Crucial Themes in theBehavior of Outlaw Bikersand the Evolution of the 1%

Subculture

James QuinnAddictions Program

University of North Texas

The development of “outlaw” biker or 1% clubs from near groups toefficient syndicates typifies the transition of countercultures to subcultures in which entrepreneurial norms replaced or modified many original values and behavior patterns. While warfare with rivals remains a critical dynamic in the subculture,its nature has changed with the subculture. Despite the neanderthal image of the iconic biker, the men who now compose these groups are selected for their adaptability and intelligenceas well as their toughness and bravado. These transitions have altered the nature of biker violence with impulsive, expressive acts of self-gratifying mayhem giving way to more calculating instrumental activities. They have also encouraged a new sort of radically entreprenurial chapters, primarily in Canada and Europe. The largest clubs are also working to mold a public imagethat will help to blunt prosecutions and (re)gain public sympathy.

INTRODUCTION

The “outlaw” biker, or 1%, subculture emerged in the years

following WWII but the subculture did not really coalesce into a

coherent entity until the late 1950s as documented by Thompson

(1967), Reynolds (1967), Wethern (1979), Lavigne (1986), Quinn

(2001) and others. The 1% label refers to bikers that cannot or

will not fit in to mainstream society, are alienated enough to

exalt in the “outlaw” status it infers and fearless enough to

defend that status against all challenges (Quinn, 1987). The 1%

appellation was coined in the late 1940s but was not “formally”

adopted until 1969 (Wethern?). Biker pride in such an exclusive

status reflects the general secretiveness of the underworld and

especially within this subculture of voluntary pariahs. The

extreme nature of 1% belief and behavior, the power of their

xenophobia, the demand for subcultural conformity, and the

subculture’s macro-social origins in status deprivation and

anomie, led Watson to characterize the male-dominated subculture

as a “secular sect” (1982).

The earliest 1% club members were largely barroom brawlers

given to theft, prostitution and drug dealing (Quinn, 2001;

Thompson, 1966). These proto-typical motorcycle clubs (MC’s) were

loosely organized “near-groups” (Yablonski, 1973) that served

members’ emotional needs. In the mid 1960s a plethora of small

clubs dotted the US, vying for power in local saloon societies

and claiming cities, even regions as their “turf.” The anomie of

the era encouraged romantic media portrayals of bikers that fed

membership and led to territorial competition. Interclub violence

attracted increasing police attention and encouraged the growth

of sophisticated organized crime rings within most 1% clubs

(Quinn, 2001).

By the mid 1970s several clubs emerged as hegemonic powers

in the subculture. These “big four” clubs – the Hells Angels,

Bandidos, Outlaws, and Pagans – methodically absorbed many

smaller groups as they consolidated power and refined their

organizations. The Mongols, Sons of Silence and Warlocks remain

as regionally powerful one percent MCs. While the Mongols are

predominantly Hispanic, the rest of the subculture is almost

entirely Anglo.

Long recognized for its extreme violence, the subculture was

recognized as a burgeoning form of organized crime in the 1980s

(e.g., Davis, 1982a & b; Clawson, 1983; McGuire, 1986) although

this trend actually began in the late 1960s. Cliques of bikers

operating under the umbrella of their club’s national or regional

organization used their ferocious reputation and well-refined

intelligence gathering capacity to create rings that moved drugs

and stolen goods around the nation while controlling many

prostitution fronts and legitimate businesses (Davis 1986; Quinn

and Koch, 2003). These 1% MCs are now widely held to be

sophisticated international criminal organizations (Tretheway &

Katz, 1998; Quinn 2001, Barker, 2001). They are the Jungian

“shadow” of US culture that is exporting itself across the globe

along with McDonalds, Wal-Mart and illegal stimulants.

Modern 1% motorcycle clubs are highly selective fraternities

that have become a significant, if not dominant, genre of

organized crime in Canada, western Europe as well as the US. The

1% club is the only form of organized crime to originate in the

US and be successfully exported across the world (Tretheway &

Katz, 1998; Kendall, 1998; Barker 2004). The Hells’ Angels and

Bandidos were especially eager to establish international bases

and have become the “superpowers” of the subculture. The Outlaws

have a significant presence in western Europe, and at least a

small chapter in Thailand but the aggressiveness of their

international expansion declined after the club was virtually

expelled from Canada by the Hells’ Angels (Lavigne, 1999; Sher &

Marsden, 2003; Brown, 1999; Haut, 1999). The Mongols and Sons of

Silence have chapters in Mexico and Germany respectively; only

the mid-Atlantic based Pagans have no chapters outside the US.

