REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUILDING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATES FOR ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

20 – 22 JULY 2015, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA

The Theory and Practice of the Developmental State: A Comparative Assessment of South Africa’s and Malaysia’s Development

By

OJOCHENEMI J. DAVID

ojochenemidavid@gmail.com 

AND

LUCKY E. ASUELIME

lucky4real14@gmail.com

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

Abstract South Africa continues to make allusions to building a democratic developmental state in its public statements, policy pronouncements and documents and policy options, particularly since the end of apartheid in 1994. However, what constitutes a democratic developmental state remains to be fully evident, especially relative to some Asian countries, including Malaysia which has largely succeeded through practice. Given the unique nature of the concept of ‘developmental state’, it is apt to inquire what it essentially constitutes in relation to Africa’s experience in general, and South Africa’s in particular. To a large extent, Malaysia exhibits features that are similar to South Africa’s socio-economic and political environment; hence, making it compelling to compare both countries’ developmental experience. While Malaysia has managed to achieve greater development, South Africa still battles with numerous developmental challenges, especially in recent years, despite acclaimed economic growth in the past. This study adopts a triangulation methodology and the Developmental State theoretical framework to explore the institutional factors in Malaysia’s developmental agenda, and comparing it with South Africa’s experience. By so doing, the kind of institutional reforms necessary for growth and development in South Africa is explored. The central claim of this study is that a competent state institution is positively correlated with economic performance (growth and development). The policy implications for South Africa, in particular, and Africa in general, cannot be overestimated in view of the many challenges facing them.

Key words: Developmental state, Human Development, Economic growth and development, South Africa, Malaysia

Introduction

Literature on the developmental state (DS) has continued to reference the East Asia miracle

of the 20th century as lessons that can neither be fully emulated nor entirely discarded by any

21st century country that aspires towards building a developmental state. Aptly, emphasis has

been on the need for innovativeness and a high level of ingenuity in the adoption of what

worked in East Asia. This is largely in view of the fact that the 21st century states are

confronted with realities somewhat different from the East Asian experience, including

democracy, resourcefulness and an advanced level of integration in a globalized world

system (Öniş, 1991; Carmody, 2002). Hence, it is argued that developmental states in the

region were successful as a result of the lesser influence of the above realities. This thus

constitutes a necessary condition for the formation of a developmental state. Other critics

have clearly shown that rather than being inimical to development, democracy for instance, is

integral to development (Edigheji, 2010; Mkandawire, 2010). Norway and Sweden as

developmental states are considered eloquent testimony to this view, even though some claim

that Scandinavian cases do not fit into the classical DSs. Although it is argued that the

Scandinavian countries ‘do not fit the classical developmental state ideals type’(Chang, 2010:

84), they engaged in selective industrial policies that were instrumental in their

developmental feat. Akin to this, the view of development first, then democracy, is jettisoned

as merely a sequence fallacy (Edigheji, 2010: 8). Undoubtedly, this counter-criticism helps to

quell belief in some quarters pertaining to the impossibility of democratic development states

(DDSs) in Africa.

Nevertheless, only a very few African states have managed to fully adopt the DS in practical

terms. In this regard, Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa as well as Uganda to a large

extent, are seen as imbibing the DS framework. In lieu, some African states merely makes

verbal allusions towards building a DS but lack in the requisite political will, particularly in

terms of the right policy formulation and implementation, as well as the necessary

institutional backup. South Africa post-apartheid fits well in the category of such states in

view of the discord between its allusion to building a DS and its development reality.

Given the resemblance between South Africa and Malaysia in terms of resource endowment,

population, and history of inequality, it is pertinent to inquire into what accounts for the

different developmental outlook of these countries at the different stages of their history.

While, Malaysia sits among the high human development countries, South Africa is ranked

among the medium human development countries. Hence, Malaysia has been largely

recognized as a success story particularly in the DS literature. This is largely through its

various impressive and progressive economic outlooks. On the other hand, South Africa’s

economic outlook in recent years, particularly since 2007 when it made allusions to building

a DS, has been less encouraging considering the decline in its growth rate, decreasing from

3.6 percent in 2011 and 2.2 percent in 2013, to 1.5 percent in 2014. Also alarming is the

projection of South Africa’s 3rd in ranking after Argentina and Venezuela in the 15 most

miserable economies in 2015, according to the Bloomberg misery survey1 (see fig 1). It is not

only worrisome but also raises the question as to how practically developmental is the South

African state? Malaysia is nowhere in the projection despite its own economic challenges in

recent times.

                                                            1A misery index (MI) is simply calculated by the summation of the unemployment rate Ur and the change in price index Chpi. That is: MI= Ur+ Chpi. (see http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-02/the-15-most-miserable-economies-in-the-world)

Figure 1: Misery index projection: 15 projected failing economies in 2015.

Source: Bloomberg News Survey 2015

While statistics, particularly about growth, do not always tell the whole story in development,

they are quintessential considering the virtuous or vicious circle between growth and

development as suggestive of the subsequent qualitative comparison between the two

economies herein. Hence, it is apt to raise pertinent questions such as: What accounts for the

different developmental outcomes of these two countries? To what extent do institutional

elements aid or inhibit economic growth and development? In other words, what similarities

and differences exist between Malaysia and South Africa with regard to institutions as

significant elements in the process of national development; and what lessons can be learnt

from the experiences of both Malaysia and South Africa with regard to the discourse on

economic growth and development in developing countries? To address these questions, this

study is designed to compare the developmental experiences of Malaysia and South Africa

with the aim of exploring the role of the state institution in the advancement of economic

growth and development.

