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COLLABORATION AND TRUST BUILDING AMONG STAKEHOLDERS IN CITARUM RIVER BASIN CONFLICT

Utomo Sarjono Putro; Dhanan Sarwo Utomo; Pri Hermawan

School of Business and ManagementInstitut Teknologi Bandung

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RIVER REGION UNIT in:

-Prov. Banten-DKI Jakarta

-Prov. Jawa Barat

POLA INDUK JAWA BARAT 2000/ MCC 2001

Citarum River Basin:6.080 Km2

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POPULATIONPRESSURE causes

deforestation

Untreatment waste disposal from

industries

UNCARE CULTUREcauses rubbish along

the river

TOO MUCH:

FLOOD

TOO LITTLE:

DROUGHT

TOO DIRTY:

DISEASE

Three Classical Problems of Citarum River basin Problem

RUSTAM SYARIF/ 2002

RUSTAM SYARIF/ 2002

RUSTAM SYARIF/ 2002

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STOP DEFORESTATION ----------------------NOT HAPPY UPPER LOCAL GOVERNMENTSTOP ILLEGAL LODGING ---------------- NOT HAPPY UPPER STREAM LOCAL PEOPLEAUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT--------------------------------NOT HAPPY COMMUNITYSELF INTERESTS UPSTREAM 　 --------------------------------------- SUFFER DOWNSTREAMDOWNSTREAM DOESN’T CONTRIBUTE TO UPPER ------UNPROTECTED UPSTREAMBLAME INDUSTRIES---------------------------------------------------------------UNEMPLOYMENTOVERACT ENVIRONMENTALIST --------------------------STAGNANT DEVELOPMENT

Partial Proposals Create Confrontations

AT LAST THE ENVIRONMENT IS MORE AND MORE DEGRADED AND “ THE PEOPLE” IS THEN BEING VICTIMS

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Transformation System

Ideal Future (No dilemmas)

• Agents have common position;• Agents have no dilemmas of

cooperation.

Existing•Agents conflict each other•Agents blame each other•Partial Actions•Confrontations involving dilemmas

Drama Theory

How can dilemmas be eliminated?

Collaboration

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OBJECTIVES

This study aims to construct an agent-based simulation of the dynamics of negotiation based on drama theory frame-work in which the Agents are equipped with emotions and ability to change their emotions.

The simulation model is developed to mimic the dynamic of negotiation in real world.

Using the constructed model, this study will propose strategy that can promote collaboration among stake holders in Citarum River Basin Conflict.

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MethodologyVirtual experiment

Drawing Conclusion

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Modelling Conflict by Drama Theory

Agent based Model:How is the influence of Agents’ emotion on dilemma reduction?

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Climax: ABM of Dynamic Negotiation

Agent 1 Agent 2• New Payoff

• New Emotion• New

Perception

Current CRF

Next CRF

OptionsAgent 1`s position

Agent-2`s position

O1 Y (75) N (87)

O2 N (79) Y (89)

OptionsAgent 1`s position

Agent-2`s position

O1 Y(75) N (87)

O2 N (79) Y (89)

Negotiation

Current Dilemma

Next Dilemma

Internal attributes:•Payoff/Preference•Perception other agent’s payoff•Bargaining strategy•Emotion

Internal attributes:•Payoff/Preference•Perception other agent’s payoff•Bargaining strategy•Emotion

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OptionsAgent-1`s

positionAgent-2`s position

O11 Y (75) Y (87)

O12N (79) Y (89)

Modeling Negotiation ProcessIncompatible choice

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Options

Agent-1`s positi

onAgent-2`s position

O11 Y (75) Y (87)

O12N (69) Y (59)

Every agent who has a dilemma will negotiate based on his/her emotional state (positive or negative emotion).

Positive emotional state is more conducive to a person acting in a friendly and sociable manner with others;

Conversely, a negative emotional state tends to heighten chances that the individual will be unfriendly, inconsiderate, or even rude to others.

Payoff DistanceAgent-1’s proposal

Agent-2’s proposal

Agent-1 Agent-2

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Climax: Dilemmas

Confrontation dilemmas(happen when there is no common

position) Threat dilemma Rejection dilemma Positioning dilemma Persuasion dilemma

Collaboration dilemmas(happen when there is a common position) Trust dilemma Cooperation dilemma

12Threat Dilemma

Party 1 has threat dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1`s threat is not credible according to party 2, because party 2 knows that party 1 prefers another scenario than the threat.

