Post on 30-Jan-2023
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The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes
Forthcoming, Journal of Politics
Shana Kushner Gadarian Robert Wood Johnson Scholar in Health Policy University of California-Berkeley sgadarian@berkeley.edu
This project was supported by a grant from Princeton University’s Policy Research Institute for the
Region. Thank you to Bethany Albertson, Matthew Baum, Larry Bartels, Ted Brader, Marty Gilens,
Tali Mendelberg and seminar participants at Princeton for comments on earlier drafts.
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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the features of the media environment after 9/11, particularly
the media’s emphasis on threatening information and evocative imagery, increased the public’s
probability of supporting the policies advocated by political leaders, principally the president. Using
the National Election Studies 2000-2004 panel and a controlled, randomized experiment, I
demonstrate that citizens form significantly different foreign policy views when the information
environment is emotionally powerful than when it is free of emotion, even when the factual
information is exactly the same. Citizens concerned about terrorism are more likely to adopt the
hawkish foreign policy views communicated in threatening news stories when that policy is matched
with fear-inducing cues than when it is not. These findings suggest that the role of the media is
broader than simply providing a conduit for elites to speak to the public; the media influences the
public through their own means as well.
Keywords: terrorism, public opinion, political communication, emotion
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Terrorism shattered America’s sense of invulnerability and unparalleled might on a sunny
September morning. Almost overnight, the American landscape went from one of prosperity, safety,
and power to one of threat, fear, and uncertainty. Threat and fear are not simply psychological
phenomena - they are politically consequential for how elites and the mass media communicate to
the public and, ultimately, for opinion formation. In times of crisis, citizens turn to political leaders
and the media to make sense of new and frightening events. The contours of the information
environment in turn influence how people prefer the government to react to threat. In this paper, I
argue that the features of the media after 9/11, particularly the media’s emphasis on threatening
information and evocative imagery, increased the public’s probability of supporting the hawkish
policies advocated by political leaders, principally the president. To the extent that the media
reinforces feelings of threat and political elites advocate a dominant set of policies, the public is apt
to support those policies.
While terrorism is inherently dramatic and threatening (Gans 1979), in a competitive media
environment, journalists and editors have incentives to use emotionally powerful visuals and
storylines to gain and maintain ever-shrinking news audiences, and these elements of news coverage
can strengthen the public’s sense of threat. Using an analysis of the National Election Studies (NES)
2000-2002-2004 panel and a controlled, randomized media experiment, I demonstrate that citizens
form significantly different foreign policy views when the information environment emphasizes
emotion than when it is free of emotion, even when factual information is identical. Citizens
concerned about terrorism are more likely to adopt the hawkish foreign policy views communicated
in threatening news stories when they are matched with fear-inducing cues than when they are not.
When people concerned about terrorism hear that a terrorist attack is likely and will bring fire and
destruction worse than 9/11, they adopt hawkish policies. When these people actually see the fire,
they react even more strongly.
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Unlike other models of public opinion (Baum 2003; Baum and Groeling 2010; Berinsky
2009; Zaller 1992), my Threat Model contends that the mass media influence foreign policy opinion
through not only providing information, that is, communicating a set of policy options from
political leaders, but also through covering threatening issues such as terrorism in an evocative way.
In other models, the media function mostly as a conduit for elite cues; the distribution of elites
supporting each position tells citizens how to align their own views to policies (Berinsky 2009; Zaller
1992) or an interaction of the cues and the credibility of the cue shape opinion (Baum and Groeling
2010). My model, however, argues that although the media influence citizens through providing
foreign policy cues, the media also affect attitudes in their own right through evoking emotion. This
theory takes information seriously, but it also explicitly considers the ways in which the mass media
can influence opinions through the tone and presentation of information.1
Theories of the media’s influence that focus on policy content but ignore the often
threatening nature of news coverage are likely to underestimate the media’s effect on the public.
Since the media tend to cover foreign policy in threatening ways (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro
2007), it is particularly important to account for how the emotional aspects of media coverage may
increase persuasion and shape the public’s policy preferences. When the news media emphasize
threat with emotional cues, those cues influence American foreign policy attitudes.
Threat and the anxiety that accompanies feelings of risk increase support for strong political
leaders as well as support for punitive policies that tend to escalate conflict (Gordon and Arian 2001;
Landau et al 2004). Fear leads individuals to search for information, and leads to less reliance on
long-standing political predispositions such as partisanship, increasing the potential for persuasion
(Brader 2006; Marcus et al 2000). If political leaders evoke fear in the public through the media
without being challenged by political opponents, citizens’ attitudes are likely to be influenced by the
foreign policy choices presented by the most prominent political leader, most likely, the president.
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In considering how psychological mechanisms as well as the information environment
influence foreign policy attitudes, my Threat Model differs from previous work on foreign policy
attitudes and provides a unique contribution to the study of public opinion. Huddy and colleagues’
(2002; 2003; 2005) work on support for counterterrorism policies argues effectively that perceptions
of national threat increase support for hawkish policy. However, in my experiment described below,
the design pushes these findings further by demonstrating that emotion rather than information
leads public opinion in a more hawkish direction in a way that Huddy et al cannot since the authors
did not manipulate threatening news coverage experimentally. Merolla and Zechmeister (2009)
demonstrate that increased support for militant policies in times of threat is not limited to the
American political context. They use media stories to experimentally induce threat in both Mexican
and American samples, but they do not manipulate the emotional content independently of the
threatening information as my experiment does. As such, I am able to show that emotional cues
rather than threatening information alone influence attitudes.
The rest of this section outlines the components of my Threat Model: 1. the psychology of
threat, 2. how the political environment influences attitudes, and 3. the information environment’s
role in spreading and reflecting threat.