This study is divided into three overlapping sections. The first unravels the theoretical and

conceptual underpinnings of the developmental state paradigm. The second gives a

comparative description of both South Africa’s and Malaysia’s developmental history. The

final section analytically draws lessons from some of Malaysia’s experiences that have policy

relevance for South Africa as an evolving democratic development state in the 21st century

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

 

Albeit that the concept, developmental state, has been described variously, emphasis has been

on its essential empirical characteristics, particularly the prioritization of economic

development in government policy by such states. Accordingly, a number of East Asian

states in the 1970s and 1980s are often used as reference points considering their marked

developmental outlook against a number of odds, even though the concept of DS predated

them. Little wonder, Edigheji (2010: 2) rightly links the development of the concept to

historical circumstance. Against this backdrop for instance, Castells (1992: 56-57), cited in

Fine, 2010: 171) defines a state as developmental ‘when it establishes as its principle of

legitimacy, its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the

combination of steady high rates of growth and structural change in the productive system,

both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy…’ Meanwhile, the DS

paradigm can hardly be limited to the experience of a given state, including the East Asia

miracle. It has rather varied from state to state, with some essential similar trends running

across them. Hence, beyond the empirical dynamics of the above definition, scholars have

appositely identified the flaw in the retrospective tagging of a state as developmental only

based on its success. This is the crux of the DS theoretical framework, which is employed in

this study, considering its relevance to South Africa where the ‘DS language’ has come to

dominate its political space, yet with less than expected results in practical terms (Poon,

2009).This dynamics of what we call develop-mentality not only highlights the ideological

(rational) basis of the developmental vision that characterizes a DS thereby making the

definition ‘less tautological’ (Routley, 2012: 9), but also opens the door for any state to aspire

towards such a vision.

A 2007 UNCTAD reports appositely acknowledged two common features in the

developmental states literature, namely, a developmental ideology and the requisite

institutional or structural design towards the embodiment of this ideology. Akin to this, South

Africa’s enunciated aspiration to develop along the DDS model is not misplaced. The

pertinent question, however, is: given the geospatial and time difference between the often

referenced 20th century East Asia experiences in the DS literature, how feasible is the

building of a democratic developmental state in Africa in general, and in South Africa in

particular?

To address this question, a succinct but sufficient deconstruction of the concepts of

development and the state arguably constitute a viable point of departure, given their

centrality to the foregoing discourse.

Development: A multidimensional concept  

As with a number of terminologies in the social sciences, the polyvalence of the concept of

development has been extensively captured in the literature (Sen, 1999; Musamba, 2010;

Alkire and Deneulin, 2009; Alkire, 2010; Akyüz and Gore, 2001). For instance, according to

Agbo (2005: 2) the term development is often [mis]used interchangeably with other terms

such as growth, modernization, evolution, progress, social change, and advancement. He

observes that scholars as well as planners readily associate development with the societal

structure of highly industrialized nations, advanced in education, science and technology. To

this effect, development often presupposes catching up with the industrialized countries of

the world, which have a positive index in terms of economic growth and GDP per capita

among other variables often used to measure modernization. Yet the experience of growth

without development is not uncommon, especially in a number of African countries. Indeed,

growth can occur with little or no effects on the citizens (Perroux, 1983) as in many of

Africa’s mineral rich states.

Sen expounded development, beyond the parochial orthodox conception hinged on economic

growth indices, GDP, industrialization, personal income and modernization, to include

human freedom, choice and capabilities (in Qobo, 2013: 342). Along these lines, the

individual or group dimension of development is also acknowledged with reference, for

instance, to issues such as growth towards self-reliance and ‘responsibleness’ towards one’s

welfare and destiny (Remenyi, 2004: 25) Apparently, the concept of development is not only

multidimensional but is also constantly developing as it has come to mean more and more

over the years. Hence, while earlier measurable aspects, such as GDP, Purchasing Power

Parity, Gross National Income GNI inter alia are retained in the conception of development,

the qualitative dimensions are equally accented. For the purpose of this study, we endorse

the view of United Nations (1971) Assembly which underscores the following as integral to

the notion of development:

[1] A minimum standard of living compatible with human dignity; [2] Improvement of the well-being of the individual; [3] Sharing of benefits by society at large;

[4] More equitable distribution of income and wealth; [5] A greater degree of income security; and [6] The safeguard of the environment.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are constructed along the above fundamental

thrust of development, the elements of which form the basis and scope of the UN’s Annual

Human Development Index (UN.HDI), and upon which this study shall draw heavily, given

the qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Arguably, the key factors highlighted above

place the assessment of development with the procedural principle of equity, efficiency,

participation and sustainability, with principal reference to people’s lives and capabilities

(Alkire and Deneulin, 2009; Alkire, 2010: 10). Accordingly, Sen’s broad conceptualization of

development which accents human freedom and capability constituted the prism through

which development is construed in this study. This is rightly so because it forms the basis of

the UN’s human-centered idea of development, as promoted both by the MDGs and

represented in the annual UN.HDI.

Hence, from this perspective, economic growth (EG) and human development (HD) are

considered as symbiotic and mutually reinforcing of each other even though not necessarily

automatically. As Stewart et al. (2000)pointedly observed of the two-fold connection between

EG and HD: [1] increases in EG not only offer the resources that permit sustained

improvements in HD, but also create an enabling environment for HD; and [2] improvement

in living standards including in terms of the quality of the labour bears significantly on EG.

Increasingly being acknowledged is that the attainment of this broad sense of development in

a given territory requires a viable state institution, especially given the eloquent testimony of

historical evidence to the fact that market forces alone in the neo-liberal tradition cannot

bring about economic development in the broadest sense. Hence, we shall now turn briefly to

the state-development nexus.

State vis-à-vis Development: The trajectory  

The debate on the state-development nexus has mainly been between adherents of the neo-

classical economic/neo-liberal school of thought and the neo-Weberians, with the former

endorsing the minimalist position while the latter advocates for effective state intervention in

development. Essentially the state’s role in development has undergone various vicissitudes:

‘from anti-market, through market-conforming, to market-friendly perception, the state is

now seen more positively, if cautiously so (Fine (2010: 1). This growing recognition of the

state’s role in development, for instance, is concisely captured in the 1997 World

Development Report thus: ‘the state has an important role to play in economic and social

development as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator. An effective — not a minimalist — state is

needed to provide the goods and services — and rules and institutions—that allow markets to

flourish and people to lead healthier, happier lives’ (cited in Chhibber, 1997). Undoubtedly

the state is the primary provider of the requisite institutional platform for the political, socio-

economic, cultural and legal development of a given country since it supplies public goods

and services, encompassing ‘the maintenance of law and order, creating and maintaining the

enabling environment for peace, security and stability, to health and education services for

the citizenry’ (Economic Commission for Africa, 2012: 2). Hence, the common

understanding of the state, in DS literature, ‘as a set of processes and institutions which act as

a form of domination or authority that produces particular sets of outcomes - in this case

developmental ones’ is apt and therefore employed in this study for clarity purpose (Routley,

2012: 7). Akin to this view, the World Bank (1993) study of the East Asia Miracle

acknowledged that deliberate and highly interventionist policies by the state was influential in

high rates of resource mobilization and accumulations (cited in Mkandawire 2010:65).

