Post on 19-Jan-2023
Article Title: What matters most in selecting top Chinese leaders? A Qualitative
Comparative Analysis
Author: Jinghan Zeng
Note: Jinghan ZENG is a doctoral student in the Department of Politics and International
Studies (PaIS) at the University of Warwick. His research focuses on legitimacy, institutional
change, ideology, and elite politics of contemporary China. This article is based on a chapter
of his PhD thesis The Communist Party’s Right to Rule: Political Legitimacy in China. For
more information, please see https://sites.google.com/site/zengjinghan/home
Acknowledgement: I am very grateful to Dr. Clive Gray for helping me with QCA. I also
would like to thank Professor Shaun Breslin, Professor Sujian Guo, and two anonymous
referees for their valuable comments. My special thanks go to Dr. Renske Doorenspleet for
suggesting that I apply QCA. Of course, all mistakes are my own.
Email address: Jinghan.Zeng@warwick.ac.uk
Mailing address:
Department of Politics and International Studies, Social Sciences Building,
University of Warwick,
Coventry, CV4 7AL
UK
Abstract:
This article analyses the selection criterion of China’s most powerful leading body - the
Politburo Standing Committee - by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the latest
data of the 18th
Party Congress in 2012. It finds that age, combined with institutional rules, is
one of the dominant factors in deciding the appointment of leaders in 2012, suggesting the
significance of institutional rules in today’s elite politics in China. It also finds that candidates’
patron-client ties with senior leaders did play a role but they are not always positive in terms
of the career advancement of candidates. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, this study finds
that powerful family backgrounds do not have positive impacts on promotion at the highest
level.
Key Words: qualitative comparative analysis, elite politics, political leader, political mobility,
patronage, faction, performance, power succession, institutionalization, meritocracy,
leadership selection.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) orderly performed its once-in-a-decade
leadership transition. As the second smooth transition of the authoritarian regime, it received
widespread attention around the world. Enormous academic interest has been generated by
the intense competition of the 18th
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) seats, especially after
the affair of Bo Xilai who had publicly campaigned for a PSC seat. Before the opening of the
18th
Party Congress, competition between the remaining eight candidates - Yu Zhengsheng,
Zhang Dejiang, Wang Qishan, Zhang Gaoli, Wang Yang, Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, and
Liu Yunshan - was widely reported and predicted by various mass media outlets including the
BBC (2012), Reuters (Lim and Blanchard, 2012), the Financial Times (Anderlini, 2012), the
New York Times (Wong, 2012a), and The Economist (Economist, 2012).1 Some China
analysts also joined in this game of line-up prediction (e.g. Li, 2012b).
Not surprisingly, the opaque nature of China’s elite politics has stimulated enormous
interests in the selection criteria of the new leadership. These criteria criterion involve a set of
three related on-going intellectual debates over the Chinese politics of power succession. The
first debate is about how to understand the outcome of the 18th
Party Congress: whether it is
simply a result of informal politics. The second debate is about whether the Chinese political
system is based on meritocratic bureaucracy or factional politics. The third is about the
practical significance of increasingly institutional norms: whether these norms have been
changed power succession or they are simply a political tool for factional struggle.
The purpose of this article is to assess what factors really mattered in selecting members
of the leading body in China. In the fields of political science and economics, a sizeable
theoretical and empirical literature has extensively studied the selection criteria of Chinese
cadres.2 To date, however, there is no systematic attempt to analyse the selection criteria of
the most important and powerful level, the PSC. This article addresses the gap by using the
method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and the latest data of 2012. The findings
of this study make an interesting and notable addition to the on-going debates. This study also
provides a guide to interpreting the obscure leadership dynamics and updates the
understandings of China’s elite politics.
Several key findings of this study can be highlighted. First, with regards to age, this article
establishes that – whether the candidates are above sixty-two years old in 2012 – plays a key
role in the transition of 2012. While many have been questioning the institutionalization of
the political system (Fewsmith, 2013; Report, 2012; Zheng and Lye, 2003), this finding
indicates that institutional rules of power succession have been shaping elite politics in China,
and that the outcome of the 18th
PSC should not be simply considered a failure of Hu Jintao’s
coalition.