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Rejection Dilemma

Party 1 has rejection dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1`s rejection of party 2’s position is not credible according to party 2, because party 2 knows that party 1 prefers party 2’s position than the threat.

14Positioning Dilemma

Party 1 has positioning dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not persuade party 2 to accept his/her position because party 1 prefers party 2’s position than his/her own position.

15Persuasion Dilemma

Party 1 has persuasion dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not persuade party 2 to accept party 1`s position because party 2 prefers threated position than party 1`s position.

16Trust Dilemma

Party 1 has trust dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not believe that party 2 commits with the common position (agreement), because party 1 knows that there is another scenario preferred by party 2 than the common position.

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Cooperation Dilemma

Party 1 has cooperation dilemma with respect to party 2, because party 1 has incentives not to commit with the common position (agreement), because another scenario is better than the common position.

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Climax: Dilemma can be identified from CRF

Current Dilemma

Current CRF

Negotiation

Next CRF

Next DilemmaNext Interaction

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Climax: Modeling Emotion

Emotion model used in this paper is the development from emotional negotiation model PAD (Jiang et.al.): Pleasure (rp): gives the direction of emotions; i.e; positive

emotion status (Pleasure)/negative emotion status (Displeasure).

Arousal (ra); the degree of effects from environments that strengthen (Arousal) or weaken the pleasure (Non-Arousal).

Dominance (rd); the degree of an agent`s ability to control the pleasure and arousal.

Therefore, each agent has the emotional state, i.e.:

.

;)1( ijijij dapij rrrES )1,1(,, dap rrr

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Modelling Emotion Dynamics based on experience from the last interaction

My current bargain is better than my previous bargain and my bargain is perceived better. OCC emotion : Satisfy, Joy

0&0 tji

tij OvOv

increase

increase

increase

tij

tij

tij

rd

ra

rp

My current bargain is better than my previous bargain but my bargain is perceived worse. OCC emotion : Anger

0&0 tji

tij OvOv

increase

increase

decrease

tij

tij

tij

rd

ra

rp

My current bargain is worse than my previous bargain but my bargain is perceived better. OCC emotion : Gratitude

0&0 tji

tij OvOv

decrease

increase

increase

tij

tij

tij

rd

ra

rp

My current bargain is worse than my previous bargain and my bargain is perceived worse. OCC emotion : Fear confirmed

0&0 tji

tij OvOv

decrease

decrease

decrease

tij

tij

tij

rd

ra

rp

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Common Reference Frame Before and After 2008 (based on focus group discussion)

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Common Reference Frame Before and After 2009 (based on focus group discussion)

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Experiments 1:Sensitivity Analysis

Experiment Scenarios:1 ) All agents begin the negotiation with negative emotion2 ) All agents begin the negotiation with neutral emotion3 ) All agents begin the negotiation with positive emotion

Each scenario was run 30 times

Using 95% confidence interval there is enough evidence that if agent begin the negotiation with negative emotion the times required to eliminate confrontation dilemmas and the collaboration dilemmas that remain will be higher than if agents use positive or neutral emotion

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Experiments 2

Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s emotionScenario 1: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2008

There is a phase in the simulation output that can mimics the actual agent’s emotional dynamics

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Experiments 2

Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s emotionScenario 2: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2009

There is a phase in the simulation output that can mimics the actual agent’s emotional dynamics

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Experiments 3

Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s positionsScenario 1: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2008

The model can predict the majority of agent’s position in the real world

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Experiments 3

Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s positionsScenario 2: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2009

The model can predict the majority of agent’s position in the real world

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CONCLUSIONS (1)

This study constructed an agent-based simulation of the dynamics of negotiation based on drama theory that incorporates agent’s emotions.

The model can show the evolution of a common reference, the time required to eliminates confrontation dilemmas and the collaboration dilemmas that remain after all agents reach compatible positions.

The model can also mimic the dynamics of agent’s position and the majority of agent’s position in the real world.

The model in this study can provide insight to stakeholders regarding the potential evolution of the conflict that may occur due to the action and reaction of each agent. Using table top exercise or FGD, the model can help to test possible scenarios and alternatives.

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CONCLUSIONS (2)

Based on the simulation results in Citarum River Basin conflict case, it can be concluded that:

If agents use negative emotions to other agents then, the time required to eliminate the confrontation dilemmas will be longer than if they use neutral or positive emotions.

If agents use negative emotions the numbers of collaboration dilemmas that remain are significantly higher than if they use neutral or positive emotions.

In the real world, positive emotions can be implemented in several forms for example:

willingness to compromise, give empathy to others, to convince others etc.

30 Thank You