Central to this idea is that without an effective state and its policies, the development was

hardly going to happen.

Meanwhile, different outcomes have characterized state-led developments in different regions

of the world. In most African states, the outcomes have been quite discouraging. In its

imitation of Europe’s successful state-led reconstruction post-war, Africa experienced a

rather opposite effect as far state-led development is concerned, considering the severe

balance-of-trade deficit that ensued from its import substitution industrialization (ISI) model

(Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). It was against this backdrop that the Structural

Adjustment Programs (SAP) were prescribed by the international financial institutions (IFIs)

in the late 70s and early 80s for most African economies, with the aim of minimizing state

involvement in economic matters. However, given the historical evidence, it is safe to argue

the ideology that undergirded Africa’s cases has been responsible for the abysmal outcomes

especially in terms of economic development. The architects of SAPs, namely the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, were particularly conscious of the

state’s role ‘in economic development and poverty reduction, with regard especially to the

entrenchment of properly functioning institutions, good governance, responsible leadership,

and participatory governance mechanisms’ (cited in Economic Commission for Africa, 2012).

Unfortunately, with reference to the reform agenda in Africa, the prevailing neoliberal view in the

1980s, which essentially advocated for market liberalisation, was driven by the mantra: ‘get

the price right’ (Mkandawire, 2010). As Mkandawire (2010: 65) clearly articulated ‘the

reform agenda confined itself to dealing with how states should govern and not what they

should be doing’ thereby producing what was ‘at best an anaemic regulatory state designed

merely for restraining social actors, especially the state’.

This ideology practically militated against Africa’s development up until its failure was

realised following the poor response of the private sectors to the whole liberalization that

characterized the first phase adjustment in Africa. Today, SAPs are generally considered as

more ‘hurtful than helpful’ to the various African states that adopted them as shown by the

alarming rate of economic dispossession and underdevelopment that has grown in the

continent over the years. Hence, as Chhibber (1997)) cautions in reaction, the tendency

towards a minimalist state following the failure of state-led development, ‘the agonies of

collapsed states such as Liberia and Somalia demonstrate all too clearly the consequences of

statelessness’. Similarly, Stiglitz’s early 1998 criticism of the Washington Consensus

essentially acknowledges the prevalence of market imperfections and provides a rationale for

micro and macro interventions on this basis (cited in Fine, 1999). What is rather at stake is

not just the state but its institutional capacity to effectively intervene. In other words, once a

state is effective it plays a vital role in development. For instance, drawing from the

Lindaurer and Princhet’s (2002) study, Mkandawire (2010: 61) succinctly highlighted that the

state can:

• influence private producers by providing incentives and enabling environments through a whole range of policies – including fiscal, monetary, investment and trade policies;

• assume regulatory roles by establish the rules of the game and by ensuring that private gains are compatible with social objectives;

• serve as mediators in conflicts between various social actors and interests; • assume welfare rolls such as redistribution of wealth and protection of citizens against

the vagaries of nature and the market; • engage in direct productive activities by assuming an entrepreneurial role taking on

high-risk or high-capital projects; and • help resolve a number of coordination problems though planning.

The above are the defining features of a strong, as opposed to a weak, state; the former has an

effective interventionist thrust to a country’s development agenda. Little wonder, the idea of

the ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ state is thus often used interchangeably with the notion of

developmental state. From its early coining by Johnson, a developmental state is

characterized by its focus on economic development through the formulation and sufficient

implementation of requisite policy (Leftwich, 1995). Such states often have institutions and

leaders that act to protect the interest of its people, for instance, against foreign corporate

exploitation. This means, a developmental state not only has autonomy and political power,

but also a good control over the economy as the main sources of its legitimacy(Castells,

1992; Pronk, 1997).

Against this backdrop, Johnson considered Japan (among other East Asian states) as an

example of a developmental state given that its remarkable economic development was

mainly realized through the far-sightedness of its bureaucrats. Other developing states largely

considered as having such “capacity’ combined with “developmental vision”, include,

Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea among others, given their marked economic

growth records among the developing nations in the last four decades. Although its literature

is largely born out of the East Asia ‘miracle’ economies, the developmental state model in the

broadest sense is as theoritically comprehensible as it is historical; hence, it is not some static

historical eventuality defied of replicability. So looking at these historical experiences can at

least ‘shake us out of our usual assumptions regarding what is possible; for reality is often

‘stranger than fiction’ (Chang, 2010: 82). In other words, the possibility of replicating DS in

Africa as any other developing state, is a reality to which scholars have rightly alluded

(Gumede, 2009; Fine, 2010; Dadzie, 2012).

Nevertheless, with the exception of Botswana and Mauritius, most African states including

South Africa, have hardly attained the impressive and sustained economic growth (for

instance, in terms of GDP) of a developmental state. As a result, the human development

outlook, especially in the sub-Saharan region is far from enviable. Nevertheless, buidling a

DS has become a political buzzword even among the drivers of statecraft in South Africa

particularly since 2007. For instance, informed by the African National Congress’s (ANC’s)

2007 conference in Polokwane, President Zuma promised that “working with the people and

supported by our public servants, we will build a developmental state, improve public

services and strengthen democratic institutions’. One would expect that given its relatively

sound democratic credentials, natural and human wealth enddowment and infrastructural

prowess, South Africa would have been able to decisively deal with a number of socio-

economic challenges facing the nation ever since then, especially in the area of service

delivery. However, national economic growth has been dismal despite government’s

spending constantly rising since the 1990s. Hence, we now turn to comparing South Africa’s

economic development trajectory to one of the South East Asian developmental economies,

namely, Malaysia given their similar DS features. For instance, both states laid institutional

foundations aimed at indigenous entrepreneurial class incubation and poverty alleviation

(Omoweh, 2012).

Comparing South Africa’s and Malaysia’s Developmental Experience  

By way of prelude, it would suffice to give a rather brief overview of the two countries in

question. On the one hand, South Africa, which was granted nominal independence by its

British colonial master in 1910, after the second Boer War, became a republic in 1961 (RSA)

following a referendum. However, the heterogeneous sub-Saharan Africa state now with nine

provinces and a population of about 51 million (according to its 2010 census), only became

fully democratic in 1994, following the demise after many years of the repressive apartheid

regime (officially between 1948-1994). These historical events were to have implications for

the overall development of the country. For instance, apartheid is largely responsible for the

uneven development along racial lines with the dominant black population being the worst

victims, a situation that not only necessitates the DS model, but also militates against it.

