Post on 06-Feb-2023
Crucial Themes in theBehavior of Outlaw Bikersand the Evolution of the 1%
Subculture
James QuinnAddictions Program
University of North Texas
The development of “outlaw” biker or 1% clubs from near groups toefficient syndicates typifies the transition of countercultures to subcultures in which entrepreneurial norms replaced or modified many original values and behavior patterns. While warfare with rivals remains a critical dynamic in the subculture,its nature has changed with the subculture. Despite the neanderthal image of the iconic biker, the men who now compose these groups are selected for their adaptability and intelligenceas well as their toughness and bravado. These transitions have altered the nature of biker violence with impulsive, expressive acts of self-gratifying mayhem giving way to more calculating instrumental activities. They have also encouraged a new sort of radically entreprenurial chapters, primarily in Canada and Europe. The largest clubs are also working to mold a public imagethat will help to blunt prosecutions and (re)gain public sympathy.
INTRODUCTION
The “outlaw” biker, or 1%, subculture emerged in the years
following WWII but the subculture did not really coalesce into a
coherent entity until the late 1950s as documented by Thompson
(1967), Reynolds (1967), Wethern (1979), Lavigne (1986), Quinn
(2001) and others. The 1% label refers to bikers that cannot or
will not fit in to mainstream society, are alienated enough to
exalt in the “outlaw” status it infers and fearless enough to
defend that status against all challenges (Quinn, 1987). The 1%
appellation was coined in the late 1940s but was not “formally”
adopted until 1969 (Wethern?). Biker pride in such an exclusive
status reflects the general secretiveness of the underworld and
especially within this subculture of voluntary pariahs. The
extreme nature of 1% belief and behavior, the power of their
xenophobia, the demand for subcultural conformity, and the
subculture’s macro-social origins in status deprivation and
anomie, led Watson to characterize the male-dominated subculture
as a “secular sect” (1982).
The earliest 1% club members were largely barroom brawlers
given to theft, prostitution and drug dealing (Quinn, 2001;
Thompson, 1966). These proto-typical motorcycle clubs (MC’s) were
loosely organized “near-groups” (Yablonski, 1973) that served
members’ emotional needs. In the mid 1960s a plethora of small
clubs dotted the US, vying for power in local saloon societies
and claiming cities, even regions as their “turf.” The anomie of
the era encouraged romantic media portrayals of bikers that fed
membership and led to territorial competition. Interclub violence
attracted increasing police attention and encouraged the growth
of sophisticated organized crime rings within most 1% clubs
(Quinn, 2001).
By the mid 1970s several clubs emerged as hegemonic powers
in the subculture. These “big four” clubs – the Hells Angels,
Bandidos, Outlaws, and Pagans – methodically absorbed many
smaller groups as they consolidated power and refined their
organizations. The Mongols, Sons of Silence and Warlocks remain
as regionally powerful one percent MCs. While the Mongols are
predominantly Hispanic, the rest of the subculture is almost
entirely Anglo.
Long recognized for its extreme violence, the subculture was
recognized as a burgeoning form of organized crime in the 1980s
(e.g., Davis, 1982a & b; Clawson, 1983; McGuire, 1986) although
this trend actually began in the late 1960s. Cliques of bikers
operating under the umbrella of their club’s national or regional
organization used their ferocious reputation and well-refined
intelligence gathering capacity to create rings that moved drugs
and stolen goods around the nation while controlling many
prostitution fronts and legitimate businesses (Davis 1986; Quinn
and Koch, 2003). These 1% MCs are now widely held to be
sophisticated international criminal organizations (Tretheway &
Katz, 1998; Quinn 2001, Barker, 2001). They are the Jungian
“shadow” of US culture that is exporting itself across the globe
along with McDonalds, Wal-Mart and illegal stimulants.
Modern 1% motorcycle clubs are highly selective fraternities
that have become a significant, if not dominant, genre of
organized crime in Canada, western Europe as well as the US. The
1% club is the only form of organized crime to originate in the
US and be successfully exported across the world (Tretheway &
Katz, 1998; Kendall, 1998; Barker 2004). The Hells’ Angels and
Bandidos were especially eager to establish international bases
and have become the “superpowers” of the subculture. The Outlaws
have a significant presence in western Europe, and at least a
small chapter in Thailand but the aggressiveness of their
international expansion declined after the club was virtually
expelled from Canada by the Hells’ Angels (Lavigne, 1999; Sher &
Marsden, 2003; Brown, 1999; Haut, 1999). The Mongols and Sons of
Silence have chapters in Mexico and Germany respectively; only
the mid-Atlantic based Pagans have no chapters outside the US.
