 124; Emil Jonweaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale," 975.

-'*' Terentyef, 28; Hayit, 65. According to Terentyef the Russian forces consisted of 469 men and 2 guns, and they lost 72 men. Hayit claims that the Russians had 600 infantty, 200 cavalry, and 15 guns.

'̂'̂ Von Hallwald, 125.

"̂̂ Jonweaux. "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 976.

^^''Singh, 3.

'^' "The Russians in Central Asia," 550.

85

defeated Russian forces consisting of 1250 cavalry, 4 artillery units, and 36 guns.̂ ^^

Though they twice failed to take Ak Mescid, the Russians determined to take the fort

because Ak Mescid would be a key town on a projected direct defensive line between

westem Siberia and Orenburg.

A Russian force consisting of 1,500 men and a few heavy guns under General

Perovski's command stormed the town for the third time in 1853. The leader ofthe

defenders was Yakub Bey. He left the fortress to get fresh forces against the Russians.̂ ^^

The new leader ofthe defenders, Abdul Vali, was killed during the battle. This time, the

town fell despite a heroic 22-day defense by a handful of defenders, "Who were only

three hundred strong, notwithstanding the loss of their chief, and who fought with lion

like courage, and two hundred and thirty fell dead on the scene of conflict, which they

had defended inch by inch, but all in vain."^ '̂* In Russian hands, the town was renamed

as Fort Perovski. As D. Charles Boulger stated.

For twenty-five days the Russian fire swept over the insignificant stronghold, and during all those days the small garrison, encouraged by the example set them by their leader in their desperate straits, held out. Several assaults made by the Russians before the walls had been leveled with the ground were repulsed, and the Khokandians had done everything to save their honour and to inspire a chivalrous enemy with respect for their courage. ""

25 Hayit, 65. Terentyef does not mention this second failed attack.

' " Kurat, "Tsarsit Russia and the Muslims of Cenft-al Asia," 510.

-'^ Jonweaux. "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centt-ale," 977; Terentyef, 28; Hayit, 65; Kurat, Tsarist Russia, 510; Von Hellwald, 129; Singh, 3; "The Russians in Centt-al Asia," 551. According to Terentyef the Russian forces composed of 2,168 men, 12 guns and 5 mortars. The town was defended by 250 men. At the end of the battle, the Russians lost 106 men killed and wounded, and only 74 defenders remained alive. Hayit states that the Russian forces included 2500 soldiers, 12 Kazachic (local men) sotnia (a sotnia comprises around 150 men) 52 ships and 36 guns that fought against a fortress in which 20 soldiers, 280 civilian men, 83 women and 65 childrenresided. The Russians killed 206 men and women and enslaved the survivors. Singh claims that the Russians, without declaring war, quietly besieged the fort for 40 days before they finally captured it.

"^ Demefrius Charles Boulger, Central Asian Portraits: the Celebrities ofthe Khanates and the Neighbouring States. London, W. H. Allen & Co., 1880, 103-116. According to Boulder, Yakub Beg, the fijttire khan of Kashgaria between 1866-1877, was "a short, thickish-built man, with a countenance that seemed to have attained the most complete immobility of expression. Although on a first glance his face was one that would not claim your attention, a closer inspection showed it to possess signs of great resolution and firmness."

86

The capture of Ak Mescid was a big blow to the power and security ofthe

Khanate of Khokand. The khan had sent his armies under the command of Shadman

Khoja and Kasim Mingbashi to retake it. However, these armies failed to defeat the

Russian forces and retake the fort.̂ ^^ In order to strengthen their newly gained position,

the Russians, on the other hand, paused their onward move for a while and erected two

new forts, Kasaly and Karmakchi, on the Syr Daria between Ak Mescid and Aralsk.

These three forts plus Aralsk formed the so-called "line ofthe Syr Darya."^"

Upon losing an important fortress, the govemment of Khokand panicked and

began to seek outside help. For this, the khan sent Shahzada Sultan Muhammad to India.

The primary objective ofthe envoy was to secure some Brhish officers and drill

instmctors for the Khokandian army. The Indian govemment cautiously declined to help

them.̂ ^^ In their rejection, the unfortunate fate of two English officers. Captain Arthur

Connolly and Colonel Charles Stoddard, both of whom were murdered by the order of

the Amir of Bukhara in 1842, played important role because the British came to despise

the monarchs of Central Asia.̂ ^^

The failure ofthe Khokandian armies to retake Ak Mescid, and the growing

Russian power in the region created popular resistance against the Russians. Izzet

Kutebar, "Schamyl ofthe desert," the leader of Kirghiz and Kazakh guerillas, was

disturbed by the successes ofthe "infidel" Russians and preached war against them. He

successfully attacked and paralyzed Russian communication lines for five years. Though

General Perovski applied the "divide and rule" principle to subdue Kutebar by supporting

another Kirghiz leader. Sultan Arslan, the Russians could not suppress Kutebar's rising.

Izzet Kutebar's successful campaigns were ended only when the Russians granted him

"* Singh, 4.

^" Von Hellwald, 129.

'̂* Singh, 4; Saray, Ruslarin Orta Asyayi Ele Gecirmeleri, 1. According to Singh, the British Indian Govemment agreed to send three native officers including Nabi Bakhsh who organized an army under Alim Kul's command. Later, he went to Kashgaria and entered Yakub Beg's service as commander ofthe Yarkant forces.

259 Saray, Rus Ifgali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti, 44.

87

amnesty and "flattering proposals" in 1858.'̂ °̂ Furthermore, the war with Turkey and

struggle against Schamyl's forces in the Caucasus disheartened the Russians enough to

postpone immediate adventures in Turkistan.'^^' Despite the temporary setback, the fall

of Ak Mescid was a great gain for the Russians as a point d'appui to their further

ambitious adventures; it brought the downfall of Khokand one step closer.

So far the developments in Central Asia did not attract much attention from the

British press. The Times had no real record of these developments as they took place.

Yet, in an article published on 29 December 1854, The Times stressed the importance of

Russian gains and aggressive policies against the khanates. The Times did not signal that

these developments were harmfiil to British interests in India. It stated,

It is perfectly palpable that Russia has been gradually working her way down to our frontier, never making a startling move, but steadily advancing her pavms. Her object is to establish her paramount influence throughout the various tribes of Central Asia, to inspire them with awe of her power, and to impress on their minds that the Russians are far more powerfiil than the English, though they have conquered Hindustan.^^^

The paper further stated that the steady expansion of Russia was a sinister expansion

aiming to subdue the khanates and to control all political activities in the region. For this

purpose, Russia wanted to reach an understanding between Khiva, Bukhara, and

Afghanistan."^^ Yet this peace attempt was just a dilatory tactic to hide the desire to

capture new places.

Meanwhile, in Khokand, responding to the harsh mle of Khudyar Khan (1845-58

and 1865-75), an opposition party rebelled and raised Malle Khan (1858-1862) to the

throne. The rebels forced Khudyar to seek refuge in Bukhara in 1858. In the same year,

the Amir of Bukhara attempted to capture Khokand, but the Khokandian forces defeated

him. The Khokandian forces also showed some successes in 1860 and 1861 against the

260 Von Hellwald, 130; Jonweaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 978.

^̂ ' Hayit, 66.

*̂̂ The Times, December 29, 1854.

^" The Times, Febmary 28, 1854.

Russians. They defeated a Russian army before the town of Tokmak and retook the town

ofAshing.^ '̂*

Though the Russians had leamed a great deal about Central Asia through their

spies, merchants, and scientific expeditions, they were still not quite sure about the exact

size ofthe power ofthe khanates. In order to familiarize themselves with the region and

create new policies for the future, they sent new envoys. These envoys consisted of

scholars of many sorts including geographers, historians, geologists, ethnographers, and

most importantly military strategists. Between 1857 and 1859 three missions were sent

to the Central Asia khanates.

The first mission, headed by N. V. Khanikov, who had visited Central Asia in

1841 -42 and written on Bokhara, its Amir and its People, was surveying Khorasan, and

collecting geographical, ethnic, and military data about the eastem borders of Persia,

Afghanistan, and westem Turkmen country. Khanikov drew a map ofthe region.

Another Russian mission, led by Captain Valikhanov, a son of a Kazakh Sultan, headed

Kashgaria to discover the economic and political prospects for future Russian policy in

Kashgaria. The best-known embassy, however, was N. P. Ignatiev's mission to Bukhara

and Khiva in 1858. In this mission, 83 persons including escorts accompanied Ignatiev.

The aim ofthe mission was to break the British infiuence in the khanates, to seek better

transportation conditions on the Amu Daria River, and to reach a better commercial treaty

with the khanates. Furthermore, Russia also hoped to demonstrate her power and

increase her prestige in the region. It was a hostile and arbitrary mission forced on these

khanates by the tsarist govemment. In order to guarantee the safety ofthe members of

the mission, the Russians detained Khivan merchants in Orenburg.

^̂ ^ Singh, 5.

-" Von Hellwald, 9-10; Khalfin, 29; Holdsworth, 51. Khanikov knew Turkic languages, traveled in Butnev's expedition as a mining engineer and wrote this description of Bukhara in 1843. He was founder ofthe Caucasus branch ofthe Imperial Geographical Society, performed scientific explorations in Khorasan, and worked as franslator in the Asian Department.

*̂̂ Khalfin, 30; Hayit, 68; Saray, Ruslann Orta Asyayi Ele Gegirmeleri, 5; D'Encausse, Reforme et Revolution Chez les Musulmans de I Empire Russe, 70-71.

89

The Khan of Khiva, Said Muhammed (1856-64), received Ignatiev on July 18,

1858. But the meeting was not a friendly one and did not go well because the khan,

through his spies, had leamt the real goals ofthe mission. He knew that the mission was

secretly encouraging the Yomud Turkmens to rebel against him and was only trying to

learn more about his khanate as a prelude to military conquest. Furthermore, an attempt

by the Russians to take away a Persian slave during their stay in Khiva was the last

breaking point. The khan saw no sincerity from the mission. He rejected all Russian

proposals and sent away the mission empty handed.̂ ^^

Though Ignatiev did not have any provisions from Khiva, he was well accepted by

Amir Nasmllah (1827-60) in Bukhara on 16 October 1859. The amir granted rights to

the Russians, including trade on the Amu Daria River, a reduction in the duty rate taken

from the Russian merchants, and permission to open a trade agency in Bukhara. Ignatiev

on his part encouraged the amir to attack Khokand. After the long stay in Central Asia,

the Russian envoy retumed to Orenburg in December 1859. In his final report, Ignatiev

firmly stated that these khanates did not have strong military power. Thus, "negotiations

should give way to military action which would extend Russia's frontiers into Central 9fiR

Asia and open the local markets to Russian merchants."

A treaty signed between Ignatiev and the Chinese in 1860 allowed Russian

merchants to trade in the Chinese territories in the north whhout paying any taxes.

This new development increased the importance of Central Asia as a short and direct

trade route to China. Furthermore, in 1861 the tsar appointed Ignatiev as the head of

Asian affairs, and D. A. Miliutin as war minister. Along with these two pan-Slavists and

active policy supporters in St. Petersburg, the Govemor-General of Orenburg, General

Bezak (1860-65), supported immediate military operations against the khanate of

Khokand.^^" Finally, the capture of Shymil in 1859 helped Russia establish a strong and

^̂ ^ Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 228.

*̂* Khalfin, 33-34; Hayit, 69.

^^'Hayit, 71.

90

secure departing point in the Caucasus.^^' By 1860, the Russians were fully ready to put

in motion their conquest of Central Asia. Indeed since the capture of Ak Mescid in 1853

there were more than twenty battles fought between the Russian and Khokandian forces.

In these wars, the Khokandians fought with courage and patience, but they lost many

lives to Russian artillery fire.^^^ Constantly expanding Russian frontiers at the expense of

local states had shown that the Russian forces in these confrontations performed their

utmost military skills.

The Fall of Turkistan (Yesse), Chimkent, Aulie Ata

Khokandian forts which had been erected to guard the khanate against Kirghiz

harassments—namely Suzak, Cholak-Kurgan, Aulia Ata, Merke and Pishpek—tempted

the Russians to occupy them in order to establish the long-desired Syr Daria line.̂ ^^

Along with this desire for a new defensive line, the impossibility of profitable trade

between the Kazakh steppes and the westem Siberia and the quality and suitability ofthe

soil for settlements drew Russian attention to these territories. "At the upper courses of

the Hi, Chui, Syr-Daria and other rivers, there is picturesque scenery and land richly

endowed by nature. Such are found in the neighbourhoods of Almaty (Vemoe),

Tashkent, Khodjend and other places. All these localities are remarkable for the fertility

of their soil, for the luxuriance of their vegetation, and for their mineral wealth.""̂ "* In

1861, the Russians were ready to move against the khanate to take these forts.

While Russian armies were attacking Khokand towns and adding new territories

in the east, Russian agents were busy in Turkmen country to induce the Turkmens to

attack Khiva and Persia. According to a dispatch sent by P. Thomson, the British Charge

"™ Hayit, 73.

^" Saray, Ruslarin Orta Asyayi Ele Gegirmeleri, 6.

"^ Hayit, 72.

^" "The Russians in Central Asia," 557.

"" D. I. Romanovski, Notes on the Central Asian Question. Calcutta: Office of Superintendent of Govemment Printing, 1870, 3.

91

d 'Affaires at Teheran, in 1854 the Russians took Tashkent and established their authority

over the khanates of Khokand and Bukhara.̂ ^^ Though the report was not true, it

perfectly predicted the Russian desire to capture this important town. He also claimed

that the Russian expansion in the region was reducing Persia's economic and political

interests. Persia was ready to attack Russia if the Allies (Britain, France and Turkey)

promised to include her into their alliance and did not make a separate peace with Russia.

Yet the Shah was afraid of Russian power. The Russian ambassador at Teheran, Prince 97/^

Dolgorouki, was openly threatening him.

The Times' reporter from St. Petersburg believed that Russia's aim at this point

was to have all commercial activities under her control and develop a profitable Russian

trade in the region. Already, Russian products easily reach to the khanates of Khiva,

Khokand, and Bukhara; also to important cities, such as Herat, Candahar, and Cabul.

The correspondent stressed that English products could not compete with Russian 977

products as the Russians increased their political power. A letter written by "B.CS.," claimed that

In the khanate of Kokan Russia has been working like a mole under ground, secure from interference, and ceaselessly pushing on her conquests. These semi-barbarous States, ever at feud with one another, and in themselves weak, are yet highly fertile and attractive enough to an invader. That they must be so is clear from the fact that 300,000 Russian troops are stationed along the frontier lying between the Caspian Sea and the Balkash Lake—a force most assuredly not required for defensive purposes only.

While the Russians were capturing frontier tovms and forts, the political disorder

within the khanate further weakened resistance against the Russians. In 1862, a

conspiracy group led by Shadman Khoja killed Malle Khan. This conspiracy group

elected Shah Murad Beg, a nephew of Malle Khan, to the throne. Yet, Shah Murad's

The Times, November 18, 1854.

'''Ibid.

"^ The Times, September 27, 1859.

"* The Times, January 9, 1857.

92

reign lasted only a few months because the Amir of Bukhara, Muzaffar, marched on

Khokand and succeeded in subduing it. He put Khudyar Khan on the throne. Yet

Khudyar Khan could not hold the throne long because of a strong opposition group led by

Alim Kul, a high-ranking Kirghiz at the khan's court. Thus, Khudyar again had to escape

into Bukhara, as he had done in 1858. With the help of Alim Kul, Said Muhammed Khan

(1862-1865) was elected as the new khan. Since Said Muhammed was just 12 years old, 970

Alim Kul became the regent.

Though the Polish rebellion in Europe paralyzed Russia's social and political life

in 1863, the Russians did not delay their goals in Central Asia. During this rebellion.

Great Britain sided with the Polish revolutionaries, which increased Russian hatred

against the British. Thus, in order to score against Great Britain in Asia, the Russians

captured territories in the khanates to challenge the British in India.'̂ ^"

In 1863, the Russian forces led by Colonel Chemiaev and Colonel Protsenko were

ordered to reconnoiter territories up to Aulie-Ata and Turkistan. Though they were not

necessarily instmcted to use force and take any town or fort. Colonel Chemiaev captured

Suzak, and Protsenko invaded Kurtka and Dzhumgal. St. Petersburg joyfully received

news of these easy victorious. In the next year, Russian forces led by Chemiaev took

Aulie-Ata and Chimkent.

The capture of Aulie Ata took four days. In the stmggle, the Khokandians lost

1,600 men, while the Russian losses were estimated to be around 500. In the first

confrontation, the Russian forces failed to take Chimkent, and were defeated by the

Khokandian forces led by Alim Kul. Another Russian force led by Colonel Verevkin

captured Turkistan (Yesse), the birthplace of famous saint, Khodja Ahmed Yessevi.

According to Singh, some people led by Taljik Tura secretly agreed with the Russians to

open the gates ofthe city. In this juncture, the Russians offered a peaceful existence if

-'" Singh, 7.

^̂ ^ Hayit, 74.

93

they were not disturbed from their newly acquired places, including Yesse, Aulie Ata,

Pishpak, Almati, and Marki. But, Alim Kul did not accept the Russian proposal.^^'

Upon these successes, Chemiaev was made general and appointed the military

govemor ofthe newly established Syr Daria district under the Govemor-Generalship of 9R9 •

Orenburg. The loss of important Khokandian cities, namely Chimkent, Hazret-i

Turkistan (Yesse), and Aulie-Ata to Russia, created anxiety in Britain. Since the British

always thought the free khanates were key to the security of their possession in India at

this time, they were greatly irritated by these successes. In order to restrain the

unfavorable feelings that arose abroad, especially in Great Britain, Prince Gorchakov,

Russian Foreign Minister, dispatched a circular to the ambassadors ofthe foreign

missions in 1864. In the circular, he stated that Russia was obliged to stabilize her 9R^

territories against the nomads, who knew no respect for the territories of others.

Losing new territories forced the Khokandians to seek foreign help. They sent

envoys to the Ottomans and the British. The former wanted to help them but declined

because of distance, lack of direct communications and resources. The latter, however,

did not want to help the Khokandians and only suggested that they obey Russian

demands.

To establish a strong district in the east side of Syr Daria River, the Russians had

to take Tashkent, one ofthe most populous cities of Central Asia. It was before the

capture of this city that a dispatch received from Tifiis stated that the Ozbek forces near

Chimkent had defeated the Russians. Yet, The Times did not believe that this defeat was

a total blow for the Russians since they had a great design in the region.̂ ^^ The next day,

in an editorial in The Times, the author sorrowfully narrated the defeat. "It is in this

^̂ ' Singh, 7-8. In this confrontation, the Khokandian forces were 35,000 men and 35 guns, and the Russians consisted of 12,000 men and 13 guns. The former lost 1,500 killed, and the latter lost 400.

^̂ ^ Von Hellwald, 136; Saray, Ruslann Orta .Asyayi Ele Gegirmeleri, 8; Hayit, 77.

^̂ ^ Von Hellwald, 139. Hayit, 79.

284 , Saray, Ruslarin Orta Asyayi Ele Gegirmeleri, 10.

'^^ The Times, }me 15, 1865.

94

district of Central Asia or Independent Tartary that a Russian army 50,000 strong has just

fought a great battle, and is somewhat apocryphally reported to have met with a decisive

defeat." He also believed that the Russians lost 4,000 in the battle and were retreating

hopelessly under their commander. General Endikimoff

In this case we may honestly declare that all our sympathies with the force which is now said to be in full flight and immediate peril.... It may or may not be true that the policy of Russia is of a traditional and aggressive character, and that there still exist at St. Petersburg vague projects of absorbing the east in one great Empire. But for generations yet to come any such project must be a wild and unpractical dream, and, amid the ever-changing political elements of dominion, speculations as to such far away future will not influence the action of a reasonable statesman.... We hope that next advice may inform us that the Russian General has succeeded in extricating himself from what would appear to be a critical position.^^^

After hoping and praying for the Russian forces to recover from the dangerous situation.

The Times' editorial stated that the Russians would continue to execute their great design.

For the time being, Russian forces were preparing to take Tashkent in order to have its 987

very fertile lands. The tone represented in The Times' editorial was quite pro-Russian

and was indeed moumful about the Russian perceived losses, though the news was not at

all true.

Meanwhile, the Russian forces led by Chemiaev were attempting to take

Chimkent. A strong Khokandian army led by Alim Kul succeeded in repulsing the first

Russian attack. According to Singh, the Russians were three times in the same year

beaten back before Chimkent. In each instance, Alim Kul showed a great leadership and

forced the Russians to retire back to Yesse.̂ ^^ Before the Russians were totally driven

286 The Times, June 16, 1865.

'"Ibid.

*̂* Singh, 8-9. Singh states that the first confrontation before Chimkent took place in July 1864. In this battle, the Russians whose forces consisted of 12,000 men and 13 guns left 400 killed, and the Khokandians, who were 35,000 men and 35 guns lost 1,500 men. The second confrontation took place in October 1864. Again the Khokandian forces that were 35,000 militia including 3,000 regular troops and 24 guns stood face to face with the Russian forces. In the struggle, the Khokandians lost 1,000 men while the

95

away from the region, Alim Kul heard that the Amir of Bukhara was attacking Khokand.

He had to divide his army, leaving 6,000 men in Chimkent. Making use ofthe war

between Khokand and Bukhara, the Russians again attacked Chimkent in September

1864. After a fierce fighting, Chimkent, one ofthe richest and populous cities of

Khokand, fell into Russian hands.̂ ^^ The Times somewhat corrected its news by

publishing A. Vambery's letter which denied a Russian setback in Central Asia.

Vambery stated that Russia was continuing to establish herself firmly along the valley of

Syr Daria and preparing to take Tashkent.^^" Throughout the first Russian successes. The

Times showed no alarm or danger to India. Indeed, the paper seemed somewhat pleased

to see a European power subduing the backward khanates.

The Fall of Tashkent

As the Russia menaced all Central Asia, the Central Asian mlers failed to

combine forces or at least to support each other to resist the common enemy. They

indeed stmggled with each other and further weakened their own power. The Russians,

on the other hand, did not hesitate to act on such favorable conditions. The first attempt

to take Tashkent, whose population, according to sources, ranged from 80,000 to 9Q1 9Q9

300,000, was in September 1864. Chemiaev with a strong army attacked the city.

The Khokandian forces led by Musa Muhammed defeated the Russians. But some 3,000

"men ofthe main street" (charshi) of Tashkent, who did not like the local mle and were

Russian losses were around 400. And the third confrontation took place in December 1864 in which 1,000 Khokandians and 700 Russians were killed. The Russians then had to retire back to Turkistan (Yesse).

^*' Von Hellwald, 138; Hayit, 78; Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 985. Von Hellwald claims that the number of defenders were 10,000, and had some guns while the extent ofthe Russian forces never made known.

^'° Arminius Vambery, The Times, June 17, 1865.

^" Von Hellwald, 147. Kurat, "Tsarist Russia and Muslims of Centt-al Asia," 511. According to Kurat, "Tashkent, with a population of perhaps 300,000, is the center of commerce and Islamism, covers an area of nearly twelve versts (a verst is around 800 meters), and lies literally in a forest of fruit trees." He states that the city housed 80,000 inhabitants.

^'" Kurat, "Tsarist Russia and Muslims of Cenfral Asia," 511.

96

after their economic interests, sided with the Russians. Their aim was to have better trade

conditions under the Russian rule.̂ ^^ Along with these merchants, many Kirghiz and

Kazakh tribes, who hated the harshness of Mirza Ahmad, the Govemor of Tashkent,

sought help from the Russians.^^"

The first failure before the city of Tashkent forced the Russians to attack again

and try to capture the city. If they accepted the defeat, the locals would harass them in

the future." " In order to revenge this setback and to gain back Russian prestige. General

Chemiaev believed in the wisdom of acting soon and applying a quick and swift

maneuver. In April 1865, Chemiaev marched on Tashkent, and after fierce fighting the

commander ofthe Khokandian forces, Alim Kul, who was the only man able to stop the

Russians, was heavily wounded and later died. His death paralyzed the morale ofthe

Khokandian forces. The Russian artillery played an important role by bombarding the

city. Fierce and close-contact fighting lasted almost a whole day on May 23, 1865. In

the battle, the Russians lost 1,200 men while the Khokandian losses were around 2,000.

After this hard won victory, the Russians attempted to take the city. Yet the garrison

continued to defend it against the Russians "until Russian money and the powerfiil

influence of Said Azim and Muhammad Saleh, two ofthe most wealthy and respectable

merchants of Tashkent, induced a section ofthe citizens to open one ofthe gates to the TOT

besiegers, who secretly entered the city on the night of June 23, 1865."" According to

Baymirza Hayit, despite the lack of unity among the defenders on the strategy ofthe

defense, at least 30,000 people with no military training and no firearm in hand fought

courageously to defend their city.

'̂̂ D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 133; Hayit, 78. Hayit states that the Russian losses were greater than what they actually reported to be 15 death and 42 wounded.

''' Singh, 5.

'̂̂ D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 132.

""̂^ Hayit, 80; Saray, Ruslarin Orta Asya 'yi Ele Gecirmeleri, 11.

'̂̂ Singh, 10.

97

Meanwhile the Bukharan forces took Khodjent and reached Khokand. They

defeated Khokand forces and toppled the khan. Said Murad. The amir reinstalled

Khudyar Khan, who had been dethroned in 1858 by opposition groups, to the throne.

This produced new anxiety among the defenders of Tashkent. In the end, the Russians

won the battle and largely destroyed the city.̂ ^^ Yet, after the fall ofthe city, Chemiaev

tried to win over the people by declaring that everybody's property and life were to be

protected and everybody was free to perform his or her religious and customary duties.

Furthermore, slavery was abolished. General Chemiaev also exempted the merchants

from taxation for five years and donated 500 rubles to construct a tomb to his fiercest

rival. Alim Kul. Finally, he appointed Kadi AhmeduUah in charge of civil cases.

General Chemiaev, contrary to the Foreign Ministry's order, which proposed to

capture Tashkent in a future time, acted fast because ofthe fear that the Bukharan forces

would take the city.''*'̂ When the British ambassador. Count F. Bumnow, questioned the

Russian foreign minister to explain the capture ofthe city, which was against the circular

issued one year earlier. Prince Gorchakov (1856-82) assured him that the occupation was

temporary and that as soon as things put on track, the town was to be retumed to

Khokand.^°' This was only a cover up policy. In reality, the Russians never seriously

contemplated giving up territories they captured. As a result of recent territorial gains, the

Russian govemment had to organize a political district. Thus, on January 25, 1865

Russia founded a new oblast on the territories extending from Isik Kul to the Aral Sea.

Chemiaev was appointed the first military govemor of this oblast?^^

The fall of Tashkent to the Russians was first mentioned in The Times on

September 4, 1865. The Times' commentary stated that Russia invaded the city in order

'"^^ Terentyef, 34; Hayit, 80. Terentyef claims that Chemiaev captured Tashkent with 1,951 men and 12 guns against 30,000 defenders and 63 guns.

^''Singh, 11.

"**'Von Hellwald, 146.

'"' Saray, Ruslarin Orta .Asyayi Ele Gecirmeleri, 10; Terentyef, vol. 2. 54.

• Saray, Ruslarin Orta Asya 'yi Ele Gecirmeleri, 10; Hayit, 80.

98

to stop attacks ofthe mountaineers (the Kirghiz) led by Zadyk Kenisafin (Sadik

Kenisari). It claimed that some local people were also unhappy because of these

attacks and supported the Russians. But, the majority ofthe people did not want to see

the Russians in their city, and they actually hoped the Amir of Bukhara would take it.

Thus, despite an initial pause by the Russians to allow the Tashkendese to offer the keys

ofthe city, the Russians took the city only after a bloody struggle. Angry because the

Russians had taken Tashkent, the amir sent a letter asking Chemiaev to relinquish the

territories that he had taken. The amir also had the Russian merchants in Bukhara

arrested. In order to stop such an action, the Russians took recourse "to reprisals without

loss of time. The Bukharan merchants in Orenburg were placed under arrest, their goods

sequestrated, and those on their way to Nijni Novgorod prevented from proceeding in

their joumey. The Emir was visibly overawed by the energy ofthe Russian general, and

in his intercourse with M. Tchemayeff began to observe again the ordinary forms of

politeness."^*'''

The Times offered several solutions ofthe problem presented by the fall of

Tashkent. It brought the event to public attention and stated that, if the British wanted to

protect their interests in Central Asia, they should physically involve themselves in this

affair. It also suggested that Great Britain would control Central Asia without spending

much effort and money. Since the Amu Daria River centrally crossed the country, the

key to control Central Asia lay in the control of this river. This river started from the

Himalayas and fiowed into the Aral Sea. Its source was more navigable than its mouth

because in the mouth it was divided into several swampy channels. Since its source was

several hundred miles away from Peshawar, Britain could easily bring a couple of

gunboats and establish control over the river, and for that matter over the whole region.

' ° ' Togan, 231. Sadik Sultan was a Kipchak leader who gathered bands of guerillas to attack the Russians, and to paralyze their communications and fransportation lines. He helped the Khokandians at the time of the Russian invasion. Sadik Sultan also helped the Khan of Khiva in 1873. But, when the khan signed a capittilation with the Russians he left to Kashgaria. He served Yakub Beg, and even after the fall of Kashgaria at the hands ofthe Chinese, he continued to sttiiggle against the invaders.

"̂̂ 7'/?e r/wes, September 4, 1865; Von Hellwald, 150-51. Though T/ze 7'//Mes does not talk about the losses ofthe Tashkendese in the sfruggle, Russian losses were 25 men killed and 89 wounded.

99

"We have only to launch this little flotilla and become masters of Turkistan; if we don't,

the Russians will,"^''^ stressed The Times.

Along with this suggestion ofthe establishment of direct British control over

Turkistan, the paper also presented another view. It suggested that Great Britain should

not involve itself in these developments and should let the Russians do whatever they

wanted in the region because a civilized nation, such as Russia, would be preferable to

any "uncivilized" nation, such as Khokand. It concluded that it would be wiser to stay in

India and defend India in case of a Russian attack.̂ '̂ ^ The Times, at this point, had no

clear idea about the proper course of action against Russian expansion. It also reflected

public concem for taking part in Central Asian affairs since the British had not forgotten

the defeat and hardship they suffered in the first Afghan War in 1842.

War with the Khanate of Bukhara

The Amir of Bukhara invaded the Khokand towns of Ora Tepe, Khodjent, and

Khokand and began to act as the tme protector ofthe Ozbek people. By invading

Khokand, the amir aimed to secure strategic places against Russian expansion and to

establish his supremacy over the Khanate of Khokand.̂ *'̂ He was greeted by many

people as the new "Timur," and was thought to be able to conquer Russia, Afghanistan,

and China and divide the entire world between himself and the Sultan. Yet though he

gained an easy victory over already tired and weakened Khokand, he did not know that

he was now facing a strong and tme enemy, the Russians.

Benefiting from the stmggle among the khanates Bukhara and Khokand, the

Russians continued to capture new tovms. General Chemiaev sent a mission consisting

of four officers to the amir to present the Russian demands for arresting the hostilities, to

305 The Times, September 18, 1865.

'''Ibid.

°̂̂ Singh, 13.

Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale," 982.

100

reach an understanding with the amir to release Russian merchants in the khanate, and to

collect information about the tme power of Bukhara.^"^ Meanwhile, the amir sent an

envoy, Necmeddin Parsa, to St. Petersburg to "enlighten" the tsar and the Russian

govemment about the unruly actions of Russian generals, especially Chemiaev, and to

ask them to restore Tashkent to Bukhara. The amir's envoy was stopped by the Govemor

General Kryjanovski (1865-81) in Orenburg and was not allowed to continue to St.

Petersburg. This act of stopping a sovereign's envoy greatly upsetted the amir. Yet it

showed that the Russian govemment had already enhanced its generals' and govemors'

powers in Central Asia to deal with the khanates. In reprisal, the amir detained the

Russian envoy sent by General Chemiaev.

According to Singh, before hostilities broke out between Russia and Bukhara, the

Russian govemment had sent two letters to the amir asking him to give rights to the

Russians to establish a trading firm at Balkh and to cede some lands in Charjui and

Termez to develop trade on the Amu Daria. The Russians also asked him to continue

cotton trade with Russia. In the first demand, the amir stated that Balkh belonged to

Afghanistan and Russia had to deal with both the Afghans and the British. As for ceding

lands on the bank of Amu Daria River, the amir violently rejected and refused to entertain

such a low demand. As far as the cotton trade was concemed, the Russians had to set

free about 300 Bukharan merchants who had been restrained in Russia. Furthermore, the

Russian govemment threatened the amir by indicating that General Chemiaev had a big

force at his disposal to act against him. Upon this threat, the amir told the Russians that

he had been containing people from attacking the enemy. He would declare a Holy War

against them.̂ '**

The situation was far from satisfying any side. In order to destroy Bukharan

forces and reduce the amir to vassalage, Chemiaev marched against the Bukharans. He

had 3,000 men and six guns. There were small skirmishes between the vanguard ofthe

Russian forces and the local militia. In one instance at Jizakh, a reconnoitering party of

Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 196.

Singh, 16-17.

101

the Russian army was attacked by local yighits (courageous warrior men). The Russians

lost one officer and nine soldiers while the militia lost 31 men and one woman.

Chemiaev found it difficult to go further and decided to retire. Because of this failure,

Chemiaev was called back to St. Petersburg in 1865^" and was replaced with Major-

General Dimitri Illyitch Romanovski. The new military govemor ofthe Syr Daria

district. General Romanovski, continued the same dynamic expansionist policy against

the khanates.

Meanwhile, the amir marched with 40,000 men to take Tashkent by force in 1866.

Ofthe Bukharan forces, there were only 4,500 regulars soldiers, including 500 Afghans

and 3,000 ex-Persian slaves. With desertions and failure of some forces to join the army,

the number ofthe amir's army was thinner than generally expected. In the battle that

took place at Irdjar in 1866, the Russian artillery and steamers played decisive roles.

When the Russians bombarded the amir's army from the battleships on the Syr Daria

River, the horses and many men panicked and ran away in disorder. This sudden attack

and panic scared the amir, who ran away from the battlefield, leaving some of his guns

and equipment. The Russian victory was complete at Irdjar (Maida Yulghun) on 20 May

1866. In the battle, the Bukharans lost 600 men killed and 150 taken prisoner. Russian

losses were estimated at around 200 men killed. '̂'̂ Upon the victory at Irdjar. the enemy

captured Khodjent on June 6, Ura Tube on September 28, and Djizzak on October 18,

1866. The Times noted fear and uneasiness in Great Britain. It stressed that the

" The Times, November 5, 1866; Von Hellwald, 153. Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale," 986; Singh, 13. Von Hellwald states that the Russian forces that were defeated by the Bukharans consisted of "fourteen companies of infantry, six squadrons of Cossacks, and fourteen field-pieces, altogether about 2,000 men." 77?e Times claimed that Ura Tube was taken by the forces led by Kryschanovski, the Govemor General of Orenburg, rather than Major-General Romanovski.

''^ The Times, March 26, 1869; Singh, 20-21; Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 197. The Times article was sent by General Romanovski who was the commander ofthe Russian forces in the Ircar battle. According to Romanovski, Bukharan forces consisted of 60,000 to 70,000 men, of which only 5,000 to 7,000 were regular troops, and the rest were either volunteered civilians or Turkmen horsemen. Boulger claims that the Russian forces were around 5,000 men and 20 guns, and the Bukharan regulars were also around 5,000 men and 21 guns. Just after the battle started, new fresh Russian forces with artillery units came to the help, and it was these new forces that determined the outcome ofthe war.

102

Russians had approached one step closer to India and that the Russian danger to India had

become more obvious. If the khanates collapsed, it claimed, the Russians would menace

India.^'^

In all these captures, the Russians severely chastised the people who bravely

defended their cities. When they besieged Khodjent, some inhabitants ofthe city came

out to discuss the surrender. While they were discussing the terms, the war party in the

city did not want to give up easily. The siege continued for six days with heavy

bombardments. Finally, the enemy stormed the city through open gates.

The inhabitants defended themselves from house to house with extraordinary courage, but at last they could not withstand the Russian arms. After a siege of seven days, on June 6, the city of Khodjent surrendered at discretion. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was estimated at 2,500 men. In this affair, however, the Russians sustained only a loss of from 100 to 150 killed and

T I C

wounded.

The fall of Ura Tepe at the hands ofthe enemy was followed by Jizakh. After leaving

around 200 casualties in Ura Tepe, the Russians captured Jizakh and harshly punished the

inhabitants. They stormed the city with 8,000 men and 20 guns. In the stmggle,

around 2,000 natives and 1,000 Russians were killed.^'^ Along with the loss of territory

'̂̂ The Times, May 26, 1866; Romanovski, 30; Von Hellwald, 158-59; Hayit, 84; Kurat, "Tsarist Russia and Muslims of Centtal Asia," 511. Togan, 228; Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," 986. Hayit states that in the war for Khodjent the Bukharans lost 2,500 men, and after capture the Russians massacred 1,500 Khokandese. Togan sfresses that the 40,000 strong amir's 'improvised' army was defeated by 3,000 Russian forces. The amir fled from the battleground as a coward. According to Von Hellwald the amir Muzaffer's forces consisted of 5,000 well-trained Bukharans, 35,000 Kirghiz cavalry, and 21 guns. The Russians on the other hand had 14 companies of infantry, 5 sotnias of Cossacks, 20 guns, and 8 rocket-stands. Though the Kirghiz continually attacked the Russians, the rockets proved to be very effective against these warriors. The Bukharans lost 1,000 men and all their material to the Russians.

'^'^ The Times, ixmc 14, 1866.

315 Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 199.

'''Ibid, 199.

'" Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale," 987; Singh, 22; Boulger, 200. According to Singh, "The citizens (of Khodjent) bravely resisted the entry of Russian tt-oops into the city. The following moming, 24* Moharram (S* June), the Russian General ordered a general massacre ofthe citizens, which lasted for an hour, sparing neither sex nor age. The loss on the Russian side was 400 men killed, and on that ofthe Bukhara Khokandis 1,500, including three Hindu merchants."

103

to the Russians, the amir lost his supremacy over the khanate of Khokand and his dream

of retaking Tashkent. The Khan of Khokand, Khudyar, sent a congratulatory message to

General Romanovski and accepted a Russian protectorate.

The defeat and loss of important towns showed that Bukhara was too weak to stop

the Russians. If the Russians wanted to invade all Bukhara, they would do it. Yet they

feared a possible Muslim rebellion. They did not want to create another Caucasus and be

forced to defend a "worthless" conquest. Indeed, it was impossible for the Russians to

invade the whole khanate because they had neither the men nor the system needed to

establish and control large territories. Their available men and material were required

immediately for defensive and offensive jobs in the newly annexed territories. Thus, they

played the game according to its mle and preferred to a wait for the right moment.

Following the Russian victories, the amir set free all Russians he had detained a

year earlier and sent them with expensive gifts to Tashkent. Though he did not feel it in

his heart, he began to accept Russian proposals. Meanwhile, he sent Muhammad Parsa

Khodja as a special envoy to India and Constantinople to seek help from the British and

the Turks respectively. The British declined to involve themselves in the conflict and

advised him to establish better relations with the Russians. They had not forgotten their

humiliation in 1842by the Amir Muzafareddin, who had killed two of their agents in

Bukhara. They did not want to undertake any serious conflict with Russia in a virtually

unknown and undesirable land. "Since the unfortunate campaign of Afghanistan, the

Indian govemment had always pursued the policy of non-interference in the affairs of

Central Asia." Yet the Indian govemment promised to discuss it with England before

doing anything,^'^ which was a dilatory and mild rejection.

The Central Asian rulers always admired the Sultan as the head ofthe Islamic

faith and as the most powerful ruler ofthe Islamic world. Whenever they needed help

against the Russians or another foe, they sought advice and help from the Sultan. The

318 Romanovski, 8.

' " Von Hellwald, 161. The author states that the Russians lost 200 men when they were taking Ura tube after an eight-day siege.

104

Porte discussed the amir's request for help, but on the ground of distance and lack of • ^90

transportation, the Turks were not able to help. But they suggested that the leaders of

Central Asia establish amicable relations with each other and combine their forces against

the common enemy."*"'

Rapid and great losses ofthe Bukharans created intemal chaos in the khanate.

The Ruler of Shehr-i Sabz declared his freedom from the amir and applied to the

Russians to take over the city. '" Furthermore, some ofthe amir's subjects, including the

Kipchaks of Zarafshan valley, declared their independence.

Establishment ofthe Govemor-Generalship of Turkistan

Upon these successes, a Russian commission called the Steppe Commission, led

by Miliutin, worked on a plan to reorganize political and administrative structures in the

newly gained territories. In July 1867, the commission decided to establish a new

Govemor Generalship, Turkistan, and to appoint Konstantin von Kaufmann (1867-1882),

a German by birth, as the first Govemor General of Turkistan. An imperial ukase made

the decision a formal one. Despite his lack of knowledge about the region, Kaufmann,

the ex-aide-de camp ofthe tsar, assumed the post. Kaufmann was given enormous

powers to control both civil and military personnel and to pursue diplomatic relations

with the vassal khanates. Because of his love of ceremonious acts and fancy displays, he

was called by the natives "yarim padishah" (half king).

•'̂ ° T. C. Bajbakanlik Devlet Ar§ivleri Genel MUdUrlugU. Osmanli Devleti tie Kafkasya, Turkistan ve Kirim Hanliklan Arasindaki Munasevetlere Dair Ar^iv Belgeleri. Ankara: Osmanli Arjivi Daire Ba§kanligi, 1992, 133-135; Saray, Ruslarin Orta Asya'yi Ele Gecirmeleri, 15-16.

" ' Saray, Rus i?gali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti lie Tiirkistan Hanliklan Arasindaki siyasi miinasebetler, 52.

'" Arminius Vambery, The Times, February 11, 1877.

"^ Von Hellwald, 164; Kurat, 511; Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 88.

105

War Against Bukhara and the Annexation of Samarkand and Zarafshan

The fall of Tashkent had "struck the death-knell" ofthe khanates, but the final

blow had yet to be delivered. "** The Russians had already tested the military powers of

the khanates and were sure that they could inflict deadly blows at any time. Of course,

they had plenty of pretexts to start military invasions any time. It did not take long to

move again against Bukhara.

The Times published a lengthy article mainly translated from the Russian

newspaper Invalide. According to the article, the relations between Russia and the

khanate of Bukhara took a bad course because General Kaufmann and General

Krijhanofski tried to impose a treaty on Bukhara in September 1867, which guaranteed ^9S

Russian safety and economic interests in the region. Despite the amir's approval of

the treaty, some begs, who refused to obey the mle ofthe "infidel" Russians and their

weak sovereign, acted on their own and began to capture Russian subjects and attack

caravans. The antagonism increased when the amir's mullahs intensified their

propagandas against the Russians. These mullahs stressed to the people that the

"infidels" could not be mlers over the Muslims.

Affairs within Bukhara were increasingly deteriorating. The amir's eldest son, the

heir apparent to the throne, Abdulmelik Khan, intrigued against his father and attempted

to topple him. Meanwhile, local feudal begs, including the mler of Shahr-i Sabz, Cure

Beg,'̂ ^̂ declared their independence from Bukhara because they thought that the amir was

Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 94.

''^ Terentyef, 43. The peace offer was drawn up by General Kaufinann and General Kryjhanofski. In this peace offer, the Russians wanted to draw a boundary line that passing from Kashgaria through Bukhan Dagh to the mouth ofthe Syr Daria, to appoint a council to draw a more precise boundary line, to ask the amir to prevent his subjects from violating the Russian territories, to lift all sorts of resttictions on the subjects of both sides to fravel freely between their territories, to offer the amir to equalize duties taken from the Russian subjects with his own subjects, to construct caravanserais in the amir's domain, to have a caravanbashi (trade agent) in the khanate, to have the right for the Russian subjects to own immovable property in the amir's domain, and to force the amir to enter communications with the Govemor-General of Turkistan.

''' The Times, September 2, 1868; Terentyef, 43-50.

106

an impotent ruler and had no courage to fight against the enemy. They believed that it

was time to struggle against the foreign invaders in order to save their religion and the

purity of their national life.

According to The Daily News, hostilities broke out between the Russians and the

Bukharans because ofthe amir's bad faith.̂ *̂* Under these conditions, the amir

reluctantly ordered war preparations.^^^ He began to seek help from neighboring states.

Though the Khanate of Khokand refused to help him, Yakub Bey and the Khan of Khiva

promised support. However, they did not send any actual help. Before things got out of

hand. General Kaufmann took the steps necessary to invade Bukhara.^^° The British not

only refused to help the amir but also persuaded both the amir of Cabul and Yakub Beg

of Kashgaria not to interfere in the hostilities.^^'

In order to punish assailants who attacked Russian territories and citizens. Colonel

Abramov entered Bukharan territories and destroyed villages that were alleged to have

committed those atrocities. These developments sparked the war. Bukharan army did

not have a strong spirit to fight the enemy. The Afghan forces, led by Iskender Khan and

were around 286, deserted the amir and joined the Russian forces.

The Russians marched on Samarkand and came face to face with the Bukharan

forces on the hills of Tchupan-ata on the Zerafshan River. It resulted in an easy victory

for the Russians, who crossed the river and drew the Bukharan forces out of their

entrenchments. Upon this victory, the Samarkandese invited the Russians to take the

"̂̂ Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, and Kuldja. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, 45; Terentyef, 43; Hellwald, 164. According to Schuyler, Cure or Jure Beg was "a tall handsome Uzbek, with a thin dark beard, pleasant gray eyes, and a serious face. His dress is always very simple, but exquisitely neat, and there is something about the sadness of his expression and the suave grace of his gestures which never fails to atfract and to interest. He is indeed a perfect gentleman."

''^ The Daily News, June 6, 1868.

^ '̂ Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 203.

"" The Times, September 2, 1868; Boulger, 202; Terentyef, 49-50. Boulger claims that the amir did not accept the treaty conditions inked by the Russians and allowed his subjects to attack the Russians in the borderlands. In one instance, four Russians were kidnapped.

331 Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 300.

107

City, while they were shutting their gates to the amir. Yet, the war was not over. The

neighboring communities began to enlist as irregular forces against the enemy in order to

save their territories. Cure Beg, the ruler of Shehr-i Sabz, attacked Samarkand and was

about to take the city before new Russian forces came to defend it. Small scale fights

between the Bukharan and Russian forces continued until the former were soundly

defeated at Zire Bulak by the Russians led by General Kaufman on June 2, 1868. The

amir lost all hope of recovering Samarkand and Zerafshan and retreated to Bukhara.

After taking Samarkand and Zerafshan, the Russians stopped their forward march

because they did not want to offend a large Muslim population who considered Bukhara

as a sacred city. The Russians knew that it would be better to leave a wom out country

to the amir than to rule it directly. They even contemplated the retum of Samarkand to

the amir after the complete payment of a 1,000,000 rubles indemnity forced on

Bukhara.̂ "̂* Even in 1870, Prince Gorchakov told the British that they were going to

evacuate Samarkand after they received the fiill amount of indemnity that was around

300,000 mbles at the time.̂ ^^ The formal peace treaty between Russia and Bukhara was

signed on July 5, 1868. According to this, the amir accepted Russian occupation ofthe

Samarkand and Zerafshan districts.^^^ Nevertheless, because ofthe strategic importance

ofthe newly conquered places and the "fear" that their evacuation would be interpreted

by the natives as a sign of weakness, the Russians kept control.

"^ Boulger. Central Asian Portraits, 204; Terentyef, 53.

^" Togan, 255; Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 443; Boulger, Central Asian Portraits. 204.

"* Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 293; Terentyef, 59-60. According to Terentyef, Kaufinann first contemplated to let Sayid Abdullah, a royal family member of Bukhara, rule Samarkand, but because of Sayid Abdullah's weak character, and Cure Beg's infiuence on him, Kaufinann decided to keep the city. Yet, he offered the amir to pay him 1,151,000 fillas (4,600,000 mbles) war indemnity in the next eight years in retum to hand the city over to the amir.

" ' Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 294; Terentyef, vol. 1, 64. According to Terentyef, this amount was 125,000 tillas or 500,000 mbles.

"* Terentyef, 63.

108

The defeat at the hands ofthe Russians created new problems in Bukhara. Katti

Tore, Abdulmelik Khan, rose against his father to topple him and capture the throne. The

amir could not deal with his son and had to seek help from the Russians, who happily

cooperated. Russian forces led by General Abramov supported the Bukharan forces to

defeat the rebels.^^^ Furthermore, along with Katti Tore, Hakim and his son Baba begs,

and Cure beg rose against their sovereign. The Russians helped the amir to subdue the

rebellious subjects because they knew that these rebels were bitterly refusing to accept

Russia as their master. Fearing to lose his throne, the amir found the Russians as his new

allies and helped them to fight the rebels. "If the Amir did not help the Russians against

the so-called rebellious leaders including Abdulmelik Tore, Cure Beg, Baba Beg,

Abdulgaffar and Sadik Sultan, the Russians would be totally wiped out in Turkistan, and

would be sent back to Siberia."^^^

Peace Treaty Signed between Russia and the Khanates of Khokand and Bukhara

The first formal peace treaty signed between the Russians and the Khokandians

was on June 30, 1868. According to this agreement:

a. All towns and villages ofthe Khanate of Khokand, without exception, shall henceforth be open to Russian merchants, as shall all Russian marts be accessible to Khokandian traders.

b. The Russian merchants shall be at liberty to have caravanserais and stores in all towns of Khokand, the Khokandian merchants enjoying the same privilege in all Russian towns.

c. With a view to regulate conduct of trade and the levying of legal imposts, the Russian merchants are accorded the right of having commercial agents (Caravan Bashis) in all towns of Khokand, the same privilege being allowed the Khokand merchants in all towns of Turkistan.

d. The impost levied upon merchandise exported from Russia to Khokand, or from Khokand to the European or Asiatic Provinces of Russia, shall be the

" ' The Times, January 8, 1869; Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 207.

"* The Times, October 19, 1869. Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 231. According to Togan, Abdulmelik Tore and Cure Beg went to Kashgaria after they lost sttnggle against the combined force ofthe amir and the Russians. Later they fraveled to Istanbul where they lived a long time. Abdulmelik Han finally fraveled to India and died in India around 1909.

109

same in Khokand and Turkistan, i.e., 2!/2 percent ad valorem. In no case shall the impost exacted from Russian merchants in Khokand be in excess ofthe duties levied on the Muslim subjects,

e. Russian merchants and caravans are guaranteed the right of safe and unimpeded transit through Khokand, and the countries bordering upon it, the like privilege being conceded to the Khokandian caravans with regard to Russian territories.^''^

The treaty was signed by the Govemor General of Turkistan von Kaufmann and by

Khudyar Khan. This treaty became a basic draft for later treaties signed between the

khanates of Bukhara and Khiva and Russia.

The peace treaty signed between General Kaufmann and Amir Said

Muzaffareddin was similar to the treaty signed earlier with the khanate of Khokand. Yet

the treaty imposed on the amir contained some harsh obligations. By the treaty, the amir

accepted the Russian invasion of Zarafshan, Samarkand, and Katti Kurgan. The amir

promised to pay a sum of 1,000,000 mbles war indemnity. He also granted enormous

rights to the Russian merchants regardless of their ethnic or religious differences. All

Russians were entitled to carry on trade in all parts of Bukhara. The amir was obliged to

protect their persons, goods, and caravans within his domain. The duty on Russian goods

was fixed to 2/4 percent of their value. (This rate used to be between 5 and 10 percent of

the total value ofthe goods.) '̂*° The Russian merchants also had the right to cross

Bukharan territories to neighboring countries without any restriction. According to

The Times, these treaties had no real value because the khanates had no strong binding

value in handling commercial affairs. Despite their treaty assurances, these khanates

would tend to exact more imposts on Russian merchants. If Russia were weakened in the

region, they would totally disrespect any sort of treaty agreement.