Second, this article establishes that political patronage of both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao
did matter; however, being aligned with both senior leaders is self-defeating as it hinders and
does not help. It suggests that patron-client ties are not valuable assets for promotion at all
times. Third, “princeling status”3 either did not matter or had negative effects on the chances
of being promoted into the highest level of party ranks, challenging the widely shared view
that princelings’ family ties make them more likely to win higher party ranks (Dotson, 2012a;
Dotson, 2012b; Li, 2001b; Shih, et al., 2012; Wong, 2012b; Zheng and Chen, 2009). Also,
this finding again indicates that political connections are not always positive to the career
advancement of Chinese leaders.
Finally, while many argue that educational qualifications boosted the chance of promotion
(Lee, 1991; Shih, et al., 2012; Sun and Hu, 2012), this study finds that they did not play a role
at the highest level. Last, as the only female candidate failed to be promoted, the line-up of
the 18th
PSC suggests that politics is still a game of men at the top.
1 The other predictions of the 18
th PSC line-up include American Voice (Chen, 2012), Sing Tao Daily(Daily,
2012), South China Morning Post (Shi, 2012), Boxun News (2012b; 2012a), Duowei News (2012), Fanhua
News(2012), The Epoch Times(Jin, 2012), Chosun Daily (Cui, 2012), Mirror Books (He, 2012)
2 For empirical studies, please see Choi 2012; Shih, et al., 2012; Qiao 2013; Chen, Li and Zhou 2005; Li and
Zhou 2005; Maskin, Qian and Xu 2000; Landry 2003; Bo 2002; Bo 1996. For qualitative analysis, see Li
2012b; Li 2012c; Pei 2012a; Pei 2012b; Bell 2012; Zhang 2012
3 In this study, princeling refers to state/party/military leaders who come from families of senior party leaders
(vice minister or vice governor level or above) or military generals (deputy military region level or above).
2. THE ON-GOING INTELLECTUAL DEBATES
2.1 The outcome of the 18th
Party Congress: factional conflicts versus seniority
The first debate is about how to understand the outcome of the 18th
Party Congress. On
the one hand, many interpret the line-up of new leadership from a perspective of factional
conflicts. A widely accepted theory is that Jiang Zemin successfully defeated Hu Jintao to put
Jiang’s protégés – Yu Zhengsheng, Wang Qishan, Zhang Dejiang, and Zhang Gaoli – into the
PSC (Dotson, 2012a; Fewsmith, 2013; Li, 2012a; Whiteman, 2012; Wong, 2012a; Wong,
2012b). According to some, Jiang Zemin’s camp – princelings in particular – became the
biggest winners of the 18th
Party Congress at the expense of Hu Jintao’s coalition (Dotson,
2012a; Li, 2012a; Whiteman, 2012; Wong, 2012a).
On the other hand, however, some argue that the factional view overestimates the
influence of Jiang Zemin, who was eighty-six years old (Shirk, 2012b). They argue that
seniority, rather than factional politics, is the key in deciding the appointment of the 18th
PSC
(Miller, 2013; Shirk, 2012b). The logic of this view is that Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang –
who are Hu Jintao’s protégés and failed to be promoted in 2012 – are still young enough to
compete for the 19th
PSC, while others are not under the institutional rules of retirement age
(Miller, 2013; Rajan, 2012; Shirk, 2012b). Therefore, in the words of Miller (2013), “it is just
arithmetic.” In this sense, Hu Jintao’s coalition was not simply defeated in the 18th
Party
Congress and the outcome of the 18th
PSC is a kind of factional bargain, because Hu’s
coalition has reserved two seats in the 19th
PSC for his protégés Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang.
2.2 Selection criteria: meritocratic bureaucracy versus factional politics
On the second issue, there are two main clusters of opinions, which can be labelled as
the meritocratic bureaucracy school and the factional politics school.
2.2.1 Meritocratic bureaucracy
The meritocratic bureaucracy school emphasizes the role of merit – candidates’
performance and quality in particular – in the selection criteria of Chinese leaders. It is
important to clarify the definition of “meritocracy” here because there is a slight but
important dispute over its meaning. Meritocracy can be translated in Chinese as “任人唯贤”
“贤能” “选贤任能”, etc.4 Some refer to meritocracy as an identical standard that is “judged
superior according to an objective standard of ability (like an examination of philosophical
knowledge and literary skill)” (Elliott, 2012). Others consider meritocracy as selecting
intelligent and capable officials; however, it lacks a unified standard to measure this
intelligence and capability. In this article, meritocracy refers to employing people based on a
set of measurable criteria, including educational qualifications, leadership experience and
economic performance.
Needless to say, the primary foundation of this school is China’s economic prosperity.