These clubs traditionally placed great value on “showing
class” or demonstrating reckless bravado and malicious violence.
The term has expanded over time to include lavish parties,
clubhouses and vehicles. The bikers’ world view remains dominated
by lower class focal concerns (Miller 1958) – legal trouble,
street smarts, toughness, excitement, autonomy, fate – and a
fascination with power. Excesses of hedonism and violence have
long characterized 1%er behavior. The Bandidos’ motto, “We are
the people our parents warned us about” (the title of the1968
novel by Nicholas von Hoffman), understates the extremes of
antisocial behavior common to one percenters. So also do the
mottos of the Pagans (“Hit hard, Split Fast”) and Outlaws (“God
Forgives, Outlaws don’t”). The Hells’ Angels’ motto, “Angels
forever, Forever Angels,” accentuates the deep loyalty and
lifelong commitment of 1% club membership.
Each club has a distinctive persona which guides their
selection of new members and their interaction with other clubs.
The Hells’ Angels are famous for their extremism and elitism, the
Outlaws for their egalitarianism and exuberance, and the Pagans
for their nomadic lifestyle and the ruthless speed with which
they attack foes. Use of Spanish terms, especially to designate
officers and other roles (e.g., el Presidente, abagado for lawyer),
distinguishes the Bandidos. These personas reflect the different
clubs’ interpretations and applications of the subculture’s
values.
METHODOLOGY
The violence and xenophobia of the 1%ers’ world present serious
obstacles to direct objective study of the subculture. Most of
the literature on 1%ers is based on retrospective participant
accounts, and/or interviews with former bikers or police sources.
Triangulation of themes from written accounts of club life is
challenging because that literature is fraught with
contradictions emanating from the biases of their sources. The
literature consists of accounts written by bikers (Reynolds,
1967; Barger, 2000; Winterhalder, 2005), police investigators
(Davis, 1986 a & b; McGuire, 1987 a & b, RCMP, 1999, 2002, Smith,
2001; Grascia, 2004) or journalists using sources similar to
those of police and prosecutors (Lavigne, 1985, 1989, 1999; Sher
& Marsden, 2003). Other media accounts and websites facilitate
efforts to keep abreast with biker activities across the world
(e.g., bikernews.org).
Although an ATF undercover agent, Queen’s book (2005) is the
least biased description of the inner dynamics of a modern 1%
club (the Mongols), but does not attempt any deliberate analysis.
Academic efforts (Montgomery 1976, 1977; Watson, 1981, 1982;
Quinn 1987, 2001; Hopper and Moore, 1983, 1990; Wolf 1991;
Barker, 2001) strive for objectivity but are biased by the
authors’ role, era, club and location as is all ethnography. Only
a few quantitative papers on 1%ers have been published (Danner
and Silverman, 1986; Alain, 1995; Tremblay et al, 1989) and their
focus is limited by topic and region.
I use a series of largely confidential contacts with both
bikers and law enforcers developed over the last thirty years to
synthesize extant descriptions of these clubs into a cohesive
explanatory framework of their evolution. The insights of other
writers are cited, those I have acquired through direct contact
with club members, their immediate “associates” and law
enforcement officials are not. Most of these contacts serve to
affirm and prioritize information that is thematic in the
published literature but unique insights into trends and events
are also gleaned from these interactions.
THEMES OF THE 1% SUBCULTURE
Popular imagery casts “outlaw bikers” as social pariahs who
invert mainstream norms, rebel against conventions and innovate
new methods of profit- and power seeking. Close examination of
the subculture, however, can also reflect the “shadow” side of
mainstream fashions and trends. A fascination with power, force,
speed and mobility, for example, can be found in U.S. mainstream
culture, but their manifestation among 1%ers is so extreme as to
be more caricature than imitation. Similarly, the equation of
power, status and honor with security is taken to extremes in the
underworld where it fosters chronic violence. The interplay of
such dynamics with the biker image and the threats posed by
police and rivals are critical to understanding the subculture’s
evolution.
A single overarching theme underlies the 1%ers’ ascendency
in the underworld but is only marginally expressed in the
literature. It is elaborated by five sub-themes. In practice
these themes are interrelated and have effects at all levels of
analysis. The transition from counterculture to subculture that
is reflected in the shift from the original “purist” values of
the early subculture to a more entrepreneurial outlook is the
critical dynamic in biker evolution. The war mentality explains
the dynamics of norm change and violence within and between
clubs, and club relations with legal authorities. The incremental
adaptation of 1% MC organizational structure to the threats posed
by rivals and law enforcement is also an important derivative of
these transitions. Finally these concepts are used to analyze
changes in the role of crime and violence among 1%ers and
attempts by the larger clubs to create a more socially acceptable
image of their values and activities.