" ' The Times, November 19, 1872. The Times got this information from the Official Gazette of Russia.

'̂'° Romanovski, 6.

341 The Times, December 26, 1868.

"- The Times, December 5, 1872.

110

After the subjugation of both Bukhara and Khokand, the Russians left the local

rulers on their thrones. According to The Times, the continuing existence of these

somewhat free khanates suited Russian interests. First of all, these khanates were nothing

but Russian vassal states and had no power to resist future Russian demands. They

already accepted that Russian subjects could freely travel and conduct trade in their lands.

Secondly, the khans helped control troubling elements such as fiindamentalist Muslims

and predatory Turkmens. For the time being, it was the best policy for the Russians to let

these khanates keep their nominal sovereignty.̂ '*^ Furthermore, these khanates were

paying tribute to Russia. The Amir of Bukhara promised to pay 500,000 mbles tribute

every year.̂ '*'* Finally, direct Russian administration, which was totally military, would

have created a big strain on the treasury. It was quite costly to the Russians to mn their

already acquired territories. "In 1868 there was a deficit of 2,500,000 roubles

(£200,000); in 1869, it rose to 4,000,000 roubles, and is still on the increase."^""

After losing his attempt to reconquer lands taken by the Russians, the Amir of

Bukhara wanted to gain some prestige by capturing new lands from Badakshan, a small

kingdom on the right bank ofthe Oxus. The khan of Badakshan appealed to Cabul for

help against Amir Muzaffar. But, before any serious confrontation took place between

the forces of hostile sides, the amir leamed that his territories extended up to the Oxus,

and that the other side ofthe Oxus was not his dominion. Thus, he cancelled marching

on Badakshan, arresting a possible war between Afghanistan and Bukhara.̂ '*^

Expedition in the Turkmen Country and the Constmction of Fort Krasnovodsk (Kizilsu) on the Eastem Caspian Sea

Since the reign of Peter I, who thought that ftiU control ofthe Caspian Sea could

provide a key to secure interests in Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and India, the Russians

'•*' The Times, January 12, 1869.

^̂ ^ The Times, October 19, 1869.

"̂̂ The Daily Telegraph, May 16, 1873.

"^' The Times, February 21, 1870.

I l l

seriously contemplated expanding their authority over this water.̂ '*^ The Treaty of

Turkmenchai (1828) signed between Russia and Persia provided high power for the

former to control the westem and northern part of this water. The eastern side, however,

stayed mostly in the hands ofthe Turkmens. The Turkmens were living in their tribal

lands and did not belong to any political authority in the Transcaspian region. Yet most

ofthe time they recognized the nominal suzerainty ofthe Khan of Khiva. Since they

belonged to a tribe or a small community with no real govemment, they loosely

developed relations among the tribes. In their free world, they were sometimes used by

the khans to attack neighboring states, especially Persia and Russia. In this sense they

were giving valuable military support to the khanate of Khiva. In retum, the Turkmens,

most ofthe time, did not pay taxes. Because of their independent way of life, the

Russians found it more difficult to deal with them than the Khivans. In a report sent by

Colonel Glukhofsky there was "no Khivan question, but only a Turkoman question, upon

which depended all the future relations of Khiva to Russia."

The largest Turkmen tribe was the Tekkes, who mostly lived in the Akhal country

and Merv. When the Bukharan forces invaded Merv in 1822, the Tekkes willingly

accepted the Khan of Khiva as their sovereign in order to protect their lands against the

Bukharans. Yet this was only a nominal acceptance. They continued to live a totally

independent life. In order to escape from one power's complete domination, they from

time to time leaned to different sovereigns. In 1855, they rose against the Khivans and

defeated the Khivan forces under the leadership of Koshut Khan. They also captured the

khan, Mehmet Emin, cut off his head, and sent it to the Kadjar Shah of Persia. Similarly,

the Tekkes defeated the Persians in 1860 and sent part ofthe rich spoils captured from the

Persian camp to Khiva. They often made alamans (forays) into Persia and Russia to

capture people to sell them in Khiva.

'*' Donelly, "Peter the Great and Cenfral Asia," 207.

"̂̂ Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 234.

"̂̂ Togan, "Tsarist Russia," 233.

112

The massacre ofthe Yomuds by the Russians in 1873 reduced the power of this

tribe. From then on, the Tekkes became the sole leader of Turkmenia and were capable

of raiding into neighboring countries. A Russian newspaper, Novoye Vremya, stated, "as

long as the Tekkes, too, are not cruelly punished and trodden under foot enormous sums

must be spent in fitting out expeditions against them, and the lives of many soldiers must

be usually sacrificed."^^°

The Russian interest in controlling the Turkmens, and establishing their authority

over the Transcaspian region gradually became a reality. In 1854, they constmcted the

fort of Novo-Petrovski on the eastem bank ofthe Caspian Sea.^ '̂ Yet, the first solid step

in capturing Transcaspia was taken in 1869. In 1869. Russia's Caspian fleet led by

General Radetsky brought men and material to construct a fortress at Krasnovodsk

(Kizilsu), on the alleged ancient mouth ofthe Amu Daria River. After constmction of

Krasnovodsk fort. General Radetsky left some men under the command of Colonel

Stolietoff.''"^ One ofthe primary aims of this act was to encircle the khanate of Khiva.

The khan of Khiva was rightfully offended by this development and began to give more

support to the Kazakh and Turkmen attacks against the Russian posts. He even sent a

detachment to help these warriors. In one confrontation, the Russian forces led by

Colonel Rukin were destroyed, and in another the Nicolai station was bumt, and Novo-

Alexandrovsk on the Caspian Sea was assailed.

After Krasnovodsk, the Russians constmcted Chikishlar fort on the southem

Caspian Sea and around the mouth ofthe river Atrek. This new fort was an important

"" The Times, October 6, 1879.

^̂ ' Romanovski, 5.

^" D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 143; Togan, 234; Charles Marvin. The Eye-witnesses' Account ofthe Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Akhal Tekke Turcomans. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1880, 2. According to Togan, Skobelev, the future commander ofthe Russian forces to capture Geok Tepe, was among the Russian forces as a captain. When the Russians were constmcting the fort, some 600 Turkmens suddenly stormed them, and killed many Russian soldiers. The Turkmens also succeeded tying a rope to Skobelev's neck, and pulling him. Skobelev was saved at the last moment by other Russian soldiers.

' " Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 140-41.

113

strategic place as far as the Russian threat to Afghanistan was concemed. Making its

military headquarters there, Russia would send her armies across the regions extending

between Persia and Turkmenia to Merv and Herat. Grant Duff and many other British

politicians thought of this fort as a menacing center for the fiiture Russian expansions.

Khivan Expedition and the Submission ofthe Khanate of Khiva

Doubtless the Khivan expedition and subjugation of Khiva in 1873 was one ofthe

most intensively discussed Central Asian issues in The Times. The main cause ofthe

expedition, according to the Russian view, was that the khan of Khiva had helped bandits

who had robbed the Russian subjects and caravans and taken away hundreds of Russians

to sell in the khanate as slaves. They believed that currently there were hundreds of

Russian slaves within the khanate and the khan was not willing to set them free.

Furthermore, the khan had been helping the Kazakhs to rise against Russian mle. "̂̂

According to the St. Petersburg Government Gazette,

Constant depredations on our territory, taxes levied on our subjects, the practice of fomenting rebellion in the Steppe or carrying off the inhabitants as slaves, forced this Govemment to determine upon retributive measures. Before proceeding to action, every attempt was made to come to a friendly settlement with our unmly neighbors. More than once did we ask the Khan for satisfaction, more than once did we place it in his power to come to an arrangement with us in moderate and amicable terms; but he either did not condescend to vouchsafe us any reply, or he sent us haughty refusals.

After subduing Khokand and Bukhara, the Russians intensified their attention on Khiva,

the last khanate in Central Asia to be taken. The khan of Khiva continued to be at odds

with the Russians. After the submission of Bukhara to the Russians, Khiva was the only

strong Turkic power.''" The Russian media intensively discussed the necessity of

"" The Daily News, April 24, 1873.

' " The Times, October 16, 1872.

"^ The Times, December 22, 1873.

"^Terentyef, 156.

114

capturing Khiva in order to establish Russia's "peaceful state of existence" on the

steppes.

To survey the country between the Caspian and Khiva and to bring information

about the actual state of Khivan forces. Colonel Markosov started his march against the

Khivans from Krasnovodsk in 1872.̂ ^^ Yet, Markosov's forces were defeated, and

forced to retum back to their headquarters on the Caspian Sea. Contrary to the generally

accepted view that this was a small confrontation, Markosov's expedition against the

Khivans was a serious one. At least 5,000 men were either killed or taken prisoner on the

Russian side. However, the news stressed that a huge military might such as Russia

would not give up its determined goals against weak states.

Krasnovodsk on the Caspian from the west, Orenburg from the north, and Syr

Daria from the east were three starting points against Khiva in 1873. The Times

correspondent in St. Petersburg stressed that the war would be long and costly to the

Russians, but the Russians would be the victorious side in the end. Furthermore, if

Russian demands including commercial rights for the Russian citizens, release of Russian

slaves, and calmness on the Russian frontier between Russia and Khiva were

immediately achieved, the Russians would not go to war against the khan. As soon as

these demands were fulfilled, the Russians would pull back their forces from the

khanate.^^' Yet many did not share the Russian claims about the bad condition of their

subjects in the khanate. According to Bumaby, the khan did not molest Russian subjects

who had been captured and brought to Khiva by the Kazakhs. The khan indeed helped

these people, and employed them in his gardens.

'̂* The Times, November 19, 1872.

^ '̂ The Times, December 2, 1872.

360 The Times, ime 9, 1873.

^̂ ' The Times, January 14, 1873.

''' Fred Bumaby, A Ride to Khiva: Travels and Adventures in Central Asia. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1883, 212; Schuyler, 29.

115

The first alarming news about the Khivan expedition was received from St.

Petersburg and published in The Times on May 15, 1871. The news indicated that the

soldiers had been under harsh training to be sent to the Khivan borders. Upon hearing

ofthe Russian mobilization of military forces toward his border, the Khan of Khiva

called every able bodied man to defend the country. He also sought other ways to defend

his dominion. One way was to contaminate the Amu Daria River and other water

resources on the way to Khiva. Meanwhile, he knew the serious situation, and wanted to

solve the problem without going to war. He sent an embassy to St. Petersburg to make

peace. However, the Russians, who had determined to establish their own authority over

the khanate by force, did not accept his peacefiil approach. They had already sent forces

to Krasnovodsk (Kizil Su) on the Caspian Sea and these forces were backed by a

Turkmen army led by Atamurat Khan.

The khan of Khiva, Said Muhammed Rahim, sought help from the British. The

Khivan envoy reached Calcutta on September 4, 1872, and had a meeting with the

viceroy. Lord Northbrook. The viceroy refused to give any help or even to mediate

between Russia and Khiva. He only suggested that the khan should restore the Russian

prisoners and enter into friendly communications with the Govemor General of

Turkistan.^^^ Though the British lack of interest in the Russian invasion of Khiva was

criticized by Punch (Figure 3.1)''̂ ^ and by the press in general, the British govemment

preferred to stay out ofthe conflict. It was believed that British policy toward the

Khanate of Khiva greatly discouraged the khan and forced him to act as a submissive

mler.̂ ^^

'''The Times, May 15, 1871.

"^ The Times, March 29, 1872.

365 The Times, September 4, 1872; Terentyef, vol. 1, 206-207.

'" Punch, January 25, 1873. Punch, which is a British comic magazine that specifically covers intemal and extemal political developments, provides caricatures, poems, prose, and jokes.

367 The Daily Telegraph, May 7, 1873.

116

' * K f ! l ? A L A ? "

Figure 3.1: Khi-va-la?

The Times' editorial article fully supported the cautionary policy adopted by the

Indian govemment. It believed that the khan should free slaves, open up his markets to

Russian goods, establish firm control so his subjects would not attack Russian merchants

and territories, give up supporting ftigitives from Russia, and enter friendly negotiations

with the Russians. It was because of these difficulties that the Russians had decided to

invade his territories. If these problems were solved beforehand, there would be a chance

for Khiva to escape Russian military conquest. 368

The Times, November 19, 1872.

117

While the khan vainly tried to get help from abroad, the Russians intensified their

preparation to attack Khiva. They sent new forces to Krasnovodsk. It was estimated that

there were already 14 companies of infantry, 20 guns, and 200 Cossacks there.̂ ^^ The

khan, a man of weak character who was obeying the impulse ofthe moment,^ '̂' gathered

his court to discuss the future steps to be taken against the Russians. Almost all members

ofthe court except Muhammed Murat, the Divan Beyi (the premier), "a well knovm

fanatic and avowed enemy of Russia," said that the khanate would not win a serious

confrontation with Russia. They also stated that, if the Russians moved into the khanate,

some Turkmen tribes including Tchodor, Jgdir, and Khodji would lean toward the enemy.

Upon seeing the hopelessness ofthe situation, the khan intensified his efforts to solve the

issue through peaceful means. He sent two envoys to both St. Petersburg and Orenburg,

and even attached a Russian slave to these embassies. However, the Russian govemment

ordered them to stop. They were told that until all the Russian prisoners were set free and

until the khan apologized to the Govemor General of Turkistan, no negotiation was to be

held."'

According to The Times, the Russian expeditionary forces consisted of 4,000 men,

including two regiments of Cossacks and 20 guns from Krasnovodsk; 2,000 men and 10

guns from Orenburg; and 3,000 men and 10 guns from Syr Daria. While the Orenburg

forces were commanded by General N. A. Verevkin, commander-in chief of the Ural

Cossacks, the Syr Daria forces were led by General K. von Kaufmann. General N. P.

Lomakin, the commander ofthe Caspian forces, commended the forces from '17')

Krasnovodsk. The supreme commander of all forces was General Kaufmann. " The

Times claimed that the Russians had mobilized five different armies. Some of these

"'^ The Times, October 16, 1872.

'''° The Times, Apri\2S, 1873.

371 The Times, November 26, 1872.

" - The Times, January 14, 1873. The Times of May 13, 1873, based a report from its Berlin correspondent stated that the Russian forces in the campaign were 15,000 sfrong. Only Kaufinann' s force consisted of at least 5,000 men.

118

forces were employed to keep communication lines open and safe from the Turkmen and

Kirghiz attacks.^^^ In order to keep the Kazakhs in line, the Russians had taken at least

sixty dignitaries ofthe Mengishlak Kazakhs as prisoners, to hold them until the end ofthe

expedition. Another source estimated the Russian forces to be around 50,000 strong

and accompanied by many princes. It claimed that Russians were enthusiastically ^7S

volunteering to join the expedition.

The Khivan forces, on the other hand, were estimated to be between 10,000 and

20,000 men. In addition to this power, the khan could raise another 15,000 men. Yet a

well-equipped Russian force of 4,000 or 5,000 would be enough to defeat this army since

the Khivans had neither the quality training nor modem weapons.^^^ Another news report

based on military sources from St. Petersburg claimed that the khan's fighting forces ^77

would not exceed 1,000 men. All predictions showed that the khan had no chance of

winning the war.

Besides the Khivan military power, the Turkmens would seem to be an obstacle to

the Russian expeditionary forces. However, the Turkmens did not have a political and

military unity at this time to side either with the Russians or the Khivans. Vambery

claimed that while the Tekkes did not like the Russians, the Chaudor Turkmens hated the

Khivans. But, the Turkmens would be problem to the Russians as they performed

alamans on the Russian subjects.̂ ^^ The khan tmsted on geography more than on his

military forces. From any given point in the east, west or north, the Russian army had to

''" The Times, March 28, 1873. D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 143; D'Encausse estimates the Russian forces to total 13,000 men and 50 cannon.

'''^ The Times, hprW 12, 1873.

" ' The Manchester Guardian, Febmary 5, 1873.

'"" The Daily News, April, 17, 1873; The Times, March 25, 1873; Arminius Vambery, The Times, April 12, 1873; Bumaby, 214. According to Bumaby, "The total force employed by General Kaufinann in his Khivan expedition consisted of 53 companies of infantry, 25 sotnias of Cossacks, 54 guns, 6 mortars, 2 mifraileuses, 5 rocket divisions, 19,200 camels, with a complement of about 14,000 men."

''''The Times, Apn] 14, 1873.

"* Arminius Vambery, The Times, April 12. 1873.

119

travel 550 to 630 miles on harsh and barren territories to reach Khiva. The khan had no

regular army except his guards consisted of Karakalpak and Persian slaves. He also had

no artillery units. Most of his army was volunteers who did not have any military • • 379

training.

By starting their march from three different locations, the Russians aimed to

overawe the khan. They did not want to leave anything to chance, and they did not want

to repeat the mistakes they had made in 1717 and in 1839. This time, the Khanate of

Khiva was to be overmn by either one or two detachments. If one or two detachments

failed, the others were to finish the job. From all ofthe four columns ofthe Russian

forces that started from three different places, namely the Caspian, Orenburg, and

Tashkent, the only column that failed to reach Khiva was Colonel Markasov's

detachment that started from Chikishlar on the Caspian and had to cross Turkmenia.

Harsh environment, severe climate, and Turkmen attacks prevented it from reaching

Khiva. They confessed that "the Turcomans and Khivese are a martial people enough,

and if they were not divided into ever so many tribes, every one hostile to the rest and

acting independently, they might make a decent stand against us." They had to retire

back to Chikishlar, losing many men and almost all their provisions. Yet this column

played an important role by keeping at least 10,000 Turkmen forces away from helping

the khan.^^"

In order to prevent Bukhara, Khokand, and Kashgaria from helping Khiva during

the expedition, the Russians intensified their control over these khanates. While they

" ' The Times, November 26, 1872. According to an article published on April 28, 1873, at the time ofthe Khivan expedition, the power ofthe khan was estimated to be so weak that he could not show any resistance to the Russians. "In military point of view, Khiva is the weakest of all Central Asian States. The small force of 500 infantry, and 1,000 cavalry, armed with muskets, swords, and bayonets, which the khan keeps as permanent guard, will be of little, if any, use in the field. In case of emergency, the khan can collect 20,000 horsemen most of which are Turkmens."

'^' Frederich Trench, The Times, April 27, 1874; The Daily News, June 28, 1873. The Daily News article claimed that Markasoff s column lost 60 men. According to Trench, the Orenburg forces, led by General Verevkine, had to make 870 miles through Emba fort. Kauftnann's forces that started from Tashkent had to march 530 miles, and finally Lomakin's forces, starting from Kinderli on the Caspian, had to march 485 miles to reach Khiva.

120

signed a free trade agreement with Yakub Beg of Kashgaria,^^' they demanded that the

khans of Bukhara and Khokand send provisions and grant free passage through their

territories. The Amir of Bukhara readily accepted the Russian demands and sent

provisions to Russian expeditionary forces. This help played an important role on the

success ofthe army. If the Russians did not receive "the grain .. .from Bokhara, the • ^R9

troops might have been forced to retrace their steps." The Khan of Khokand also

promised to help the Russians. Because of assistance provided by the Khanate of

Khokand, the tsar elevated the khan's title to "Serene Highness." Hitherto the khan had T O T

been addressed as "Your Honour," a title accorded in Russia to merchants.

Muhammed Rahim Khan knew that he had no chance of winning the contest. He

tried to be submissive, and accepted all previous demands ofthe Russians. Though the

khan released all Russian slaves, or subjects in the khanate, and offered an unconditional '7QA

surrender to the Russian demands, the Russians continued their march.

As the Russian columns moved toward Khiva, they met many nomadic tribes on

the road. Almost all these tribes offered their service to them. In one occasion, the

famous Kazakh chieftain, Izzet Kutebar, "being the most powerfiil chief between the Aral

and Caspian, and a determined enemy ofthe Russians until a few months ago ... and a

man of imposing presence, tall, calm, and sagacious, moving like a pagan divinity among

his adoring countrymen," offered his assistance to the Russians. The submissive

character ofthe nomads on the way to Khiva greatly enhanced the safety ofthe Russian

armies. Along with the tribal help, the Russian armies had new survival techniques to

cross difficuh terrain without casualties. Since the last time in 1839 when they tried to

cross these difficult territories, many things had been improved to make marching

381 The Times, November 18, 1872.

'^' Terentyef, 108-109. amir's provisions consisted of "400 battnans (3,200 puds) of flour, 50 battnans of badey, and 30 battnans of rice, which were preceded by a letter to the effect that he would consider any payment for these supplies as a personal affront."

'^' The Times, May 15, 1873.

"^'^ The Times, May 13, 1873.

121

columns comfortable, including the invention of pipe-pumps used to take underground

water and the use of preserved meat. *''' The march was so successful that almost all

Russian forces reached Khiva in good health.

The enemy marched in the khan's territories for a long time without any serious

confrontation. Without any real obstacle, the Russians marched on Khiva.̂ ^^ Yet,

according to the Daily Telegraph, Khivan forces that were "wretchedly armed, knowing

nothing ofthe musket, but using the old useless weapon, the matchlock," confronted the

Russians in Khodja Hi. They started to flee after a short stmggle. In Mangit, the Russians

had to fight the Yomud Turkmen. In the fight, the Russians succeeded in defeating them T O T

although losing 15 men. Without any loss of men, Kaufmann's column reached • ^RR

Khiva. Whenever a prospect appeared for a battle, the Khivan army preferred to

retreat rather than confront the enemy on the battlefield. They knew that there was no

chance of winning the war against a formidable army. As the Khivan army retired, some

ofthe soldiers actually joined the Russians. Serious skirmishes occurred only between

the Turkmen light cavalry and the Russians. The Russian forces led by Colonel Skobelev

attacked Turkmen villages on the way destroying them as a punishment to their light

cavalry.̂ ^^

When the Russians appeared before the city of Khiva on June 9, 1873, there was a

serious battle between two forces. In the battle, the Russians beat the Khivans. They lost

two men killed and many wounded. Among the wounded men was General Verevkin,

'^^ The Times, June 6, 1873; Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 155-57. According to Boulger, Izzet Kutebar was bom in the beginning ofthe century, and grew up as a robber. He was a charismatic leader, led his armies against the Russians for decades, robbed Russian caravans, and destroyed Russian armies and posts. However, after the Crimean War, the Russians sent large armies against him. Seeing that the sfruggle had no successful end, and receiving honorable terms from the govemor-general of Orenburg, Katenin, he surrendered himself to the Russians in 1859, and was received as a respected guest in St. Petersburg. During the Khivan expedition, he was an old man and already a Russian vassal.

'*'The Times, ixxnQ 20, 1873.

'" The Daily News, June 28, 1873.

'^^ The Times, My 1, 1873.

'^"^ The Times, My 11, 1873.

122

the commander ofthe Orenburg forces. The Khivans lost around 200 men.̂ ^° Upon

seeing no hope of escaping from invasion, the khan asked the Russians to accept his

capitulation. Yet he escaped from the city with his guards and Turkmen forces at night.

The next day, the Russians marched into the city without a shot from the Khivans.^^' The

Times' leading article concluded on the fall of Khiva that "So perishes ... the last relic of ^Q9

independence in Central Asia!" At the head ofthe Russian forces entering to the

capital were Grand Duke Nicholas Constantino witch and Prince Eugene

Maximilianowitch. The officers who successfully prosecuted the expedition were

awarded higher ranks and medals.̂ ^^ In all, throughout the expedition, the Russian losses

amounted to "21 killed and 92 wounded, of whom the fleet lost 14 killed."^ '̂*

The khan sent an envoy to Kaufmann to offer his allegiance to Russia. MacGhan,

who traveled Central Asia with Eugene Schuyler, the first American political secretary at

St. Petersburg, at the time ofthe Khivan expedition, and was an eyewitness to this war,

simply stated that the khan, a tall man (6 feet 3 inches) and with a well-built body had to

obey a short and simple person like Kaufmann. Before an armistice was signed,

Kaufmann ordered him to come to Khiva, and submit his allegiance in person. The khan

accepted the proposal and retumed to the city. Kaufmann left him on his throne, but

appointed a Council of Administration to handle things during the Russian occupation.'̂ ^^

'"^ The Times, July 21, 1873; T/ze Daily News, July 21, 1873; T/ze Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1873.

' " r/ze 7'/>we5, June 30, 1873.

392 The Times, June 26, 1873.

''^' The Times, August 5, 1873. Lomakin was made Major General, General Verevkin and Golowatchev were awarded the Cross of St. George. General Kaufmann was knighted as a second class. They were also awarded silver medals.

"'* The Daily Telegraph, August 4, 1873.

'^^ The Times, August 27, 1874.

'^'The Times, My 14, 1873.

123

The first thing the khan did was issue a declaration of freedom to all slaves. He

stated that "penetrated by veneration for the Emperor of Russia, I declare all slaves in the

Empire of Khiva to be free, and the slave trade abolished for ever."^^^

Most ofthe information published in The Times regarding the Khivan expedition

came form Russian sources. Only a few sources were sent from Teheran, Calcutta, Paris,

Berlin, and Vienna. Thus, the Russian sources seem to have misrepresented the reality.

In a leading article, which was a review of a book written by Lieutenant Stumm, who was

a Prussian officer and who was the only non-Russian military person allowed to

participate the expedition. The Times clarified many points and brought light to military

confrontations and actual conditions ofthe khanate. It remarked on the patience ofthe

Russians in crossing a very difficult terrain under very bad weather conditions. The

paper stated that the success ofthe Russian expedition was due to effective intelligence

prior to the expedition. The Russians had sent many spies to draw a map and bring

necessary information. Furthermore, as for the tactics ofthe native armies applied during

the confrontation, it said that the natives still had the spirit and prowess ofthe famous

Genghis Khan's armies. They had performed many tactics that surprised the Russians.

But all availed nothing; though they might know something of tactics, and were sufficiently disciplined to tum their knowledge to account, the Russians knew more. Though they fought with the utmost brevity, and on half-a-dozen occasions hurled their wild horsemen into the very enclosure ofthe hostile camp or into the marching columns ofthe enemy, the Russians were no cowards either. Last, not least—and this is the most important point, which decided the campaign before it was fairly begun—though they had cannon and rifles of medieval make, the Russians confronted them with the best specimens of German and American manufacture to be had. Once more the rockets, which have done duty so often in Central Asia, frightened the horses ofthe cavalry; once more the infantry, when the troopers found it impossible to rein in their rebellious steeds, were thrown into constemation by revolving grenades thrown out of Krupp guns ofthe latest fashion; ...the Russian infantry walked up, and out ofthe Berdan rifle—a cross between the Chassepot and the Droyse—poured a deadly hailstorm into the ranks of their helpless

'̂̂ The Times, July 25, 1873; Terentyef, 219. Terentyef states that there were as many as 30,000 slaves in the khanate. These slaves were divided into five of six hundred companies to be escorted to their native lands by the help ofthe Khivan forces. Along with these slaves, there were as many as 6,500 previously liberated slaves within the khanate, who received 44 Russian desytins of land.

adversaries. Thus, it was chiefly the want of efficient arms, which doomed the indigenous troops to destruction the moment they stood face to face with a European drilled force. They could certainly not compare in strategy with the commanders arrayed against them, but they knew enough to have applied their impetuous bravery to some good purpose if only they had had the means.

The paper stressed that the Russians had successfully prevented the natives from

obtaining new weapons. It also stated that after the defeat ofthe Khiavese army at the

Battle of Mangit, they had lost their spirit and the army was dispersed. The infantry

began to seek refuge inside the fortified towns, and the cavalry, consisting mostly ofthe

Turkmens, "carried out a sort of guerrilla warfare with no definite object in view."

Indeed, there were many tactics to be taken. They could bum the wooden bridges, and

use the water ofthe Amu to stop the Russian advances. Yet the Khiavese did none of

these.

The Russians marched, with little or no resistance through a country where each step might have been contested with every prospect of success. More than this, the fierce fellows who had but lately confronted the needle-gun in solid array now not only omitted flooding the plains, but also, met the conqueror outside the open gates of their penitent towns. It is not in the Asiatic to resist the inevitable.

In their 1873 settlement with the British, the Russians openly and repeatedly

assured the British that they were not after annexation ofthe khan's lands. Yet as the

victory was gained, the Russians did not want to leave the khanate intact. They made

some arrangements, including the ceding of territories located on the right bank ofthe

Amu Daria River to Bukhara as a payment to the amir's help to the Russian

expeditionary forces. Part of these territories was annexed in order to construct forts and

to erect military posts to control the khanate in the future. Along with this territorial

arrangement, the Russians ordered the khan to pay a 2,000,000 ruble indemnity. In a

country where the income ofthe govemment was not more than 400,000 mbles, the

obligation of paying 2,000,000 mbles as indemnity in a span of seven years was a harsh

'̂* The Times, January 2, 1874.

^ '̂ The Times, January 2, 1874.

125

treatment ofthe vanquished. Later, 800,000 of this amount was decided to be paid by the

Yomud Turkmens. The Russians also forced the khan to abolish capital punishment in

his khanate. Furthermore, the treaty signed with Khiva was similar to the treaties

signed with Khokand and Bukhara in 1868. Again in this treaty, Russian merchants had

rights to trade freely and have trade houses within the khanate. The khan was also

reduced to the vassalage level and was prohibited from pursuing independent relations

with the outside world.'*'̂ '

When the news about the defeat of Khiva reached England, The Times happily

annonced the successful conclusion of Russia's "good cause." The Russians had now

ended the mischief of the khan in inciting the Kazakhs against them, troubling their

merchants and holding them prisoners. It said.

No regret can be affected for the defeat ofthe Khan. He brought his punishment on himself, and deserved the fate by which he has probably now been overtaken... as for ourselves we have often admitted that Russia might, if she chose, be a better neighbour to us in India than the neighbours we have at present, so would she be to Persia; but she might also prove more formidable and more troublesome.

It concluded that this success had pacified Russia's possessions in Turkistan and provided

her with full control of Central Asia.'*"̂ The Committee ofthe British and Foreign Anti-

Slavery Society congratulated the Tsar and praised him because of his effort to abolish

slavery in Central Asia.'*°'̂ The Amir of Bukhara also sent a congratulatory message with

his a special envoy to St. Petersburg upon the Russian successes in Khiva.

The Russians joyfully celebrated their latest victory. The St. Petersburg

Exchange Gazette compared the march on Khiva with one done centuries before by

Alexander the Great. Only now, it claimed, the region and the mlers were more

^^ The Times, My 26, 1873.

""' Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 299; The Times, November 26, 1873.

*°'-The Times, My 2, 1873.

""̂ The Times, January 6, 1874.

404 The Times, January 20, 1874.

126

"barbarous" and harsh. "It is well know that only 200 years ago Khiva and Bokhara

boasted a certain degree of culture, and have only gradually been made by Mongol

barbarism and ignorance the inhospitable deserts they are." Furthermore, it stated that

the success ofthe Russian forces was not new. There had been the others, such as Kazan,

Astrakhan, and Crimea. But now they succeeded despite hundreds of miles of harsh

deserts and severe climate.'**'̂ The story was the same as it had told at the end of every

victory ofthe Russians against the Turkic people. It was again the victory of

"civilization" over "barbarism" and the Russian victory over the Mongols.

Though the Russians did not annex all territories of Khiva, they stripped the

khanate of its throne. When "A Lover of Tmth" visited Moscow in 1876, he was shown

the actual throne ofthe khan of Khiva. He was surprised to see this throne because it was

an act of disrespect to a vassal state. He said, "1 considered it a great curiosity. The

English Government has not, I believe, taken away the thrones ofthe protected Princes of

India." The invasion of Khiva was regarded by the Daily News as "having

permanently filled up an important gap in their [Russian] Central Asian conquests."'"'^

Massacre ofthe Yomud Turkmens

The first news about the massacre was published in The Times on September 11,

1873. According to this, the Russians demanded the payment of 300,000 mbles

indemnity at once on July 25. Being poor and having no cash money as big as 300,000

mbles (£83,000), the Turkmens wanted some additional time to collect the money. The

Russians insisted on the payment immediately. Even before their accepted deadline had

expired. General Kaufman ordered Major-General Golovatchov to "make an example of

them."'*^^ They attacked the Turkmen villages composed of kibitkas (tents) and arabas

*°^ The Times, My 11, 1873.

*"' "A Lover of Truth," The Times, December 3, 1878.

^°'' The Daily News, May 28, 1873.

*"* The Times, November 14, 1874.

127

(wagons). According to Burnaby, the collection ofthe indemnity was only a pretext.

The real aim was that General Kaufmann, who was the last to reach Khiva and did not

have the glory of first capturing it, did not want to retum empty-handed. His greed for

victory of any sort and love for a new medal forced him to destroy the Turkmens.'*^^

The Russians wanted to punish the Turkmens,"the bravest and most warlike"^ "̂

people who harassed the Russian armies during the Khivan expedition. According to a

Russian thesis, the cause ofthe Russian attack on the Turkmens was their disobedience to

orders. When they were ordered to collect the indemnity, the Turkmens either tried to

escape or to collect men to fight the Russians."*"

The Yomuds were surprised by the sudden attack, because they did not know why

the Russians were attacking them. Nevertheless, the Russians doggedly pursued the

Yomuds, destroyed their arabas, bumed their tents, and household items, and took with

them their valuables, including carpets, silk, and most importantly animals. Moreover,

the Russians killed almost all the men they reached, without sparing the wounded, and

they also killed women, children, and elderly. Seeing no more to kill and no more to

destroy. General Golovatchov ordered his troops to retum to Khiva, leaving behind many

helpless orphans and widows. "The power ofthe Yomud Turcomans was broken; their

min complete. The greater part of their livestock had been captured. All of their wheat,

grain, and forage, upon which they depended for subsistence during the winter, had been 41 9

bumed, and their dwellings laid in ashes."

The massacre of the Yomuds was a source of debate between The Pall Mall

Gazette and The Times. A letter written by "A Russian" claimed that The Pall Mall

Gazette twisted the tmth about the incident that occurred between the Russians and the

Yomud Turkmens because in a leading article. The Pall Mall Gazette claimed that the

''"'Bumaby, 217.

"'" J. A. MacGahan, Campaigning on the Oxus, and the Fall of Khiva. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1874,349.

"" "A Russian," The Times, November 13, 1876. MacGahan, 355.

•"- MacGahan, 355-409.

128

Russians had attacked twice and massacred the Turkmens in two different times. "A

Russian," stated that the story ofthe second massacre was a fabrication or a

misunderstanding ofthe Russian dating system. According to the Russian old and new

calendars there were 12 days difference. The fighting with the Turkmens took place in

July 16, 17, and 18 according to old style. The new calendar, however, marked the same

event on July 28, 29, and 30. It was because ofthe calendar that The Pall Mall Gazette

misrepresented the event.""^ Upon the letter of "A Russian," the editor of The Pall Mall

Gazette sent an explanatory and apologetic letter to The Times, stating that his

correspondent's coverage ofthe second massacre ofthe Yomud Turkmens may be

dismissed. He suggested that for the true character ofthe event, the reader should read

Schuyler's accounts.'"'*

The Times had published Schuyler's account ofthe massacre. According to this,

the Russians had imposed a very heavy indemnity on the Yomud Turkmens, who did not

have money to comply with the order. The Russians demanded cash rather than animals,

jewelry or other material. The amount was too high for the Turkmens, whose wealth was

limed to their flocks of animals. Still they promised to collect it. The Russians gave 15

days for them to come up with the money. Even before the deadline had expired, the

Russians attacked the Turkmens. They thought that without striking a deadly blow on the

Turkmens, tranquility would not come to the khanate because the Turkmens had never

been under the khan's authority, and always lived a freelance life. Indeed, the khan had

always fulfilled the demands ofthe Turkmens. Schuyler stated that, between 25 and 31

July, the Russians had attacked the Turkmens, destroyed villages, bumed their crops,

killed women, children, and men, and taken away their animals. On July 31, the

Turkmens yielded to the enemy, and agreed to act as the enemy wished. Then, they

gathered as much money as they found to give the enemy. They had taken all the jewelry

from their women and daughters. They collected animals and other valuables, including

carpets, and gave them to the Russians with any price to fulfill the indemnity imposed on

^'' "A Russian," The Times, November 13, 1876.

'"" The Times, November 15, 1876.

129

them."*'̂ In a letter published in The Times the next day, on November 16, 1876, Eugene

Schuyler stated that he was in Tashkent when the incident was happening. He got his

information from Russian officers, including a Mr. Gromov, who was present and who

took part in actual fighting with the Turkmens. He also said that he carefully documented

the orders of General Kaufmann to the Russian forces on the field. In these orders.

General Kaufman openly stated that all Turkmens must be exterminated without making

any exceptions for women, children, and the elderly.

When the Russians attacked them without waming, the Turkmens panicked in

many places. The Cossacks set fire to the prairies, and to Turkmen tents.

Six sotnias of Cossacks, led by Prince Eugene ... swooped down on the horde of fugitives, which broke up its compact mass and streamed away in an agony of terror. There were shouts and cries—a scattering discharge of firearms, and the Cossacks, their lines broken by abandoned carts and impeded by the terrified animals running madly over the plain, were in among the rout. The scene may be well imagined by those who tum to the vivid word-picture of our author—women and children crouched in the sand amid their household min, sobbing piteously and begging for mercy; men dead and dying; a mck of Cossacks sabreing, shooting, and lancing their miserable prey to the verge of a marsh, where women and children, up to their necks in water, are trying to hide among the weeds and grass, or beg for their lives and scream most pitifully. '"^

In a night attack, the Yomud Turkmens fought with utmost ferocity. Yet, they left

500 men dead, while the Russians had only 60 killed. Gromov said.

That same day and the next we began to pursue the Turkomans, who were very much disheartened by the result of their attack. We bumt—as we had done before—grain, houses, and everything which we met, and the cavalry, which was in advance, cut down every person—man, woman, or child. Many ofthe men had gone, although a few of them got up and fired at us. They were generally women and children whom we met. I saw much cruelty. The infantry came at a run behind, running fully 18 miles, and continuing the work of murder.'*

"'̂ The r/wei, November 16, 1876.

"'* MacGhan, The Times, August 27, 1876.

""' The Times, November 15, 1876.

130

Despite brave resistance, superior Russian forces defeated the Yomuds. The Times 41 R

presented the number of Turkmen losses as 800 people. Vambery claimed that the

Russians massacred "nearly 10,000 Turkoman Yomuds" at Kizil-Takir.'*'^ The pursuit

was kept up inexorably. Native guides led the Russians on the trail and, on the second

day after the fight. Scattered over the plain in every direction were hundreds of arabas, or carts, loaded with the household goods ofthe Yomuds. Unable to cross the canal on the one narrow bridge, they had cut their horses loose and fled, abandoning everything. Some, however, had failed to make their escape, either because they had no horses or possibly because they tmsted too much to the clemency ofthe Russians. These had been overtaken and cut down by the Cossacks. Everywhere, lying among the thickly standing arbas, were the bodies, with saber-cuts on head and face, bloody and ghastly. But worse still to see were the women cowering under the carts, like poor dumb animals, watching us with fear-stricken faces and beseeching eyes, but never uttering a word, with the dead bodies of their husbands, lovers, and brothers lying around them... but worst of all to see was a number of little mites of children, whose parents had probably been killed. Some were crawling about the wheels, crying; others, still sitting in the carts among the baggage, watched us with curious, childish eyes; one little girl crowed and laughed at the sight of General Golovatchoff s banner.'*^*'

After this destmction, the Turkmens were left with their miseries, and were

further forced to pay four Sterling per tent, which was heavier when the poomess ofthe

Turkmens was taken into consideration than what the Germans forced on the French in

1871, after the Franco-Prussian War.'* '̂

The khan seems to have prospered from the new conditions. The Russians'

merciless destmction ofthe Turkmens helped him to strengthen his poshion in the

khanate. He may have lost the right bank of Amu Daria, but in retum he found a new

ally who helped him against the possible Turkmen attacks. It did not take too long for

him to write the commander of Petro-AIexandrovsk, Colonel Ivanov, to seek his

"'* The Times, September 11, 1873.

""̂ Arminius Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India. London: Cassell & Co., 1885, 28.

™ MacGhan, The Times, August 27, 1874.

^-' MacGhan, The Times, August 27, 1874.

131

assistance against the "menacing" Turkmens. Upon receiving this letter. Colonel Ivanov

sent a waming to the Turkmens, reminding them ofthe horrors ofthe past year and

waming them to behave.^"' Later, in order to collect some part ofthe indemnity and to

scare the Turkmens, the Russian forces at Petro-Alexandrovsk entered Turkmen country.

Wherever Colonel Ivanov went, the Turkmens accepted his demands. Ivanov only

ordered his forces to punish the Kul Yomud Turkmens because of their "atrocities"

against the khan. He wanted his men not to kill inhabitants, but bum their kibitkas, and

take away their animals and all other possessions. He also collected a 36,000 mble war

indemnity during this expedition.

The Times leading article condemned the behavior ofthe khan. The author

accused the khan of being unfaithful and forgetful of his obligations toward the

Turkmens. When the Russians were preparing to attack the khanate in 1873, he had

asked for Turkmen help. The Turkmens on their part did as much as possible to harass

and stop the Russians. Yet as soon as the Russians established their supremacy over the

khan and forced him to sign a capitulation, the khan did nothing to stop the massacre. He

allowed the Russians to rob already poor people by imposing a heavy indemnity on them.

The poor Turkmens became even poorer and many of them began to settle elsewhere.

The article stated that the khan was not fit to rule the country. The direct mle ofthe

Russians would be more beneficial to the people than the native mle. It concluded that

the Russians had not only acted as blind and deaf to the civilized manner, but also they

had acted as barbarians by massacring the Yomuds. They inflicted inhumane and cmel

blows on them.'* '̂*

*'' The Times, November 13, 1874.

*" The Times, March 30, 1875.

424 The Times, November 14, 1874.

Annexation of the Khanate of Khokand

Troubles within the khanate of Khokand started in 1873 because of heavy taxes

imposed on the subjects by Khudyar Khan. The khan even made his subjects work his

fields and stables, and treated them as serfs. Besides heavy taxes and labor duties, the

khan ended the use of free grazing and free woods from communal lands. The harsh

treatment by the khan created wide unrest within the khanate."* ' The Kirghiz began to

resist the tax collectors, and retreated to the mountainous regions to defend themselves.

The khan sent military forces to suppress these uprisings, but dismption was everywhere.

The army and many dignitaries also disliked the khan. Still, Khudyar Khan had power to

suppress such uprisings at this early time. But unrest within the khanate was on the rise.

The dislike for Khudyar's harsh treatment created a general rebellion in 1875. The first

signifying an end ofthe khanate of Khokand appeared in The Times as a report of intemal

confiict among the different political forces fighting for the throne. In the confiict,

Muhammed Amin, a son ofthe khan, was sided with conspiracy to topple the khan. Yet

their plot was discovered and sixteen ofthe conspirators were executed.

According to an eyewitness, Herr von Weinberg, an envoy of Kaufmann to the

khan, the rebels first started their rising in Karategin, and were led by Polat Khan and

Nazar Beg, the latter being a nephew ofthe mler.'*^^ In order to suppress the rising, the

khan sent his forces under the command of Abdurrahman Avdobashci and Issa Aulie.

These commanders joined the rebels and began to march against the khan. They

succeeded in forcing the khan to escape from the capital. Meanwhile. General Skobelev

was in Khokand at the head of a Russian mission. He suggested Khudyar go to Khodjent

and wait there until Russian forces suppressed the rebellion. The rebels took the

^-' The Times, February 18, 1875.

*" The Times, May 16, 1874; Boulger, 182.

•*-' D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 146. According to D'Encausse. the leader ofthe rebels was Polat Khan with another name, Ishaq Hasan Oghlu.

133

49R

throne and declared Said Nasreddin, the eldest son and the pretender to the throne, as

the new khan.

Abdurrahman Avdobashci was a son of Musluman Kul, who was the prime

minister, the guardian of Khudyar and his closest helper in the 1850's. He represented

the Kirghiz voice at the palace. Since there was a great hostility between the nomad

Kirghiz and the sedentary population, the khan had to keep the balance well in the social

structure. In the 1850's there was a bitter fight between the nomads and the settled

people. Hundreds of thousands of people died from these fights. The khan sided with the

sedentary people against Musluman Kul's Kirghiz nomads.'*"^ Musluman Kul was

decapitated in 1853 by the order of Khudyar Khan'* °̂ in order to destroy the authority of

the Kirghiz in the khanate. "With him [Musluman Kul] were executed no less than

20,000 Kiptchak nomads, suspected of aiding and abetting Musulman Kul. From this

camage arose ever-recurring rebellions, terminating in the final catastrophe to be

recounted."^^' The execution of Musluman Kul and bitter hostility between the khan and

his Kirghiz subjects continued to create instability in the country. The rebellion of 1875

gave a chance for Abdurrahman Avdobashci to revenge his father's execution and

strengthen the nomadic authority in the khanate.

The Russians did not like the change in mling stmcture in Khokand. Since the ex-

khan was a Russian puppet and did not object to Russian demands, the Russians were

afraid that the new khan would be hostile to them. Indeed, the new ruling group ofthe

khanate, especially Abdurrahman Avdobashci, had already declared war against the

"̂ ^ The Times, August 9, 1875; Singh, 39.

"̂ ^ The Times, Febmary 10, 1876.

*'° Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 170-171. According to Boulger, Musluman Kul served as prime minister for ten years from 1843 to 1853. It was Musluman Kul who successftilly put things in order within the state after the Amir of Bukhara, Nasmllah invaded Khokand, and executed Khan Muhammed Ali in 1842. In a short time, Shere Ali became the khan. Yet, with the help of Musluman Kul, Khudyar Khan became the khan.

*'' The Times, September 29, 1875. Abdurrahman Avtobaschi was a son of Muslim Kul. Muslim Kul was a Kipchak, and served as the khan's guardian during his youth and ex-prime minister in the first ten years of his reign.

134

"infidel" Russians. They thought that by gaining some victories over the Russians their

rule in the khanate would be strengthened."* '̂

The Russians were afraid that the insurrection would spread into Russian-held

territories, and the Muslims would massacre them all. In order to defend themselves, the

Russian subjects in Tashkent and in the other regions were distributed weapons from

govemment stores. Many Russians had already escaped from Tashkent to more secure

places.'*'̂ ^ The Khokandians attacked to the Russians in and around the khanate. The

insurgents had overrun the Russian town of Kuramin and attacked Khodjent.''̂ ^ Thus,

these developments gave new opportunities for the Russians to move again in the

khanate. The Times correspondent stated that this time the Russians would occupy the

whole khanate.'*^^

General Kaufmann first offered to allow the new khan. Said Nasraddinm, to keep

his throne, if he could stop the rebellion, if he would obey to all agreements previously

made, and if he would compensate Russian losses from the insurrection. This offer was

made to divide the newly established front in the khanate against the Russians.'*^^ The

khan did not accept the offer and continued to fight. Meanwhile, the Russians suspected

that Yakub Beg of Kashgaria had a hand in the insurrection. Since Yakub Beg had

leadership and charisma to influence Muslim subjects, he was the first to be blamed for

the problem. Though the Russians had a treaty with Yakub Beg, they were afraid of his

power. Yet as the Chinese were preparing to take Eastem Turkistan back, Yakub Beg 4^7

had no time and power to directly involve himself in Central Asian affairs.

'^" The Times, August 30, 1875; Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 184. Boulger stated that the rebels drew up a remarkable document which called upon the Russians either to become Muslim or to abandon territories they wrongfully acquired.

"" The Times, August 31, 1875; Boulger, 186.

^'^ The Times, September 3, 1876.

"̂ ^ The Times, August 21, 1875.

"'* Singh, 41.

"*" The Times, September 3, 1875.

135

The Russians under the command of Generals Skobelev, Golvatchev, and

Kaufmann commenced a full-scale attack against the Khokandians. At Abkhora on the

bank of Syr Daria, the Russians gained their first important victory. In the stmggle no

less than 3,000 or 4,000 Khokandians, and 1,000 or 2.000 Russians were killed.

Meanwhile, the new khan, Nasraddin, changed his eariy opposition to the Russians and

acted against the rebels. He sent letters to the chiefs of every tribe except Kirghiz and

Kipchaks and to begs of every town to advise them to lay down their weapons against the

Russians. Most ofthe tribes and town people, upon receiving the letter, stopped helping

the rebels and fighting against the Russians. Now, the Kirghiz and Kipchaks, who

undermined the khan's submissive order, were left alone to deal with the enemy."*̂ ^

Govemor General Kaufmaim commanded the main body ofthe Russian armies.

In a battle the rebels, who numbered 30,000, they were soundly defeated by smaller

Russian force at Machram on September 4, 1875. This was the most decisive battle that

the Russians ever fought in Central Asia. After the battie, all hopes of a new Muslim

rising perished.'*''̂ The victory gave the Russians their desired goal of annexing

Khokand and establishing their firm authority over the whole region.

According to Singh's account, the Khokandian forces in this battle consisted of

mostly Kirghiz and Kipchak warriors who initially had some successes. He said. t̂h On Friday, the 20 August 1875, about half an hour after daybreak, the

Russian troops attacked Mahram. A sanguinary engagement ensued between them and the Khokandi troops headed by the Aftabchi. Both parties fought bravely with swords, and the Aftabchi with his Kirghiz and Kipchak troops

438 Singh, 41.

*'^ The Times, September 29, 1875; Marvin, Conversations, 108-111. As Marvin reported in his interview with Skobelev, who was present in the Russian army during the fighting with the Khokandians, the Khokandians lost the battle because of their lack of military tactics. When General Kaufinann reconnoitered the ground at Makram, he found out that the Khokandians left the hills on their back unguarded. Then Kaufinann ordered his troops to station themselves on these hills. As Skobelev recorded "The next day we marched straight in that direction, keeping all the way on elevated ground alongside the mountains, until the enemy's position was outflanked. Then we changed front: tuming our back upon the hills and our faces to Makram, and, marching sfraight towards it, swept the enemy right into the river. The river was quite black with heads. Twenty thousand Khokandese perished. We lost only eighteen men. I commanded the cavalry that day.' If Skobelev's account was tme, out of 60,000 Khokandian soldiers 20,000 died either in the river or at the hands ofthe Russians.

136

captured the Russian guns and raised a cry of victory. The Russian retreated.... The next day (the 21^' August 1875) the Russians rallied and attacked the Kirghizis and the Kipchakis, retook their batteries of artillery, and put the enemy to flight.

Yet, Kaufmann's telegram to St. Petersburg stated that the Russians lost only an officer

and six men, with one officer and seven men wounded. According to the Berlin

correspondent of The Times, General Kaufmann occupied the city of Khokand on

September 16, 1875 without any resistance. The new Khan, Said Nasraddin, accepted all

Russian demands. All the territories located on the right bank of Syr Daria were

incorporated into Russia by a treaty signed on October 3, 1875. As the Russians invaded

Khokand, they tried to gain the respect ofthe people. After the victory and subjugation

ofthe khanate. General Kaufmann declared that

The representative ofthe Czar informs the Khokanders that their late ruler (Khudyar Khan) not having been popular with his people, the General has sent him to St. Petersburg, and will not allow him to mle again. The Czar, he adds, respects the religious laws ofthe Mohamedans, [sic] and allows the followers ofthe Prophet to lead a happy, pious, and contented life under his mle.

Despite Russian victories over the rebelles ofthe khanate in September and

October 1875, the establishment of tranquility was far from being complete. The new

khan. Said Nasraddin, was forced by a new wave of rebellion to escape to Khodjent. The

rebels were mainly Kirghiz subjects ofthe khanate led by Abdurrahman Avdobashci and

by Sultan Murad Bey, a stepbrother of Khudyar Khan. The center ofthe new rising was

Andican. A column of Russian forces under the command of Major-General Trotsky was

-"" Singh, 42.

