Post on 08-Apr-2023
The Signifigance of Mosqueswithin Political Culture in the
17th CenturyComparing the Mosques of Shahjahanabad and Isfahan
Painting by William Carpenter of Jami’ Masjid, Shahjahanabad, 18521
Painting by Pascal Coste of Masjid-I Shah in Isfahan, 18412
Essay: Final draftName: Willem van der Sluis
1 http://collections.vam.ac.uk/search/?limit=15&q=William+Carpenter&commit=Search&quality=1&after-adbc=AD&before-adbc=AD&material%5B0%5D=62&narrow=1&offset=15&slug=0 (referenced on 14-4-2014)2 http://islamic-arts.org/2012/imam-shah-mosque-in-isfahan-iran/ (referenced on 14-4-2014)
Course: Political CultureTheme: The Mughals
Teacher: Anjana SinghDate: 13-6-2014
Words:
Table of Content
Introductionpage: 3-5
One: The Empires of Shahjahan and Shah Abbas Ipage: 6
1.1: Empires and Their New Capitalspage: 6-8 1.2: The Role of Islam
page: 9-12
Two: The Mosque as a Political Buildingpage: 13
2.1: A Mosquepage: 13-142.2: The Place of the Mosque in the Citypage: 142.3: The Khutba page: 142.4: The Madrasa page: 142.5: The Administration of Justicepage: 14
Conclusionspage: 15
Literature page: 16-17
2
Introduction
“Wherever you pray, that place is a mosque.”3
The Prophet Muhammad(570-632 A.D.) himself has been recorded saying
this sentence in relation to prayer. On a technical level the
mosque, the English translation of the term Masjid, therefore does
not necessarily indicated the building like we know it today. It
only needed to consist of one wall with its main feature being that
it provides the direction towards the qibla, the black stone within
the Ka’ba in Mecca.4 But as we can see, mosques are numerous in the
Islamic world and have also been built in every other part of the
3 Robert Hillenbrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 31.4 Idibem.
3
world. As the most important religious building in Islam, it became
the central place for worship for Muslims and it started from the
very beginning to develop various functions, one of which is a
political function.5
The role of the mosque within political culture will be
examined in this essay. This will be done for two congregational
mosques in cities that became the new capitals of two empires in the
seventeenth century eastern Islamic world. These are the Jami’
Masjid in Shahjahanabad, the new capital of the Muhgal emperor Shah
Jahan(1628-1658)6 of India and the Masjid-I Shah in Isfahan, the new
capital of the Safavid emperor Shah Abbas I(1586-1628)7 of Iran.
Shah Jahan and Shah Abbas I both decided they needed a new
capital as their political, administrative and religious centers. In
order to establish this they built, besides a large congregational
mosque, different constructions like a palace and a bazaar centered
around a grand square. All these constructions had different
functions in relations to economics, culture and politics. In order
to get a sense of a part of the political culture of both empires
and their most important cities and buildings, this essay will
provide a comprehensible comparison between the role of the two
congregational mosques within the political culture of their
respective Islamic empires. The focus will be on Shah Jahan and Shah
Abbas I, but because their mosques were built at the end of their
reigns and preformed also their functions afterwards, the reigns of
their successors also needs to be taken into account. Therefore the
research question is:
5 Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture, 61.6 Ebba Koch, Mughal architecture: an outline of its history and development (1526-1858). (Munich: Prestel, 1991.), 93.7 Stephen P. Blake, “Fathpur Sikri and Isfahan: the founding and layout of capital cities in Mughal India and Safavid Iran.” In Cities in the Pre-Modern Islamic World: the urban impact of religion, state and society, eds. Amira K. Bennison and Alison L. Gascoigne, 145-157. (Oxon: Routledge , 2007), 145.
4
“What was the significance of the Jami’ Masjid of Shahjahanabad and the Masjid-I Shah of
Isfahan within the political cultures of seventeen century Mughal India and Safavid Iran
respectively?”