Many consider the cadres’ evaluation system as a key causal factor of economic prosperity in
China. It is argued that officials’ economic performance is the key to deciding their
promotions, which has provided strong political incentives for Chinese cadres to promote
economic growth (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Chen, et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005;
4 This article will not go into details of regarding the accuracy of and differences between each translation
because of the topic.
Whiting, 2001). Many empirical studies also find that the economic performance of provinces
substantially impacts upon the promotion or demotion of provincial leaders (Bo, 1996; Bo,
2002b; Chen, et al., 2005; Choi, 2012; Li and Zhou, 2005; Maskin, et al., 2000). Some
studies also find that the performance of revenue collections plays a more important role than
growth performance in cadres’ promotion (Bo, 2002b; Shih, et al., 2012). In addition to
economic performance, other aspects of performance also matter. Qiao’s study (2013) finds
that demotions of local leaders are closely associated with power-abusing, corruption and
mishandlings of accidents in post-Deng era (1997-2010).
Notably, the selection bias of cadres varies significantly at different levels and time
periods. Landry’s study (2003) on the level of mayors between 1990 and 2000 and the study
of Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) on the level of the CCP Central Committee between 1982 and
2002 find that there is no evidence to prove that the strong economic performance of political
elites would lead to their promotion or demotion.
In addition to performance, some also argues that educational qualification matters in
selecting Chinese leaders (Lee, 1991; Shih, et al., 2012; Sun and Hu, 2012). This view is
supported by empirical evidence (Shih, et al., 2012). Indeed, educational qualifications have
become increasingly important since the CCP launched the “four modernizations (四化)”
project of Chinese cadres. My recent study on the institutionalization of power succession
finds that, in 1982 when this project had just launched, only 4% of Politburo members had
received a college education, but in 2012 only 4% of them did not attend colleges(Zeng,
2013). In 2012, over 68% of the 18th
Politburo members held masters or PhD degrees
including Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang(Zeng, 2013).
Chinese culture and history have also been linked with meritocratic bureaucracy. Some
argue that the Chinese political culture’s emphasis on the ideal of political meritocracy and an
imperial examination system (科举制度 ) was institutionalized to practice it in ancient
times(Bell, 2012; Zhang, 2012). The imperial examination system has been an examination
mechanism of ancient China in selecting civil servants since the Sui (隋) Dynasty in 605.
This system mainly examines students’ philosophical knowledge and literary skills, such as
writing eight-legged essays (八股文).5 Zhang (2012) considers the imperial examination
system an effective way of facilitating social mobility. On the contrary, Elman (1991: 17)
argues that “over 90%” of the Chinese population are not eligible to take the test because of
the unequal distribution of social and educational resources. Elliott (2012) argues that “family
connections and material resources” rather than merit are the keys to political success for “a
majority” of Chinese imperial political elites.6
2.2.2 Factional Politics
5 Eight-legged essay is a special writing style for the imperial examination system.
6 An important dimension of the examination system which is not pointed out in the debate is whether those
who succeed in this examination because of their better literary skills are capable of managing the nation.
Excellent writing skills do not necessarily mean management expertise. The old method of writing eight-legged
essays, in particular, is very pedantic. Similarly, a PhD degree indicates expertise in specific areas rather than
general administration or management skills. Despite the many problems of the imperial examination system, it
is better considered as a critical way to co-opt educated elites and build an image - if not a channel - of social
mobility, rather than a search for governing talents.
The factional politics school argues that patron-client ties are more important than merit
in the selection mechanism of Chinese leaders (Li, 2012d; Li, 2012e; Pei, 2012b; Pei, 2012a;
Shih, et al., 2012). Some even consider patron-client ties as the most influential factor (Li,
2012d; Li, 2012e; Minxin, 2012; Pei, 2012b; Wong, 2012b). Some empirical evidence also
demonstrates the importance of political allegiance(Choi, 2012; Shih, et al., 2012).
Notably, princelings’ powerful family ties have been considered crucial for them to win
higher party ranks. Princelings tend to have more political resources in terms of networks and
connections because of their families (Dotson, 2012a; Dotson, 2012b; Li, 2001a; Wong,
2012b). Some argue that senior leaders might benefit from princelings’ families by promoting
their children (Shih, et al., 2012). Princelings also know more about various informal and
formal rules of the party (Li, 2001a; Zheng and Chen, 2009). In addition, princelings are
considered more loyal and reliable to the regime (Dotson, 2012a; Dotson, 2012b; Economist,
2011; Li, 2001a; Zheng and Chen, 2009; Zheng and Lye, 2003), not only because this regime
was founded by their parents, but also to ensure that they and their families continue to enjoy
the privileges of “red nobility.”