'*'" The Times, September 8, 1875.

^*- The Times, October 18, 1875. Khudyar Khan was a harsh and despotic ruler against his subjects, but mild and submissive to the Russians. When the rebellion broke out, he found almost no one to rely on. At first he rejected the offer of asylum in Russia, but later as he saw no chance in the khanate, he escaped into the Russian territories. He first went to Tashkent, and then to Orenburg. According to the Orenburg correspondent, Khudyar Khan reached Orenburg on September 22. 1875. He was accompanied with his 80 or 90 wives. He also carried a large amount of cash, silver mbles, which were estimated to be 10,000,000, and he already deposited 2,000,000 in a Tashkent bank. In Orenburg, he was received as a regal dignitary and was given a band of Cossacks to serve him.

137

sent against them. These forces succeeded in defeating the rebels and destroying the

town on October 19, 1875. A large number of Kirghiz and Kipchak were killed. "As the

Andijan people had assisted the rebels, the Russian Generals (Skobelev and Trotsky) set a

portion ofthe city on fire, and cannonaded it from all sides. Many inhabitants lost their

lives during the bombardment, which caused a great terror among them."^^^

While the Russians were killing people in the city, the Kirghiz forces led by Polat

Khan and Abdul Gaffar attacked them. The center ofthe fighting shifted to a nearby

town, Balikchi. After a fierce battle, the Russians again defeated the rebels and captured

a great quantity of war materials. After the defeat in Balikchi, the rebels lost their hopes

of gaining power. One ofthe most important leaders ofthe rebels, Polat Khan, was later

captured in Marghilan and was hanged in Andijan.'*'*'*

The end ofthe last rising for freedom in the khanate of Khokand gave the

Russians a chance to annex whole territories. On October 7, General Kaufmann in an

ordre dujour proclaimed the annexation ofthe northem half of the khanate to Russia.

The new district, which included lands between the Syr Daria and Marin Rivers, was

named the District of Namanghan.^^^ Meanwhile, losing all hope of becoming a khan

again, Said Nasreddin escaped into Russia where he was put under surveillance.'*'*^

According to Boulger, Said Nasreddin was imprisoned in Russia and other pretenders to

throne were executed.

Though the stmggle between the Russians and the Kirghiz continued on a small

scale, the rebels began to appreciate the power ofthe invaders. Eventually, Abdurahman

Avdobashci submitted to the Russians after General Skobelev's guarantee of his and his

^*' The Times, November 4, 1875; Singh, 47; Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 189. In the struggle, it reported, the Russians losses were 12 soldiers and 5 officers killed, and 35 soldiers and 5 yigits (native, courageous, and well-built men who were employed in the Russian armies as guards) wounded.

"*"* D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 147; Singh, 53.

**^ The Times, November 13, 1875.

*^' The Times, November 15, 1875.

•*'*̂ Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 190.

138

followers' lives and properties.̂ ^** He was received by General Skobelev, who granted

security for him and his family on January 30, 1876.̂ ^^

The Russian press, especially Golos, increasingly supported the idea of annexing

the rest ofthe khanate of Khokand. They claimed that many people in the khanate were

willing to be Russian subjects.̂ ^*^ However, the people ofthe region were not at all

satisfied with the Russian rule. The Matshintsens, who lived in the Zerafshan district,

rose against the Russians. General Kaufman sent a detachment under Abramov's

command to help the Zarafshan garrison. With much difficulty and many losses they

eventually defeated the rebels. Upon these developments, the Russians began to

reinforce their forces that were already 30,000 strong in the region."^' Shortly after these

developments, the khanate of Khokand was totally incorporated into Russia and was

renamed Ferghana Province under the administrative power ofthe Turkistan Govemor-

Generalship.'*^^

Before the total annexation ofthe khanate, there would have been a slight chance

for the Khokandians to establish a small khanate under the Russian protectorate, if Said

Nasreddin had been clever enough to appeal to the Russians—a segment ofthe

population still wanted him as their ruler. Yet because ofthe Kirghiz opposition,

Nasreddin could not dare to attempt to sit on the throne. Most ofthe inhabitants of

Khokand indicated their desire to become Russian subjects."*^̂ The Russian forces

under General Skobelev entered Khokand, the capital ofthe khanate, and the inhabitants

received them peacefiilly and calmly on Febmary 20, 1876. General Skobelev became

'"' Singh, 52.

"'''̂ The Times, Febmaiy 12, 1876.

*^' The Times, December 1, 1875.

"'' The Times, December 24 & 27, 1875.

"" The Times, March 1, 1876.

*'' The Times, February 17, 1876.

"'" The Times, February 24, 1876.

139

the first military govemor of the new province. " In a durbar on February 21, 1876,

Kolpakovski declared that the order ofthe tsar was communicated to him through

Govemor General Kaufmann, who was in St. Petersburg at that time. Kolpakovski stated

that the tsar had already pardoned all past wrongdoings ofthe inhabitants.

By order ofthe Czar, and under instmctions from Govemor Von Kauffmann, I congratulate you on your coming under the Russian protection and acquiring the privileges and rights of its subjects. The Czar is ever ready to promote the happiness ofthe people and the peace ofthe country. You should improve your conduct and gain the imperial favors by obeying Russian laws and regulations.'*^^

The tsar stated that the "wish" ofthe Khokandians to be Russian subjects had been

fulfilled"*̂ ^ and granted the same rights to them as his other subjects had been enjoying.

In an editorial. The Times described the annexation of Khokand as an inevitable

action. It had already been under the virtual authority ofthe Russians. The khan had

acted as a servant ofthe Tsar. But the unmly actions ofthe "semi-barbarous" rebels

forced the Russians to annex the khanate. If the khanate had been left free up to this time

it was only because Russians had found a puppet govemment less expensive. In

another leading article. The r/we^ justified Russia's action as a political necessity. It

stated that the British had experienced similar difficulties when they came face to face

with the "semi-barbarous" tribes in India. Because ofthe unstable character ofthe

frontiers inhabited by such tribes, the British as well as the Russians had to annex new

territories until they reached natural boundaries such as deserts and mountains.

"" D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 147.

"̂ ^ Singh, 53.

"*" The Times, March 6, 1876.

*^^ The Times, hpxW 15, 1876.

"' ' The Times, March 16, 1876.

460 The Times, May?,, 1876.

140

The final settlement in the khanate took place at the Alai Mountains located on

the south of Ferghana. Here lived a group of Kirghiz nomads who had not yet accepted

Russian authority. A Russian force led by General Skobelev was ordered to subdue these

mountain dwellers. In the summer of 1876, the Russians defeated these Kirghiz after

hard fighting. Upon their defeat, they offered their submission. Because of their

resistance to the Russian forces. General Skobelev ordered them to pay indemnity for

their losses, and to construct roads in the mountain passes.'* '̂

War against the Turkmens and the Fall of Geok Tepe

After Khiva, the last free khanate of Central Asia, had been subdued in June 1873,

the Russians began to intensify their effort to annex Turkmenia, the last free Turkic lands

in Central Asia. Turkmenia mainly consisted of three parts. In the farthest north lived

the Yomud Turkmens, who had accepted a Russian protectorate since 1877. They lived

on the territories from Krasnovodsk to the Atrek River. In the middle was the Akhal

oasis and in the south Merv. The Tekke Turkmens, the most powerfiil and warlike of all 4^9

the Turkmen tribes, mostly inhabited the Akhal and Merv oases. The last free Turkic

people of Central Asia, they successfully resisted Russian attacks because of their

"natural courage and indomitable love of liberty."^

After the Khivan expedition. General Lomakin was appointed the commander of

Russian forces at Krasnovodsk. One of his first actions was to make an exploring

expedition to the river Atrek, which flowed into the Caspian Sea. On his trip, some

Turkmen leaders came to offer to live peaceftiUy with the Russians. They also

complained that the Kurds, who were settled by the Persians on the Turkmen border to

stop Turkmen alamans, were attacking their communities. '̂''* Lomakin agreed to pressure

*'' Singh, 56-60.

^" Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 306.

*" The New York Times, January 19, 1881.

464 The Times, June 17, 1874.

141

the Persians to keep them under control and force the Kurds to free some Turkmens

presently prisoners in their hands.'*^^

News and commentaries relating to Central Asia published in The Times after the

fall of Khiva always claimed that the Turkmens were coming to offer their allegiance to

Russia. According to these, wherever Russian forces and scientific explorers went in

Turkmenia, they were received with respect by tribes whose leaders were eager to live

under the tsar's authority. Yet the reality seems to have been different. Indeed, a bitter

hostility existed between major bodies ofthe Tekke Turkmens and the Russians. When

the Russians attempted to invade Turkmenia, the Turkmens effectively resisted.

According to Charles Marvin, one ofthe causes ofthe Turkmens' fierce opposition to the

Russian invasions in Turkmenia was that British military officers sent to the Persio-

Turkmen frontiers encouraged their resistance. In this respect. Colonel Valentine Baker.

Colonel Charles M. MacGregor, Major Robert Napier, Captain F. E. H. Butler and many

other British officers, acting either as secret or as diplomatic agents, were sent to survey

the state of affairs in Merv and in all Turkmenia. These officers provided no money or

weaponry to the Turkmens yet they did encourage the Turkmens to resist the invaders in

order to create every possible obstacle before Russian onward march toward India. If

these officers did not encourage them, the Turkmens would accept Russian suzerainty in

a couple of years and there would not be any war between the Russians and the

Turkmens; consequently, both belligerents would not lose tens and thousands of humans

and enormous quantity of materials.'*

Along with their desire to invade Merv, the Russians were mainly trying to find

easy and short caravan routes to Central Asia. With an expeditionary force consisted of

1,000 men and many scientists. General Lomakin succeeded in surveying the area from

the Caspian to Sari Kamish near the Aral Sea. On the way many Turkmen leaders,

including Nurverdi (Boudaiverdy) Khan, the brother of the principal leader of Merv

^'^ The Times, i\xm 18, 1874.

^" Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia, 245-248.

142

Tekkes, and Khurshit (Kaouchit) Khan came to offer their allegiance to the Russians.'*^^

Yet encounters between Russian and the Turkmen forces were not always friendly. In

one instance, Russian forces and Turkmens fought a battle in Kizil Arvat. It was reported

that the Turkmen losses were heavy and that General Lomakin captured the town.'*^̂

The news was nothing but a fabrication. Since The Times along with the rest of British

press mostly received their news through Russian sources, they were not objective, and,

indeed, they generally reflected the Russian way of twisting the tmth.

The Russian forces led by General Lomakin in 1876 undertook the first serious

expedition against the Tekke Turkmens. They reached Kizil Arvat, but ceaseless Tekke

attacks forced them to retum back to Krasnovodsk. Yet the Russians never gave up their

dream of subduing the Turkmens and establishing their mle over the Transcaspian region.

In 1878, as political, diplomatic and militEiry tensions mounted in Europe because ofthe

Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Russians wanted a major victory that would threaten

British possessions in India. For this goal they had to eliminate Tekke power. According

to Vambery,

The Tekkes are the bravest and most warlike of their race. They have the best weapons and horses, form the largest and most compact mass, and have, as far as history tells us, not only never had to suffer from foreign intmsion, but, on the contrary, defied Nadir's army and totally mined those of Medemin of Khiva and the present King of Persia. If the Russians in 1873 found formidable enemies in the Turcomans of those parts, who are only half nomads and little warlike, and did not appear in any such numbers as the Russians say, how would they be able to measure swords with those Turcomans who, like the Tekkes, have been constantly fighting for centuries, who in bands of 30 or 40 carry their raids 50 and often more geographical miles into Persia, and of whom each is the type of those indomitable warriors with whom the old-world conquerors carried out their bloody exploits? A Russian advance through the country ofthe Turcomans to Merv seems, therefore, to us decidedly improbable.

•*" "A Student of Central Asia," The Times, September 23, 1875.

^^ The Times. ]\mQU, 1877.

''*' Arminius Vambery, The Times, November 19, 1878.

143

They had already piled up a great amount of provisions at Krasnovodsk.'*^" The

new army that consisted of 16 battalion infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, 21 sotnias of

Cossacks, and five sotnias of Turkmens who were gathered from the hostile tribes,

numbering in all around 15,000 to 18,000,"* '̂ was commanded by General Lazarev, an

Armenian by birth and a fierce looking man.'*̂ ^ The primary aim ofthe expedition was to

pacify the Turkmens and capture Merv. The Russians believed that the Mervlies had

been sent many guns by the British to defend their country.'*^^ They feared that, if the

Mervlies became a strong power, then Russia would lose its chances to subjugate

Turkmenia. Thus, they had to act quickly and mobilize at least 18,000 men and

guarantee Persian help for provisions to march on Merv.'*^"

Though the real aim ofthe 1879 expedhion was to invade Merv, the Russian

press, including Invalide Russ, claimed that they sent the expeditionary powers to secure

the caravan roads between Krasnovodsk and Khiva from the attacks ofthe Akhal Tekke

"^ The Times, December 6, 1878; The Daily Telegraph, July 3, 1879. According to The Daily Telegraph, Russian forces consisted of "16'/2 battalions of infantry, two squadrons of dragoons, twenty-one sotnias of Cossacks and Caucasian Militia, five sotnias of volunteers, and thirty-six guns. The train comprises 15,000 camels and 6,000 other beasts of burden. The total number of men is 22,000, of whom 18,000 carry arms."

''^' The Times, January 10, 1880. Charles Marvin, The Eye-witnesses' Account ofthe Disastrous Russian Campaign against the .Akhal Tekke Turcomans, 102-103. According to Marvin, the Russian forces consisted of 16,5 battalions of infantry, each 800 men; 23 sotnias of Cossacks and Dragoons, and 5 sotnias of Turkomans, 32 nine-pounder guns and 4 Cossack guns.

^'' The Times, September 8, 1879. According to the Berlin correspondent, "General Lazareff, the late Commander-in-Chief to the Tekke Turcoman expedition, was an Armenian by birth, and had raised himself entirely by his own abilities from the ranks ofthe Army ofthe Caucasus. His career furnishes one ofthe very few instances of a private soldier rising step by step to the rank of general in the Russian Army. It seems that his education was ofthe poorest character, and his success chiefly owed to his inbom talent and pracfical knowledge ofthe half-civilized peoples of Asia with which Russia has had to do. In addition to this, his imposing stature and fierce mien, as the Russian press remarks, were calculated to sfrike terror into the hearts of Asiatic savages, and in this respect it appears that he had already made an impression on the Turcoman chiefs before he met with his untimely end."

*'^'The Times, My 14, 1879.

*''* Arminius Vambery, The Times, July 29, 1879. Vambery claimed that the Mervlies could raise 70,000 or 80,000 men to defend their country.

144

Turkmens. " They also claimed that the expedition aimed to liberate about 40,000

slaves, who were believed to be suffering in the hands ofthe Turkmens.'*^^

Apart from their overall indication ofthe conflict between the Tekkes and the

Russian forces, most ofthe news published in The Times had no value as far as the real

state of affairs in Turkmenia. The country was still an unknown land to the east. For

instance. The Times claimed that the leader ofthe Tekkes at this time was Tikma

Serdar."*̂ ^ Yet Tikma Serdar, who had just finished a raid on the Persian Kurds,

destroying two settlements and taking away many slaves, did not command the

Turkmens. Indeed, he came to Russian headquarters to offer his allegiance to the

Russians. He believed that it was useless to resist a formidable force like the Russians

who a year earlier had defeated the Ottomans. Tikma Serdar stayed with the Russians

during the expeditions. The leader ofthe Akhal Tekke at this time was Berdi Murad, a

son of Nur Verdi Khan of Merv.'*^*

After preparations were done, the Russians launched a great offensive against the

Akhal Tekke Turkmens in 1879. Though General Lazarev died during this expedition,

the Russians continued to march against the Turkmens under the temporary command of

General Lomakin. Before General A. Tergukassov, another Armenian by birth, took

command ofthe army. General Lomakin hurried to attack Geok Tepe. Yet he showed

very weak leadership. The Turkmens routed the army, the Russians' biggest defeat in

their entire Central Asian adventure.

The first but false news about the struggle between the Russians and the Tekkes

stated that Russian forces defeated 30,000-strong Turkmen forces around Dengil Tepe.

The losses ofthe Turkmens were great while the Russians lost seven officers and 178

''̂ ^ The Times, October 9, 1879.

"̂ ^ The Daily Telegraph, July 9, 1879.

"*" The Times, August 6, 1879.

^'^ Marvin, Disastrous Russian Campaign, 97-98.

145

soldiers killed and 16 officers and 234 soldiers wounded."* Though the news gave quite

accurate information about the losses of both sides, it was wrong as far as the defeat of

the Turkmens was concemed. In reality, the Turkmens headed by Nurverdi Murad Han

successfully defended Geok Tepe and inflicted a great defeat on the enemy, even though

they had "only ordinary Asiatic guns, and a very small number of short range rifles."'*^°

The Russians were forced to escape from Geok Tepe at night. The Turkmens could not

take advantage of this retreat because their leader, Murad Han, was badly wounded.^^' A

Russian newspaper, the Golos, published the first complete news about the defeat. It

said.

Our reconnoitering detachments have just proved by bitter experience the tmth ofthe proverb 'that man proposes and God disposes.'.... On the 30' of August...the troops attempted to take the position by storm, but were repulsed, and we were obliged to retreat on the mill, and afterwards to fall back abut the distance of a verst further. All night we were kept in alarm, and at daybreak on the 31 ̂ ', when all were soundly sleeping, firing suddenly broke out on the picket line, and there followed such a panic as it would be difficult to describe. (Here occurs an interval of dots, which I suppose represent the description, forbidden to be published by the censor.). During the storm no fewer than 433 of our troops were placed hors de combat, including 21 officers. Among this number, too, seven officers and 176 men were killed. The percentage of our losses was enormous and unprecedented. In one battalion, not counting those covering the transport, not more than from 250 to 300 men were left. On the 15**̂ of

4R9

September the columns retumed to Beurma.

Besides their warrior qualities, the Turkmens took advantage of wrong decisions

made by Russian commanders. Before totally exhausting the Turkmen forces in their

fortress. General Lomakin ordered his troops to engage a hand-to-hand battle, which gave

•"' The Times, September 30, 1879.

"*" The Times, November 24, 1879.

''*' Togan, "Tsarist Russia," 234. According to Togan, the Russian expeditionary forces in 1878 against the Turkmens consisted of 10 units of infantt^, 14 cavalry, 16 guns, and many technical personnel. Togan believes that the Turkmens desfroyed one third ofthe Russian forces in half an hour. In retreat, the Russians were inflicted new blows. Even the women were attacking the Russians. The Russians were refreating in such a disordered manner that they even shot one of their own man who stayed behind and followed from a distance.

"'̂ The Times, November 1, 1879.

146

the Turkmens, who were already familiar with the ground and fought for their families, a

chance to compensate technical advance of Russian forces. Thus, the battle ended with a

Turkmen victory.

On November 24, 1879, the Russian govemment published an official account of

the Geok Tepe battle. It stated that prior to the final and decisive hand to hand combat in

which the Tekkes "rushing from all sides, fell with desperate fury on" the Russians, the

Russian artillery inflicted heavy losses on the Turkmens and at least 2,000 Turkmen men

and around 2,000 women and children were killed.'*^^ Yet, during the hand-to-hand

struggle, the Russians were defeated and were forced to retreat.'**'* The defeat ofthe

Russians was "attributable, not to weakness in numbers, but to bad generalship."'**^

Upon the publication ofthe official account ofthe Geok Tepe defeat. The Times'

editorial praised the Russians for accepting the tmth with "cool courage." The Times was

also moumful, and upset about the result.

No less bravery in facing realities is shown in the history ofthe campaign against the Turcomans. The Russians have met with a severe check in their efforts to reduce their nomad enemies, and they are neither afraid nor ashamed to confess it. The fact is, perhaps, more creditable to Russia than a victory over such enemies would be. No one can doubt, from the various accounts we have published ofthe unfortunate operations against the Tekkes, that the Russians

4Rft

will in the long run be successful.

As a representative of another big imperialist empire. The Times seems to have

sympathized as the Russians.

The victory at Geok Tepe caused too much pride among the Tekkes. They acted

as proud and confident statesmen, told the Russians they were ready for negotiations, and

labeled other Turkmen leaders traitors to their homeland. They began to intensify their

Marvin, Disastrous Russian Campaign, 236.

"*" The Times, November 24, 1879.

^^^ The Times, January 10, 1880. According to Militar Wochenblatt, the Russian forces consisted of 16 and half battalions of infantry, 22 squadrons of cavalry, and 24 guns.

^^' The Times, November 25, 1879.

147

forays against Persia and Russia. It brought Russian prestige to its lowest ebb in Central

Asia. As General Annenkov said, "[the defeat had] shaken the power of Russia

throughout Central Asia; the Turcomans raided to the very outposts of Krasnovodsk and

Tchikishlar, the Kirghiz of Manghislak were mutinous, Persia treated Russia coolly, and 4R7

the Chinese prepared to take Kuldja by force."

The Russians thought that, if revenge was not taken immediately, other Turkic

peoples and other enslaved nations would rise against them. Even a so-called filo-Turk,

Vambery, stressed the need for subjugation ofthe Turkmens. In a conference, before the

Royal United Service Institute, he talked about "the past and future ofthe Turkmens."

He briefly narrated the history ofthe Turkmens, who had preserved their true

Turkishness, and had been living in their present homeland for centuries. Vambery

believed that the unruly and freelance actions ofthe Turkmens had destroyed the peace in

the region. Thus, they had to be stopped. He said. The Turkmens could not be allowed any longer to continue their present mode of living, by which they had become a plague to the north of Persia and had checked the peaceable intercourse between Iran and Turkestan. There was a remedy for the evil, and it depended only on Russia whether she permitted the application of it. The predatory character ofthe nomads did not originate exclusively in the barrenness ofthe deserts, but chiefly in the weakness and

48S

anarchy ofthe neighbouring settled countries.

In order to punish severely the Turkmens, the Russians prepared a new army'**̂

led by Skobelev. General Skobelev'*^" chose the best Russian soldiers for this expedition.

The preparation for the expedition was precise and complete. The Russian forces started

'*" Marvin, Conversations, 258.

**' Arminius Vambery, The Times, April 22, 1880.

"•̂^ D'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest, 1865-1884," 148. According to D'Encausse, Skobelev's forces consisted of 11,000 men and 100 cannon.

"''' Charles Marvin, The Russian Advance Towards India: Conversations with Skobeleff, Ignatieff, and other Distinguished Russian Generals and Statesmen, on the Central Asian Question. Peshawar: Saeed Book Bank, 1984, 94. General Skobelev was chosen because of his reputation as a merciless and feadess fighter in Central Asia. He took part in the Yomud Massacre in 1873, and in the fight with the Khokandian forces in 1875.

148

their march in March 1880 from Chikishlar on the Caspian Sea. They chose Bami, 300

kilometers away from Chikishlar, as their headquarters. At Bami, they piled up

provisions. In one instance they brought 5,000 camels from Orenburg.'* '̂ They also

constmcted new forts on the way to guard transportation and communication lines.

General Annenkov, meanwhile, was pushing hard to constmct a railway from

Krasnovodsk to Kyzil Arvat to provide quick and easy provisions for the fighting men. It

was believed that, if the Russians concentrated 10,000 men and 100 guns, they would

capture Geok Tepe. The Russians believed that victory over the Tekkes would be

achieved by February 1881 ."* Along with the railroad constmction, the Russians

finished extending a telegraph line from Baku to Krasnovodsk by laying submarine cable

under the Caspian.'*

Meanwhile, the Tekke Turkmens were preparing to confront the Russians. After

the death of their leader, Nurverdi Khan, they chose Tikma Serdar as their new leader.'*^"

They renovated the walls of Geok Tepe, which were 4 meters high and 4 meters wide.

The whole fort was around 4 square kilometers, and was defended by 30,000 men, of

whom only 5,000 had primitive firearms."*^̂ These 30,000 Turkmens faced Skobelev's

army that was around 15,000 strong, and equipped with modem weapons and good

artillery.

491 The Times, September 2, 1880.

^'" The Times, October 26, 1880; Togan, 235. According to Togan, Skobelev's forces consisted of 11,000 men.

493 The Times, November 5, 1880.

"'" Togan, "Tsarist Russia," 235. According to Togan, Tikma Serdar was a courageous warrior who prosecuted many alamans against the Persians. Once he was caught by the Persians, but he succeeded in escaping from Persia.

495 Hayit, 111; Togan, Turkili, 236.

149

Figure 3.2: Kibitka.

According to first news, the Tekkes fought with utmost bravery and

determination. Twice they tried to lift the siege but were beaten back by the Russians. It

was earlier reported that the Turkmens lost the battle, leaving 300 dead. The Russian

forces were said to have lost eight officers and 102 men killed, and nine officers and 84

men wounded.'*^^ These losses probably actually resulted from a single hand-to-hand

stmggle because the number given for the losses would not reflect the reality.

The Turkmens led by Kul Batir repulsed the first Russian offensive against a

stronghold near Geok Tepe. General Tersevichin died in this confrontation. The

Russians could not take Geok Tepe by storm imtil they had totally bombarded and

The Times, January 14, 18, 20, 1881.

150

destroyed it. The Turkmen fortress (Figures 3.2'*'̂ '' and 3.3'*^*), like almost all forts in

Central Asia, was made of mud and was far from being a real barrier to artillery

J^i r I ,i . "-'x^^A

f, t-t J.,

•J

Ik

«' J* * "- * y

-« a f « . u ^ ,'hl.rk

«r,

.^ ^ J »j ^ '^ J .J ..t ^ ^r....

J -

I OF A TURCOMAN FORTRESS.

mut.

-a- mdi :x! A. hufh: ma.i I Figure 3.3: Turkmen Fortress.

bombardments and explosives. Besides the weak mud walls, within the fortress almost

all houses were made of tents that would easily be destroyed by balls thrown by Russian

artillery.

While the Russians were bombarding the fortress, the Turkmens were making

night attacks on the enemy. Even Turkmen boys established small storm groups and

successfully penetrated the Russian lines. They stole weapons and ammunition. In an

offensive against the Russian forces, Tikma Serdar infiicted a big blow, killed many, and

497 L. V. S. Blacker, On Secret Patrol in High Asia. London: John Murray, 1922, 139.

Marvin, Merv in Russian View. 32.

151

took away eight guns and a Russian flag. In this way, the Turkmens made many

incursions, but they also lost many men. The bombardment by the invaders was lethal to

the Turkmens who had nowhere to run. Though families ofthe Turkmens tried to get out

ofthe fort to save themselves, they faced Russian resistance and were forced to retum to

the fort. It was easier for the enemy to exterminate them without making distinction

between sexes or ages in the camp.'*^^

In order to open large gaps in the walls, the Russians dug tunnels under them and

blew them up with bombs. On January 12, 1881, they opened enough space to storm the

fort. "The Tekkes showed a sample of the best courage and patriotism to defend their

home inch by inch."̂ *'*' However, their power was no match for the Russian forces.

The Russian Govemment was wamed by the checks of last year ofthe difficulties of its undertaking. It had fumished its General with twelve millions of roubles to push a railway over an immense waste of arid sand, and with engineers capable of employing the treasure with effect. General Skobelev did not begin his march before the line was well in progress. He guarded the entire route with camps of Cossacks, infantry, railway battalions, artillery, and skirmishes. Each post was connected with the rest by telegraph. When the fortress was reached he seems to have taken up no position which could be isolated, to have taken not a step forward out of its appointed course. The result has been that each valiant sortie ofthe defenders left the besiegers, as the flood ebbed, nearer to victory.

Despite their best effort to protect their town, the leaders ofthe Turkmens, including

Tikma Serdar, Makhtum Kuli Khan, and Murad Khan, had to retreat to Tejend valley.

They gave up the armed struggle against the Russians, and were ready to accept the

Russians as their new mlers.

said.

A telegram from General Skobelev reached St. Petersburg on January 24' . It

Today after nine hours' sanguinary fighting, all the fortified positions ofthe enemy at Geok Tepe and Denzil Tepe were stormed by our troops. The enemy

"' ' The Times, January 28, 1881; Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 236.

"̂̂ Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 236.

501 The Times, January 28, 1881.

152

was routed along the whole line, and were pursued and cut down for a distance of 15 versts. Our victory is complete. We captured a quantity of arms, cannon, ammunition, and provisions. Our loss is being ascertained; that ofthe enemy is enormous. The troops fought truly heroically.̂ *'̂

The Russians tried to be very careful not to give detailed information about the real losses

of both sides. Skobelev's vague telegram, which stated that the Turkmens were pursued

and cut down for a distance of 15 versts, concealed the real number ofthe Turkmen

losses from the press. There was no mention in The Times about the massacre ofthe

Tekkes at Geok Tepe, except for a long summary ofthe fighting from General

Skobelev's accounts, sent by a St. Petersburg correspondent. Russian forces were

directed under three advancing units commanded by Colonels Kuropatkine, Kosselkov,

and Gaidarov. According the report of General Skobelev, Russian forces consisted of

five companies and one battalion of infantry, half a company of sappers, one detachment

of volunteers, one sotnia of foot Cossacks, a battery of mounted artillery, and two rocket

tubes under Colonel Kuropatkine's command; two battalions of infantry, detachments of

sappers, naval volunteers, and artillery, two rocket tubes, and one heliograph under

Colonel Kosselkov's command; and one battalion of infantry, detachments of volunteers,

sappers, and artillery, five rocket tubes, and a sotnia and a half of Cossacks under

Gaidarov's command engaged the battle. The fourth storming column, held in reserve,

consisted of 21 companies, including three companies of foot Dragoons and Cossacks

and 24 guns. On January 24, they stormed the fort. At 7 o'clock in the moming, they

attacked the advanced fortifications ofthe Turkmens while 36 guns commenced

cannonading the breach for the advance of other columns. Meanwhile, 125 puds {a pud

was around 401b) of powder were exploded under the rampart, in the mins of which

several hundred Tekkes were buried. The enemy poured into the fort from the open gates

around 11 o'clock. A hand-to-hand battle lasted for an hour.

The enemy desperately maintained their position on the walls, and the stmggle on the rampart lasted about an hour.. .The defenders on the ramparts then mshed forward between the two attacking columns, and were cut down after a

502 The Times, January 27, 1881.

153

desperate resistance. At half-past 1 o'clock in the aftemoon Lieutenant-Colonel Gaidaroffs column escaladed the south westem part ofthe walls, when an engagement ensued in the interior ofthe fortress. At 2 o'clock the hill redoubt of Denzil Tepe, dominating the whole position, was occupied, when we became complete masters ofthe fortress. The enemy fled, abandoning their camp, and also their property and families. The pursuit ofthe enemy was at once commenced by a division of Dragoons, four sotnias of Cossacks, six companies of infantry with long-range guns, and a mounted detachment. The enemy were pursued and cut down for a distance of 15 versts. In addition to the bodies that filled the trenches and the large number ofthe enemy who were cut down by the cavalry during the pursuit, upwards of 4,000 ofthe enemy's dead were found in the interior ofthe fortress. ... We captured a large number of rifles, including some ofthe Russian Berdans pattem. many guns, and a large quantity of ammunition, several small flags, and a considerable number of kibitkas, large supplies of flour, and a quantity of forage. There were found in the place 4,000 families, including three Imam families, and also 700 persons who had been taken prisoners. Our losses in all the engagements from the 1''' to the 24"̂ of January were 16 officers and 267 men killed, 42 officers and 647 men wounded, and 11 officers and 123 men slightly injured. One hundred and forty-three horses were killed, and 121 wounded.^

Yet, Vambery, citing from Charles Marvin's works, presented a much higher number of

losses on the Turkmen side. According to him, "40,000 Turkomans, huddled up in the

fortress of Geok Tepe, 6,500 bodies were found inside the fortress, 8,000 fugitives were

slaughtered, many hundreds of women and children were killed, so that nearly half of the

garrison perished."^ '*

When Shoemaker visited Geok Tepe in 1894, he described the event with his

dramatic words.

The heart of a once war-swept country; silent and deserted now, save for our slowly crawling train and some floating vultures. Desolation reigns absolute monarch around the mins ofthe fort rising yonder. Its irregular walls were deprived of half their height by Skoveleff to cover the dead—twenty thousand and more—that he sloughtered here in 1881. None were spared save the women and children and the chained Persian prisoners. Russia advanced with flying colors and triumphant music to the attack of Goek Tepe, and with flying colors and triumphant music pursued the people in their mad flight over this

503 The Times, February 3, 1881.

'"'' Vambery, Struggle for India, 30.

154

awful desert, hacking and hewing until twenty thousand dead told the tale of another victory for the Czar. So to this day music strikes terror to the hearts of the few who survived; and when, on the occasion ofthe opening ofthe railway, a sudden burst of melody was heard, men and women went down in the desert praying for mercy and life, so convinced were they that the sound meant death. As far as the eye can reach, rise the small clay watchtowers of the Turkomans, and the rectangular walled forts with towers at the comers; but no life or movement anywhere, save it be some moving column of dust or some wolfish-looking dogs. For nearly a week the Russian soldiers were allowed to loot this captured fortress, and three million roubles worth of plunder were carried off These plains had been accustomed to sights of horror—Jenghiz Kahn had passed this way—but it remained for Christian Russia to eclipse all that had gone before. ̂ ^̂

General Skobelev later confessed to Charles Marvin in an interview at St.

Petersburg that they "killed nearly 20,000 Turcomans at Geok Tepe."''^^ During

conversations with Marvin, the officers who took part in the Geok Tepe massacre told in

detail what happened at that day, and how they killed women and children. " 'It was

war,' said Sobolev, smiling and shmgging his shoulders, in reply to what I said; 'in war

women get killed as well as men.' " There was great suffering on the Turkmen side

when the Russian forces were slaying them after the victory. "Eight thousand ofthe

besieged perished in this disastrous rout, besides 10,000 or 15,000 more slain during the

siege and capture. So great was the camage that thousands of bodies had subsequently to

be bumt to prevent the spread of disease."^"* At the Geok Tepe battle, the Tekkes not

only lost almost half of the population that lived in the Akhal Oasis but also almost all

^"^ M. M. Shoemaker, Trans-Caspia: The Sealed Provinces of The Czar. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1895,85.

^'" Marvin, Conversations, 99.

"̂̂ Marvin, Conversations, 198-199. Marvin reported "The Cossacks slashed the women to pieces as they ran shrieking before them, or dropped on their knees imploring mercy; and that the babies, falling out of their arms on the sands, afterwards died of cold or starvation. Many ofthe women and children were subsequently brought in; but the officer told me several hundred women at least were killed by the Cossacks, and that most ofthe children left on the sands at night were found dead the next moming."

'"* George Dobson, Russia's Railway Advance into Central Asia: Notes of a Journey from St. Petersburg to Samarkand. London: W. H. Allen, 1890, 158.

155

their worldly belongings. As Major-General Grodekov said to Charles Marvin, after the

war over. General Skobelev ordered his men to sack Geok Tepe for three days. "The loot

was enormous. It exceeded 6,000,000 roubles."^°^

After the great destruction, the Russians tried to win over the people. A dispatch

from St. Petersburg stated that a general amnesty was granted to the Tekkes, and it also

stated that already 16,000 families had retumed to their places. Moreover, the chiefs of

the Tekkes, who had showed their best efforts in the battle of Geok Tepe but had been

beaten, determined to be loyal subject ofthe tsar.^'°

In an editorial. The Times' evaluation ofthe battle reflected mixed feelings

toward both the victor and vanquished. It said.

If the admiration for the achievement is modified by a regret for the coming doom of another independent Asiatic people, Russians must not suppose the feeling is prompted by European jealousy of their growing empire. The Tekkes have eamed the sympathy always accorded to men combating gallantly for their liberty and soil. There is no occasion to mingle with the sentiment laments for the annihilation or absorption of another national type from among the community of peoples. The Tekkes, like their fellow Turcomans nomads, share with the untamed bravery the savagery of wild beasts. They are nobler enemies to meet in the field than neighbours to dwell beside. If General Skobeleff s exploit be the sign that their days of kidnapping and freebooting are numbered, he will have made for himself as high a place among the benefactors of humanity as he certainly has among military strategists.^"

After the deadly loss at Geok Tepe, the Turkmens had no power to resist the

Russians. The Russians continued their successful march, and reached Askabad in

March. They captured this town, and declared it the center ofthe Transcaspian region.

Because of British uneasiness, the Russians stopped going beyond Ashkabad, and they

recalled General Skobelev.^'' Yet Russia did not evacuate the Akhal country. An

509 Marvin, Conversations, 49.

'̂̂ The Times, February 18, 1881.

^" The Times, January 28, 1881.

512 Marvin, Conversations, 98.

156

imperial ukase issued on March 24, 1881 declared that the Akhal Oasis was incorporated

into the Russian Empire under the name ofthe Transcaspian Territory.^'^

Upon losing all hope of revenge, and taking back their lands from the Russians,

the leaders ofthe Turkmen tribes, including Tikma Serdar, came to offer their allegiance

to the Russians. Furthermore, later two Tekke leaders presented their swords to the

Emperor in St. Petersburg. The Emperor received them with joy and gave them many

gifts, including fine gold watches. While in the presence ofthe tsar, they asked the

emperor to force the Persians to free their countrymen who were captive in Persia. '̂'*

Incorporation of Merv

The Russians wanted to march on Merv and finish the job at once after the fall of

Geok Tepe in 1881. Yet they waited a little because of possible hostile British reaction,

and, to some extent, because they hoped to gain those lands without shedding blood.

Another cause for the arrest ofthe march, according to General Skobelev, was a lack of

provision, for soldiers. Skobelev claimed that Russia at that time did not seriously

contemplate the invasion of Merv. The massacre and destmction ofthe Akhal Tekke

Turkmens at Geok Tepe advanced Russia's desired goal to subjugate all Turkmens.

Since this massacre, a

State of helplessness and confiision has reigned in and around Merv... It is in this state of anxiety that Russia has ultimately succeeded in tuming the tide of Turcoman sympathies in her favour, and by creating a party which, evidently tired ofthe useless wavering, and fully convinced ofthe hopelessness of any Persian or English assistance, has found out that it would be much more advisable to throw itself into the arms ofthe lion than to be forcibly devoured.^'

Marvin, The Russian Advance Towards India, 38.

^''^ The Times, kpxW 14, 1881.

^'^ Marwin, Conversations, 9S; Handsard's Parliamentary Debates 262 (June 10, 1881): 2302-231. In the question, Ashmead-Bartlett stated that Russia not only gained fertile lands, but also 60,000 ofthe finest light cavalry in the recent tertitorial acquisitions.

516 Arminius Vambery, The Times, February 23, 1884.

157

In order to annex Merv without a fight, the Russians sent officers to leam the true

feelings ofthe Mervlies. A group of Russian officers headed by Alikhanov, under the

guise of Russian merchants, went to Merv to observe the political situation and the

prospect for peaceful surrender. After a long trip, and meeting with local dignitaries,

these officers reported that the Mervlies were going to accept Russian authority without

any resistance. The military commander ofthe Russian forces in the Transcaspian

region. General Alexander V. Komarov, also invited a group of dignitaries from Merv to

attend the coronation ofthe Emperor Alexander III in Moscow in May 1883. These

Mervlies saw how advanced and powerful the Russians were, and, after they retumed to

their lands, they told their stories, and greatly helped to influence people to accept a

Russian protectorate.^'^

The first news about the Russian "peaceful" annexation of Merv was published on

Febmary 5, 1884. Punch mocked the adjective "peaceful" before the annexation because

ofthe Russian precise pre-designs and efforts to incorporate Merv (Figure 3.4). On the

first day of Febmary, General Komarov, the Govemor of Transcaspian region,

telegraphed St. Petersburg stating that,

I have the pleasure of most humbly informing your Imperial Majesty that to­day in Askabad the Khans of four tribes of Merv Turcomans and 24 chosen delegates, one for every 2,000 kibitkas of tents, accepted unconditional allegiance to your Majesty; confirming the same by solemn oath for themselves and the whole people of Merv. According to the khans and delegates, the Turcomans of Merv come to this decision from the conviction that they cannot govem themselves, and that only the strong govemment of your Majesty can introduce and secure order and prosperity among them. -Lieutenant-General Komaroff. "̂ °

'̂̂ Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 48.

'̂* N. V. Tcharykow, Glimpses of High Politics through War and Peace 1855-1929. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1931, 161.

' 'VM«C/J , March 8, 1884.

^'^ The Times, February 16, 1884.

158

'V^^\, r-- Ji, ••i-J

Figure 3.4: "Peacefully" annexed Merv.

The Russians carefiilly planned the timing ofthe incorporation of Merv. As the

British were preoccupied with the Egyptian problem, the Russians easily annexed one of S9 1

the most strategic places, Merv. Though, General Komarov stressed the

"unconditional allegiance" ofthe Turkmens, the reality was that these people knew they

could not win even if they resisted as far as their last man. They could not stand before

The Times, February 16, 1884.

159

the enormous power of Russia. When General Komarov marched into Merv to establish

Russian authority, Kadjar Khan and his helper, Siah Push, black-robed-one, an Afghan

preacher who was hailed as mahdi, gathered military power to stop him. But, though

Kadjar Khan and his men attempted to stop the Russians, the majority ofthe Turkmens

were in favor of surrendering their country. They told Tcharykow that they "were not

afraid of you, but of your tail."''"^ As the Russian semi-official Journal de Saint

Petersbourg stated years ago, "Russia can easily bring the strength of her 70 millions to

bear upon her few Mussulman subjects.""^ ft was not Komarov's small detachment, but

the whole Russian power backed by the Russians' determination to enlarge their lands

that succeeded in annexing Merv. Russian authority was accepted by the leaders ofthe

Mervlies, including the widow of Nurverdi khan, Guljemal, who was later visited by

Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff and given an expensive dress as a gift.̂ '̂* It was an

inevitable destiny for them to accept the Russians, since the British denied to support

them. If the British had extended their political and military help to the Turkmens, they

had a very good chance of establishing their influence over Merv because the Turkmens

were "dissatisfied with Persian mle, dismayed at the possibility of annexation by Russia,

and desirous of passing under an English protectorate."

Although it was claimed to be a peaceful annexation to Russia, the native people

ofthe region always hated the idea of being ruled by the infidel Russians. "The notion of

a Mussulman province asking to be govemed by the Giaours is too ridiculous to be

entertained," said Captain Maslov who was present in both General Grodekov's ride into

Herat and General Skobelev's Akhal Tekke expedition.^^^ Yet, the circumstances they

^'' Tcharykow, 169; The Times, May 12, 1884. According to Tcharycow, the total population of Merv was estimated to be around 400,000.

^" The Times, My 26, 1875.

"•* The Times, June 13, 1884; Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 50. Vambery states that the dress was said to be sent by the Empress of Russia, marked with her needlework.

"^ Charles Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia: Pioneering Adventures in the Region Lying between Russia and India. London: Swan Sonnenschein, Le Bas & Lowrey, 1886, 92.

160

were in forced them to accept Russian rule because there was almost no land of their race

left. Almost all Turkic lands had already become part of Russia after the invasions.

Joining with this new empire was, in a sense, meeting with their countrymen. In

addition, the Russians made it clear prior to the acceptance of allegiance that the Mervlies

were going to be a 'respected' member of a big empire, and keep their way of life. This

mild and somewhat friendly offer was an important element in inducing them to accept

Russian rule. Furthermore, the Russians offered them protection, "welfare, order,

security," ' and the right to use the resources of a large empire.

The Mervlies had been rejected by the British, and had been treated as worst

enemies by the Persians, and had never felt comfortable with the Afghans. Being lonely

and surrounded by not a single friendly power, they were induced to come under a

Russian protectorate.

In a lengthy article, Vambery said.

Commercial and scientific travelers, civil engineers, and military adventurers have incessantly plied between Askabad and the Tejend.. .The horrible onslaught and heavy losses sustained by their Akhal brethren stmck them with terror, and, considering the absolute want of any sense of common interest, we can easily explain the state of helplessness and confusion which has reigned in and around Merv since 1880.

The Russians had perfectly spread their messages among all the Turkmens, and

succeeded in gaining their sympathies by allowing them to know that neither the English

nor the Persians would really help them. Thus, "it would be much more advisable to S7R

throw itself into the arms ofthe lion than to be forcibly devoured."

Incorporation ofthe Sarakh Country and the Penjdeh Incident

After Merv, Russian officers and spies were busy in surveying the Sarakh country

and trying to induce the Sarakh Turkmens to join Russia. Again the Sarakhs because of

"* Marvin, The Russians at Merv and Herat, 153.

" ' Arminius Vambery, The Times, February 23, 1884.

528 Ibid.

161

in part their loneliness in a hostile land, and in part the threat imposed by the Russians

accepted Russian mle in May 1884. Yet it was not easy to annex the Sarakh country

since the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdurahman Khan, claimed it as his territory. The tribes

who lived in this country were paying tribute to the amir. The British also were in

agreement with the amir, and they promised to protect his territories against Russian

aggression. "It is not only because Russia has chosen to act herself, or to allow her

ambitious and ill-controlled generals in Central Asia to act, in defiance of repeated

assurances, understandings, and agreements that it is impossible for England to yield her

preposterous pretensions."^^^

As the situation became quite fragile by the Russian incorporation of Merv and

impending annexation ofthe Sarakh country, the British and Russian governments had to

solve this problem through political and diplomatic means or else a military clash would

be inevitable. The amir had already mobilized his forces and occupied Penjdeh, after

having the consent ofthe Indian government. '̂'*' Bearing in mind the tendemess ofthe

situation, both governments agreed to finalize their long-lasting rivalry in Central Asia by

defining the borders and drawing a line between the respected spheres of both empires.

They decided to settle the issue on the ground by a joint-boundary commission in 1884.

Before the Afghan Boundary Commission reached any solid decision, the

Russians determined to solve the Sarakh issue as they wished. They did not want a large

group of Turkmens left outside of their Central Asian possessions lest these Turkmens

continue to create difficulties on the border. Moreover, the Russians, after the peaceful

incorporation of Merv, came to consider themselves as the sole protector of all the

Turkmens. The practical result of such consideration was to unite all Turkmens under

Russian mle."' They also thought that the amir occupying Penjdeh was an aggressive

and threatening move. The Sarakhs, about 10,000 kibitkas (tents) of them, were living on

" ' The Times, March 13, 1885; Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy. 1814-1914. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964, 200.

"" The Times, March 13, 1885.

" ' The Times, February 17, 1885.

162

the territory from Penjdeh to the Murghab Valley on the Tedjent River. The Kafkas, a

newspaper published in the Caucasus, published the first news about the incorporation of

Merv into the Russian Empire. According to the news, the Sarakhs were also willing to

embrace Russian rule; after all, their brethren had accepted it."^ Indeed, because ofthe

efforts made by Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff, the Govemor General ofthe Caucasus,

who visited Merv in May 1884, and who presented a richly decorated dress to the widow

of Nur Verdi Khan, many Sarakh leaders came to submit their allegiance to the Russians.

In addition, the Sarakhs who lived between Merv and Herat were already taken under

Russian authority. The next step would be the incorporation ofthe Sarakhs in and around

Penjdeh."^

On March 30, 1885, a Russian army led by General Komarov attacked the

Afghans at Penjdeh, and badly defeated them. The "woeful" Russian engagement '̂''*

coincided with the Sudan problem created by so-called mehdi, who declared Holy War

against the Europeans and killed General George Gordon. Despite their Mehdi problem,

the British violently protested the latest Russian move, and fully mobilized their armies in

India to prevent a Russian attack on Herat. They assembled an Anglo-Indian Army of

50,000 men, fully equipped for service, with necessary provisions piled up at Quetta and

other points.^^^ In a leading article. The Times supported an active policy of making a

reprisal against the Russian attack on the Afghans. It stated that the only way to arrest

any military conflict was to pull back General Komarov and his forces from Penjdeh, and

let the mixed-commission work freely to solve the problem.^ ^ Though both empires

came to the brink of an armed conflict because ofthe Penjdeh incident, they acted with

" ' The Times, May 19, 1884.

"' Charles Marvin, The Times, May 25, 1884. Marvin stated that with the incorporation to Merv, The Russians added 240,000 Merv Tekkes, 250,000 Ersari Turkmens, 50,000 Sarakh Turkmens, and a few thousand Salor Turkmens to their already huge empire.

"* W. D. Handcock (ed.), English Historical Documents 1874-1914. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977,380.

"^ The Times, March 23, 1885.

536 . The Times, April 11, 1885.

163

restraint. Growing German power in Europe and in the colonies, and the impending

prospect for the establishment of hostile camps among the big powers in Europe

challenged both Russia and Great Britain to reach a peaceful solution."^ They again

agreed to solve the problem through the already established Afghan Boundary

Commission. This commission drew a boundary line between Russian Turkistan and

Afghanistan after long surveys on the ground leaving larger parts ofthe Sarakh country

on the Russian side, including Penjheh.

Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 200; Hayit, 115.

164

CHAPTER IV

THE TIMES'VIEW OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN CENTRALASIA IN THE SECOND HALF OF

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the rivalry between Russia and Great

Britain in Central Asia was one ofthe most hotly discussed subjects in The Times

because it was tied to imperial British interests in the east. These interests required that

Russia be kept away not only from India but also from other strategic places between the

frontiers of the Ottoman Empire and those of China. However, the Russian danger was

particularly felt in Central Asia because Britain lacked allies over the Himalayas. '̂'̂ The

Times, throughout this period, brought to the public's as well as politicians' attentions the

fresh news and information necessary for developing sound policies toward military,

social, commercial, and political developments in Central Asia. The paper commented

on new developments and tried to show different aspects of them. Its approach was

almost identical to British foreign policy pursued in the course ofthe same period. Yet,

despite the parallels between The Times' approach and British official undertakings. The

Times indeed greatly impacted the shaping of that official policy by commenting on each

aspect ofthe Central Asian question and discussing all sides ofthe issues. The paper

generally exhibited mixed feelings toward the rivalry. In this respect. The Times took a

more aggressive tone when the Russians directly menaced British interests. As far as the

Central Asian khanates were concemed. The Times strongly supported the idea of

"masterly inactivity," because it believed in Russia's civilizing power in the region. But,

when the rivalry touched Persia, or especially Afghanistan, it rallied behind the

"forwardist" views and cried out for taking the strongest action against Russian

aggression.

British policy in Central Asia, which was generally applied throughout the second

half of the nineteenth century, was perfectly defined by a correspondent of The Times,

"* Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1970. London: Longman, 1975, 152-153.

165

who wrote from Lahore in February 1857. According to his views, the British were

subsidizing the Amir of Afghanistan to be a faithful ally against the Russians and the

Persians. Yet, there was doubt about the honesty ofthe amir, whose friendship would be

lost when his interests were jeopardized. The correspondent also suggested that, instead

of subsidizing the amir to be the British guard in Central Asia, and instead of wasting

money in this way, Britain should take the matter into her own hands, and send forces

wherever and whenever needed. It was clear from the beginning that the British had

determined to keep Afghanistan, especially the Herat region, under their influence and

away from the domination of a hostile power. Yet throughout the period under scmtiny,

a constant dilemma existed regarding how to keep these places safe for the ultimate

security ofthe Indian Empire.

The rivalry between Russia and Britain over Central Asia came not from an

immediate Russian danger to India but from the lack of a clear concept of Russia's

intentions regarding both Central Asia and India. In September 1868, The Times' leading

article stated that the British feared that they would one day be forced to fight the

Russians for the possession of India and, if so, they needed to ask what would be the best

way to prepare for such a confrontation? Where? And when? The article continued,

"Every step ofthe argument must obviously depend upon the answer to the question first

propounded, respecting the real designs of Russia. If she has no designs against British

India, the case falls to the ground; but on this point it is clearly impossible to establish at

present any conclusion at all."""*** Questions about Russia's future designs toward India,

and her constant and threatening moves in Central Asia made British minds uncertain

about what would be the most reliable policies in that region. In short, it was India rather

than Central Asia that the British were concemed about most. But the events taking place

in the region drew the shape and intensity of this rivalry because both sides actually

stmggled to achieve their goals there.

