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Contents

Preface ........................................................................................................................

iii

Abbreviations..viii

Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................

. xi

Executive summary ..................................................................................................

xiii

Introduction

..............................................................................................................xiii

Main findings from past researc ...............................................................................

xiv

Intellectual property rigts! foreign direct investment and international

trade .................................................................................................. xiv

Intellectual property rigts! international tecnology transfer and

domestic innovation........................................................................... xiv

Intellectual property rigts and public ealt .................................................... xv

Intellectual property rigts! genetic resources and traditional knowledge ......... xvi

"uture researc directions .........................................................................................

xvii

Intellectual property rigts! foreign direct investment! trade and licensing ...... xvii

Intellectual property rigts! international tecnology transfer and

domestic innovation......................................................................... xviii

Intellectual property rigts and public ealt ................................................. xviii

Intellectual property rigts! genetic resources and traditional knowledge ......... xix

C#AP$E% & Introduction ..................................................................................... &

C#AP$E% ' Intellectual property and foreign direct investment .......................... (

'.& Introduction ...................................................................................................... (


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'.' Intellectual property and foreign direct investment) te teory ..........................

*

'.'.& $e case for stronger intellectual property rigts .................................. *

'.'.' $e case against stronger intellectual property rigts ............................ +

'.( Intellectual property and foreign direct investment) te empirical

evidence ............................................................................................................ +

'.(.& Evidence from te perspective of developed countries .......................... +

'.(.' Evidence from te perspective of developing countries ......................... ,

'.* Conclusions and future researc directions ........................................................

-

C#AP$E% ( Intellectual property and trade ....................................................... & IPand /eveloping Countries %A0/ Europe

vi

(.& Introduction .................................................................................................... &

(.' Intellectual property and trade) te teory .......................................................

&&

(.'.& $e case for stronger intellectual property rigts ................................ &&

(.'.' $e case against stronger intellectual property rigts .......................... &&

(.( Intellectual property and trade) te empirical evidence .....................................

&'

(.(.& Evidence from te perspective of developed countries ........................ &'

(.(.' Evidence from te perspective of developing countries ....................... &*

(.* Conclusions and future researc directions ......................................................

&+

C#AP$E% * Intellectual property and innovation .............................................. &1

*.& Introduction .................................................................................................... &1

*.' Intellectual property rigts and innovation) te teory .....................................

&1

*.'.& $e case for stronger intellectual property rigts ................................ &,


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*.'.' $e case against stronger intellectual property rigts .......................... &,

*.( Intellectual property and innovation) te empirical evidence ............................

'

*.(.& Evidence on international tecnology transfer .................................... '

*.(.' Evidence on domestic innovation ....................................................... '&

*.* Conclusions and future researc directions ......................................................

''

C#AP$E% + Intellectual property and public ealt .......................................... '+

+.& Introduction .................................................................................................... '+

+.' $e importance of patents for parmaceutical innovation ...............................

'2

+.( Intellectual property rigts and access to innovations .......................................

'1

+.(.& Patents are taken out only in selected countries .................................. '1

+.(.' Accessing ealtcare innovations by lowering prices ........................... '1

+.* Intellectual property rigts and innovation for ealt ......................................

(

+.*.& 3imits in using intellectual property rigts to address developing

country problems ............................................................................... (

+.*.' Creating conditions for more effective intellectual property

policy ................................................................................................. ('

+.+ Conclusions and furter researc directions .....................................................

(+

C#AP$E% 2 Intellectual property! genetic resources and traditional

knowledge ...................................................................................... (,

2.& Introduction .................................................................................................... (,

2.' Intellectual property! traditional knowledge and genetic resources) te

teory .............................................................................................................. (-

2.'.& An emerging field of researc ............................................................. (-


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2.'.' Assumptions about te nature of traditional knowledge ..................... *

2.'.( #uman rigts discourse ..................................................................... *

2.( Intellectual property! genetic resources and traditional knowledge) te

empirical evidence ........................................................................................... *&

2.(.& Evidence from te perspective of developed countries ........................ *'

2.(.' Evidence from te perspective of developing countries ....................... *(

vii

2.* Conclusions and furter researc directions .....................................................

