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The Gulf crisis: A case study of national constraints oncommunity actionCarlos Closa aa University of Hull , EnglandPublished online: 13 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Carlos Closa (1991) The Gulf crisis: A case study of national constraints on community action, Journal ofEuropean Integration, 15:1, 47-67, DOI: 10.1080/07036339108428966

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THE GULF CRISIS: A CASE STUDY OFNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON

COMMUNITY ACTION

Carlos CLOSAUniversity of Hull, England

The interaction between EPC and national foreign policies can beinterpreted as the interplay of two contrary tendencies.1 On the one hand, theSEA commitment to develop a "single voice" might be considered a restraint onnational policies even though there are no indicators to assess such influence.The possibility, however, is only feasible in those areas in which EPC hasdeveloped procedures and mechanisms and, moreover, where the Community hascompetence and instruments to implement the decisions.

The second tendency is the dominant one: EPC becomes an instrumentmore for the pursuance of national foreign policies, albeit on the basis of aprogressively more coordinated line. As David Allen has expressed it, theCommunity being part of a broader framework, the effect of national activities inother ambits influences policy with the EC.2 Although EPC can be consideredone of the circles for national foreign policy, Françoise de la Serre points outthat there cannot be illusions as to the priority EPC enjoys in reality^ andparticularly in the event of a crisis. Dearly exposed, crisis management isconspicuously absent among twelve sovereign states with only the mechanismfor convening emergency meetings.4 When the demands on member statesexceed the limited EPC scope, national constraints on the achievement of aEuropean common action become particularly evident Paradoxically, thoseconstraints being one of the main causes impeding a common policy, the lack ofmechanisms and procedures within EPC stimulates domestic constraints.

1 C. HILL, National Interests—the Insuperable Obstacle? in C. HILL (ed.),National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation. London, 1983, pp.197-201.

2 D. ALLEN, Foreign Policy at the European Level: Beyond the Nation-state?, in WALLACE and PATERSON (eds.), Foreign Policy Making in WesternEurope. London, 1978, p. 141.

3 F. DE LA SERRE, The Scope for National Adaptation to EPC, in A.PIJPERS (ed.), European Political Cooperation in the 1980s, London, 1988, p. 202.

4 A. PDPERS, The Twelve Out-of-Area: A Civilian Power in an IncivilianWorld?, in A. PDPERS (ed.), op. cit., p. 158.

I n « d'lnMf ration turopitnocAJourn«! of European Integration, 1M1, XV, no. 1, unid».

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. This article examines ETC performance during the Gulf crisis betweenAugust 2,1990 and January IS, 1991. The analysis has been divided into twoperiods even though the second could be regarded as the exacerbation of certainalready existent tendencies. National constraints are reviewed in the secondsection. The concern here is to identify the common elements rather than todescribe the twelve differentiated policies. Particular attention, however, is paidto the UK and France. They still possess the means to validate their role asmedium size powers specially in the event of a crisis. As Christopher Hill hasput it, the agreement of both and important changes in their national orientationsare sine qua non conditions for a common foreign policy.5 Finally, the mainchallenges on EPC after the crisis are evaluated in the conclusions.

I . EPC AND COMMUNITY ACTIONS DURING THECRISIS

The performance of EPC and the Community can be interpreted in twodifferent stages, the first of which lasted approximately until the end of October.Although divergences among national policies did already exist, the Communitymanaged to meet the international exigencies and EPC could express a certaindegree of consensus. From November onwards, the explicit UN endorsement ofthe use of force added pressure on EPC which was also deeply influenced bynational constraints in play.

A . The Initial Consensus

The EPC mechanism worked satisfactorily during the first stage of thecrisis, when EPC action was orientated to endorse the sanctions already adoptedby some of the members. The international backing of the United Nations,which prevented sanctions being regarded as unilateral Western action, wasessential for EC decisiveness. However, the effectiveness of Community actionwas due to the fact that sanctions were related to an area in which theCommunity has effective competence, that is, foreign trade.

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, the Twelve released a statement inthe EPC framework asking for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces fromKuwaiti territory and expressing their support for Resolution 660 of the UNSecurity Council.6 With the same speed, the Commission attempted to outlinethe economic repercussions of the crisis for the EC. In the first instance, theCommission's opinion was that the crisis would imply neither a price explosionnor supply difficulties and the overall conclusion indicated that the situation was

5 C. HILL, op. cit., p. 137.

6 EC BULLETIN 7/8, 1990, p. 122.

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THE GULF CRISIS: A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 49

not too serious. The Commission proposed several measures to the Council,such as suspension of the Generalized System of Preferences for Iraq, an embargoon oil imports from that country and a common decision to freeze Iraqi andKuwaiti assets following the measures already adopted by some member states.

Those three measures, together with the suspension of cooperation inthe military, scientific and technical spheres, were the basis of EC action asapproved by an EPC meeting on August 4. The statement released reaffirmedsupport for the UN Resolution and, furthermore, indicated the predisposition ofthe Community and its member states to participate in any effort to defuse thetension in the area. The main instrument for Community action was theCouncil Regulation preventing trade by the Community as regards Iraq andKuwaiP which represented an effort to adapt the Community's overall policy toseveral (mainly national) initiatives. In retrospect, however, the advances inEPC after the SEA can be better appreciated if compared with a similar event:the Iranian crisis in 1979-80. On that occasion, sanctions were imposedreluctantly and as a result of American pressure. Moreover, the implementationof the sanctions was marked by the constitutional dispute between Denmark andits partners over whether the Community or the member governments had thecompetence to implement them.8

There was also agreement in recognizing the role of the Commissionwhose leadership role was further enhanced by a Council mandate whichempowered it to monitor Community trade measures as well as non-Communityones. That is, the Commission was authorized to supervise national policies.Moreover, the Commission received an explicit mandate to coordinate energy,financial and economic affairs. The use of its right of initiative was decisive forreleasing funds despite the fact that the limitations for granting humanitarian aiddue to budgetary constraints are particularly felt in urgent situations.^ Althoughthese measures were important, Commission President Delors exaggerated theirimpact in saving that they enhanced progress towards European union.

