Post on 28-Mar-2023
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Title: The DAC and the South, a failed encounter? Strategies of Association and
Participation in the 2000s
Author: Isaline Bergamaschi, assistant professor, Department of Political Science,
Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia
Key words: global South, multilateralism, OECD/DAC, aid efficiency
Word count: 8.919
Abstract: How do countries of the global South take part in multilateral mechanisms,
and with what effects? And how can global governance better take into account the rise
of Southern powers? This article addresses this issue by looking at works about aid
efficiency carried out at the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) in the 2000s.
The article first argues that the DAC has partially failed to accomplish its stated
objectives regarding Southern country participation. On the one hand, the modalities of
non-member country (NMC) participation set up by the DAC did not allow for
challenging the traditional division of labour between donors and recipients. On the
other hand, emerging donors of the South have remained reluctant to participate in
DAC’s Paris agenda and endorse its policy norms. However, the article shows that some
other developing countries such as Rwanda and Colombia have actively seized the DAC
to promote certain visions and priorities.
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The DAC and the South: a failed encounter?
Strategies of Association and Participation in the 2000s
How do countries of the global South take part in multilateral mechanisms, and with
what effects? And how can global governance better take into account the rise of
Southern powers?
Even though it has been under-represented in the existing literature1, the Development
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD/DAC) is a relevant site to study the role of Southern states (both poor, recipient
countries and new donors) in the changing landscape and architecture of aid. The
organisation is composed exclusively of “developed” countries. But in the past years,
new demands for inclusiveness have affected the OECD and the DAC, whose mission is
to formalise, rationalise, and disseminate information about development assistance. As
the DAC is not a development bank or agency which implements projects and
programmes), it provides – in theory at least – a space where emerging powers could
exert some normative influence on the international agenda and practices of aid.
This article scrutinises why and how, in the 2000s, the DAC has increased its efforts to
associate non-member countries (NMC) of the South to their work related to the “Paris
agenda”, i.e. the principles and commitments made since the adoption of the Paris
declaration on aid harmonization and efficiency in 20052. Almost ten years down the
line, and in the aftermath of the first Forum of the Global Partnership on Effective
Development Cooperation in Mexico (April 2014), the article offers a critical
assessment of these efforts3.
In the first section, the article traces the genesis and rationale of DAC’s attempts to
“open up” and improve the inclusion of non-member states of the global South. The
second section examines the ways in which this has been done in practice. The third
section puts forward a typology of Southern country strategies for participation in the
discussions about the Paris agenda, highlighting their different roles, contributions and
agendas.
The article first argues that the DAC has partially failed to accomplish its stated
objectives regarding Southern country participation. This can be attributed to two main
factors. On the one hand, the modalities of non-member country (NMC) participation
set up by the DAC did not allow for challenging the traditional division of labour
1 There is a notable exception: Rosalind Eyben and Laura Savage, “Emerging and Submerging Powers:
Imagined Geographies in the New Development Partnership at the Busan Fourth High Level Forum”, The
Journal of Development Studies, 2013, 49:4, 457-469; and the literature on this topic is growing. See, for
example, the special issue of the Third World Quarterly called « Emerging Powers and the UN: What
Kind of Development Partnership? », Volume 35, Issue 10, 2014.
2 These principles are: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability. For more
details, see: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm
3 It is important to note that interactions between the DAC and NMC from the South in other divisions
(for example, the Development Centre) and on other topics (aid statistics) are not taken into account in
this article.
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between donors and recipients prevailing in the aid field, at the expense of so-called
low-income countries (LDCs). On the other hand, emerging countries of the South such
as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have remained reluctant to
participate in DAC’s Paris agenda and endorse its policy norms. However, the article
then shows that the space opened up by the DAC has created opportunities that some
other developing countries such as Rwanda and Colombia have actively seized to
promote certain visions and priorities.
The methodology adopted here is inspired by sociological approaches to international
relations and by socio-anthropological accounts of development4. As such, the article’s
objectives go beyond an evaluation of Southern country participation’s effects on policy
outcomes and on aid’s multilateral agenda, i.e. on the decisions made and the norms
adopted within the framework of the OECD/DAC. Attention is also paid to the concrete
and mundane forms of Southern participation, including issues of self-presentation (i.e.
how delegates present and understand their country’s role and status within the DAC),
mutual representations and interactions between participants. The notion of “division of
labour”5 is applied to relations between Northern and Southern participants so as to
unveil the limits of the “partnership” between so-called “developed”, “emerging” or
“partner” countries promised by the DAC6. But our observations do not point to simple
domination or subordination of Southern participants. On the contrary, their agency is
taken seriously in the typology presented in section III7.