Evolutionary Dynamics
Many aspects of this subculture’s norm system are derived from
various (and often transient) subcultures as well as the
mainstream trends. The violent, hard-drinking chauvinism of blue
collar tavern habitues were the base onto which these emerging
norms were grafted. Even in this formative era, biker appeals to
the frontier ethos of rugged individualism and libertarianism of
mainstream America were common. The hedonistic, rebellious and
nomadic lifestyle that characterized the early 1% clubs utilized
beatnik and hippie themes while the aesthetic, peaceful, tolerant
aspects of those subcultures were rejected. More recently, the
savagery of Latin American drug lords and the ruthless
rationalism of corporate globalization provided models for 1% led
enterprises ranging from drug distribution to securities fraud.
The use of geographically dispersed “cells” or chapters
linked into networks with a semblance of guidance from a single
source, along with the use of savage violence to deter disloyalty
within the group and threats from outside are increasingly noted
among 1%ers. These features of 1% clubs appear to be part of a
larger form of “modal organization” towards which many outcast
stateless entities (e.g., white supremacists, gangs, terrorists)
have drifted. This organizational form, along with the bikers’
tendency to adopt attractive themes from the surrounding society
and its subcultures, have shaped the modern 1%club.
The selective, even idiosyncratic, combination of mimicry,
parallel evolution and norm inversion is typical of the dynamics
of subcultural norm creation in general, and 1%er norms in
particular. This dynamic varies from one club to the next: the
Hells’ Angels, for example, increasingly distrust heavy drug use,
while in most other clubs it is normative. The increasing use of
pre-emptive military force in Vietnam, Central America and the
Middle East is also echoed in biker tactics. However
reconstituted, club norms reflect prominent social currents,
although in unpredictable and highly selective ways. Unlike those
of the mainstream, norms are always cast in terms acceptable to
warriors rather than in the language of diplomacy and trade.
This same modal organization is seen in the organizational
behavior of the largest clubs: iconic “gang” leaders are rapidly
being replaced by more shadowy and diffuse “officers’ councils.”
The increased emphasis on “networking “ increasingly seen in all
clubs (e.g., RCMP, 1999: 5-6. 8, 16,18,22,49) bears some
resemblance to mainstream political, corporate and diplomatic
behavior. The Hell’s Angels, a somewhat hegemonic force in the
subculture, have led these trends but the other major clubs are
not far behind. Entreprenuriualism is also the driving force
behind the recent “expansion franchises” these two clubs (and the
Outlaws) have founded in Canada and Europe.
“Expansion franchise” describes some chapters formed since
1980, primarily in Canada and western Europe, that lack the group
loyalty and purist values of most US chapters. They were created
by the major clubs largely to extend territorial claims and
criminal enterprises (Anderrson, 1997; Brown, 1999, Lavigne,
1999). They are less focused on motorcycling than earlier
chapters and more oriented to blatant racketeering. In many cases
these new chapters are led by men with long bitter rivalries with
one another (e.g., Sweden) although in other cases, former
partners in crime have split to head competing biker groups and
embarked on fierce exchanges of extreme violence (e.g., Quebec).
These interpersonal rivalries feed the vehemence of warfare in
the newly developed biker areas. Clashes between these groups in
Canada (Roslin,1999; Sher and Marsden, 2003) and Scandinavia
(Brown, 1999)
Expansion franchises were at the center of the most lethal
and public warfare ever seen in this subculture. The formal
truces that quieted warfare between the Scandinavian Hells’
Angels and Bandidos (Brown, 1999; Lavigne, 1999: 90-121) reflect
the triumph of entrepreneurial rationality over purist notions of
honor (Bay, 2002). The most significant distinction of these new
chapters is their propensity to switch club affiliation (e.g.,
Bandido members exchanging their red and gold “Mexican” for the
red and white death’s head of the Hells’ Angels). Similar acts
have been noted in more established chapters of US clubs. (i.e.,
Several Pennsylvania Pagans traded their “wooly beasts” for Angel
colors in 2001, sparking a regional war.) While often practical,
such acts are anathema to the purist value of gang loyalty.