The impact of family ties varies at different levels and times. The study of Shih, Adolph
and Liu (2012) finds that princeling status has substantial impacts on political elites’ party
rank at the level of the CCP Central Committee based on the data from 1982 to 2002;
however, Choi (2012) finds that princelings status did not matter at the level of provincial
leaders based on the data from 1989 to 2009.
The main assumption of the factional politics school is that Chinese leaders have to
select loyal followers in order to survive the intense factional struggles. Indeed, many
factional studies suggest that selecting loyal followers rather than the most capable ones is the
key to maintaining their leadership (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; Pye, 1992). Shih,
Adolph and Liu (2012) argue that less clever followers tend to be more loyal; therefore,
promoting these kinds of subordinates can help leaders to prevent a coup and stay in power.
Li Cheng (2012d) argues that political groups might attempt to support their members to get
into the PSC in order to “protect their interests and exert their influence”.
This study emphasizes patron-client ties and family ties instead of factional background
for two reasons. First, personal relationships among a relatively small group of leaders are
clearly important, but it is not the same as trying to identify firm, coherent and stable
factional groupings. It is very important to make the distinction between the importance of
patronage and the formation of factions.7 Political faction implies ties between members
including horizontal ones, but patronage is more based on hierarchical relationships with
loose or no contacts horizontally at lower levels. Factionalism also implies that people are
aware that they are in a group together.
Many elite studies fail to notice this significant distinction and they mostly tend to use
the language of factions to refer to loose sets of relationships. Nathan’s factional models
(1973), for example, was not describing about political factions at all. He was actually
describing the network of patron-client relationships that created vertical links rather than
horizontal ones. In the study of Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012), they also use the language of
factions when they actually refer to what might be captured under patronage.
Second, we should be wary of placing our trust in certain inside stories of the CCP.
Politics at the very top of the Chinese system is mysterious and the state never responds to or
7 I owe this idea to Professor Shaun Breslin.
denies the existence of factional politics. The opaque nature of China’s elite politics has
cultivated various rumours, hearsay and myth. Ascertaining who belongs to which factions is
subjective, and China does not have party factional politics like western democratic parties
which show clearly who belongs to which faction. Some elite studies actually rest their
arguments on the grounds of rumours, hearsay and sometimes guesswork, instead of building
on credible evidences (Breslin, 2008; Li and White, 2003). The community of Chinese
political studies has been tolerating questionable sources of factional studies for a long time.
2.3 The divergence over institutionalization
Since the 1980s, the CCP has taken impressive efforts to institutionalize its political
system, in particular power succession. Various institutional rules, such as age and term limits,
have been increasingly enforced to ensure the rapid circulation of political elites(Zeng, 2013).
In the intellectual discourse of institutionalization, the core of divergence lies over the
impacts of institutionalization. While many recognized that power succession in China has
been increasingly institutionalized (Huang, 2008; Miller, 2008; Miller, 2013; Teiwes, 2001),
others focus on the limits of institutionalization (Fewsmith, 1999; Fewsmith, 2013; Zheng
and Lye, 2003).
The two debates previously outlined are both central to the third. From the perspectives
of factional politics, institutional rules are nothing but a tool of power struggle. Specifically,
the retirement age limit has been considered by many as a tool to force Jiang Zemin’s
political rivalry out of the game (Fewsmith, 2003; Fewsmith, 2008; Fewsmith, 2013; Ou,
2012; Shirk, 2012a; Zheng and Lye, 2003). The proponents of institutional rules, however,
argue that the increasingly institutionalized power transition has been changing China’s elite
politics (Huang, 2008; Li, 2012f; Nathan, 2003; Teiwes, 2001). These kinds of view suggest
that institutional rules have become a key factor in reshaping power succession. The above
competing views leave opposing interpretations over the deciding-pattern of the 18th
Party
Congress. The factional approach argues that informal politics dominates the decision-making
of the transition in 2012 (Fewsmith, 2013). The institutional approach argues that “the
seniority principle” is the dominating factor (Miller, 2013; Shirk, 2012b). Miller (2013), for
example, argues that the 18th
Party Congress marked a remarkable progress in the
institutionalization of China’s elite politics.