Two further factors added consistency to EPC during this first stage.The first was the coordinated Community response to the question of theembassies and hostages held in Kuwait, which showed a high degree ofsolidarity. Although earlier statements had addressed the issue, the situation ofthe hostages became the main Community concern at the end of August whenthe Iraqi attitude evidence that foreigners were considered a blackmail instrument.

7 OJEC, No. L213/1, September 8, 1990.

8 See W. WALLACE, Political Cooperation: Integration ThroughIntergovemmentalism, in WALLACE, WALLACE and WEBB (eds.), Policy Making inthe EC, 1983, p. 393.

9 S. NUTALL, Where the European Commission Comes in, in A. PIJPERS(ed.), op. cit., p. 115.

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An EPC Declaration10 expressed the Community's commitment to unity ofpurpose and common interest. The Twelve warned the Iraqi govenunent that anyattempt to harm or jeopardize the safety of any EC citizen would be considered asa most grave offence directed against the Community and all its member statesand would provoke a united response from the entire Community. TheCommunity response was directed against the Iraqi practice of establishingdifferences in treatment among member states nationals on the basis of therelative involvement of their respective countries. The Twelve reiterated theñ-resolve to keep the embassies in Kuwait open regardless of Iraqi claimsreaffirmed again after the worsening of the situation. Moreover, the ItalianPresidency started reviewing the possibility of imposing specific sanctions as areaction to the closing of the EC members' embassies. In a timely effort to givepolitical transcendence to such coordination, the Presidency convened a meetingof the Ambassadors to the UN in order to engage proceedings with a view torapidly convening the UN Security Council. As will be shown below, thepossibility of a common UN action pushed EPC beyond the threshold fixed bynational constraints.

Within its strict limits, the Community position was again reiterated inthe third EPC meeting, held in Rome on September 7. One of the declarationsadopted insisted on the condemnation of the measures taken by the Iraqiauthorities against foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait.11 It stressed thedetermination to do what was necessary to ensure their protection and theattribution of full responsibility for the safety of foreign citizens to the Iraqiauthorities. The consistency of the agreement was not questioned by the entry ofIraqi troops into the French embassy on September 14. This violation met aquick Community response and a statement was released within the EPCframework condemning the action and asking for the liberation of hostages.12

Three days afterwards, the EPC Council issued a Declaration repeating that itconsidered any act committed against one or several of the EC states as affectingthem all. The most important decision to come out of this meeting was thecommon agreement to expel military personnel attached to Iraqi embassies and tolimit the freedom of movement of embassy personnel The Twelve also agreedthat their embassies in Kuwait would take over the responsibilities of thosemissions whose personnel were required to leave Kuwait.13 The relevance of

1 0 EC BULLETIN 7/8, 1990. p. 124.

1 1 EPC SECRETARIAT, Declaration on Foreign Citizens in Iraq and Kuwait,Press Release, No. 63, 1990.

1 2 EPC SECRETARIAT, Statement by the Twelve on the Embassies inKuwait, Press Release, No. 68, 1990.

13 Agence Europe, No. 5330, September 17-18, 1990. p. 3.

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this decision can be judged through the wards of the President of the Council, DeMichelis. He sustained that the crisis resulted in a de facto recognition ofEuropean citizenship.

Together with the economic actions and the embassies issue, the thirdelement which gave consistency to EPC on the eve of American pressure wasthe successful separation between the US requests to the individual memberstates and the effective Community capabilities. In a parallel way, EPCattempted a timid autonomous course of action based on the traditionalCommunity policy towards the Arab world. The referred EPC- meeting ofSeptember 7 was decisive; the Council approved a declaration which analyzed thepolitical aspects of the crisis. The Community expressed its full support for theimplementation of the resolutions of the UN Security Council. The EPCCouncil recognized the legitimacy of the US request for a contribution to theGulf effort, although this was not incorporated into the Declaration. However,the Council pointed out that the best way for the Community to assume itsshare of responsibilities was to supply substantial economic aid to the affectedcountries. Thus, the Council endorsed the proposals forwarded by theCommission: emergency aid for refugees; economic and financial support to thecountries penalized by the embargo;14 and the strengthening of relations withthe GCC.15

Lacking other means, the Community attempted to use its traditionalchannels of dialogue. The second Declaration (on EC-Arab relations) reaffirmedits determination to consolidate and reinforce the historic EC-Arab friendship andits predisposition to contribute to the establishment in the region of peace,stability and cooperation.16 However, the scheduled meeting with the ArabLeague had to be postponed because of Arab fears that such an initiative wouldonly highlight the deep divisions within the Arab world. Despite this attempt,EPC was burdened by a major weakness, the lack of instruments to back itsdiplomatic initiatives. Apart from economic aid, the Community was unable tooffer credible alternatives and, therefore, it was unable to assert itself as a partner.As Giovanni Bonvicini has pointed out, the crisis management procedure isfundamentally weak because it lacks instruments of persuasion, both militaryand through direct intervention.1''

14 See the Proposal for a Council Regulation on Financial Aid for theCountries Most Directly Affected by the Gulf Crisis, OJEC, No. C 265/5, October 20,1990.