Countercultural Purists and Subcultural Entrepreneurs
The shift from countercultural values of “purist” bikers to an
entreprenurial subculture has been the predominant dynamic
guiding the evolution of the subculture. This shift is predicted
by Yinger’s idea that countercultures, based on rebellion
against pivotal societal conventions, evolve into subcultures
that exaggerate particular norms to the point of caricature
(1982: 45-6, 300-303). Wolf describes both the group norms of
counterculture and the proto-typical value system of the 1%er
with the term “conservative” while labeling the more rational
criminal orientation that characterizes the more subcultural
aspects of 1% groups as “radical” (1991: 102-103, 272).
Wolf’s conceptual scheme is based on the idea that
‘conservatives” want to preserve the values that defined the
subculture prior to 1975. Conservatives value the tough,
mechanically-oriented, homo-social world of the biker bar and
clubhouse (Barger, 2000:35-36, 103; Quinn, 2001). While they
value sophisticated weaponry, they usually settle their disputes
with fists, knives or chains and prefer riding, wrenching and
carousing to jetting around the continent in pursuit of profits.
The opposite, “radical.” pole in Wolf’s typology is typified by a
preoccupation with organized criminal enterprises.
Wolf’s terminology fails to link these value clusters to the
concepts of counterculture and subculture. Further, the terms
“conservative” and “radical” are polar opposites that form a
continuum more applicable to an individual than to the relative
power of two partially congruent sets of values. One cannot
always adhere to both sets of priorities at once. Instead of a
continuum defined by polarities, a pair of ideologies that can
remain distinctive or merge is a more useful device for
describing biker ideologies.
“Purism” denotes the bikers’ countercultural leanings
towards raucous hedonism and blue collar masculine camaraderie,
while “entrepreneurial” describes the subcultural sensitivities
that favor developing the club’s potential as a base for
profitable enterprises. Purists are not true conservatives
because they rarely object to illegal enterprises, per se. Purists
hold honor, brotherhood, fighting, riding and mechanical skills
to be the supreme values of the subculture. Entrepreneurs give at
least equal weight to more instrumental criminal skills and
interpersonal contacts from which power may be derived. The
subculture’s roots and imagery are largely grounded in purist
values, but an increasing emphasis on entrepreneurial thinking
led to the emergence of the “Big Four,” and is shaping the
subculture’s future.
The two ideologies are not incompatible: Most “big four”
bikers concur with at least some aspects of each view. Purists
are not necessarily anti-entrepreneurial; nor are entrepreneurs
seeking a different way of life for themselves or their brothers.
The difference is one of priorities. Purists prioritize proto-
typical biker values (as manifested in their club) and are
willing to limit club and enterprise growth to protect these
values. Entrepreneurs see the financial power attained through
enterprises and growth as essential to the preservation of the
club and subculture. They reason that if the club falls, its
version of the subcultural values will fall and then even the
purist goal is lost. Minor and hopefully temporary sacrifices of
values are therefore acceptable to them if they serve the greater
purpose of advancing the club and its values.
The extreme sense of masculine honor generated by purist
values is common in the underworld; it demands an immediate and
extreme response to any threat or affront to individual or group
status. Mechanical ability, heavy drug and alcohol use,
outrageous sexual acts and appearance, spontaneous instrumental
crimes and impulsive violence typify the purist biker who chooses
to live on the margins of society (Watson, 1982; Quinn and Koch,
2003). In the relative isolation of the criminal underworld, both
hedonism and violence rapidly escalate to outrageous levels as
bikers strive to outdo both friends and rivals in demonstrating
their toughness and masculinity (Quinn 1987).
A more entrepreneurial spirit was inspired by the need to
finance warfare caused by the proliferation of clubs in the 1970s
and led to the prioritization of drug, theft, fraud and
prostitution profits (Davis, 1982a, McGuire, 1986a). Economic
success allowed a few clubs to dominate the subculture and
catapulted their members into all variety of organized crime.
Initially a method by which subcultural dominance was sought,
affluence became a goal in itself for many bikers, chapters and
clubs (Quinn, 2001).
Counterculture members have a distinctive appearance and
demeanor that attract attention and reprobation from the
mainstream; they are self-made pariahs who relish mainstream
rejection. This status grants some power in saloon society and
similar settings, but the resulting visibility undermines
criminal enterprises. Subcultures blend in more readily and can
at least claim to share some values, such as rational planning
and normative appearance, with the mainstream. A subcultural
orientation is far more amenable to instrumental criminality than
is countercultural purism (Alain, 1995). This shift reflects the
adaptability of this and other criminal forms to the surrounding
society. This adaptation process evolves in a dialogue of threat,
response and counter-response between each club and the legal
system as well as between rival clubs.