But what then is political culture? For starters, political
culture tries to be something more than only political history. It
looks beyond what we call default history and it therefore covers a wide
variety of things. Among these are the conditions outside the
political realm that create a certain kind of political system,
political rituals and speech from an anthropological perspective,
norms and values that are dominated within the political realm and
how they change overtime8, and the significance of religion in
politics. Besides this, according to Henk te Velde, political
culture is not just about the small political elite, but takes the
relation between politics and society into account. It is therefore
a constant struggle about the boundaries of the political realm and
the way people should behave within.9 He states: “At the core of the study of
political culture is the research of the forms in politics and the form of politics.”10 In
regards to this essay the significance of religion, with a focus on
mosques, will be at the heart of the political cultures that will be
examined. By looking at the significance of the mosque within the
political culture it is clear that the mosque finds it way in both
the religious and the secular domain.
A comprehensible answer to the research question will be given
according to themes, with each theme providing a different aspect of
the significance of the mosque within the political culture. But
before examining these themes, some historical background is needed.
This first part will therefore provide an introduction for both
8 Henk te Velde, Politieke cultuur en politieke geschiedenis, Groniek, 391-393.9 te Velde, Politieke cultuur en politieke geschiedenis, 398.10 te Velde, Politieke cultuur en politieke geschiedenis, 399.
5
empires and Shah’s, covers their motives to (re-)built a new capital
and looks into the role of Islam within their empires.
The second part will provide an introduction to what a mosque
actually is. Besides this, it will cover the following four themes.
The first theme is the place of the mosque within the city. Both
being the Friday or congregational mosque, they took a prominent
place within the city. They both were built in the center of the
city near the palace of the Shah’s, the political leaders of the two
empires .11 This shows their political importance.
The second theme is the khutba. This is an important part of the
Friday Jumu’ah prayers given in the mosque. It consist of a part
prayer, a part sermon and a part formal address. This khutba, given
by the khatib, has an important political role because the rulers
legitimacy depended on his name being mentioned during the Jumu’ah,
it was a tool to affirm allegiance and it was the platform from
which political announcements were made.12
The third theme is the madrasa. This is commonly known as a
place for religious study adjacent to the mosque. Both mosques in
question had one or more madrasas which fulfilled a role within
Islamic education. This in turn is important for the formation and
the function of the Islamic religious establishment which could
influence the two Shah’s bureaucracy and administration.
The fourth theme is the administration of justice. According to
Hillebrand there exists a long-standing relationship between mosques
and the administration of justice.13 So this part will look at what
the role of both mosques was in relations to the administration of
justice and which other forms regarding this administration existed.
11 C. Edmund Bosworth, ed., Historic Cities in the Islamic World (Leiden: Brill, 2007),133 and 176.12 Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture, 46 and 61.13 Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture, 61.
6
Most these themes are chosen according to what Robert
Hillebrand sees in general to be the important political functions
of a mosque. He deals with the madrasa separately, but as is
mentioned above education and the religious establishment preformed
an important political function. It is the aim of this essay to show
to what extent the Jami’ Masjid and the Masjid-I Shah made use of
these functions.
To conclude, a comprehensible answer to the research question
will be given. The significance of the Jami’Masjid and the Masjid-I
Shah within the political cultures of the Mughal and Safavid empires
and their main similarities and differences will be given in an
overview and the main conclusion will be provided.
One: The Empires of Shahjahan and Shah Abbas I
1.1: Empires and Their New Capitals
Together with the Ottoman Empire, the empires of the Safavids and
the Mughals were the major Islamic empires of the pre-modern world.
They were established at the beginning of the sixteenth century, in
1501 and 1526 respectively, and reached their apogee of power in
the seventeenth century, to which Shah Abbas I and Shah Jahan made
important contributions. But after this century decline and
eventually collapse followed. In the case of the Safavids, this came
much earlier than for the Mughals. The last Safavids were overthrown
in 1722, this did not happen to the Mughals until 1857.
The Safavid empire was known to many by different names. For
the inhabitants the name of the country was Iran, to Arabs and Turks
it was ‘Ajamistan, land of the barbarians, and in Europe it was
known as Persia.14
14 Stephen P. Blake, Half the World, The Social Architecture of Safavid Isfahan, 1590–1722. (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 3.
7
The empire’s geography was
characterized by mountains
and deserts with only three
rivers flowing through. It
stretched out from what we
now know as Iraq and
Azerbaijan to Afghanistan,
but its borders depended on
the outcome of the battles with the Ottomans, Uzbegs and Mughals.15
Due to the lack of arable land it had only an
Map of Safavid empire16 estimated population between
eight and ten million people, a major contrast with the large plains
of Mughal India and its population in the tens of millions.17 This
explains why almost half of the population of Safavid Iran were
nomadic tribesmen.18
The Safavid dynasty originated with the fourteen century
Islamic mystic, Shaykh Safi al-Din, and over the years his
successors gained more followers, called Sufis or Muslim mystics.