*1

C#AP$E% 1 Conclusion ..................................................................................... *,

%eferences .......................................................................................... *-

%eferences .............................................................................................. +

Appendix) International patent protection 4 &-24'+ ..........................................

2+

viii

Abbreviations

AI/5 Ac6uired Immune /eficiency 5yndrome

/fI/ /epartment for International /evelopment

"A7 8nited 0ations "ood and Agriculture 7ffice

"/I "oreign direct investment

9I 9eograpical indication

#I: #uman Immunodeficiency :irus

IP Intellectual property

IP7 Intellectual Property 7ffice

IP%s Intellectual property rigts

P:P Plant variety protection


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%;/ %esearc and development

$%IP5 Agreement on $radeation

Executive summary

Introduction

$e debate concerning te economic implications of intellectual property rigts

?IP%s@ as

gained considerable attention over te past two decades in te context of te =orld

$rade

7rgani>ations ?=$7@ Agreement on $rade


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strengten teir national intellectual property ?IP@ regimes! in order to armonise

tem

wit tose of developed countries.

$e movement towards strengtening IP%s in te laws of developing countries was

initiated by developed countries under te belief tat tis would generate additional

profits

leading to more researc and development ?%;/@! and it would be necessary to fuel

economic growt in tose countries. #owever! suc belief attracted many critics!

particularly researcers! wo stressed tat tis movement was initiated against

developing

countries! underscoring te absence of empirical evidence to Bustify te socioynska Gavorcik!

'*@. %A0/ Europe IP and "oreign /irect Investment


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+

'.'.' $e case against stronger intellectual property rigts

5trengtening intellectual property rigts can increase market power

5trong IP%s negatively influence "/I by providing rigts olders wit increasedmarket

power. As a result! strong IP%s! at least teoretically! cause firms to divest and

reduce teir

service to foreign countries ?Maskus and Penubarti! &--+D Primo raga and "ink!

&--,a@.

$e market power effect can reduce te elasticity of demand facing te foreign

firm!

inducing tem to invest 4 or produce 4 less of its patentable product in te ost

country!

or products made by a patentable process in te market wit te stronger IP%s.

5tronger

IP%s can allow te practice of iger prices by foreign firms because IP%s reduce

competition among firms. $erefore! stronger prices can compensate for lower

investment

or production.

5tronger intellectual property rigts can deter foreign direct investment by

encouraging

licensing

0ot only can strong IP%s increase te market power of foreign firms! but tey also

can

cause multinationals to switc teir preferred mode of delivery from foreign

production

and %;/ to licensing ?Primo raga and "ink! &--,a@. "errantino ?&--(@ argues tat

firms

prefer "/I over licensing wen protection is weak! as firms are more able to

maintain


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direct control over teir proprietary assets troug internalised foreign production

or iniarg and =elc! ',@. More

generally! international trade is viewed as an important instrument to reduce

poverty in

developing countries ?8nited 0ations Conference on $rade and /evelopment

?80C$A/@! '*@ by facilitating a process of sustained economic growt!

developing

productive capacities and expanding employment opportunities. "or most

developing

countries! exports allow tem to ac6uire goods troug importation tat are

necessary for

economic growt and poverty reduction! but are not produced domestically. In turn!

exports can make it possible to transform underutilised natural resources and

surplus

labour into foreign excange! in order to pay for imports to support economic

growt.

#owever! tis process re6uires speed and stability in export growt so as to meet

growing

import demand sufficiently.

/espite te results of tese empirical studies sowing te potential benefits of tradefor

developing countries! several prominent economists ?5tiglit>! '(D 5amuelson!

'*@ ave

argued tat! as guided by te rules set out in recent multilateral and bilateral

agreements!

international trade remains unfair to developing countries! as te maBority of gains

from

trade are accrued to developed countries. Moreover Cang ?''@ sows tat many

developed countries did not pursue trade liberalisation wen tey were climbing te

economic ladder of success in te nineteent century.