These clubs traditionally placed great value on “showing

class” or demonstrating reckless bravado and malicious violence.

The term has expanded over time to include lavish parties,

clubhouses and vehicles. The bikers’ world view remains dominated

by lower class focal concerns (Miller 1958) – legal trouble,

street smarts, toughness, excitement, autonomy, fate – and a

fascination with power. Excesses of hedonism and violence have

long characterized 1%er behavior. The Bandidos’ motto, “We are

the people our parents warned us about” (the title of the1968

novel by Nicholas von Hoffman), understates the extremes of

antisocial behavior common to one percenters. So also do the

mottos of the Pagans (“Hit hard, Split Fast”) and Outlaws (“God

Forgives, Outlaws don’t”). The Hells’ Angels’ motto, “Angels

forever, Forever Angels,” accentuates the deep loyalty and

lifelong commitment of 1% club membership.

Each club has a distinctive persona which guides their

selection of new members and their interaction with other clubs.

The Hells’ Angels are famous for their extremism and elitism, the

Outlaws for their egalitarianism and exuberance, and the Pagans

for their nomadic lifestyle and the ruthless speed with which

they attack foes. Use of Spanish terms, especially to designate

officers and other roles (e.g., el Presidente, abagado for lawyer),

distinguishes the Bandidos. These personas reflect the different

clubs’ interpretations and applications of the subculture’s

values.

METHODOLOGY

The violence and xenophobia of the 1%ers’ world present serious

obstacles to direct objective study of the subculture. Most of

the literature on 1%ers is based on retrospective participant

accounts, and/or interviews with former bikers or police sources.

Triangulation of themes from written accounts of club life is

challenging because that literature is fraught with

contradictions emanating from the biases of their sources. The

literature consists of accounts written by bikers (Reynolds,

1967; Barger, 2000; Winterhalder, 2005), police investigators

(Davis, 1986 a & b; McGuire, 1987 a & b, RCMP, 1999, 2002, Smith,

2001; Grascia, 2004) or journalists using sources similar to

those of police and prosecutors (Lavigne, 1985, 1989, 1999; Sher

& Marsden, 2003). Other media accounts and websites facilitate

efforts to keep abreast with biker activities across the world

(e.g., bikernews.org).

Although an ATF undercover agent, Queen’s book (2005) is the

least biased description of the inner dynamics of a modern 1%

club (the Mongols), but does not attempt any deliberate analysis.

Academic efforts (Montgomery 1976, 1977; Watson, 1981, 1982;

Quinn 1987, 2001; Hopper and Moore, 1983, 1990; Wolf 1991;

Barker, 2001) strive for objectivity but are biased by the

authors’ role, era, club and location as is all ethnography. Only

a few quantitative papers on 1%ers have been published (Danner

and Silverman, 1986; Alain, 1995; Tremblay et al, 1989) and their

focus is limited by topic and region.

I use a series of largely confidential contacts with both

bikers and law enforcers developed over the last thirty years to

synthesize extant descriptions of these clubs into a cohesive

explanatory framework of their evolution. The insights of other

writers are cited, those I have acquired through direct contact

with club members, their immediate “associates” and law

enforcement officials are not. Most of these contacts serve to

affirm and prioritize information that is thematic in the

published literature but unique insights into trends and events

are also gleaned from these interactions.

THEMES OF THE 1% SUBCULTURE

Popular imagery casts “outlaw bikers” as social pariahs who

invert mainstream norms, rebel against conventions and innovate

new methods of profit- and power seeking. Close examination of

the subculture, however, can also reflect the “shadow” side of

mainstream fashions and trends. A fascination with power, force,

speed and mobility, for example, can be found in U.S. mainstream

culture, but their manifestation among 1%ers is so extreme as to

be more caricature than imitation. Similarly, the equation of

power, status and honor with security is taken to extremes in the

underworld where it fosters chronic violence. The interplay of

such dynamics with the biker image and the threats posed by

police and rivals are critical to understanding the subculture’s

evolution.

A single overarching theme underlies the 1%ers’ ascendency

in the underworld but is only marginally expressed in the

literature. It is elaborated by five sub-themes. In practice

these themes are interrelated and have effects at all levels of

analysis. The transition from counterculture to subculture that

is reflected in the shift from the original “purist” values of

the early subculture to a more entrepreneurial outlook is the

critical dynamic in biker evolution. The war mentality explains

the dynamics of norm change and violence within and between

clubs, and club relations with legal authorities. The incremental

adaptation of 1% MC organizational structure to the threats posed

by rivals and law enforcement is also an important derivative of

these transitions. Finally these concepts are used to analyze

changes in the role of crime and violence among 1%ers and

attempts by the larger clubs to create a more socially acceptable

image of their values and activities.