Fear itself – The psychological underpinnings of foreign policy attitudes
In my Threat Model, individuals receive information about foreign policy primarily through
the mass media, which disproportionately focus on threat and cover terrorism in sensationalistic
ways (Iyengar 1991; Nacos et al 2007). Additionally, in threatening times, the political spectrum
tends to conform to a “one-message” environment where opposition to the president’s foreign
policy lessens and, in turn, the media reflects one particular message about the appropriate foreign
policy approach (Zaller 1992). The War on Terror news frame that emerged after 9/11 argued, in
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line with the president’s positions, that a military solution was necessary to counteract terrorism and
this frame received little serious opposition from Democratic leaders or the press (Entman 2003).
Individual perceptions of threat lead citizens to support policies that they believe will
neutralize the source of threat and protect them (Gordon and Arian 2001). The presence of threat is
associated with in-group solidarity (Turner et al 1984), ethnocentrism (Feldman and Stenner 1997),
an increased reliance on enemy images (Hermann 1986), and decreased support for civil liberties
(Davis and Silver 2004). In foreign policy, the threat of terrorism is associated with increased
support for retaliatory action by the government (Huddy et al 2002), greater support for overseas
involvement (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), and support for George W. Bush (Huddy et al 2003;
Landau et al 2004). In sum, threat is related to a range of shifts toward more punitive preferences
and behavior. Therefore, I expect that individuals who perceive more threat from terrorism will support more
hawkish foreign policy. Conversely, heightened threat will decrease support for dovish foreign policy.
Media and foreign policy attitudes
The news media play a key role in shaping public opinion about the fundamental issues
facing the nation. Particularly in foreign affairs, where complicated issues as well as low knowledge
challenge the public’s ability to form attitudes, the media can affect opinion (Baum 2003; Berinsky
2009). Yet, until recently, the media’s role in forming foreign policy preferences was mostly ignored
in the literature on how people form attitudes about war and conflict (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987;
Mueller 1973). Terrorism can influence the public by having a venue via the mainstream media
(Norris, Kern, and Just 2003), and also through the way that terrorism stories are presented to the
public. Terrorism is newsworthy given its dramatic nature and receives inordinate coverage on the
national news. Even before the recent focus on terrorism, terrorism news predominated over other
types of potentially threatening news. Iyengar (1991) found that ABC, NBC, and CBS broadcast
more stories on hijackings in the 1980s than on poverty, unemployment, race, and crime combined.
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Terrorism receives a considerable amount of coverage, and the coverage itself tends toward
sensationalism (Nacos et al 2007).
George W. Bush’s framing of the 9/11 attacks as the commencement of a global war against
terrorism was not significantly challenged by Democratic leaders or the press for some time after
9/11 (Entman 2003). For example, in New York Times coverage from 2001 to 2005, more than 70
percent of stories that utilized a “terrorism” frame took a pro-military engagement/hawkish tone
(Boydstun and Glazier 2008). Although hawkish frames generally dominated news coverage of the
War on Terror, the coverage did not have a complete lack of opposition. Guardino and Hayes
(forthcoming) found that the national network news featured sources opposed to the Iraq war, but
those opposition voices came mostly from overseas whereas the pro-military arguments came
mostly from “official” sources. So while dovish viewpoints were available to the public, they came
from less credible sources, suggesting a legitimization of hawkish views. Additionally, the imagery in
terrorism stories supported the foreign policy recommendations favored by the president (Entman
2003). Griffin (2004) found that photographs in Time, Newsweek, and US News after 9/11 depicted
the events in ways congruent with the president’s War on Terrorism frame.
The role of visual imagery in how the media affects attitudes
In the Threat Theory, the media act not only to provide the public with cues about elites’
foreign policy positions but also to impart emotional emphasis to foreign policy and terrorism
stories, primarily through the images accompanying news stories. Visual imagery may powerfully
arouse emotions and influence attitudes independently of news story messages (Brader 2006). Visual
information, particularly negative imagery, captures viewers’ attention and interest, is easier to
understand than verbal information, and makes retrieving information easier (Neuman, Just, and
Crigler 1992; Newhagen and Reeves 1992). Negative visuals like those in terrorism stories are likely
to induce emotion since they evoke a fear of death (Landau et al 2004) and remind viewers of their
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traumatic emotional experience on 9/11. Surveys of Americans immediately after 9/11 showed a
strong connection between media exposure to the attacks and post-traumatic stress disorder
(Schuster et al 2001). The more television coverage people watched on 9/11 and afterward, the
more severe their stress responses, especially among people who saw vivid images of the attacks.
How threat and media interact
The interaction of threat and media on foreign policy opinion is rarely explored in the media
and public opinion literatures. Notable exceptions are studies by Huddy et al (2003), Hermann
(1986), and Merolla and Zechmeister (2009). Collectively, these studies find that threatening
information and images increase support for hawkish foreign policy while reassuring information
causes liberalization on defense issues. Yet none of this work asks whether, at a given level of threat,
different media messages with varying levels of emotion influence attitudes differently.
The perception of threat after 9/11 was compounded by media coverage that portrayed
“vivid and unceasing depictions of death and destruction” (Landau et al 2004), meaning that the
effect of threat may be conditional on media consumption. Druckman and McDermott (2008)
found that distress increases framing effects, suggesting that individuals concerned about terrorism
may be more open to persuasion and the messages offered about foreign policy through the mass
media. Thus, the influence of threat on opinion may depend on exposure to coverage of terrorist
acts or threats. In other words, threat should have a larger influence on attitudes for those people
exposed to fear-inducing media stories. If this is true, then we should expect the interaction of
perceived threat and exposure to emotionally threatening media content to predict hawkish opinion.
That is, increased media consumption in combination with heightened threat will increase support for hawkish foreign
policy. However, this relationship exists primarily when media content provides emotional coverage of threat.
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Testing the Threat Theory 2002
From my Threat Theory, I expect that individuals who perceive high threat from terrorism
will support the most hawkish policies. In addition, I expect that individuals exposed to frightening
media coverage of foreign policy will be the most likely to support hawkish policy.