By linking institutional rules – step-by-step promotion in particular - with political
meritocracy, some argue that selected Chinese top leaders are well-trained and experienced
before they assume power (Bell, 2012; Zhang, 2012). Step-by-step promotion means that
leaders are usually promoted level-by-level. For instance, a candidate should usually be a
regular or alternate member of the Central Committee or a minister level official in order to
be eligible for Politburo membership. This promotion mode helps the Chinese leaders to
broaden their visions, increase their leadership experiences and hone their skills.
Theoretically, this institutional rule also provides a way of filtering out incapable
leaders as there are many chances to test their capability. Provincial administration is an
important ground upon which to examine leaders’ capability and skills. With China’s rapid
economic growth, many Chinese provinces are now much bigger than many countries in
terms of not only population but also total economic output (Li, 2010; Zhang, 2012). Thus,
Zhang (2012), an advocate of the meritocratic bureaucracy school, argues that “it takes
extraordinary talent and skills to govern a typical Chinese province, which is on average the
size of four to five European states. Indeed, with the Chinese system of meritocracy in place,
it is inconceivable that people as weak and incompetent as George W. Bush or Yoshihiko
Noda of Japan could ever get to the top leadership position.”
Nowadays, the provincial experience has become increasingly crucial for national
leadership8. 59.1% of the 15
th Politburo, 66.7% of the 16
th Politburo, and 76% of the 17
th
Politburo members have worked as provincial chief before (Li, 2010). Most top Chinese
leaders have served as head of (at fewest two) local provinces. Arguably, provincial
leadership is “the most pivotal stepping stone to top national leadership offices in post-Deng
China” (Li, 2010).
3. KEY HYPOTHESES
For the purposes of this study, this section summarizes several key hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Candidates whose family members are high-level party leaders have a distinct
advantage in competing for promotion.
Hypothesis 2: Political patronage matters in selecting top leaders.
Hypothesis 2a: Patron-client ties with Hu Jintao play a positive role in influencing promotion.
Hypothesis 2b: Patron-client ties with Jiang Zemin have positive impacts on promotion.
Hypothesis 3: Senior leaders who are under the age limit are more likely to be promoted.
Seniority (论资排辈 ) as an important element of Chinese political culture might be a
significant factor in the selection mechanism. Senior leaders tend to accumulate more
political capitals and experiences of political struggle, which makes them more competitive
(Shih, et al., 2012). Of course, their age should not exceed the retirement age limit.
Hypothesis 4: Higher education qualifications facilitate the likelihood of promotion.
Hypothesis 5: Experiences in being provincial leaders (governors) have a positive impact on
promotion.
Hypothesis 6: Gender does matter in selecting Chinese leaders. Some argue that the current
selection mechanism in China tends to discriminate against women (Bell, 2012; Shih, et al.,
2012). As a higher representation of women helps to eliminate gender discrimination and
enhance the legitimacy of leadership, the CCP Organization Department has ruled that there
ought to be a certain proportion of female cadres in leading posts and the state should give
priority to female cadres in the same conditions. Yet, these kinds of rules have not been
applied at the top level. As the first systematic attempt to study political competition at the
highest level, it would be interesting to examine the significance of gender.
4. DATA
To analyse the selection criteria of the PSC, it is important to find a pool of eligible
candidates and winners. No data before 2002 can be used because various institutional rules,
such as age limits and step-by-step promotion, were not well-developed or adhered to before
8 For studies on provincial leadership, please see (Bo, 2002a; Li, 2002; Li, 2010)
2002. Thus, we have no clear idea about the list of candidates. Neither the 16th
nor the 17th
PSCs form appropriate data. This is because the retirement age was changed at the 16th
Party
Congress in 2002. In addition, all eligible candidates for the 16th
PSC were promoted and thus
it was a kind of “uncontested election” that lacked competition. The selection of the 17th
PSC
includes the consideration of establishing heirs apparent in order to prepare for taking over
the top power. Thus, the 18th
PSC is the only remaining and latest valuable research object.
In 2012, eleven of the 17th Politburo members were eligible for the 18th PSC
membership according to the age limit of sixty-eight and the practice of step-by-step
promotion. Those candidates were Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Li Yuanchao, Liu
Yandong, Wang Qishan, Zhang Dejiang, Liu Yunshan, Wangyang, Bo Xilai and Zhang Gaoli.
Because of the institutionalized system of power succession, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang who
were the 17th
PSC members would certainly maintain their PSC seats. Bo Xilai was removed
in early 2012, so there are actually five seats available for the real competition among these
eight candidates. As discussed, the line-up predictions of various mass media and China
experts were based on the competition between these eight candidates.