"^ The Times, April 10 1857.

"̂̂ The Times, September 2, 1868.

166

Russophobia and Sources ofthe Rivalry

Social, political, cultural and emotional elements that created the anti-Russian

feeling in Great Britain were not without foundation. Russia's centuries-old expansion in

Europe, the Near East, and Asia was the most important development that gradually

created anti-Russian feelings in Great Britain. The Russian role in cooperation with

Austria and Prussia to destroy Poland by sharing its territories in the eighteenth century

was violently protested by the British. Furthermore, Russia gained great victories against

the Turks in the south. The Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74 ended with a Russian victory

and made her the protector ofthe Orthodox citizens ofthe Ottoman Empire. She also

gained considerable new rights in the Black Sea. The war separated the Crimea from the

Turkish Empire by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja (1774). The Crimea was declared a

free state, only to be annexed by the Russians in 1783. These territorial gains from

Poland and the Ottoman Empire provided Russia with strategic areas from which to

attempt to increase her power in the Turkish Straits. Thus, her dangerous expansion

toward the Mediterranean created fears among the European Big Powers, especially in

Great Britain. Great Britain preferred to remain silent during the partition of Poland

because she did not want to harm her intensive trade with Russia. However, the British

govemment, presided over by young William Pitt, did demand in 1791that Russia restore

the fortress of Ochakov on the Dineper River to the Ottoman Empire. '̂*' Up to this time,

Russia had been treated only as a power with commercial opportunities for Britain.

Russian occupation of any warm water port in the south, especially in the Turkish

Straits, would have threatened British interests in the east. In order to prevent such a

threat many British statesmen believed in resisting Russia by means of providing

technical and material help to the Turks, Persians, and Afghans. This group came to be

named as "Russophobists." All throughout the nineteenth century British statesmen were

all accused or named either "Russiphobe" or "Russophile." Tories, many researchers,

historians and most British military personnel, who especially served in India, had made

''*' John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study ofthe Interaction of Policy and Opinion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 9.

167

up the former group. Benjamin Disraeli, John Jacob, Henry Green, Henry Rawlinson, W.

J. Eastwich, Lord Lytton, Bartle Frere, and Charles Marvin were some ofthe

Russophobes. The latter group also wanted to protect British interests in the east, yet

through diplomacy and peaceful means rather than aggressive and military actions. It

was an irony that this group was overwhelmingly from the liberal party although liberals

generally valued conservative and religious values less in other countries, such as Turkey

and Russia. Some of them were William E. Gladstone, the Duke of Argyll, Charles W.

Dilke, and the Earl of Northbrook.

The Russophobists firmly believed in the regeneration ofthe Ottoman Empire to

be the best block to the Russian "barbarism" that threatened civilization.'"*^ Since Great

Britain had already constructed a rich Empire in the east, Russia's southward movements

rightly alarmed her. She thought that one day the Russians would destroy her supremacy

by becoming a new power in the eastem Mediterranean. If the Russians had succeeded in

gaining a free port in the warm-waters either in the Mediterranean or in the Indian Ocean,

the British monopoly and sole influence over India, Arabia, Persia, East Africa, and the

Mediterranean world would have been lost. Hostility toward Russia's imperialist gains

continued ever since she began to pose a danger for British interests toward the end ofthe

eighteenth century. Some even shared feelings of hopelessness. "Whatever we do

Russia will remain and the Russians will continue to inhabit the whole of Northem Asia

and Eastem Europe. That we carmot prevent though we bleed ourselves like veal in the

endeavor to slaughter them into impotence." '̂*^ Nevertheless, the British decided to resist

Russia by seeking alliances with the European Big Powers and helping decadent states,

such as the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Afghanistan, and China. These states also feared

Russia's unsatisfied appetite for expansion. Thus, under the so-called Eastem Question,

^*' A. L. Macfie, "Opinions ofthe European Press on the Eastem Question, 1836." Middle Eastern Studies 21,no. 1 (January 1991): 132-137.

^*' "A Former Resident in Russia," "Some Truths about Russia." The Fortnightly Review 52 (July-December 1889): 274.

168

Central Asian Question and the Far Eastern Question, a "great game" and a "cold war"

determined the course of history.

While the British feared the Russian southward advances, the Russian monarchs

drew plans to gain access to the open seas in the south, and thus dispose of British

supremacy in the east. Tsar Paul 1 discussed the possibility of invading India with

Napoleon I in 1801. Later, when Alexander 1 and Napoleon 1 met at Tilsit in 1807 to

decide the fate ofthe world in general and Europe in particular, both of them agreed to

destroy British power and influence in Europe, the Middle East, and the Near East by S44

attacking them in India. Though this concept was never put into reality, the British

became wary of potential Russian intrigues in Persia and Central Asia.

Gaining the Transcaucasus region by the Treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828, Russia

intensified her domination over Persia and beyond. She began to involve herself in

intrigues in Teheran and Kabul to destroy any prospect for British policy gain in Central

Asia. As John McNeill, the British political agent in Teheran in the 1830"s, reported,

Russian intrigues aimed to end British supremacy in Central Asia and even in India.

These developments led to the catastrophic First Afghan War, and greatly enhanced the

rise of Russophobia in Great Britain." "

India was the British source of wealth and commercial superiority over other

powers. It made Great Britain a special power in Europe. Thus, the safety of India and

safe passages to India were the primary goals ofthe British govemment in the nineteenth

century. Safety was possible as long as the Russians stayed away from the south, and the

independence of Turkey and Middle Eastem countries, namely Persia and Afghanistan,

was maintained. In 1833 Russia signed the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi with the Ottoman

Empire, which provided Russia joint control ofthe Turkish Straits. This development

greatly alarmed the British. The British govemment sent David Urquhart, a political

agent, to Istanbul to evaluate the prospect of destroying the Hunkar Iskelesi Treaty.

544 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1967, 118.

^*^ Michael Edwardes, Playing the Great Game: A Victorian Cold War. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975, 13.

169

Urquhart spent many months in Istanbul and in the Caucasus among the Circassians.

During this time, he composed a book, Turkey and Its Resources, published in London in

1833. The book claimed that Great Britain should increase its trade with Turkey in order

to end Russia's overwhelming share in her overseas commerce.^''^

Urquhart first tried to influence the British govemment to take military action by

sending the fleet to the Black Sea to stop the Russians from gaining power in the Straits

and the Caucasus. He aimed to free the people ofthe Caucasus from their Russian yoke.

The foreign office, headed by Tory Prime Minister Wellington at this time, did not give

credit to Urquhart's views. Upon failing to influence the Tory govemment, Urquhart

decided to enlighten the public about the intricacies ofthe Eastem Question. One of his

first publications was a pamphlet titled, England, France, Russia and Turkey. He stated

that the Russians were working to take control ofthe Straits. He believed that as soon as

they succeeded in this, they would establish influence over Turkey, Persia and

Afghanistan, and would destroy the interests of France and Britain in the east. Urquhart

also wrote to daily newspapers and periodicals to defend his thesis. He even published a

new weekly. Portfolio. Portfolio flrst appeared in November of 1835 and published

"Secret Russian dispatches and ... lucid articles designed to propagate Urquhart's views

on the Eastem Question." '̂*^

The Russian threat to British colonial interests in the east forced almost all literate

persons in Britain to have some sort of notion about Russia and the Russian people. In

this respect. The Times, as one ofthe leading newspapers in England, if not in the world,

was tenaciously interested in the Russian threat. On the other hand, as one ofthe most

democratic states. Great Britain was mostly open in her foreign affairs in the nineteenth

century. She knew the value of public support for her foreign policies. Thus,

govemment officials as well as joumalists generally agreed that Russian imperialist

ambitions were harmful to their own. They used the press to create a favorable public

^*' G. H. Bolsover, "David Urquhart and the Eastem Question, 1833-37: A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy." The Journal of Modern History 3. no.4 (December 1936): 446.

^^Ubid, 455-51.

170

sentiment toward foreign policy. The Times became a semi-official tool for shaping

public perceptions within the state.

Many specialists discussed different views in The Times about what would be the

proper policies to pursue in Central Asia. Some of these correspondents, as well as other

writers and academics, preferred to remain anonymous, probably because of their official

identities. One such anonymous correspondent was "A Student of Central Asia," whose

views were pro-Russian, and who was always trying to convince people that the Russians

were not planning to attack India, but were only trying to establish their commercial and

economic supremacy in Central Asia. Nonetheless, many authors—including Robert

Michell, a researcher on Central Asia who translator of many Russian works, including

Valikhanof Veniukov's The Russians in Central Asia; Henry Green, who was a British

officer and served as a superintendent in Sind and the author of 77?̂ Retention of

Candahar (1881); Sir Henry Rawlinson, a British officer who spend many years in India

and took part in British military actions in Afghanistan, and who was the chief supporter

ofthe forward policy against Russia, and who wrote England and Russia in the East

(1875); and Arminius Vambery, a Hungarian Jew who traveled Central Asia in 1863 and

who was one ofthe most knowledgeable historians about the region, and whose articles

frequently appeared in The Times, claimed that the real aim ofthe Russians was to invade

Central Asia and then use it as a step to attack India. They were even angry about being

accused as "Russophobists" by many who believed in the existence of a genuine Russian

threat to British interests but disagreed on the best method of dealing with the problem.

They did not like The Times' interpretation of their views. "Should a discussion on this

subject be permitted in The Times, I trust that the silly terms of 'Russophobist,'

'Alarmist,' «fec., which have been so freely applied to all those who look a little beyond S4R

the present into Central Asian affairs, may be omitted."

Russia's emergence as a world power in the eighteenth century and its

threateningly aggressive policies toward its neighbors created anti-Russian feelings

among the British. The British feared losing their hegemonic power to the Russians.

548 Henry Green, The Times, September 24, 1875.

171

Yet, the British intellectuals and the politicians were mainly divided into two groups on

how to handle the problem. One group cuttivated anti-Russian feelings while another

group tried to find peaceful solutions. The Times generally mixed comments and tried to

indicate both sides' arguments in its pages. It presented more of an objective and

academic picture than a politically-oriented and biased sentiment.""''*^ Nonetheless, despite

its adherence to multi-voices of different groups of correspondents. The Times

championed only British interests. When it was dealing with local cultures, most ofthe

editorial commentaries carried Eurocentric biases. In this respect, it was closer to

Gladstonian ideology.

Security Concems for India as a Source ofthe Rivalry

The security ofthe Indian empire was one of Great Britain's major concems. The

source of this concem was Russia. The British always suspected Russia having secret

plans to invade India though the Russians had dismissed in 1857 a possible invasion plan

drawn up by Prince Bariatinski, the Govemor General ofthe Caucasus, in a top-ranking

meeting, included foreign minister Prince Gorchakov and the tsar, at St. Petersburg. The

Russians concluded during the meeting that it was impossible to invade India because of

the distance, geographic and climatic barriers, the existence of hostile intermediary states,

such as Khiva, and the enormous strength of Great Britain and her allies. Based on this

decision, N. A. Khalfin, a Russian historian and author of Russia's Policy in Central Asia

(1964), claimed that the Russian threat to India was not a reality but a fabrication ofthe

British press.̂ '̂̂

Besides rejection of Bariatinski's plan, almost all well-known Russian statesmen

and generals openly stated that they had no desire to attack India. Similarly, in the

1850's, almost nobody in Great Britain really thought that the Russians were about to

invade India. However, The Times and other British newspapers were concemed about

the gradual Russian moves into Central Asia, which obviously brought the Russian

"" Gleason, 43.

'^" Khalfin, 28.

172

danger closer and closer to India. As the Russians closed the distance between their own

territories and British India, many people in Russia came to exploit the fear felt by the

British about the perceived threat to India. Many Russians, including military historian

General M. A. Terentyef, the author ofthe two-volume Russia and Britain in Central

Asia (1874), backed British fears by the aggressive tone of their writings. Terentyef, one

ofthe most important Russian authors in the 1870's, stated openly, "Central Asian

possessions serve only as an etape on the road to further advancement, and as a halting

place where we can rest and gather fresh strength."^^' Thus, the fiirther the Russians

expanded their territories, the more tense British feelings became.

The Central Asian khanates, Afghanistan, and Persia played quite a large role in

British foreign policy in the nineteenth century. Their influential position did not come

from their power to alter the politics already set by the big powers, but, rather, from their

role in the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East. British statesmen were

unconcerned about changes within either Afghanistan or Persia. These states were

viewed as "semi-barbarous," backward, and, consequently, harmless countries. The real

concem was the Russians and the Russian role in undermining British interests in these

countries. "If the reader will look at any ordinary map of Asia" The Times stated, "he

will see that beyond our North-Westem frontier lies Afghanistan, and that beyond

Afghanistan lies Persia. Neither of these States could of themselves occasion us the least

concem: but beyond Persia lies Russia, and the imputed designs of Russian upon our

Eastem Empire are for ever in the minds of Indian statesmen." The article suggested

that Britain had to keep Afghanistan intact, and the city of Herat, the key to India, under

the control of friendly mlers.

In order to stop intermittent Russian intrigues in Teheran or Kabul, in 1838 the

British invaded Afghanistan and captured Kabul. By this move, Britain showed her

determination to guard India. Though Great Britain succeeded in invading Afghanistan

and establishing their own political monopoly, she could not hold the country for a long

"'Terentyef, vol. 2, 155.

552 The Times, January 2, 1868.

173

time. Because of unsavory and increasingly bitter relations between the Afghan civilians

and the British army, growing hatred ofthe invaders, and lack of a clear idea on the

British side about how to handle the turbulent Afghans, events tumed very unpleasant for

the British forces. The Afghan tribes attacked them, and exterminated almost all ofthe

British forces in 1842. This bitter defeat at the hands of warlike Afghans created an

Afghan "syndrome" in British India. It prevented the British from establishing their

influence in Central Asia. If they had not been defeated in 1842, the British would have

carried the railway lines up to the city of Herat and would have established a line of

defense on the Oxus (Amu Daria) rather than on the Suleiman range. Then, the three

Central Asian khanates, not Afghanistan, would have been the neutral zones between

Russia and Great Britain.'̂ ^^

Besides their defeat and loss of men and a huge amount of money in the first

Afghan War, the British seem to have had no clear concept about how to direct Central

Asian affairs. From the start the only thing they knew was the urgent necessity of

protecting India against a possible invasion from the north. However, the British

authorities had failed to establish a single and effective policy to do this. The men who

specialized in and had authority over India were divided into two camps. On the one

hand, a group led by Sir John Lawrence, Viceroy of India (1864-1869) and founder of

"the Panjub School" which valued traditional forms of society and law in India, wanted

to protect the status quo on the northwestem frontiers and did not want to commit the

British army in Afghanistan or Central Asia against the Russians. This group believed

that military actions beyond the Indian borders would drain the resources ofthe Empire.

Thus, they wanted to stay away from any conflict in Central Asia and let the Russians

deal with the warlike Afghans and other natives.̂ '̂*

Unlike Lawrence's inaction policy, supporters ofthe "forward" policy in the

Central Asian question claimed that the best way to actively deal with the Russians was

"^ Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 227-228.

"" The Times, September 2, 1868.

174

to establish military posts in Herat and Kandahar.' " Herat was generally accepted as the

key to India because it controlled the roads to Kabul and Ghazni; moreover, it had fertile

lands able to sustain a large army. They believed that Britain could not "expose Herat to

the risk of being taken by a Russian coup de main. Russia, in possession of Herat,

.. .would have a grip on the throat of India."^^ Nevertheless, they failed to make great

changes in the course of British diplomacy in Central Asia, but they provided

altematives, and were responsible for creating awe in the Russians, so they would be

more careful not to pursue a policy directly offensive to British interests in the region.

Despite hot debates among the British statesmen over the course of action against

the Russian advance in Central Asia, the "masterly inactivity" policy would continue to

be the only policy that the British would really follow. However, the "masterly

inactivity" policy was not inactive at all. It was only inactive as far as the use of military

power against the Russians was concemed. When Lord Mayo, Viceroy of India (1869-

1872). had a durbar with the Amir of Afghanistan at Umballa in 1869, he stated his desire

to continue to help the amir strengthen his position in Afghanistan against both his

intemal rivals and the Russians.^^^ Yet it required the British to supply the Amir of

Afghanistan with money and weaponry, even to scare him not to approach the Russians.

It also required them to pressure Persia not to be a Russian tool in Central Asia. It was

this policy that forced the British to fight against the Persians in 1856 when the latter

tried to capture Herat.

The Times represented at this time a generally accepted mood ofthe British public

as well as the officials. The common mood was that the British should not clash

militarily with Russia in Central Asia over the Turkic lands. It became generally

accepted that Russia had the right to establish her own authority over these places, as

^̂ ^ The Daily News, March 6, 1885. The article was written in the memory of Sir Henry Rawlinson, who died a day earlier, on March 5,1885.

556 Colquhoun, Russia against India, 222.

"^ The Times, July 6, 1871. If the British did not help Shir Ali to protect his throne against his son Yakub Khan, he was going to offer Herat to Persia in retum for help from the Persians to subdue Yakub. The British feared to lose Herat to Persia since the later was prone to be a Russian puppet power in the region.

175

long as she did not cross the borders of Afghanistan: "We do not wish to compete with

Russia for her dominion over the tribes of Tartary, or her difficult civilizing mission in

Central Asia.""^

Even after the Russian advances into the Syr Daria region in the 1860's. The

Times, in an editorial commentary, ridiculed the idea of any immediate danger to India.

According to the author, the danger was only in the imagination ofthe alarmist group.

"The greatest alarmists in India are neither Hindoos nor Mahomedans, neither Princes nor

people, but countrymen of our own whose minds have been engaged in free speculations

upon future events." ̂ ^̂ This alarmist mood had mainly resulted from the background of

the British statesmen who served in India. They generally came from the military and

knew war much better than peace. Thus, they were prone to see military threats. They

thought that India was taken by the sword and must be defended by the sword. The

Times' article stated that the alarmist situation created a dangerous atmosphere in India.

Whenever a rumor regarding a possible Russian design to invade India was heard, the

whole country fell into an emotional commotion. ̂ °̂ Many felt that Russia, as an outside

agitator, would be a real menace. They believed that despite a civilized and advanced

British mle over 200,000,000 natives, the Indians would never "love their white

conquerors. This is a fact that should be ever present to the eyes of our administrators.

We mle because we are supposed to possess the power to enforce obedience; we are

obeyed because ofthe disintegrating force of caste prejudices, which prevent concerted

action among the Indian races."^^' Over this insecurity and distrust ofthe natives, which

was mainly created by the Indian Mutiny of 1857. many British had doubts as to whether

their existence in India was appreciated or not. They knew that at any time they would

find themselves in a troubling situation if there were an outside agitator to incite the

^^^ The Times, My 6, 1871.

" ' The Times, December 26, 1870.

'"Ibid.

''' Sir Samuel W. Baker, "Reflections in India, 1880-1888." The Fortnightly Review 50 (August 1888): 215.

176

Indians. In short, the fear that created the Anglo-Russian rivalry came not only from a

possible invasion of India by the Russians but also from a possible agitation ofthe

natives by the Russians against British rule.

Possibility of Perceived Threat to India

The fear among the British statesmen, researchers, and military strategists about

the Russian threat to India from the north was never sufficient to unite them on a single

policy in the period under consideration. Yet, as Punch represented in its caricature

Figure 4.1: Temptation.

forms in 1885 (Figures 4.1 and 4.2),̂ ^^ the common notion was that Russia had an

expansionist design toward Afghanistan and India, or at least she had the power to

menace India. In order to prevent her menacing acts, the best way was to be ready at all

times to confront her.

^'^ Punch, March 14, and April 4, 1885.

177

Figure 4.2: Anti-temptation

The Times was confident in the 1850's that Russia was not in a position to menace

India. A Russian invasion of India was seen as an impracticable and indeed impossible

event. In a long editorial, it said "if 100,000 men were to start from the Russian station

nearest to India it is certain that not more than one-fifth of that number could reach the

Indus; and they would not be in a condition to encounter the fresh and well equipped

army of four or five times that number with which we should meet them." ̂ ^'^ Even in

1880, D. Boulger stated that presently there were 20,000 strong offensive troops of

Russia in Central Asia, and almost no native forces. Therefore "the army of Turkestan,

even when reinforced from Orenburg, is utterly incapable of undertaking those extended

operations which are necessary to carry Russian arms to the banks ofthe Indus."^ '̂* In

The Times, December 29, 1854.

178

the same fashion. General Skobelev stated that it was not feasible to invade India. He

said, "To invade India we should need 150,000 troops; 60,000 to enter India with, and

90,000 to guard the communications... We should require vast supplies, for Afghanistan

is a poor country and could not feed 60,000 men, and we should have to fight the

Afghans as well.""*'-̂ Contrary to Skobelev's opinion. General Chemiaev believed that

although it would not be an easy task, it would be possible to invade India from the

north.'^^

The Times stressed the growing danger from the north. "It is perfectly palpable

that Russia has been gradually working her way down to our frontier, never making a

startling move, but steadily advancing her pawns. Her object is to establish her

paramount influence throughout the various tribes of Central Asia, to inspire them with

awe of her power, and to impress on their minds that the Russians are far more powerftal

than the English, though they have conquered Hindustan." ^̂ ^ It was not the present

position ofthe Russian military stations, but their constantly advancing policy that

concemed the British. The Times expressed that "not the least annoying result of these

advances is the feverish excitement it creates in India, both in our own territories and

among our native allies.""^^*

Yet skepticism about any genuine Russian threat was overwhelmingly shared by

most of British statesmen, researchers, and politicians. They thought that India, which

was guarded by one ofthe most modem armies, and protected from the north by high

mountain ranges and by predatory tribes who would inflict great damages on any army

marching through their passes, was safe and secure from an immediate invasion. But, as

Sir James Stephen pointed out, the Russians could raise new armies, form alliances, and

"^ "The Military Position of Russia and England in Central Asia." The Edinburgh Review 151 (January 1880): 74.

"' Marvin, Conversations, 102-104.

'"Ibid, 131.

"'^ The Times, December 29, 1854.

'"Ibid

179

gradually develop into a great power in Central Asia, and thus become a real danger to

India." Again, Sir Bartle Frere wrote in 1874 that the Russians would drill the Afghans,

and would direct "hordes of Asiatic barbarians upon India," as had been done by Nadir

Shah in the eighteenth century. Sir Henry Green even talked about the possibility that a

combined Turco-Russian force, provisioned by their respective empires, would easily

cross the difficult passes to attack India. Furthermore, Colonel Baker, who stood up "on

the crest of Khorassan mountains in 1875 was very unhappy at the apathy of his

countrymen, ... told us that 'the dangers threatening India are looming nearer and nearer,

and nothing as yet has been done to meet or arrest them.'" '̂'° Besides these dreary

pictures drawn mostly by supporters of an active policy in Central Asia, there were

people in the British Parliament, including Sir Henry Lawrence, the Earl of Northbrook,

Sir Henry Norman, and Sir Vincent Eyre, who never really believed the existence of a

genuine Russian threat to India. They claimed that the distance between Russia proper

and India was over 2,000 miles. The transportation on this road was very difficult due to

lack of water and provisions in the barren and dry lands with high mountains that greatly

blocked the northem frontier of India row after row. "The very condition of these

impoverished lands offers perhaps the best security against the advance of a great power

like Russia." Besides the geographical difficulties, there were hostile tribes who preyed

on each other for survival. They also believed that the Russians would not raise enough

men to march on India because their Caucasian army had to remain stationed in the

Caucasus because of Turkish and local dangers."' The leader ofthe passivist or masterly

inactivist group. Lord Lawrence, claimed that England should concentrate her resources

to erect the first defensive line on the Suleiman range to constmct forts and control

passes. The second defense line should be the Indus, where again she should constmct

military forts and a river fleet containing ironclads to defend India from a Russian army

"'^ Sir James Stephen, The Times, October 16, 1878.

"" "The Military Position of Russia and England in Centt-al Asia," 77-90.

" ' Ibid, 78-90.

180

marching from the north."''̂ " Therefore, the British statesmen and strategists had a major

dilemma that lasted throughout the period of Russian expansion in Central Asia. It was

this dilemma that produced intensive diplomatic, political, and intellectual confrontations

in Great Britain.

Though the impossibility of an immediate invasion from the northwestem

frontiers of India was generally accepted, a "Friend of India" stressed how an

unimportant mmor on a Russian advance in Central Asia created a great anxiety in India

by increasing the feelings of Russophobia. Fear of Russian moves had to be taken

seriously. One way to do this, he suggested, was to educate "semi-barbarous"

mountaineers and tribes with westem military tactics and manners. This way a second

empire could be created beyond the Suleiman Range. Furthermore, it was fear ofthe

Russian menace in Central Asia that forced almost all British subjects in India to pay

great attention to what was going on in Central Asia. The Time's correspondent

described the state of British mood in India by saying, "Every movement beyond the

frontier and every half-caught rumor from Central Asia were interpreted as an intention

ofthe policy of St. Petersburg. Men grew familiar with Balkh and studied Bokhara,

bought up Moorcrof's Travels, and talked of Khirgiz steppes, and the Jaxartes.""'^

"Tmth lies between extremes," stressed "A Hertfordshire Incumbenf in his letter

to The Times. He did not believe that the Russians would ever attempt to invade India.

All mmors and scenarios were groundless. Indeed, these two civilized big nations had

similar jobs to do in the region. They could solve their differences through

conversations, and conduct commercial activities while they assumed a civilizing role in

the region. It was an inescapable fact that either Russia or Britain would exercise

authority over "inferior" civilizations when they came into contact with."'* As far as

Central Asia was concemed. Great Britain should stay within the range ofthe Suleiman

"^ The Spectator 58 (March 7, 1885): 302.

''" "A Friend of India,' The Times, December 28, 1854.

"" The Times, January 6, 1857.

181

and hold the important passes to India. As long as Britain held these passes with loyal

troops, it was impossible for outsiders to penetrate into India from the north. But, if the

Suleiman range were once crossed, it would be very difficult to find a clear border along

which to establish a strong defensive line.̂ ^^

The Times provided different opinions to eliminate the perceived threat to India.

One way to create a solid and impassable wall was to educate and raise the Indians to the

level of a modem civilization. If 200,000,000 Indians were trained to grasp the European

civilized life, they would be the strongest barriers to the Russian danger. Yet the

supporter of this view recognized that such an advanced society would be the biggest

problem to British rule in the first place, because most Indians considered the British as

alien invaders. Here lay a reason for the British to be afraid ofthe Russian advance

toward India. Russia as a big European power would stir up the national feelings ofthe

Indians, and might create rebellions against British mle. The Times considered that, the

closer the Russians got to India, the bigger the problem became for the British. In order

to prevent such a dangerous situation, it said "we should consider the frontier tribes, even

to the Afghans, as allies, and their countries as outposts to protect India from the moral

invasion which is assailing it.""^ Sir Samuel W. Baker believed that the Indians would

never like their white conquerors. At every opportunity, these people would try to end

British mle in India. "We mle because we are supposed to possess the power to enforce

obedience; we are obeyed because ofthe disintegrating force of caste prejudices, which

prevent concerted action among the Indian races. Were the two hundred and fifty

millions unanimous, their united action would tum us out. And still we sleep

unsuspiciously upon the slope ofthe volcano without anxiety or care." Having

experienced the cmshing destruction ofthe Indian Mutiny in 1857, the British rightfully

had concems for a possible intemal conflict since they had only around 70,000 European

' " The Times, January 9, 1857.

576 The Times, September 6, 1869.

"^ Baker, 215.

182

soldiers to guard borders and to keep the security of their administration in the country

against 250,000,000 natives in India.

Economic and Commercial Concems of Great Britain

Besides the fear of a possible invasion of India from the north, the second most

important source ofthe conflict between Great Britain and Russia regarding Central Asia

was Russian protectionism, and the desire to close the regions under her influence to

foreign merchants. As one ofthe leading British politicians ofthe nineteenth century,

Benjamin Disraeli, believed, half of the Central Asian question would be solved if Russia

totally agreed to allow British merchandise to enter her domain. ̂ ^̂ Nevertheless, the

Russians liked to establish a monopoly over the trade and economic stmctures of their

own colonies. They knew that they could not compete with the advanced westem nations

in the economic and commercial arenas.

The Times always stressed that Russia's protectionism was destmctive toward

foreign economic interests. It claimed that, while the Russians were trying to develop

"the protection and extension ofthe Russian trade with Central Asia and China," they

were seeking ways to close these regions to foreign products." Even though it was not a

direct violation ofthe British Indian Empire, it was a harmful development for British

trade in Central Asia. The more the Russians gained ground in trade, the fewer British

goods penetrated into the region. If the Russians did not interfere with the trade, the

British would have greater advantages than the Russians in establishing trade with the

khanates. At first instance it would seem that the British goods had to cross high

mountain passes to reach Turkistan. Harsh roads would be seen as barriers to this trade,

along with the robbers on the roads. However, as far as the race between the British and

Russian merchants was concemed, the former had better chances because despite the

high mountains the distance between India and Central Asia could be walked in 43 days.

The Russians, on the other hand, had to cross very long distances, as harsh as, even

" ' The Times, February 10, 1873.

" ' The Times, November 18, 1854.

183

harsher, than the roads to India because the roads to Russia were not only longer but also

passed through waterless, barren and desert territories. Russian merchants had to spend

65 days to reach the Central Asian market places.̂ *̂̂

ft was not only the existing trade with Central Asia that stimulated British and

Russian rivalry; it was also the future of this trade. In an article The Times stressed "now,

Bokhara is productive in cotton, wool, and silk; Khokand has long been celebrated for

minerals and precious stone.... the inhabitants of Central Asia generally are quite

advanced enough to appreciate the advantage of commercial barter. They may be in most

part in a semi-civilized state, on the border land, as it were, of nomad and settled life." It

suggested that British merchants and officials should work to improve commercial

activities with Central Asia by fixing roads, building bridges, and establishing political

treaties. If Great Britain failed to have a strong hand in the region, "it will be our fault,"

it stressed.^^'

Losing a profitable market and source of raw materials in Central Asia also

contributed to the rivalry because of Russia's unwillingness to allow outsiders to trade

freely in their dominions. Almost all Russian monarchs dreamt of capturing Central Asia

and fulfilling the so-called "will" of Peter I. Nicholas I was no exception. Indeed, he

seems to have believed that the geographical position of his country gave him the right to

monopolize the commerce of Central Asia. Such was the thought of his successors,

namely Alexander II and Alexander III, and they always drove their policy toward the

fiilfillment of this dream. Yet, British trade also found its way into Central Asia. The

Russians believed that the British, by sending William Moorcroft, a British veterinarian

who traveled to Tibet to find better horse breeds, made geographic discoveries in Central

Asia and died in Balkh in 1825; Captain Arthur Connolly; and Colonel Charles Bumes,

both of whom were British agents who were sent to Bukhara to seek an alliance with the

Amir of Bukhara against Russia but both of whom were executed by the order of the amir

in 1842, were trying to establish their own domination, and arming these khanates to

'^^ The Times, April 11, 1863.

'*' Ibid

184

menace Russian economic and political interests.^^^ They also thought that because of

jealousy of Russian economic and political expansion in Central Asia, Lord Auckland,

Viceroy of India (1836-1841), had invaded Kabul in 1838.̂ ^^

"An Old Indian" wrote to The Times that as long as Russia or China did not

occupy Turkistan, millions of Muslims would trade with Britain. Indian tea and other

products would be exchanged for gold, silver, and other precious metals. If Russia and

Britain managed to put their hostilities aside and agreed to open Turkistan to free trade,

both countries would be in much better positions.^^'' Yet, Russia was not inclined to

share the fruits of Central Asia with Great Britain. The Times' correspondent rightfully

stated that Russian products easily reached the khanates of Khiva, Khokand, Bukhara,

and such important cities as Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul. English products could not

compete with Russian products as the Russians increased their political and commercial 585

power.

The interests of Russia and Great Britain clearly required them to pursue a strong

policy in Central Asia. Since the Russians saw the region as their natural sphere of

influence, they cared very little about what the British thought until the latter became

very firm in insisting on Afghan neutrality. Yet, as the Russians began to establish their

solid control over the whole of Central Asia, the options for the British to have a free

hand in the region began to disappear. Was keeping Afghanistan in her sphere of

infiuence enough to save the British interests in the region? There were people who did

not think that it was a good policy to leave huge territories to the Russian sphere of

influence. In a letter to The Times, Vambery, who traveled in Central Asia in 1863 as a

disguised dervish, claimed that Great Britain had to establish a very firm relation with

Yakub Bey of Kashgaria to have a hand in the khanates. He believed that Yakub Bey

'^- Jonveaux, "Les Russes dons I'Asie Cenfrale," 990.

'^' Ibid, 991.

'^* The Times, November 9, 1866.

'^' The Times, September 27, 1859.

185

was a talented ruler who could establish his authority over the khanate of Khokand.

Through Kashgaria, Great Britain would continue to have a profitable trade with Central

Asia. Though the British sent several ambassadors, including Sir Douglas Froyst, and

in India received ambassadors from Yakub Bey, such as Seyid Yakub, in order to

establish better economic and commercial links with Kashgaria, as well as to create

another friendly buffer state to arrest Russia's threat on India,̂ ^^ they never

wholeheartedly supported Yakub Bey's state that fell into the hands ofthe Chinese in

1877.

Though the economic and commercial concems ofthe British over the Russian

expansion into Central Asia created some degree of need to resist these expansions, the

rivalry has always been viewed as political and diplomatic in character. Since none of

the rivaling forces totally challenged the political influence ofthe other, there was no

prospect for any military clash. Thus, the invasion ofthe region by the Russians almost

barred the entrance of British products by the 1870's. The British did nothing to lift the

Russian monopoly on the region, but they did not find if agreeable.

Stages ofthe Rivalry during Russian Expansion into Central Asia

In the mid nineteenth century Russian expansion into Central Asia created

excitement among the British people and their politicians. Especially in the 1860"s, when

the Russians began to take solid steps to take the khanates, many English began to

criticize these developments on the ground of a growing threat to India. At this initial

phase of Russian invasions The Times performed two tasks: informing the public about

geographic, political, social, and cultural aspects of Central Asia, and stressing the

importance ofthe Russian invasions to British interests. While fear and hatred toward

the Russian invasions were growing. The Times worked in its way to soothe the public

and show how harmless Russian moves were. It sided with the "masterly inactivists" and

586 The Times, November 11, 1868.

'" Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: the Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kodansha Intemational, 1992, 337.

186

undermined the forwardist's views. The paper told stories about how difficult and

unbearable it would be for an invading army to cross long, barren, and hostile territories,

and how a small army would be enough to resist a big invading army on the Indian

border. It brought views of specialists to the public attention. In one citation, the

Swedish General Bjomstjema stressed in his 1839 work, "ft will require four campaigns

before a Russian Army can possibly arrive at the Indus by way ofthe Hindoo Koosh and

Cabul." Besides the harsh climate and unfriendly terrain, on the route to India lived

many warlike, "barbarous," or "semi-barbarous" tribes, who had preyed on caravans,

travelers, and weak communities.^^^ Yet, when the khan of Khiva, Allah-Kulu (1825-

1842), asked the British for help for the defense of his country in 1839, the Brhish were

quick to send Captain James Abbot, a British officer at Herat who was sent Khiva to

induce the khan to free Russian slaves in order to arrest General Perovski's attack on the

khanate. Lieutenant (later Captain and Sir) Richmond Shakespeare, another British

officer at Heart, was also sent after Abbot to Khiva to advise the khan to set free the

Russian slaves. Though Abbot failed to meet with the khan, Shakespeare succeeded in

inducing the khan to free over 300 Russian slaves. Following British advice, the khan

also thanked the British for their help. By destroying any pretext for Russia to attack the

khanates, the British aimed to keep the Russians out of Central Asia as long as

possible.^^^

If the Russians had attempted to march on India in the 1850's, they would have

had to collaborate not only with predatory tribes but also with Persia to secure their line

of retreat as well as communication and provision lines. Thus, in order to provide a safe

pass, and enough provisions to the marching army, thousands of soldiers had to be

employed along the roads and passes. Such a wom-out army had no chance to face a

superior and fresh army of Great Britain in the Indus valley. Since the British army was

equipped with steamers, modem artillery and advanced weapons, the Russians had no

chance of winning a possible confrontation after a long and troubled march to India.

'^^ The Times, January 23, 1854.

Saray, Rus i§gali Devrinde Osmanli Devleti Ile Tiirkistan Hanliklan .Arasindaki siyasi miinasebetler, 42.

187

Furthermore, in case of a defeat, an army would never see the Caspian or the Aral Sea

again. They would suffer much more than Napoleon's armies suffered in the famous

retreat from Moscow in 1812.̂ *̂̂

Despite the seeming impossibility of a successful invasion of India from the

north, the British were not foolish enough to leave things to luck or chance. The British

paid extra attention to the defense ofthe northwestem frontiers of India. It was largely

through this part of India that invaders, prior to the British, had come to conquer.

Alexander the Great, Sultan Mahmud, the Mongols, Timurlenke, Babur, and Nadir Shah

all crossed the Khyber or Bolan Passes, crossed the Indus, and then invaded the

subcontinent. Since the strong British fieet easily defended India on three sides, it was

only on the northwestem front that the British had to create policies to protect this

"crown" of British colonial possessions. For this, Britain employed the best of her

officers along with well-trained and equipped soldiers.^^'

Russian moves into the Syr Daria region against the Khanate of Khokand created

vivid emotions in England in the 1860's. Since the British at this stage still regarded the

independence of Central Asia as an indispensable guarantee to the safety of India, they

wanted to know what was the real object of these recent moves. In order to restrain rising

emotions abroad. Prince Gorchakov, the foreign minister of Russia, issued a circular,

which stated that contrary to the will ofthe tsar and the Russian govemment, the

Russians had to take action against the nomadic neighbors who frequently crossed

borders and violated Russian territories with their incursions as well as life necessities.

He stated that in order to connect westem Siberia with Orenburg, Russia had to take steps

to annex territories beyond the Aral Sea, Ak Mesjid, Turkistan (Yesse), Aulie Ata, and

Chimkent to the Siberian posts. He also stated that Russia needed to acquire fertile lands

to feed its men and animals and to prepare for future colonization. An important aspect

590 The Times, January 23, 1854.

^" Ibid.

' Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Cenfrale," 984.

188

ofthe circular was its stress the Russian desire to stop aggression against the Khanate of

Khokand once the desired Syr Daria line was established.

Despite this promise made in the Gorchakov circular, the Russians continued their

forward march. They annexed one ofthe most important centers in Central Asia,

Tashkent, in 1865. Continuing Russian annexations created some anxiety in Great

Britain. At this juncture. Lord Russell, British foreign minister, wrote to Prince

Gorchakov that Britain accepted the gains the Russians had made in recent years. He

also asked that both governments should exchange notes expressing respect for each

other's interests in the region. In his letter, Russell asked Gorchakov to respect the

integrity of Persia. Prince Gorchakov rightly asked in retum how the British established

a connection between Persia and the Khanate of Khokand, two places separated by long

distances. Gorchakov stated that the Russians had always tried to encourage the Persian

monarch to have a strong state, and Russia did not have any designs on that state.̂ '̂̂ By

emphasizing Persia and dismissing the khanates. Great Britain made it clear to the

Russians that British leaders had no objection to the Russian invasions in the Syr Daria

region. The British govemment hinted that they held no interest in Central Asian affairs

as long as these affairs were restricted to the Turkic khanates, and did not affect Persia or

Afghanistan.

By the time ofthe initial victories ofthe Russians in the Syr Daria region against

the Khanate of Khokand, the British generally thought that there was no need for alarm

over India. Indeed, most of them believed that Russia would be a better neighbor than

the unmly and "barbarous" tribes in the north if the Russian and British borders touched

each other. They also thought that, under Russian authority, the British would have more

chances for trade and would establish better economic relations with Central Asia.̂ '̂*

When the Russians gained clear victories over the Khanate of Bukhara in 1866,

The Times first stated that both the public and the govemment had shown no serious

alarm at all because of Russian moves. This development would be good for British

Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 289-290.

'̂̂ "The Russians in Central Asia," 533.

189

policy in Central Asia. It predicted that, with its present speed of expansions, Russia

would easily annex Balkh, and Kabul, and reach to the Indian border in the next few

years. Such a development, however, would not be a bad thing because the Russians

would be better neighbors than "unruly" native tribes. Secondly, The Times accepted that

the Russians, like the British, had rights to enlarge their territories in the east.̂ ^^

Similarly, when the Russians captured Samarkand and the Zarafshan Valley in

1868, The Times wamed the public as well as the politicians to be cautious, and not to

exaggerate the recent Russian acquisitions. It accepted Russian designs on India, but it

was too early to send British armies in retaliation for the Russian move to Afghanistan, or

further. Instead, The Times suggested that Britain develop a more friendly relationship

with Afghanistan, and support it against the Russians. In this way. Great Britain would

avoid fighting against the Russians in India because it believed that with British help the

Afghans would prove a real obstacle to any possible Russian move on India.

Furthermore, The Times claimed in June 1868 that Afghanistan was full of warlike

groups who would make any possible Russian invasion a disaster, as they did for the

British in the First Afghan War. In October 1869, The New York Times also stressed the

impossibility of a Russian invasion of India because ofthe Afghan obstacle, and its

subsequent transportation and communication problems. It also claimed that there was

no need to be alarmed by any type of Russian intrigues in India because the Indians

would not prefer Russian rule over British mle. Furthermore, a forward policy for the

British was not practicable. If Britain invaded Afghanistan to retaliate against Russian

moves in Central Asia, she would bring herself into a messy situation by becoming a

neighbor to Russia. The best way to keep any Russian menace away from India, it

suggested, was to keep Afghanistan a free zone between Russia and British India.̂ ^^

As the Russian moves took place against the khanates, almost all possible options

were discussed in The Times, including the "forward" policy and "masteriy inactivity."

In a letter signed by "Hotar," the author bitterly criticized the policy of "masterly

''^'The Times, iune 14, 1866.

'^' The Times, June 10, 1868; The New York Times, October 19, 1869.

190

inactivity." He believed that Russia exhibited sneaky and steady moves in Central Asia.

These moves threatened the existence of free nations in every respect. Since the Russian

advance did not immediately harm British national interests, many people in Britain did

not care to show a real resistance beyond a weak sentimental dislike ofthe Russians.

Some "masterly inactivity" advocates such as Grant Duff, writer ofthe Blue Pamphlet,

intentionally or unintentionally supported the Russian moves as something that brought

civilization into uncivilized places. "Hotar" stated that such a behavior toward the

Central Asian people was unacceptable. He said, "It is not yet too late to require Russia

to respect the independence of Khiva, Khokand, and Bokhara... If we delay speaking out,

Russia will consolidate her power in those regions; she would find it more difficuh to

recede, and any further advance which she may make will still further increase our

difficulties in India."^^^ As a response to "Hotar," Grant Duff wrote that his approach in

defining the political situation in Central Asia would be one sided and pro-Russian. Yet,

he believed that similar moves by the British on the grounds of spreading civilization in

Asia and Africa had been made many times. He thought that it would be absurd to go to

war against Russia in Central Asia just because the Russians incorporated some backward

places.^^^

The editorial in The Times called the situation created in Central Asia by the

Russian invaders "a great evil." It divided officials and the public into two camps:

activists and inactivists. The feeling of Russophobia had risen to its zenith in those days.

The Times strangely was in support of an active policy against the Russian

encroachments in Central Asia. It believed that something had to be done before the

Russians became a real danger to India. It criticized the inactivists for being blind to the

long-term consequences of these developments. The supporters of "masterly inactivity"

claimed that the Russians were going to stop as soon as they reached their natural

boundaries, which were the Hindu Kush Mountains. But The Times' commentary

'•̂ ^ The Times, Februaiy 13, 1869.

598 The Times, February 22, 1869.

claimed that, if the Russians reached these mountains, they would constmct better

fortresses, enlarge roads and passes, and make better preparations to attack India.̂ ^^

When the Russians seriously contemplated the invasion of Khiva in 1872, the

Khan of Khiva sent an envoy to India to seek British help. The viceroy. Lord

Northbrook, not only rejected any assistance to the khanate but he even suggested that it

yield to Russian demands.̂ *"̂ In one of its leading articles. The Times was critical ofthe

decision made by the British govemment not to help the Khivans against Russia. It

claimed that it would have been better if the British had had a legitimate ground to

intervene in Central Asian affairs. By not helping the Khivan envoy, the British lost an

opportunity to gain a legitimate ground for action. The Times claimed the following:

Lord Northbrook, instead of openly declining to assist the Khan of Khiva, might have privately entered into some kind of Treaty relation with him, political, semi-political, or purely commercial, and this relation might afterwards have been used as a ground for intervention in the contest between him and Russia...If any treaties are to be made with ...States of Central Asia for the benefit of British commerce, let them be made above board, and published to all the world; the will thus be far more effectual in maintaining British influence than if they were sedulously concealed till a critical juncture. If it be thought necessary to set a watch on any vulnerable point between Peshawar and the Caspian, let it be done through a recognized British Agent, and either civil or military, rather than by a system of espionage, although the choice out of millions of Musluman [sic] subjects would afford us unexampled agents for such a policy.

The proper policy to be taken against the Russian expedition was discussed in the

House of Commons upon W. J. Eastwick's proposal over the proper policy to be adopted

against Russia's attack on the Khanate of Khiva on April 22, 1873. In the discussion,

Grant Duff, who was one ofthe most informed members ofthe House on the issue,

claimed that the situation in Central Asia had not changed since 1869 despite Russian

moves made against the khanates. The fear ofthe Russian danger was groundless.

'''7'/zer;we5,July 12, 1869.

'°° The Times, September 19, 1872; The Daily NCMS, April 18, 1873.

601 The Times, January 25, 1873.

192

despite a few Russians who dreamt of fighting the British on the banks ofthe Indus. W.

J. Eastwick, an ardent supported of a forward policy, stressed the Liberal government's

passivity toward the solution ofthe question, because, he implied, J. Gladstone, the only

non-Russian statesman whose portrait decorated the Russian minister of interior Count

Ignatiev's office in St. Petersburg, was indeed appreciative ofthe Russian move to

destroy Turkey and the Turkish religion. Stafford H. Northcote, State Secretary for India,

simplified the proper policy by saying "we ought neither to neglect the advance of Russia

in Asia, nor on the other hand ought we to be unduly alarmed at them.. .the best plan

would be to so govem India as to secure the affections ofthe people, and to strengthen

our frontier by such strategical measures necessary." The discussion did not produce

any solid conclusion for the future course ofthe policy. The British did not commit

themselves to any certain set of actions; instead they decided to respond according to the

consequences ofthe regional events.

Once the British govemment lost all hope of competing with Russia in the

khanates of Central Asia, it was easy to seek a political solution to the problem. The

solution required partition ofthe whole ofthe Middle East, or Central Asia. The main

character of this partition was to establish spheres of influence in the region. Since no

other great power was involved in the conflict, Russia and England had to solve their

problems by themselves.

The growing volume of comment in the press about Central Asian affairs during

the Khivan expedition created a strong anti-Russian public sentiment, and more people

began to pay close attention to the question. The public grew determined to resist firmly

Russian aggressiveness in the region. They thought that the only thing that would stop

the Russians was a strong will. This strong will had grown in the British govemment

Marvin, Conversations, 229.

"" The Daily News, April 23, 1873. Grant Duff summarized the proper course of reaction against the Russian aggressiveness in Central Asia by a Spanish proverb, "Let him attack who will, the sfrong man wins."

193

with the support ofthe public who firmly believed that India was worth preserving and

the Russian aggression was a menace to the rights and interests of Great Britain.

The unanimous approbation which the public has bestowed on the firm policy ofthe Govemment with regard to the Russian advance in Turkistan is a national decision of the highest importance, and involves corresponding responsibility. In contradiction to the sentiments which have exercised a deep influence in former years, the public verdict now decides that the indefinite progress of Russia is attended with danger to us, and may justly be resisted.̂ **'*

The public at this stage did not.support sending armies against the Russians immediately.

Instead, this support was given to the government's accepted goal ofthe drawing of a line

between the spheres of influence of both empires.

The diplomacy initiated by Lord Clarendon's assumption ofthe Foreign Office in

1868 crystallized when he sent a dispatch to Sir Andrew Buchanan, the British

ambassador in St. Petersburg, regarding the creation of a neutral zone in Central Asia in

1869.̂ °^ Later, Lord Clarendon and Prince Gorchakov met at Baden in Germany to

discuss the issue. It seemed that Prince Gorchakov was as eager as Lord Clarendon to

find a political solution to the rivalry in Central Asia. Lord Clarendon had in mind in

March 1869 a scheme to keep Afghanistan and Persia outside Russian influence, leaving

the Turkic khanates to Russia. Upon this proposal. Prince Gorchakov stated, "Keeping a

zone between the possessions ofthe two Empires in Asia, to preserve them from any

contact, has always been shared by our august Master."^*'̂ He strongly affirmed that the

Russians had appreciated the policy of abstention of Lord Lawrence in Afghanistan, and

that they had no intention to exercise any influence on the Afghans. He agreed that

Afghanistan was outside the Russian sphere of influence. "̂̂^ After agreeing in principle

on the solution ofthe problem in its simplest form, it remained to establish a borderline

between the spheres of influences in order to prevent misunderstandings and petty

""^ The Times, January 28, 1873.

'°' Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 229 (May 5, 1876): 108.

"̂̂ Leiven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 292; Terentyef vol. 2, 126.

""ibid, 126.

194

quarrels among the local forces. At first, they had in mind the river of Amu Daria as the

desired line.

Yet many, including General M. N. Wilford, and Sir H. Rawlinson, criticized the

officially accepted British view that aimed to abstain from any involvement in the

khanates. Wilford questioned the idea that the Russians did not have power to cross the

passes to India. He believed that "a combined Russian, Persian and Tartar invasion of

India is a perfectly possible operation."^°^ Still another General, A. J. Cunynghame,

claimed that a Russian invasion of India could only be possible through Persia. The

Russian expansion in Central Asia would not harm British interests in India, but her

settlement in the long mn would create a better environment for the consideration of an

invasion of India.^°^ The proposal was in line with The Times' main assertions.

The British were not yet alarmed about the prospect that the Russians would

capture Khiva. They already knew that Russia had established her domination over the

khanates of Bukhara and Khokand. The possible fall ofthe third khanate would not make

too much difference in the political stmcture of Central Asia as long as Russia was

willing to stay behind the Afghan borders. Yet, this border was not a clear one. Nobody

really knew how to draw a line between Bukhara and Afghanistan since there had never

been a stable borderline defined before. Nomadic societies had been living on the

proposed borders and they never respected borders.

As the Khivan expedition was pending in 1872, The Times intensified its effort to

include almost every British viewpoint conceming the solution to the problem. It

confessed that the opinions of politicians, civilians, and military personnel were too

complicated to grasp with clarity. Yet there were two overwhelming inclinations toward

the proper way with which to deal with the new developments. The first group, though

few in number, consisted of "influential and high ranking personalities" who were "such

acute and confident men as are apt to make their opinions prevail in any political society.

They have described the advance of Russia as a necessity which it would be equally

608 The Times, October 19, 1872; The Daily News, April 24, 1873.

'^ The Times, November 2, 1872.

195

immoral and futile to resist." They considered it as a gain to humanity and civilization.