Situated at the southern tip of Africa, South Africa is endowed with a range of mineral

resources including gold, diamonds, platinum, chromium and iron, not to mention the yet to

be fully developed Karoo Basin gas reserve. All these have implications for the feasibility of

DS.

Malaysia, on the other hand, is a South East Asian country with thirteen states and three

Federal Territories created officially in 1963 by the merger between Malaya (now West

Malaysia), Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (Cho, 1990). Singapore was later to move out of

this amalgamation. Despite its multiracial composition with major groups such as Malay,

Chinese, Indian and other significant indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak, Malaysia is

largely considered as a rapidly industrializing country and a strong state with well-defined

economic distribution policies. It belongs, alongside, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the

Philippines, to the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN. As at 2010, Malaysia

had a population of 28.3 million with the distribution shown comparatively with South Africa

in figure 2.

Figure 2: Population composition: Malaysia and South Africa

67.424.6

7.3 0.7

Figure 2a: Percentage distribution of the population by ethnic group, 

Malaysia, 2010

Bumiputera

Chinese

Indians

Others

Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia (2010).

80.2

8.8

2.5 8.4

Figure 2b: South African population, Mid‐2014 estimates

Africans

Coloured

Asian/Indian

Whites

Source: Statistics South Africa (2014)

Why is the comparison between South Africa and Malaysia useful especially apropos the DS

model? It is simply due to the striking similarities between the two economies. First, both

multi-ethnic countries had colonial legacies that left positive as well as negative impacts.

Demographically, South Africa and Malaysia have been growing at almost the same pace,

with the former having a higher population of 51.8 million according to the 2010 census.

Meanwhile like the Bumiputera of Malaysia, the most populous and political dominant

groups in South Africa, namely the black Africans, have far less income and fare worse in

overall development than their counterparts. While colonialism is partly responsible,

apartheid aggravated the South African case. For instance, in 1994 the white population had

the highest proportion of skilled employment of 42.2% compared to the 15.1% of the black

African population (Statistics South Africa, 2014:4). Meanwhile, in Malaysia, through the

government’s efforts this has improved since 1994. However, the marginal gain by the black

population (1994- 2014) is unacceptable for a developmental state.

What is more, among the renowned South East Asian developmental economies, Malaysia in

the 1980s had a strikingly similar development outlook to South Africa. Roughly 30 years

ago the GDP per capita of South Africa and Malaysia stood at $5 635 and $7 469

respectively (International Monetary Fund 2009 cited inWentzel and Steyn, 2014: 325).

Although the outlooks were not drastically apart, South Africa’s trend has been less

encouraging compared to Malaysia, which by its pursuit of both economic growth and equity

amidst historical challenges similar to South Africa, has distinguished itself as a

developmental state. Malaysia was one of the ten fastest growing economies between the

1970s and 1990s while at the same time effecting a rigorous wealth redistribution, which

understandably attracted the South African government’s attention to draw up its Affirmative

Action policy (Snodgrass, 1995). During this two-decade period of 1970-90 in particular,

Malaysia enjoyed sustained growth and remarkable wealth distribution owing to the

government’s concerted interventionist efforts both in the formulation and implementation of

the National Economic Plan (NEP). Suffice is to say that it is one of the most defining

characteristics of Malaysia and of a developmental state.

Figure 3: Population growth rate: South Africa and Malaysia

Source: Trading economics (2015).

Importantly, like the South African black population, the Malays prior to this period

perceived government’s responses to their economic disadvantage as inadequate; hence, they

responded violently to the threat of political take-over by the Chinese-Indian supported

parties during 1969. However, government ingenuity through the NEP not only addressed

this threat by the formulation of a reassuring constitution but also through the economic

empowerment of the Malays thereafter. As Snodgrass (1995: 7) explained, the NEP had two

prongs, both which were to be achieved with a constant growth rate:

The first was "to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty," the second "to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function." The second "prong" in turn had two aspects: (a) employment was to be restructured by sector and occupation, eliminating the "ethnic division of labor" that had been created in colonial times and remained quite evident in 1970; (b) the ownership and control of wealth was to be restructured; specifically, Malays were to hold 30 percent of corporate sector assets by 1990, compared to their current share of percent; Chinese and Indian Malaysians were to hold 40 percent

With some of these policies, Malaysia was able to boost its economy and reduce the poverty

rate drastically over a period of time. For instance the poverty rate was gradually reduced

from the 49.3% in 1970 to 3.6% in 2009. Figure 4 below captures this feat in brief, indicating

that Malaysia is an upper middle income economy. Notably, the period between 1970 and

1990 witnessed most of the poverty alleviation effect. Although it was not as impressive as

other East Asian economies during the 1980s, Malaysia’s growth rate surpassed most

countries around the world. In fact, according Snodgrass, outside the region, only Botswana

and Lesotho grew faster than Malaysia at the rate of 8.1% and 4.5% respectively.

Figure 4: GDP per capita, poverty rate, real wage and Gini Coefficients of Malaysia 1970-90

Source: (United Nations Development Program, 2014)

South Africa’s developmental outlook as figure 5b below clearly reveals in comparison with

Malaysia shows that while the former, in the view of some scholars, has striven reasonably

well to build a developmental state, more needs to be achieved, more still needs to be done.