15 EC Bulletin, 9, 1990.

1 6 EPC SECRETARIAT, Declaration on EC-Arab Relations, Press Release,No. 64, 1990.

1 7 G. BONVICINI, Mechanism and Procedures of EPC: More thanTraditional Democracy?, in A. PDPERS et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 61.

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In spite of shortcomings, EPC diplomacy showed its instrumentalviability as a framework to solve bilateral problems between a member state anda Third Party. Britain found, through EPC, an excellent way out of the deadlockin her relations with Iran. The initial decision to take initiatives with a view tonormalization with Syria and Iran was adopted on September 7. The Twelveconsidered a British proposal in favour of negotiations of a new protocol withSyria and agreed to organize a meeting between the Iranian foreign minister andthe troika in New York. By October 1, new measures moving towardsnormalization of relations were announced. Those concrete measures were agreedin the EPC Council meeting on October 22. The ministers noted that theconditions for lifting the sanctions (excluding military cooperation, arms salesand visas) against Iran and for normalizing relations were fulfilled. Theapplication of the same measures in the case of Syria was rejected because of theBritish refusal.

B . The Breakdown of a Precarious Equilibrium

The deepening of the crisis underlined the differences among memberstates which seriously affected EPC along two dimensions, its overalleffectiveness and the capability to establish a common policy through thecoordination of national lines.

William Wallace has noticed that the effectiveness of PoliticalCooperation depends on national governments individually stressing that theCommission is not either a "scape goat for failure" or an "alibi for inaction."18

The way in which the liberation of the hostages proceeded showed theineffectiveness of EPC owing to the failure to bring about strict nationalimplementation of the decisions. In line with former declarations, theextraordinary European Council held at the end of October had adopted aDeclaration condemning the Iraqi practice of holding hostages. Furthermore, theTwelve expressed their determination not to send representatives of theirgovernments to negotiate the release of foreign nationals with Iraqi officials andalso to discourage others from doing so.19 This had previously been a commonpractice and threatened the unity and solidarity displayed by the Community.The main suspicion concerned the French whose nationals had been releasedunilaterally by the Iraqis. Confronting these allegations, the French declared thatthere had been no negotiations with Iraq for the release of French nationals.20

1 8 W. WALLACE, Introduction, in C. HILL (ed.), op. cit, p. 4.

1 9 EPC SECRETARIAT, Declaration on the Gulf Crisis, Press Release, No.80, 1990.

20 Agence Europe. No. 5360, October 29, 1990.

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Two days later, it was announced that the German ex-Chancellor, WillyBrandt was going to Baghdad with the official support of the Germangovernment This evoked concern among several governments. The Britishcondemned the initiative as they did a similar one by ex-Prime Minister EdwardHeath. In order to clarify the situation, a new extraordinary meeting of the EPCCouncil was called, but it only reiterated the unanimous determination tocontinue respecting the Declaration adopted by the European Council. On theother hand, the Twelve avoided taking a position on the concrete issue of ex-Chancellor Brandt's visit to Baghdad. Trying to diffuse the affair, ForeignMinister Genscher declared that Brandt's mission was purely humanitarian andthat he had worked, without entering into negotiations, to release all thehostages.

If in the diplomatic field the consensus started to crumble, the prospectsof military action encouraged the apparition of other differences. On November30, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 678 which allowed the use of •"all necessary means" to implement the remaining Resolutions. The position ofthe Community, as announced by the President of the Council, expressed fullsupport for the new Resolution, endorsement of the American initiative fordialogue with Iraq, support for the initiatives of the UN Secretary General andthe members of the Security Council, and confirmation of the EC'sdetermination to act as a single entity.

The approval of Resolution 678 implied an endorsement of the USpolicy which stressed the long-standing disjunctives of EPC. First, it raised thequestion of a possible common defence involvement linked to the securityaspects contemplated in the SEA as well as its eventual autonomy from theUSA. The events demonstrate again that EPC is a part of what has been calledthe polymorphisme of the material basis and institutional superstructure of theEuropean security arrangements.21 This is a functional confusion ofcompetences and objectives which do not always absolutely coincide. Thus,during the Gulf crisis, sanctions were endorsed by EPC as economic and politicalaspects of security covered by Article 30 of the SEA and in accordance with theTreaty's Preamble. Naval action to implement the embargo, however, had to bereferred to the WEU. If the President of the Council is to be believed, the WEUendorsed militarily the political decisions of EPC. In the words of De Michelis,the decisions taken within the WEU (to send ships to implement the embargo)were part of the discussion within political cooperation during which convergentactions were decided upon and which had taken shape in Paris on the basis ofindividual approaches,22 a point of view further corroborated by Mr. Andreotti.

21 C. FRANK, L'Europe communautaire et le polymorphisme en matière desécurite, in P. TSAKALOYANNIS (ed.). Western European Security in a ChangingWorld: From the Reactivation of the WEU to the SEA, Maastricht, 1988.

22 Agence Europe No. 5323, November 7, 1990.

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If this could be regarded as a process of formulation of a specificEuropean security policy, "some specificity" was lost somewhere between bothinstitutions. ETC did refer to the UN Resolutions as a source of legitimacy and,initially, did not explicitly endorse the US actions. The point of view of theWEU, as expressed by its Secretary General, Van Eekelen, was somewhatdifferent: he made clear that WEU forces were not there as a UN force. Rather,he stressed that their presence underscored that Europe accepted its responsibilityside by side with the US2 3 and the credibility of the autonomy of this policywas undermined by two further facts. First, the institutional design~leaves thefinal decision to national governments and, therefore, allows for different degreesof commitment Secondly, WEU lacks operative procedures and unifiedcommand. In fact, both gaps ended up by being covered in practice by NATOand the US.