They accepted that Russian civilization was not as perfected as westem civilization, yet it

was better than the "barbarous" civilization ofthe east. The Russians were expected to

be "the destined instrument on the hands of Providence for bringing the vast hordes of

Asia out ofthe sight of Barbarism to at least the early twilight of civilization." ̂ "̂ The

second opinion was more popular and older than the first one and stressed the necessity

of keeping the Russians on a line that would guarantee British interests in India.^"

Should Britain take any military action against the Russians as the Khivan

expedition was impending? The Times was against any kind of reprisal, and supported

the expedition as a rightful act by the Russians. An editorial said, "We cannot prevent,

and we ought not to desire to prevent, the extension of Russian influence over the

barbarous Principalities of Turkestan. The Khanates with which Russia is now dealing

are entirely beyond our Asiatic system." As the Khanate of Khiva was on the brink of

being subdued by the Russians, which naturally was to provide Russia a complete

domination of all the khanates. The Times' editorial did not believe that this development

would alter anything in the region as far as the security of India was concemed. It

believed that the Russian intention was to challenge Britain and to threaten her to accept

Russian designs in Europe. It suggested that the best way to deal with the problem was to

be calm and be prepared on the Indian border in case of a confrontation. The Times

stressed that Britain's strong border defense would be enough to provide problems to the

Russians in Central Asia by means of politics, diplomacy, propaganda, subsidies, and

spying activities.

We shall do better by maturing our resources within our own dominions, by perfecting our railway communications, by organizing our power, and, above all. by securing the respect and affection of our subjects. Once render the Natives well-affected to our rule, and Russian intrigues would be without scope or opportunity. With a compact Empire and a contented people we

610 The Times, November 26, 1872.

*" Ibid.

*'- The Times, December 27, 1872.

196

might afford to laugh at the threats of our neighbor. Not for years or generations yet to come can the power of Russia in the East be anything like a match for ours. We have got all the riches ofthe plain, while she has nothing but wildemess and poverty ofthe hills. Tme, these mgged regions are tenanted by martial tribes at her disposal; but there are no better soldiers in Asia than we can command by tens of thousand in Hindostan. Moreover, intrigue and mpees are as much at our service as at hers.^'^

When the British became really alarmed about the safety of their possession of

India, as the Russians were clearly preparing to attack Khiva, Lord Augustus Loftus,

British ambassador in St. Petersburg, delivered a note '̂'* to Prince Gorchakov. In the

note, Britain wamed Russia to respect Afghan territories.^'^ The Times stressed the

advantage of such a diplomatic step to keep Russia out of Afghanistan or for that matter

out of British sight. It appreciated the government's decision to leave Central Asia at the

mercy ofthe Russians. There was no advantage for the British to interfere in the affairs

of 'barbarous' places in Central Asia. Let the Russians deal with them and bring them

European civilization.^'^ Besides Russia's enlightening ftinction in the region. The

Times' leading article believed that Russia would not be a threat to India at any time.

613 The Times, November 28, 1872.

The Times, February 13, 1873. According to this note: 1. Badakshan, with its dependent disfrict of Wakhan form the Sarikal (Woods Lake) on the east

to the junction ofthe Kouktoha River with the Oxus (or Penjdeh), forming the northem boundary of this Afghan province throughout its entire extent.

2. Afghan Turkestan, comprising the disfricts of Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh, the northem boundary of which would be the line ofthe Oxus from the junction ofthe Koukteba River to the post ofthe Khodja Saleh, inclusive, on the high road from Bukhara to Balkh. Nothing to be claimed by the Afghan Ameer on the left bank ofthe Oxus below Khoja Saleh.

3. The intemal distticts of Aktchi, Saripool, Maimane, Chibbirgan, and Andkhol, the latter of which would be the exfreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to independent fribes of Turcomans.

4. The westem Afghan frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those ofthe Persia province of Khorassan is well known and need not here be defined.

The Times, December 27, 1872.

The Times, December 27, 1872.

197

This confidence in Russia's inability to attack India in the calculable future let The Times

be supportive of Russian expansion in Central Asia.^'^

Upon seeing how insistent the British were to directly involve themselves in

Central Asian affairs, at least as far as Afghanistan was concemed, the Russian

govemment agreed to continue already-established communications in order to establish

a neutral zone. In November 1869, Douglas Forsyth, famous explorer of Kashgaria, was

in St. Petersburg where he met with the Russian foreign minister. Prince Gorchakov. He

gave the Prince a letter form Lord Mayo, the Viceroy of India. Forsyth's mission was an

attempt to convince the Russians that the British did not have any interest beyond the

Afghan territories. As long as the Russians did not touch the Amir of Afghanistan Shere

Ali (1868-1878), Britain was not going to encourage Shere Ali to violate Bukharan

territories. At this time, Russia was afraid of British intrigues in Afghanistan, and

thought that the British would encourage the Amir of Kabul to attack Bukhara. They

justified their fear on the ground of British support of Shere Ali in the forms of money

and weapons. Yet, the British assured Russia that their help for the amir simply sought to

foster a stable state on their northem frontier, and it had been the policy of Britain since

the viceroyalty of Lord Lawrence. The British fear, on the other hand, was of a Russian

attempt to take Balkh and Herat or to incite the Amir of Bukhara to attack Afghanistan.

It seemed obvious for both sides that it was time to reach an agreement and end the

misunderstandings. In 1870, both sides assured each other that they would do everything

in their power to dissuade Bukhara and Afghanistan from taking any aggressive actions

against one another. In December 1871, Prince Gorchakov sent a dispatch to Lord

Granville, British Foreign Secretary (1870-1874), as a response to the Forsyth mission

saying that Russia was respecting the territories mled by Shere Ali, that the British

should restrain him from any attempt to spread his influence beyond the present

territories, and that the Russian govemment would use all its power to keep the Amir of

*" The Times, January 20, 1873.

Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 293-294.

198

Bukhara from violating Afghan borders. The British govemment in London and in

Calcutta unreservedly accepted these principles. ̂ '̂

While negotiations between the two governments were going on, the Russian

govemment ordered General Kaufmann to survey Bukharan territories, and collect

information about the true state ofthe borderline between Afghanistan and Bukhara.

They did not readily accept the British suggestions about Shere All's possessions on

these frontiers. According to the British plan the territories, including Kodja Salih,

Badakshan, Wakhan, Balkh, Kunduz, Seripool, Andkoi, and Maimena, belonged to the

Afghan Amir. The Russians indicated that both governments had imperfect knowledge

about the region. Before the actual state ofthe possessions ofthe local mlers was known

with accuracy, nothing would be promised to ascertain these frontiers. The Russian

objection to the British plan concemed especially the status of Badakshan and Wakhan,

small khanates between Afghanistan and Bukhara. In this respect, the British insisted

that these two small khanates had been paying tribute to the Amir of Afghanistan. Thus,

their territories should be accepted as part of Afghanistan. Yet, before the Badakshan and

Wakhan conflict ended. Prince Gorchakov hinted that Russia was willing to accept the

British proposal for a demarcation line.

The British had their own weaknesses in the region, which required them to reach

an agreement with Russia. As The Times put it.

As may be observed with equal frankness, the very solidity and organization of our Eastem Empire exposes it to risks of its own. We have far more to lose in Asia than Russia has. She, at the most, could but be driven back a few hundreds of miles, with the prospect of recovering the lost ground at some fiiture opportunity...Russia, as she well understands, could disturb us, and possibly create even serious commotions in the very heart of our dominion. We are supposed to be constantly apprehensive of this very interference, and it has, perhaps, been calculated that we might endure much rather than provoke the risk. But it should also be remembered that we have known of this risk from the

619 Ibid, 294-296.

'^^ Ibid, 291.

199

first that we have been accustomed to measure or compute its imminence, and that the very nearness ofthe peril might induce us to confront it at once.^^'

While the British govemment was willing to sacrifice Central Asia up to the

Afghan border to solve the problem created by Russian advances in Central Asia, The

Times brought new interpretations to the solution ofthe question. In a letter, Henry

Green, a specialist on Central Asian geography and history, claimed that the line should

be defined not on the Afghan border but from a further distance, preferably near

Samarkand. His concem was that, if the neutral line passed on the Afghan border, it

would allow the Afghans "to play off one nation against the other—a game which would

be very costly on the Indian Treasury." He suggested that the best policy for the British

in the present time was to strengthen their powers on the northwestem frontiers of

India."^

In an accusatory letter about governmental policy toward Central Asian affairs.

The Times stressed that the alarmist course ofthe policy had failed to produce useful

plans or programs. When the perceived Russian threat to India was formulated years

before, nobody had clearly defined the timetable and territorial limit to Russian

aggression in Central Asia in order to invoke British forces when needed. Generally, the

govemment had stressed the importance of Herat as the key to India. In the past, the

Russians had shown much aggression, yet no British force had ever taken any action

against them. "The vision which for years created all our alarms, and which was

employed to justify all our precautions, is now allowed to vanish, with the candid

confession that ft was a baseless fabric from first to last." "

In order to calm rising anti-Russian feelings because ofthe Khivan expedition,

and to reach an agreement with the British govemment conceming the neutral zone

between the two empires in Central Asia, the Russian govemment sent Count P.

*̂ ' The Times, January 11, 1873.

'-'^ Henry Green, The Times, January 13, 1873.

623 The Times, January 20, 1873.

200

Andreyevich Schouvalov to London. On January 1873, Lord Granville received him.

The main topic, which had already been discussed by both governments through their

ambassadors, was to improve understandings of each other's views over the demarcation

line. Negotiations led to the conclusion of an understanding that stressed the present

territories under Shere All's control comprised the kingdom ofthe Afghan state, that the

British govemment would persuade Shere Ali not to violate this limit, and similarly, that

the Russian govemment would force the Amir of Bukhara not to violate the Afghan

territories.*'"^ The Schouvalov mission to London was far from inducing and comforting

the British on Central Asia affairs. The British continued to have their doubts about

Russian commitments to stay away from the Afghan border. They thought that relations

would tum to normal only if the Russians pulled their forces out of Khiva.̂ ^^ Meanwhile,

the Russian govemment was not happy about the commentary ofthe British press,

especially The Times. They believed that the British press had no right to attach any

importance, or speculate on it, since both governments were trying to reach a mutually

accepted resolution.

Though an understanding was reached between Britain and Russia during the

Schouvalov mission conceming a demarcation line in Central Asia, the British still had

doubts about whether the Russians would keep their promises or not. They preferred to

wait until the end of hostilities between Khiva and Russia.^^' During the Schouvalov

mission to London, both sides roughly agreed that the river Amu Daria would constitute

the borderline between Bukhara and Afghanistan.^^* Since Turkmenia and some part of

the territories on which this proposed borderline passed were not clearly known and

*̂ '' Leiven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 299-301.

'^' The Times, January 20, 1873.

'^' The Times, January 25, 1873.

^" The Times, February 4, 1873.

628 The Times, February 13, 1873.

201

politically settled, the demarcation line was nothing but an agreement on paper. It did not

really create any solid frontier to end the complicated situation.

The settlement of 1873 became the comerstone ofthe later negotiations between

the two empires conceming the Central Asian question. By this settlement, Russia

gained a free hand to deal with the remaining Turkic lands in Central Asia. It also meant

that the British gave up their hopes or desires to have any authority in the khanates of

Central Asia. The Times celebrated the result with some doubts and sadness. It said, "It

is some satisfaction to find that our govemment has not, after all, been devising any novel

scheme of political interference in Central Asia." Yet, being passive and losing every

hope of interfering on the other side ofthe line, the British let the Russians mn freely in

Central Asia. ̂ '̂ ^ According to The Manchester Guardian, the "doctrine of non­

interference with Russia in her civilizing mission of conquest has been of late years so

constantly and eamestly preached in this country [England] that it might have been

supposed our Foreign Office had no views of its owoi to communicate to the Russian

prime minister." However, as the recent diplomatic move showed, the British firmly

taught the Russians that there was a limit to their expansion in Asia as there had been in

Europe.̂ '̂ ** Furthermore, it was too late for England to take the necessary steps to protect

the khanates. All the British "can do now is to consider what will be the effect ofthe

conquest of Khiva in strengthening the military position ofthe Russians in Central

Asia."^^'

The conclusion of diplomacy on the settlement of a demarcation line, beyond

which both countries had full freedom to act as they wished in their respective sphere of

influence, was "definite and satisfactory," according to The Times. However. The Times

again stressed that the drawing of a demarcation line did not mean that the British and the

Russians divided Asia. "If Afghanistan be the neutral territory, we do not in any way

'^'Ibid.

"° The Manchester Guardian, January 9, 1873.

" ' The Manchester Guardian, January 17, 1873.

202

commit ourselves to the recognition of Russia's right to extend her territory up to the

border of that neutral territory."^ '̂̂ The Times' conflicting or even contradictory

comments showed that the problem between Russia and Great Britain was still far from

definitely concluded. Though, for the time being the British and the Russians established

an understanding on the existence of a neutral zone, neither of them seems to have been

satisfied. Nobody in Britain knew where and when Russian expansion in Central Asia

was going to stop. They believed that Russia was still an aggressive power, and

continued to threaten Khiva, Turkmenia, Merv, and even Persia.

In a session held in the House of Commons, the issue was discussed on April 22,

1873. In the discussion, W. J. Eastwick stressed Russian aggression against her

neighbors. He said,

Russia will never stop of herself; she must be stopped by us or some other Power, or else she will gradually absorb all that lies between her and us, and then, perhaps, be ready for, and capable of, a further and momentous struggle. She must be met, firmly and boldly, by military preparation rather than by diplomatic subtlety; her aggressive craft must be worsted by our straightforwardness. Our power in India and our enormous wealth must be used to secure important positions and to cement durable alliances. To make Peshawar impregnable and its defiles impossible, to occupy Quettah, to bring Persia and Kashgar into league with us on terms of mutual friendship.

Eastwick also stated that the understanding over a demarcation line should not have been

reached because such agreements had no power in real life. Instead, he suggested,

Britain had to be ready to act any time it was required. Contrary to Eastwick' s opinions.

Sir Charles Wingfield and Grant Duff insisted on the quality ofthe "masterly inactivity'

policy. They believed that Britain should stay in India, and develop a better defense

policy against a possible enemy attack as well as confidence in the Indians. They

suggested that to safeguard India Britain should establish mutual relations with

Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Tibet, and Eastem Turkistan. They also believed that Russia

"^ The Times, March 12, 1873.

"'The Times, April 22, 1873.

203

was going to keep her word on, pulling her army back from Khiva after the war was

over. In similar words. The Manchester Guardian said.

One point will not .. .be lost sight of by our Govemment -that it is not enough to proclaim a policy; we must be prepared to act with energy and constancy in giving it effect. Hitherto we have so buriesqued the policy of 'masteriy inactivity,' which was founded on what is in the main the tme belief that the English in India are strong enough to defend that country against any invader, that we have shmnk from having direct diplomatic communications with the princes ofthe intermediate states between India and Russia, and have even discouraged enterprises intended to facilitate commercial intercourse with the nations of Central Asia. It is quite evident that now all this must be changed. If we are to extend our protectorate as far as the Caspian and the Oxus, we must have British officers stationed at the chief towns beyond the Himalayas, with power to advise and check native chiefs who might otherwise provoke frequent collisions with Russia. It will be necessary to appoint British residents at the Courts of Cabul and Yarkand, with subordinate officers at Balkh, Herat, Merve, Kashgar, and wherever else a watchflil British agent may be of use.""'

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Gladstone had no intention of giving credit to the "alarmisf

voices. He, as usual, believed in the merit ofthe Russian incorporation of "barbarous"

places, and supported the policy of inactivity. He thought that the last agreement with

Russia was a valuable one. His definition ofthe agreement was "if little had been gained,

nothing, at any rate, had been lost." He also stated that Prince Gorchakov had repeatedly

assured him that Russia would respect the integrity of Afghanistan. Furthermore, he

stressed that the right of Britain to interfere in Afghan affairs anytime was preserved if

the interests of Britain were at stake.

The mild and restrained policy ofthe British toward the Russian invasions in

Central Asia up to the Afghan borders partly resulted from the pro-Russian premier,

Gladstone, and his Liberal govemment. Many believed that, unlike Gladstone and his

liberals, leaders such as Lord Palmerston and many other conservatives were more

"Ubid.

'" The Manchester Guardian, January 17, 1873.

"' The Times, April 24, 1873.

204

determined to oppose Russia's threatening moves in the Near East and Central Asia.

When the Russians confiscated the khan's treasure in Khiva in 1873, they found a letter

written by Lord Palmerston. In the letter, Palmerston indicated that any expansion ofthe

Russians against Khiva would be considered as a ca.ms belli.^^^

The settlement of 1873 between Russia and Great Britain regarding the neutral

zone, and the successful conclusion ofthe Khivan expedition by the Russians, helped

relax the tension during the expedition. The calmness ofthe situation provided a

relatively prejudice-free time to discuss the issue with a progressive mood. Many

specialists, including Robert Michell, "A Student of Central Asia," and "A Tashkendian"

freely discussed their opinion ofthe Russian invasions ofthe khanates, the present

position, and the future prospect. "A Student of Central Asia" claimed that the Russian

position would not be a threat to India but would add more burdens to the Russians. He

claimed that the Russians indeed heaped more responsibility and new problems on their

shoulders by invading Central Asia. Because of his positive mood toward Russian

expansion, correspondents such as Robert Michell accused him of being pro-Russian and

acting like a Russian "mouthpiece." Robert Michell, "A Tashkendian," and many others,

on the other hand, believed that the Russians were now in a better and stronger position

to threaten India more than ever. Besides the growing danger to India, they thought that

the next step for Russian expansion would be Turkmenia. They agreed that if the

Russians invaded Turkmenia, there would not be any reason for them to threaten the

British in India."*

As the mmor regarding the Russian plans to invade Merv was spreading, the Amir

of Afghanistan asked Lord Northbrook what would be the proper course of action against

the Russians if they violated his kingdom. Lord Northbrook promised him that Britain

would provide material help. Meanwhile, the issue ofthe Russian perceived threat to the

"'' The Times, August 14, 1873; MacGahan, 394. According to MacGahan, a copy of Palmerston's letter, which probably was sent by Lieutenant Shakespeare in 1840 on his mission to Khiva, was found among other things in the Yomud Turkmen camp after the Russian desfruction of their village during the Yomud expedition in 1873.

"^ The Times, August 18, 1875.

205

British interests in the region was discussed in the Upper House in London in August

1873. In the discussion. Lord Derby stated that in case of a Russian assault on the amir,

the best way was to help the Afghans without loss of time. The British did not have any

clear view about how to deal with Russian invasions in Central Asia. They produced too

much talk but no real policy or solid step. Yet, they always had same thoughts that

Russia would one day attack India. Even despite the repeated assurances made by Prince

Gorchakov and other high-ranking Russian officials regarding Russia's adherence to non­

violation ofthe Afghan borders, the rumors about Russia's secret design for an invasion

of India created anxiety among the British. Thus, The Times editorial concluded that the

best way to deal with such mmors was to "form no rigid plans of defense, but to be

guided by events."^^^

The annexation ofthe khanate of Khokand in 1876 was one ofthe most important

steps in the Russian occupation of Central Asia. As the British were usually alarmed by

every new move the Russians made, this annexation surprisingly does not seem to have

produced similar strong anti-Russian feelings. The most important reason for the weak

reaction to this development was that the Russians would not menace India by annexing

Khokand because there were no roads or mountain passes large enough to march on

India. The Hindu Kush Mountains were unpassable barriers to the Russians. Yet, this

was the first time the British felt that it was time to take precautionary steps agains

Russian practices in Central Asia. In his letter of January 1875, Lord Salisbury wrote

Lord Northbrook to take developments into considerations, though there was not an

immediate danger to India. Again in Febmary 1876, Lord Salisbury sent a dispatch to the

Viceroy, Lord Lytton, to improve communications with the Amir of Afghanistan and to

monitor Russia more closely in Central Asia.

While Russia silently incorporated the Khanate of Khokand in Central Asia, some

alarmists in Great Britain thought that Britain should retaliate against Russia's annexation

of Khokand by annexing new territories still under native mle in the north. Despite the

weak voice ofthe alarmists, the majority ofthe British did not condemn the Russians

639 The Times, August 23, 1875.

206

upon their latest move. Many correspondents of The Times condemned this state of

calmness and ignorance in Great Britain. As G. Bowles pointed out, Russia should not be

trusted because she had broken her words as easily as she made them.

To give solemn words was one thing and to fulfill them another. The Russians

had promised many times, especially in the 1864 Gorchakov circular, to the British and

other concemed powers, that they had no desire to annex territories in Central Asia.

They did it again when they annexed the right bank ofthe Khanate of Khiva. "Russian

solemn assurances about Khokand, about Khiva, about Samarkand, about Turkey, about

almost every thing and place with which Russian diplomacy is concemed, have seen not

only solemn assurances, but even solemn treaties, violated openly in the light of day. Are

we to rely on them any more?"̂ '**' It was this slippery ground of Russian diplomacy and

skillfully produced lies that concemed many British. Stead said, "Moderation, self-

restraint, straightforwardness, are words that find no place in the vocabulary of Russian

politics."^^'

Diplomatic traffic between Russia and Britain was intensified again in 1876

because of British suspicions about General Kaufmann's secret communications with the

Amir of Afghanistan. They believed that General Kaufmann was trying to reach an

agreement with the amir to establish an offensive front against British India. The source

ofthe renewed hostility was British aggression and occupation of Quetta, and the

growing prospect for war between Turkey and Russia in the Near East. The Russians in

the name of General Kaufmann wanted to pressure the British not to attempt any

aggression against Russian interests, either in Central Asia or in the Near East. Thus, the

British carefully monitored Kaufmann's secret approach to the amir. The amir was at

this time angry with the British because ofthe latter's organization ofthe Persian-Afghan

frontiers starting in 1870. He was not satisfied with the boundary arrangements on his

Persian border.̂ "*̂ The British viewed these developments as casus belli. Thus, the gap

'^'^ Gibson Bowles, The Times, December 26, 1876.

'̂" "A Former Resident in Russia," 287.

207

in communication with the amir and the British fear about a secret design of both the

amir and the Russians over India led to the Second Afghan War in 1878.̂ '*''

Though the Russian government rejected any attempt to create a joint front with

Afghanistan against India, her mobilization of Turkistan forces, and backing them with

eight battalions of reserve infantry divisions in May 1878, increased the suspicions ofthe

British. Furthermore, the Turkestan Gazette announced the immediate organization of

three offensive detachments, which were to start from Samarkand, Marghelan, and Petro-

AIexandrovsk. Despite the Russian denial of any intrigue in Kabul, on this point they

accepted only sending M. Bakouline, the Russian consul at Asterabad, to Meshed to

watch the movements of Captain F. E. H. Butler, who was sent by Viceroy Lytton to

ascertain the state of affairs in Merv as a secret agent in 1877, and Major Napier, a secret

British agent who was sent to survey the state of affairs in the borders of Afghanistan,

Turkmenia, and Persia in 1874, among the Turkmen tribes. A letter published in the

Moscow Gazette indicated the arrival of General Stoletov to Tashkent. After detailed

investigations, the British leamt that a Russian mission led by General Stoletov, and

consisting of a large group of officers and a military force had made its way to Kabul.

They were well accepted by the Afghans. Meanwhile, in support to this mission, an army

of 15,000 strong was employed on the Afghan border. The British believed that the

Russians had gained the consent ofthe amir to build roads, telegraph lines, and stations

through Afghanistan on the way to India. The amir also promised to provide provisions

and safe passage to the Russian forces.̂ "** Lord Lytton, the viceroy of India, thought it

was time to force the amir to accept a British resident in Kabul in order to stop Russian

intrigues there.̂ '*^ A British ambassy, headed by Sir Neville Chamberlain, was sent to

discuss the prospect of mutual relations with the amir. In this way. the British wanted to

'^^ "Parliamentary Papers: Further Correspondence Respecting Central Asia." The Edinburgh Review 163 (April 1886): 4-5.

'^' Boulger, Central Asian Questions, 63-65.

'^^ Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 308-319.

*"•' Holdsworth, 63.

208

use the same tactics as the Russians did. Their immediate aim was to end Russian

influence on the amir. They believed that if Russia established her influence in

Afghanistan, she would use warlike Afghans to create pressure on India.

As the issue became alarmingly serious and prone to lead to an armed conflict.

The Times took the matter in hand. It believed that Great Britain had the power to roll

back any attack on India, yet, it suggested it would be better to send a mission to Kabul to

bring the amir into his senses. They did not want any complication on their doorstep, and

did not want to lose their long-established influence on Afghanistan. Furthermore.

Britain "wants nothing of Shere Ali except that he should make his kingdom prosperous

and keep it independent... Shere Ali must be made to understand how necessary a friend

Great Britain can be and how destmctive a foe."̂ '*^

While the diplomatic situation with Afghanistan had taken a threatening tum, the

reports from Central Asia added new anxieties. It was believed that the Russians were

preparing an army of 30,000 under the command of Kaufmann to march against the

British at the first chance available. They also believed that Kaufmann would want to

manipulate the situation to derive more benefit from a possible conflict between Britain

and Russia.̂ '*^ But, unlike the Russian military expeditions against the natives in Central

Asia, which were published daily in detail in the press, the Russians showed great care

not to leak any information about preparations for an attack on India. This state of

uncleamess increased the fear ofthe British to suspect more about the Russo-Afghan

rapprochement. According to Sobolev, the head ofthe Asiatic Department in the 1880's,

the Russians were seriously contemplating an attack on India. They concentrated an

army of 20,000 strong at Djam on the Bukharan border, and ordered another 50,000

reserves from Siberia. If conflict broke out between Russia and Britain, they would bring

more and more men to the Indian frontiers.

'*' The Times, August 15, 1878.

"̂̂ Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 98.

648 Marvin, The Russian Advance Towards India, 86.

209

Under this fragile situation, it was necessary for the British to know the real

reason the amir had accepted a Russian mission. "For the last nine years Shere Ali had

declined to receive a resident British officer at Kabul... He has now received

distinguished Russian officers in an official capacity at his Court, and we are,

consequently, able to test his sentiments by the dispatch of a similar embassy." The

choice of General Sir Neville Chamberiain, the hero ofthe Umveyla campaign, showed

that the British were quite serious about what was going on in Kabul. "Notwithstanding

General Stolieteff s mission and General Kaufmann's preparations, we are and must

remain the master ofthe situation. General Chamberiain's mission will afford Shere Ali

an opportunity for demonstrating his friendship to England, and we have little doubt that

he will seize the opportunity." '̂*^

Their respective presses reflected the rising conflict between Russia and Britain.

While the Russian press accused the British of being secretly supportive of opposition

forces in Central Asia against Russia, by sending secret agents such as Sir Douglas

Forsyth and spending big quantities of money, the British press in retum accused the

Russian papers of being the voice of their govemment and of lack of objectivity in their

publications. The Russians claimed, "Headed by The Times newspaper, the English Press

is hounding public opinion against the defenseless Ameer. Russia should make the

Ameer's cause her own, and by the dispatch of a sufficient force render Afghanistan

invincible. A small Russian corps would suffice to force England to stake her Asiatic

position on the issue ofthe stmggle."^^*'

As Shere Ali continued to deny permission to the British mission to come to

Kabul, the British began to change their approach toward the question. In the end, fear of

future trouble in India, and uncertainty in Afghan affairs, caused the British to take

military steps. The Times was supportive ofthe military action, and stated that it was

necessary to straighten political issues, and to establish secure frontiers between

Afghanistan and India. "The public will not fail to recognize that the outbreak of war

*"' The Times, August 17, 1878.

"" The Times, October 1,10, 1878.

with Afghanistan has forced upon us the necessity of forming a clear decision with

respect to our future relations with that country, and in some measure with respect to our

general policy on the north-west frontiers." It believed that the war would reinstate the

just cause ofthe British over Central Asia. The object at the end ofthe war should be the

establishment of friendly British policies over the lands lying beyond her dominions.

We wish to respect and to uphold the independence of Afghanistan. It may be of the highest importance in respect to our influence not merely in that country, but beyond it, that our intentions in this respect should be made known beyond mistake... We cannot.. .maintain friendly relations either with States which act in deliberate antagonism to the interests of our Empire or with Governments which refuse to recognize the claims of humanity and justice within their territories. But, subject to these conditions, we have the same regard to existing rights, whether in Princes or people, as we expect to be paid to our own; and annexation can never again be contemplated be us except as a dire necessity. Our present quarrel is not with Afghanistan, but with Shere Ali.^^'

The British easily succeeded in defeating the Amir, Shere Ali, and replacing him with

Abdurrahman Khan. They also repulsed the Russian attempt to establish a joint front

against the British.

While the British succeeded in establishing their unquestionable authority over

Afghanistan, the Russians were quick to push their way toward the Afghan border, and

came closer to Herat. For this purpose, they attempted to invade Turkmenia. They sent

an invading army under General Ivan Davidovitch Lazarev to punish the unmly actions

ofthe Turkmens as they announced, but in reality, the Russians were contemplating the

annexation of Turkmenia. General Lazarev's expedition against the Akhal Turkmens in

1879 alarmed the British to take diplomatic steps to determine the true character ofthe

event. The Marquis of Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the

English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the Eari of Dufferin, to leam about the

developments. The concem ofthe British at this time was that the Russians would

attempt to invade Merv and violate Afghan borders. Count Schouvalov denied any

design to march on Merv, and only accepted that Russia was determined to punish the

The Times, November 26, 1878.

Tekkes and establish a line of fortresses from Krasnovodsk to Tchikishlar on the eastem

shore ofthe Caspian Sea.̂ '̂ ^ Though their expedition in 1879 against the Tekke

Turkmens was a failure, the Russians attempted a second expedition in 1880, under the

command of General Skobelev. This time, they succeeded in defeating the Tekkes at

Geok Tepe. The battle was not only a complete success for the Russians, but also ended

Turkmen resistance in Turkmenia. The harsh method used by the Russians to subdue the

Tekkes was very effective in the complete submission of Turkmenia and the destmction

of more than half of the Akhal Tekke Turkmens, massacred by the Russians on January

24, 1881.̂ "'̂

As the Russians broke the Turkmen barrier in Turkmenia, British politicians

became alarmed about a possible Russian march on Merv. They also feared that the

Russians would violate Afghan borders. Anti-Russian feelings ran rampant again, and a

mood of "mervousness" was bom. After the British reaction, the Russians stopped their

marching armies at Ashkabad, and called back General Skobelev. Though General

Skobelev was recalled because ofthe success of his main object and weakened Russian

forces were not able to march on Merv, the British celebrated his recall and even thought

that the Russians would evacuate invaded territories as far back as the Caspian Sea.

While the Russians were pushing forward to add new territories, the British were

discussing their retreat from Kandahar. The fall of Geok Tepe intensified these

discussions. Most ofthe civil and military authorities in India, and important

personalities such as Lord Napier, Sir Frederick Roberts, and General Hamley were in

favor ofthe retention of Kandahar. According to their view, the city

Is so strong a flanking position to the whole Suleiman range that it practically commands all the passes into India, and, moreover, enables us to advance, if

"^ Marvin, The Russian Advance Towards India, 33.

"' The Times, Febmary 3, 1881. According to Skobelev's account, the Turkmens left at least 4,000 killed within the Geok Tepe Fortress during the Russian bombardment. After the fall ofthe fortress, the Russians pursued the panicking and running Turkmens, cut them down without making distinction of sexes and ages. At least 15,000 to 25,000 people were massacred during the expedition.

"'^ Marvin, Conversations, 98. According to Skobelev, he was recalled because the army he was leading was too small to be led by a general with his rank.

212

necessary, to Herat. At present the revenue is small, but let the railroad be completed and Candahar will become the most important depot for Central Asian trade, agriculture and industry would flourish, and we should gain, not only a strong military, but an unassailable commercial position at small cost.^^'

Yet, the economic side ofthe retention ofthe city would be unacceptable because

it would create a big strain on the Indian treasury.̂ ^^ The British govemment decided

not to agree to the forwardist, or alarmist, views. After the Liberal Pary's overwhelming

pro-evacuation stand. Parliament decided to reinstall local mle over the city. Supporters

ofthe evacuation believed that the best guarantee for the defense of India was to establish

a much more enlightened govemment in India. The govemment should be capable of

mobilizing all forces ofthe large empire to stand firm against outside intrigues.

As the Russians cleared almost every obstacle before the annexation of Merv and

Herat, the British were alarmed even more by recent developments. The alarmists,

including Charles Marvin, Ashmead-Bartlett, and Arminius Vambery, continue to claim

that the Russians had power to strike Herat at any time before the British could do

anything to save the city.̂ ^^ Despite warnings ofthe alarmist group, the British

govemment did not show any sign of anxiety. The reason for this inactive state of mind

by the British lay in the most Eurocentric cadre ofthe British people. This group so

strongly believed in Russian civilizing power that they did not want to block any Russian

move in Central Asia. As The Pall Mall Gazette correspondent put it, they believed that,

by annexing Merv, "Russia has done one great and good work in Turkestan, she has

stmck a very great blow at one ofthe most barbarous and cmel systems of slave trade."^^*

The mode ofthe British against the Russian annexations in Turkmenia hardly changed

since the Russian massive invasions started in the 1860's. Still, there was not a single

strong notion about how to deal with Russia. The main course between the alarmist and

The Pall Mall Gazette, Febmary 7,1881.

'"Ibid.

*" The Pall Mall Gazette, Febmary 22, 1884.

"^ Olga Novikoff, The Pall Mall Gazette, March 5, 1884.

213

passivist views was generally applied by the British government with some leaning

toward the passivist group. The Times also leaned to this course of politics.

Despite their assurances of non-violation of Turkmenia and Afghanistan in 1873,

1876 and 1881, the Russians continued to break their pledges. In 1881, they annexed the

Akhal country. In the same year they reached an agreement with Persia about the eastem

borders of that country. According to this treaty, Russia relinquished part ofthe

territories between Kopet Dagh and the Atrek to Persia.̂ ^^ The Persians yielded to

Russian demands and gave up some territory between Ashkabad and Sarakh on the Atrek

valley in December 1881.̂ *̂* These new concessions would provide the Russians a

straight route from the southem coast ofthe Caspian Sea through Meshed, Herat, and

Kandahar to India. They would also provide arable lands to feed their men and animals

in case of an offensive expedition against Afghanistan.^^' Along with her gains of

strategic lands, Russia also had "the finest cavalry force" in Turkmenia to menace

India.̂ ^^ After these gains, the tsar and the Russian govemment openly denied any design

to annex Merv. But, they annexed it in 1884.̂ ^^ Thus, the Russian promise to keep peace

in Central Asia became untmstworthy. This marked the failure of British diplomacy

started in the 1860's to protect or at least make Russia respect the integrity ofthe Central

Asian khanates. Britain gradually accepted the Russian invasions and annexations of

Turkistan. Yet, the British continued to try to persuade the Russians to draw new plans

after they broke earlier promises.

The official communications respecting Merv started in 1874. By that time, the

Russians were sending small expeditionary forces into Turkmenia in order to reconnoiter

the region. These forces naturally affected the British officials who began to fear that the

*" Marvin, Conversations, 82.

"° Marvin, Conversations, 117-118; The Times, March 3, 1882.

"^ The Times, Febmary 22, 1882.

"- The New York Times, February 13, 1881.

663 The Times, April!, 1885.

214

Russians would annex Merv. The British feared that if Russia annexed Merv, the

"independent Turkoman tribes, a restless race," would come into the Afghan territories

where they could create conflict with the Afghans. This conflict would include Russia

and Persia and would lead to an intemational confrontation. Lord Augustus Loftus,

British ambassador at St. Petersburg, reminded the tsar in a meeting in 1874 about his

promise not to attack and annex Turkmenia, but only to punish the mlers for their

alamans. The tsar and high Russian authorities continued to assure the British that they

had no intention of marching on Merv.

While the British feared losing Merv to Russia, a political dispatch sent by Mr.

Thomson. British resident at Teheran, stated that the Merv Turkmens had accepted Persia

as their sovereign country, and later, the Shah accepted their allegiance by issuing a

degree {firman) in February 1878.̂ '̂* Yet, the news never came to be authenticated. It

was probably only a small part ofthe Tekkes who accepted Persian suzerainty. The

majority ofthe Tekkes continued to live independently and served as the source of

diplomatic communications with Russia.

The failed expedition of 1879, and the destmction ofthe Akhal Tekkes in January

of 1881 by General Skobelev's forces, made the British aware ofthe tme intention ofthe

Russians in Turkmenia. Lord Dufferin, British ambassador in St. Petersburg, questioned

M. de Giers, Russian foreign minister, about Russian intentions in Turkmenia. Seeing

how concemed the British were, on January 26, 1881 Giers denied that the Russians had

any intention of marching on Merv. Yet, because of their weak faith in Russian

promises, the British repeatedly insisted on leaming the real desires ofthe Russians. In

March, both Giers and the Emperor again assured the English that they had no intention

of invading Merv. They also said that the British should abstain from helping and arming

the Turkmens. They believed that Major Butler, a British officer, had gone to Merv to

teach the westem style of warfare, and that he brought arms to the Turkmens. Yet, the

Indian govemment did not approve of Butler's actions. He was repudiated upon his

Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 304-306.

215

return to India. Meanwhile, as a sign of good faith to these assurances, the Russian

govemment dismissed General Skobelev from his post, and replaced him with General

Rorhberg, who was an administrator more than a military man. While the Russians were

making efforts to ease the tension in their relationship with Great Britain, The Times'

leading article stressed that sooner or later the Russians were going to occupy Merv.̂ ^^ It

was a logical development as it persuaded many to consider that Russia's next move

would be in Merv. The Russians were already drawing maps that showed Merv as part of

the Russian Empire.̂ ^^

As discussions about the possibility of a Russian incorporation of Merv. and

Russia's growing threat to India were hotly filling the press and politico-scientific

conferences, Gladstone and his Liberals tried to ignore the question of whether Russia

would annex Merv. In response to a question posed by Ashmead-Bartlett inquiring about

the government's view on the extermination ofthe Turkmens, destmction ofthe last

barrier toward Afghanistan and India, and railway constmction in the Transcaspian

region by the Russians, the Marquess of Hartington in the House ofthe Commons

responded that the British govemment objected to the opinion shared by forwardists

regarding the extermination ofthe Turkmens and destmction ofthe last barrier. He also

stated that they had no intention to retaliate against the Russian offensive in the region

either by incorporating Kandahar or by constructing a railway to this city. This

ignorance ofthe govemment did not keep people from writing their fmstrated views to

The Times. In a letter Vambery stated "We cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that

she (Russia) has made a clever stroke of policy, the sound of which will soon re-echo in

the valleys ofthe Hindoo Koosh, nay. reach the rocky wall ofthe Suleiman Range."̂ *̂̂

'" The New York Times, January 27, 29, 1881. General Skobelev was raised to the General of Infantry rank, and was awarded with Order of St. George, which was dreamt by most Russian officers.

"'The Times, April 2, 1881.

"'^ The Times, My 2, 1881.

668 Handsard's Parliamentary Debates 251 (January 2%, 1881): 1629-1630.

216

After the Russians established their authority over Central Asia, they started to

benefit as much as possible from their new dominion. Though they politically and

militarily subjugated these places, they had not yet established their economic and

commercial supremacy. The deserts and poor roads were the great obstacles before the

Russian exploitation ofthe resources ofthe region. In order to overcome this problem

they started to constmct a railway from the Caspian Sea to Samarkand via Turkmenia.

The intended increase in the control ofthe resources of Central Asia, and the construction

of a railway, would greatly enhance the Russian military and political power in Central

Asia against the Persians, the Afghans, and the British. Russia would then have a

capability of easy and quick transportation of military personnel and provisions to the

region whenever such action was needed. When M. Lessar was surveying Turkmenia to

draw a plan for construction of a railway, the British, knowing hardly any means to stop

it, said that it was not going to bother them as long as the Russians stayed away from

Herat.̂ ^*'

While Merv occupied the center of discussions after the defeat ofthe Tekkes in

Geok Tepe in 1881, the British suspected General Chemiaev to be an aggressive person

who was working on a plan to attack India. This suspicion was somewhat proved by the

Russian government's dismissal ofthe general from his post as Govemor General of

Turkistan. It also strengthened feelings among the British that Russia was not really after

any gain in Afghanistan.^" Yet, General Chemiaev made it quite clear in his interview

with Charles Marvin in 1882 that he did not contemplate any aggressions toward British

India. Though he accepted that the Khanate of Bukhara would eventually be annexed to

Russia, there would be no extension beyond the Oxus River. He said, "You may repeat

my assurances to England, Mr. Marvin, that she need have no fear of fresh

annexations."

"^ Arminius Vambery, The Times, February 23, 1884.

"° Sir Henry Rawlinson, The Times, May 18, 1883.

*'' The Times, February 27, 1884.

''''^ Marvin, Conversations, 129.

217

The annexation of Merv was achieved by the Russians despite their repeated

assurances to the British throughout the course ofthe rivalry in Central Asia. Yet, after

the Russian annexation, the British did not remonstrate seriously. '̂'̂ The calmness ofthe

British politicians surprised many, including Arminius Vambery and Charles Marvin.

Vambery, one ofthe most knowledgeable persons about the history, culture, and

geography of Central Asia, attributed this calmness to the British acceptance of it as the

last move of Russia in Central Asia or their desire to see Russia on the Suleiman

Range.*'̂ ^ Marvin suggested that it would be wise to retaliate against this latest Russian

move by extending the railway up to Cuetta, and establishing negotiations and mutual

relations with the Sarakh Turkmens on the northem borders of Afghanistan.̂ ^^ Yet,

Marvin supported the idea that the annexation of Merv by Russia was a natural right, but

the same would apply to Herat. He pointed out that Herat occupied a very special place

in British policy in Central Asia. In order to save Herat from hostile forces, Great Britain

had gone to war against Afghanistan and Persia in 1838 and 1856. She would do it again

if the Russians attempted to take this important city. Marvin further stated that General

Chemiaev had prepared a 50,000-strong army to attack India before his dismissal from

his post as Govemor General of Turkistan. If Russia should create an aggressive policy

against India by attempting to take Herat or march on India, Great Britain would resist.

In a possible war, fortune would determine the end.^'^ Furthermore, Sir E. Hamley

stressed the importance of occupying Kandahar and the Khyber Pass in a lecture attended

by Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lord Napier, Sir Lepel Griffin, and Lord Chelmsford. Sir

Henry and Lord Napier accepted Hamley's suggestions of capturing Kandahar and

Khyber to establish a stronger defense line. Rawlinson even had a firm opinion on the

great benefit of occupying Herat, and making it a British fort against the Russian menace

''" Handsard's Parliamentary Debates 284 (February 22, 1884): 1759-1791.

'^* Arminius Vambery, The Times, Febmary 23, 1884.

''" Chades Marvin, The Times, March 1, 1884.

''" Charles Marvin, The Times, May 26, 1884.

218

in Central Asia.̂ ^^ Vambery called the decision to evacuate Kandahar "masterly

imbecility." He believed that Russia was gaining while Britain was losing territories. By

evacuating Kandahar, and paying no attention to the suggestions of such important

personalities as Lord Napier, General Roberts, Colonel Malleson, General Sir Edward

Hamley, Lord Lytton, and Sir Richard Temple, who were prominent figures either in the

British military or in the Parliament, the British govemment was assisting Russian

annexations in the region.̂ ^^

The core argument in the retention of Kandahar was that England had to keep it

because she needed such a strategic place to establish an efficient defense line against

possible Russian intrigues against India. Some even believed that England should not

only retain Kandahar but also be ready to send armies to take Herat if the Russians

moved into Merv or another part of Central Asia. Despite the fear of Russian expansion

in Central Asia, the British govemment saw the retention ofthe city as a harmful

development to their interests in the region. They believed that if the Afghans stayed

friendly to them, the Afghans could be used as advanced guards ofthe empire. If, on the

other hand, the Afghans became hostile to the British, it would be better to have them

before the British Army in India than behind. Furthermore, most people, including Sir

Frederick Roberts, thought that" the more Afghans see of us the less they dislike us."^^^

Thus, the British not only hesitated to experience the second loss of an army in

Afghanistan, but also desired to stay beyond the Suleiman Range.

After taking Merv, the Russians contemplated locating the Sarakh country within

the Russian Empire. They succeeded in inducing the Sarakhs, who lived on the territories

located roughly from Penjdeh to Murghab, to be Russian subjects. The Russians, as the

Kafkas stated, believed that the Sarakh country was located outside the Afghan states.

'''^ The Times, May 19, 1884.

"* Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 75.

*™ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 257 (January 28, 1881): 243.

'^° The Daily News, July 10, 1884.

219

The problem arose from the right of sovereignty over the Sarakh country. While

overwhelming British sources claimed that the country belonged to the Amir of

Afghanistan, a correspondent of The Daily News at Teheran believed that it had been a

Persian territory. The Persians had constructed two forts there to protect themselves

against the Turkmen raids. Yet, some time before, they had deserted these forts. Now, /TO 1

the Russians took their place. In a long letter to the Russian govemment, the British

claimed that the cultivable part ofthe Sarakh country belonged to Afghanistan as agreed

upon in 1873 after the long political discussions between Earl Granville and Prince

Gorchakov. Sir Lepel Griffin declared that by incorporating Merv and the Sarakh

country, the Russians had made an obvious declaration of war against Great Britain. He

accused the Russian Foreign Office of being deceitful: For the Russian Foreign Office Is never honest; and only those who have misunderstood the Russian system are indignant when, with light heart, Russia swallows her most solemn promises. For her diplomacy is not the diplomacy of Westem Europe. It is Oriental, as are her Govemment and her people. 1 remember, in Moscow, some years ago, asking a prosperous English settler the secret of his unusual success. He replied, 'It is that I never attempt to intrigue. I always speak the tmth, which never fails to deceive the Russians, as they cannot imagine a man telling them tmly what he intends to do. They consequently do not oppose what 1 have told them 1 shall do, believing I am about to do something else.'̂ ^^

The Sarakh country was an important geographic location and, according to

MacGregor, who surveyed Khorassan in 1875, it was a key place for an invading army

from the Caspian region to march on India.

After the incorporation of Merv and the Sarakh country, Russia gained important

strategic and military advantages against the British in Central Asia, as well as in a

possible military clash over the possession of India. Along with strategic places, Russia

^̂ ' The Daily News, August 6, 1884.

'^^ The Daily News, August 14, 1884.

'^' Sir Lepel Griffin, The Times, May 26, 1884.

'^* Marvin, Reconnoitring Central Asia, 173.

220

also increased her manpower by adding 240,000 Tekkes, 25,000 Tejend Turkmens,

250,000 Ensari Turkmens, and 50,000 Sarakhs. And, she came 140 miles closer to the

city of Herat. This would give her enough power to determine the course of future events

in the region. The Russian gains in Turkmenia were closely monitored with concem

by the Indian government. When Lord Elgin was appointed the new viceroy of India, the

very first thing he did was to visit the northem frontiers and view preparations for a

possible attack. He was pleased to find out that border towns and forts had been firmly

constmcted in Quetta, Sikkur, Mooltan, Rawalpindi, Attock, and Peshawar to provide the

best defense to India. He was convinced that the only thing more to do was to appoint

brave men to defend India.̂ ^^

Though The Times ' editorial claimed that the Russian annexation of Merv and

Sarakh was handled in an opportunistic manner at a time when the British were tied down

in Egypt and the Sudan, it was forgetting that the fate of these territories had been known

for years. The British foreign office had always been submissive to Russian annexations

as far as these annexations did not violate Afghan territories. It was the lack of interest, or

ignorance ofthe British statesmen that helped the Russians to freely incorporate these

lands, and along with it the finest 100,000 light cavalry in the world.̂ *^ Not long before,

the Duke of Argyll, served as Secretary of State for India from 1868-1874 and wrote two

volumes The Eastern Question (1879), accusing the people who believed that the

Russians would move into Merv as "alarmist" and their mood as "mervousness."

The fact is that that the training of English statesmen is so exclusively domestic that they frequently prove incapable of accommodation themselves to the conditions that obtain when there is not superior and resistless power to enforce contracts and decide disputes. They have a childlike faith in agreements and conversations, imagining, in spite of numerous lessons, that these things possess

'^' Charles Marvin, The Times, May 26, 1884.

'^' Henry Beauchamp, "The North-West Frontier of India." The Fortnightly RevicM' 63 (January-June 1895): 721.

'^^ Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 53.

221

some intrinsic power to get themselves executed. They have.. .even [been] ignoring the accomplished facts.̂ ^^

Furthermore, the last territories taken by the Russians had belonged to the Amir

of Afghanistan, to whom England had pledged protection against any aggression from

Russia or Persia. Now the national honor of England was at stake if Russia acted freely.

In addition, Russia would strengthen her forces in the newly annexed territories, and

would use them as a new base to further her intrigues in Afghanistan and India.

If we once permit her to gain a footing in Afghanistan, she will involve us in endless trouble and hostilities without herself undertaking an official war, while as a result war with her must come some day unless we humbly abandon India without a stmggle. It is high time, therefore, that, in the interests ofthe Empire and in the interests of peace, our Foreign Office should make it clear by word and deed beyond possibility of mistake that this country will discharge its obligations to the integrity and tranquility of Afghanistan as a casus belli... Hitherto Russia has acted within her right, though contrary to our interests. But any interference at Herat will be an encroachment on our rights and an attack upon our honour which we can best avert by showing our fixed determination to resent.

As The Times stressed the necessity of showing real determination rather than

listening to promises made by the Russians upon the latest developments, the British

made it clear that the violation of Afghan territories meant the outbreak of war against the

Russians. Meanwhile, different opinions upon the solution ofthe problem continued to

be discussed in The Times. In a lengthy letter Sir Lepel Griffin made an extreme

suggestion that Britain should annex Egypt, Baghdad, the Persian Gulf and Kandahar to

save the British interests.̂ ^** However, this extreme opinion, according to John Slagg,

would create new enemies, namely Turkey, France, Afghanistan, and Persia. It would

isolate Britain from her decades-long allies.

'^^ The Times, May 26, 1884.

**' The Times, May 26, 1884.

'^ Sir Lepel Griffin, The Times, May 26, 1884.

*'' John Slagg, The Times, May 30, 1884.

222

So far. there had been three important developments, namely the Russian

expedition of 1873 against Khiva, the annexation of Merv, and the incorporation ofthe

Sarakh country and attack on the Afghans at Penjdeh. In each of these developments,

Russia made great gains. It was during this critical period that The Times had produced a

great variety of publications and was heavily involved in discussions. Unlike these three

important developments, which directly challenged British interests in Central Asia and

created a closer threat to India, The Times had always followed a balanced mood toward

interpretations of Russian expansion in the region. However, these three events were

generally discussed with an aggressive tone and detailed coverage.

The Penjdeh Incident, in which the Russians attacked Afghan forces and killed

700, was indeed the first, the last and the most aggressive step undertaken by the

Russians against the British.̂ ^^ It was a direct violation of established British policy in

Central Asia. Up to that point, the Russians were capturing lands outside the British

sphere of influence in the region because the British already in 1873 had accepted the

Russian interest up to the Afghan border. The whole British policy was built on non­

violation ofthe Afghan frontiers by outsiders. She many times promised the mlers of

Afghanistan to protect them against the Russians. The defeat ofthe Afghans in Penjdeh

also meant the defeat ofthe British in Central Asian politics. Such a defeat created a

notion among the natives of India and Central Asia that the Russians were stronger than

the British. In order to gain the confidence ofthe natives and stop the Russian menace,

Britain should have extended the railway lines to Kandahar and constmcted another one

on the Persian Gulf up from Bushire to Herat. Sir Valentine Baker even suggested that the

Muslims, united under the Sultan-Caliph of Istanbul and backed by the British army

could destroy the common enemy, the Russians.^^^ Feeling humiliated and degraded, the

British began to seek men and money to use against the Russians in case of actual

fighting for India.̂ '̂*

692 Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 99.