The Threat Theory implies that one of the major ways that the media can influence attitudes
is by enhancing feelings of fear and vulnerability. I use television versus newspaper consumption as
distinct measures of more emotional and less emotional media exposure to test the implication that
emotion, not just information, moves foreign policy attitudes. I utilize the 2000-2002-2004 NES
panel to model the effect of threat, television news, and newspaper consumption on an additive
index of foreign policy attitudes from 2002. The panel allows me to look at the same people before
and after 9/11 and to demonstrate that the type of media exposure significantly affected policy
attitudes. The policy index contains six items weighted equally: approval of going to war in Iraq,
approval of Bush’s handling of terrorism, spending on foreign aid (reverse-coded), defense, border
security, and homeland security (Cronbach’s α = .62).2 The index represents the range of policies
that the United States could use to fight terrorism – from diplomacy and aid (dovish) to military
action (hawkish). The spending questions asked respondents whether the federal budget should be
increased, decreased, or remain the same. The index ranges from -1 to 1 and is constructed so that
higher values signify more hawkish attitudes. While some policies, such as homeland security
spending, were relatively uncontroversial, it should be noted that in 2002, support for policies such
as war in Iraq represented the far end of the hawkish spectrum.
I model the effect of threat perception, television news consumption, newspaper reading,
and the interactions of threat and television and threat and newspaper, controlling for ideology and
partisanship, in two ways – using OLS and two-staged least squares (2SLS). Since my major interest
is modeling the influence of threat and media exposure on attitudes, it is important to take into
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account the potentially cyclical relationship between threat and media exposure. Media exposure is
potentially both a cause and a result of threat perception. People who feel threatened by terrorism
might watch more TV news to cope with their anxiety about terrorism, but that information might
increase threat perception, leading to more TV news watching, in a mutually reinforcing cycle.
Ignoring endogeneity may lead to biased coefficients and high variance estimates in linear
regression, leading to incorrect inferences (Achen 1986). Given these potential drawbacks, I model
the relationship between threat and foreign policy attitudes using 2SLS as well as OLS. In the OLS
models, ideology and partisanship are measured in 2000 while television watching, newspaper
reading, and threat perception are measured in 2002.3 All independent variables are scaled to range
between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating more newspaper reading, television watching, and
threat perception. Higher values on the ideology and partisanship measures indicate more
conservative and Republican views. In the 2SLS models, I instrument television watching and
newspaper reading and their interactions with measures from the 2000 wave and include the 2000
ideology, partisanship, and 2002 threat measures.4
If the media influence attitudes through providing threatening information, then I expect
newspaper reading to affect attitudes; however, if the media influence attitudes through heightening
the effect of emotion rather than simply providing information, then television news exposure
should have a larger effect than newspaper reading. News consumption is measured by two variables
that capture media exposure: the average number of days in the past week the respondent watched
national and local television news and the number of days in the last week respondents read a daily
newspaper. Newspaper reading remained steady between the 2000 and 2002 panel waves while
television watching increased significantly. On average, in 2000, respondents read a newspaper 3.44
days a week, with 25 percent of respondents not reading a newspaper at all. In 2002, 21 percent of
respondents read no newspaper in the past week and the average respondent read a newspaper 3.67
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days per week. In comparison, television news consumption increased from 3.12 days in 2000 to
3.75 days in 2002 (p<.01).5
Almost a year after the terrorist attacks, American citizens were still quite concerned about
future terrorism. I operationalized threat perception as respondents’ belief about the likelihood of
another terrorist attack, on a 4-point scale ranging from “very unlikely” to “very likely.” Forty-eight
percent of the 1,100 respondents in 2002 thought that another major terrorist attack was likely in the
next year, while another 19 percent believed that a terrorist attack was very likely, leaving one-third of
respondents less concerned about terrorism. Only 8 percent of respondents answered that terrorism
was very unlikely in the next year. This level of concern over foreign affairs was high in comparison
to respondents’ level of worry in 2000. There were no questions about terrorism in 2000, but the
NES did ask respondents in 2000 and 2002 how worried they were over the prospect of both
conventional and nuclear war. Concern over both types of war increased substantially over time.6
One of the main findings of these models is that television news significantly increased
support for hawkish policies whereas newspaper reading did not, suggesting that emotional coverage
mattered more than information on its own. However, television news watching did not significantly
affect attitudes in the absence of threat perception. The left side of Table 1 displays the results of the
OLS models. Respondents concerned about future terrorism reacted to threatening news by
increasing hawkishness while the one-third of respondents unconcerned by terrorism were unmoved
by television news. The effect of television exposure ranges from -.03, when a respondent believed
that terrorism was very unlikely in the next year, to .18 at the highest level of threat. Figure 1
presents the expected hawkishness scores for a respondent at varying levels of threat and television
watching, holding partisanship, ideology, and newspaper reading at their means. The figure
demonstrates that: 1. as respondents believed that terrorism was more likely, they preferred more
hawkish types of foreign policy and 2. television watching increased hawkishness among those
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concerned about terrorism. The lower line displays the effect of television watching on attitudes for
respondents at the lowest level of threat; the flatness of the line demonstrates that citizens
unconcerned about a terrorist attack were unaffected by television news exposure. In contrast,
respondents at the highest level of threat were more responsive to media messages, as demonstrated
by the steeper top line of Figure 1. As they were exposed to more television news, high threat
respondents increased their hawkishness from .55 to .75, moving toward the top of the hawkishness
scale. This increase in support for hawkish policies had a substantively important effect on future
political preferences. For a moderate, Independent respondent, increasing hawkishness from .55 to
.75 in 2002 translated into an increased probability of supporting George W. Bush in the 2004
election by 14 percentage points.7
Unlike television exposure, newspaper reading had no significant effect on foreign policy
attitudes either on its own or when controlling for television exposure. Newspaper readers are more
able to tailor the information that they are exposed to – individuals not worried about terrorism may
simply have chosen to avoid terrorism stories or avoid the most threatening aspects of stories and
therefore the threatening information did not influence their attitudes. Alternatively, low threat and
high threat respondents may simply watch different news altogether, which is not possible to
ascertain using this measure of media use. Yet the differences between newspaper reading and
television exposure may also be due to the more emotional nature of television news – television
stories allow individuals to visualize terrorism.