This grew out to be the Safaviyya Sufi Order of which the future
Shah’s were the spiritual leaders.19 The first of them was Shah
Isma’il I(1501-1524), he founded the Safavid empire in 1501 after he
defeated the Aq Quyunlu forces, who ruled western Iran in the late
fifteenth century. The Safaviyya Sufi Order had already a long time
alliance with Turkish tribesmen, known as the Qizilbash, and
together they made this victory and further expansion of the empire
possible. The tribesmen regarded Isma’il, as well as his successors,
15 Blake, Half the World, 4.16 http://www.zonu.com/detail-en/2010-01-05-11618/The-Safavid-Empire-or-Safavid-Dynasty-1501-1722.html (Referenced 4-5-2014)17 Blake, Half the World, 5.18 Blake, Half the World, 6.19 R.S.Canby, Shah 'Abbas: the remaking of Iran. (London: British Museum Press,
2009),14.8
as their divine leaders. 20 But in order to keep individual tribe
leaders from gaining too much power, Isma’il’s son Tahmasp I(1524-
76), divided the Qizilbash tribes internally and moved them around.
This weakened the power relationship between them and the emperor.
The effect was a civil war between Qizilbash tribes after the death
of Tahmasp I.21
The first two successors of Tahmasp failed to end the civil
war, but the third did not. Shah Abbas I(1587-1629) succeeded to end
this civil war in 1590 and became the fifth Safavid emperor. The
civil war was a period of political and economic instability, it
undermined the authority of the emperor and
resulted in the loss of territory both to
the Ottomans in the west and the Uzbegs in
the east. It would therefore be the main
incentive for Abbas to undertake sweeping
reforms.22 First of all, he executed a group
of tribal leaders and his viceroy, Murshid
Quli Khan, who had helped getting him on the
throne.23 In order to prevent subsequent
civil wars he increased his personal bodyguard, still consisting of
Qizilbash tribesmen, but he made them more loyal by incorporating
them into the imperial household. The same did he with his newly
created Shah Abbas I24 corps of household
slaves composed of Christian converts to Shi’a Islam from the
northwest of the empire. Both these groups held the most important
imperial positions.25 To do this he needed more income, so he
20 Blake, Half the World, 6-721 Blake, Half the World, 8.22 Ibidem.23 Ibidem.24 http://www.superstock.com/stock-photos-images/1566-781588 (Referenced on 1-5-2014)25 Blake, Half the World, 9.
9
incorporated agricultural land from the tribal leaders into the
imperial domain and established a imperial monopoly on the export of
silk.26 He reorganized the empire, but his reforms also included the
seeds of decline. Among these are the disappearance of the
theocratic basis, conflict between old and new elements in the
military class and the upbringing of successors within the harem
with no idea of the outside world. 27 A French jeweler and traveler
to the Safavid empire, Jean Chardin, stated it in these fine words:
As soon as this great and noble prince ceased to live, Persia ceased to prosper.”28
Shah Abbas I’s most important move would be the establishment
of his new capital, Ishafan. The city had been the capital of Iran
during the Saljuq period in the eleventh to thirteenth century. With
rise of the Safavids Tabirz and later Qazvin became the capital, but
Isfahan stayed a provincial center.29
The relocation of the capital from Qazvin in the northwest to
Isfahan in the center occurred in 1697-98, and changed the political
geography of the empire. The
motives for the relocation differ
and include geopolitical and
economic reasons, but also the
influence of the Qizilbash. 30
26 Ibidem.27R.W. Ferrier, ed., A Journey to Persia : Jean Chardin's portrait of a Seventeenth-century empire. (London: Tauris, 1996), 5.28 Ibidem.29 Blake, Half the World, 15-16.30 Blake, Half the World, 15.
10
1.2: The Role of Islam
The role of Islam differt between the empires of Mughals and the
Safavids. In the first place because of the difference between Sunni
and Shi’a Islam, but also to what extent they were theocratic
empires. At least one thing is clear, they both used their form of
Islam to legitimize their power.31
At the heart of the division of the Islamic community between
Sunnis and Shi’as lays a fundamental disagreement about who should
hold the political leaderships of this community. Sunni Muslims
accept the line of caliphs starting with the Rashidun caliphs,
followed by the Umayyads and the Abbasids. Shi’a Muslims reject all
these caliphs except for one, Ali, the last Rashudin caliph, and his
decedents.32 Ali was murdered in 661 after a civil war broke out
31 Harbans Muhkia, The Mughals of India (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 40.; Blake, Half the World, 6.32 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 31.