Evolutionary Dynamics

Many aspects of this subculture’s norm system are derived from

various (and often transient) subcultures as well as the

mainstream trends. The violent, hard-drinking chauvinism of blue

collar tavern habitues were the base onto which these emerging

norms were grafted. Even in this formative era, biker appeals to

the frontier ethos of rugged individualism and libertarianism of

mainstream America were common. The hedonistic, rebellious and

nomadic lifestyle that characterized the early 1% clubs utilized

beatnik and hippie themes while the aesthetic, peaceful, tolerant

aspects of those subcultures were rejected. More recently, the

savagery of Latin American drug lords and the ruthless

rationalism of corporate globalization provided models for 1% led

enterprises ranging from drug distribution to securities fraud.

The use of geographically dispersed “cells” or chapters

linked into networks with a semblance of guidance from a single

source, along with the use of savage violence to deter disloyalty

within the group and threats from outside are increasingly noted

among 1%ers. These features of 1% clubs appear to be part of a

larger form of “modal organization” towards which many outcast

stateless entities (e.g., white supremacists, gangs, terrorists)

have drifted. This organizational form, along with the bikers’

tendency to adopt attractive themes from the surrounding society

and its subcultures, have shaped the modern 1%club.

The selective, even idiosyncratic, combination of mimicry,

parallel evolution and norm inversion is typical of the dynamics

of subcultural norm creation in general, and 1%er norms in

particular. This dynamic varies from one club to the next: the

Hells’ Angels, for example, increasingly distrust heavy drug use,

while in most other clubs it is normative. The increasing use of

pre-emptive military force in Vietnam, Central America and the

Middle East is also echoed in biker tactics. However

reconstituted, club norms reflect prominent social currents,

although in unpredictable and highly selective ways. Unlike those

of the mainstream, norms are always cast in terms acceptable to

warriors rather than in the language of diplomacy and trade.

This same modal organization is seen in the organizational

behavior of the largest clubs: iconic “gang” leaders are rapidly

being replaced by more shadowy and diffuse “officers’ councils.”

The increased emphasis on “networking “ increasingly seen in all

clubs (e.g., RCMP, 1999: 5-6. 8, 16,18,22,49) bears some

resemblance to mainstream political, corporate and diplomatic

behavior. The Hell’s Angels, a somewhat hegemonic force in the

subculture, have led these trends but the other major clubs are

not far behind. Entreprenuriualism is also the driving force

behind the recent “expansion franchises” these two clubs (and the

Outlaws) have founded in Canada and Europe.

“Expansion franchise” describes some chapters formed since

1980, primarily in Canada and western Europe, that lack the group

loyalty and purist values of most US chapters. They were created

by the major clubs largely to extend territorial claims and

criminal enterprises (Anderrson, 1997; Brown, 1999, Lavigne,

1999). They are less focused on motorcycling than earlier

chapters and more oriented to blatant racketeering. In many cases

these new chapters are led by men with long bitter rivalries with

one another (e.g., Sweden) although in other cases, former

partners in crime have split to head competing biker groups and

embarked on fierce exchanges of extreme violence (e.g., Quebec).

These interpersonal rivalries feed the vehemence of warfare in

the newly developed biker areas. Clashes between these groups in

Canada (Roslin,1999; Sher and Marsden, 2003) and Scandinavia

(Brown, 1999)

Expansion franchises were at the center of the most lethal

and public warfare ever seen in this subculture. The formal

truces that quieted warfare between the Scandinavian Hells’

Angels and Bandidos (Brown, 1999; Lavigne, 1999: 90-121) reflect

the triumph of entrepreneurial rationality over purist notions of

honor (Bay, 2002). The most significant distinction of these new

chapters is their propensity to switch club affiliation (e.g.,

Bandido members exchanging their red and gold “Mexican” for the

red and white death’s head of the Hells’ Angels). Similar acts

have been noted in more established chapters of US clubs. (i.e.,

Several Pennsylvania Pagans traded their “wooly beasts” for Angel

colors in 2001, sparking a regional war.) While often practical,

such acts are anathema to the purist value of gang loyalty.