Table 1 also displays results from 2SLS models regressing foreign policy attitudes on
respondents threat perception and exogenous measures of media consumption in 2002. The right
side of Figure 1 shows the predicted values of foreign policy holding the newspaper reading,
ideology, and partisanship at their means. The dependent variable is the same index as above. These
2SLS models reveal the same basic patterns as the OLS models with one significant difference.
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Consistent with the findings from the previous models, respondents high in threat prefer
significantly more hawkish policy than those lower in threat. Unlike the OLS models, the 2SLS
models show that newspaper reading may increase support for hawkish policies among high threat
citizens, although the effect of newspaper reading is significantly attenuated when accounting for
television watching, meaning that newspaper consumption does not have a direct effect on attitudes
– the direct effect is carried only by the more emotive television content. This suggests that the
threatening information captured in newspaper stories can influence foreign policy attitudes but that
emotive television coverage mattered more.
These models suggest that television news, even very threatening news that catches viewers’
attention, may influence viewers in a variety of ways – consumers’ threat perceptions influence how
they understand what they watch. High and low threat respondents take away different types of
information and emotion from television coverage of foreign policy. Overall, both the OLS and the
2SLS models provide support for the hypothesis that an increased sense of vulnerability about
terrorism led to more support for a variety of policies linked to the War on Terror – more defense
and border spending, higher support for the Iraq war, and less support for dovish policies such as
foreign aid. Additionally, the findings show that television watching rather than newspaper reading
moved foreign policy attitudes, suggesting that emotionally potent coverage of terrorism influenced
attitudes more significantly than information itself.
Respondents threatened by terrorism were open to persuasion, and in the mostly one-sided
political environment, these threatened individuals adopted the president’s position on foreign
policy. Support for hawkish policy was especially high among people watching the nightly television
news, news that ran hundreds of terrorism segments in the year after 9/11. Because the national
news reflected the president’s War on Terror framing (Entman 2003), respondents already
concerned about terrorism received messages to help connect their sense of threat to hawkish policy
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options. Threat matters for political attitudes because the president and the media imbued the threat
of terrorism with political meaning that citizens used to shape their attitudes. Television news, with
its more emotional coverage of terrorism, mattered more for attitudes than did less evocative
newspaper coverage, a dynamic explored in the next section.
The Threat Experiment
Utilizing the 2006 Threat Experiment, this section shows that when news stories pair
threatening information with fear cues, threatened respondents are significantly more likely to
support militaristic foreign policy than respondents who only receive threatening information.
As shown in the previous section, threatened individuals exposed to the most television
news adopted the most hawkish attitudes. However, the survey data cannot disentangle exactly why
the television news exposure so effectively influenced attitudes - whether the threatening
information or the emotionally evocative presentation of the information increased support for
hawkish policy. Using an experiment, this section further tests the hypothesis that television news
stories increase support for hawkish policy through emotionally threatening cues.
To test the effect of threatening media content on policy attitudes, I designed and ran the
2006 Threat Experiment, a media experiment with a nationally representative sample of 1,229 adults
recruited through YouGov/Polimetrix. Because the experimental design required subjects to watch
a news segment, the experiment took place on-line. Experiments provide a way to determine the
causal impact of media exposure on attitudes in a way that secondary survey data cannot, making an
experiment a better methodological choice. Using survey data alone, it is not possible to determine
whether media cause feelings of threat, or whether pre-existing feelings of threat determine attention
to news and threatening information in particular. Additionally, media exposure self reports such as
those used in the NES analysis are prone to over-reporting because citizens have a difficult time
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estimating their news exposure (Prior 2009). Lastly, even with a perfect measure of media exposure,
secondary data is unable to distinguish the effect of information from the effect of emotion.
Given these issues, an experiment provides the advantage of control over both exposure and
content. Respondents are randomly assigned to experimental conditions and exposed to the same
information within each experimental condition, meaning that the selection mechanism for exposure
is random rather than determined by subjects’ characteristics. The randomization enhances the
ability to make inferences about how the media affect attitudes.
Experimental treatments
The experimental treatments manipulated both the presence of threat (threatening v. non-
threatening verbal information) and the emotional cue (threatening visuals v. non-threatening
visuals) in real television stories about recent terrorist attacks. The experiment took place online
during fall 2006 with a representative sample of Americans. The sample is composed of 52 percent
female respondents, 80 percent white respondents, 23 percent with bachelors’ degrees or higher, and
an average age of 46 years old. Participants answered a variety of attitude questions and were
randomly assigned to watch one of three videos. In the control condition, participants watched an
irrelevant news story on India’s economy that provided neither verbal information on threat nor a
visual emotional cue to threat. Subjects in the two treatment conditions watched a story entitled
“Wave of Terror” that outlined recent terrorist attacks and suggested that a terrorist attack was
imminent. The experimental story suggested that, given the pattern of terrorist attacks in the past
year, the public should expect further attacks and featured terrorism experts warning the public. All
subjects in the treatment conditions received exactly the same verbal information about terrorism --
government authorities were troubled by the increase in smaller-scale terrorist attacks like the ones
in London and Madrid and the attacks might signal a new wave of terrorism.
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Only the visual imagery differed between the two treatment conditions: the “scary visuals”
group viewed the terrorism story with evocative imagery of terrorism while the “neutral visuals”
group viewed the same story with neutral imagery. Both terrorism stories highlighted the threat from
terrorism, but the neutral visuals condition used a non-emotional tone and no visual imagery of
terror. In the scary visuals treatment, the terrorism news story was edited to enhance the threatening
nature of the visual imagery. This editing added video such as the burning World Trade Center and
bloodied victims of the 2005 London transit bombings. In the neutral visuals condition, subjects
watched the same story on terrorism with the visuals replaced by less violent imagery. For example,
in place of the London victims, the neutral condition included maps of the London subway system.
Table 2 summarizes the design of the experiment and the online appendix provides the text of the
experimental treatments and compares the types of images seen in each treatment condition.