The second disjunctive which EPC faced was the possibility ofpursuing an independent policy nom that of the US. Despite their earlier failure,the Twelve persisted in their diplomatic efforts. Early in December, the EPCtroika planned to meet the troika of the Arab League and agreed to invite the Iraqiforeign minister to a meeting with the President of the Council in an attempt tofind a negotiated settlement. However, the diplomatic initiative was notsupported by any consensus. The issue raised discrepancies among the Twelvebecause the meeting was conditional upon the holding of a previous one betweenthe US and Iraq. Italy and Spain criticized this since they wanted the meeting tobe held before the US-Iraq contacts. Among the other states, particularly the UKand the Netherlands, there was an implicit fear that the meeting would be used bythe Iraqis to accent the divergences between VS and Europe and to weaken theUS position. Despite this, however, the possibility of an autonomous initiativewas not ruled out

A global divergence did exist. Indeed, the European Council hadapproved a document which contained the elements that summed up thedifferences between the US and some member states. The Council, held inRome on December IS, issued a Declaration on the Gulf whose main point wasthe support for UN Resolutions.24 However, the Twelve also issued a separateDeclaration on the Middle East in which the Community reaffirmed its supportfor the principle of convening, at an appropriate time, an international peaceconference under the auspices of the UN.25 The outrage caused by the killingsof Palestinians by Israeli forces in the Temple Mount events on October 8provoked the return to the traditional basis of EPC Middle East policy relegated

2 3 VAN EEKELEN, WEU and the Gulf Crisis, Survival, Vol. XXXII, No. 6,1990. pp. 519-532.

2 4 EPC SECRETARIAT, Declaration on the Gulf Crisis, Press Release, No.85, 1990.

25 EC BULLETIN.

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since the beginning of the crisis. Since the Venice Declaration, the Twelve'sposition has been characterized by the idea of a comprehensive settlement and anemphasis on the Palestinian question. Even though EPC did not link bothissues, as the issuing of separate declarations proves, it was dear that it favoureda global solution. Nevertheless, a cleavage was established between the attitudesof the US, the UK and the Netherlands on the one hand, and those of theremaining EC members on the other. As has been noted, the weakening of theEuropean collective positions on the Middle East has been an habitual result ofthe American pressure.26 •- -

The approach of the January 15 deadline fixed by Resolution 678brought the possibility of war closer. That circumstance polarized even more thepositions within EPC. The discrepancies among the Twelve were abruptlyemphasized in an extraordinary meeting of Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg onJanuary 4. Attitudes ranged from the flexibility of the Spanish, French andItalians, who believed that a European diplomatic effort was worthwhile, to therigidity of the Dutch, who considered that the Community should only make anappeal to Iraq to respect UN Resolutions. Furthermore, the Dutch arguedvigorously against acting independently of the US. The root of the disarray wasa seven-point plan27 submitted by the French. This included the followingaspects:

1) Iraq must abide by UN Resolutions;2) assurance of non-aggression in case of withdrawal;3) a post-crisis conference on Middle East problems;4) a meeting as soon as possible of the EC with Iraq;5) acknowledgement of Bush's offer of talks with Iraq;6) establishment of talks between the troika and the Presidency of Non-

Aligned countries;7) a general conference on security in the Mediterranean.

The statement released assigned to Iraq the entire responsibility for waror peace.28 The main point of agreement with respect to the French proposalwas that of the guarantees. All members agreed that if Iraq withdrew it should beassured that it would not be subject to military intervention. The differenceswere related to points 3,4 and 7. Although the Council issued an invitation tothe Iraqi Foreign Minister, the German and Dutch in particular sustained that anyEC-Iraq meeting should be conditional on a previous US-Iraq one. Italy andSpain considered that Community action should go ahead regardless, trying to

2 6 A. PIJPERS. op. cit., p. 160.

27Agence Europe, No. 5405, January 7-8, 1991, p. 4.

2 8 EPC SECRETARIAT, Presidency press statement on the Gulf crisis. PressRelease, No. 3, 1991.

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reaffirm EC autonomy and, more importantly, to prevent eventual involvementin the imminent armed conflict. In any case, Iraq initially rejected the invitation,denying any relevance to EPC initiatives. Furthermore, the Iraqis considered thatEC policy was dictated by the US.29 Obviously, the claim to autonomy isunattainable if the external actors do not perceive and endorse such autonomy.

Disagreements were concentrated on three aspects. Point 7 of theFrench plan, about which Italy and Spain were particularly enthusiastic as aninstrument to show independent and constructive views, was not included in thestatement The same happened with the very problematic point 3. The Dutchand British vetoed it, rejecting any, action autonomous from the US. Indeed,American Secretary of State Baker declared that the French plan contained alinkage—between the Kuwaiti and Palestinian questions—consideredunacceptable. As if endorsing his words, the above-mentioned statement notedthat any initiative tending to establish a link between the full implementation ofthe resolutions of the UN Security Council and other problems wasunacceptable. This view was further endorsed by the President of the Councilafter talks with Baker.30

The issue, however, was not definitively settled and EPC preference fora global solution reappeared in a meeting of the Twelve with the UN SecretaryGeneral. The President's statement reiterated the points already known(implementation of the Resolutions, guarantees to Iraq, etc.). However, itunderlined the Community's commitment to the settlement of other problems inthe region. Furthermore, it recalled, in contrast to the above, the EuropeanCouncil Declaration of December IS which affirmed that the EC and its memberstates remained fully in favour of convening an international peace conference onthe Middle East at an appropriate time.