$e $%IP5 Agreement and increases in te strengt of IP%s troug bilateral

agreements


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in te $%IP5


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5tronger IP%s confer ownersip advantages to firms serving foreign markets by

providing

legal recourse against violation of teir assets. In tis regard! stronger IP%s expand

te

markets served by firms.

In addition! strong IP%s can increase bilateral excange to foreign markets by

reducing te

costs associated wit preventing loss of knowledge assets. 5uc costs consist of

foregone

revenues resulting from reduced bilateral excange andJor expenses incurred to

make

knowledge assets difficult to imitate. $us! under market expansion conditions!

strengtening IP%s can positively affect trade ?Maskus and Penubarti! &--+@!

especially

wen te destination country as strong imitative abilities ?5mit! '&@.

International armonisation of intellectual property rigts regimes can reduce te

transaction costs associated wit trade

/iscrepancies among national IP% regimes create effects tat are comparable to

non


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Altoug strong IP%s enance ownersip advantage! tis enanced ownersip can

increase

or decrease bilateral excange. $e market power concept olds tat strong rigts

reduce

bilateral excange by ensuring a temporary monopoly over te protected

knowledge. $is

market power is attributed to te patent ?grant@ older! weter domestic or

foreign. %A0/ Europe IP and $rade

&'

"irms tat secure strong patent protection in foreign markets can exercise teir

market

power by restricting 6uantity and increasing te unit price of bilateral excange to

tat

market ?Maskus and Penubarti! &--+D "ink and Primo raga! '*@.

"irms beaviour depends on a variety of conditions. "or example! market power

can be

generated by relatively modest strengt of IP%s wen markets are segmented!wen few

close substitutes are available and tecnical absorption capacities are weak.

Concomitantly!

strong IP%s can reinforce market segmentation and reduce te ability to substitute

products. As a result! a negative relationsip can emerge between te strengt of

IP%s and

bilateral flows under market power conditions! especially wen tecnical absorptive

capacities are weak ?5mit! '&@. "irms are likely to reduce te 6uantity supplied

and

increase te protected products prices.

5tronger intellectual property rigts can deter trade and encourage licensing


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A furter source of ambiguity stems from te fact tat differing levels of IP%s can

affect a

firms decision about its preferred mode of serving a foreign market.

In an environment caracterised by strong rigts! a firm may coose to serve a

foreign

market by "/I! or by licensing its intellectual assets rater tan troug direct

export. In

tis respect! strengtening intellectual property protection can ave negative

effects on

trade flows ?"ink and Primo raga! '*@.

(.( Intellectual property and trade) te empirical evidence

$e empirical literature on te effects of IP%s on trade as grown over te past two

decades. $e empirical evidence comes mainly from econometric studies and! to a

lesser

extent! from case studies.

$e empirical evidence can be divided into two main bodies of work) first!

examining te

impact of IP%s on trade flows from te perspective of developed countriesD and

second!

investigating ow IP%s can affect economic growt in developing countries troug

trade.

(.(.& Evidence from te perspective of developed countries

Intellectual property rigts positively affect trade! at least wit countries wit ig

tecnical absorptive capabilities

Early studies based on aggregate trade data suggested tat firms in developed

countries

were influenced by te strengt of importing countries IP regimes wen engaging

in

export activities. 8sing bilateral data for 85 exports from &-,- and covering (+

partner


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countries! eiter developed or developing! Primo raga and "ink ?&--1@ estimated

te

impact of te strengt of IP%s as measured by te %appek index on armsed selectively and imaginatively ?'') -(-@. #owever!

pursuing

tis option aggressively is subBect to significant power relations. "or example! te

85

5ection (& =atc 3ist in te $rade Act of &-1* allows it to employ measures

against any

country tat it considers to be denying 85 companies or persons ade6uate and

effective


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protection of teir IP rigts ?Parliamentary 7ffice of 5cience and $ecnology! '&@.