*" Baker, 218-225.

•yn:

The popular notion among the Russians at this time was that in intemational

politics they had always been defeated by British gold. Now the Russians knew how to

stop the British from spending money to secure political and military allies in Asia. They

thought that if Russia invaded India that had been the source ofthe British wealth that

Britain would cease to be a power that could affect Russian expansion. Furthermore, by

invading India, the Russians hoped to use the wealth gained from India to enlarge their

power over the worid.̂ *̂ ^ Moreover, Russia now manufactured more of almost every

article than what she needed for herself Thus, she looked for new markets with no

competition from the big powers. As she succeeded in establishing her monopoly over

Central Asia, she then concentrated on doing the same thing over India. By invading

India, Russia hoped to exploit the wealth of India for herself without any competition.^^^

Final Settlements

The Times' correspondent, "Anjir," suggested in 1875 that the best way to solve

problems and end misunderstandings was to establish a joint boundary commission to

determine the final shape ofthe borders between the Russian spheres of influence and

Afghanistan in Central Asia.^ '̂' The idea of settling the age-old rivalry between Great

Britain and Russia was almost half solved in 1873 during the Shouvalov mission to

London. In this settlement, the British made it clear that they did not want to see the

Russians interfere in Afghan affairs and violate Afghan territories. The Russians agreed

on this point, and, in a poorly drawn map, the Oxus River was accepted at the border

between the Central Asian Turkic lands and Afghanistan. It meant that the Russians were

free to establish their sphere of influence up to the Afghan border, but should totally

leave Afghanistan to the British.

'̂'* Edward Ingram, "Approaches to the Great Game in Asia." Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 4 (October 1982): 450.

'̂̂ "Constantinople, Russia, and India." The Quarterly Review 164 (January-April 1887): 221.

'"" Ibid, 227>-24.

*'' The Times, August 26, 1875.

224

Many things had changed since the 1873 settlement. The Russians had subdued

Khiva, crushed the Turkmens at Geok Tepe, and "peacefully" incorporated Merv. In

order to eliminate any chance for a future conflict between two empires, it was strongly

necessary to establish a clear border. Thus, in 1884 Russia and Britain agreed to appoint

a joint boundary commission to determine the line between the Turkic regions and

Afghanistan.

In the old days, neither the Persians nor the Afghans nor the Central Asian

Khanates knew a clear border between their respective states. Indeed, on these borders

nomadic people had been living. They were generally independent. But, when they

needed an ally, they freely chose to enter under any authority that served their needs.

They would change their sovereign any time if the circumstances were opportune, or

forced on them. It was mostly the lack of any clear borders between the local political

powers that created frequent wars. When the British and the Russians came face to face

with each other on these grounds, they had to solve the frontier question. As advanced

big states, they could not yield to petty quarrels and misunderstandings because of

undetermined frontiers. Thus, both sides were willing to solve the problem on the ground

by the commissioners.^^^ Thus, Major General Sir Peter Lumsden was appointed as the

head ofthe British commission and expected to leave for Persia in September 1884.̂ ^^

On the Russian side, Lieutenant-Colonel Alikhanov, who had taken an important part in

the subjugation of Merv, was considered to be the head ofthe Russian commission

because of his Islamic faith and his ability to speak the Turkish language. It was not a

wise choice, declared The Times, for the Russians to appoint an officer inferior to the job.

It implied that it would be disrespect for the British General. The paper said, "Both rank

and present position" of Major Alikhanov were inferior, and suggested that General

Abramov or Grodekov should have been appointed to such a task.

'^^ Seton-Watson, The Russian History, 570.

'"^ The Daily News, September 4, 1884.

700 The Times, September 15, 1884.

225

According to Vambery, the entire British commission consisted of 35 Europeans

and 1,300 natives from India.^ ' The Times' Calcutta correspondent reported that the

British commission consisted of almost 1,000 persons, of whom 300 were cavalry and

200 were infantry. The first problem the commissioners had to solve was to travel safely

to the destination through unmly countries ofthe many predatory tribes in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the Amir of Afghanistan showed a great interest in the undertaking and sent

orders to the tribes on the road not to molest the commissioners. ̂ *̂^

Though both governments agreed to act seriously and provide every help to the

commissioners, the Russian govemment began to delay sanding its commissioners.

Leaving the British commissioners in the middle of nowhere in Central Asia, the

Russians implied to the British that their position needed no modification because they

had strategically important places, had constmcted a railroad closer to the Afghan border,

had subdued almost all warlike Turkmens, and had defeated the Afghans. Russia now

enjoyed the position she had finally reached. It was time for the Russians to play the

game with utmost confidence. Meanwhile, fearing from the Russian dilatory action,

which meant new designs to annex extra territories, the British contemplated sending new

troops to Herat, and they had already sent breechloaders and ammunition to the Afghans.

Yet, the press, including The New York Times, believed that the British were not showing

the necessary determination to force the Russians to negotiate meaningfully. The paper

stated that the course ofthe events would reverse the British decades-old

accomplishments if Gladstone continued to find excuses for the Russian actions.

The British were more eager to draw a line in Central Asia than the Russians

because the British had always felt that they had a weaker chance in a possible clash

against the Russians. However, the policy that aimed to restore a lasting peace in the

region was somewhat unfavorable for the Russians because for centuries the unruly

™' Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 84.

™̂ The Times, September 8, 1884.

703 The New York Times, April 14, 1885.

226

character ofthe region better served Russian interests. Hiding behind chronic pretexts,

such as the violation of borders by the unruly tribes, the Russians had invaded large

territories. The organization of definite boundary lines meant for them giving up their

traditional policy. Furthermore, while the Russians were confident of their established

position and power in Central Asia, the British had their own reasons to keep pushing for

a diplomatic solution to the problem. They not only felt somewhat weak against the

Russians in the region because of their doubt of Afghan faithfulness, but also feared that

they would not gain anything by a military confrontation. However, they knew that the

Amir of Afghanistan had leamed his lesson from the Penjdeh incident and, now more

than ever, he was willing to side with the British. Besides, the amir's growing faith in the

British had been perfectly strengthened by British diplomatic resistance against the

Russians.^ '*

While a diplomatic solution ofthe problem was in progress, a new event began to

threaten the political solution ofthe question. This new development originated from the

Sarakh country. The Amir of Afghanistan, backed by the British, claimed that the Sarakh

country had been under his sovereignty. In June 1884, his troops occupied Penjdeh. Upon

this development, Giers asked the British ambassador. Sir Edward Thomton, in St.

Petersburg to persuade the amir to pull his troops from the Sarakh country because Giers

believed that these lands were populated by the Turkmens and had never been a part of

Afghanistan. Sir Eeward, in retum, replied that, if all the Afghan Turkmens left

Afghanistan then Penjdeh would be given to Russia. Again, in a Russian memorandum

dated July 30, 1884, the Russians insisted on establishing their full authority over the

Sarakhs. They claimed that if the Amir, Abdurrahman Khan, renounced all his claims on

the Sarakhs who had never been under Afghan mle, then the boundary line could be

determined. The Russian proposal was clear and consisted of an ethnic consideration in

addition to geographic one. However, the British govemment continued to support the

™'' "Parliamentary Papers: Further Cortespondence Respecting Centtal Asia," 23-27; The Times, April 11,

1885.

227

f - ^ ^ • •

"ONLY HIS PLAY" n ! ! i^m

Figure 4.3: The Bullying Bear.

Afghans and instmcted Sir Peter Lumsden, the head ofthe British commission, not to go

against the claims ofthe amir, and especially not to recognize Russian claims on Penjdeh.

Because ofthe strategic importance, the British were unwilling to yield Russian

demands.'*^^

Having failed to persuade the British, the Russians determined to take Penjdeh

and crush the amir's troops. They first sent M. Lessar both to persuade the Sarakhs to

accept Russian authority and to survey the land. Lessar reached Pul-i Khisti and intended

™̂ The Times, April 4, 1885; "Parliamentary Papers: Further Correspondence Respecting Central Asia,' 9.

228

to enter Penjdeh. Upon Lessar's activities. Lord Granville sent a letter to Giers to state

disapproval ofthe situation. Though Giers denied that Lessar's mission was a part of

Russian policy, it was evident that the Russians were planning to take the Sarakh country

before reaching any agreement with the British over the borderline. Meanwhile, General

Komarov with a strong army reached Pul-i Khisti and stationed himself opposite the

Afghan outposts. This act was called by The Times' article. The Story of our

Negotiations with Russia, a violation of established facts ofthe diplomatic relations

between the two empires.̂ *^̂

The determination ofthe Russians to include the Sarakh country within their

Central Asian possession was accomplished with military means despite the British

remonstrance and repeated assurances to the amir. As Punch's caricature above (Figure

4.3) shows, the British were not only amazed by the Russian reckless action but also

seriously made preparations to move into Central Asia if the Russian advances continued

in Afghan Turkistan.

Komarov's defeat ofthe Afghans on March 30, 1885 created a wild discussion in

the British press. The Times called the action a declaration of war on Great Britain. "We

repeated that this act of war, directed against the troops of our ally, during negotiations of

the most delicate kind, is an offence for which, if Russia desires to remain on friendly 70R

terms with this country, ample and immediate reparation must be made." The

Spectator's article. War or Peace?, stated that England could not be humiliated like this

because her reliability was at stake in Asia and elsewhere.

According to Komarov's account, he was forced and compelled to fight by the

arrogant and aggressive Afghans. Thus, it was a defensive rather than an offensive act on

'^°'The Times, April 4, 1885.

™'PMWC/J, April 18, 1885.

''^^ The Times, April 11, 1885.

™' The Spectator 58 (April 11,1885): 472.

229

the Russian side. The Times' leading article commented on this explanation, "The

Afghans had 900 men killed and 300 wounded in the engagement on the 30"̂ ult.. General

Komarov's system of self-defense must have been a marvel of military art."^'' Komarov

established a provisional goveming body in Penjdeh after taking the place.^'^

Unlike Komarov's report that claimed that Afghan forces used every aggressive

mood to spark the war, based on Peter Lumsden's report, Gladstone stated that it was the

Russians who provocatively approached the Afghans to create a military clash in order to 71 ^

take Penjdeh. The British instmcted Sir Peter Lumsden to make preparations in Herat

to strengthen the city against a possible assault from the north.

In a lengthy letter sent by The Times' correspondent in St. Petersburg, the author

commented on the Russian feelings toward the Penjdeh incident and the prospect for war

between Great Britain and Russia. In this respect, the Russian public paid meager

attention to the developments in contrast to the British public. They believed that the

British were seeking excuses to declare war against Russia because they claimed the

British had provoked the amir to send troops to annex Penjdeh and vicinity, which had

never been Afghan territories. Besides this aggression, the British encouraged and

supported the Afghans to act aggressively toward the Russians. Though the public had

mild interest in the developments, they firmly believed that they were in better condition

to face a military conflict than the British because their subject people in Central Asia

were much more dependable than the British ally, the Afghans.^'" Arminius Vambery

also stated that the Turkmens had amazingly developed a very cordial relationship with

the Russians after their annexation of Merv. Many Turkmen warriors were gladly

""' The Times, April 17, 1885; The Spectator 5S (April 13, 1885): 501. According to news published in The Times on April 10, 1885, the Russian losses were 10 killed and 29 wounded.

"^ The Spectator 5% (April 13, 1885): 501.

'̂̂ The Spectator 58 (April 11, 1885): 472.

^^^ The Times, April 4, 1885.

'̂̂ The Times, April 13, 1885.

230

wearing the Russian uniform and serving in the Russian army. In the recent clash with

the Afghans, one of these warriors, Yusuf Khan, was killed.^'^

The defeat ofthe Afghans at the hands ofthe Russians was a great blow to the

prestige of both the British and the Afghans in the region because the British had always

accepted their warrior qualities. The idea ofthe invincibility ofthe Afghans ended with

this confrontation. While it raised Russian prestige all over the Central Asia, it destroyed

the prestige ofthe British and the Afghans.^'^ Britain's failure to retaliate to this incident

further strengthened the Russian political and military position in the eyes ofthe natives.

Thus, the British endured the most humiliating and agonizing experience in all their

Central Asian adventure.

At the time ofthe Penjdeh incident. Amir Abdurrahman and Lord Dufferin,

Viceroy of India, were having a meeting in Rawulpindi. The incident came as an

opportunity for both the amir and the British to test their close friendship. Yet, both sides

proved that they were not as faithfiil as they had claimed previously. Nevertheless, while

the amir used the incident as an excuse to extract more money from the British, the

British firmly believed that they could not tmst their Afghan ally. Though both sides

raised their voices to be heard by the Russians, they took no solid action to punish the

Russians.^'^

While the press and politicians still hotly debated the prospect for war, the

governments of both countries agreed to solve the problem through diplomatic means.

They agreed to keep ambitious and aggressive generals out of this conflict, and let the

politicians decide the outcome.^'^ The amir, on the other hand, knew that in a possible

war between Russia and Britain his country was to suffer most as a battlefield. Thus, he

''^' The Times, My 22, 1885.

^''Tcharykow, 197.

™ "India under the Marquis of Duffenn." The Edinburgh Review 169 (January 1889): 11.

"" The Spectator 58 (May 9, 1885): 597.

231

gradually accepted the Russian capture ofthe Sarakh country. The amir and the British

began to modify their stance toward Russia.̂ ^*'

Some in Britain believed that British policy lost in the Penjdeh incident because

British statesmen, especially the Liberals and passivists, failed to appreciate and apply the

policy described by Lord Palmerston in the 1850's. In a letter published in The Times,

Palmerston's views were portrayed as a perfect policy to be pursued against the Russians.

According to this.

The policy and practice ofthe Russian Govemment has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next favorable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In ftirtherance of this policy, the Russian policy has always had two strings to its bow— moderate language and disinterested professions at St. Petersburg and at London; active aggressions by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the St. Petersburg Govemment adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend, but cannot in honour recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instmctions. This was exemplified in the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simonitch and Vitkovitch in Persia. Orloff succeeded in extorting the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circumstances ofthe time and place, and not the result of any previous instructions; but, having been done, it could not be undone. On the other hand, Simonitch and Vitkovitch failed in getting possession of Herat, in consequence of out vigorous measures of resistance; and as they had failed they were disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held at St. Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, although no human being with two ideas in his head could for a

721

moment doubt that they had acted under specific instructions.

Though Palmerston perfectly understood the method of Russian foreign policy and

wanted to act accordingly, the British had neither determined leaders nor allies in the

1880's to create a showdown with Russia in Central Asia.

720 "Parliamentary Papers." The Edinburgh Review, 12.

^̂ ' The Times, March 23, 1885; Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 64.

As far as the natives ofthe territories were concemed, British resistance to the

Russian incorporation of Afghan Turkistan into the Russian Empire was somewhat

harmful to the native population. Since Afghan rule was not favored for these people

because of its oppressive character, they were more than happy to accept Russian mle.̂ ^^

Yet, the interests ofthe locals would not matter much to the British. It was the protection

ofthe British imperialist interests by keeping Russia from gaining any access to the

seaports and occupying any territory to menace India in the region that forced the British

to stmggle against the Russians. After debates in Great Britain and Russia, both sides

decided to resume their efforts to solve the problem by means of diplomacy. The Times • • 77^

heartily applauded the change of stance from possible war to peaceful negotiation.

Though the Russians annexed much ofthe oases around Penjdeh, a considerable

part ofthe Sarik Turkmens were left within Afghan territories. In order to prevent

another incident. Colonel West Ridgeway, the new head ofthe British commissioners

after General Lumsden, forced these Turkmens to leave their territories. Moreover, the

British insisted on having some territories on the Oxus River, at the expense ofthe

khanate of Bukhara and contrary to the 1873 settlement, in retum for some lands in the

Sarakh country. In the end, the settlement ofthe borders in Central Asia ended quite

satisfactorily to British interests. As The Times' leading article said, "Without for a

moment imagining that by the issue of this negotiation all our difficulties with Russia

have been forever removed, or that her presence in those regions will cease to be a cause

of anxious watchfulness on our part, we may at least find satisfaction in the good faith

with which she has acted in this matter."^^" The solution ofthe boundary question ended

satisfactorily to the British since they always wanted to draw a line to stop Russian

forward progress. Nevertheless, the natives suffered the consequences by losing their

lands and freedom of easy travel in the region.

^̂ ^ Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, 122.

™ The Times, June 1, 1885.

724 7'/7e 7'/OTe5, August 18, 1887.

233

The Settlement ofthe Pamirs in 1895

One ofthe last issues that had to be settled between Russia and Great Britain was

the Pamirs Question. When Lord Clarendon and Prince Gorchakov agreed in principle to

recognize the main head stream ofthe Amu Daria River up to Zor Kul as a dividing line

between the two empires' spheres of influence in 1873, the region was not clearly known.

Later explorations on the ground showed that the Afghans were claiming sovereignty

over some regions in the east ofthe settied line. Yet, the Russians had sent many military

expeditions to survey the region in order to find new passes to India and to collect

information about the region. As The Times indicated, the region commonly called the

Pamirs was to create a diplomatic and political problem between Russia, Britain, China,

and Afghanistan.^^^ In a leading article, the author stated that Russian activities in the

Pamirs would not create anxiety among Indian statesmen because Russia could not attack

India from this side due to the elevation and the difficult passes. Yet, Russia could

squeeze Afghanistan as well as China to gain more ofthe Pamirs.̂ '̂ ^ Though the Pamirs

had no agricultural or economic value, since no one but robber tribes lived on them, it

had strategic importance to all ofthe surrounding countries, including Central Asia,

China, India, and Afghanistan. Because of its strategic importance. Great Britain would

not be indifferent to the Russian activities led by Colonel Yanov, a "cold, cmel-looking"

commander,̂ •̂ ^ who did not hesitate to attack the Afghans.̂ ^^ In the stmggle at Yeshil

Gol, the Afghans lost nine men including an officer while the Russians lost only one

man. Upon this incident, the amir, Abdurrahman, asked for British help in India. The

Times commented that the British had obligations to help the amir and finish the

boundary delimitations from Khodja Salih to the Pamirs.

^-' The Times, September 25, 1891

'"Ibid.

'"^ Shoemaker, Trans-Caspia, 244.

™ The Times, August 5, 1892.

™ The Times, August 25, 1892.

234

The solution ofthe Pamirs question was the last important step prior to the Anglo-

Russian Convention of 1907. After surveys ofthe region and much discussion, both

sides agreed to draw a boundary line over the Pamirs between Russian Turkistan and

Afghanistan. As The Pall Mall Gazette's article, entitled as "Yonoff Gone Off," stated

that the British were happy to see the long battled rivalry coming to an end, and she was

also happy to see that Russia was becoming a more agreeable neighbor.̂ ^**

The agreement was signed in April 1895 between the British and the Russian

governments. By the agreement, Russia basically gained a large part ofthe Pamirs,

including the small khanates of Roshan and Shignan, and consented to Darvaz on the

Oxus being placed under the Afghan rule. Commenting on the agreement, Vambery

stated that while the British secured their possessions in India, the Russians gained

strategic places. Yet, Russia would be having troubles with China in the future.^ '̂

Almost everyone in England believed that the agreement fairly settled England's 7^7

demands in the region.

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907

The growing prospect for the solution ofthe Middle East, which at that time

described a geographic region comprised roughly by the Central Asian Turkic khanates,

Persia and Afghanistan, problems had already achieved the demarcation ofthe Afghan

borders, the Pamirs agreement, and a wom out the rivalry over Central Asia. These solid

steps were facilitated by changes in European politics because of growing German

power. The establishment of European alliances required Britain and Russia to reach an

understanding in Central Asia to end their already faded rivalry. France pushed Russia

and Britain to reach an agreement in order to balance the power in Europe, which seemed

to have tilted in favor of Germany because of Germany's growing military and naval

"" The Pall Mall Gazette, January 3, 1895.

" ' Arminius Vambery, The Times, April 23, 1895.

732 The Times, May S, 1895.

235

power, as well as her alliances with Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1879 and 1882. In

1887, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the British minister at Teheran, desired to improve

Anglo-Russian relations in Asia. He suggested the partition of Persia for the first time in

terms of economic spheres of influence. He attracted the Prince of Wales to his views.

This idea of economic partition was made known to the Russians. Both sides began to

approach each other for the solution ofthe problem.̂ ^^

Sir Edward Grey, secretary for foreign affairs, and Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky,

Russian foreign minister, signed the Anglo-Russian Convention in September 1907. The

agreement mainly divided Persia into three parts. As Punch's caricature that depicted

Persia as a play-cat between the British lion and the Russian bear (Figure 4.4),^ '* some

territories bordering Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean in the south were recognized as

being the sphere of Britain: in the north, similarly, some territories were accepted as the

Russian sphere. The central parts ofthe country were left free to be exploited by both

powers. Though Persia violently protested such a division of her territories, she had no

power to change the course of events. The division ofthe country tumed Persia into a

battlefield between the great forces, which caused a famine, death of at least 2,000,000

people, and the desolation of almost all countryside because of growing insecurity within

the state and foreign interventions.^^^ The convention also provided a firm right to Great

Britain for exercise her influence freely over Afghanistan. Furthermore, both empires

decided to stay out of Tibet and not interfere in its affairs.

^" Rogers Piatt Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1939, 11.

'"'^ Punch, October 2, 1907.

'"' "H. A.," "Anglo-Persian Relations." The Edinburgh Review 249/250 (October 1929): 189-209; Korff, Baron S. A. Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last HalfCentuiy. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922,39-42.

236

THE HARMLESS ^rrpy^Qsj^x ^ A T . Mm in, fiMriw Bear}. "M)OK HJE8E! TW CAN.I'LAY Wrffl HIS IffiAD. AKD f CAH PLAT WITH HB TiJI* AitfD WE CAH IKE THK MALL OF IHS MCK." ::Ua. • ! BONT EHUEMBFJB HAVTSO BEEH COKSDLTED ABOt?T TBIS!-

Figure 4.4: Playing with the Persian cat.

By signing the convention both sides ended decades of rivalry. The British were

glad to see the Russian steady advance toward India come to a peaceful end while the

Russians were happy to have rights to exercise freely their own influence in a large area

of Persia. The Times' leading article praised the agreement and said, "The peace of Asia

and the prospect of some eventual reduction ofthe heavy military burden of India are

worth some sacrifice... It will rank among the most important instmments for securing

the peace ofthe whole world."

According to The Spectator, its major importance was that it secured the Persian

Gulf from Russian access. It also called the convention a "cold business, in order to end

The Times, September 2, 1907.

237

a dangerous dispute.. .it is thoroughly satisfactory to think that the crisis of this long

disease of anxiety about Russian intentions is over."^^^

Count Serge Witte stated that "the agreement was a triumph of British

diplomacy," and created many difficulties for the Russians. Though Russia confirmed

her status quo policy in the region, she lost her freedom of direct communication with

Afghanistan and part of Persia. She had to communicate through Britain in case a

diplomatic or political problem arose between Russia and the neighboring buffer states.

"Under these circumstances the buffer became something in the nature of a loaded gun

pointed at us," said Witte. Besides some Russians, the convention did not satisfy

German interests in the region. In recent years, Germany had increasingly involved

herself in the Near East and in Middle East affairs. She was seeking economic and

political advantages in the Ottoman Empire and Persia. The Anglo-Russian Convention

of 1907 came as a great blow to her growing interests in Persia. Although Persia was

basically put under British and Russian imperialist control, which virtually ended the

influences of other states there. The Times still claimed that the agreement was not

directed against German interests, but it "is purely and simply intended to regulate 7^0

Anglo-Russian interests in Central Asia on the basis of amity and good will." The Times' leading article said,

Taken as a whole, the Anglo-Russian Convention will, we hope and tmly believe, fulfill the purpose set forth in its preamble. It settles by mutual consent the different questions affecting the interests ofthe two powers in Asia, and, if loyally carried out, it should remove an antagonism which, whether real or imaginary, has for the last half century and more continually threatened the peace ofthe world... For ourselves it is surely no small gain to have achieved a settlement which clearly defines, as it has never been defined before, the attitude of Russia towards the regions ofthe Middle East which separate her Asiatic possessions from our Indian Empire. Those regions form

'"'' The Spectator 99 (September 28, 1907): 420.

'^'^ Yarmolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte. New York: Howard Pertig, 1967, 434.

™ The Times, September 25, 1907.

238

a barrier which Russia has now for the first time explicitly bound herself towards us to respect.̂ '***

The convention basically ended the long-continued rivalry in Central Asia. No longer

were British statesmen forced to create new policies and spend large sums to maintain

strong armies in India in case of an attack from the north. Moreover, by the convention,

Russia definitely accepted the sole power ofthe British over the Afghan state, which had

always been desired by British statesmen, including both the "masterly inactivists" and

the "forwardists." Besides such solemn assurances ofthe Russians conceming non­

intervention in Afghan affairs, the convention did not specifically address the situation of

the Persian Gulf While the Russian sphere of influence was kept away from this body of

water, the British successfully included Bander Abbas on the Gulf within her sphere of

influence. This strategic point provided the British an unchallenged superiority over

control ofthe Gulf, which secured the future trade routes to India.

The Times, September 25, 1907.

239

CHAPTER V

IMPACTS OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION ON CENTRAL ASIA

At the time ofthe Russian invasions. Central Asia had a medieval-style social,

cultural, economic, technological, military, and political stmcture. The Russian invasions

introduced some modern changes combined with Russian despotism, strict control,

arbitrary mle, and military occupation. Yet many Russians genuinely believed in their

progressive and beneficent rule over these backward states. As N. V. Tcharykow said.

Central Asia "was in a mediaeval condition of apathy and anarchy, but was beginning

slowly to awake under the civilizing infiuence of Russia's policy of 'peace and

plenty.'"'"

Though the technological and civilized level of Russia was not as advanced as

that of Great Britain, she had succeeded in gaining ground in her dominions in Asia

because she had experienced Turkic culture for many centuries. In this success, Russia's

degree of civilization, slightly different from that ofthe rest of Asia, played an important

role. In contrast to the British tendency to mle as haughty conquerors, the Russians did

not treat the natives as a second-class people. They

Did not mle the country because of their higher civilization but with an overwhelming and inexhaustible military force. In this respect, for example, contrary to the British and French, the Russians did all sorts of higher and lower jobs in their dominions. While the British left military and official jobs to the natives and kept only higher administrative jobs to themselves, the Russians were conductors, police, secretaries, cleaners, and soldiers.''*'̂

Furthermore, the Russians came to think ofthe natives as new subjects ofthe tsar

and ofthe territories as parts ofthe empire ready to be exploited for future settlements.

In this respect, as Russian history showed, they had successfully incorporated large

territories in Europe and in Asia. Excelling in colonization and administration of

'̂" Tchar/kow, 159.

'^' Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 279.

240

multinational and multireligious communities, in part because of respect shown to local

cultures and rulers, the Russians not only succeeded in creating one ofthe largest

empires, but also mobilized their newly conquered resources to go on to the invasion of

further territories. "Russia triumphs in her Asiatic provinces quite as much by affinity of

character as by force of arms, and no one can properly understand Russia in Europe until

he has seen Russia in Asia."''*^ Nevertheless, Russia had a dilemma about how to solve

national differences within the empire. Nicholas 1 (1824-1855), Alexander II (1855-

1881), Alexander HI (1881-1894), and Nicholas II (1894-1917) had to some extent

applied a policy of Russofication of Poles, the Baltic peoples, Finns, Georgians, and

Ukrainieins. For the Turkic groups, this policy was not insistently pursued. The main

reason for treating Muslim subjects more tolerantly than other non-Russian subjects was

pragmatic. Along with the difficulty of erasing religious feelings, pressure on the

Muslims would create new problems in regions where Imperial authority was established

only by military power rather than by demographic or cultural forces. Furthermore,

Russians feared that any dramatic improvement in the dominions would increase the

expectations ofthe natives for freedom and thus encourage them to try to separate from

the Empire. In this way, the Russians continued to treat Central Asia as a military

dominion during the time period under consideration. A deep-rooted hesitation and fear

of an uprising ofthe natives continued to be a real part of Russian imperial policy. Only

after the 1890's, did many Russian colonials settle in the region.'^^ If the total

subjugation ofthe new territories had not been satisfactorily achieved, the military mlers

continued to pressure native opposition groups. After complete subjugation, despite their

initial tolerance of native culture and local rulers, Russians took a sort of premature joy in

imposing their own culture and lifestyle. Thus, cormpt military administrations

established in the Turkic lands played a negative role in keeping local people under strict

control and in preventing them from developing a better civilization.

"̂̂ Dobson, 12.

744 Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 279.

241

Since The Times was primarily interested in the imperialist stmggle in the East

between Russia and Great Britain, it paid only secondary attention to the impact ofthe

Russian expansion on the native peoples. Yet it provided valuable information on how

Russia handled the region's political, social, cultural and economic development.

Obviously, the primary aim of The Times in bringing news about the changing character

ofthe region was to make constant comparisons between British and Russian imperial

rule over their dominions. In this way. The Times not only provided an insight to Russian

imperialism, but also provided the best daily information to help both British officials and

the public argue successfully against Russian claims. It was, in a sense, a war between

the media of both countries to cover up their own weaknesses and to praise their own

imperial policies in their respective dominions. In this contest. The Times gained well-

eamed fame.

Some ofthe most important effects of Russian expansion into Central Asia were

the establishment of modem transportation lines, new trading colonies near the old urban

centers, telegraph lines, modem postal systems, new urban centers, and growing cultural

diversity. Just a look at the bridge (Figure 5.1)̂ '*̂ constmcted over the Amu Daria River

as a part ofthe Transcaspian Railway in the 1880's provides an impression ofthe Russian

impact on Central Asia. One ofthe impressive sides of these developments was their

quick adoption by the native population. The natives always appreciated a new

development as long as it was progressive and more advantageous than the old system.

Despite religious sentiment and spirits that had been broken by Russian invasion, most

natives came to accept the new conditions as bearable evils. New communication and

transportation facilities and, most importantly, a thriving cotton industry induced many to

accept or at least tolerate the new system. They began to see Russian conquest as a result

of God-ordained destiny.''*'

'"*' Dobson, 189. The bndge on the Amu Daria was one mile and 992 feet long.

''*' Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 262.

'"' Ibid, 276.

242

Figure 5.1: Bridge over Amu Daria

As the Russians completed their expansion into the khanates of Central Asia by

1873, they began to rearrange social, economic, and cultural structures. The Times

portrayed these changes as positive developments for Central Asia. The paper stressed

that by these changes the world, above all Central Asia, would benefit:

The Russians are thus improving their victory for the purpose of attacking on every side the barbarism by which Central Asia has hitherto been closed to the civilized world. By the abolition of slavery they compel the sedentary population of Khiva to adapt themselves to the ordinary requirements of civilized life; by their plan for controlling the Kirghese they will establish order among the nomad population; by their physical improvements they bid fair to alter the very face ofthe country, and the way will henceforth be clear for the natural influence of trade. We hear already of caravans being regularly organized, and we may expect that before long, from Russia on the one side, and from India on the other, a new and vast market will be opened to European manufactures. By making such a use of their conquests, the Russians are working in the interests ofthe world, but of Central Asia above all; and the vast power ofthe Empire could not be applied to a more legitimate or beneficent purpose. Among the many extraordinary achievements ofthe last

243

few years none is more remarkable than this opening up of Central Asia. Ten years ago it was a region wholly isolated from the general life ofthe world.... Conquest is now a means instead of an end, and so long as Russian arms are employed to introduce threats of peace their success must be desired by every friend of human progress.''*

Nevertheless, The Times had poorly predicted Russia's "opening up" the region to the

larger world. The Russians opened up Central Asia only for their own commercial,

economic, social, and military goals. As soon as they established their protectorate over

the khanates, they established trade barriers to isolate them from the outside world.

Effects on Industry

Despite their primitive industries, Central Asian technology and manufactures had

advanced enough to satisfy native needs. "C.E.A.," a correspondent of The Times who

had been in Central Asia and had fresh knowledge about the region, reported in 1854 that

Tashkent was an important industrial town. It was located on the banks ofthe Syr Daria

(Jaxartes) and was as large as Moscow. It produced large quantities of cotton goods.

Before the Russian invasion ofthe city, the cotton manufacturers had employed

foreigners, including some British, in their factories. Khokand, Bukhara, and Samarkand

were all lively commercial towns. They were centers of an extensive urban life. In the

bazaars of these rich and populous cities one could easily find merchants from China,

Persia, Russia, and Kirghizia. Merchants in Central Asia traded one ofthe best grades of

cotton and silk. The best Turkmen carpets were sold in the bazaars of big cities and

towns. Khiva produced the finest fruits that were exported to Turkey and China.

Tchapani robes found in Khiva were not only used in the country but also exported to

neighboring states.'̂ ** Along with Tashkent, the city of Khokand was famous for its

paper production. "Most ofthe paper used in Central Asia is manufactured either here or

"̂̂ The Times, August 16, 1873.

''^'^ The Times, November 22, 1854.

"° Emile Jonveaux, "Les Russes dans I'Asie Centrale," Revue des deux Mondes 67 (1867): 971.

244

at the little village of Tcharku, also in Khokand...This paper, which is usually grey,

although sometimes couloured pink and blue, is very firm and tough, and excellent for

the gummy ink with which the natives write."'^'

The Russians exhibited many samples of Turkistan manufactures in Moscow and

St. Petersburg after subjugating Khiva in 1873. These exhibitions included minerals,

manufactured goods, such as paper made in Khokand, cardboard made in Kuldja, cotton

and silk garments, and furs. Soaps, dying materials, shoes, saddles, bridles, hamesses,

robes, tents, mgs, and other household items were produced in the native factories.'^^

Bukharan carpets and knives were made of very good quality materials and for that

reason they were expensive.'^^

After the subjugation and annexation of Central Asia, the Russians concentrated

on how best they could exploit the wealth of the region. They knew that, with the

existing primitive transportation and communication systems, it would be impossible to

impose their OWTI military, economic, and political will. Thus, the first thing they

attempted to achieve was to improve transportation lines. For this, they tried to divert the

Amu Daria into its ancient bed to create a waterway from the Caspian Sea to the Aral

Sea, and then over the Syr Daria to China. In 1873 during the Khivan expedition, the

Russians sent surveying companies to ascertain the possibility ofthe diversion ofthe

Amu Daria River. Despite their surveys on the ground and their attempt to dig canals and

construct dams, they discovered that the volume ofthe water in the river was not enough

to fill the bed. In order to fill the bed for the purpose of creating a water transportation

line, the govemment would have had to destroy all previously existing dams and

irrigation canals, which had served the irrigation ofthe region for centuries. This action

would be highly detrimental to the existing economy and therefore the project was

postponed.'^'*

751 Schuyler, 179.

^"Schuyler, 105.

753 Meakin, 213.

245

In order to establish a strong central authority over Central Asia, the Russian

government had to construct better communication techniques. For this purpose, a

telegraph line reached Tashkent in 1875. In the same year, Russians also opened the first

imperial bank to help investors and to support a capitalist economy in the region.'^^ After

several fruitless attempts to induce the Amir to extend the telegraph line to Bukhara, the

Amir finally relented in 1884 and granted permission to General Rosenbach, the

Govemor General of Turkistan. The last time the Russians had made such an offer was in

1882 during Prince Wittgenstein's mission to this city. Yet the Amir had refused to

accept it on the ground that "the Mollahs and Ulema, who already twitted him with

listening too much to Russian advice, were strongly opposed to the introduction ofthe

telegraph and European innovations generally, and that their influence among his subjects

was too strong to be disregarded." According to a member ofthe embassy, the Amir was

afraid of being dethroned by his people and of losing his dignity in the eyes ofthe people.

This time the Russians must have pressed hard indeed to obtain the right to constmct the

telegraph line, which was opened on September 9, 1884. The Times stressed that the

telegraph line to Bukhara would greatly improve Russian commercial and political

positions in the khanate.'^^ In the same year, some Russian capitalists agreed to establish

a Central Asian Steam Navigation Company with a capital of 4,000,000 mbles. The

company was to work between Khodjent and Kazalinsk on the Aral Sea.'^'

Effects on Population

Besides some religious and ethnic differences, the people of Central Asia had

been divided into two major social groups, namely the nomads and the sedentary people.

Religiously, they were almost totally Sunni Muslims. Ethnically, the Turkic Ozbeks,

Sarts, Turkmens, Kirghiz, and Kazakhs, and the Iranian Tajiks would be identified as the

'"'^ Schuyler, 116; Terentyef, 222.

"'Schuyler, 112.

'"' The Times, September 2, 1884.

" ' The Times, September, 25, 26, 1884.

246

largest groups. Despite their ethnic differences, the Central Asian people had not

experienced any noticeable racial problems thanks to the Sharia and Turkish customary

laws, which prohibited ethnic discrimination within Islamic society.

Unlike its somewhat homogenous ethnic and religious character. Central Asia had

different social communities each of whose economic, cultural, and social lifestyles

represented a real defining line within the society. The khanates comprised nomads,

seminomads, agricultural communities, merchants, and artisans. According to The

Times,

Between the Anglo-Indian and the Russian there are now interposed only a number of semi—barbarous clans—for such are they rather than nations— Persians, Afghans, Turkomans, and others—innumerably subdivided, and of very various degrees of civilization, from the Belooche robber or the Turkmen slave-dealer to the shopkeeper of Meshed or the market-gardener of Cabul. Each of these, as they are, by the increasing power ofthe two great rivals, brought within the sphere of their influence, becomes insensibly attracted to the one or the other.

Initially the Russians did not bring many Russian settlers to make a dramatic

change in the social character ofthe Central Asian population. Most ofthe Russians in

Central Asia in the first years ofthe occupation were either soldiers or govemment

servants; many of them were either banished or ordered to serve their term in the region.

Though they did not hurry in colonizing the oases, Russian settlers gradually came to

settle the most fertile parts ofthe country, especially the river valleys and irrigated lands.

One group of setflers was the Cossacks whose military colonies had long been used by

the Russian govemment to guard Russia's frontiers against nomadic incursions. In one

instance in 1875, 1,500 Cossacks were banished to settle in Turkistan because of their

objection to the new military code.

In all Turkistan, the number ofthe Russian settlers rose by 1911 to some 400,000

people, half of which were mral population. But most Russian settlers were established

in the steppe region at this period. They amounted to around 1,500,000 people, making

"^ The Time, January 6, 1857.

" ' The Times, September 24, 1875.

247

up to 40 percent ofthe whole population.'̂ *^ Compared with the geographic size of

Central Asia, 400,000 settlers who actually settled in the oases region would be

considered unlikely to make any drastic change in the demographic stmcture ofthe

country. The region, however, was not densely populated due to the limited space for

agriculture. In Russian Turkistan in 1873, there were only 1,600,000 people, of whom

1,000,000 were nomads.'^' Many Russian peasants, mostly those from Siberia in search

of better climatic and territorial places, fiooded into Central Asia. Their number

increased every year.'^^

The nomadic segment ofthe Central Asian population suffered the most from

Russian invasions. The nomads, who had been quite independent, found themselves in a

hostile situation under Russian administration. They began to lose their age-old

grasslands either to the Russian settlers or to ever-expanding farmlands. Some historians,

including Z. V. Togan, claimed that the Russians had reduced the nomads to starvation

level by pushing them from their grazing grounds and distributing these lands to Russian

colonists. Their age-old habit of going yaylak in the summer and kishlak in the winter

began to disappear as larger grazing grounds were tumed to farmlands by sedentary

people. The nomads, who used to cultivate some lands in their kishlak, ceased to produce

grains or vegetables because their cultivated lands were largely distributed to farming

communities. They began to rely on the settlers for these agricultural products.'^'*

To give a precise figure for the population of any community in Central Asia

before the end ofthe nineteenth century is quite difficult because there was not any

reliable official census taken by the govemment. The figures given by the historians,

travelers, and govemment documents vary enormously. Yet these figures have given an

760 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 671.

'"^ Schuyler, 54.

'"^ The Times, March 16, 1888.

763 Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 299.

'"* Elizabeth Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966, 389.

248

idea ofthe number and character ofthe ethnic structures in the region. In the 1850's the

Tekke Turkmens alone had about 100,000 tents {kibitka) or 500,000 people, according to

Togan. But Sir Henry Rawlinson reported in his presentation to the Royal Geographical

Society in 1873 that the Turkmens numbered about 1,000,000 souls and 200,000 tents.

The largest among the Turkmen tribes was the Tekke tribe, with 60,000 tents or 300,000

people.'̂ "^

Though Sir Henry estimated the number of people including Uzbeks,

Karakalpaks, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Sarts and Persians in the khanate of Khiva at around

500,000, A. Vambery claimed that there were at least 1,000,000 people living there in

1873. The Russians, on the other hand, gave far lower figures for the population of

Khiva. According to the Invalide, Khiva had 340,000 souls in 1873.'^^ As far as the

population ofthe khanate of Khokand was concemed, she had a much denser population

than did other places. Even after losing Tashkent, Turkistan, Aulia Ata, and Khodjent,

the khanate had around 700,000 souls. The cities of Khokand and Namangan housed

60,000 and 20,000 inhabitants respectively in 1875.'" The sources that tried to give

more credit to Central Asia tended to present higher numbers, while politically oriented

and technically hostile sources provided low numbers.

The total population of Central Asia including Russian Turkistan, Bukhara, Khiva

and Turkmenia was estimated to be around 6,000,000 souls.'^^ In 1873, after five years

of Russian mle, the population of Zerafshan, including Samarkand, was around 350,000;

'"' The Times, March 25, 1873; Togan, 234.

766 The Times, April 28, 1873. Ofthe number 340,000, the Ozbeks were 100,000, the Tadjiks were 100,000, the Persians (mostly slave) were 40,000, the Karakalpaks were 45,000, the Kazakhs were 35,000 and the Turkmens were 15,000. The Invalide also gave statistical information about the cities ofthe Khanate. According to this, the city of Khiva had 20,000; Kungrad had 8,000; Khodsheili was 8,000; New Urgendj was 3,000; Khanki had 5,000; and Khazar had 4,000 souls.

^" The Times, September 8, 1875; Holdsworth, 8. According to Holdsworth, the city of Khokand had 80,000 souls in 1867.

'^'^ George N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1889, 253.

249

of these the civilian Russians were only 847, and most lived in Samarkand.'^^ Yet as

Russian rule began to establish itself firmly in the region, more and more foreign settlers

came to dwell in the Turkic lands, including Russian, Armenian, Georgian, and Persian

merchants and farmers. For example, Kyzil Arvat, that was located on the Akhal Oasis

and had no foreigners but few Tekkes in 1880, just before the Russian invasion had a

population of 3.296 in 1889. Of this number, 1,700 Russians, 660 Armenians, 60

Georgians and 816 Persians were living in the town.''*^ The population of some ofthe

important centers is shown in the table (Table 5.1) below.'"

Table 5.1: Changing Demographics.

The Population of Native and Newcomers in 1889

Place Natives Russians Others

The city of Bukhara

District of Samarkand

The city of Samarkand

The city of Tashkent

100,000

452,844

32,500

100,000

150

9,397

6,000

20,000

na

2,744

1,500

na

Furthermore, the newcomers increasingly overpopulated Merv, Ashkabad, and

many other towns. The Novoe Vremya stressed that the Russian govemment should take

necessary steps to stop these newcomers because they would harm Russian trade in the

region."^ The Persian emigrants to the Russian territories annoyed even the Shah of

Persia."^ Along with these foreign elements that generally settled in the towns, the

nomadic Turkmens, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Uzbeks were increasingly settling in the

towns. By the end ofthe nineteenth century less than one-fourth ofthe population

The Times, October 1, 1884.

™ Dobson, 145.

'^' Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, 205-230.

''^^ The Times, July 1, 1884.

773 The Times, July 25, 1884.

250

remained nomad. The Russians considered the non-Russians and non-Orthodox

people as second-class citizens, though they did not behave that way on the public 775 level.

Environmental Impacts

The environment of Central Asia had not yet experienced the destmctive effects

of industrial development at the time ofthe Russian invasion because it lacked industrial

institutions. The region was still using medieval techniques in transportation,

manufacture, and agriculture. Furthermore, mostly barren and dry lands characterized the

region. A dense population could not be found only in the river valleys that resembled

chains of oases along the rivers. Except for some poorly developed forests in the

mountains ofthe khanate of Khokand, and for Kopet Dagh in Turkmenia, there was no

forested area in Central Asia. In the valleys and irrigated lands trees were planted for

commercial or agricultural purposes. Yet the region had plenty of saxaul trees, the most

characteristic tree ofthe region. The establishment of steam navigation in the Aral Sea

by the Russians had the first and the most destmctive effect on the environment ofthe

region. In order to fliel their steamers, the Russians began to cut saxaul trees because

they did not find coal or naphtha in the immediate vicinity ofthe Syr Daria River. They

tried to transport coal from the Don region, but because ofthe high cost they continued to

consume saxaul trees as fuel for the steamers."^ "The supply is soon exhausted; places

rendered desolate; the forage so necessary to the Kirghiz dries up in consequence ofthe

lessening of moisture in the atmosphere and the dryness ofthe climate, and the sands

become shifting.""' Overuse of poor resources had worsened the already harsh climate

™ Holdsworth, 13.

775 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 267.

''" Marvin, Conversations, 290.

Leiven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 239.

251

and expanded the arid lands. Shifting sands began to invade both the grasslands and the

plantations.

Along with their steam navigation, the Russian settlers, officials, and soldiers

began to construct their headquarters, villages, or districts at the most beautiful places. In

this way, they changed the natural landscape, which was generally the greenest part ofthe

invaded territories. "For the pleasure ofthe Russian authorities and their suite, the speedy

destruction ofthe native gardens for fuel and timber has the worst possible effect on the

condition of Bukhara.""^ The thrifty tendency ofthe natives, who had leamed to live by

the least necessities of life, was not present in the Russian authorities. The individual

Russians did not think that they were going to stay forever in the region. Indeed, most of

the Russians had been exiled to these places to complete their service. For them, the

short-term extravagant life seemed much more desirable than a long-term commitment to

conserving social and environmental stmctures. Yet there were some Russians who tried

to reforest the region as it was believed to have been in ancient times: under General

Chemiaev's auspices, the Russians planted 100,000 trees in southem Turkistan."^

Coming from almost totally agricultural communities, the Russian settlers desired

to create more agricultural lands. They began to settle in Turkistan and to clear away old

pasturelands. They constructed new cities, including Almati (1854), Kazali (1867),

Karakul (1869), Krasnovodsk (1869), and Carkend (1882). Along with these new cities,

the Russians constmcted new towns near such old cities as Samarkand, Bukhara, and

Tashkent. The constmction ofthe Transcaspian Railway increased the number ofthe

Russian towns and of Russian settlers. They intentionally established railway lines 5 to

15 kilometers away from the native cities to pull the center of economic life from the old

bazaars to the newly erected Russian towns. Yet they did not succeed in destroying the

lively market places ofthe old chies. While the Russian centers had modem hotels, bars.

'''^ Ibid, 22,6.

'™ Marvin, Reconnoitering Central Asia, 211.

252

theaters, schools, and govemment buildings, the old native cities continued to hold its

trading centers.'̂ *^

One ofthe projects that made an enormous change in the appearance ofthe

landscape in Central Asia was the constmction of a railway that crossed the whole region

from the Caspian Sea to Tashkent. Prince Bariatinski was the first to propose the

constmction ofthe railway in the 1850's. However, the Russian govemment did not start

the project immediately because the Turkmens, Khivans, and other native groups were

not ready to allow the Russians to undertake such a project. The subjugation ofthe

khanates finally made it possible for the Russians to constmct the railway. When the tsar

appointed Colonel A. 1. Glukovski in 1873 to survey the commercial, economic and

social character of Central Asia, he expected him to make a detailed report on the ftiture

of economic life ofthe region. After spending months in Khiva and Bukhara, Glukovski

reported that a union of Central Asia with Russia should be achieved through a railway

providing efficiency in economic, commercial, and administrative stmctures.'*' Another

important suggestion for the constmction of a railway in Central Asia came in 1873 from

Ferdinand-Marie de Lesseps, a Frenchman who was the chief engineer ofthe Suez Canal

(1859-69) and the failed Panama Canal (1881-1888) constmctions. The project that de

Lesseps planned was much more detailed and extensive than the one suggested by Prince

Bariatinski or Colonel Glukovski. De Lesseps believed that a railway connecting India

with Europe through Central Asia would be useftil economically and politically to

countries along the tracks and would end the rivalry between Russia and Britain.

According to his plan, the Russian railway system that already reached to Orenburg

would be connected with the British railways in Peshawar. If it had succeeded, travel

from Europe to India would have taken only a week's time.'*" The Daily Telegraph

stressed that such a plan for the construction of an Indo-European railway would not

'*" Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 264.

™' Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 238.

782 The Daily News, May 27, 1873.

253

work because ofthe roundabout line described by de Lesseps. The paper suggested that,

if there were an Indo-European railroad to be constmcted, the best direction followed

would be to go through Adrianople (Edirne), Istanbul, Asia Minor, and Persia to India.'*^

The timing of de Lesseps' proposal coincided with the Russian expedition to Khiva. It

well-served for Russia to ease the tension that arose in England because ofthe Khivan

expedition.

The first solid step toward constmcting a railway in Central Asia was taken in

1880. At this time. General M. N. Annenkov, in order to carry provisions to the fighting

forces led by General Skobelev against the Tekkes, started to construct a military railway 7R4

from Krasnovodsk to Kyzil Arvat. It was reported that the Russian Govemment

invested 8,000,000 dollars for constmction of this railway. "The railroad follows General

Skobeleff s line of march across the old bed ofthe Oxus to the Akhal oasis. It is now in

operation for a distance of about 40 miles, and is advancing at the rate of a mile and a

half daily."'*^ After the subjugation ofthe Akhal Tekkes, there was no real obstacle for

the Russians to survey the lands from Geok Tepe via Ashkabad and Merv to Samarkand.

Even though the fate of Merv had not yet been determined, the Russian exploring group

led by M. Lessar was surveying these places to make plans for the extension ofthe

Transcaspian Railroad to Samarkand and Tashkent. The natives of these places, it was

reported, had shown a cordial and great interest in Lessar's geographic explorations.

Vambery stressed that the constmction ofthe Transcaspian Railway served not only

Russian economic, political and military interests, but also the rise of civilization in the

region. With it, the interrelations with the west would be intensified, and European

civilization would easily make its way into the region. Already many large towns had

begun to appear there. For example, Ashkabad already had 8,000 residents. Yet most of

™̂ The Daily Telegraph, May 27, 1873.

•'*'* The Times, November 5, 1880.

'*' The New York Times, February 13, 1881.

''^' The Times, October 10, 1883.

254

the population beginning to crowd these towns consisted of outsiders, such as the

Russians, Armenians, Georgians, and Persians.'*'

It was an established Russian dream to create transportation lines on water

through the Volga River, the Caspian Sea and the Amu Daria to give life to the old Silk

Road. They believed that the Amu Daria River once flowed into the Caspian Sea.

According to Togan, the Amu Daria had indeed flowed into the Caspian until 1575 A. D.,

when h changed its course to the Aral Sea.'** When Colonel Glukovski was assigned to

survey the country for economic and commercial purposes in 1873, he had special orders

to survey the region to report allow the possibility of shifting the river. Glukovski found

out that the volume ofthe river was not great enough to fill the old bed. In order to

succeed in such a project, almost all dams and irrigation canals, which had been

constmcted to irrigate lands since the time immemorial, on the river would have to be

destroyed. He concluded that destmction of these ages-old irrigation systems would

bring disaster to the towns, villages, and cities located along the river and would destroy

both agriculture and environment.'*^ Upon considering the pros and cons ofthe project,

the Russians postponed indeterminately the idea.