The experimental design thus clearly teases apart the unique aspect of media coverage that
my model predicts will affect attitudes – threatening visual cues that convey emotional content –
from the unemotional information about the likelihood of a terrorist threat. To the extent that
experimental respondents receive a threatening message about terrorism paired with emotional
imagery, these respondents should be the most likely to support hawkish foreign policy. Across the
conditions, the message about the increased likelihood of threat is the same while the emotional
presentation differs, so any differences in opinion that occur can be attributed to differences in the
imagery/emotion rather than to differences in the threatening information or other dimensions such
as framing. If there are differences in opinion only between the control group and the treatment
groups but not between the neutral visuals condition and the scary visuals condition, then
threatening story content influences opinions but how the content is presented does not. If there are
differences between the neutral visuals condition and the scary visuals condition, then presentational
factors like the visual content affect opinion.
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The Threat Experiment provides a hard test for pinning down the mechanism by which the
media matter. The “Wave of Terror” story that respondents in the treatment conditions watched
contained threatening information about potential terrorist attacks but did not contain overt policy
content. The story itself did not advocate hawkish policies or quote sources arguing for more
homeland security funding or sending more troops abroad. In addition, the experimental treatment
consisted of only one, 2 ½ minute story about terrorism abroad in the midst of more than five years
and literally thousands of other news stories about terrorism. Even though respondents were asked
their reactions and attitudes directly after the story, the treatment was relatively mild compared to
the vast amount of relevant news available to Americans.
To confirm that the scary visuals condition evoked respondents’ emotions as anticipated,
this study used two manipulation checks to measure emotional reactions to the news stories. Prior to
the Threat Experiment, all images were pre-tested by a separate sample of 79 students to confirm
that the terrorism images provoked anxiety. Respondents viewed a series of both neutral and
evocative photos in random order and answered how afraid, hopeful, and angry each photo made
them, on a scale from 1 “not at all” to 10 “very”. On average, the neutral images evoked significantly
less fear than the terrorism images. For the seven neutral images the mean fear score was 1.60 while
the average fear score for the terrorism pictures was 4.84 (p<.01). Respondents who saw a neutral
image of a double-decker London bus (Mbus = 1.70) were significantly less fearful than those who
saw the iconic image of the London bus attacked on July 7, 2005 (Mexplosion= 4.91, p<.01).
As another measure, after watching the news story, each subject received a set of questions
designed to tap into particular negative emotions; respondents rated how fearful (worried, fearful,
anxious), sad (sad, depressed, grief stricken), and angry (angry, mad, and furious), they felt.
Respondents rated their emotional reactions on a 9 point scale from “did not feel the emotion” at
the low end to “felt the emotion very strongly” at the high end of the scale, which I rescaled to vary
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between 0 and 1. All of these negative emotions loaded strongly onto a single dimension in a factor
analysis (Eigenvalue =2.00, Cronbach’s α = .87). Respondents in the scary visuals condition felt
significantly more negative emotions (Msv = .43) than subjects in the control condition (Mc = .27,
p<.01). Additionally, respondents concerned about terrorism prior to watching the terrorism story
reported feeling significantly more negative emotions in the scary visuals condition than either of the
other two conditions (Mc= .28, Mnv= .48. Msv = .54, p<.02 both differences), suggesting that the
visuals worked as intended.
Threat and emotion’s effects on foreign policy attitudes
To establish that emotionally evocative media coverage increases support for hawkish
policies, I measure respondents’ foreign policy attitudes by experimental condition using a set of five
dependent variables. All dependent variables were measured after exposure to the experimental
treatments. The militarism measure asked respondents whether they thought that the best way to
ensure peace was through military strength or diplomacy. The dichotomous measure is scored from
0 to 1, with 1 representing the “military” position. The spending index is a four item index; each
questions within the index asked respondents, “Should the federal government should increase,
decrease, or keep funding levels the same?” on foreign aid, defense, border security, and homeland
security. Each question weighed equally in the index (Cronbach’s α= .70), which was scaled from -1
(spend less) to 1 (spend more), and foreign aid was reverse coded. These measures are identical in
wording to the measures from the NES utilized in the previous section.
To test whether threat has broad consequences on foreign policy, respondents also answered
several questions on their attitudes about specific military engagements in Sudan and Iraq. In 2002,
Americans who perceived a high threat of terrorism were supportive of using the United States
military to destroy terrorist groups in Sudan (Pew 2002). Respondent’s reaction to the Darfur region
of Sudan provides a way to measure whether, given limited resources, citizens want the United
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States to spend funds for military or dovish means. The Sudan measure is a combination of two
questions that asked respondents about hypothetical actions that the U.S. government could take–
military action to destroy terrorist groups and sending humanitarian foreign aid to Darfur.
Respondents gave their preferences toward military action and humanitarian relief separately using a
5-point scale that ranged from strongly oppose to strongly favor, with “neither favor nor oppose” as
the middle position. I created the Sudan measure by categorizing respondents who wanted to send
aid but not troops as doves with a score of 0 and respondents who wanted to send troops but not
aid as hawks with a score of 1.8 The Iraq measure asked respondents to evaluate retrospectively
whether they believed that the war in Iraq was worth the cost, and is scored on a 5 point scale from
“strongly disagree” at 0 to 1 “strongly agree”. Lastly, the Government approval measure is a three item
index (Cronbach’s α = .70) that asked respondents to evaluate how well they believed the
government was doing in reducing the threat of terrorism, how much they approved of the
president’s handling of terrorism, and whether they believed that the ability of terrorists to carry out
terrorist attacks was greater, less, or the same than before 9/11. Higher scores indicated higher
approval of the Bush administration and are categorized as being more hawkish.