It is true that a huge percentage of the population is still poor, depending on race, given the

high level of inequity. It against such a backdrop that Gelb argues that South Africa is not a

development state due to its ‘low level of equilibrium trap and its failure to reach a pact with

its social partner on growth and redistribution’(cited in Omoweh, 2012: 12). Owing to this

slow economic growth rate, South Africa lost its place as the largest economy in Africa, to

Nigeria in 2014. Based on the latest report in 2015, the unemployment rate in South Africa

stands at 26.5 percent, while the growth rate averaged 3.09% between 1993 and 2014 b

(Trading Economics, 2015)

The end of apartheid raised many hopes and expectations. Following its democratic election

in 1994, South Africa expressed its commitment to addressing the historical inequality

entrenched by apartheid that manifested itself in various facets of societal life, covering the

gamut from education, health, employment, welfare and human settlement, to access to

infrastructure and services. The realization of these difficult objectives are yet to fully

materialize given that over twenty years after the attainment of freedom from the repressive

apartheid regime, the state is still faced with a number of developmental challenges. The

Executive Director of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Fanie du Toit’s apt

summary of the state of affairs in South Africa in 2008 (which has hardly improved in 2015)

gives an idea how much of the dividend of democracy had been realised 15 years post-

apartheid:

Despite democracy, peace in communities remains brittle. Despite economic gains, racialised inequality lingers. Despite transformation programs, institutions continue to suffer from popular legitimacy. Despite ambitious government policies, the poor continue to suffer from patchy service delivery. Despite having turned the risk of civil war into the opportunity of democracy, we still have a long way to go towards realising a just society of peace with all its citizen, whether rich or poor, indigenous or foreign, black or white (in Hofmeyr, 2008:ix).

Hence, as far as the DS idea is concerned, we can better appreciate the differences in

development between South Africa and Malaysia by comparing the two economies at

different epochs, particularly when they match developmental practice with policy

pronouncements to achieve developmental vision. The figures 5a-e below generally highlight

some statistical comparisons between both economies on measurable economic indices. This

is to show the current state of affairs in the two countries. Following this therefore is an

analysis which also draws on qualitative factors in view of the broad notion of development.

The approach is to specifically but systematically compare both economies at different eras in

their DS practice. Accordingly, in the case of Malaysia the emphasis in the analysis is on the

period of 1970-1990, while for South Africa, it is 1994-2014.

Figures 5a-e: Economic Figures: South Africa and Malaysia, 1990-2010

(a) GDP per capita compared (US$) 

Source: Trading Economics (2015)

‐4 ‐2 0 2 4 6 8 10

199020002005200620072008200920102011201220132014

(b) GDP growth Rate(annual %), 1990‐2014

South Africa Malaysia

Source: (World Bank, 2014)

(c)Unemployment Rate % of the Labour Force: South Africa versus Malaysia, 2000-2014

(d)Employed persons (1975­2009) 

(e)Government Spending (2000­2014) 

Source: (Trading Economics, 2015)

 

Analysis  

The foregoing statistical comparisons suggest that both economies have had very similar

developmental outlooks in recent times at least in a measurable sense. However, Malaysia’s

outlook seems better than South Africa’s on some fronts, owing to the foundation of DS laid

in the two-decade period 1970-1990, during which Malaysia’s DS story is often underscored

in the literature. For instance, starting with a GDP of US$2.4 billion in 1960, the country

recorded US$4.4 billion by 1990. Unlike Malaysia, South Africa’s economy was caught in

what was described as ‘a low-growth, middle-income trap, characterised by a lack of

competition, little workforce participation, low saving and a poor skills profile’(Hofmeyr,

2012: XIII). The negative trade-offs trickles down to the municipal government that is

directly faced with the ‘severe strain in attempting to deal with poverty, unemployment,

marginalized communities, urbanizations, and HIV/AIDS’ (Atkinson, 2007: 53). Gumede

(2009: 1)compares the unemployment level to the level last seen during the Great Depression

of the 1930s and rightly noted how it ‘exacerbates the persistently high levels of poverty and

inequality in the country’. All of these feed directly or indirectly into the growing discontent

with government that drives various service delivery protest across the state. For the

numerous demonstrations, petitions and violent confrontations that marked 2010, and even

beyond, are eloquent testimony to this view (Atkinson, 2007). Unfortunately government

responses to these crises was described as ‘as uncompromising and inscrutable as the

National party of old’, oscillating between the two extremes of ‘honest acceptance of guilt, at

one extreme to, autocratic obstinacy, at the other’ (Atkinson, 2007: 53). The causes of these

crises arguably lie most often in institutional weakness. According to Atkinson, the causes of

the mass protests lie in three factors, namely ‘municipal ineffectiveness in services delivery,

the poor responsiveness of municipalities to citizen’s grievances and the conspicuous

consumption entailed by a culture of self-enrichment on the part of the municipal councilors

and staff’ (Atkinson, 2007: 53).

Qualitative Dimension:Malaysia versus South Africa through HDI prism  

To appreciate further the development difference between the two economies, we draw

insight from the United Nation’s Annual Human Development Reports (UN.HDI). The HDI

is a composite index that measures average achievement based on three basic dimensions of

human development, namely a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of

living. Beyond economic figures, HDI gives a qualitative insight into human development. It

is measured on a scale of 0-1, representing lowest to highest human development records.

y = 0.002x ‐ 3.4781R² = 0.7459

y = 0.0061x ‐ 11.432R² = 0.9857

0.5

0.55

0.6

0.65

0.7

0.75

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

HDI V

alue

Year

Figure 6. HDI: Malaysia and South Africa (1980‐2013)

ZA

MAY

Linear (ZA)

Linear (MAY)

Source: (UNDP, 2014), authors’ compilation

As the above figure suggests, from almost the same human development index of 0.577 (with

South Africa at 0.569) in the 1980s, Malaysia has moved consistently up the ladder unlike

South Africa; hence, the trend lines (R2 )=0.9857 and 0.7459 respectively. Among the 199

countries surveyed Malaysia and South Africa rank 62nd and 118th respectively. Fleshing out

a little detail of the technicality of this rating could further illuminate our appreciation of the

dynamics of the HDI calculations 2 . For instance, the difference in inequality in life

expectancy between Malaysia and South Africa stood at 4.9 % and 25.7% (or at the adjusted-

inequality value of 0.805 and 0.422) respectively as of the 2013 rating. In gender inequality

terms, Malaysia stood at a lower value of 0.210 with a rank of 39 in the world, while South

Africa was at 0.46 with a rank of 94 in the world, in the 2013. What is more, between 2004

and 2013, Malaysia recorded a low percentage unemployment rate of 3% against South

Africa’s 25.1%. A comparison of South Africa’s with Malaysia’s indices, in terms of poverty

rate, Gini Coefficient, wage and GDP as captured in figure 4 earlier, clearly suggests that

South Africa still lags behind in human development roughly two decades after its imitative

adoption of Malaysia’s Affirmative Action policy. On quality of education, Malaysia

recorded 13 pupils per teacher against South Africa’s 30 per teacher (2003-2012). Hence the

perception of government efforts at sustainable development is lower n South Africa

compared to Malaysia. Based on a HDI survey covering 2007-2013, only 25% and 42% of

South Africa’s population were satisfied with the government’s effort at poverty alleviation

and environmental sustainability respectively. These, for Malaysia, stood at 70% and 72%

respectively. Figures 7a and b below reveal differences in other key aspects of the HDI.