Primary sources include relevant institutional documents produced by the DAC. Field
and ethnographic observations of formal meetings and informal exchanges were
collected during several events organized by the OECD/DAC, including the Working
Party on Aid Effectiveness in Paris and the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness (HLF4, 29 November-1 December 2011) in Busan, Korea. Some
meetings were viewed online. Given that Southern countries do not have a permanent
delegation or representation at the OECD headquarters in Paris, the collection of data
was multi-sited. In total, 31 interviews were carried out: with DAC delegates, former
and current staff of the DAC Secretariat / Development Co-operation Directorate
4 Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. Anthropologie et développement. Essai en socio-anthropologie
du changement social. op. cit. and Mosse, David. Cultivating development: An ethnography of
aid policy and practice. London: Pluto Press, 2005.
5 The notion has been used in the works of Johanna Siméant, Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and
Frédéric Sawicki focusing on the sociology of the international; in the ongoing doctoral work of Hélène
Baillot (see her Master’s thesis: Hélène Baillot, Penser la division du travail et les rapports Nord-Sud au
sein d’un réseau transnational de lutte contre la dette. Master 2: Science politique Mention Etudes
africaines: Paris : Université Paris 1, Panthéon-la Sorbonne, 2010, 204 p.) and in Bergamaschi, Baillot,
and Iori, “Division of Labour and Partnerships in Transnational Social Movements: Observations of
North-South and South-South Interactions at the World Social Forum”, in Johanna Siméant, Marie-
Emmanuelle Pommerolle, and Isabelle Sommier (eds.), Observing an International Mobilisation: The
World Social Forum in Dakar (2011), University of Amsterdam Press (under review). 6 The rise and ambiguity of the “partnership” rhetoric has been informed by Abrahamsen Rita. “The
power of partnership in global governance”, Third World Quarterly, vol.25, n°8, 2004, p. 1453-1467. 7 Our approach builds on Brown, William & Sophie Harman, (eds), African Agency in International
Politics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013.
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(DCD-DAC) and other directions at the OECD in Paris and London; and with Southern
country delegates in Bamako (Mali) and Bogota (Colombia), as well as by Skype8.
“Ten years ago, we did not know we would have this discussion”9. DAC’s
engagement with the global South
The OECD is a multilateral but selective organisation. Its members are industrialized
countries only and it is hence considered a “rich club”. Once an explicitly European,
Western and liberal organization, its membership has progressively broadened to
include countries in transition after the dissolution of the Soviet block and non-Western
states. In addition, as Peter Carroll and William Hynes recall, engagement with NMC,
including developing countries, was laid down in the OECD’s founding Convention in
1961. At its creation, the DAC sought to reach out to non-members so as to “spread the
burden of assistance (…) to new donors – especially Germany, (…) Japan”10
and Italy11
and as part of a broader effort to counter Soviet bloc influence in the Third World
during the Cold War era.
The drafting of the Paris declaration, which in 2005 proposed a roadmap to improve the
processes and modalities of aid delivery and reduce transaction costs, was strictly driven
by prominent DAC donors. Developing countries were silent observers at the High-
Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003) – with the exception of
Tanzania’s Ministry of Finance, who stated in the opening session that it was time for
donors to harmonise12
. Recipient countries had “little to do with Paris”13
. Overall, the
Paris declaration appeared as a “European donor thing”14
and did not make any
reference to emerging donors15
. The DAC’s initiatives to “reach” beyond its members
and foster dialogue with NMC have targeted more specifically than ever before at
countries of the global South. The quest for legitimacy, after a period of aid fatigue and
harsh critique against the International Financial Institutions in the 1990s, has played a
key role in this development16
.
DAC’s efforts to increase the participation of NMC countries have been intensified
significantly after the adoption of the Paris declaration in 2005. In fact, most principles
and objectives of the Paris declaration can only be operationalized and monitored at the
country level, i.e. in aid-recipient countries. There was agreement around the notion that
8 See list of interviews in annex 1.
9 Representative of Ghana, WP-EFF meeting, Paris, October 2011.
10 William Hynes and Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval, “The Donor that came in from the cold: OECD-Russian
engagement on development co-operation”, IIIS Discussion paper 450, p. 4. The authors make this
argument by building on J. Wheller, Around the World for 85 Years: A Memoir by Joseph C. Wheeler,
Special Collections, Concord Free Public Library, Concord, Massachussets. 11
Migani Guia, « La politique de coopération européenne: une politique étrangère ante litteram? Le rôle
de la CEE au DAC pendant les années 1960 », in M. Rasmussen, A-C. Knudsen (eds.), The Road to a
United Europe. Interpretations of the Process of European Integration, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009, p.