To test the hypothesis that high threat respondents are especially likely to support hawkish
policy when exposed to threatening news paired with fear cues, Figure 2 shows the differences in
means between treatments and the 90 percent confidence interval around the differences.9 This
figure compares the treatment effects on all foreign policy measures for all respondents. The black
circles represent the differences in attitudes between respondents in the neutral visuals condition
and the control condition, and the white open diamonds represent the differences in opinion
between the scary visuals condition and the neutral visuals condition. Movements in a hawkish
direction are shown to the right of the vertical dotted line while movements toward the dovish end
appear to the left of the line. Respondents are divided by their pre-test level of threat, measured as
20
how likely the respondent believed a terrorist attack was in the next year. The 553 low threat
respondents believed that terrorism was “(very) unlikely” while the 674 high threat respondents
answered that terrorism was “(very) likely”.
Consistent with the findings from the NES, low threat subjects are unresponsive to both the
message and the presentation of television news, with the exception of the decision to send troops
versus aid to Sudan. While subjects unconcerned about terrorism are no more likely to support
hawkish policy in the treatment conditions than in the control condition across 4 of the 5 dependent
variables, low threat subjects in the scary visuals condition actually adopt a more dovish position
than respondents in the neutral visuals condition. While 26 percent of low threat respondents in the
neutral visuals condition preferred sending troops to fight terrorism in Sudan rather than send
humanitarian aid, only 13 percent of those in the scary visuals condition did. This move toward
dovishness suggests that the imagery associated with terrorism may not automatically be associated
with hawkish policy outcomes. Terrorism in Sudan and the Darfur situation are not salient issues
closely associated with the War on Terror, meaning that the threatening imagery may easily sway
respondent to support a variety of positions, including dovish ones. Among those individuals
unconcerned about terrorism, neither the threatening information contained in the neutral visuals
story nor the evocative imagery in the scary visuals story affected foreign policy attitudes for the
majority of measures.
Citizens often choose between not watching a terrorism story at all and seeing an evocative
story highlighting death and destruction. The experiment allows a test of the effect of that choice on
foreign policy attitudes by comparing the foreign policy views of high threat respondents in the
scary visuals condition to those in the control condition. Across all five foreign policy measures,
high threat respondents in the scary visuals condition are about 6 percent more supportive of
hawkish policy than high threat subjects in the control condition.10 To compare the magnitude of
21
these effects, the largest effects of the scary visuals conditions are in the case of overall militarism
(10 percentage points) and in willingness to bomb Sudan (9 percentage points). These effects are
slightly less than the effect of being a Republican (14 percentage points) and about a third of size of
voting for Bush in 2004 (34 percentage points) on respondents’ hawkishness in the 2004 NES. The
experiment also allows for a tougher test of the hypothesis that the emotional nature of terrorism
news increases support for militaristic policies.
If threatening information about terrorism alone affected attitudes, then support for hawkish
policies should be equal in the neutral visuals and scary visuals conditions. Figure 2 demonstrates
though, that the scary visuals condition increased support for hawkish policies over the neutral
visuals condition among high threat subjects. In contrast to low threat respondents unmoved by
either information or emotion, high threat respondents react to the threatening information and
emotional imagery in the scary visual condition by supporting increasingly more militant foreign
policy. Compared to respondents who watched the Wave of Terrorism story without the emotional
imagery, respondents in the scary visuals condition are more supportive of military solutions to
international problems by .07 on the 0 to1 scale (p<.08), prefer more spending on areas such as
defense and border security by .09 (p<.02), rate the government’s handling of terrorism more
positively by .06 (p<.07), and a larger percentage of respondents prefer to send troops to Sudan
rather than foreign aid by .11 (p<.06). High threat subjects are more supportive of the Iraq war than
low threat subjects, but the experimental treatments failed to increase support for the war among
those high in threat. Although not all of the differences between the neutral and scary visuals
conditions are significant at the conventional p<.05 level, the overall pattern of findings
demonstrates that threatening media content can increase hawkishness but that the most powerful
effects from television news comes from stories that utilize emotional presentations. These findings
demonstrate that watching one news story about potential terrorist attacks that included emotion-
22
inducing imagery increased support for a variety of militaristic policies while the less emotional
neutral visuals condition did not
According to the hypotheses, I expect that terrorism stories significantly affect attitudes
because they evoke negative emotions like anxiety that make citizens more open to political
persuasion. To more directly test whether the scary visuals condition affects attitudes through
evoking respondents’ emotions, Figure 3 compares the mean levels of foreign policy attitudes
among respondents who did not react emotionally to the scary visuals condition (low emotion) and
those with stronger emotional reactions (high emotion) and 90 percent confidence intervals around
the means.11 As Figure 3 demonstrates, the scary visuals condition affected foreign policy attitudes
through evoking emotion. Subjects who reacted emotionally preferred more militaristic policy
overall (Mdifference = .41, t=8.78, p<.01), supported more defense and border security spending
(Mdifference = .36, t=7.02, p<.01), evaluated the Bush administration’s handling of terrorism more
positively (Mdifference = .18, t=4.51, p<.01), and were more supportive of the use of the military
overseas in Sudan (Mdifference = .22, t=6.31, p<.01), than respondents unemotional after watching the
scary visuals condition. The size of the emotion effect is roughly equivalent to the difference
between Democrats’ and Independents’ foreign policy views in this sample. The effect of emotion is
to substantively increase support for a range of more militaristic policies that respondents do not
prefer in the absence of emotion.
The experiment demonstrates that more than 5 years after the 9/11 attacks, exposure to a
single terrorism story led high threat respondents to prefer more hawkish types of foreign policy
when the story presented both a threatening message and emotional presentation. What makes this
finding especially striking is that, in the years since 9/11, American citizens saw frequent news
stories about terrorism and had stored knowledge and beliefs about counter-terrorism policy.
Equally remarkable is the fact that, even though the public is both interested and knowledgeable
23
about terrorism, watching one more frightening terrorism story significantly influenced attitudes of
respondents concerned about terrorism more than 5 years after 9/11.