Countercultural Purists and Subcultural Entrepreneurs

The shift from countercultural values of “purist” bikers to an

entreprenurial subculture has been the predominant dynamic

guiding the evolution of the subculture. This shift is predicted

by Yinger’s idea that countercultures, based on rebellion

against pivotal societal conventions, evolve into subcultures

that exaggerate particular norms to the point of caricature

(1982: 45-6, 300-303). Wolf describes both the group norms of

counterculture and the proto-typical value system of the 1%er

with the term “conservative” while labeling the more rational

criminal orientation that characterizes the more subcultural

aspects of 1% groups as “radical” (1991: 102-103, 272).

Wolf’s conceptual scheme is based on the idea that

‘conservatives” want to preserve the values that defined the

subculture prior to 1975. Conservatives value the tough,

mechanically-oriented, homo-social world of the biker bar and

clubhouse (Barger, 2000:35-36, 103; Quinn, 2001). While they

value sophisticated weaponry, they usually settle their disputes

with fists, knives or chains and prefer riding, wrenching and

carousing to jetting around the continent in pursuit of profits.

The opposite, “radical.” pole in Wolf’s typology is typified by a

preoccupation with organized criminal enterprises.

Wolf’s terminology fails to link these value clusters to the

concepts of counterculture and subculture. Further, the terms

“conservative” and “radical” are polar opposites that form a

continuum more applicable to an individual than to the relative

power of two partially congruent sets of values. One cannot

always adhere to both sets of priorities at once. Instead of a

continuum defined by polarities, a pair of ideologies that can

remain distinctive or merge is a more useful device for

describing biker ideologies.

“Purism” denotes the bikers’ countercultural leanings

towards raucous hedonism and blue collar masculine camaraderie,

while “entrepreneurial” describes the subcultural sensitivities

that favor developing the club’s potential as a base for

profitable enterprises. Purists are not true conservatives

because they rarely object to illegal enterprises, per se. Purists

hold honor, brotherhood, fighting, riding and mechanical skills

to be the supreme values of the subculture. Entrepreneurs give at

least equal weight to more instrumental criminal skills and

interpersonal contacts from which power may be derived. The

subculture’s roots and imagery are largely grounded in purist

values, but an increasing emphasis on entrepreneurial thinking

led to the emergence of the “Big Four,” and is shaping the

subculture’s future.

The two ideologies are not incompatible: Most “big four”

bikers concur with at least some aspects of each view. Purists

are not necessarily anti-entrepreneurial; nor are entrepreneurs

seeking a different way of life for themselves or their brothers.

The difference is one of priorities. Purists prioritize proto-

typical biker values (as manifested in their club) and are

willing to limit club and enterprise growth to protect these

values. Entrepreneurs see the financial power attained through

enterprises and growth as essential to the preservation of the

club and subculture. They reason that if the club falls, its

version of the subcultural values will fall and then even the

purist goal is lost. Minor and hopefully temporary sacrifices of

values are therefore acceptable to them if they serve the greater

purpose of advancing the club and its values.

The extreme sense of masculine honor generated by purist

values is common in the underworld; it demands an immediate and

extreme response to any threat or affront to individual or group

status. Mechanical ability, heavy drug and alcohol use,

outrageous sexual acts and appearance, spontaneous instrumental

crimes and impulsive violence typify the purist biker who chooses

to live on the margins of society (Watson, 1982; Quinn and Koch,

2003). In the relative isolation of the criminal underworld, both

hedonism and violence rapidly escalate to outrageous levels as

bikers strive to outdo both friends and rivals in demonstrating

their toughness and masculinity (Quinn 1987).

A more entrepreneurial spirit was inspired by the need to

finance warfare caused by the proliferation of clubs in the 1970s

and led to the prioritization of drug, theft, fraud and

prostitution profits (Davis, 1982a, McGuire, 1986a). Economic

success allowed a few clubs to dominate the subculture and

catapulted their members into all variety of organized crime.

Initially a method by which subcultural dominance was sought,

affluence became a goal in itself for many bikers, chapters and

clubs (Quinn, 2001).

Counterculture members have a distinctive appearance and

demeanor that attract attention and reprobation from the

mainstream; they are self-made pariahs who relish mainstream

rejection. This status grants some power in saloon society and

similar settings, but the resulting visibility undermines

criminal enterprises. Subcultures blend in more readily and can

at least claim to share some values, such as rational planning

and normative appearance, with the mainstream. A subcultural

orientation is far more amenable to instrumental criminality than

is countercultural purism (Alain, 1995). This shift reflects the

adaptability of this and other criminal forms to the surrounding

society. This adaptation process evolves in a dialogue of threat,

response and counter-response between each club and the legal

system as well as between rival clubs.