Abbotts ?'+@ legal analysis of te =$7 trade rules finds tat global institutions

need to

undertake regular cecks and balances to te $%IP5 framework! wile ensuring tat

te

85A does not exert its power to alter =$7 rules in bilateral arrangements ?i.e.

$%IP5on! '1@

find

tat te global pricing strategy tat best combines e6uity wit coverage of %;/

costs is


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one were prices are muc lower in nations wit a low ability to pay! tan in

wealty

countries. #owever! suc differential pricing faces two callenges.

&(

"or example! local parmaceutical companies may obtain compulsory licenses to

produce generic versions of

patented medicines! or to import generic versions of medicines from foreign

manufacturers. %A0/ Europe IP and Public #ealt

'-

$e first issue is in parallel importing!

&*

were differential pricing is tougt to be

undermined by low


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te nature of media coverage and te efficacy of various advocacy and none@ is ig! but

creating viable markets entails a concerted international effort! suc as te one

displayed in setting up an advanced purcase commitment

&1

for pneumococcal

vaccines.

"unding as improved! IP as been strengtened and te neglected disease

landscape as canged considerably since &-- in an effort to engage te

parmaceutical industry.

#owever! parmaceutical industries! including tose in countries suc as India!

are responding imperfectly to developing country needs. Instead! tey often focus

on developed country markets.

IP%s facilitate trade in knowledge but may stifle innov ation by reducing

researcers access to knowledge and increasing te costs of collaboration.

&1


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"or more on advanced market commitments! see Hremer and 9lennerster ?'*@.

%A0/ Europe IP and Public #ealt

(1

Public4private partnersips ave emerged as a prevalent new institutional

arrangement for addressing neglected diseases! but it is not clear wat significant

roles! if any! IP%s ave in teir formation.

In future! IP may ave a bigger role to play in dealing wit te ealt problems

common

to bot developed and developing countries. $ere is evidence tat many of teir

problems

are converging.

&,

$e causes of tis convergence remain unclear! but tere are likely to be

important implications for IP systems in bot developed and developing countries.

$is capter also noted a significant lack of understanding in te role of IP in public4

private partnersips. 5ince tese types of arrangements ave emerged as te

dominant

paradigm for addressing neglected diseases! furter researc on tis issue is

needed

urgently.

A number of IP


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&,

7f te disease burden in ig


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$e use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources! bot inside and outside of

teir

local context! raises te prospect tat tey may play an important role in driving

development. $e issue for policymakers is ow tis prospect migt be realised

best!

particularly wen te use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources is

becoming

increasingly subBect to governance by various! and sometimes contradictory! IP

systems

?3aksmanan! ',@.

$%IP5 recognises te issue by allowing for sui generis protection of genetic

resources!

specifically plants! animals and biological processes ?Commission on Intellectual

Property

%igts! ''@. 5ui generis protection is a system of protection tailored to

accommodate te

special caracteristics of traditional knowledge ?Commission on Intellectual Property

%igts! ''@. 5ince $%IP5! tere as been pressure for increased protection of

knowledge

linked to genetic resources from plants! animals and micro


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been formed tat empasise te knowledge and genetic resource rigts of more

marginalised stakeolders. In &--'! te Convention on iological /iversity was

created as %A0/ Europe IP! 9enetic %esources and $raditional Hnowledge

(-

a legally binding convention tat explicitly outlined principles of e6uitable access

and

benefit


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knowledge preservation and innovation can promote alternative patways to

development!

building upon local contexts. In tis sense! protecting traditional knowledge and

genetic

resources may empower marginalised stakeolders to drive development from te

bottome and canola in developed countries are te main crops to

benefit

from IP protected innovations in genetic modification! generated mainly in 0ort

America.

Muc of te literature from developed countries concerns te use of geograpical

indications ?9Is@. Already included in $%IP5! 9Is protect products specific to a

geograpical area. $ere are tree levels of protection for 9Is in $%IP5) one forwines

only! one for wine and spirits! and one for all products ?7Connor! '*@.

'&

As defined in

Article ''.& of $%IP5! 9Is identify goods

Loriginating in te territory of a Member! or a region or locality in tat territory!

were a

given 6uality! reputation or oter caracteristic of te good is essentially

attributable to its

geograpical origin ?roude! '+@.