11
between him and Mu’awiyah, the governor of Syria, who won and
subsequently established the Umayyad dynasty. His successor and son,
Yazid, dealt with the last Shi’a rebellion of Husayn, Ali’s son,
and his followers in 680 at Karbala, which became the holiest place
in Shi’a Islam.33
Apart from the dispute about succession, there exist a
difference about the role of the leader of the Islamic community.
Sunni Muslims acknowledge the caliphs as the religious leadership,
but they have no divine power and thus are mortal beings with
temporal authority. Their task was to uphold the sharia and the
Islamic way of life, while they left matters of doctrine and
jurisprudence to the ulama, the religious establishment.34 In Shi’a
Islam the religious leaders are called Imams, and were direct
decedents from Ali. These Imams did, in contrast to the Sunni
caliphs, poses divine inspiration because it is believed that
Muhammad transmitted this over to Ali. This provided them with
knowledge about the hidden meanings of the Quran. According to the
mainstream Shi’a belief, Twelver Shi’ism, the twelfth Imam, Muhammad
al-Mahdi, entered into a state of occultation in 874 and remains
alive, but concealed by God. This problem of religious and
political leadership was eventually solved when the Shi’a ulama
claimed to represent this so-called Hidden Imam.35
Harbans Mukhia provides in his book, The Mughals of India, two
criteria to examine whether empires where theocratic. The first
looks if the state would use all its power to convert all subjects
to Islam and eliminate all non-Islamic presence in its lands. The
second concerns the jurisdiction of sharia and if this Islamic law had
been applied to all subjects, no matter their religion.36 According
33 Ibidem.34 Ibidem.35 Cleveland, , A History of the Modern Middle East, 32.36 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 22-23.
12
to these two criteria a judgment will be made about the theocracy of
both the Safavid and Mughal empires.
The Mughals were a Sunni Muslim dynasty in a predominately
Hindu land. Most Mughal rulers used Islam to legitimize their
authority by battling kufr(infidelity), demolishing temples,
prohibiting the construction of new ones, erecting mosques instead
and collecting the jiziya, the tax non-Muslims had to pay to practice
their own religion.37 But in Mughal India theory and practice in
regards to religion were very different. Consumption of wine and
pork were no exceptions among some of the rulers and also flirting
with other religions was not uncommon.38 In the case of Shah Jahan,
his court chronicle, the Shah Jahan Nama, paints the picture of his
forces as the armies of Islam fighting for the glorification of this
religion, yet there is little evidence of him emphasizing his
Islamic identity.39
This ambivalent attitude was also present when looking at the
two criteria mentioned above by Mukhia. You can say that total
conversion of the Indian population had failed under the Mughals,
because after their reign in 1857 less than 25% of the population,
mainly from the periphery regions what is now Pakistan, Kashmir and
Bangladesh, was Muslim.40 Given the fact that these regions were
never under total control of the Mughals, not even during the height
of their reign under Shah Jahan, there thus exist a divergence
between regions with a high percentage of Muslims and regions with a
strong Muslim authority.41 The reasons for this are various, but,
although conversions did happen, it is clear that there was no real
intent to converse the whole Indian subcontinent to Islam.42
37 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 17.38 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 20.39 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 22.40 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 27-28.41 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 28.42 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 30-39.
13
There is much evidence of the demolishing of Hindu temples by
various emperors prior to Shah Jahan, but also of the saving of, the
permission to reconstruct and even to extent temples.43 Thus there
existed a kind of tolerance of religion within the Muhgal empire in
the beginning of the seventeenth century. This tolerance continued
with the enthronement of Shah Jahan, although he was a little less
tolerant then his predecessors. He was vehement against the
construction of new Hindu temples and he ordered that “whatsoever idol-
temples had been recently built be razed out to the ground.”44 But even if the
emperors wished to eliminated all forms of infidelity, they would
never succeed. India, with its large Hindu population, simply had
too many temples across the vast territories of the subcontinent.45
In regard to the second criteria, the sharia as the only form of
jurisprudence, it must, as for the first criteria, be concluded that
this was not applicable to Mughal India. The sharia was used for
criminal offenses, but with concerns to other parts of life,
marriage, family life and property, the different kinds of civil law
within each community were exercised. So the Hindu, Zoroastrian,
Christian, Sikh, Jain and Buddhist communities followed their own
religio-legal traditions and codes.46 Looking at the two criteria, it
is obvious that the Muhgal empire was not a theocracy.