One percent bikers are often depicted as a counterculture by
writers such as Lavigne who focus on their inverted versions of
crucial mainstream norms (e.g., violence, hedonism, chauvinism).
This description still retains some truth, especially among the
smaller clubs in the subculture. The 1%ers’ countercultural
tendencies are rooted in the pariah image of the original bikers
of the 1950s and 1960s. This image was based on the romantic view
of the rugged individualist that runs through U.S. culture (see,
for example, Reynolds, 1967:97; Thompson,1967:79, 101) and was
popularized by films such as The Wild One (1954) and Hells’ Angels’ 69
(1969).
Concern with power, fed by hyper-masculine competitiveness
and the sense of victimization implicit in a pariah status,
became integral to subcultural norms early in the 1%er history.
That concern was translated into profit-seeking and became the
engine that now drives the subculture. Power is the central goal
of the 1%er; violence and intimidation are the chief means by
which it is achieved and asserted. While power lust is more
subcultural than countercultural, countercultural elements are
vital to many of its particular manifestations not the least of
which is the constant warfare that pervades the 1%.social world.
The War Mentality
The mentality of a society at war differs radically from that of
one engaged in ordinary life. LeShan (2002 :35-6, 72-90) explains
the appeal of war via its appeal to ego, its energizing and
solidarity creation effects, and the suspension of ordinary norms
and goals that it justifies. Being at war simplifies the complex
circumstances by eliminating even the recognition of the shades
of gray that color ordinary insights into specific situations.
In wartime, anything that helps one’s cause or social group
is “good”, and all that threatens it is evil. Because the a
biker’s social world consists of his club, the 1% subculture,
saloon society and the local underworld, inter-club conflicts
easily take on epic significance. This dynamic feeds large egos,
inflates lesser ones, and inspires both to action. Moral concepts
are reduced to “us” and “them:” the normal rules of conduct and
ethics are suspended to facilitate a “win at any cost”mentality.
One’s own side of the conflict represents virtue and success
while the enemy represents evil and death. Bikers apply this
mentality to both internecine rivalries and their constant
conflicts with law enforcement; it is one of few constants in
their history.
Several writers have inferred that bikers are dominated by
sociopathic tendencies (Lavigne, 1989: 2-3,6-7; Davis 1986a,
McGuire, 1987a). A subculture of sociopaths could not survive and
prosper as have 1%ers, but a sect of warriors whose only ethic is
victory, would almost certainly succeed under these conditions.
Modern 1% clubs are a bit of each, with competitive
entrepreneurial sentiments roughly correlating with sociopathy,
and gang-like ones more closely resembling those of a stateless
warrior society. The mentality of perpetual war that pervades
club life is key to understanding the 1%er behavior, especially
acts that appear to violate in-group loyalties. This mentality
has also effected many aspects of club organization. The war
mentality explains the depth of both their emotions and their
group loyalty. It is key to explicating how men can be neglectful
or even abusive husbands and fathers by all standards, while
adhering to the highest standards of their wives and brethren.
Initially the motive for organized crime involvement, warfare is
now largely guided by profit driven schemes for underworld
domination.
ORGANIZED FOR ORGANIZED CRIME
Warfare is one of the few organized criminal activities that is
clearly the premeditated product of a clubs formal hierarchical
structure. Other organized crime enterprises are operated by
cliques within the club. This is to say that clubs more often act
as facilitators than direct actors in the organized crime they
spawn. Each chapter of a large 1% club contains cliques of
members who operate one or more illicit enterprises. These
“specialty gangs” (Klein, 2007:55) use the larger club apparatus
to cement ties with similar groups in other chapters with
complimentary specialities (e.g., drug manufacture, importation
and distribution) based on clique skills and chapter location.
This economic diversification protects the financial welfare of
the group as well as providing some legal insulation for
corporate assets and leaders. Thus each club contains a wide
breadth of criminal repertoires which can be tapped by cliques or
the club itself as circumstances dictate.
One Percent clubs evolved from small isolated groups to
large, multinational confederations of chapters. The independence
of the local chapters arose as a requirement of the raucous
independence of the purist bikers who created the subculture.
That same independence is now a critical, if partial, method of
insulating clubs and their leaders from the laws designed to
control organized crime. Each club’s national and regional
organization guides and supports its chapters using formal and
informal networks through which massive illegal drug,
prostitution, theft and white collar scams are also organized.
This network of cells keeps the club itself and many of its
leaders sufficiently aloof from these operations to avoid direct
prosecution. Clubs provide seed money for such operations, then
use their wealth and power to collect sufficient monies from the
profits to provide members the finest possible legal defense when
arrested. The club is also the primary network through which
illegal operations are organized.