Table 1 lists the backgrounds of all eight candidates.9 Information of the personal
qualifications and working experience is summarized by the author from the Xinhua News
Agency.10
The eligibility of the 19th
PSC is based on the retirement age limit of sixty-eight. If
the age of a candidate is under sixty-eight at the 19th
Party Congress in 2017, then he or she is
eligible for the competition of the 19th
PSC. Only Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang are eligible
for the next PSC membership. Among all candidates, Liu Yunshan and Liu Yandong are the
only two who have not worked as provincial heads.
Five candidates are princelings: Yu Zhengsheng’s father is Yu Qiwei (more often
called Huang Jing), who was the first mayor of Tianjin and the former Minister of Machinery
Industry; Wang Qishan’s father-in-law is the former Vice Premier Yao Yilin; Zhang
Dejiang’s father is the Major General of PLA Zhang Zhiyi; Li Yuanchao’s father Li
Gancheng was the former deputy Mayor of Shanghai (vice-minister level); and Liu
Yundong’s father Liu Ruilong was the former deputy Minister of Agriculture.
Data on political patronage are drawn from the existing literature. Among the eight
candidates, many argue that Jiang Zemin’s protégés include Wang Qishan(Li, 2012b; Rajan,
2012), Yu Zhengsheng(Li, 2012c; Rajan, 2012), Zhang Gaoli (Li, 2010; Li, 2012c; Rajan,
2012; Zheng and Chen, 2009), and Zhang Dejiang (Fewsmith, 2004:81; Li, 2012b; Rajan,
2012; Zheng and Chen, 2009:13). Wang Yang, Liu Yunshan, and Li Yuanchao are considered
by many to be Hu Jintao’s protégés (Li, 2009; Li, 2012c; Rajan, 2012). According to
Li(2012c:8), Liu Yandong is “widely” considered as the protégé of both Hu Jintao and Jiang
Zemin because of her family ties with Jiang and her work experience with Hu.
9 Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are not included as they would certainly maintain their PSC seats: they did not need
to compete for the PSC seats. As their heir apparent status is dominating, other variables have almost no effect.
10 Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-07/14/content_1600008.htm on 20 December, 2012.
Table 1: Background of the 18th PSC candidates
Outcome
Candidates
Personal Qualification Political Patronage Working
Experience
Age Eligible for
the 19th
PSC?
Education Gender Princeling
Jiang Zemin's
Protégé
Hu Jintao's
Protégé
Provincial leaders
(Governors)
Winners
Zhang Dejiang 66 No Bachelor Male Yes Yes No Yes
Yu Zhengsheng 67 No Bachelor Male Yes Yes No Yes
Wang Qishan 64 No Bachelor Male Yes Yes No Yes
Zhang Gaoli 66 No Bachelor Male No Yes No Yes
Liu Yunshan 65 No Bachelor Male No No Yes No
Losers
Li Yuanchao 62 Yes PhD in law Male Yes No Yes Yes
Liu Yandong 67 No PhD in law Female Yes Yes Yes No
Wang Yang 57 Yes Master Male No No Yes Yes
5. RESEARCH METHOD
As the data of this study only include eight cases, conventional quantitative methods
are difficult to apply in such a small N research design. QCA, however, offers an alternative
approach to investigating the research question of this study. QCA is a case-oriented analytic
technique that can systemically deal with small numbers of cases (i.e. 5-50) by applying
“Boolean algebra to implement principles of comparison used by scholars engaged in the
qualitative study of macro social phenomena”.11
It is proposed by Ragin (1987) and has
gradually developed into a widely applied method in various research fields.12
In the field of
political science, there are not many studies using QCA.13
As the same outcome can be produced by multiple causal mechanisms, one feature of
QCA is that it considers the outcome a result of the combination of several conditions. Using
the survival of mankind as an example, air, water and food are necessary conditions and the
lack of any of these is sufficient for a person to die. The regression model can only tell that
the higher the frequency of such conditions’ absence, the more likely it is that a person will
die; however, QCA treats these conditions equally and pays more attentions to the absence or
presence of such conditions instead of their frequency.
Moreover, QCA can detect conditioning effects of independent variables and specify
different paths to the outcome. The limitation of QCA is that in many cases it is better to use
binary, nominal-scale variables (assigned as 0 and 1) in order to preserve the accuracy. With
the development of the methodology, there are several software programs available for QCA,
including fs/QCA, Tosmana, Stata’s fuzzy, etc.14
In order to avoid software errors, this study
employs both fs/QCA and Tosmana to run QCA.