The role of Shi’a Islam within the Safavid empire was a whole
different story. The Safavid emperors were know by different names
referencing to geography, time and age, but in the religious context
they were known as a sayyid, a descendant of Ali, the first Imam of
Twelver Shi’ism. The emperors had three main sources to legitimize
their rule: the pre-Islamic Iranian tradition of divine kinship, the
claim to represent the Mahdi, the twelfth and Hidden Imam, and their
43 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 23-24.44 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 24.45 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 25.46 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 39-40.
14
role as leader of the Safaviyya Sufi Order.47 As explained above,
the Safavid dynasty started off as leaders of this order. Originally
a Sunni Sufi order, it was exposed to Shi’ism due to their
allegiance with Shi’a Turkish tribesmen, and eventually turned to
Shi’ism. With the enthronement of Shah Isma’il I in 1501 Shi’ism
became the state religion.48
Applying the criteria by Mukhia to the Safavid empire, it can
be concluded that the emperors established a theocracy by promoting
Shi’ism. According to Robert Cleave “All evidence suggests that the Safavid
shahs took this responsibility very seriously.”49 This was much easier for them
than for the Mughal emperors because the Safavids had to deal with
an already predominantly Muslim population, but not all followers of
Shi’ism. In the second half of the fifteenth century the leaders of
the Safaviyya Sufi Order proclaimed a jihad against the Christian
populations, in 1501 Shi’ism became the state religion, and Shah
Tahmasp issue two Edicts of Sincere Repentence, in 1532-33 and 1555,
in which he disallowed all non-Islamic behavior and forbid gambling,
prostitution and alcohol. Also he started with the conversion of
Christian slaves within his government, a policy continued and
increased by Shah Abbas I.50
As part of his reforms, Shah Abbas tried to counter treats to
his authority from Sufi groups by giving preference to the Shi’a
ulama and bringing Shi’a practice more in line with the sharia51,
although he did not always uphold the Islamic law.52 He thus
preferred to emphasize his legitimacy as a sayyid over his lineage
from Shaykh Safi al-Din. Although Shah Abbas was, unlike his
47 Blake, Half the World, 6.48 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 15.49 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 88.50 Ibidem.51 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 17.52 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 18.
15
grandfather Tahmasp, more tolerant towards Christians53, his
religious policy had to disseminate Twelver Shi’ism in order to
create a stable empire. He did this by seeking advice of prominent
Shi’a theologians of which Shaykh Baha’i as the Shaykh al-Islam, the
leading authority on matters of religious law, was the most
important. Just as consistent laws were needed, a new congregational
mosque would also help to achieve his goal. This became the Masjid-
I Shah.54
Comparing the role of Islam within both empire, it can be
concluded that Islam was much more dominant within Safavid Iran than
in Mughal India. First of all, the majority of the population was
Muslim, in contrast to Mughal India. Therefore it was much easier to
convert people and to prohibit non-Islamic practices. Secondly, the
sharia was the dominant jurisprudence in Safavid Iran for all
subjects. R.W. Ferrier writes, based on the work of Chardin: “The
important events of every day live, marriage and death were strictly prescribed in
accordance with the precepts and rites of the faith.”55 If we define a theocracy as
an political entity in which one form of religion is the basis for
governing this entity, we can conclude that this was the case of
Safavid Iran and not for the Mughal India in the seventeenth
century. This difference will have its effect in regards to the
political significance of the two congregational mosques of both
capitals.
Two: Mosques within Political Culture
2.1: A Mosque
As mentioned in the introduction a mosque, on a technical level,
does not imply a building of any kind and was in essence an open
53 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 18 and 24.54 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 27-28.55 Ferrier, A Journey to Persia, 97.
16
place with a wall directed to Mecca. It remained an open place for
worship and the centre for a Muslim community, but it also developed
some key characteristics. The main three will be described below.