One percent bikers are often depicted as a counterculture by

writers such as Lavigne who focus on their inverted versions of

crucial mainstream norms (e.g., violence, hedonism, chauvinism).

This description still retains some truth, especially among the

smaller clubs in the subculture. The 1%ers’ countercultural

tendencies are rooted in the pariah image of the original bikers

of the 1950s and 1960s. This image was based on the romantic view

of the rugged individualist that runs through U.S. culture (see,

for example, Reynolds, 1967:97; Thompson,1967:79, 101) and was

popularized by films such as The Wild One (1954) and Hells’ Angels’ 69

(1969).

Concern with power, fed by hyper-masculine competitiveness

and the sense of victimization implicit in a pariah status,

became integral to subcultural norms early in the 1%er history.

That concern was translated into profit-seeking and became the

engine that now drives the subculture. Power is the central goal

of the 1%er; violence and intimidation are the chief means by

which it is achieved and asserted. While power lust is more

subcultural than countercultural, countercultural elements are

vital to many of its particular manifestations not the least of

which is the constant warfare that pervades the 1%.social world.

The War Mentality

The mentality of a society at war differs radically from that of

one engaged in ordinary life. LeShan (2002 :35-6, 72-90) explains

the appeal of war via its appeal to ego, its energizing and

solidarity creation effects, and the suspension of ordinary norms

and goals that it justifies. Being at war simplifies the complex

circumstances by eliminating even the recognition of the shades

of gray that color ordinary insights into specific situations.

In wartime, anything that helps one’s cause or social group

is “good”, and all that threatens it is evil. Because the a

biker’s social world consists of his club, the 1% subculture,

saloon society and the local underworld, inter-club conflicts

easily take on epic significance. This dynamic feeds large egos,

inflates lesser ones, and inspires both to action. Moral concepts

are reduced to “us” and “them:” the normal rules of conduct and

ethics are suspended to facilitate a “win at any cost”mentality.

One’s own side of the conflict represents virtue and success

while the enemy represents evil and death. Bikers apply this

mentality to both internecine rivalries and their constant

conflicts with law enforcement; it is one of few constants in

their history.

Several writers have inferred that bikers are dominated by

sociopathic tendencies (Lavigne, 1989: 2-3,6-7; Davis 1986a,

McGuire, 1987a). A subculture of sociopaths could not survive and

prosper as have 1%ers, but a sect of warriors whose only ethic is

victory, would almost certainly succeed under these conditions.

Modern 1% clubs are a bit of each, with competitive

entrepreneurial sentiments roughly correlating with sociopathy,

and gang-like ones more closely resembling those of a stateless

warrior society. The mentality of perpetual war that pervades

club life is key to understanding the 1%er behavior, especially

acts that appear to violate in-group loyalties. This mentality

has also effected many aspects of club organization. The war

mentality explains the depth of both their emotions and their

group loyalty. It is key to explicating how men can be neglectful

or even abusive husbands and fathers by all standards, while

adhering to the highest standards of their wives and brethren.

Initially the motive for organized crime involvement, warfare is

now largely guided by profit driven schemes for underworld

domination.

ORGANIZED FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

Warfare is one of the few organized criminal activities that is

clearly the premeditated product of a clubs formal hierarchical

structure. Other organized crime enterprises are operated by

cliques within the club. This is to say that clubs more often act

as facilitators than direct actors in the organized crime they

spawn. Each chapter of a large 1% club contains cliques of

members who operate one or more illicit enterprises. These

“specialty gangs” (Klein, 2007:55) use the larger club apparatus

to cement ties with similar groups in other chapters with

complimentary specialities (e.g., drug manufacture, importation

and distribution) based on clique skills and chapter location.

This economic diversification protects the financial welfare of

the group as well as providing some legal insulation for

corporate assets and leaders. Thus each club contains a wide

breadth of criminal repertoires which can be tapped by cliques or

the club itself as circumstances dictate.

One Percent clubs evolved from small isolated groups to

large, multinational confederations of chapters. The independence

of the local chapters arose as a requirement of the raucous

independence of the purist bikers who created the subculture.

That same independence is now a critical, if partial, method of

insulating clubs and their leaders from the laws designed to

control organized crime. Each club’s national and regional

organization guides and supports its chapters using formal and

informal networks through which massive illegal drug,

prostitution, theft and white collar scams are also organized.

This network of cells keeps the club itself and many of its

leaders sufficiently aloof from these operations to avoid direct

prosecution. Clubs provide seed money for such operations, then

use their wealth and power to collect sufficient monies from the

profits to provide members the finest possible legal defense when

arrested. The club is also the primary network through which

illegal operations are organized.