The episode which definitively showed the division between memberstates was the French peace plan presented to the UN Security Council onJanuary 14. Disapproval was mainly expressed by the British because the planhad not been communicated to them previously. The French initiatives were, atthis stage, addressed primarily to establishing a course of events which could beregarded as providing a moral justification for a future French militaryinvolvement Undoubtedly, the plan can be interpreted as an example ofpursuing a unilateral course of action; but this interpretation should be modifiedby taking into account the rejection of the former French plan presented to EPCon January 4. The points of this later plan were the following:31

1) a final appeal to Iraq;

29 Agence Europe, No. 5404, January 7-8, 1991, p. 3.

30 Agence Europe, No. 5405, January 9, 1991. p. 3.

31 Agence Europe, No. 5410, January 16, 1991, p. 3.

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2) an invitation to Iraq to announce its intention to leave Kuwaitimmediately and to begin the withdrawal;

3) the dispatch of UN observers and the deployment of peace keepingforces;

4) a guarantee of non-aggression against Iraq;5) a promotion of all measures for a peaceful solution; and6) an active contribution to the settlement of other conflicts in the region,

particularly, the Arab-Israeli conflict.There was not even an attempt in EPC to coordinate the Twelve's

response. The plan was individually supported by Germany, Spain and Belgium.Belgium even proposed to the UN Secretary General the appointment of amediator with a view to convening an international conference on the MiddleEast and to granting further delay in the application of Resolution 678 if Iraqcommenced the withdrawal. On the other hand, the British delegation in the UNrejected the plan on the same grounds as the US, i.e., because it created aninadmissible linkage with the Palestinian issue. After this last attempt, thediplomatic initiatives were exhausted, the deadline for war approached and,therefore, other security arrangements became predominant

The burden on EPC came not only from the restrained attitude of somemember states, but also from pressure from the USA and the predisposition ofsome member states to endorse US policies. The effectiveness of the firstactions was diluted by the EC incapability of asserting itself as an independentpower. Despite initial consistency and even saliency, EC policy soondisappeared under a constellation of different initiatives and discordant behaviourswhich unveiled the constraints to be faced by EPC.

II. NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

The criticism directed against this poor profile of the EC must be placedin proper context. The structures and mechanisms of EPC facilitate thecoordination of national actions rather than the expression of a commonposition, despite this being the goal acknowledged in Tide in of the SEA. TheEPC basis is previous national policies which can be considered a constraint inthemselves or the vehicle for national constraints influencing EPC.

A . National Foreign Policies and EPC: FactorsUndermining the Consensus

The elaboration of consensus, on which EPC procedure is based, had toconciliate divergent attitudes. On the one hand, the ambivalence and passivitydisplayed by some EC members was mainly a response to domestic factorsstimulated by the crisis. This attitude implied also a reticence towards militarycommitments, as was the case with Germany, Spain and Belgium. On the otherhand, consensus was also undermined by unilateral policies and the preference for

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alternative bilateral relations, which ran along long-standing national lines. Inthe background, the troubled relationship with the US was another source oftension within ETC enhanced by the particular British role during the crisis.

1. Unilateralism

Unilateralism on a global scale is limited to those member states withresources (diplomatic and military) to follow it through in the internationalarena, namely, France and UK. For some of the remaining members; EPC isnot only the main diplomatic framework; but almost the only one.32

Both France and Britain have means to support independent stances. Inthe diplomatic field, their seats in the UN Security Council allowed them tosustain differentiated national positions. There was no consultation processbetween them or the other ten Community partners, despite attempts by theItalian Presidency in this area. Of course, both governments rejected anysuggestion of voicing EPC common positions inside the Council. Moreover,they refused to join a common EC request for UN Security Council actions.

The situation unveiled one of the fundamental problems in achieving acommon foreign policy, since maintenance of the UN status of both countriesalways opens the theoretical and practical possibility of unilateral policies—anationally independent stance parallel to EPC coordination procedures. Aware ofthat problem, De Michelis launched a proposal to substitute the two seats heldby member states by a Community seat This suggestion was of coursedismissed but it pointed out the instrumentality that both countries assign toEPC and the real preference for unilateralism.33

French unilateralism is a consequence of three main features of itsforeign policy: an attitude of independence from the US; the pursuit of a"nationalistic" foreign policy, and traditional links with the Arab world.Although France was militarily committed to supporting the embargo from thebeginning of the crisis, she tried to present an independent stance through aposition of detachment from the US. Despite the concern to the British and theDutch within EPC that this attitude caused, it was particularly fruitful for theFrench. As early as August 23, the Iraqis reiterated their plans to release Frenchnationals to show their appreciation of the constructive and balanced positions ofthe French government. This threw a shadow of doubt on the EPC endorsementof the principle of equal treatment for all EC nationals, but those suspicions didnot prevent further French unilateral action. One month later, Mitterrandproposed a peace plan to the UN General Assembly, whose main points were at

3 2 C. HILL, op. cit., pp. 185-197.

3 3 In the opinion of De la Serre, Great Britain and France have used EPClargely as a means of safeguarding their international positions and what remains oftheir power (F. DE LA SERRE, op. cit., p. 206).

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THE GULF CRISIS: A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 59

odds with the American standpoint.34 The proposal, however, had not beenpreviously agreed with the Community partners.