Before turning to the characteristics the two types of mosques,
masjid and jami’ must be mentioned. The masjid, which means to prostrate
oneself, is the smaller mosque for daily private prayer. Every
Muslim community has a masjid and it became associated with a
secondary place of worship.56 A jami’, which means to assemble, is a
congregational mosque used for the collective Friday prayers.
Because of its collective function these mosques are much larger,
mostly needed the approval of the ruler and were most of the time
located in the centre of the city.57 The two mosques examined in this
essay thus perform the function of a jami’, although the name of Shah
Abbas’ mosque, the Masjid-I Shah, not directly indicates this. The
name Jami’ Masjid is the common name for a congregational mosque.
The first characteristic and most important is the mihrab. In the
form of a semicircular niche in a wall of the mosque it provides
the worshippers the qibla, the direction to Mecca.58 The Imam, or the
prayer leader, stands in front of the mihrab during prayer.59 The
second is the minbar, the elevated platform of which the khatib
performs the khutba.60 The minbar is mostly placed right to mihrab and
it was elevated for the simple reason that the khatib needs to be
visible and audible.61 The Masjid-I Shad contained two minbars, one
covered in case of bad weather and one in open air for good
weather.62 The third is the most recognizable of them all, the
56 Robert Hillenbrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 44.57 Ibidem.58 Hillebrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning 45.59 Stephen P. Blake, Half the World, The Social Architecture of Safavid Isfahan, 1590–1722. (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 139.60 Ibidem.61 Hillebrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning, 46.62 Blake, Half the World, 143.
17
minaret. It is used to perform the adhan, the call to prayer for
Muslims. This is done by the mu’azzin and leads to the filling up of
the mosques by Muslims after they preformed the pre-prayer washing
ritual which is done in the courtyard of the mosque. Although the
call to prayer is commonly its function, the minaret in Safavid Iran
was not used for this purpose.63
For most mosques it was common to have three officers performing
different tasks. For the administration of the property and revenue
there was the mutavalli or the superintendent, the mu’azzin gave the
call to prayer and the Imam led the Muslims into prayer.64 Larger
mosques employed more people. The Masjid-I Shah, for example, had
seventy-six officers and servants.65 Now that it is clear what a
mosque is, the significance of the congregational mosques within the
political culture of both the Mughal and the Safavid empires will be
examined according to the themes laid out previously.
2.2: The Place of the Mosques within the City
Both mosques, the Masjid-I Shah and the Jami’ Masjid, took a
prominent place along the new constructed central squares of their
respective capitals. As the imperial congregational mosques they
dominated the religious architecture of their cities, reveal a great
deal about the religious organization of the empires and functions
as the central space for worship.
2.3: The Khutba
The main political function of the Khutba is to legitimize the rulers
as the sovereign, to form loyalty from its subjects and to proclaim
political announcements. But what if the large majority of the
subject are not Muslims and therefore do not attend the collective
63 Hillebrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning, 129.; Blake, Half the World, 139.64 Blake, Half the World, 139.65 Ibidem.
18
Friday prayers? Its function will not have its affect on the whole
population, so there are other forms are needed. This is the case in
Mughals India and straightaway the main difference with Safavid Iran
in regards to this theme.
2.4: The Madrasa
Conclusions
The first conclusion so far is that the place of the mosques within
their respective cities are very important for religious
organization of both empires
The second is that the political significance of mosques(Khutba) in
Safavid Iran is larger than in Mughal India due to the difference in
Muslim/Non-Muslim ratio. So the percentage of Muslim within the
empire sais someting about the political reach of mosques.
The third is that the role of the ‘Ulema (Madrasa) is larger in
Safavid Iran than in Mughal India due to the difference in
applicability of the sharia
19
List of literature
Secondary sources:
Blake, Stephen P., Half the World, The Social Architecture of Safavid Isfahan, 1590–
1722. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999.
Blake, Stephen P., Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India 1639-1739.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
20
Blake, Stephen P. “Fathpur Sikri and Isfahan: the founding and
layout of capital cities in Mughal India and Safavid Iran.” In Cities in
the Pre-Modern Islamic World: the urban impact of religion, state and society, eds.
Amira K. Bennison and Alison L. Gascoigne, 145-157. Oxon:
Routledge , 2007.
Bosworth, C. Edmund, ed., Historic Cities in the Islamic World. Leiden: Brill,
2007.
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