One percent clubs unite the boldest, strongest and smartest

offenders they can find. Members create or join enterprises

through which they profit and extend their influence over other

underworld actors (e.g., street gangs, local racketeers). Money

flows into the club through various dues and fees as the club

grants the power of its name and networks to members. The cash

flow, in turn finances internecine warfare that claims territory

for the club in which members’ enterprises can flourish. The more

power a member holds, the greater the likelihood that he will

benefit from the illegal enterprises in the subordinate

structure. The more hierarchical the club becomes, the greater

the integration of its enterprises and thus its power and

profits.

Hierarchy opens the club and its leaders to more costly

prosecutions, however, so fear of infiltration or betrayal

mitigates against completely rational, hierarchical illegal

operations. War provides the rationale for this structure and

builds solidarity among otherwise egocentric club members. The

development of organizations resistant to prosecution and rival

attacks reflects the adaptability of these clubs and the

intelligence of their members. The Outlaws, for example,

discarded their traditional “National President” office in favor

of a group of regional leaders after the arrest of Taco Bowman.

They reasoned that a single leader “was too much of a target.”

This evolution occurred in a piecemeal fashion as threats arose

and new information obtained rather than through a deliberate

strategic design effort.

The subculture’s transition to entrepreneurialism is marked

by greater organizational sophistication and emphasis on profits.

These values are increasingly reflected in membership selection

processes, much to the chagrin of the remaining purists. The

creation of cell-like chapters under the umbrella of a single

club is the most effective way for violent stateless entities to

organize themselves. It is seen now in gangs, crime syndicates

and terror groups: violent stateless entities that evolved by

learning from their mistakes, problems and setbacks as well as

those of their rivals and affiliates.

Legend has it that a Cleveland Hells Angel spent his prison

time reading accounts of Mafia life and applied them upon his

release. While such events undoubtedly occur, club ties to

conventional mobsters predate the emergence of 1%ers as a serious

force in the underworld by more than a decade. The underworld is

relatively small, and connects with many other violent stateless

entities (e.g., revolutionaries, white supremacists, terrorists,

mercenaries). There are only a few, easily bridged, degrees of

separation between its players. The legend nonetheless

illustrates the resiliency of bikers as they adapt all variety of

situations to their advantage. Many use prison time as an

opportunity to expand their network of criminal contacts and

skill repertoire. Some of this learning is focused on police

procedures with the goal of allowing clubs, chapters and cliques

to anticipate police and rival actions against them.

Paranoia and intra-group violence are “natural” biker

responses to increased police efforts to penetrate clubs. As 1%

clubs became more entrepreneurial their willingness to kill their

own members suspected of theft or treachery increased. Cleansing

incidents, such as the 1985 “Laval” (Quebec) massacre of one

Hells’ Angels chapter by another, the torturous execution of

three Angel “Nomads” in Holland, and the murder of seven Ontario

Bandidos are extreme examples of this sort of response to

financial irresponsibility, intra-group theft, and disloyalty

respectively. Belligerent hyper-vigilance becomes paranoiac when

exacerbated by the adrenalin of the “war mentality” and the

bikers’ penchant for alcohol, methamphetamine and cocaine.

Reciprocal aggression toward those who threaten the club is

reflexive for 1%ers. Police violate the libertine and fraternal

values of the 1% subculture with constant surveillance and

infiltration efforts. Local attempts to use zoning and other

forms of law to control 1%ers also feed the war mentality. The

bikers respond in kind by monitoring police officers’ official

and private behavior, and by planting spies (Ayoob, 1987; Roslin,

2001) within all variety of social control organizations and

their ancillaries (e.g., janitorial services).

The desire to deflect social control efforts at all levels

of government leads to greater concern with the actions of

individual club members. This is part of the dynamic that

increasingly excludes impulsive, addicted/alcoholic purists from

larger clubs and encourages the upward mobility of more urbane,

calculating members. Increased control over members’ behavior by

the formal hierarchy is a manifestation of the same trend that

encourages attempts at systemic corruption (Roslin 2001 Thouin,

1999; Queen 2005:29; Economist, 1998).

Biker corruption efforts have received more attention in

Canada (Roslin 2001; Beltrame & Branswell, 2000; Thouin, 1999;

Economist, 1998) than in the U.S. (Clawson, 1983, Brandel, 1996)

but the problem is widespread and well-known in both nations.