One percent clubs unite the boldest, strongest and smartest
offenders they can find. Members create or join enterprises
through which they profit and extend their influence over other
underworld actors (e.g., street gangs, local racketeers). Money
flows into the club through various dues and fees as the club
grants the power of its name and networks to members. The cash
flow, in turn finances internecine warfare that claims territory
for the club in which members’ enterprises can flourish. The more
power a member holds, the greater the likelihood that he will
benefit from the illegal enterprises in the subordinate
structure. The more hierarchical the club becomes, the greater
the integration of its enterprises and thus its power and
profits.
Hierarchy opens the club and its leaders to more costly
prosecutions, however, so fear of infiltration or betrayal
mitigates against completely rational, hierarchical illegal
operations. War provides the rationale for this structure and
builds solidarity among otherwise egocentric club members. The
development of organizations resistant to prosecution and rival
attacks reflects the adaptability of these clubs and the
intelligence of their members. The Outlaws, for example,
discarded their traditional “National President” office in favor
of a group of regional leaders after the arrest of Taco Bowman.
They reasoned that a single leader “was too much of a target.”
This evolution occurred in a piecemeal fashion as threats arose
and new information obtained rather than through a deliberate
strategic design effort.
The subculture’s transition to entrepreneurialism is marked
by greater organizational sophistication and emphasis on profits.
These values are increasingly reflected in membership selection
processes, much to the chagrin of the remaining purists. The
creation of cell-like chapters under the umbrella of a single
club is the most effective way for violent stateless entities to
organize themselves. It is seen now in gangs, crime syndicates
and terror groups: violent stateless entities that evolved by
learning from their mistakes, problems and setbacks as well as
those of their rivals and affiliates.
Legend has it that a Cleveland Hells Angel spent his prison
time reading accounts of Mafia life and applied them upon his
release. While such events undoubtedly occur, club ties to
conventional mobsters predate the emergence of 1%ers as a serious
force in the underworld by more than a decade. The underworld is
relatively small, and connects with many other violent stateless
entities (e.g., revolutionaries, white supremacists, terrorists,
mercenaries). There are only a few, easily bridged, degrees of
separation between its players. The legend nonetheless
illustrates the resiliency of bikers as they adapt all variety of
situations to their advantage. Many use prison time as an
opportunity to expand their network of criminal contacts and
skill repertoire. Some of this learning is focused on police
procedures with the goal of allowing clubs, chapters and cliques
to anticipate police and rival actions against them.
Paranoia and intra-group violence are “natural” biker
responses to increased police efforts to penetrate clubs. As 1%
clubs became more entrepreneurial their willingness to kill their
own members suspected of theft or treachery increased. Cleansing
incidents, such as the 1985 “Laval” (Quebec) massacre of one
Hells’ Angels chapter by another, the torturous execution of
three Angel “Nomads” in Holland, and the murder of seven Ontario
Bandidos are extreme examples of this sort of response to
financial irresponsibility, intra-group theft, and disloyalty
respectively. Belligerent hyper-vigilance becomes paranoiac when
exacerbated by the adrenalin of the “war mentality” and the
bikers’ penchant for alcohol, methamphetamine and cocaine.
Reciprocal aggression toward those who threaten the club is
reflexive for 1%ers. Police violate the libertine and fraternal
values of the 1% subculture with constant surveillance and
infiltration efforts. Local attempts to use zoning and other
forms of law to control 1%ers also feed the war mentality. The
bikers respond in kind by monitoring police officers’ official
and private behavior, and by planting spies (Ayoob, 1987; Roslin,
2001) within all variety of social control organizations and
their ancillaries (e.g., janitorial services).
The desire to deflect social control efforts at all levels
of government leads to greater concern with the actions of
individual club members. This is part of the dynamic that
increasingly excludes impulsive, addicted/alcoholic purists from
larger clubs and encourages the upward mobility of more urbane,
calculating members. Increased control over members’ behavior by
the formal hierarchy is a manifestation of the same trend that
encourages attempts at systemic corruption (Roslin 2001 Thouin,
1999; Queen 2005:29; Economist, 1998).
Biker corruption efforts have received more attention in
Canada (Roslin 2001; Beltrame & Branswell, 2000; Thouin, 1999;
Economist, 1998) than in the U.S. (Clawson, 1983, Brandel, 1996)
but the problem is widespread and well-known in both nations.