Conclusion
In times of crisis, citizens turn to the government and mass media for answers, comfort, and
protection. In the hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, millions of Americans turned on televisions
in their homes, schools, and workplaces to make sense of events and to understand how they should
react. But television heightened threat instead of providing comfort because it focused on
threatening, emotionally laden images of terror. Television watchers saw the Twin Towers fall in
New York City, saw crowds of office workers running away from the disaster as fire fighters and
police ran toward the collapsed buildings, and saw the desperate faces of bystanders. Bearing witness
in this way led many Americans to feel profound emotions – anger at the hijackers, sadness over the
loss of life, and fear of future attacks. The emotional cues in the media combined with the
perception that another attack was likely shaped the types of policies that the public demanded to
address terrorism in the aftermath of the attacks.
In this article, I argue that evocative, emotionally powerful images of terrorism cued the
public into supporting hawkish foreign policy in the years after 9/11. Using an experiment that
tightly controlled the type of terrorism stories respondents saw, this article demonstrates that
emotionally charged news influences attitudes significantly more than information on its own.
However, not all citizens reacted to the information environment in the same way. Those individuals
already concerned about future terrorism were especially supportive of hawkish policy when
exposed to news coverage, particularly news coverage that was emotional in nature. Americans
convinced that terrorism was likely in the future were responsive to the message and emotional
content of terrorism news stories. The mass media covered the War on Terror heavily from the
9/11 attacks onward, and the findings from this paper illustrate that the amount and type of
24
information that citizens received from the media profoundly affected policy attitudes, conditional
on individuals’ level of concern over terrorism.
While the focus of this particular study is terrorism, the results hold implications for other
policy domains. In policy areas where there are resonant images reflected in mass media coverage
that can induce negative emotions, these findings suggest that elites have an opportunity to persuade
citizens to support preferred policies, particularly punitive policies. In particular, past research
demonstrates that perceptions of threat shape attitudes toward crime, immigration, and public health
(Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Iyengar 1991; Witte and Allen 2000). What the Threat Theory
can add to this research is an understanding of how mass media coverage of these issues may
increase support for punitive/hawkish policies - that is, through evoking emotion.
Issues of war and peace are fundamental to democracy, and this paper reveals conditions
under which the mass public will support the use of force. This paper fills a hole in the literature on
public attitudes in times of crisis by demonstrating that public support for hawkish policy is not the
only possible outcome after terrorist attacks, but under the conditions where the public feels
threatened and the mass media covers terrorism in a sensationalistic manner, support for hawkish
policy will increase. These findings also suggest that the role of the media is broader than simply
providing a conduit for elites to speak to the public; the media influences the public through its own
means as well. This article outlines how the media play a role in convincing some members of the
public to support different policies than they otherwise might. While respondents high in threat
adopted significantly more hawkish attitudes after watching the scary visuals condition than the
control condition, this article should also provided some relief to those concerned about the
unchecked power of fear to adulterate the public’s attitudes on foreign policy and war. Emotion did
alter some respondents’ attitudes, but the largest effect was on individuals open to the threatening
messages in the treatment conditions, suggesting that people can rely on certain mechanisms, such
25
as diminishing the threat of terrorism, to cope with threatening news. Yet, if the media can activate
citizens’ sense of impending danger, my findings show that when political leaders trumpet the right
threatening message and the mass media use the right images, the public may consent to war, even
though a citizenry with less emotion may have chosen otherwise.
26
Table 1: The effect of threat and media consumption on foreign policy attitudes 2002
Foreign policy index 2002
OLS 2SLS
Television
model Newspaper
model All
media Television
model Newspaper
model All
media
PID 2000 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.18 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.032) (0.038) Ideology 2000 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.16 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) Threat of Terrorism 2002 -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.10 (0.053) (0.046) (0.061) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) TV watching 2002 -0.03 -0.03 -0.50 -0.53 (0.059) (0.060) (0.184) (0.210) TV * Threat 0.22 0.22 0.83 0.89 (0.083) (0.084) (0.239) (0.292) Newspaper reading 2002 0.03 0.01 -0.36 -0.06 (0.048) (0.048) (0.16) (0.20) Newspaper * Threat -0.02 -0.03 0.60 -0.13 (0.070) (0.069) (0.25) (0.330) Constant 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.35 (0.038) (0.035) (0.044) (0.040) (0.030) (0.041)
Observations 1158 1163 1157 1047 1058 1046 R2 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16
Source: NES 2000-2004 panel. Model Specification: OLS and 2SLS. Coefficients in bold are significant at p < .05. Standard errors are in parentheses. Foreign policy index is a 6-item additive index – spending on foreign aid, defense, border security, and homeland security/ war on terror, support for the war in Iraq, approval of the president’s handling of terrorism. The indices range from -1 to 1, higher values are more hawkish. Partisanship and ideology are measured in 2000 and range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating Republican and conservative. Television and newspaper consumption are measured in 2002 as the number of days a week respondents watched TV news/read a daily newspaper, recoded to range between 0 and 1 in the OLS models. Television and newspaper consumption in the 2SLS models are instrumented from TV watching and newspaper reading in 2000 and their interactions are instrumented as well. (See footnote 4 for details) Threat perception is respondent’s belief about the likelihood of another terrorist attack ranging from “terrorism not very likely” (0) to “terrorism very like” (1).
27
Table 2: The Threat Experiment Design
Story watched Story content Visual content
Control condition
Indian economy
Neutral “This is India booming.”
Neutral
Neutral visuals condition
Wave of Terror
Threatening “Is this the beginning of a wave of attacks?”
Neutral
Scary visuals condition
Wave of Terror
Threatening “Is this the beginning of a wave of attacks?”