190. 12
Talaat Adel-Malek, interview 13
Brian Atwood, interview 14
Former DAC representative of a European donor, interview 15
Gerardo Bracho, interview 16
On how the IFIs responded to critiques and reformed their practices in developing countries, see,
amongst others: Jacqueline Best, “Legitimacy Dilemmas: the IMF’s Pursuit of Country Ownership.”
Third World Quarterly, 28, no. 3 (2007), p. 469-488.
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responsibility for aid’s past failures had to be at least partly shared, as illustrated in the
notion of “mutual responsibility” included in the declaration. A China-DAC Study
group was created in 2008. The DAC’s New Deal on Fragile States17
has closely
associated low-income and conflict-ridden countries. The DAC shares information with
India, China and Brazil about its peer review mechanism, good practices, transparency,
and aid statistics. In April 2011, the DAC issued a statement welcoming non-DAC
partners to engage in a mutual learning dialogue about poverty reduction.
Furthermore, since 2005, some Asian and South American countries have consolidated
their status as “emerging” countries and “new” donors (China, India, Brazil, Venezuela
and Mexico). These countries are both donors and beneficiaries of aid. For the DAC,
this is an indication that “the world has changed”18
. While the West is immersed in
economic crisis and finds it difficult to meet its aid commitments, a growing share of
development finance comes from donors from the South. For Paul Isenmam and
Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval, greater inclusion of Southern donors is a matter of burden-
sharing and relevance for the DAC, which needs to reinvent itself19
.
The Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 recognized SSC as a “valuable complement to
North-South cooperation” and encouraged SSC providers to endorse the Paris
principles20
. The rising role of new donors has blurred traditional lines and divides
between aid donors and recipients. The question of “Who is ‘we’?” – in reference to the
uses of the word “we” in the outcome document – was a recurrent one amongst
participants at the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) meeting held at the
DAC in Paris in October 2011. The new configuration of the aid field is a source of
unease as much as excitement, a constraint as well as an opportunity – as illustrated by
the following quotes by participants:
“Recipients are also providers. We are no longer in a world of donors and
recipients but a world of partners” (Brian Atwwod, DAC chair, in one of
the plenary sessions at the HLF4 in Busan, 2011)
“The world is changing and we’re working to make change happen (…)
They [emerging countries] are anxious to learn and we are anxious to learn
about how they reduced poverty in their country” (Brian Atwood,
interview)
“Things used to be easy, with DAC on one side and partners on the other.
Now it’s crowded and complicated (…) We don’t have common views”
(Mexican delegate at the post-Busan senior meeting, Paris, April 2012)
“The BRICS are essential to make a new partnership (…) We need to be
more inclusive (…) We need to open the doors (…) We cannot work in our
self-referential world.” (Talaat Abdel-Malek, WP-EFF Co-Chair, Plenary,
Paris, 7th October 2011)
17
“Brian Atwood (OECD-DAC Chair) reflects on Busan Progress”, op. cit.
18 OECD/DAC, “Welcoming New Partnerships in International Development Co-operation, OECD
Development Assistance Committee Statement”, April 2011: http://www.oecd.org/dac/47652500.pdf 19
Interview with the author, skype, 22.7.2013 20
Paolo de Renzio and Jurek Seifert, opcit.
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“The OECD is a rich kids club (…) You don’t have ordinary donors and
ordinary recipients anymore (…) We’ve started a process and we won’t let
you go away with it so easily”. (Representative of Ghana, WP-EFF meeting,
Paris, October 2011)
“The negotiation will be more difficult than three years ago because of
issues of representation and the global political economy (…) Emerging
powers will have to be included (…). We will not force anybody. I’m happy
to see that a new group is taking the lead of the global economy” (Bert
Koenders, WP-EFF Co-Chair, WP-EFF meeting, Paris, October 2011)
After its adoption, the Paris declaration was signed and endorsed by a number of aid-
recipient countries21
. Later on, many of them were involved in monitoring its
implementation and in its evaluation at the country level. While only 34 recipient
countries took part in the Paris declaration monitoring survey in 2005, 55 participated in
the second survey in 2007, and 91 did so in the 2013 survey22
.