Another project that the Russians contemplated was to change the course ofthe

Syr Daria back to its old bed, Yeni Daria, which had a southwesterly course from Ak

Mescid. The main purpose ofthe project was to create new farmlands in the Yeni Daria

Valley. Colonel N. A. Ivanov, the commander of Petro-AIexandrovsk, who later became

the Govemor General of Turkistan (1901-1904) and was known as "Sari Sakal Ivanov,"

made efforts to dig canals and constmct dams to bring water to Yeni Daria.'̂ *' Yeni

Daria was active until the Russians began to threaten the khanate of Khiva in the 1830's.

Upon the Russian danger, the khan ordered construction of a dam to block the water to

787 Arminius Vambery, "The Transcaspian Railway." The Fortnightly Review 41 (June 1887): 303.

*̂* Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 178.

'*'Terentyef, vol. 1,222.

'̂° The Times, July 29, and August 12, 1875.

255

eliminate a possible waterway. When the Russians captured Ak Mescid, they first

destroyed the dam, but because ofthe lessening of water in the Syr Daria River, which

hampered their transportation to the Aral Sea, they reconstmcted the dam. Again, later,

in order to create new farmlands for the settlers, they allowed the water to mn into the

Yeni Daria valley. Along with the Yeni Daria project, the Russians dug canals and

constructed dams on the Amu Daria to bring some water to the Murghab River to irrigate

the Murghab Oasis in order to create new cotton plantations. If the project succeeded, an

area of 300,000 desiatines (770,000 acres) would be watered, and the cotton produced on

it would satisfy almost all needs ofthe Russian textile industry.'^^ Besides these large

projects, the Russians were making plans to constmct dikes on the Murghab and Tedjent

Rivers to water the Merv Oases. They believed that by spending only 15,000 mbles on

these projects they would irrigate almost 150,000 desiatine of land to produce good-

quality cotton and rice. They claimed that, if the project succeeded, they would eam

350,000 mbles' revenue annually from these lands."^ Yet these changes in the first place

were generally serving the Imperial government's economic interests. The local

population, who had for centuries developed their own way of using these lands, came to

resent these changes. When Count Serge Witte was visiting Central Asia in the 1890's,

he found that these projects were extremely unpopular among the local people because

the projects were changing age-old courses ofthe streams to new directions. They

destroyed the local irrigation systems and thus adversely impacted native farming.

Along with new projects, such as steam navigation, diversion of riverbeds, and

constmction of railways, the Russians also concentrated their efforts on improving old

caravan roads and opening up new, easy, and short lines. The first transportation line

opened by the Russians was a caravan road from Krasnovodsk on the Caspian to Kunya

^" The Times, July 22,, 1883.

'̂̂ Dobson, 233.

™ The Times, March 11, 1886.

^''' Yarmolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte, 34.

256

Urgentch and Khiva on the Amu Daria. They also constructed a postal line between

Khodjent and Khokand.'^^

The somewhat poor and simple lifestyle ofthe natives had long been adapted to

the environment, creating simple and even happy lives for the natives. They would have

continued to have a similar lifestyle had they not been forced to change by a conquering

power. The lifestyle that they had developed was suitable to the environment and the

geography in which they lived. But the increasing contact with the British in the south

and the Russians in the north forced them to adopt new lifestyles to survive in a

capitalist-imperialist world.

Administrative and Judicial Effects

All three khanates of Central Asia had virtually the same kind of administrative

stmcture. It would be reasonably safe to call this system a semifeudal monarchy. At first

impression, the absolute power ofthe khan and the amir was unchallengeable. Yet the

begs, who were generally leaders ofthe different tribes, and the govemors, were

generally from the royal families and mled over cities and big towns, had considerable

administrative power in their respective domains. During the reigns of weak khans, these

feudal lords acted as the real rulers of their territories. Furthermore, because ofthe lack

of laws of succession for choosing the next mler, frequent battles occurred between and

among the royal family members who virtually had equal rights to claim the throne. The

khans were from the Ozbeks, and since the time of Nadir Shah's invasion of Central Asia

in the 1740's, the khans had come from the Mangit tribe who lived mostly in and around

Bukhara and Karshi.'^^ They generally believed or at least made people believe that they

were descendants of both Ghengiz Khan and the Prophet Muhammed. In this way, they

were trying to strengthen their position in the eyes ofthe lay people. In reality, as The

Times saw it, they were "Tatars generically, Turks more precisely."

'̂̂ The Times, July 26, 1876.

''^ Khanikoff, Bokhara, 76.

257

When the Russians first started to move into the Turkic lands in Kazan, and

Astrakhan on the Volga (Etil), then Siberia and the Kazakh steppes in Asia, they applied

a primitive administrative skill and acted like the Mongols centuries earlier to keep the

local people under control. However, as westem ideas penetrated into Russia and more

and more minorities, especially the Baltic Germans, rose to high posts, the harsh

treatment ofthe natives in the early phase of their expansion began to give way to a much

milder treatment ofthe conquered people in the steppes and oasis regions in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus the increasing participation of minorities in the

decision-making process and the growing westem ideas among the Russian statesmen

and intellectuals produced a more civilized and mild policy that made it possible for the

Russians to expand their territories by making every invasion a new stepping-stone to the

next one, and by mobilizing new resources in the invaded lands to create necessary

provisions for constant invasions. The later phase ofthe Russian expansionist policy in 708

Asia could be called "a European type in the Russian form."

The almost endless human and material sources ofthe Russian Empire created a

notion among the peoples of Central Asia to show respect to Russian authority. The

people, especially the nomadic groups, had always lived a rather independent life. They

scarcely showed real obedience to their khans, begs, or any other authority. They

nominally viewed khans as their sovereigns, and paid scarcely any taxes to the state.

Though they were fond of living a free life away from pressures of a central authority,

they had their own customary mles allowing them to live a peaceful life in their own

community. According to J. A. MacGhan, who traveled in Central Asia in 1873, and took part in the actual fighting during the Khivan expedition.

Each tribe is divided into many smaller subdivisions, which probably are formed by family ties and connections, and which are presided over by head men, or chiefs. But the state does not exist among the Turcomans. There is no body politic, no recognized authority, no supreme power, no higher tribunal

''^'' The Times, April 29, 1873.

'̂* Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 239.

799 The Times, June 6, 1884.

258

than public opinion. Their head men, it is true, have a kind of nominal authority to settle disputes; but they have no power to enforce decisions. These the litigants can accept, or fight out their quarrel, just as they please. And yet they have such well-defined notions of right and wrong as between themselves, and public opinion is so strong in enforcing these notions, that there are rarely dissensions or quarrels amongst them.*

They possessed "no political or civil organization in the European sense ofthe

term. The free will ofthe people, or rather of each settlement, always prevailed, and only

a few persons here and there enjoyed any influence over the masses."**" Each tribe had

its own dignitaries who were respected only because of their talent, generosity, honesty,

wealth, and courage. These leaders were not by any means capable of collecting taxes,

organizing armies, or solely giving orders. In extraordinary times that involved military

expeditions to neighboring states or local defense, the Turkmen leaders, who consisted of

a council made of khans and ishans (imams or religious leaders), decided the proper

course of action.***̂ When Vambery heard that the Mervlies had "willingly" accepted

Russian authority over Merv in 1884, he could not believe it. He wrote:

Strange indeed! The most unmly adventurers ofthe Central Asian Steppes, who boasted twenty years ago before the writer of these lines that royalty is not according to their taste, and that with them everybody is a king...well these adventurers and thieves have now suddenly become anxious to get a chief— nay, an Emperor; and, to our great amazement, they show willingness to be govemed, taxed, and led on the path of modem civilization by the mighty tutor on the Neva. **'̂

Vambery believed that Russian suzerainty meant for the local people a strict military mle

and suppression of old unruly practices. He also stated that the Turkmens, though they

had been problematic subjects under their own mlers, would be loyal subjects ofthe tsar.

As the early suppressed Turkmen tribes showed, the Turkmens had been peaceful and

800 MacGahan, Campaigning on the Oxus, 349-350.

*"' Marvin, The Eye-witnesses' Account ofthe Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Akhal Tekke Turcomans, 46.

"̂̂ The Times, September 15, 1884.

*"'' Arminius Vambery, The Times, February 23, 1884.

259

helpful subjects of their new rulers. They were capable of adopting a more peacefiil and

productive life. The common mistaken view shared by most westemers about the

impossibility of changing the fierce warriors**̂ '* of Central Asia into people living in a

more civilized fashion in a short time period came to be proved another prejudice of

westemers, who did not have real knowledge but speculated for centuries on what they

had heard from their ancestors. Moreover, these kings ofthe steppes did not believe that

Russian authority would make too much of a change in their poor and secluded life in an

environment where life had always been harsh and difficult. In addition, Russian

imperial mle in the region was thought not capable of making major changes. It was

already reported, "the military administration in Central Asia is rotten to the core."**'̂

The Giers commission in the 1880's and the Pahlen investigation in the 1900's showed

that Russian military administrations were highly cormpt. Bribery, mistreatment of

locals, mismanagement, and other forms of corruption were widely practiced by the

officials. Yet many travelers, historians, and researchers believed in the value of Russian

mle. The claimed that the Russians knew how to treat the natives and how to blend in

with them. There was a sort of mutual yield to each other's differences between the

natives and the Russians. George Dobson observed, "The Russian takes as kindly to the

manners and customs of Central Asia as the Asiatic in Russian uniform quickly feels

himself at home in Russian society." He also claimed that extreme Russian cmelties,

such as Skobelev's massacre ofthe Tekkes in 1881, were always followed by kindness.

"The Russians readily fratemize with them, and both parties soon arrive at a mutual

understanding."

Feeling confident in the monopoly of imperialist expansion in Central Asia,

Russia did not show any sign of anxiety in hastening its conquests. Instead, Russians

804 The New York Times, November 25, 1866; MacGahan, Campaigning on the Oxus, 349.

^°' "The Military Position of Russia and England in Centtal Asia." The Edinburgh Review 151 (January 1880): 73.

*°* Dobson, 67.

**" Dobson, 68.

260

moved slowly and cautiously. She did not want to create a widespread hatred among the

natives against her rule, and did not want to offend the British and thus find herself in a

critical situation in the intemational arena. Thus Russia preferred to capture key places

and leave the native subdued mlers on their thrones. When the Russians signed the first

treaties, they still considered these khans as equal sovereigns according to intemational

law, and these agreements were mutually beneficial.**'* But, later, the Russians

increasingly became oppressive and treated these vassals as simple, backward and

primitive mlers who were left on their thrones to govem the native populations with their

weak and cormpt states. Vassal khans were defined as "worshippers ofthe tsar" and not

allowed to establish free diplomatic relations with the outside world. These khans were

ordered to communicate with and solve their problems through the Govemor-General of

Turkistan rather than with the govemment at St. Petersburg. When the Amir of Bukhara

complained about the Russian invasion of his territories in 1868, he tried in vain to send

an envoy to St. Petersburg to discuss the situation. His envoy was not allowed to

proceed, and the Amir was ordered to enter into negotiations with General Kaufmann.

Yet in 1869, the Amir sent his son, Abdulfettah, to St. Petersburg to petition the Russian

govemment to be treated as a sovereign. He did not want to enter into a relationship with

Kaufmann on equal terms. The Russians then accepted the Amir's demand and allowed

him to establish direct communication with St. Petersburg.**'̂ This nominal acceptance of

the Amir as a sovereign of a vassal country continued until the end ofthe khanate in

1920, when the Bolsheviks established their direct rule over the whole Turkistan.

Though the vassal rulers were not allowed to enter direct diplomatic and political

relations with the outside world, they enjoyed total freedom in their domains:

Inside his own dominions he maintained his own army and enjoyed absolute power of life and death over his unfortunate subjects. The Russian population was limited to a few officials and merchants, while the Emir excluded other Europeans from his domains with jealousy which has been emulated by his Bolshevik successors. Bukhara thus remained a center of Mohammedan

' Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 254.

"^ Ibid, 255.

261

civilization, a holy city with a hundred mosques, three hundred places of learning, and the richest bazaar in Central Asia.*'"

Because of economic, social, and political concems, the Russians did not

incorporate whole territories in Central Asia. Economically, annexation of every new

territory meant more strain on the imperial treasury.*" Almost the entire Russian press

stressed how much it would cost the treasury to pay for the Khivan expedition, and how

impossible it would be to compensate for that loss from local resources.*'^ Politically,

the pressure ofthe British to keep the Russians away from India as long as possible

played an important role in Russian official circles, especially in the foreign office,

encouraging them to leave a distance between the British and their respective dominions.

Socially, the native people, who had developed a strict sense of Islamic culture, would be

a problem to the Russian administration if the whole region were invaded in a short time.

The principle of divide and rule characterized Russian imperial policy toward Central

Asia. In this respect, the Russians wanted to establish authority over the region piece by

piece. Furthermore, the Russians had already achieved their primary goal by subduing

these khanates as vassals. They were confident that the khanates would never be a

military threat to Russia; thus they saw no advantage in annexing the whole region.

Besides having confidence in the security of their borders, the Russians believed that the

cormpt regimes ofthe khans and the unenlightened mullahs would always continue to

prevent these countries from becoming a danger to the Russians. By leaving weak and

powerless mlers on their thrones, still enjoying all ofthe economic, political, diplomatic,

and cultural aspects ofthe region, the Russians succeeded in killing two birds with one

stone. In short, they escaped the cost of administration while they enjoyed a monopoly of 813

economical and commercial stmctures.

*'° Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches. New York: Atheneum, 1984, 148-49.

*" Boulger, Central Asian Portraits, 90.

*'̂ The Times, March 28, 1873.

*'̂ The Times, November 24, 1874.

262

After military confrontations had ended with the victory ofthe Russian forces, the

local rulers and dignitaries ceased to be a threat to the Russian Empire. They even came

to enjoy their new state of political existence. A friendly and cordial intercourse began to

develop between the Russians and these vassal states.

The Russians and the peoples of Central Asia were not such strangers to each other as, for instance, the British and the peoples of India; the 250-year domination of Russia by the Mongols and the fact that the Tatars ofthe Volga Region had been an integral part of Russia since the sixteenth century meant that there were never those feelings of biological or social superiority and inferiority which existed elsewhere; finally, the peoples of Central Asia never experienced the sensation of signal military defeat, for they never offered the Russians any organized military resistance.*''*

The khans, amir and other high dignitaries sent their sons to Russia to be educated in

Russian military schools. These friendly relations provided the vassals a free hand to

deal with intemal affairs, freeing the Russians from having to deal with any military

confrontation or other forms of disturbance in Central Asia. Indeed, the friendly relations

came to a point where the conqueror and the conquered were supporting each other in

difficult times. For example. Amir Muzaffer was given Kitap and some territories on the

right bank ofthe Amu Daria River at the end ofthe Khivan expedition because of his

help by sending provisions and by allowing the Russian army to pass through his

territories. Upon this Russian gesture, the amir became even more a faithful servant of

the "white tsar." He mled Bukhara as a good govemor for the Russians until his death in

1885. In order to eam the favor ofthe tsar, the Amir of Bukhara sent congratulatory

messages with his sons and high officers any time Russia made a move in Central Asia.

After the invasion of Khiva in 1873 and the annexation of Khokand in 1876, the amir

presented rich gifts and congratulations to the tsar in St. Petersburg.*'' His sons. Said

Abdulahad (1885-1910), who received a sword of investiture at the hands ofthe

*'" Geoffrey Wheeler, Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 5.

*'̂ The Times, December 29, 1876.

263

Emperor, and was later known as the "reformer" because of his reforms,*'^ and Alim

(1911-1920), son of Abdulahad, were also faithful to Russia.

Said Abdulahad followed the Russian suggestions closely. He allowed the

Russians to keep a permanent political agent at Bukhara and granted rights to the

Russians to construct a railway through his dominion and to open an imperial bank in his

capital. The Russian political agent N. V. Tcharykow helped him to succeed in

making many changes, including completely eradicating slavery, closing the infamous

prison (zindan), ending the cruel practice of throwing convicted criminals from the

highest minaret, and prohibiting public display of dancing boys {batchas)^^^

When Schuyler visited the region in 1873, he was surprised to see how little the

Russians exercised their suzerainty rights over these vassal states. He stated that the

khans had ordered his people to keep relations with Russian merchants purely

commercial. He prohibited them from inviting Russians into their houses. The Russians

were only allowed to sleep in the bazaars. Besides their limited relations with the

natives, Russian merchants and womenfolk dressed like the natives and following the

native lifestyle.*^*' Yet the Russian tolerance ofthe vassal khans of Central Asia did not

last long. Since they needed to establish transportation and communication lines between

Russia and her dominions in northem China, the Russians became more demanding.

They did not have too much difficulty in inducing these vassal mlers to impose on them

their political, social, economic, technical, and military policies because these vassals had

no power to resist. The establishment of communication lines on their territories meant

more Russian interference in their intemal affairs, as well as loss of their freedom of

action within the country. After the establishment of a railway toward the end ofthe

*'* Tcharykow, 163.

*'̂ Arminius Vambery, The Times, January 25, 1887.

*'* Tcharykow, 205-207.

*" Schuyler, 182.

^̂ ^ Tcharykow, 190.

264

nineteenth century, the Russians began to penetrate Bukhara and the territories along the

railway track. On the railway, "the invention of devil," as it was sometimes called

locally, many towns were filled with Russian officials and military personnel, and new

Russian quarters were constmcted near the old cities, including Bukhara.*^' Increasing

Russian presence in the khanate forced the amir to look for new centers of administration.

His court first moved to Kermine and later to Karabad to stay away from Russian eyes.

In addition to the Amir of Bukhara, the Khan of Khiva mled his poverty-stricken

country until the Bolshevik takeover in 1920. Mehmet Rahim Khan (1864-1910) ruled

the country under a Russian protectorate, and provided somewhat better leadership by

ensuring not too much prosperity but peace to his dominion. His reign was more

progressive than that ofthe Amir of Bukhara. In contrast to the assertions ofthe press,

which portrayed him as a tyrant and a cmel mler in dealing with his subjects and

especially with slaves, he was respectful of religious practices and was a generous

man. Although the Amir of Bukhara was allowed to enter into direct communication

with St. Petersburg as a free sovereign, the khan of Khiva had to communicate with the

Govemor General of Turkistan. In this way, the Russians treated him as their govemor

though the tsar did not directly appoint him.

Though these vassal mlers were prohibited from establishing any degree of

diplomatic relations with other states, the Amir of Bukhara continued to send envoys to

the capital ofthe Ottoman Turks. His primary aim was to ask for Turkish help to

improve the industrial capacity and military capability of his coimtry. In the 1870's he

requested military officers for the training of his army, and industrial engineers to 874

construct factories in his domain. Because of his treaty obligations, the Amir 87 S

dismissed his envoy, Abdullah, who was in Istanbul in 1871.

*̂ ' M. M. Shoemaker, Trans-Caspia: The Sealed Provinces ofthe Czar. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1895,96.

*̂ ^ Boulger, The Portraits of Central Asia, 138.

^^' D'Encausse, Reforme et Revolution Chez les Musulmans de I'Empire Russe, 71-72.

265

In the territories under direct Russian rule the Russians continued to practice

military administration rather than civilian govemment. They found this both more

suitable and efficient for the region and also more serviceable to Russian interests.*'̂ ^

The tsarist govemment did not encourage any sign of local self-administration. It always

treated the natives as ruled people. It did not intend to prepare them for a future native

govemment system. The closest step in the consideration ofthe natives for a possible

self-government was the acceptance of some ofthe native deputies into the First Duma in 877

1906. Yet in the Third Duma, in 1907, all deputies from Turkistan were excluded.

The Govemor Generals of Turkistan showed different attitudes toward the

natives. Some of them, such as Kaufmann (1867-1882) and General Dukhovski (1898-

1900), were haughty men who loved to be treated as "big" men by both the locals and the

govemment officials. Both Kaufmann and Dukhovski were fond of elaborate and

expensive celebrations. Their actions reminded the natives that they were nothing but

invaders and aliens. They had a somewhat childish and comic pride. While everyone

was standing up in the presence of Kaufmann, Dukhovski wanted people to bow or even

prostrate themselves on the ground in his presence. Yet most ofthe Govemor Generals

acted as natural mlers ofthe region, including M. G. Chamiaev (1865-66 and 1882-

1884), Sari Sakal Ivanov (1901-1904), and A. N. Kuropatkin (1914-1917). They did not

want to be treated as alien and strange beings. They showed respect for the native

customs. They sat on the ground with the people and shared their food and drank their

beverages.*^* Compared with English rule in their dominions, Russian mle was more

adaptive to local customs, yet less progressive in the development of education, industry

^^* T. C. Ba§bakanlik Devlet Ar?ivleri Genel MudUrlUgQ. Osmanh Devleti He Kafkasya, Tiirkistan ve Kirim Hanliklan Arasindaki Munasevetlere Dair Arfiv Belgeleri. Ankara: Osmanli Arjivi Daire Ba?kanligi, 1992, 136-137.

*̂ ^ Terentyef, 103.

^" Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 238.

* '̂ Geoffrey Wheeler, "The Russian Presence in Cenfral Asia." Canadian Slavonic Papers 17 (Summer and Fall 1975): 191.

828 Togan, Bugunku Turkili, 240; Boulger, The Portraits of Central .Asia, 229.

266

and social standards. However, the Russians wanted the natives to feel somewhat at

home under tsarist rule, while the English caused the natives to feel inferior and to regard

British "higher" civilization as a long-desired gift. After all, the "Englishman persists in

dealing with Asiatics like a European, whereas the Russian invariably deals with them 870

like a brother Asiatic." According to Annenkov, the Russians had both a good nature

and the ability to adapt themselves to the habits and customs ofthe country in which they

dwelt.*^*' Schuyler believed that Russian mle was beneficial to the natives. In his words. Despite the drain upon the Imperial exchequer, it is practically impossible for Russia to withdraw from her position in Central Asia. Notwithstanding the many faults which may be found in the administration ofthe country, the Russian mle is on the whole beneficial to the natives, and it would be manifestly unjust to them to withdraw her protection and leave them to anarchy and to the unbridled mle of fanatical despots. Apart from this moral consideration, that of her prestige in Central Asia would be sufficient to keep

O l 1

Russia there even at a still greater loss.

The westem joumalists, politicians, and intellectuals severely and almost

imanimously criticized Russian administrative practices toward the Poles, Jews, and other

European minorities under Russian mle. They considered Russian administration as

autocratic, dogmatic, oppressive. Oriental. Asiatic, and despotic. Nonetheless, the same

rule in Central Asia came to be considered as beneficial, progressive, somewhat

European, and more suitable to the region. This approach, of course, resulted rather from

the double standard and stereotyping than from any objective and scientific thoughts

existing in the mentality of westem Europeans. Yet it would not be totally fair to ignore

the developments, such as rising security, improved transportation and communication

lines, and decreasing petty quarrels between different segments ofthe society in Central

Asia. Indeed, even the natives ofthe region confessed that the incorporation ofthe

Turkmens under Russian rule was more preferable than living under Persian or another

^ '̂ The New York Times, March 8, 1885.

*•"' Marvin, The Russian at Merv and Herat, 29.

831 Schuyler, 284.

267

local rule. "The Turcomans were lucky that they became Russian subjects. They would

no longer be subject to arbitrary exactions, and experience the tyranny of Persian

rulers,"*^^ stated a Persian official in Khorasan.

As far as judicial matters were concemed, the Russians generally kept the existing

system of law and order. The kazis (Islamic Judges) continued to perform and to take

care ofthe conflicts that arose between the natives. The Russians appointed their own

judges who were not to "constitute among themselves a court of appeal, but simply act as

higher arbitrators." Besides keeping the native court system alive, the Russians

introduced a new civil tribunal, mahkeme, similar to those established in Algeria by the

French and in the Caucasus by Prince Bariatinski. Though in 1866 the govemor of

Turkistan, General D. 1. Romauiovski, started the process of establishing civil tribunals, it

succeeded only during the time of General Kaufmann. The main aim ofthe mahkeme

was to break the power of the mullahs and kazis because the mahkeme were to be

presided over by civil judges and a Russian officer. Previously, the kazis. who all came

from an intensive Islamic education and basically made decisions according to the

Sharia, had not particularly served Russian interests. Yet by keeping the Islamic and

traditional courts along with the newly established mahkeme system, the Russians made it

more complicated for the people to pursue their cases in the courts.

Cultural Effects

Being isolated from the rest ofthe world by either geographic barriers, such as the

Himalayas, or by hostile states, namely, Persia and Russia in the west and the north and

the Kalmuk Mongols in the east. Central Asia had little chance to interact with the

outside world to create a better and more progressive culture rather than, as The Times

often termed, a fanatical, fundamental, dogmatic, and intolerant culture. Besides the

^'^ Marvin, Reconnoitering Central Asia, 144.

*" Marvin, The Russian at Merv and Herat, 36.

"* Romanovski, 43-46.

268

geographical and political difficulties, the Central Asian culture had to face not only

aggressive but also destructive cultural belts on almost every side. In this respect, the

Buddhist Mongols and Chinese in the east, the Indian caste system in the south, the

Iranian Shia, and Russian Orthodoxy in the west and north, deprived Central Asians of an

open gate to the larger Islamic and westem cultures. Thus they had to develop a culture

as intolerant as that ofthe surrounding cultures in order to survive. The result of such

isolation also meant the creation of a strictly conservative culture that was incapable of

regenerating itself

Turkistan stood lowest of all Muslim lands on the cultural scale...had no printing establishments, either in lithograph or in type, whereas Turkey and Persia had long possessed them. Turkey and Persia had shown signs of European influence in their political and social life already in the eighteenth century, while Turkestan still remained entirely medieval.*'̂ ^

Despite all negative elements, they were aware of their splendid history and ofthe high

level of Islamic civilization. Their isolated and religious attitudes were interpreted by

outsiders, especially Russian and European historians, as being those of fundamentalist

fanatics. But Central Asia had its fame throughout history as the center of Islamic

teaching. The cultural, political, and social richness of Central Asian history was present

at the time ofthe Russian invasions.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the Russian conquerors found in Turkestan nothing but barbarity and no cultural activity which they might foster. At the time ofthe conquest the economic welfare ofthe greater part of Turkestan was much higher than it had been a century earlier. Khiva and Samarkand were once more considerable cities.

Despite all difficulties, the people of Central Asia struggled to keep their social

and religious ties with the rest ofthe Islamic world. Every year tens of thousands of them

visited Hijaz to perform pilgrimage. Central Asian merchants and students were active in

going to distant places to eam money and gain an education. Aware ofthe changing

^"W.V.Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia. Trans, by V. and T. Minorsky. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956,66.

^" Barthold, 67.

269

worid, the khans increasingly asked the Ottomans to send them not only military

instructors but also engineers and teachers (though mostly theologians) to help them to

develop their cultural level.

When the Russians penetrated Central Asia, they did not have any desire to

improve the cultural level ofthe natives. Indeed, they had a somewhat negative effect on

the development of westem style civilization because as soon as they had succeeded in

establishing their authority over the region they sealed it off against the outside world.*'"

They allowed scarcely any Europeans, especially the British, to enter Central Asia.

Furthermore, in order to avoid the improvement of native cultural standards, they did not

interfere with the native practices and with cormpt mlers. Not only was their military

rule cormpt; also, native mle was incompetent to produce a better life for the people.

Furthermore, the natives were tom between remaining loyal to their own customs or

adopting new developments introduced by the Russians. While they were stmggling to

keep their traditional values intact, they faced an alien authority. Thus, most of them

considered cultural renovation largely as a development parallel to being Russianized and

acted cautiously in regard to new cultural developments.

The Russians did not intermix with the local people on social and cultural levels

largely because of religious beliefs. They generally established a Russian quarter and

rarely visited the native side ofthe cities. Moreover, the first Russians who came to live

in Central Asia were soldiers and govemment officials. They were "workers" rather than

settlers. However, the Russians carried their own culture, and lived like small alien

communities in a large country. They opened clubhouses, churches, and schools. The

first clubhouse in Tashkent was opened on October 21, 1868. One of Russians wrote to

the Moscow Gazette:

Till very lately we felt ourselves but temporary sojoumers in Central Asia, and were forever on a war footing. But things are improving now. There is immense activity in the entire country, a building of houses in the towns, a paving of streets, a sinking of wells, a digging of mines, a constmcting of

*" The Times, November 2, 1872.

^'^ Wheeler, "The Russian Presence in Cenfral Asia," 194.

270

ships; and consequently development of commerce on the Sir, which will soon render existence on these parts easy and agreeable. The female element, however, is but scantily represented as yet. We want ladies and family life to make us feel at home.*^^

While the Russians quarters and towns showed a modem and flourishing

character, the old native cities and towns continued to keep their historical and romantic

air. Russian sectors ofthe cities had larger streets and more specious public places in

contrast to those in the native sectors. Yet "they can never vie with such places as old

Samarkand in the beautiful and durable architecture and omamentation given to it by its

great barbarian rulers, and the influence of which is still traceable in the mde imitations

of style and design on many a tumble-down mosque or tomb on both sides ofthe

Oxus."*"**

The Russians "purposefully forced Bukhara to stay as a medieval-like state and 841

wanted it to be rotten in itself The ulema also had the same desire." The weaker the

khanates were, the more secure the Russians felt in the region. Despite their somewhat

democratic approach to local mles and practices, the Russians never wholeheartedly

supported a real improvement in the primitive lifestyle and administration ofthe natives.

A relatively sophisticated native school system had been established before the

Russian penetration of Turkistan. Children started at the age of six and spent seven years

to complete their primary education. In these years, they were taught Quran, religious

manners, and mantyk (reasoning). They leamed to read in both Persian and Turkish.

But, most ofthe time, they just loudly repeated passages in the books, especially in

Arabic, without knowing the meaning and content. After primary education, the students

attended medreses, where the education lasted fifteen or twenty years. Upon graduation

from medreses, they generally became imams, schoolteachers, muftis, kazis, and

^'"^ The Times, January 12, 1869.

*''° Dobson, 209.

*"' Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 257.

271

secretaries to the kazis. "Besides the regular medreses there are some special schools,

such as Saliabat Khana, where nothing but prayers are taught; Karikh Khana, where the

pupils do nothing but leam the Koran by heart, so as to become kazi; and Masnavi

Khana, where the works of poet Masnavi (Jelalleddin Rumi) are studied."*"*^ Though the

quality of education had not yet reached European standards and was still religious in its

content, the khanates had many Islamic colleges in almost all towns and cities. In 1867, 844

just in Bukhara, 105 medreses were found in 1863, and in Khokand, 15 medreses, 600 84 S

mosques were in operation. In the city of Khokand, 15,000 students were educated.

The Russians did not immediately introduce Russian schools to the natives.

Nonetheless, the first Russian school for education ofthe natives was opened in Tashkent

in 1884. The main aim of this school was to teach the Russian lifestyle to the locals.

"The school was placed under the charge of a Russian master, and the very first 40

children, chosen from the best Sart families, were sent there. The pupils increased so

rapidly that in a short time two fresh schools had to be opened, and the desire shown to

leam the Russian tongue was so great that many Sart families employed Russian teachers.

In 1886, 18 new schools had been opened."*'*^ Yet Russian schools remained very few in

number compared with thousands ofthe native schools. According to G. Wheeler, the

Russians did not show a real interest in the education ofthe region. They also did not

encourage and aid the Jadidist movement that aimed to improve the cultural and

educational level ofthe Turkic people. The literacy rate stood at around 2% in 1917, and 847

there was no modem higher education in Turkistan.

^'' Meakin, 80.

"" Schuyler, 93-94.

*'*'' Lory Alder and Richard Dalby, The Dervish of Windsor Castle: the Life of Arminius Vambery. London: Bachman & Turner, 1979, 144.

"̂̂ Holdsworth, 8.

^'^' The Times, March 29, 1888.

Wheeler, "The Russian Presence in Central Asia," 194.

272

The Turkic people of oases, especially urban folks, did not pay strong attention to

the Russian way of life and manners. They tried to resist the penetration of European

ideas and cultures into their social, cultural and daily life. Their long-developed Islamic

culture prevented them from opening their hearts to new developments. For them, the

cultural changes meant degeneration, weakness, and transgression. Though many of

them studied Russian and became govemment servants in the Russian governmental

agencies, they did not care much about the Russian way of working, acting and living.

They considered their jobs as worldly and temporary necessities and not worth making

part of their real life. Furthermore, not many people really desired to go to European

Russia to leam about the modem civilization except for a few royal family members who

studied in Russian military schools. Later these became officers in the Russian army.

Though the Russians did not particularly want to improve the quality ofthe

cultural level ofthe natives in Central Asia, they unintentionally introduced European

civilization in its Russian form into the region. One ofthe positive developments was the

publication of a newspaper, Turkistan Vilayet News, in a bilingual form in 1866 in

Tashkent. It aimed to educate people in national and intemational matters suitable to the

imperial policies.*"* Their somewhat modem buildings, large streets, parks, playgrounds,

banking systems, railways, telegraph lines, and infrastmctures came to be a part of

Central Asia.

Tax Collection

The local mlers had always had an unlimited authority to extract taxes from their

subjects because ofthe undefined character ofthe customary laws. Besides the

customary laws, the sharia provided additional authority for the khans to impose heave

taxes on their subjects.*'*^ As far as the main taxes were concemed, there were three

types of these taxes, namely kharac, tanab, and zekat. While kharac was taken from the

non-Muslims, tanab was levied on agricultural products. The zekat was taken on

'"* The Times, December 6, 1876.

*'*'Romanovski, 41.

273

merchandise and animals at the rate of 2'/2 percent ofthe trade value ofthe commodity.

On agricultural products, though the percentage ofthe tax was not stated precisely, the

common tax rate was 10 percent, and was generally taken in kind. It was a great burden

on the farmers to pay this considerable part of their harvest. Sometimes the tax on the

agricultural harvest would rise to 20 percent according to the quality ofthe soil and

irrigation facilities. According to V. Veniukov, the tax on agricultural yields would be

as high as one-third ofthe harvest.

The old tax system continued to be practiced for a long time under Russian mle.

The Russians did not immediately introduce a new taxation system into the newly

conquered territories in Central Asia. Yet, one ofthe very first important changes they 8S7 • • •

made was to stop taking zekat in their domains. Abolishing zekat helped native

merchants to compete on equal terms with the Russians, who had already been exempted

from this tax. Its repeal had negative effects on Russian traders. "The wholesale trade

has, up to this time, been in the hands of Russian merchants, thanks to the existence of

the zaket system; but with the abolition of this the trade is passing in the hands ofthe

natives."*"

In the khanates, the taxes were collected by serkars and emlakdars. The Russians,

though they tried to employ their own tax collectors who were to go into gardens and

lands to assess the value ofthe tax, failed to introduce a better taxing system. This failure

was due mostly to cormpt tax collectors who were easily tempted toward bribery and to

the efforts ofthe natives to conceal the real extent of their harvests. Thus the Russians

again retumed the task of tax collection to the natives.* '̂* For example, in Tashkent, there

was one serkar and 24 mirabs who were responsible for collecting taxes. In 1869, the

*'" Holdsworth, 9.

*̂ ' Veniukof, The Russians in Central Asia, 316.

*" Holdsworth, 65.

^" Leiven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 238.

'̂ ^ Schuyler, 155.

274

positions of serkar and emlakdar were no longer used, but, instead, emin and illikbashi,

who were also responsible for irrigation canals {ariks), began to collect taxes.*^^

In the first years of their rule, the Russians exempted some places, including

Tashkent, from taxes for some years. They also demanded lower taxes than the native

rulers had imposed on the people. Besides their repeal ofthe zekat, the Russians

generally took one-tenth of agricultural products. On livestock, they collected taxes

when these animals were sold in the bazaars. The rate was one-fourth of a tenga {tenga:

a silver coin worth seven pence) for a sheep, and one full tenga for a head of cattle. The

Russians used these taxes primarily for the improvement ofthe local institutions,

construction of infrastructures, and social organizations. According to E. Bacon, the

Russians lowered somewhat the taxes taken from the villagers, but compensated for this OCT

act with taking the natives' lands in order to provide land for the newcomers.

Under native mle, there was no land tax. The land was generally divided into

different categories according to its ownership. The first category ofthe lands was mulk

(private lands). The mulks belonged to people who had the right to sell, make vakf, or

leave to their children.*^* Along with the mulks, large territories belonged to the khan

and the state. Most of these lands were controlled by the sipahis (cavalrymen). They in

retum had to raise some soldiers according to the sizes of their lands and to join the

expeditions during the time of war. The third group of lands was vakf the economic

source for many social organizations and for medreses, mosques, roads, bridges, and

schools. The wakfs were generally exempted from taxes and were controlled by a will

that was drawn up by the founder ofthe valrf. Along with these owned lands, there were

grasslands, dry lands, and deserts. Most ofthe time local villagers or nomads used these

lands.

*''Togan, 261.

^" Singh, 29.

*" Bacon, "Soviet Policy in Turkistan." Middle East Journal I (1947): 388.

*̂ * Schuyler, 153.

275

When the Russians established their rule over Turkistan, they changed the status

ofthe khan's lands into Imperial territories. Though they initially showed some respect

to the private and va^lands, they increasingly sought to constmct Russian towns and to

settle new colonials on these lands. In addition to their efforts to bring new settlers to the

region, they wanted to change the traditional land system. According to E. Schuyler, the

biggest mistake that the Russians made was trying to convert the lands into communal

properties ofthe kind they had in European Russia. He believed the Russian system was

inefficient and unfamiliar in Central Asia. He thought that it would be a disaster to the

agriculture ofthe region if the Russians insisted on applying that system.

In 1881 the Russians began to take land taxes on the lands of both the govemment

officials and the vakfs, which had been exempted from any tax. Indeed, in Turkistan,

there was no regular land tax during the native mle. A mejlis (a commission) whose

members were the kh£uis and some ishans (religious dignitaries) generally decided to Qf.r\

impose additional taxes when they needed money.

The nomads were to pay one percent of their animals every year to their native

governments. The khans sometime took 2'/2 percent of animals under the name of zekat.

Yet strong nomad tribes, such as the Yomud Turkmens, paid hardly any tax to the khan's

treasury. As the Russians established their threatening authority, which became a reality

after the massacre ofthe Yomuds in 1873, these nomads began to pay regular taxes.*^' In

the first years of their mle. the Russians took 1 percent ofthe nomads' animals. In cash

value in 1868, the Russians began to take three mbles from each tent ofthe nomadic

societies. According to Annenkov, one mble, or two shillings tax per capita, the amount

of per capita tax, "cannot be regarded as excessive."*^^ Yet the Russians gradually

demanded heavier taxes. When General Chemiaev was appointed Govemor General of

*^'Schuyler, 153-54.

*̂ ° The Times, September 15, 1884.

861 The Times, March 30, 1875.

^''^ Charles Marvin, The Russian at Merv and Herat, and Their Power of Invading India. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1883,22.

276

Turkistan in 1882, he imposed stamp duties on the Kirghiz.*" Initial Russian tolerance

and reduction of taxes did not last. Enlightened rule did not last long. The Russians

began to show their real face as they established their authority more firmly every passing

year. Russian civilization came to have quite negative effects on the natives' lives. The

folktales and poetry of Central Asia in this period portray the Russians as seemingly

friends, but in reality cowardly enemies.* '̂*

Economic and Commercial Effects

Doubtless Russia's invasion of Central Asia had fundamental effects on the

commercial and economic stmctures ofthe khanates. The Russians began to involve

themselves in Central Asian trade much more intensively by opening up trade houses,

having caravanbashi (commercial agents), and opening a banking system for the first

time. As the Russian merchants began to enjoy secure and easy conditions for trade with

the region, the native merchants began to lose the monopoly that they had been enjoying

in the trade with Russia. By 1911, almost all cotton merchants who bought cotton from

the farmers and sold it to Russian textile factories were Russian, Armenian, and Jewish.

The natives had lost almost all their effectiveness in the trade. As soon as the Russians

subdued the khanate of Bukhara, they employed a civilian merchant, M. A. Khludov,

who owned one of Russia's largest cotton-spinning mills and was a leading Russian

exporter to Central Asia, to handle trade issues and collect tribute from the Amir in

October 1868.

The Russians always had favorable expectations for the future development ofthe

trade in the region. They aimed to make Central Asia both a source of raw materials to

their factories and a large market for their poor-quality merchandise. Though their

products had no chance of competing with British high quality merchandise, they were

^" The Times, January 23, 1883.

^''^ Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 262.

^" Ibid, 2S0.

277

suitable for the native taste in the region.*^^ In this respect, the Russians applied a trade

policy that aimed to control borders to restrict the entrance of foreign goods, especially

British products from India. Meanwhile, they encouraged Russian merchants to involve

themselves more intensively with the region. "In advancing into the heart of Central

Asia, our soldiers and administrative officials should not forget to call the merchant to

their assistance, who will find a wide and lucrative field awaiting him in those parts. To

conquer entails expense; to trade is to make money."*^'

Because of Russian annexation of part ofthe territories ofthe khanates of

Khokand and Bukhara and the signing of advantageous treaties with these vassal states,

the trade sustained a dramatic increase in the 1860's. The Times paid closer attention to

these developments and published a great deal of statistical information, including the

following table (Table 5.2).*^*

Table 5.2: Increasing Trade in Central Asia.

Imports and Exports Between Russia and Turkistan in the 1860's

Years: Imports to Russia from the Khanates Exports from Russia to the

(in Ruble): Khanates (in Ruble):

r862 3,201,100 1,720,799

1863 4,378,200 1,410,190

1864 7,699.700 2.397,000

1865 N/a 2,360,070

1866 5,065,700 3,777,400

1867 8,503,753 6,951,889

As the table shows, the volume of exports and imports between Russia and the

khanates steadily increased despite hostilities and military clashes. The imports from the

^" The Times, January 6, 1870.

**̂ The Times, January 12, 1869.

Ibid.

278

khanates in the years from 1862 to 1867 almost tripled (increased approximately 265

percent). The exports from Russia to the khanates, on the other hand, had increased

almost four times (an increase of 397 percent). The only exception to the steady rise of

trade occurred in 1866. In that year, the imports from the khanates decreased almost 35

percent compared to the imports that had taken place in 1864. This was due to the

hostilities between Russia and Bukhara, causing both countries to arrest trade. Another

important side ofthe developing trade was its growing profit in favor ofthe Russians.

While Russian exports had compensated for only 64 percent ofthe imports in 1862, this

percentage changed greatly to the advantage ofthe Russians. In 1867, Russian exports

reached almost the level of imports, with only a 19 percent difference.

The Tatars, who had been Russian subjects since the sixteenth century, played

important roles in the continuation ofthe trade. They were culturally, ethnically, and

religiously related to the Central Asian people and, for that reason, mostly held the trade

in their hands. They always had better chances of being accepted in both countries. Thus

they continued to practice their trade without any serious prohibition or limitation except

during the hostilities with Bukhara in 1866.

Conscious ofthe importance of trade with Central Asia, the Russian press,

including the Invalide, urged the constmction of a railway from the bay of Krasnovodsk

on the Caspian Sea to the Amu Daria River. The Invalide stated that trade with Central

Asia would be both more profitable and larger than trade with Persia, or even China.

According to its findings, in 1867 Russian exports to Central Asia amounted to 8,500,000

mbles, while she imported 10,250,000 mbles worth of goods. "The resuh is the more

satisfactory, as the official statistics are probably incorrect, and do not embrace the whole

ofthe business transacted. As the China trade in 1867 amounted to only 9,500,000

roubles, and the Persian to 6,500,000, Turkistan has now become our principal market in

Asia, and if peace continues, will be so more and more." ft also stressed that Central

Asian trade had a special place in the Russian economy because of her 30,000,000 rubles'

payment to American cotton producers.

The Times, December 6, 1869.

279

When Colonel Glukhofski visited Bukhara in 1873, he found that trade in the

bazaars had greatly increased since his first visit to the city in 1865-66.*'° Yet this

increase was not due to Russian involvement, but resulted from the rise of Afghan and

Hindu trade. He estimated that around 400 Afghans and 600 Hindus were trading in the

khanate. These merchants were selling, "tea, daka, indigo, prints, sof, sugar, ginger and

drugs, camel-hair shawls, gold embroidered stuffs, in all about 11,000 camel loads, of

which 6,000 camels carry tea, to the amount of 3,000,000 roubles, 2,000 camels come

with indigo to the amount of 1,200,000 roubles, and 2,000 camels with various wares to

the amount of 3,000,000 roubles, in all about 7,800,000 roubles."*" The trade between

Afghanistan and Bukhara amounted to around 10,000,000 mbles. However, contrary to

the overwhelming evidence ofthe increase of Central Asian trade after the invasion,

Glukhofski believed that the involvement ofthe Russians in Bukharan trade had

dramatically decreased after the invasion of Turkistan. He said.

In 1867 about 400,000 poods of cotton were exported to Russia; now [1873] only about half that amount. Before the occupation of Turkestan there were constantly Russian firms trading in Bokhara, having their Russian agents. During the time I was in Bokhara there was not a single Russian merchant or clerk constantly trading there, and there were only ten Tartar clerks.*'^

This decrease in trade resulted from both Bokhara's loss of more fertile lands, the

Zerafshan and Samarkand, to Russia in 1868 and the preference ofthe Russian merchants

in buying goods within the Govemor Generalship of Turkistan. Furthermore, the

maltreatment of Russian merchants in Bukhara also discouraged them from entering into

the khanate. The native officials were collecting zekat on Russian merchandise contrary

to the agreements signed earlier. The local merchants also showed less respect to

Russian merchants by not paying their dues on time. In case of a remonstrance from • • 87^

Russian merchants, the kazis or native judges did not act in an impartial manner.

' Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 236.

' " Ibid, 236.

^'^^ Ibid, 22,1.

280

Though the Turkmens were skilled silversmiths and their women were among the

best carpet weavers, they never made good progress in trade due to insecurity within their

country. The total trade with the region had never exceeded £50,000 in any given year

prior to the Russian invasions. However, under Russian rule, Merv had good potential to

become a trade center between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Persia.*"* Yet the

incorporation of Turkmenia into Russia did not necessarily help the natives have a greater

share in the trade or in the increasing wealth, ft primarily helped outsiders, including

Persians, Armenians, Russians, and other minorities to develop an elaborate trade

because Russian invasions provided them long-needed security. The Turkmens, whose

long-developed character was suitable for either rural or nomadic life, did not greatly

profit from the growing commerce. Indeed, they began to be treated as poor and rough

mral folks in their own country.*'^ They continued to have their simple way of life,

which was by no means an attractive one for many "civilized" people. As Edmond

O'Donovan, the correspondent of The Daily News who spent a long period among the

Turkmens in 1879-80 described, they had always had a life that was satisfied with the

fewest necessities. The Turkmens were not expecting to gain anything more from

Russian annexation. According to O'Donovan,

The dietary of an ordinary Turcoman is by no means luxurious. Before the sun rises he partakes of some hot half-baked griddle bread, which has an intensely clayey taste and odour. This is washed down by weak black tea, and he thinks himself fortunate if he can now and then procure himself a piece of sugar wherewith to sweeten this draught. When he happens to meet with this luxury, he adopts, with a view to economy, the Russian peasant's method of sweetening his tea. A small lump of sugar is held between the teeth, the tea being sucked through it. Several glasses are thus got through with an amount of sugar which would scarcely suffice for one glass taken by Westem Europeans. While the Turcomans ofthe Caspian littoral and hundred miles inland use only black tea, their more Eastem brethren constantly consume green. Should he be at home, his midday meal consists of pilaff, made of rice if he be in fiinds, or of brownish oatmeal if otherwise. The usual

873 Ibid, 237.

"'' The Times, September 15, 1884.

*" Dobson, 173.

281

accompaniment to this is a little grease or butter boiled through the mess, or, as is more generally the case, some dried salt fish. Sometimes, on fete days, dried plums or raisins are mixed with the pilaff. The evening meal, partaken of a little after sunset, is the best ofthe day, and for it is secured a small portion of mutton to accompany the pilaff, or a couple of wild ducks caught or shot by some male member ofthe family.*'̂

Thus, the time was yet to come for the Turkmens to leam how to compete with swarming

minorities in making more money in trade and other industries.

The Russians did not interfere with Bukharan economic life until the railway was

constmcted from the Caspian to Samarkand in 1889. Upon the completion of this

railway, the Russians increasingly sought to constmct new Russian towns along it and to

control trade from India, Afghanistan and Persia. Though the Bukharan govemment tried

to protect its sovereign rights, it eventually granted almost every Russian demand.

Bukharan cities, such as Kagan, Cherdjui (Carcuy), and Kerki became centers of Russian

governmental servants and military personnel. The Russians also succeeded in 877

controlling the customhouses on the Afghan border by 1894. They erected

customhouses at Krasnovodsk, Askabad, Ushak, Merv, Kerki, Kilif, and Sarakh. With

the exception of their consent to allow the Amir of Bukhara to receive merchandise for

his own personal requirements free of duty up to the value of 3,000,000 mbles (about

£290,000) a year,*'* they imposed duties on every material subjected to export and

import. In a long letter, Ney Elias, the Consul-General at Meshed, reported that there had

not been any effective control ofthe trade along the borders up to 1886 between

Afghanistan, Persia, and the Central Asian khanates. Only on important roads were

police collecting duties. Yet after 1886, the Russians began to establish effective

customhouses to collect the necessary dues. Strict control of trade along their borders

reached a peak when Russia included Bukhara within the imperial custom system.

"* Edmond O'Donovan, The Merv Oasis: Travels and Adventures East ofthe Caspian during the Years 1879-80-81, including Five Month's Residence Among the Tekke of Men'. Vol. 1. London: 1882,468; "The Merv Oasis." The Edinburgh Review 157 (January 1883): 211.

' " Tcharykow, 206.

"* The Times, March 27, 1894.

282

Starting in January 1895, the Russians regularly took 5 percent duties on trade items ad

valorem on Afghan and Persian goods. But they prohibited most items of British goods

from entering Central Asia. They allowed only green and black tea, muslin, indigo, some

drugs, gems, and shoes to be sold in their dominion. Nevertheless, they asked very high

tariffs on these items. Their aim in doing this was to paralyze trade through Afghanistan

and Persia. It was estimated that Persia alone would lose £80,000 a year because of such

restrictions. One reason behind erecting custom barriers was that the Russians wanted to

give better options to Russian merchants to carry the same items through the Black Sea

and the Caucasus. Though the Russians erected many customhouses and regularly

employed at least 800 custom agents on these frontiers, due to the geographic length of • • 870

these borders, restricted items easily entered the country illegally in large quantities.

Effects on Agriculture

For centuries agriculture had been one ofthe most important ways of eaming a

living in the oases of Central Asia. Yet because ofthe nature ofthe climate and

geography, the cultivable lands had always been restricted to river deltas and some part

ofthe base of mountains. In the river deltas that had always been called oases because of

chains of fertile and irrigated lands the people grew vegetables and fmits. The orchards

ofthe oases had always been admired because of their picturesque look and delicious

fruits. The rivers generally irrigated the oases. At the base ofthe mountains, however,

wheat, barley and other type of grains were produced, which were very important for

feeding the country. Generally these lands were not irrigated, but they relied on rain.

Along with these cultivated lands, the greater part of Central Asia consisted of deserts

and semiarid land, which were not suitable for farming but were used by the nomads to

herd their animals.

*™ The Times, October 3, 1896.

'*° Schuyler, 150.

283

Because ofthe geographic and climatic conditions, the Turkic people of Central

Asia developed three major lifestyles.**' They were divided into the nomads, who were

mostly Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Turkmens; the semi-nomads, who could be any tribe; and

the sedentary people, who were mainly Sarts, Tadjiks, and Ozbeks. The last group was

composed largely of agriculturalists who lived in the valleys ofthe Syr Daria, Amu

Daria. Zerafshan, and Tedjend Rivers. They were commonly called the people ofthe

oases. They produced wide varieties of agricultural products, including cotton, silk,

wheat, barley, com, and rice. They also produced many types of vegetables and fmits,

including apricots, plums, figs, peaches, grapes, and many more. Though they were

thickly populated in the oases, their labor had always provided enough harvest to survive.