 

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

1990

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

Figure 7a :Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 1990‐2013

South Africa

Malaysia

                                                            2 For full details on how HDI is calculated see Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/en.

y = ‐0.3347x + 680.88R² = 0.7692

y = ‐0.8937x + 1855.6R² = 0.195

0102030405060708090

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Percen

tates

Year

Figure 7b: Mortality rate, under‐5 (per 1,000 live births)

Malaysia

South Africa

Linear (Malaysia)

Linear (South Africa)

 

Source: (World Bank, 2014)

Further still, on the scale of 0-10 (least - highest satisfaction) overall life satisfaction stood at

5.1 and 5.9 for South Africa and Malaysia respectively. Corroborating this on the part of

Malaysia is Economic Planning Unit (2011: 6) Malaysian Quality of Life Index (MQLI),

which highlights the progress in Malaysian education sectors in terms of pre-school and

secondary and higher literacy rates, better teacher-student ratios as well with the high test

increase of 20.2. Other key indicators of Malaysia’s development record including

satisfaction with: standard of living (75%); service deliveries (87%); as well as the aspect of

freedom of choice and job satisfaction, were higher than what obtained in South Africa

(UN.HDI, 2013). It is little wonder that only 43% of South Africa’s population answered

‘yes’ in terms of trust in national government as compared to Malaysia at 76% (2007-2013).

Various reasons are adduced for South Africa’s low developmental records particularly from

the perspective of its low economic growth that has resulted in its derailment it from the DS

path. These include, inter alia: under-utilization of its youth population; low attraction of

foreign direct investment (FDI); low industrialization; export-oriented manufacturing;

relative state autonomy vis-à-vis international market forces; and inadequate manufacturing

thrust.

On the first point, it is noted that, investment in the cognitive and skills development of

young South Africans (with particular reference to primary education, and maths and science

education) requires more urgent practical attention considering the country’s dismal ranking

of 132 and 143 out of 144 in these areas (Hofmeyr, 2012).There is a global aquiescense that

human capital, understood as the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or

members of a society, is integral to development, and that the East Asian development stories

were the practical demonstration thereof (Lucas and Verry, 1999; Oluwatobi and Ogunrinola,

2011). According to Lucas and Verry (1999: 94), ‘investment in human capital, particularly

education and training but also raising nutritional and health standards, raises labour

productivity, earnings and, possibly, physical capital investment as well’. This resulted in

Malaysia’s National Development Plans adapting constantly to the various needs of different

times in line with it vision to be a knowledge-based economy. Hence, the focus on primary

and secondary education dominated the initial stage of Malaysia’s Developent Plan in view

of its revelance to initial mass labour for large-scale but low-skill mass production, as

suggestive of the influx of labour-intensive assembly companies in the pre-1990s in Malaysia

(Rasiah, 2002: 16).

On FDI, the National Treasury of South Africa has time and again acknowledged the positive

contribution of FDI to the nation’s economic growth and development, especially in terms of

its contribution to GDP. In fact, Fedderke and Romm’s (2006:738) study reveals the direct

positive effects of FDI on economic growth in South Africa. Yet over the years FDI inflows

have been unfavourably inconsistent. According to UNTAD reports (2012:190), the values

of Greenfield FDI projects declined by more than 50% in 2010, that is, to US$6 805 from its

value of US$13 533 million in 2008. This then turned around in 2012 by rising to US$12 410

million. Considering South Africa’s potential, it has been widely considered to be receiving

less FDI inflow than necessary for the economic growth that would ameliorate the

developmental lags. Factors adduced for these inconsistencies range from skills shortage and

extensive labour legislations to crime (Wentzel and Steyn, 2014). Related causes also include

the state’s having relatively less control of market forces due perhaps to the state’s

‘embedded or institutionalized dependence on global forces’ (Carmody, 2002: 261). For

instance, as autonomous states, the East Asia economies that gained socio-economic

development using FDI, contemporaneously managed external capital while still being a

major player. These economies are able to ‘govern the market and not be subservient to it’

(Gopinathan, 2007). While depending on capital imports as some stage, developmental states

like South Korea, Taiwan and Japan were able to ’accumulate capital surplus at home and

develop R & D capacity to such an extent that they were able to create their own

multinationals, whose investment in the region further boosted growth’. By so doing, they are

able to also dictate terms in the global market (Gopinathan, 2007:57). No doubt, South Africa

exhibited the above feature to a large extent. In fact, as a country that experiences

globalization more from within relative to other developing nations, the benefits of these

dynamics are expected to be more. However, compared to these Asian economies, South

Africa is worse off in this regard considering the impact on joblessness as production

contracts instead of expanding. For instance, ‘whereas many mines in South Africa are close

to being worked out, this is not the case for new acquisitions in the rest of Africa’ (Carmody,

2002: 263). By implication, regardless of the other merits of this outward FDI, there is a

creation of jobs outside and contraction thereof within.

On relative state autonomy, DS literature underlines the centrality of embedded state

autonomy especially in relation to industrial transformation, as well as ’meritocratic

rationalised bureaucracy’ for an autonomous operation of the state (Johnson, 1982; Evans,

1995; Trezzini, 2001). This, for instance, according to Evans (1995) entails ‘dense networks

of interaction between the state and domestic industrial capital, with the state in the dominant

position’. But this must happen against the backdrop of a positive relationship between state

and society since the latter is an active receiver of state power. Hence, the relevance of

embeddedness which implies ‘a concrete ‘set of connections that link the state intimately and

aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of

transformation’ (Evans 1995: 59). In a DS, this autonomy wisely facilitates the right

ambience for developmental-oriented interaction among the diverse actors. The East Asian

economies, including Japan and Malaysia, manifested these dynamics in their political

economies by making an effort to chart the middle ground between statist and neoliberal

approaches to development.As far as political ideology is concerned, South Africa’s relative

state autonomy, particularly with regards to its unusually globalized energy-mineral

conglomerates in terms of links and capabilities, constitute an impasse to its developmental

state aspiration. For instance, Chang (2010:88) rightly explains that this factor limits the

‘range of things that the state can do without facing major opposition from the capitalists –

specifically if it as some future point ends up fully liberalising the capital accounts’. Akin to

this, Carmody (2002)incisively points out that:

This dependence is manifest in 'negative autonomy' from domestic social forces. Negative autonomy is where the state appears autonomous from domestic social forces, but that autonomy is the obverse of dependence on global forces, and therefore reflective of their priorities. Thus, the state liberalizes the economy to maintain the 'confidence' of international investors and uses the global market to discipline productive capital and labour, rather than being able to discipline them on its own to achieve developmental goals (Carmody, 2002).