9Is facilitate te use of reputation in overcoming information asymmetries in

markets.

8nlike IP%s! 9Is do not protect te knowledge embodied in products ?/utfield! 'D

%angnekar! '*@D instead! protection is offered for te association of a given6uality wit

a geograpical location.

As outlined by Pacciani et al. ?'&@! 9Is can provide space for nice markets!

creating


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collective monopolies and facilitating market access. $roug tis space for market

access!

9Is can enable communities or individuals to capture a market premium for a

product

?$iedig and 5ylvander! '@. In turn! te si>e of tis premium is dependent on

market

si>e! competition! consumer perceptions and elasticity of demand ?Correa! ''@.

$is

premium is not necessarily assured for developing countries enforcing 9Is. %ater!

less

well


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European countries vary in teir experiences of 9Is in protecting te sare of

market

power eld by local communities. 5tudies find tat te effectiveness of 9Is in

protecting

local communities position in markets and production of local products depends on

market conditions! and local capabilities to market and distribute products

?%angnekar!

'*@.

Callois ?'*@ determined tat 6uality labels do not necessarily ensure te transfer

of

profits and rural developmentD rater! if benefits occur! tey are unlikely to benefit

te

wole rural region. =ilson et al. ?'@ compared te price premiums for two

varieties of

protected potatoes! finding tat premiums are iger for bot protected products!

but are

significantly greater for te product tat is protected troug a igly coordinated

and

organised supply cain.

In contrast! elletti ?'@ found tat une6ual capabilities can prevent premiums

from

being captured by local producers. In te case of olive oil from $uscany! e found

tat

production was capitalised upon by areas outside of $uscany! and tat premiums

were

reallocated to favour bottling companies rater tan producers ?elletti! '@.

$us! te

case studies from Europe sow tat local capabilities in developing market

products!

product! communication! marketing and distribution strategies determine te

effectiveness

of 9Is for producers ?$regear! ''@.


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2.(.' Evidence from te perspective of developing countries

8niform IP laws cannot ensure diversity of access and benefiton ?$orremans et al.!'1@.

%einforcing te findings from developed countries! studies of istorical experiences

in

developing countries also suggest tat une6ual influence is linked to a low

capability to %A0/ Europe IP! 9enetic %esources and $raditional Hnowledge


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**

engage in market production and excange. /eveloping countries ost te maBorityof

genetic resources but often lack te tecnological capacity and capital to develop

tese

resources sustainably. $rommetter ?'+@ suggests! troug reference to istorical

case

studies in parmaceuticals and agriculture! tat developing countries capacity to

negotiate!

teir bargaining power and perceptions of teir commitment to enforce agreements

affect

te e6uitable benefitagen and #olm


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intellectual property

$%IP5 allows for sui generis IP regimes in relation to genetic resources and

traditional

knowledge. Empirical studies ave found tat sui generis IP systems can facilitate

increased

influence on te part of local communities in developing countries in innovation.

$o investigate te possibilities for sui generis protection to protect diversity! te

empirical

studies examine attempts to integrate traditional knowledge and IP%s troug

regional and

national legislation. Earlier studies describe ow different developing countries ave

tailored national laws to facilitate continued access to traditional knowledge

?7guamanam!

',@. $ese studies refer to experiences in a range of developing countries!

spanning

3atin America ?ra>il! Peru@! 5out and 5outation of African 5tates@. #owever! wile describing

te

legal frameworks for sui generis protection! tese studies do not provide evidenceabout

teir effectiveness in actually protecting diversity in access and benefit


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5imilarly! troug interviews wit companies in different economic sectors! ten Hate

and

3aird ?'@ found tat IP laws can allow for widespread involvement in innovation

systems in developing countries! if policies involve relevant stakeolders in bot te

public

and private sectors ?ten Hate and =ells! '&D 3aird and ten Hate! ''@.

Case studies in Africa provide some evidence of te impact of sui generis systems

in low

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