The British case presents substantial differences. Despite her. interest indeveloping political cooperation, the UK has not been particularly keen onachieving an autonomous European policy. The reflection of C. Hill previousto the SEA seems to be still valid. Britain is in favour of consultations as ameans of providing a harmonious backing for the principal soloists.35 Duringthe crisis, Britain was particularly eager to secure full Community backing forits moves. The British government presented a policy of consummated factswhich had to be either endorsed or rejected as a package.

Two main factors differentiated the British position. First, the Thatchergovernment adopted a conflicting attitude in front of its Community partnersbecause of their incapacity to match the military commitments demanded by theUK and US. The tendency to subordinate Community actions to a broaderframework can be illustrated by the question of emergency aid. Initially, Mrs.Thatcher criticized the inadequacy of European efforts to offer aid to Turkey,Egypt and Jordan.36 Later, the British themselves vetoed a final decision on theissue, requesting a revision of the proposal which was to be funded equally bythe EC budget ant individual member states.37 From the British point of view,the EC contribution should take full account of the military effort being made byBritain as compared with other EC countries. Although decisions on militarycommitments were made unilaterally at their own budgetary risk, the Britishpresented their case as a new version of burden sharing.

3 4See Middle East International, No. 384, August 28, 1990, p. 28. Theplan proposed a process in four stages:

— a declaration of Iraqi intention to withdraw and a UN supervision of thewithdrawal;

— restoration of the Kuwaiti sovereignty and confirmation of the democraticwill of the Kuwaiti people;

— direct dialogue between the parties involved in other Middle East problems(Lebanon, Palestians, etc.);

— reduction of arms throughout the Middle East.Although the Iraqis expressed their interest in the plan, the French conditioned anytalks on the release of all hostages. See Agence Europe, No. 53410, October 1-2,1990.

35 C. HILL, Britain: A Convenient Schizophrenia, in C. HILL (ed.), op.cit., p. 24. As Hill himself clarifies, there is only one possible soloist: for theBritish, participating in Political Cooperation inevitably means seeking to lead in it(Ibid.. p. 23).

3 6 See The Independent, August 23, 1990.

3 7 See The Independent, September 18, 1990.

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The second particularity of British policy was that it did not attempt anindependent course. British unilateralism was, rather, an endorsement of the USaction in what was regarded as a revival of the special relationship.

2. The US and Britain's "Special Relationship"

The bilateral relationship with the US has been a priority of UK foreignpolicy38 which often burdened her relations with the rest of the Communitymembers and EPC itself. Indeed, the UK is perceived by some member states asthe guardian of US interests in EPC, mainly because Britain has always tried toaccommodate EPC into US policies. By 1990, events in Europe had started tochange the priorities of US policy. As a demonstration of this, the June NATOsummit welcomed the move within the European Community towards politicalunion, including the development of a European identity in the domain ofsecurity, which implied explicit US endorsement of one of the issues feared mostby Mrs. Thatcher.

The Gulf crisis provided an ideal background for a confrontation strategyaddressed against the feared project of a common defence policy. Even thoughthe feeble response of some member states provided additional arguments, thequest for criticism was decided a priori. In the immediate aftermath of the Iraqiinvasion, Mrs. Thatcher delivered a speech at the Aspen Institute in which sherejected further transfer of national sovereignty to Community institutions,particularly in security affairs. At the same time, she strongly supported thepreponderance of the Atlantic connection in the face of European claims. Hence,the British government consistently aligned its policies with the US (forinstance, committing forces at the earliest stage of the crisis). Some of the UKactions did not take into account EPC or the other member states at all. Thus,the UK and US had already agreed on November 19 that military force wouldhave to be used against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait.

The endorsement of US leadership was paralleled by a condemnation ofthe evasive European response and the explicit reaffirmation of the Britishpredisposition to share the burden of being the world policeman in the defence offundamental principles. This attitude was criticized by other member states,which regarded EPC as a mechanism for implementing an independent stance.As P. Ifestos has recorded, the need for disassociating from American policieshas been one of the motives behind EPC involvement in the Middle East39

3 8 See W. WALLACE, Britain's Bilateral Links Within Western Europe,London, 1984, p. 10.

39 See on this as well as for the argument of the next subsection theexcellent work by P. IFESTOS, EPC—Towards A Framework of SupranationalDiplomacy?, Aldershot, 1987, pp. 379 and 563.

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3. EPC and National Policies towards the Middle East

The development of an EPC policy towards the Middle East has givenway to a process of harmonization of domestic policies. During the crisis,indeed, the Community kept its traditional pro-Arab orientation which wasdemonstrated by the declaration issued by the European Council reaffirming itssupport for the role that the UN can and should play in protecting the rights ofthe Palestinian people and called once more on Israel to meet its obligations.Furthermore, it considered that the tragic events that had occurredin Jerusalemshowed once more that the "status quo" in the Occupied Territories isunsustainable.40

However, the consensus on this point was not very solid and maskedtwo conflicting views already pointed out On the one hand, Britain and Hollandwere very reticent towards the possibility of establishing a link between the newcrisis and the older Palestinian issue. This tough stance accords with thetraditional Dutch support for Israel and the earlier British disputes with Syria andIran about the Lebanon hostages and the Salman Rushdie affair, respectively.