Club efforts to corrupt officials are much like those of the
traditional ethnic mobsters who helped initiate this process by
introducing bikers to key officials or at least those thought to
be corruptible. The widely accepted efforts of professional
lobbyists also provide models for legitimate efforts to gain
influence in government circles (Brandel, 1996). The police are
constant antagonists to all 1%ers; application of war mentality
to them takes the form of a limited “cold war,” consisting mainly
of intelligence gathering, corruption and obstruction strategies
but occasionally resorts to overt threats or intimidation, such
as demonstrating knowledge of a police officer’s residence
address or children’s identities. Planned violence toward
authorities is relatively rare but spontaneous acts of resisting
arrest are common, especially among purists. In the 1975-1990
era, many clubs encouraged violent responses to what they
considered “harassment” by police but most 1% hierarchies now
prefer to use lawyers or the media to fulfill this goal.
The Changing Role of Crime and Violence
Entrepreneurial bikers’ use of violence is more premeditated than
that of purists, but is far from totally rational. Indeed,
entrepreneurial violence sometimes seems more likely to impact
innocent bystanders than the impulsive belligerence of purists.
Biker imagery reflects the impulsive violence of the purist who
sometimes victimized errant motorists or non-biker patrons of
taverns and restaurants frequented by 1%ers. (Such behavior draws
the ire of entrepreneurs because it can attract police attention
to biker activities and thus ti illicit enterprises.) “Purist”
wars were largely confined to clubhouse strikes and barroom
brawls but modern clubs have patronize or have financial
interests in legitimate businesses which become ready targets for
rivals. In all cases, 1% violence often parallels the reflexive
desire for retribution and deterrence found in many US criminal
justice and foreign policies. More savage than that of the legal
system, biker efforts to deter internal and external threats to
club and personal power tend to escalate the savagery within the
subculture.
The pattern of escalatory behavior originated among the
original 1%ers of the 1960s who challenged one another to ride
faster, fight harder, and engage in wilder sex than any other
group (Quinn, 1987). Partial isolation from the mainstream and
hyper masculine competitiveness drive the escalation of violent
and hedonistic activities among bikers, but these same tendencies
can be found in the dominant culture as well.
The war mentality motivates and justifies the use of the
most powerful available weapons as it nullifies concerns with
“collateral” impacts on citizens. One percent clubs have
curtailed violence in a few situations (e.g., Quebec,
Scandinavia), but only when their recklessness led to calls for
extreme legislation against their organizations. The violence has
merely been delayed and displaced to other areas (e.g. Alberta,
British Columbia) and become more covert. The desire to deter
unwanted behavior seems to lie deep in the human psyche, as
neither criminals nor authorities recognize its repeated failures
(Philips, 2006).
Violent deterrence is rarely an effective method of taking
control, but it appeases the emotional needs of the men who
control club activities. The increased lethality and power-
seeking of these clubs is motivated by the confluence of their
violently hedonistic (purist) and competitive (entrepreneurial)
norms. The emergence of these qualities has been heavily mediated
by the same forces that encouraged the creation of 1%
organizational structures: internecine rivalries, contacts with
traditional mobsters and legal pressures. The legitimization
efforts of ethnic mobsters has certainly been noticed and adapted
by modern bikers using the latest internet technologies.
Legitimatization
Entrepreneurialism has led to the increasing desire for a facade
of social acceptability, cultivated mainly through skillful use
of various media and participation in charitable events. Here we
see an amalgam of the forces that have shaped the 1%er clubs and
subculture: The purist image of the outlaw biker appeals to the
frontier ethos of rugged individualism and autonomy that run
strong in US culture. The violent hedonism of the image also
makes the very idea of these men collecting toys for needy kids
or carrying the Olympic torch (Sunday Advocate, 1984) very
“newsworthy.” Some bikers have a true affection for the causes
they support. Bikers Against Child Abuse (BACA), whose members
are drawn from both the 1% and legitimate biker communities, has
made some very tangible contributions to victims’ emotional
welfare but also indirectly supports the image sought by these
clubs. Charitable activities are calculated to neutralize legal
assertions of endemic crime among 1%ers by reinforcing claims
that 1% clubs are merely fraternal organizations whose members
seek only raucously masculine camaraderie.
At a broader level, such cynical management of corporate
public imagery is now deeply embedded in US culture and routinely
exploited by groups ranging from political parties and businesses
to churches and charities. Simultaneous use of both purist and
entrepreneurial behaviors and images is typical of the modern 1%
club and can be very deliberate in one context but wholly
unconscious in others.