Threatening
28
Figure 1: Effect of threat and media use on foreign policy attitudes 2002
High threat
Low threat
.2.3
.4.5
.6.7
.8
Haw
kis
hness
No TV Mean TV Every day
TV watching per week
OLS model
High threat
Low threat
.2.3
.4.5
.6.7
.8
Haw
kis
hness
No TV Mean TV Every day
TV watching per week
IV model
Source: 2000-2004 NES
Predicted values and 95% CI
Foreign Policy Attitudes 2002
29
Figure 2: Scary visuals condition increase hawkishness among high threat respondents
Hawkishness
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Iraq Worth Cost
Approval
of Handling
of Terrorism
Sudan
Foreign Policy
Spending
Militarism
Diff(Neutral-Control)
Diff(Scary-Neutral)
Foreign Policy Attitudes by Condition
(Low threat subjects)
Hawkishness
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Iraq Worth Cost
Approval
of Handling
of Terrorism
Sudan
Foreign Policy
Spending
Militarism
Diff(Neutral-Control)Diff(Scary-Neutral)
Foreign Policy Attitudes by Condition
(High threat subjects)
31
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1 The Threat Theory’s emphasis on threat and emotion does not imply that I believe threat is the
predominant determinant of foreign policy attitudes or that predispositions such as partisanship and
ideology are irrelevant to opinion formation. While partisanship and ideology may be less helpful
cues in foreign policy than domestic policy, foreign policy opinion in the post-9/11 era is
significantly affected by partisanship, elite positions on foreign policy, and beliefs about information
credibility. The Threat Theory argues that terrorism stories moved the public toward hawkish policy
because the presidential administration effectively framed hawkish policy as the remedy for
terrorism and that that link between terrorism and policy is strongest when connected to
emotionally evocative images. Even as views on the War on Terror became more polarized by party,
35
emotionally charged news could influence attitudes by increasing support for the policies advocated
by one’s favored elite or for the dominant hawkish policy if no strong alternatives were offered by
elites outside the presidential administration. Emotion may be most powerful in a “one-message”
political environment, yet it does not preclude the possibility that other political actors can harness
emotions to argue for alternative policies or the possibility that the emotion may be so powerful as
to persuade citizens to permanently shift their attitudes. The moderating effects of partisanship on
foreign policy attitudes are explored further in Gadarian (2008).
2 The online appendix http://rwj.berkeley.edu/scholars/gadarian.php includes question wordings
and codings. This foreign policy index captures a broad foreign policy dimension of how
respondents want the government to handle international problems: through diplomacy or the
military. Using factor analysis with varimax rotation, the 6 items loaded strongly on one dimension
(Eigenvalue = 1.37). The 2002 index correlates with a 7-point diplomacy-militarism scale from the
2004 NES wave (r=.36, p<.01) and the same index measured in 2004 correlates with the 2004
diplomacy-militarism scale (r =57, p<.01).
3 Conservative and Republican identification both increased in the NES panel between the 2000 and
2002 survey waves as did support for hawkish foreign policy. To control for the possibility that
respondents updated their partisanship and ideology to remain consistent with their foreign policy
preferences, the models use respondents’ partisanship and ideology measured in the 2000 wave
rather than the 2002 measure.
4 The panel structure is useful for finding instruments for the media exposure variable in 2002
because respondents answered the same media questions in 2000. The television questions asked
respondents how many days in the last week they watched local and national television. In order to
get a “purged” measure of TV watching in 2002, I regressed the average of respondents’ national
36
and local news watching in 2002 on respondent’s average television watching in 2000, race, age,
education, political sophistication, partisanship, ideology, marital status, and whether they lived in
the West. I then use the predicted measure of TV watching in the second stage equations. Finding a
useful instrument for threat perception is much more difficult since the 2000 NES did not ask about
the threat of terrorist attacks. Threat perception may be closely related to individual personality
dispositions such as trait-anxiety, for which there are few good measures on the NES. The lack of
appropriate prior measures inhibits my ability to find appropriate instruments. While ignoring
endogeneity may wreak havoc on statistical estimations, using weak instruments may also seriously
bias statistical inferences (Bartels 1991). Because I doubt the appropriateness of any instrument for
threat perception, I include the original 2002 threat measure in all of the models in Table 1.
5 Media exposure self-reports may be problematic because individuals have trouble estimating their
own exposure (Prior 2009). Yet, these models are concerned with whether media consumption
increases or decreases rather than with the actual number of days respondents watch/read.
Additionally, the experiment later in the argument controls exposure rather than relying on self-
reports.
6 In 2000, 50 percent of respondents answered that they were somewhat or very concerned about
the prospect of conventional war, which increased to 84 percent by 2002 (χ2 = 31.8, p<.01).
Similarly, anxiety over nuclear war increased over time, in 2000, 43 percent of respondents were
either somewhat (35 percent) or very worried (8 percent), while in 2002, 75 percent of the same
respondents were somewhat (50 percent) or very worried (25 percent) (χ2 = 92.8, p<.01).
7 These calculations are based on a model that using the NES 2000-2004 panel to predict the
probability that a respondent would vote for George W. Bush in the 2004 election based on
respondent’s partisanship, ideology, gender, race (all measured in the 2000 wave) and 2002
37
hawkishness (measured with the foreign policy index). I then calculated a white, male respondent’s
probability of voting for Bush when ideology and partisanship were held at their 2000 mean
(moderate Independent). When hawkishness increases from .55 to .75, the respondent goes from
being indifferent between Kerry and Bush (49 percent probability of voting for Bush) to being a
strong Bush supporter (63 percent probability of voting for Bush).
8 Respondents who preferred a combination of dovish and hawkish action were excluded from this
measure.
9 Because the Threat Theory expects that evocative imagery should only move respondents toward
the hawkish end of the scale, Figure 2 utilizes one-tailed significance tests and shows 90 percent
confidence intervals.
10 Comparing the mean hawkishness score among high threat respondents in the control condition
to high threat respondents in the scary visuals condition, the difference in means across the 5
dependent variables ranges in size from .03 to .10 on scales that range from 0 to 1, with the
exception of the spending scale that ranges from -1 to 1.
11 The Emotion variable is constructed from respondents’ emotional reactions to the scary visuals
condition that were described in the manipulation check section. Fear and anger scaled together on
one dimension in a factor analysis, so I combined these two emotional responses into one emotion
index and divided respondents by the median. Respondents were categorized as low emotion
(n=514) if they were below the median on either the fear index or the anger index. Respondents
were categorized as high emotion (n=715) if their scores on either the fear or anger indices was
above the median or if they were above the median on both indices.