5.1 Outcome
The outcome is whether the candidate wins a seat in the 18th
PSC. Winners in Table 1
are assigned as 1 and losers are assigned as 0.
5.2 Five Conditions
Considering the small number of cases, the appropriate number of variables should be
four to six. This study selects five key variables as conditions for outcome.
a. 19th
PSC / eligibility of the 19th
PSC (age): candidates who are under sixty-three in 2012
are assigned 1 and those who are not are assigned 0.
b. Princeling: candidates who have a princeling background are assigned 1 and those who do
not are assigned 0
c. Jiangzemin/ Jiang Zemin’s Protégé: those who are Jiang Zemin’s protégés are assigned 1
and those who are not are assigned 0
d. Hujintao/ Hu Jintao’s Protégé: those who are Hu Jintao’s protégés are assigned 1 and those
who are not are assigned 0.
e. Governors : those who have worked as a governor in local provinces are assigned 1 and
those who have not are assigned 0
5.3 Other variables
11 For more information about QCA, see http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/
12 For more literature that applies QCA, see http://www.compasss.org/index.htm;
13 My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for this information. For political science studies that have been
conducted with QCA, please see Chan, S. (2003). Explaining war termination: A Boolean analysis of Causes.
Journal of Peace Research 40(1), pp. 49-66. Osa, M. and Corduneanu-Huci, C. (2003). Running uphill: political
opportunity in non-democracies. Comparative Sociology 2(4), pp. 605-629.
14 For fs/QCA, see http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/links.shtml; for Tosmana, see
http://www.tosmana.net/
To maintain the accuracy of this study, it is important to select the most important factors.
As indicated in Table 1, the following variables do not have much variation across the
outcome, thus they are not selected as conditions for QCA.
5.3.1 Gender
As indicated in Table 1, there is only one female among eight candidates and she failed to
be promoted. Although we cannot test this variable, the line-up of the 18th
PSC did suggest
that politics is still a men’s game at the high level of party rank.
5.3.2 Education
All candidates with postgraduate degrees failed to be promoted, but it is not reasonable to
conclude that higher educational qualifications are negative assets for candidates to seek for
promotion. It is notable here that both heirs apparent, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, have PhD
degrees. Therefore, this study considers this result a coincidence, which means educational
qualifications do not play a role in this selection.
5.4 Interpretation of results
This study runs a Crip-Set Analysis using the software fs/QCA and Tosmana. They
provide exactly the same results, as follows (see Appendix):
Solution 1: “~19th
PSC * Jiangzemin *~ Hujintao *Governors”
Solution 2: “~19th
PSC * ~princeling*~Jiangzemin *Hujintao*~Governors”
The solution of QCA uncovers different paths to achieving the outcome. For this study, it
provides two solutions to achieving the outcome (membership of the 18th
PSC). The major
solution includes four conditions: that the candidates should not be eligible for 19th
PSC
membership (Condition 1) AND being a protégé of Jiang Zemin (Condition 3) AND not
being a protégé of Hu Jintao (Condition 4) AND having worked as governors in local
provinces (Condition 5). The second solution is that the candidates are not eligible for the
19th
PSC membership (Condition 1) AND not being a princeling (Condition 2) AND not
being a protégé of Jiang Zemin (Condition 3) AND being a protégé of Hu Jintao (Condition 4)
AND have not worked as governors in local provinces (Condition 5).
Among all variables, not being eligible for the 19th
PSC membership (Condition 1) is the
only condition shared by both solutions, suggesting its significance in the selection. This
finding is not surprising as the only two candidates who are eligible for the 19th
PSC - Li
Yuanchao and Wang Yang - failed to be promoted into the 18th
PSC. Political patronage
matters as well, but they are not always helpful. This condition only helps to win PSC seats
when the candidate is close either to Jiang Zemin or to Hu Jintao. When the candidate is close
to both or neither Jiang and Hu, he or she is not likely to be promoted into the 18th
PSC. In
the case of Liu Yandong, she is not selected into the 18th
PSC, although she is close to both
Jiang and Hu.
The variable of princeling is particularly notable. It disappears in the first solution,
suggesting that it does not play a role in this solution. This variable appears in the second
solution, however, and the output shows that the condition not to have princeling background
is necessary for the candidate to achieve the outcome (18th
PSC membership). In other words,
princeling status is a burden on the second solution. This finding indicates that princeling
background either does not matter or has a negative impact upon promotion. Either way, it
can be argued that princeling background is not a valuable asset in selecting Chinese leaders
at the highest level. As indicated in Table 1, two out of three losers, Li Yuanchao and Liu
Yandong, were princelings.