Moreover, although geo-spatial and historical factors account for the differences in the

approach towards the export-orientation of the two countries, the active role of the Malaysia

state in promoting manufacturing exports must be duly applauded (Rodrik, 2008: 7). While

Malaysia’s expansionist approach towards the manufacturing sector was largely growth and

equality promoting, South Africa case was different as manufacturing lost ground to the

tertiary sector thereby distorting corresponding employment. Figure 8 below clearly reveals

that trends in South Africa and Malaysia 1970-2002 (Rodrik, 2008: 3).

Figure 8 Manufacturing employment between 1970-2002

Source: Rodrik (2008: 8)

In addition, meritocratic bureaucracy was the backbone of East Asian developmental success

as the institutional design was tilted to attract the best of managers. ‘Rigorous standards of

entry not only ensured a high degree of bureaucratic capability, but also generated a sense of

unity and common identity on the part of the bureaucratic elite’. The result was that, rather

than turning state leadership power towards self-enrichment goals, the bureaucrats ‘were

imbued with a sense of mission and identified themselves with national goals which derived

from a position of leadership in society’(Campbell, 1998: 103). Hence, what has essentially

driven the elites in their policy negotiation and implementation with business actors is

‘connections between constituencies and the state as an organization’ rather than ‘personal,

clientelistic ties’ among bureaucrats (Campbell, 1998: 103). However, in South Africa, it

appears the bureaucrats lack such dynamics due among other reasons to the party politics that

tend to often dominate the performance-based election of leaders. Besides, ‘the development

of a New Public Management framework failed to empower the bureaucrats, because it

destroyed their esspirit de corps’ (Omoweh, 2012: 12).

Recommendations and Conclusion  

From the foregoing, key attributes of DS can be gleaned, including: developmental-oriented

leadership; state autonomy and embeddedness; state-society partnership; performance-

oriented governance, among others, all of which were integral to Malaysia’s success.

Meanwhile, Malaysia’s unique case (as compared to other East Asia countries) suggests that

a developmental state is possible in a heterogeneous population such South Africa’. It also

highlights and that the historical antecedent of inequality, while a notable constraining factor,

can be addressed through the developmental state model. Also, given that democracy is not

necessarily inimical to development, a simultaneous delivery of economic and social

developments within an atmosphere of deepening democracy is required in South Africa. To

this effect, Gumede (2009) suggests key areas that require attention. To paraphrase Gumede,

these include: balancing economic growth with social development; building democratic

institutions; the empowerment of citizens capability towards capitalizing of opportunities; the

revitalization of civil society towards constructive politics of engagement rather than

destructive politics of protest; and the redesigning of public and private sector relationships

outside the ‘impotent tripartite negotiating platforms’ (Gumede, 2009: 2).

However, South Africa’s growth rate in the past two decades has fallen dramatically below

what is necessary to building a DDS compared to what obtained in Malaysia between the

1970s and 1990s in particular. Clearly, Malaysia’s success story, as with the case of other

developmental states such as Japan and Thailand, has so much to do with the demonstrated

political will and long term vision of its bureaucrats that drove both the formulation and

implementation of developmental policies. Hence, for South Africa to achieve its vision of

constructing a DDS, similar (even a better and stronger) ‘political will, long-term vision and a

determination by the country’s political elite to drive a broad-based and inclusive

industrialization and development project’ must be in place (Gumede, 2009: 2). The good

news is that South Africa has what it takes to construct a DS. As Chang (2010:88) rightly

pointed out, South Africa ‘has highly developed organisational vehicles that can be used for

developmentalist projects – the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Insustiral

Development Corporation (IDC), and a number of strong SOEs’. These organizations

possess the financial resources, and technological, analytical and business capacities, which,

well harnessed with Presidency, presage positives for the developmentalist project. Further

still, South Africa’s impressive ranking in some areas in the Global Competitiveness Report

(2012) including: ‘1st for regulation of securities exchange; 2nd for availability of financial

services (after Switzerland and ahead of the United States); 2nd for the accountability of

private instituions; 6th for the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy and 20th for intellectual

property protection’ suggest all hope are far from being lost (Hofmeyr, 2012). Despite other

shortcomings, all the above are positives that, well harnessed, will enable South Africa to

actualized its vision of building a DS in which it has recorded some success, especially from

the pespective of wealth redistribution. In other words, the requisite institution is the object

for turning its other challenges into opportunties. After all, South Africa is a country

‘endowed with a decidedly youthful population, brimming with energy’ that, can promote a

sustained and higher growth economy compared to what obtains (Hofmeyr, 2012: 12).

As the forgoing exposé suggests, Malaysia’s economic progress since 1963 is largely a

reflection of a dynamic and pragmatic state-market relationship that is performance-oriented.

Despite its troubled beginning of a negative colonial legacy in terms of racial strife, Malaysia

has been able to build a vibrant diversified economy of an enviable measure. To some the

prospect of DS let alone DDS in Africa seems ‘no more than a pipe dream’ against the

backdrop of various prevailing constraining factors ranging from ‘our patrimonial

institutions, our ethnic diversity, our geographical location and globalisation’(Mkandawire,

2010: 67). But lessons from East Asia are instructive. Indeed, as Mkandawire (2010: 67)

rightly pointed out ‘while social scientists loudly pronounced the impossibility of

development in East Asia, due to oriental mysticism and Confucian disdain for manual

labour, East Asia societies had already embarked upon their spectacular economic growth’.