Club efforts to corrupt officials are much like those of the

traditional ethnic mobsters who helped initiate this process by

introducing bikers to key officials or at least those thought to

be corruptible. The widely accepted efforts of professional

lobbyists also provide models for legitimate efforts to gain

influence in government circles (Brandel, 1996). The police are

constant antagonists to all 1%ers; application of war mentality

to them takes the form of a limited “cold war,” consisting mainly

of intelligence gathering, corruption and obstruction strategies

but occasionally resorts to overt threats or intimidation, such

as demonstrating knowledge of a police officer’s residence

address or children’s identities. Planned violence toward

authorities is relatively rare but spontaneous acts of resisting

arrest are common, especially among purists. In the 1975-1990

era, many clubs encouraged violent responses to what they

considered “harassment” by police but most 1% hierarchies now

prefer to use lawyers or the media to fulfill this goal.

The Changing Role of Crime and Violence

Entrepreneurial bikers’ use of violence is more premeditated than

that of purists, but is far from totally rational. Indeed,

entrepreneurial violence sometimes seems more likely to impact

innocent bystanders than the impulsive belligerence of purists.

Biker imagery reflects the impulsive violence of the purist who

sometimes victimized errant motorists or non-biker patrons of

taverns and restaurants frequented by 1%ers. (Such behavior draws

the ire of entrepreneurs because it can attract police attention

to biker activities and thus ti illicit enterprises.) “Purist”

wars were largely confined to clubhouse strikes and barroom

brawls but modern clubs have patronize or have financial

interests in legitimate businesses which become ready targets for

rivals. In all cases, 1% violence often parallels the reflexive

desire for retribution and deterrence found in many US criminal

justice and foreign policies. More savage than that of the legal

system, biker efforts to deter internal and external threats to

club and personal power tend to escalate the savagery within the

subculture.

The pattern of escalatory behavior originated among the

original 1%ers of the 1960s who challenged one another to ride

faster, fight harder, and engage in wilder sex than any other

group (Quinn, 1987). Partial isolation from the mainstream and

hyper masculine competitiveness drive the escalation of violent

and hedonistic activities among bikers, but these same tendencies

can be found in the dominant culture as well.

The war mentality motivates and justifies the use of the

most powerful available weapons as it nullifies concerns with

“collateral” impacts on citizens. One percent clubs have

curtailed violence in a few situations (e.g., Quebec,

Scandinavia), but only when their recklessness led to calls for

extreme legislation against their organizations. The violence has

merely been delayed and displaced to other areas (e.g. Alberta,

British Columbia) and become more covert. The desire to deter

unwanted behavior seems to lie deep in the human psyche, as

neither criminals nor authorities recognize its repeated failures

(Philips, 2006).

Violent deterrence is rarely an effective method of taking

control, but it appeases the emotional needs of the men who

control club activities. The increased lethality and power-

seeking of these clubs is motivated by the confluence of their

violently hedonistic (purist) and competitive (entrepreneurial)

norms. The emergence of these qualities has been heavily mediated

by the same forces that encouraged the creation of 1%

organizational structures: internecine rivalries, contacts with

traditional mobsters and legal pressures. The legitimization

efforts of ethnic mobsters has certainly been noticed and adapted

by modern bikers using the latest internet technologies.

Legitimatization

Entrepreneurialism has led to the increasing desire for a facade

of social acceptability, cultivated mainly through skillful use

of various media and participation in charitable events. Here we

see an amalgam of the forces that have shaped the 1%er clubs and

subculture: The purist image of the outlaw biker appeals to the

frontier ethos of rugged individualism and autonomy that run

strong in US culture. The violent hedonism of the image also

makes the very idea of these men collecting toys for needy kids

or carrying the Olympic torch (Sunday Advocate, 1984) very

“newsworthy.” Some bikers have a true affection for the causes

they support. Bikers Against Child Abuse (BACA), whose members

are drawn from both the 1% and legitimate biker communities, has

made some very tangible contributions to victims’ emotional

welfare but also indirectly supports the image sought by these

clubs. Charitable activities are calculated to neutralize legal

assertions of endemic crime among 1%ers by reinforcing claims

that 1% clubs are merely fraternal organizations whose members

seek only raucously masculine camaraderie.

At a broader level, such cynical management of corporate

public imagery is now deeply embedded in US culture and routinely

exploited by groups ranging from political parties and businesses

to churches and charities. Simultaneous use of both purist and

entrepreneurial behaviors and images is typical of the modern 1%

club and can be very deliberate in one context but wholly

unconscious in others.