CONCLUSIONS
One percent MCs began as loosely organized gangs but have
developed into sophisticated umbrella organizations for a
multitude of organized crime enterprises. The shift from
countercultural values to an entreprenurial subculture is the
predominant dynamic in 1% club history. The modern outlaw club
reflects the “modal organization” of many violent stateless
entities ranging from Al Quaeda terror cells to the leaderless
resistance of white supremacists. The subculture’s norms evolved
from bikers’ selective attention to attractive aspects of
prominent social currents that represent the “shadow” side of
mainstream institutions. The selection process was initially
grounded in lower class focal concerns and self-serving hedonism
but now reflects a more rational orientation to underworld power.
While some norms are adopted from the mainstream, others are
inversions of conventional values intended to shock outsiders and
demonstrate the bikers’ independence from the surrounding
society.
Anomie and media romanticization of the early clubs led to
the proliferation of 1% groups in the late 1960s. Territorial
conflicts led to internecine wars spawned by purist gang
loyalties that necessitated an entrepreneurial spirit in the
larger clubs who survived and prospered while absorbing lesser
groups. One outcome of this process was the merger of purist
elements into more entrepreneurial ones that give the modern 1%
club its distinctive image and structure.
Concern with power, hyper-masculine competitiveness and the
sense of victimization transferred easily from purist gang to
entrepreneurial clubs and cliques. Partial isolation from the
mainstream and hyper masculine competitiveness escalate the
savagery, profit-seeking and paranoia of these bikers. Extremes
of violence are evident in the constant escalation of savagery in
both their internal control efforts and their chronic warfare The
1%ers’ lethal forms of power-seeking are motivated by the
confluence of these values and violent hedonism. Biker violence
also demonstrates the reflexive desire for retribution and
deterrence found in many criminal justice and foreign policies
that may be innate to primates..
Warfare is one of the few activities that is overtly
directed by clubs’ formal structure. It also explains the bikers’
willingness to depart from their own norm systems and neglect
other aspects of their lives in order to support the club which
becomes their “cause.” Under a war mentality, normal rules of
conduct and ethics are suspended and egos find rich rewards for
defending their “cause” in a epic struggle of us versus them, or
“good” versus “evil.” The mentality of war also fosters a
paranoiac hyper-vigilance intended to help the group anticipate
police/rival activities. When police are targeted this mentality
is generally restricted to a limited “cold war,” consisting
mainly of intelligence gathering, corruption, obstruction and
even intimidation. In internecine conflicts it has led to
competitions in bomb building that have threatened the peace of
entire cities but is now largely restricted to the shadowy
underworld of saloon society. In this sense the 1% subculture
appears to have come full circle.
Clubs are best described as facilitators of organized crime
rather than its direct coordinators. The formal hierarchy
indirectly profit from the activities of component cliques that
extend their influence over ever larger areas: members’ wealth
supports the club as the club’s power promotes the members’
enterprises. Since 1980 the 1%ers have developed an extremely
broad repertoire of criminal enterprises and skills which can be
tapped for either club or clique needs. The particularly intense
warfare seen in Quebec and Scandinavia in the 1990s reflected a
desire to claim new territory for economic gain as well as to
advance the status of the warring clubs. It was bolder and more
public than any seen previously in the subculture buts its
extremity resulted in an unprecedented detente between the
superpowers of the subculture that was motivated almost entirely
by the desire to protect profits..
Club organization has also changed with the shift to
entrepreneurial subculture. Club hierarchies have tightened their
grip on the autonomy of local chapters and, through those
chapters, the behavior of individual bikers. Formal control of
chapter and individual activities protects the club from police
and media attention at times critical to particular enterprises
or war-related efforts. Formal hierarchy efficiently integrates
enterprises and thus club power. However, such a consolidation
of power opens the group and its leaders to more costly
prosecutions. The cell-like organization of chapters and the
veneer separating enterprises from the club’s formal structure is
thus an organizational development within the subculture that
makes each group more resistant to prosecution. This is perhaps
the single most concrete adaptation of the 1% club that has
evolved from the dialogue of threat, response and counter-
response between each club and the legal system. Legitimization,
another defensive aspect of biker evolution, refers to the
bikers’ growing desire for a facade of social established through
cynical management corporate public imagery .
The themes of the 1% subculture’s evolution have much in
common with those guiding the development of other violent
stateless entities. The details of this evolution are
idiosyncratic and history-bound but the underlying patterns
deserve further study. Such research must be unhindered by the
reflexive desire to define “deviant” groups in ways that
demarcate them from the norms and values of the mainstream. It is
the shadowy extremes of conventional norms that provide the
values and strategies these groups use to thwart control efforts
and justify themselves.
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