Because ofthe quality ofthe soil and the well-adapted climate, agricultural products

yielded great quantities, and trees grew quite fast.**^ Almost all travelers admired the

taste and flavor of Central Asian fmits and vegetables, especially the honey melon and

watermelon, which had an important place in the people's diet. Almost all valleys and

irrigated places were covered with green and perfectly arranged gardens. The khanates

exported an important part of their agricultural products. Among the Khokandian

exported goods, wool, fmit, hides, silk, opium, and indigo played important roles.**^

Initially many would think that the Central Asian people had had only primitive

techniques in working their lands, and they would also think that the natives had

borrowed modem plantation techniques from the Russians. According to some

researchers, including Togan, this assumption was not true. The natives ofthe oases had

developed intensive farming and practiced sound irrigation and farming techniques long

before the Russians ever came to that region. Yet the Russians did not appreciate the

high quality of farming on small plots of land. They thought that planting large tracts of

**' Nikolai Vladimirovich Khanikoff, Bokhara: Its Amir and Its People. Trans, by The Baron Clement A. de Bode. London: James Mdden, 1843, 81.

**̂ Annette M. B. Meakin, In Russian Turkestan: A Garden of .Asia and Its People. New York: George Allen & Unwin, 1915, 11. According to Meakin, "The man who sows his sack of wheat or rice, or millet, is sure of his forty-fold, his hundred-fold, or even his three hundred-fold retum."

^^' Holdsworth, 8.

284

land would increase the output of agricultural produce. However, while they were trying

to use more and more land for farming, they lost the high quality of production. Thus a

new method of extensive farming replaced the centuries-old intensive style production.**"*

As far as the irrigation system of Central Asia was concemed, researchers,

historians, and joumalists have provided conflicting opinions. While some of them claim

that the Russian invasion brought new and advanced techniques to improve the efficiency

of use ofthe water, some others believe that Russian expansion had brought new and

irreparable harm to the system of irrigation. An article sent by the Beriin correspondent

of The Times stated that the Russians had dramatically improved the irrigation system:

A beneficent and highly-commendable result of Russian progress in Central Asia is the development of a new and perfected irrigation system. Very large portions ofthe steppe admitting to be converted into arable land by the fertilizing wave, the advantage accming to the natives from this branch of Russian activity is inestimable. In the Hungry Steppe, north of Samarcand, the works are steadily progressing, and prove a perfect success. Russian Khiva has witnessed similar experiments with an equally satisfactory result.**^

While the Russians were improving some parts ofthe country, they were

destroying an age-old system and harming other parts. They initially cared very little for

the native structures. The natives had developed effective methods of constmcting canals

and using water to irrigate their lands. They paid careful attention to and exerted their

best efforts to use water, the most precious element in the region. "There is nothing more

remarkable in the whole of Turkestan than its wonderful system of canals—a system that

must have been handed down from the earliest inhabitants, for without canals nothing

could ever have grown." One ofthe worst effects ofthe Russian invasion of Central

Asia was the change in irrigation and the use of water. This occurred in part because of

the new towns established in the conquered territories and in part because ofthe Russian

desire to change the established irrigation systems. When Colonel Glukhofski visited

**'' Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 291.

**̂ The Times, November 2, 1875.

'** Meakin, 12.

285

Bukhara in 1873, he saw how once "flourishing" lands between Amu Daria River and the

city of Karakul had been tumed into desert because ofthe lack of water. Some parts of

Karakul had not had any water for three years. The lack of irrigation had killed trees, and

helped the shifting sands to cover once fertile and flourishing lands. The main reason for

this lack of water was the Russians extravagant use of this precious liquid in the

Samarkand and Zerafshan districts. After the annexation of these lands, the Russians

controlled the upper side ofthe river, and established their own system. They used water

as they wished. Glukhofski said, in Samarkand and Zerafshan, "... A large Russian

population is growing up, which always requires a great quantity of water. In the Russian

part of Samarkand [one finds] the street canals, the watering ofthe streets, the large

gardens, with constantly miming water, for the pleasure ofthe Russian authorities and

their suite." He suggested, "Unless the Govemment wishes entirely to min Bokhara it

ought to limit the supply of water used in the Zerafshan district, and let the rest go on.

The former system of water supply should also be studied."**' Furthermore, Glukhofski

suggested the establishment of an independent water administration whose members were

to be from both Bukharan and Russian districts in order to control the use of water more

efficiently. Moreover, he believed that all water supplies should be used for irrigation

purposes. For this, the water ofthe Syr and Amu Daria rivers should be diverted to the

valleys ofthe Kuvan, Yeni, and other valleys. The Sea of Aral should be totally dried up 888

to create new farmlands.

Although irrigation systems and many ofthe native farmers suffered from the

Russian invasions due to the changes in the irrigation methods and eviction of some of

the local farmers from their lands, none ofthe native groups suffered as much as did the

nomads. Clearly the Russian invasions ofthe region had the worst effect on the nomads.

Prior to the Russian invasions, the nomads had been involved heavily in the mling ofthe

country and had made up the greater part ofthe military power ofthe khanates. They

were also quite strong and capable of imposing their will on the sovereigns. They used

*" Lieven, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 236.

^^^ Ibid, 239.

286

large irrigatable lands to graze their animals. However, after Russian authority had been

established in the region, the Russians became more supportive ofthe sedentary people,

and especially supportive of agriculture because they needed cotton. Yet the nomadic

societies were the most destructive of all on the farming societies. The nomads cared

little for the farmlands. They needed good grasslands to feed their animals. For this

purpose, they sometimes destroyed plantations and orchards. The nomads, who came

from the east during the Mongol invasion ofthe thirteenth century and became the mlers

ofthe region, always considered agriculture and farming harmful practices to their noble

ruling spirit.**^

In order to clear away new lands for irrigation and plantations, it was necessary to

impose strict govemment will on the nomads. General Chemiaev once said, "If the

robbers ofthe hills attack the people ofthe plain, we must retaliate to protect the

latter."*^*' This policy of protecting farmers against the nomads greatly enhanced the

agricultural productivity ofthe region. The Russians forced the nomads to leave better

lands, and stay away from the tillable soils. In this way large landmasses began to be

tilled by farmers.*^' The Russians, in order to show better farming techniques to the

natives and to settle new immigrants from Russia, opened large state farms in the Mirza

Desert and Murghab Valley. In both projects, they failed to achieve better results.*^^ Yet

Tcharykow claimed that the Murghab Valley flourished with modem dams and irrigation

canals.*^^ And Yeni Daria, a dry riverbed, was another project undertaken by the

Russians to create new farmlands for the settlers. It was believed that this valley had

been a lively farming center until 1839. By bringing water again to this valley, the old

glories ofthe region might well be brought back again. Thus, it became a new arable

**' Togan, Bugunku Turkili, 33.

*'" Marvin, Conversations, 130.

*" The Times, March 30, 1875.

'̂ ^ Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 295.

893 Tcharykow, 177.

287

valley after the Russians had constructed a dam and diverted part ofthe water of Syr

Daria River to this old bed.*"*̂

Although The Times always portrayed the Turkmens as marauding and unmly

nomads, they were to some extent involved with the agriculture in their irrigated lands.

They might be called semi-agriculturalists or semi-nomads because of their intensive

farming of tillable soils. In this respect, the Akhal Oasis amazed Russian soldiers when

they entered the country in 1879 and in 1880 during their fight with the Tekkes. There

were meadows and comfields surrounding each settlement in the country. "The maize is

growing sufficient high to conceal a man on horseback. The ploughs used have small

iron shares, and are commonly drawn by camels or oxen. Wheat and barley are largely

cultivated, and also immense quantities of maize."*^^ The Tekke Turkmens were divided

into two groups in terms of their geographic distribution. One group lived in the Akhal

Oasis on the northem skirts ofthe Kopet Dagh, and the other group lived in the Murghab

valley and along the Tedjend River in Merv. Their number was estimated to be around

280,000 in the 1880's. These groups were not only raising livestock but also

producing grain, vegetables, and fruits. Thus the Turkmens were not only nomads but 807

also good agriculturalists.

Besides the governmental policies of depriving the old nomads of their grazing

lands, the Russians began to use more modem techniques to till larger areas of soil. By

these methods, the sizes of regions for agricultural use were constantly enlarged.

"During the first three years ofthe Russian administration in the Amu Daria province the

extent of land under cultivation by the natives increased 50 percent—that is, from

^"^^ The Times, July 22,, 1883.

*'' Marvin, Disastrous Russian Campaign, 35.

""Ibid, 2,9.

Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 234.

288

120,000 to 170,000 acres."*^* For example, in Turkmenia the area of tended soil was

10,300 desitina in 1908. In 1913, this size reached 41,500 desitina.'^'^^

The Russian invasions and the establishment of Russian mle over Central Asia

introduced new agricultural products. The Russians encouraged production of sugar from

sugar cane, wine from vineyards, honey, and potato products. Yet the most dramatic

developments in the production of expanded agricultural produce occurred with cotton.

Since the Russian textile industry badly needed this raw material, the Russians exerted

great efforts to raise the quantity and quality of cotton. While they were encouraging

farmers to plant more and more cotton, they introduced new cottonseeds, including

American cotton that began to be grown in the 1880's. Because of its high-yielding

harvest, this cotton had a dramatic rise among the agricultural products. In 1884, it was

planted only on a field of 300 desitina, but six years later, in 1890, it was growing on

59,000 desitina. "By 1911 Central Asian cotton growing had been so far expanded that it

provided over half of Russia's total requirements."^"*'

The expanding cotton production had an adverse impact on some other products,

especially wheat and other grains. Since the land and water for agriculture were limited,

one plant's gain was another's loss. The result was that Central Asia began to be a

cotton-producing center and a grain-importing market. In this way. Central Asia

imported grain from Russia and exported cotton to her. A kind of "cotton slavery" was

bom as the Russians extensively promoted the cultivation of this product. Furthermore,

the decrease in the production of grains of all sorts, including wheat and barley, raised

grain prices. The country increasingly started to depend on imports of grain for local

consumption. The import rate of barley and wheat from Russia rose 802 percent from

1892 to 1907.̂ *"

^^^ The Times, June, 6, 1884.

*'' Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 276.

"'° Wheeler, "The Russian Presence in Central Asia," 196.

' ° ' Meakin, 29-33; Togan, 287.

289

As far as silk production was concemed, the Russian influence was great. During

the time of invasion, the silk industry was collapsing due to a silkworm disease. The

Russians supported new developments and improvements ofthe industry. In 1889, M.

Aloise, a Corsican by birth, came to Turkistan with 500 boxes of eggs from France. With

his help, silk production revived. Silk produced in Central Asia was soon superior to that

produced by Japan.̂ *'̂

Rising Security in the Country

Without a doubt the Russian conquest of Central Asia ended age-old quarrels

between the different segments ofthe Turkic nation. There had always been hostilities

not only between the khanates but also between the tribes. These quarrels resulted both

from the lack of a strong central authority and from conflicting interests among the

people. The country was mled by many khans, begs, and tribal dignitaries who showed

no respect for each other's political and economic life. At every opportunity, these mlers

tried to crush each other's power and destroy each other's domain. The unceasing

quarrels between the mlers of Central Asia continued not only between different mling

families but also within the same mling family. The family feud was a chronic illness

throughout the Turkic lands. Life in the villages, on the roads, and even in the cities had

no real security. Robbers, bandits, and killers enjoyed the vacuum in intemal authority.

Besides the weak and cormpt governments. Central Asia lacked enlightened and

determined local officials. As a Turkish proverb says, the govemment was cormpted

from the head. Since the central govemment lacked strong will and scientific methods to

deal with the backwardness ofthe state, the lesser officials were even more prone to

cormption. Furthermore, the lack of a strong intellectual group within the khanates

resulted in cormpt and weak social structures. Though the ulema and mullahs were

emotional leaders ofthe society, they generally viewed things from the point of strict and

dogmatic religious sentiments. They did not have a clear concept ofthe changing world

and resisted violently new developments in social and cultural matters. They had no little

'"^ Meakin, 37.

290

responsibility for keeping the public away from current worid concepts and modemism.

In such circumstances, the people grew up ignoring the most basic responsibilities of a

nation and a state. Ignoring ofthe people by the govemment and by the intellectuals

caused the people to ignore the state and the social stmcture. In this way, social,

political, cultural, military, and economic cormption came to be chronic problems ofthe

Central Asian states. Failure ofthe rulers to make just laws and prosecute those laws

with utmost determination and ability as well as the failure ofthe people to care about

what was going on around them created an attractive environment for bandits, robbers,

and alaman mnners. Merchants, travelers, and caravan drivers were all in danger of

being caught by these robbers who "rob pious to nakedness and impious to death."^*'̂

The unmly state of social existence was worse where different economic and

tribal groups lived. In this respect, the khanate of Khokand and Turkmenia were the most

troubling places. In Khokand, fighting between the nomad Kirghiz and the sedentary

Sarts and Tadjiks never stopped. Besides these intemal confiicts, they had to face the

Kalmuk Mongols and Chinese and later the Russians as outside enemies. In Turkmenia

also fighting between the nomads and the sedentary people, as well as between the

Turkmens and the Persians, never ceased, thus never allowing creation of a peacefiil

environment. Before the invasion of Turkmenia, almost all able men ofthe Turkmens

were practicing forays on the Persian villages and even on other Turkmen tribes. The

reasons for these forays were mainly economic and political. By selling Persians in the

slave markets ofthe khanates, the Turkmens responded to the treacherous policies ofthe

Persian mlers as well as eamed their living for centuries. Though the Persians tried to

settle the Kurds and other troublemaking Turkmen tribes on their eastem frontiers to

protect them from the Tekke attacks, these new groups were more harmful to the Persians

than to the Turkmens.^"'*

' " Alder, 142.

'"'' Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili, 184.

291

Though Vambery defined the Turkmens as "ruthless robbers and manstealers,

and as such utterly unreliable,"^*'̂ he, as most other researchers, failed to appreciate the

social, political, geographical, and climatic conditions of their country. The Turkmens

were in a sense trying to survive in a country surrounded by hostile powers, and in a

country where everything for a decent life was scarce. They had slim chances of

becoming rich and of having a good life. The surrounding communities, including the

Persians, Khivans, and Russians, most ofthe time cheated them, buying their dairy

products and live animals cheaply, but selling their merchandise expensively to them.̂ **̂

Furthermore, the contemporary common view about the Turkmens as marauders and

robbers did not at all reflect reality. The Turkmens were practicing these bad habits in

spite of their dislike of them. They were people "whose instincts lead them, like tme

children ofthe desert, to be extreme in all things, with a passionate longing for the

excitement of war and the chase, with a not less keen desire for the friendship of others,

and an equally bitter hatred towards those who incur their antipathy."^*" Furthermore,

they had to defend themselves against the regular armies of neighboring states. One

method of keeping their freedom, to which they adhered saying, "We are all

equals.. .each and every one of us is a khan and padishah," was to continue stmggling

with their neighbors.̂ *'* Since they were not respected at all by their neighbors because of

their independent and free lifestyle, they little cared for these neighbors. They

established their own special way to deal with problems.

Though most ofthe books, articles, and other publications condemned the

lifestyle ofthe Turkmens as well as of other nomads, there were some people who tried

to find a different answer to the issue. Boulger, for example, wrote a description ofthe

conditions that forced the Turkmens to choose their lifestyle.

'"' Arminius Vambery, The Times, April 12, 1873.

'"* Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 294-95.

'"' Boulger, Central Asian Question, 235-36.

'°* Togan, Bugunku Tiirkili, 207.

292

The feuds between the tyrannical govemor and his mercenary troops on the one side, and the freedom-loving people on the other, have been handed down from generation to generation. The loam land ofthe valleys and mountain slopes watered by the Atrek and its affluent, has been enriched with blood of those who should have made it prolific with their labour, just as it has been watered by the tears of human grief and suffering. The child has inherited the wrongs ofthe father, the antipathy of races has been perpetuated. The Persian came, and what was once a smiling paradise was tumed into a region which the children ofthe soil scarce dared to cultivate. He brought in his train the Kurd and the dregs ofthe Turkish race. He built his forts, and he gave the land at first to successful soldiers, and then to unscmpulous govemors to fatten on. Yet, despite all these disadvantages, the Turcomans [sic] held their own in the remoter glens and beyond the mountain lines. Their villages were small forts, their cultivated plains were restricted to the vicinity of these forts, their horses, as on the Scotch border in the Middle Ages, stood saddled in their stalls night and day—^yet the Turcomans throve. The Persian grew feebler, the Shah's authority became the shadow of a name, the Kurd govemor more independent, and in many cases inclined to show indulgence towards the Turcoman—the Akhal and Teke multiplied more. The prospect of a better future was beginning to appear over the horizon when the Russian invasion came on the Akhals like a thunder-cloud—but we anticipate the progress of events.̂ *'̂

The Turkmens had to be warriors for life and to keep their lifestyle as long as they were

threatened by these states. Yet after the Russians invaded their country, the Turkmens

easily gave up their old habit of foraying, and began to settle on the land and develop a

more sedentary way of life. This quick change ofthe Turkmen lifestyle resulted not only

from fear of punishment by the Russians but also from the Turkmen feelings of security

from outside countries established by the Russians. Furthermore, despite their unmly and

restless life, the Turkmens were quickly able to alter their culture for better. In any case,

the invasion by Russia of Turkmenia ended age-old quarrels between different tribes and

states. Dobson was surprised to see how the marauding Tekkes and "would-have-been

slave" Persians were working in the railway constmction for the Russian govemment side

by side as if there had never been any hostility between them.

'" ' Boulger, Central Asian Question, 238-239.

""Dobson, 152-53.

293

The western travelers, joumalists, and politicians failed to appreciate the lifestyle

ofthe nomads. These sons ofthe steppes naturally were not in favor of attacking or

being attacked by the neighboring states or tribes. Yet in their lifestyle that required them

to constantly move in order to find grasses for their animals, as well as to change their

environment for the milder climate in the winter and cooler one in the summer, they had

to cross boundaries. They had to adopt this life style to survive as they had done for

centuries. When the Russians and the Persians were establishing a boundary line

between Turkmenia and Persia in 1881, problems arose from the drawing of a definitive

line due to the Turkmens. The Atabai Yomuds were crossing to Persia for the winter and

coming back during the summer.^" A similar situation existed on almost all frontiers

that were inhabited by the nomads. Thus it was difficult to arrange permanent borders

between these states. These moves, of course, always created problems also between the

settled people and the nomads.

Establishment of Russian authority over the khanates and the nomads greatly

enhanced the security ofthe villages and caravan roads. General Romanovski confessed

that he was amazed by the result of their victory over the Amir of Bukhara as far as the

security ofthe conquered places was concemed.

Not more than three weeks had elapsed since the issue ofthe detachment from Chinaz to Irdjar, yet everything was different, and complete tranquility prevailed. Not alone had the enemy's bands disappeared, even the marauding parties which had always infested the Trans-Chui district had now vanished into the mountains at the head waters of Chirchik and Syr-Daria Rivers.^'^

The roads from the Caspian to Khiva began to gain importance as the Turkmen

and Kazakh harassments ofthe caravans began to disappear. While that line gained

importance, the old caravan roads to Orenburg began to lose their importance.

' " Marvin, Conversations, 140.

'̂̂ Romanovski, 35.

'^^'The Times, May 18, 1875.

294

The British generally believed that Russia was fulfilling a mission in Central Asia

by suppressing the harsh practices and unmly actions ofthe natives.

Peace and security of life and property, which are the foundation of every other improvement, have been substituted for rapine and personal outrage. These darkest of all the dark places ofthe earth were fiill ofthe habitations of cmelty. Their pacification and settlement were beyond our reach, and we ought not to obstruct Russia in her costiy and difficult task by habitual misconstmction and 1 • • 914

depreciation.

Vague borders, petty quarrels between neighboring tribes, and forays into Persia by the

Turkmen tribes, raids and reprisals by Persian military forces to the Turkmen country, as

well as attacks ofthe Afghan tribes, especially the Djemshidis and Hazaras, on the weak

Turkmen tribes in and around Merv and in the Sarakh country, had all come to an end as

the Russians installed their authority over Turkmenia in 1885. They ordered Persia to

pull its forces from the Sarakh country, and they also employed a garrison to keep the

borders safe from incursions. They accepted the responsibility and the task of keeping

life safe in the region. According to the Baku News from Askabad, the Turkmens were

a fine people, and they were on the best of terms with the Russians, whereas the Persians,

who overpopulated the town, lived entirely by crimes and malpractices. ' After all, A.

Vambery and other historians exaggerated the Turkmen lifestyle, and treated them as

restless and redoubtable warriors. The Russians used these overly polished writings to

stress their interests and gains larger than they really were. Yet the Turkmens were as

vulnerable to any pressure as the next one. Besides, they were good natured and more

017

civilized people than usually accepted by many researchers and politicians. Despite

rising security in Turkmenia, many believed that it was hard to eradicate blood feuds,

thefts, and freebooting.^'* Yet some believed that the Russian invasion only helped to

"" C. E. Trevelyan, The Times, November 28, 1878.

"^ The Times, June 2, 1884.

'"Ibid.

917 The Times, June 6, 1884.

295

increase vices in Turkistan. "Up to the present time the Mussulman code answers well

enough the needs of Mussulman communities, and in the hands of skilful lawyers it is

capable of still greater development. Unfortunately, the contact of Christian civilization

with Mohammedan nations has, thus far, only served to develop faults and vices under

gloss of civilization."^'^

Along with the enhanced security in the country, the Russian invasion of Central

Asia had a strong effect on the slave trade. For centuries, the Turkmens and other

predatory nomads had made incursions into Persia in order to catch women, children, and

men to sell them in the bazaars of big cities in Central Asia. The Persians had also

practiced similar activities in Turkmenia. When the Russians invaded the Turkic lands,

one ofthe first things they did was to abolish slavery. Thousands of slaves were freed,

and many of them were sent back to their native lands. "The exorable slave trade, with all

its concomitant horrors, has been abolished; brigandage has been suppressed, and

Mohammedan fanaticism and cmelty have been generally mitigated and controlled.

Commerce at the same time has been rendered more secure."^^*' "Russian Rule imparted • 071

to Central Asia a degree of peace and security which had been unknown for centuries."

Judging from the relative peacefulness and lack of revolutionary movements in

Central Asia up to the end ofthe nineteenth century, Russian mle in the region would be

called a successful one. It brought security to travelers, merchants, nomads, and

sedentary people. The only serious threat to the peacefulness of Turkistan under Russian

mle occurred in 1898. Ishan Muhammed Ali Khalif prepared and executed a plan to

declare a holy war against the Russians. He attacked the Russians at Andijan. According

to The Times, his action originated from totally religious motives and was strengthened

by the Turkish victories over the Greeks in 1897. He was believed to have close relations

with the Ottoman Turks. He planned a general uprising in many towns of Ferghana.

"* The Times, September 15, 1884.

' " Schuyler, 94.

'^° Sir Henry Rawlinson, The Times, May 18, 1883.

'^' Wheeler, Racial Problems, 6.

296

Following his attack and the discovery of his conspiracy, the Russians took extraordinary

measures in the important towns of Ferghana, and cleared many native police and public

officials in the government services.^^^ After a court decision, Ishan and 38 rebels were

hanged, and another 38 people were sent to prison.̂ '̂̂

Effects on the Social Stmcture ofthe Society

Though the social structure in Central Asia was not totally feudal at the time of

the Russian invasion, there were khans, begs, and mullahs who somewhat shared political

and social authority over the rest of the population. Yet it would be absurd to accept

Central Asian society as a feudal community in its literal sense. In a real feudal society,

wealth and noble birth served as the determining factors between feudal ranks. And there

were also vassals and suzerains. In Central Asia, however, there was not a ranking in the

sense of feudal hierarchy. The khans were absolute mlers who were supposed to have

received their power from God. They sometimes believed that they were the descendents

of both Ghengis Khan and the Prophet Muhammed. They might have had blood relations

with Ghengis Khan, but their biological ties to the Prophet Muhammed were not at all

tme. Adapting these suspicious family ties to important and sacred historical figures was

a device to serve them in the eyes ofthe lay people. The begs generally were leaders of

small communities and different tribes. Though they usually came from respected

families, they were not rich, and they did not need to come from noble families. Their

high-standing position among their own community had mostly emerged largely from

their courage, generosity, decency, and good character. In time of peace the power ofthe

leaders decreased to a very limited level. Only in time of war or other cause of anxiety, a

strong leader was sought to overcome the difficulty.

Despite their dislike of excessive authority, nomads do not live in a state of anarchy... Below the orda level, the Kazaks had "big bits and little bits' -chief of larger and smaller subdivisions in the tribal genealogy... At the base of this segmented political stmcture, the head ofthe family {aqsaqal, 'white beard')

'-- The Times, June 11,14, 18, 1898.

'^' Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 334.

297

made decisions for the aul. A group of related auls had a bii who in turn made decisions concemint' the welfare ofthe group, with the advice ofthe aqsaqals ofthe member auls. '^

Finally, the mullahs were educated men to lead the religious prayers and ceremonies

rather than a religious order. They did not have any real political or administrative

power. Yet, because the public accepted them as knowledgeable people they showed

some respect to the people. They sometime would influence people through their

preaching ofthe Quran. Their power lay on their use of Islamic laws rather than their

social or political positions. It was religious sentiments, rather than charismatic mullahs,

that drove hundreds and thousands to resist the Russians. Conscious ofthe power ofthe

mullahs, the rulers most ofthe time preferred to use them as supporters of their policies.

If the rulers ofthe country and the mullahs combined their forces, then the mullahs would

be a real power in determining both the intemal and extemal affairs ofthe country. They

would make the rulers' orders as sacred as possible to force the people to obey them,

even though these orders had no advantage to the public. In this way, they would create

an oppressive state.

After the invasion of Central Asia, the Russians effectually destroyed this feudal

power.''̂ ^ Under Russian rule, neither the khans nor the begs and mullahs, had any

chance to exercise strong influence or to keep their authority. While the members ofthe

royal family renounced their rights under Russia to directly mle regions, begs continued

to influence their people as good people. Yet this influence never threatened the Russian

authority. The mullahs were also free to lead the crowds but lost their old-time unlimited

right of preaching at will. They now had to be faithful to the "infidel" Russian Empire.

Two groups of people, the merchants and the mullahs, became local dignitaries

after the Russian conquest. The merchants thought that they would be better off if they

had safe and free trade in the huge empire. Thus most of them helped the Russians to

establish their authority over the region. Likewise, the sympathy ofthe mullahs for the

'̂ ^ Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule, 38.

'̂ ^ Togan, Bugiinkii Turkili, 261.

298

Russians originated from General Chemiaev's protective approach to the Sheria (Islamic

Law). When Chemiaev captured Tashkent and became the first govemor of Turkistan,

he abolished all taxes that were not accepted by Sheria. He also gave high privileges to

the religious men.̂ ^^ Yet the Russians from time to time violated sacred places and

offended religious feelings ofthe natives. Schuyler witnessed in Samarkand in 1873 the 077

Russians tuming a mosque into "a dining room and billiard saloon for the officers."

Along with changing ruling groups and the establishment of Russian military

administration over the annexed regions. Central Asia began to lose its homogenous

religious and ethnic character. The Russians brought with them Orthodoxy and

thousands of Christian people. In the cities and bazaars of Central Asia, Russians,

Armenians, Germans, Georgians, and Persians began to appear frequently. These

developments helped the natives to witness directly European social life in their own

country. This affected the natives to alter their traditional lifestyle. Their old and

somewhat simple life began to be replaced by complicated multiethnic, mufti-religious,

multi-administrative and multicultural structures.

'^'Ibid., 213.

"-'Schuyler, 138.

299

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The people of Central Asia had long been subjected to harsh and cormpt mle by

both alien and native rulers. They had been exploited, pressured, ignored, forced to pay

heavy taxes, brainwashed by the rulers and mullahs alike to obey orders without

criticism, raised as soldiers to be used in the wars either against foreign invaders or

against the other pretenders to the throne, and manipulated by almost every powerful

ruler or elite group. Under cormpt rulers, they became numb to physical abuses, deaf to

the cry for development, and humble in life. Because of cormption in almost every

aspect of life neither a strong patriotism nor nationalism developed to unite the people

against Russian expansion. Though historians have generally stressed existence of an

Islamic fanaticism to resist the Russians, deep-seated hatreds and clashing interests

among the different groups of society, and wrong messages produced by weakly educated

and almost illiterate intellectuals who had almost no idea about modemity of life in

Europe, produced a favorable environment for Russian encroachments. The so-called

fanaticism not only increased the destmction by the invaders, but also sent hundreds of

thousands to battlefields only to be killed by the modem weapons of their enemy.

The primary cause ofthe Russian invasion of Central Asia was not, as generally

presumed, the bad faith ofthe khanates or the presence of troublesome states on Russia's

frontiers. The reason for these activities was the Russian ambition to monopolize all of

the economic activities in Central Asia, and keep rival forces, especially the British, out

of these areas. In this respect. Central Asia was to be a source of raw materials, such as

cotton and silk, for Russian industry, as well as a market for low quality Russian

merchandise. In no other part ofthe world could Russian industry and trade have the

same easy, yet profitable, opportunities. It is also quite wrong to assume that the Russian

invasion ofthe Turkic lands resulted from the courageous and pioneering spirit of certain

successful individuals. Starting with Yermak in the sixteenth century, almost all

renowned military leaders, such as Chemiaev, Skobelev, and Kaufmann, had been not

300

only supported from the center, but also carefully directed by special commissions to

create an empire in the East. Without the systemic orders and policies developed in the

Russian govemment, and without huge Russian manpower and materiel power rallied

behind them, these generals, or agents ofthe Empire, could do nothing against the people

ofthe east.

Researchers and historians ofthe period in general tend to exaggerate the

existence of a strong rivalry between Russia and Great Britain. They have created high

sounding terms such as "great game" and "Victorian cold war" to define this rivalry. In

reality, from the beginning to the end, the relations between Great Britain and Russia in

Central Asia were constantly developed in a positive and progressive course. Both sides

made clear in the beginning that they had no interest in fighting each other for supremacy

in the region. While the Russians began to push their way into the khanates in the

1850's, the British made almost no serious attempt to become physically involved in

Central Asia as a reprisal to the Russians. British reaction was limited to a weak

diplomatic resistance, which was never taken seriously by the Russians.

From the start, both empires knew the limit of their power and never made a

serious attempt to pass this limit. Their statesmen, military strategists, and high-ranking

politicians successfully respected the main courses of their policy in the region. Though

they were divided into different camps, such as active policy supporters or forwardists, or

as passivists or masterly inactivists, the main course ofthe policy that their respective

governments applied ascertained both the causes and the outcomes ofthe political, social,

military, and economic developments. Most ofthe time, the press, statesmen, and other

responsible people, especially in Great Britain, wamed each other in an educating manner

to reach a progressive and peaceful conclusion to each problem that occurred throughout

the period. The rival sides were not anxious, or overly fmstrated, but quite calm when

they were trying to solve problems. After all, both powers never treated the issue as a

serious threat to their respective empires.

As far as the point of view ofthe natives of Central Asia was concemed, the

British approach toward the solution ofthe problem regarding the boundaries or the

301

neutral zone was much more selfish and based on pure imperialist interests than the

Russians. The Russians tried to justify their policies on the grounds of creating more

secure areas on their frontiers, while the British were after the establishment of a buffer

region for their Indian possession. Especially during the final phase ofthe rivalry, the

Russians made it clear that they were trying to unite the neighboring Turkic people under

a Russian protectorate to forestall future possible confiicts on their borders. It would

have been more beneficial to the Turkmens to live under a single govemment rather than

being divided between the Russian and the Afghan states. The Turkmens who have left

remained under Afghan or Persian rule would not have better conditions than their

brothers under the Russian authority.

The motive ofthe British to draw a demarcation line between the Afghan and

Central Asian border was not serving the needs of a large part ofthe native inhabitants. It

was a purely British-based desire to create a geographic and strategic frontier. For this

purpose, Afghan Turkistan in general, and Herat, in particular, were viewed as the key to

India. They were not only controlling the strategic passes into India, but also would

serve a marching army from the north as a base of for provisions for men and forage for

their animals. In case of a defeat, these places would offer a shelter to the retreating

armies. Thus, with any means. Great Britain tried to keep Russian expansion as far away

from the Indian borders as possible, without respecting ethnic stmctures of these lands.

The Turkic people left under Persian, Afghan, and even Chinese authority

suffered as much as, or even more than those under Russian mle. The Persians who freed

themselves from the Turkmen forays after the Russian annexation of Turkmenia began to

be more oppressive towards the Turkmens who lived in the Attek and Sarakh regions.

The Persians not only demanded heavy taxes, but also forced these Turkmens to leave

their fertile and irrigated lands to the Persian peasantry. Similarly, Afghan mle, which

was largely controlled by the British, severely oppressed Turkmens in Afghan Turkistan.

Even after the Penjdeh incident in March 1885, oppression against the Turkmens

increased because the British began to see their existence in the Afghan "state" as an

incentive to Russian expansion towards India. In order to prevent fiarther Russian

302

pretexts on the ground of ethnicity ofthe region, the British and the Afghans forced many

Turkmens to leave their ages old territories. Thus, the so-called Anglo-Russian rivalry in

Central Asia harmed the native Turkic people more than any other group that took part in

this event.

Yet. the rivalry brought some benefits to the region. Though the rivalry created

by the myth of a possible Russian invasion of India was not a genuine threat, and though

both imperialist powers did nothing but talk throughout the period, the rivalry had created

somewhat beneficial developments for the well being ofthe local population. Fearing

more from possible intemal rebellions incited by an outside power than actual military

clashes in their dominions, both Russia and Great Britain tried to win over their subjects

by treating them mildly and patemalistically, which helped the region to receive better

transportation and communication lines.

Throughout the period. The Times' correspondents and other researchers boasted

and even proudly exclaimed that their Indian subjects were loyal to Her Majesty the

Queen because ofthe positive developments in cultural, educational, and social structures

there. They always compared their imperialist mle in India with Russian mle in Central

Asia, and they always came to praise more of their own mle over Russia's administration.

Indeed, the British viewed Russian mle as partly Asiatic, barbaric, and poorly advanced.

Similarly, the Russians came to evaluate their mle over that ofthe British as more

humane and suitable to the region. They claimed that they were improving the quality of

living in a secure and developed place. In this way both empires not only envied each

other's possessions but also raced to provide a much more acceptable mle to their

subjects.

Almost unanimously, all the Russian politicians, such as Prince Gorchakov and

Prince Giers, and distinguished military generals including Chamiaev and Skobelev,

repeatedly made it clear that Russia never seriously contemplated sending military forces

into India. Despfte these assurances, the British were fearful of every move the Russians

made in Central Asia. The British feared not an immediate Russian military expedition,

but the broken promises such as given by Prince Gorchakov in 1864 and sinister moves

303

on India's borders. Every time the Russians made a move, they broke promises given by

the Foreign Office, as in the annexation of Khokand territories in 1864, as in Khiva in

1873, as in Turkmenia in 1881 and in 1884, and as in the Sarakh country in 1885.

Against these broken promises, the British doggedly pursued a policy of trying to restrict

Russian advances behind a neutral line. If the British had failed to make their timely

stance against the Russian moves, the Russians would not have hesitated to incorporate

all Turkistan, including Afghan Turkistan and Persian Khorassan. That would have

provided Russia with direct access to the Persian Gulf and a foothold on India's

northwestem border.

The British, in the beginning, hinted that they were going to allow the Russians to

establish their own sphere of influence over the Turkic khanates. What they were

interested in was the security of their Indian empire in general, and the monopoly of their

sea power in particular. They would let the Russians take the khanates or large territories

in Asia, but they would never allow the Russians to reach the warm-water ports to

challenge their supreme sea power, both commercially and militarily. Because of this

fear, the British became particularly interested in the states that had seashores and

important seaports, including Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. Thus, the real aim of

British diplomacy in Central Asia was to keep the Russians out of Afghanistan and

Persia, in other words, away from warm-water ports. In this respect, British policy was a

real success. The Times acted as "semi-official" organ ofthe British govemment to wam

the public and the politicians about Russia's threatening moves in Central Asia. The

paper impressed and, to some extent, educated British politicians. Generally opposition

politicians used The Times' commentaries to inquire about the present course of action

adopted by British govemment.

Both the British and the Russian foreign offices acted carefully not to increase

tension for a military clash even though their military leaders in the field presented a

more aggressive tone for action. While Russia did not annex all territories ofthe

khanates and left part of Khiva and Bukhara to be mled by the native rulers as her

vassals, Britain, though invading Afghanistan in 1839 and in 1879, carefully refrained

304

from keeping military forces beyond the Suleiman Range. They pulled back their forces

as soon as they reached their diplomatic and political goals.

The Russians had acted freely in the khanates, and pursued their own policy laid

down by the Imperial government. Though some ofthe administrators of this policy,

including General Chemiaev, acted sometimes more independently, in the end all went

according to the central designs.

Throughout the period under discussion there was not a serious military

confrontation between the khanates and the neighboring native states, namely Persia,

Afghanistan, and Kashgaria. The only exception was the establishment ofthe central

Afghan authority over Balkh and Herat in the 1850's, which did not lead to any real

military clashes between Bukhara and Afghanistan. The military confiicts ofthe local

states were replaced by the rivalry between Russia and Great Britain. While the former

worked its way from the north to subdue the khanates and Turkmenia by a series of wars,

the latter intervened in both Persia and Afghanistan in order to keep her authority in these

states to retain commercial interests and the safety of India.

In the 1850's, Central Asia presented a large place wherein many small or large

powers, mostly monarchical and feudal, were mling the people. The borders between the

domains of these feudal and monarchical figures were most unclear due to the social

character ofthe population. In this respect, the nomads, as well as merchants, travelers,

religious scholars, and students, who liked to conduct their business without receiving

formal visas from most ofthe neighboring states, made it impossible for the mlers to

draw a certain line between the khanates. Furthermore, most ofthe people who lived

within the borders were loosely connected to the central govemment. Their chieftain, or

bey, would choose to enter into the service of another neighboring power anytime, if it

was more appropriate to do so. Yet, the establishment of Russian and British influence in

these countries forced local mlers, nomads, and other groups to respect each other's

territories, and stay in their respective places permanently. To this end, these two big

imperialist powers created special commissions to survey the boundaries between

Afghanistan and the khanates on the ground in order to reach an agreement. Besides their

305

diplomatic understanding in 1873, Great Britain and Russia appointed a Joint-Afghan

Boundary Commission to ascertain the frontier line between Turkmenia, Afghanistan,

Persia, and Bukhara, in 1884. Another commission was created in 1895 to settle the

Pamirs question. The efforts of these commissions helped polhicians to conclude the

rivalry that arose ever since Russia started to impose her will over Persia, Afghanistan

and the Central Asian khanates in the 1830's. The Pamirs Convention of 1895 and the

Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 were two key steps in terminating this rivalry.

Throughout the period. The Times tried to cover political, diplomatic, military,

and economic changes in as much detail as possible. The newspaper showed mixed

feelings toward the countries, leaders, and other figures. Yet it always elevated the

British interests to the highest level and presented alternative solutions ofthe problem to

the British Govemment. In Great Britain, the govemment officials, as well as the public,

found a generally reliable source of information in The Times.

Nevertheless, as far as Central Asian states and societies were concemed, The

Times' views and opinions were greatly hampered and its objectivity was damaged

because of its strict adherence to the British imperialist interests, Christianity,

Eurocentricism, and, to some extent, the myth ofthe races. Since Great Britain was not

so different from Russia as far as imperialism was concemed in the East, The Times did

not really try to humiliate the Russians for their conduct in the region. Indeed, judging

from The Times' coverage ofthe events. Great Britain and Russia represented one side of

the coin while the indigenous populations were ofthe other.

Besides being imperialist countries and looking after the same sorts of interests in

faraway territories, Great Britain and Russia shared another similarity: Eurocentricism.

Both power originated from Europe and shared different branches ofthe same religion.

The Times championed or at least praised more the Christian civilization over others,

including Islamic civilization. Both Eurocentricism and Christianity, which were

sometime used interchangeably, came to be viewed as higher defining values for the

Europeans in the East. By this way, The Times represented a more Gladsonian attitude,

and, to large extent, poorly and wrongly judged local civilization. Moreover, despite its

306

faulty approach to local values and life styles. The Times surprisingly included ideas

represented by many travelers, historians, politicians, and foreign authors. Some of these

showed respect for native cultures and criticized Russia as being mthless invaders as

"Asiatic," "barbarous," and "oriental" as their one-time conquerors, the Mongols.

Along with both Russian and English religious feelings of "togethemess" in the

East, The Times represented an increasing stress on racial traits. As nationalism was on

the rise, and as Darwinian thoughts were creating Social Darwinism, many in Europe

came to accept pseudo-scientific views about the superiority of races. The rise of racial

ideologies increasingly supported Eurocentric feelings against non-European peoples. As

far as the Central Asian question was concemed, many articles, commentaries, and news,

as well as British govemment documents, stressed racial differences and implied the

victory ofthe European "white" races over the "Mongoloid" Asians. Such perverted

ideas combined with the "white man's burden" ideology made The Times an unreliable

source for objectivity regarding local values in this period. Nevertheless, most ofthe

Russians were free from such misrepresented ideas. Although they subjugated these

places, they had not acted as haughty conquerors, which, to some extent, increased

acceptability ofthe Russian mle by subjugated people, which was enviously viewed by

The Times.

It is easy to see how The Times reflected ages-old prejudices of Europeans against

Asians in general, and the Turkic people in particular. It portrayed them as barbarians,

marauders, merciless killers, and bmtal warlords. It is an irony to know that the Turks

portrayed the Europeans in similar ways. These feelings naturally led intellectuals as

well as social scientists to pay less attention to the sufferings ofthe native people, while

exaggerating the losses ofthe so-called civilized nations. In part because of these long

developed prejudices, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, especially the Turkmens, were

portrayed as lawless warriors who attacked the Persians and the Russians alike, and took

them away to sell them in the bazaars of big towns as slaves. Though, it is tme that these

people practiced forays, and took away hundreds ofthe Persians as slaves, it is wrong to

blame only the Turkmens for these notorious practices. When The Times presented this

307

issue in its pages, it almost always blamed the Turkmens or other nomads. It missed the

fact that these people had been subjected to even worse treatments by the regular armies

ofthe neighboring states. The Persians established Kurdish and troublesome Turkic

tribes on the eastem borders to raid into Turkmen lands. They were also quite

treacherous towards the Turkmens, and in every opportunity they tried to invade

Turkmenia. Similarly, the Russians forced as well as encouraged convicts and outlaws,

such as the Cossacks, to settle on the frontiers, and encouraged them to attack the villages

ofthe Kazakhs and other less fortunate communities. Thus, the representations in The

Times and other European sources in the nineteenth century were not objective, and,

indeed, were misleading about the true character ofthe people of Central Asia.

Despite its prejudices toward the natives of Central Asia, The Times had showed

great interest in reporting developments in its columns for the sake of British interests.

The editors had not thought to create a service to the Central Asian people, but they

provided valuable information about the Russian subjugation ofthe region in the

nineteenth century, and, for that reason, about the history of Central Asia. Thus, The

Times has deservedly been called the "newspaper of record."

308

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APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY

Date Short Descriptions of Events

1839 Governor General of Orenburg, Perovski, undertook a fatal expedition against the Khanate of Khiva.

1842 British armies were destroyed by the Afghans, which terminated the First Afghan War.

1847 Russians constructed Fort Aralsk on the Aral Sea, which provided them with control of this water and the lower part ofthe Syr Daria River.

1852 Russia launched the first Aral fleet, consisting of two steamers, made in Sweden and carried in pieces to the Aral Sea, and some small vassals constmcted in Orenburg.

1853 Execution of Musluman Kul by the order of Khudyar Khan in order to break the power ofthe Kirghiz within the khanate.

5 July 1853 Fall of Ak Mesjid.

14 December 1853 Kokandian forces attempted to retake Ak-Mesjid, but they were badly defeated by the Russians.

1856 The Crimean War ended and the Paris Peace Treaty was signed. 1858-1859 Count Ignatiev s long Mission to Khiva and Bukhara, which

convinced Russians to pursue a militarist policy towards the khanates.

1859 Sheik Shamil was finally defeated after almost twenty years of stmggle in the Caucasus.

November 1861 Fall of Yengi Kurghan, a Kokandian town.

1863 Fall of Aulie Ata.

June 1864 Fall of Turkistan (Yesse).

November 1864 Prince Gorchakov issued his famous circular to assure foreign countries that Russian occupation ofthe Syr Daria region was the final line of Russian expansion.

October 1864 Fall of Chimkent.

323

16 October 1864 Russian attempt to take Tashkent failed, and the Russians were defeated by Kokandian forces at Sharabkhana.

16 May 1865 Fall of Niaz Beg.

23 May 1865 Fighting before Tashkent in which Alim Kul, the commander of Kokandian forces, was fatally wounded.

23 June 1865 Fall of Tashkent.

July 1865 The Amir of Bukhara invaded the khanate of Kokand.

8-20 May 1866 At Irjar, Russian forces led by Romanovski badly defeated the Amir's forces.

7 June 1866 Khodjent was taken from Bukhara.

26 September 1866 Ura Tube fell to Russian hands.

18 October 1866 Djizak was captured by the Russians from Bukhara.

1867 Muhammad Parsa Khodja, the envoy ofthe Amir of Bukhara, reached Istanbul to seek help against the Russians.

28 July 1867 An Imperial degree, ukaze, was issued to create Turkistan a Govemor Generalship. General von Kaufmann was appointed the first Govemor General of Turkistan.

September 1867 General Kryjhanovski and General Kaufmann offered a peace treaty to the Amir of Bukhara.

May 1868 At Tash Kopm. the Russians defeated the Amir's forces.

May 1868 Samarkand and Zerafshan conquered from Bukhara.

2 June 1868 The Battle of Zire Bulak, in which the Russians infiicted defeat on the Bukharan army, and forced Bukhara to accept peace, loss of territories, and indemnity.

June 14, 1868 The Amir made the last stand against the Russians at Sirpul six miles west of Samarkand, but he was badly defeated.

June 20, 1868 Cure Beg and some other local leaders failed to retake Samarkand

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because of General Kaufmann's retum to the city with a large army.

July 5, 1868 The peace treaty between Russia and Bukhara was signed.

November 1868 Karshi was taken from the rebels led by Abdul Malik, the heiraapparant to the throne, by the help ofthe Russian forces.

1868 Russian forces temporarily invaded Kuldja.

1873 Khiva was conquered and territories on the right bank ofthe Amu Daria River was annexed into Russia, and Russian forces massacred hundreds ofthe Yomud Turkmens

October 1873 A peace treaty was signed between the Amir of Bukhara and General Kaufmann.

1874 A commercial treaty was signed between the Russians and Yakub Beg of Kashgaria.

20 August 1875 Kokand forces were badly defeated at Makhram.

11 September 1875 Russians entered Kokand without any resistance.

3 October 1875 The Khan of Kokand, Said Nasraddin, ceded all territories on the right bank of Syr Daria to Russia.

23 October 1875 Russians retook Andijan and bumed ft. Many inhabitants ofthe town were massacred.

14 November 1875 Namanghan was taken by the Russians; destmction of the city and massacre of its people took place.

21 Febmary 1876 All Kokandian territories were annexed by Russia.

1879 Russian forces led by General Lazarev and Lomakin were badly defeated before Geok Tepe by the Tekke Turkmens.

January 1881 Russian forces led by General Skobelev took Geok Tepe, and massacred thousands ofthe Tekke Turkmens.

December 1881 Treaty between Russia and Persia conceming the boundary line between Turkmenia and Persia.

February 1884 Russian annexed Merv.

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30 March 1885 Penjdeh Incident, Russian forces led by General Komaroff defeated the Afghans and drew them away from Penjdeh.

January 1895 The settlement ofthe Pamirs Question.

September 1907 Anglo-Russian convention was signed at St. Petersburg, terminating the ages-old rivalry between two empires.

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APPENDIX B: RULERS AND STATESMEN

Table B.l: Russian Tsars Name Period of Reign

Nicholas I (1824-1855) Alexandern (1855-1881)

Alexander 111 (1881-1894) Nicholas 11 (1894-1917)

Table B.2: Prime Ministers of Great Britain Name

Lord John Russell Earl of Aberdeen

Edward Stanley Derby (Earl of Derby)

Viscount Henry John T. Palmerston William Ewart Gladstone

Benjamin Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield) Robert C. Salisbury (Marquess)

Party

Whig Coalition

Conservative

Conservative Liberal

Conservative Conservative

Date in Office

(1846-1852 and 1865-1866) (1853-1855) (1852, 1858-1859 and 1866-1868) (1855-1858 and 1859-1865) (1868-1874, 1880-1885, 1886 and 1892-1894) (1868, 1874-1880) (1885-1886, 1886-1892 and 1895-1902)

Table B.3: Rulers ofthe Central Asian Khanates Name of Ruler

Khokand Khudyar Khan

Malle Khan Said Muhammed Khan

Said Nasreddin Bukhara

Amir Nasmllah Amir Said Muzaffareddin (Muzaffar) Amir Said Abdul al-Ahad (Abdullah)

Amir Alim Khiva

Said Muhammed Mehmet Rahim Khan

Isfendiyar Khan

Period of Reign I

(1845-1858 and 1865-1875) (1858-1862) (1862-1865) (1875-1876)

(1826-1860) (1860-1885) (1885-1910) (1911-1920)

(1856-1864) (1864-1910) (1910-1918)

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Table B.4: Russian Foreign Ministers Name Term in Office

Prince M. D. Gorchakov (1856-1882). N.K. Giers (1882-1895)

A. B. Lobanov-Rostvskii (1895-1896) M. N. Muraviev (1896-1900) V. N. Lamzdorf (1900-1906) A. P. Izvolsky (1906-1910) S. D. Sazonov (1910-1916) B. V. Sturmer (1916)

N. N. Pokrovskii (1916-1917)

Table B.5: Brhish Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs Name

George W. F. Villiers (Earl of Clarendon) Lord John Russell

James H. Harris (Earl of Malmesbury) Edward H. Stanley (Earl of Derby)

George Leveson-Gower (Earl Granville) Robert A. T. Gascoyne-Cecil (Marquis of

Salisbury) Archibald P. Primrose (Earl of Rosebery)

John Wodehouse (Earl of Kimberley Henry C. K. Petty-Fitzmaurice (Marquis

of Landsdowne) Viscount Edward Grey

Term in Office (1853-1858. 1865-1866 and 1868-1870) (1859-1865) (1858-1859) (1866-1868 and 1874-1878) (1870-1874 and 1880-1885) (1878-1880, 1885-1886, 1887-1892 and 1895-1900) (1886 and 1892-1894) (1894-1895)

(1900-1905) (1905-1915)

Table B.6: Russian Govemors General of Turkistan Name Term in Office

K. P. Von Kaufmann (1867-1882) Michail Grigorevich Chemiaev (1882-1884)

N. O. Rosenbach (1884-1889) Baron A. B. Vrevskii (1889-1898)

S. M. Dukhovskoi (1898-1901) N. A. Ivanov (1901-1904)

N. N. Teviashov (1904-1905) D. 1. Subotich (1905-1906)

N.l. Grodekov (1906-1908) P. 1. Mishchenko (1908-1909) A. V. Samsonov (1909-1914)

A. N. Kuropatkin (1914-1917)

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