CONCLUSIONS

One percent MCs began as loosely organized gangs but have

developed into sophisticated umbrella organizations for a

multitude of organized crime enterprises. The shift from

countercultural values to an entreprenurial subculture is the

predominant dynamic in 1% club history. The modern outlaw club

reflects the “modal organization” of many violent stateless

entities ranging from Al Quaeda terror cells to the leaderless

resistance of white supremacists. The subculture’s norms evolved

from bikers’ selective attention to attractive aspects of

prominent social currents that represent the “shadow” side of

mainstream institutions. The selection process was initially

grounded in lower class focal concerns and self-serving hedonism

but now reflects a more rational orientation to underworld power.

While some norms are adopted from the mainstream, others are

inversions of conventional values intended to shock outsiders and

demonstrate the bikers’ independence from the surrounding

society.

Anomie and media romanticization of the early clubs led to

the proliferation of 1% groups in the late 1960s. Territorial

conflicts led to internecine wars spawned by purist gang

loyalties that necessitated an entrepreneurial spirit in the

larger clubs who survived and prospered while absorbing lesser

groups. One outcome of this process was the merger of purist

elements into more entrepreneurial ones that give the modern 1%

club its distinctive image and structure.

Concern with power, hyper-masculine competitiveness and the

sense of victimization transferred easily from purist gang to

entrepreneurial clubs and cliques. Partial isolation from the

mainstream and hyper masculine competitiveness escalate the

savagery, profit-seeking and paranoia of these bikers. Extremes

of violence are evident in the constant escalation of savagery in

both their internal control efforts and their chronic warfare The

1%ers’ lethal forms of power-seeking are motivated by the

confluence of these values and violent hedonism. Biker violence

also demonstrates the reflexive desire for retribution and

deterrence found in many criminal justice and foreign policies

that may be innate to primates..

Warfare is one of the few activities that is overtly

directed by clubs’ formal structure. It also explains the bikers’

willingness to depart from their own norm systems and neglect

other aspects of their lives in order to support the club which

becomes their “cause.” Under a war mentality, normal rules of

conduct and ethics are suspended and egos find rich rewards for

defending their “cause” in a epic struggle of us versus them, or

“good” versus “evil.” The mentality of war also fosters a

paranoiac hyper-vigilance intended to help the group anticipate

police/rival activities. When police are targeted this mentality

is generally restricted to a limited “cold war,” consisting

mainly of intelligence gathering, corruption, obstruction and

even intimidation. In internecine conflicts it has led to

competitions in bomb building that have threatened the peace of

entire cities but is now largely restricted to the shadowy

underworld of saloon society. In this sense the 1% subculture

appears to have come full circle.

Clubs are best described as facilitators of organized crime

rather than its direct coordinators. The formal hierarchy

indirectly profit from the activities of component cliques that

extend their influence over ever larger areas: members’ wealth

supports the club as the club’s power promotes the members’

enterprises. Since 1980 the 1%ers have developed an extremely

broad repertoire of criminal enterprises and skills which can be

tapped for either club or clique needs. The particularly intense

warfare seen in Quebec and Scandinavia in the 1990s reflected a

desire to claim new territory for economic gain as well as to

advance the status of the warring clubs. It was bolder and more

public than any seen previously in the subculture buts its

extremity resulted in an unprecedented detente between the

superpowers of the subculture that was motivated almost entirely

by the desire to protect profits..

Club organization has also changed with the shift to

entrepreneurial subculture. Club hierarchies have tightened their

grip on the autonomy of local chapters and, through those

chapters, the behavior of individual bikers. Formal control of

chapter and individual activities protects the club from police

and media attention at times critical to particular enterprises

or war-related efforts. Formal hierarchy efficiently integrates

enterprises and thus club power. However, such a consolidation

of power opens the group and its leaders to more costly

prosecutions. The cell-like organization of chapters and the

veneer separating enterprises from the club’s formal structure is

thus an organizational development within the subculture that

makes each group more resistant to prosecution. This is perhaps

the single most concrete adaptation of the 1% club that has

evolved from the dialogue of threat, response and counter-

response between each club and the legal system. Legitimization,

another defensive aspect of biker evolution, refers to the

bikers’ growing desire for a facade of social established through

cynical management corporate public imagery .

The themes of the 1% subculture’s evolution have much in

common with those guiding the development of other violent

stateless entities. The details of this evolution are

idiosyncratic and history-bound but the underlying patterns

deserve further study. Such research must be unhindered by the

reflexive desire to define “deviant” groups in ways that

demarcate them from the norms and values of the mainstream. It is

the shadowy extremes of conventional norms that provide the

values and strategies these groups use to thwart control efforts

and justify themselves.

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