On the other hand, the Mediterranean members, which have traditionallypaid particular attention to Arab concerns (Spain, Italy and France), triedsystematically to individualize their positions minimizing the negative effects ofother allies' policies. The inefficiencies of EPC in providing satisfactoryresponses to national priorities stimulated in the Mediterranean group the searchfor alternatives and the three of them developed a parallel unilateral diplomaticactivity specially addressed to reassure their Magreb partners. France pursuedthis line unilaterally through its peace plans, whilst Italy and Spain cooperatedin proposing a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

B. Constraints in Crisis Management

Apart from the general policy lines indicated above, there were specificfactors derived from the domestic environments that generally do not influenceEPC but suddenly become an important source of pressure in a crisis situation.The essential intergovernmental nature of the process makes it not veryaccountable but, at the same time, does not allow the establishment of a solidbasis for consensus. As W. Wallace has pointed out, national governments willfind themselves constrained by domestic lobbies and interests which areuninvolved in, or even unaware of, the wider European framework.41 Three

4 0 EPC SECRETARIAT, Declaration on the Middle East, Press Release, No.74, 1990.

4 1 W. WALLACE, Introduction in C. HILL, op. cit., p. 13.

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main elements constrained policies during the crisis: public opinion, the degreeof political consensus and the style of leadership.

1. The Role of Public Opinion

Public opinion in the Community was a strong constraint on nationaldecision making which placed some governments in a conflict between externaldemands and domestic pressure. The figures showed an overwhelming approvalof the EC initiatives during the crisis (humanitarian aid, support* to countriesaffected by the embargo, etc.).42 Despite widespread appreciation and awarenessof Community measures, public opinion indirectly affected EPC effectiveness.Humanitarian concerns were focused on the release of the hostages, creating apropitious environment for the endorsement of unilateral actions by personalitiesseeking the release of nationals. The case of Brandt referred to earlier wasparamount in breaking the consensus expressed in EPC. However, it was therule rather than the exception.

Although an overwhelming majority of European opinion wasunequivocally against the Iraqi invasion and later annexation of Kuwait, nationalpublic opinion diverged in appreciation of appropriate security measures to tacklethe problem. There was a consensus ab negado in public opinion—with thenotable British and French exceptions, that a national military involvement wasnot desirable. The polls throughout the period showed a continuous Britishendorsement of the use of force. On January 10, a Mori poll showed 75 percentof Britons in favour of the use of force, as well as 70 percent of Germans, 53percent of Frenchmen and 51 percent of Italians.43 However, those figures fell(except in Britain) when the question was put whether the country in questionshould participate in military action.

These data corroborated the trends expressed in earlier polls reported onSeptember 15.44 In those polls, 54 percent of the Germans interviewed rejectedany possibility of sending German troops (33 percent in favour); and 53 percentopposed the amendment of the Basic Law allowing the deployment of forcesoutside the NATO area. The data for Spain were more exhaustive: 54 percent ofthose interviewed rejected any direct (Spanish) intervention; 48 percent opposedthe dispatch of Spanish warships to enforce the embargo; one-third thought thatSpain should keep out of the crisis entirely and only 22 percent thought thatSpain should provide non-military help.

4 2 See Eurobarometer, 34, p. 39.

43 The Economist, January 19, 1991, p. 33.

44 The Independen, September 15, 1990, p. 11.

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TABLE I

EUROPEAN OPINION ON MILITARY ACTIONIN THE GULF CRISIS45

Use of Military Force to Free Kuwait

Germany Spain Fiance Italy Britain ECS

SupportOpposeDon't know

632413

66286

7520

5

59347

86122

70237

Sending Military Equipment and Supplies

Germany Spain France Italy Britain EC 5

SupportOpposeDon't know

60328

41517

70246

43448

85123

61327

Sending Ground Forces from your Country's Armed Forces

Germany Spain France Italy Britain EC 5

SupportOpposeDon't know

28666

33607

62326

33616

77194

47476

Thus, the majority of public opinion did not provide the basis formilitary involvement and seemed to favour policies stimulating a diplomaticsolution. This was the main component of the EPC response, and so did notundermine the legitimacy of EPC actions. Public opinion, however, questionedthe viability for EPC to incorporate the main instrument of crisis management,i.e., the eventual use of force.

2. The Political Consensus

Public opinion was reflected by political parties and parliamentaryoppositions which reinforced, undermined or prevented consensus on propersecurity actions being adopted by national governments.

4 5 Data from Gallup Political Index, Report No. 362, October 1990. Thepolls were carried out between October 1 and 10.

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Although national parliaments have tended to adopt a permissiveinactivity towards EPC,46 this is mainly due to its low profile. When "highpolitics" become seriously involved, the attitude changes radically. The generalpattern during the period was that of parliamentary oppositions trying to preventengagement in military action, weakening the national positions for crisismanagement. Britain was again the exception; the government counted on anearly and continuous parliamentary endorsement The only intention of theopposition was to ensure that an eventual military intervention should beendorsed by an explicit Security Council Resolution. The discrepancies betweenthe Cabinet and the Opposition that foreign policy towards the Community hadraised in the past did not exist this time.

The situation was very different for other governments which enjoy ahigher degree of domestic consensus in general EC affairs. The Spanishgovernment faced loud opposition from the left which extended even to otherparliamentary sectors. In France, criticism was expressed not only by theCommunists, but also by the far right National Front and the Gaullists.Moreover, the divergent approach was reflected within the Cabinet by DefenceMinister Chevènement, who was very reluctant to contemplate French militaryinvolvement in the crisis.4^ Similarly, the German government had to face notonly strong warnings from parties ranging from the Greens to the SPD, but alsothe lack of internal consensus in Cabinet, whilst the defence minister argued infavour of some military commitment, Foreign Minister Genscher adopted amuch more restrained, even negative, position.48

The relevant fact is that most of the twelve governments foundthemselves faced with strong political opposition which prevented or hinderednational accord. Therefore, they failed also to provide clear and negotiablepositions that could lead to a Community consensus. Not surprisingly, themain aim of most of them was to keep a low profile which would satisfyinternal pressures and domestic opposition.