Identifiable attributes of such a state have been given to include: (1) developmental-oriented

leadership, (2) state autonomy and embeddedness, (3) state-society partnership, (4)

performance-oriented governance (Dassah, 2011; Evans, 1995; Evans and Rauch, 1999)

Hence, caution must be taken in discouraging the pospect of DSs in Africa, especially using

an idealized view of the developmental state that often tends to be associated the East Asia

Miracle with ‘whatever one thought was good – transparency, accountability, authonomy,

non-corruption and so on’ (Mkandawire, 2001: 78; Mkandawire, 2010). Of course, this is not

to suggest that the above had no role(s) in the process, but to caution against their being

overstretched and consequently dousing Africa’s prospect with those challenges.

Mkandawire’s (2010) suggestions pertaining to the role that the state must play in the

attainment of development in Africa include: resource mobilization; reconstructing the

bureaucracy; addressing globalization through regional developmentalism; reconciling

democracy and development; implementing a transformative social policy; managing

‘developmental pacts’; and addressing the social questions.

It also suffices to reiterate that the authoritarian dimension to the East Asia DS is hardly a

necessary ingredient in their development as long as one focuses on their ‘infrastructural

power’ – defined as ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to

implement logistically police decisions throughout the realm’ rather than their despotic

power. It is however apposite to acknowledge that democracy does have at least some

inherent tendency of slowing the pace of development. Indeed, “democracy has an inherent

tendency to disperse power and slow down decision-making processes, and it also makes the

state less autonomous and less insulated from societal demands”(Fritz and Menocal, 2007:

537) However, democracy becomes a necessary evil when the idea of development as

freedom is recognized. In the final analysis it is the driving vision of the leaders that can help

in mitigating the effects of these challenges.

Increasingly and rightly so, Africa is being projected as the future pole of global economic

growth. However, growth alone is not an end, but should be a means to development -

precisely, human-centred development. Hence, the continent needs states that are capable of

overcoming the numerous developmental challenges – preferably democratic developmental

states. Some of the factors that makes the construction of democratic developmental states in

Africa more auspicious, according to Edigheji (2010), include: the vast mineral wealth and

population; and the emergence of new global players such such as China, Russia and India,

particularly against the backdrop of the collapse of the Washington Concensus. Hence, the

feasibility of constructing such states in Africa is contingent on a number of issues including

the need for right leadership and institutional structures. Even the ethnic diversity can become

Africa’s strength if leaders are able to ‘recuperate the progressive intent and élan of nation-

building of the nationalist movments’ benchmarked on effective state-society and market

relations (Mkandawire, 2010: 77).

Furthermore, there is no procrustean approach to achieving a DS: the willingness for radical

experimentation of diverse economic policies is vital to the demonstration of the

aforementioned political will and long-term vision.What matters essentially is the ‘need for

orginality, intelligent emulation and borrowing’ of developmental ideas and ideals (Edigheji,

2010). Congnisance must be taken of context specificy; hence, the originality since ‘there is

no fixed prerequisites for the establishment of a developmental state’ (Mkandawire, 2010:

78). Flexibility and constant process review (self reflection) are critical to goverment’s

posture towards growth and development by learning from its mistakes. As Pack and

Westphal’s (1986:99, cited in Mkandawire, 2010:88) rightly noted, it is the learning from

mistakes and not government minimizing mistakes, that is the object. Hence, ‘Doing

developmental state’ as Chang (2010) aptly corroborates must not be tied to having or hiring

first world’s the best economists; that is, one must be wary of the kind of arguments put

forward by Winters (as cited in Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). After all, ‘the negative role that

US-trained mainstream economists played in dismantling the Korean developmental state is

an eloquent terstimony to this’ (Chang, 2010: 93). Nonetheless all was not necessarily rosy

during these decades 1970 - 1990. Indeed, for Malaysians there were ups and downs

‘including a major recession in the 1980s and (especially if they are Chinese or Indian) some

degree of alienation by government policies, and they are uncertain what the future

holds’(Snodgrass, 1995: 8). But the state was able to move beyond its challenges.

Finally, while cautioning against the blind adoption of everything in the South East Asia

success story, the overarching economic policy stance of South Africa might need to be more

tailored towards some vital policy stance that proved effective for the East Asian economies

such as Japan and Taiwan, and even Malaysia, and more recently China. According to

Prestowitz, the focus of these economies was as follows.

Is production and technological “catch-up,” not consumption? They compel their citizens to save at very high levels, pursue export-led growth, foster development of target industries such as semiconductors, aim to accumulate large trade surpluses as a matter of national security, use markets as tools rather than as ends in themselves, and strive to change their resource endowment in order to achieve broader ranges of production and targeted economic structures (cited in Poon, 2009: 3).

Essentially, South Africa needs to move away from the neo-classical informed chronic

consumption beyond its economy’s productive means, if it must avoid lapsing completely

into a nation of ‘wage earners’ in lieu of a ‘capital-owing nation’. In order words, South

Africa must gravitate from its consumption-led growth to a more production-led growth

considering its low, if not negative, industrial growth rate in recent decades (Poon, 2009).

Indeed, ‘from 1990 to 2007, South African household consumption gradually rises from a

level of 57% to 62% of GDP’ an increase essentially funded not by ‘increasing incomes, but

by a rising share of household debt as a percentage of disposable income’, pegged at 50% to

80% from 2003 to 2008 (IMF, 2008a:5, cited in Poon, 2009:5). This relatively

‘squanderville’-like scenario, Poon appositely explains puts enormous strain on the ‘amount

of domestic capital resources available for production and investment, as well as the rate of

capital equipment replacement, technical progress and new product development’ (2009:5).

Cognisance must also be taken of the interdependence of various factors that undergird a

developmental state, against the rather parochial focus on specifics in the Asian experience.

In this regard, Gumede’s observation is helpful. It the pragmatic mix of ‘an effective state,

the presence of key institutions, their inter-arrangements and mix, and their relationships with

the market and civil society, including business, organized labour, communities and citizens’

that results in a DS. Hence, looking at the Malaysia experience, it is important that the

political atmosphere promoted by the state favoured the economic development.

There is also need for the electoral behaviour of South Africans to be driven by demand for

ccountability from its leaders, as a means of quality control, irrespective of racial or political

affiliations. The continued reign of the dominant party, even within the municipalities that

experience widespread protest concerning poor service delivery, hardly suggests this so far.

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Ojochenemi J. David is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the University of Zululand, South Africa. He can be contacted via ojochenemidavid@gmail.com

Dr. Lucky E. Asuelime is a Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Politics and International Studies. He can be contacted via lucky4real14@gmail.com