In terms of the governor variable, the outputs show that provincial experience matters to
Jiang Zemin’s protégé but not to Hu Jintao’s. This is perhaps because most of Hu Jintao’s
protégés rose from the Communist Youth League, who are experts in propaganda, while
Jiang Zemin’s protégés usually lack the relevant experience (Li, 2012d). As the CCP has
been keen on propaganda and ideology, the capability of coordinating ideological campaigns
and guiding public opinions are highly valuable and irreplaceable. Thus, it perhaps offsets
their inadequate provincial experience.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By using QCA, this study analyzes the selection criteria of Chinese leaders at the
highest party rank. The key finding is that seniority plays a significant role in the leadership
transition of 2012. The personnel arrangement of seniority perhaps attempts to maximize
power-sharing among all eligible candidates, as seven out of eight candidates would be PSC
members eventually under this arrangement. Thus, it is the most efficient solution in terms of
distributing positions to as many candidates as possible without breaking any of the existing
institutional rules. To a certain extent, it is also an effort to prevent individuals’ excessive
power by widening power-sharing.
Most importantly, this arrangement, based on seniority, helps to maintain political
stability by reducing the risks of cruel political struggles over the most powerful positions
(Shirk, 2012b). As demonstrated by the history, the dangers of authoritarian regimes usually
come from the inside. The majority of authoritarian leaders are overthrown by the ruling
elites rather than the masses (Svolik, 2012:5). The CCP learned a lesson with enormous cost
from the protests of 1989 about the risks of a split leadership; Bo Xilai’s affairs in early 2012
perhaps evoked this memory. The regime knows its weakness during the transfer of power
very well - therefore, they choose to use the seniority principle to reduce the discontent of
losers by minimizing their numbers. In this way, political stability during the transition is
maintained at the expense of selecting the most capable leaders and practicing intra-party
democracy (Shirk, 2012b).
The role of age-related promotion in 2012 indicates the significance of institutional
rules, which resulted from the incremental institutionalization of the political system, and has
been changing leadership dynamics. Arguably, the 18th
Party Congress actually “advanced
rather than retarded the progress of institutionalization” (Miller, 2013). Telling who belongs
to which faction is subjective, and China does not have party factional politics like western
democratic parties which show clearly who belongs to which faction. Therefore, using
"factions" as criteria for evaluation and determining who will be selected to top leaders in a
power transition is always uncertain, unpredictable, and even wrong. Age is a factor of
selection in the institutional rule, which rules out people for selection, regardless of who you
are or to which faction you belong. In this sense, the outcome of the 18th
PSC should be
better understood as a product of institutional rules rather than simply a failure of Hu Jintao
and his coalition.
Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that princeling status is helpful to winning the
highest party rank. Interestingly, it either did not matter or had negative effects. This finding
challenges a widely accepted sense that princelings have distinct advantages when competing
for promotion. It is valid to a certain point that princelings might benefit greatly from their
family connections and understand more about various informal rules of the CCP than non-
princelings; however, public resistance to nepotism and favouritism, institutional restraints
and other powerful networks might restrict their political career (Li, 2001b). Therefore,
princeling status might be a burden to promotion, in particular at the highest level of authority.
A leadership filled with princelings would undoubtedly harm the legitimacy of not only the
leadership, but the entire regime. Thus, in 2012, a relatively positive public image of new
leadership is built perhaps at the expense of the failure of two princelings, Li Yuanchao and
Liu Yandong.
In addition, while the factional politics school argues that leaders are able to stay in
power because of their active engagement in factions (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006;
Pye, 1992; Shih, et al., 2012), the findings of this study suggests that it is not always the case.
The self-defeating effects of senior leaders’ patronage as well as the negative impacts of
princeling status indicate that patron-client ties are not valuable assets in seeking promotion
at all times.15
Many argue that Xi Jinping is selected as the first leader because of his
factional neutrality (Breslin, 2008; Zheng and Chen, 2009), which indicates that factional
neutrality sometimes can be crucial.
APPENDIX
Figure 1: Output of fs/QCA
Figure 2: Output 1 of Tosmana
15 Of course, this is not to say that patron-client ties are not important
Note: If a condition is present (1) for the outcome, it is indicated by UPPER-CASE notations.
If it is absent (0) for the outcome, it is indicated by lower-case.
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