3. The Leadership in the Management of the Crisis

Whether public opinion and lack of political consensus could restrain orprevent European security engagement in security actions depended mainly thethird element of policy style, namely leadership. Crisis management requires the

4 6 C. HILL, op. cit.. p. 189.

47 Chevenement declared already in August that he could not agree withthose who were getting carried away in their reactions to the Gulf crisis stressing therisks of an ultra-technological and frightfully archaic war. Agence Europe, No. 5314,August 25, 1990, p. 3.

48 The Economist, August 18, 1990, p. 38.

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exercise of detailed control by governments on the policy options. A slow andreticent response was the most common line taken due to a need to checkdomestic criticism first So, for instance, the Italian government had to delaysending naval units until it could get parliamentary approval.49 In contrast, theassertiveness and intransigence of Mrs. Thatcher, which had been a cause ofinternal disagreement in other cases, was a source of strength vis-a-vis hesitantCommunity partners during the Gulf crisis. She had made clear the Britishstandpoint since the beginning of the crisis, and it remained unchanged despitethe coming to power of Mr. Major.

Most of the other Community leaders had to confiront critical domesticopinion on the one hand, and a critical and demanding attitude from the US andthe UK on the other. Caught between these two influences, most of them wereunable to establish a solid and coherent course of action and numerous mistakesunderlined their weakness. And EPC's low profile did not contribute toimproving conditions. As Françoise de la Serre has put it, EPC has an "alibi"or "windbreak" function, i.e., it is a framework for swings in national policies,under the excuse of harmonization, without provoking domestic publicopinion.50 Such an option was largely reduced because of the secondary role ofEPC when security is at stake. The case of Spain can illustrate this pointAlthough Spanish public opinion generally rejects military commitments, it isstrongly supportive of the integration process and, therefore, the Spanishgovernment has systematically linked EC membership to security compromises.During the crisis, the tendency of public opinion was confirmed. In the event ofwar, 30 percent thought that Spain should abstain from any kind of participationand 32 percent believed that Spain should do whatever other EC states did. Butthe Spanish government could not point to a single European response as areason for military involvement and had to confront again the suspicions thatany engagement with US policies raises in sectors of the public. Therefore,military commitments had to be reduced to the minimum required by WEU,which left the decision to government discretion.

The French, and particularly Mr. Mitterrand, provided a good exampleof skillful management His performance focused on satisfying those whodeeply distrusted American objectives, keeping a favourable position in the Arabworld, checking public opinion in the hope of eventually gaining support for useof force and, finally, presenting the country as a full member of the coalition.

The importance of political leadership is self-evident in Community andEPC affairs. The Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart attributed to the EuropeanCouncil and, therefore, to the Heads of State and Government, the task ofproviding a general political impetus to the construction of Europe. However,

49 Agence Europe, No. 5314, August 25, 1990, p. 3.

5 0 F. DE LA SERRE, op. cit., p. 201.

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subordinating themselves to national constraints, most of the governmentstransmitted the impression that European constroction would be subordinated toselfish, discordant and awkward national interests. This happened in a momentin which the political union issue was gathering momentum. It affected themost sensitive area to be discussed in the forthcoming talks on Communityreform, i.e., security; and it showed that those who had held the mostmaximalist views towards union excused themselves form taking decisive actionbecause of national constraints. The projected Conference on Political Union, asfixed in the Rome meeting, faced, then, the difficult task of further developingforeign policy and security in the context of the Gulf legacy.

ra. CONCLUSIONS

Traditionally, crises have provided the grounds for the improvement ofthe EPC mechanism and procedures. Thus, for instance, the urgency procedurewas developed after the Afghanistan crisis. Therefore, it is logical to supposethat the Gulf crisis could influence the new EPC shape under the Political UnionTreaty. This crisis, indeed, put forward the issues and challenges that EPC hasto face if it is to evolve into a truly common policy. The Head of the EPCSecretariat, Giovanni Januzzi, singled out the first issue: if Europe wishes toplay its rightful role in the regions which concern its vital interests, it musthave resources available.^1

The EC has demonstrated that it can satisfactorily respond tointernational requirements when political and economic measures are related toareas in which the Community has effective competence and procedures toimplement the decisions. The overall Community action became inconsistentwhen crisis management had to face the main EPC shortcoming: the lack ofcompetence on security and defence. European action demonstrated adisorganized passivity when an untidy institutional design of organizations andcompetences permitted the free play of national constraints. Therefore, thedevelopment of a "European role" implies a linkage between economic anddiplomatic muscle and the military dimension.

Beyond the enlargement of the scope of EPC however lies the mainchallenge: the problem discussed by P. Ifestos of identifying a single Europeaninterest or Europe's correct role.52 National constraints, so evident during thecrisis, have shown the difficulties of reaching a European consensus fromdivergent national policies through the coordination of positions. Given thereduced EPC scope, national constraints mainly affect forthcoming areas

5 1 G. JANUZZL Europe and & Security Dimension, in NATO Review, No. 2,April 1991, p. 5.

5 2 P. IFESTOS, op. cit., pp. 96-113.

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(security and defence) but exemplify the EPC paradox: whilst nationalconstraints place a brake on the possibility of reaching a common foreignpolicy, the lack of mechanism, procedures and competences stimulates thebreakaway from consensus on behalf of the satisfaction of domestic constraints.

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