Another fundamental step was taken with the creation of the WP-EFF in 2003, an
“international partnership for aid effectiveness with 80 participants including bilateral
and multilateral donors, aid recipients, emerging providers of development assistance,
civil society organisations, global programmes, the private sector and parliaments” in
charge of implementing and monitoring the Paris declaration. Originally, the WP-EFF
included fewer than 30 members. At the Third High-level Forum on aid effectiveness
(HLF3) held in Accra in 2008, it had over 80 members; the increase was due to partner
countries such as Ghana, Honduras, the Salomon Islands, Malaysia, Mali, Vietnam or
Cambodia. In order to foster the participation of NMC, the DAC’s membership
requirements did not apply to the WP-EFF, which was open: “any developing country
was welcome to join and participate in the discussion”23
. In 2011, new donors were
invited to the table for a WP-EFF senior-level meeting; Chinese and Brazilian officials
attended.
Partner countries were granted a co-chair of the WP-EFF. Before HLF4 (2011), the very
final negotiations of the Busan Outcome document (BOD) were led by 18
representatives, the so-called ‘sherpas’, which included representatives of Southern
countries such as Bangladesh, Rwanda, South Africa, Mali, Timor-Leste, the People’s
Republic of China and Honduras24
. Southern country representatives have been able to
lead or take part in the “task-teams”, “building blocks” and “clusters” in charge of
preparing the HLF425
.
21
See list in annex 3 22
Jonathan Glennie, “The OECD should give up control of the aid agenda”, The Guardian, 29.4.2011:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/apr/29/oecd-control-aid-agenda 23
Talaat Abdel-Malek, interview 24
Hayman Rachel/ INTRAC, “The Busan Partnership: implications for civil society”, Policy brief paper
29, 2012. 25
These are initiatives that enabled development partners and organisations to unite behind pressing
development issues and to make concentrated efforts to further progress in the context of the Third and
Fourth High Level Forums:
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After the HLF3 in 2008, a Partner Country Caucus was created. It was “informal” but
was deemed “very successful” in relation to its purpose: the “exchange of information
and the development of an informal but lively network; and to develop a uniform
position paper as [a] negotiating document in Accra and Busan”26
.
Finally, the representation of NMC was institutionalised within the steering committee
of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), which
replaced the WP-EFF after 2011, whose three co-chairs represent a South-South
cooperation provider, one traditional donor and one aid-recipient country. This surely
represented an innovation for the “rich club”. The establishment of the Global
Partnership also sealed a strategic alliance with the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). The DAC sought to combine its technical expertise with the UN
agency’s political legitimacy, which is guaranteed by its quasi-universal membership.
As a result of the aforementioned initiatives, the DAC chair declared at the Working
Party held in October 2011: “Looking around the table, I can see that everybody is here;
it is inclusive”27
. In the same vein, the WP-EFF chair assessed at a meeting in October
2011 that: “The first time I came here in 2001, the divisions [between old and new
participants] were very clear. The gap has conceptually and pragmatically diminished”.
However, I argue that DAC efforts have faced structural limits.
NMC participation and division of labour
Field observations suggest that partner participation in DAC spaces did not transform
aid recipients into full-fledged partners in the agenda-setting and decision-making
process. The DAC’s institutional settings and the conditions of participation have led to
the reproduction of archetypal roles (“donors” and “partners”) as well as a symbolic and
material division of labour between participants.
The DAC does not have an institutional tradition for dealing with partner countries in
practice. Neither the OECD nor the DAC have representation in developing countries.
As a consequence, the DAC is not represented in or part of everyday negotiations and
“policy dialogue” on development strategies and aid management at the country level.
Reversely, NMC do not have a permanent delegation or representation at the DAC or
the OECD’s headquarters in Paris. The institutional mechanisms established within the
WP-EFF did not ensure equal representation and power-sharing. For example, African
countries also felt that the continent, with its 54 countries, was under-represented in the
system of sherpas.
The DAC is difficult to understand from a Southern perspective: “the OECD is not a
donor, and it’s not a multilateral organisation like the UN”, summarized the
representative of Ghana at a meeting in 2011. The DAC cannot provide financing for
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/fourthhighlevelforumonaideffectivenessbuildingblocksponsors.ht
m 26
Member of the Partner country causus, interview 27
WP-EFF meeting, Paris, 07/10/2011
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development and that, to a certain extent, makes it less attractive for developing
countries, whose governments “do not know what the OECD can do for them”28
. At the
HLF4 in Busan in 2011, a certain degree of misunderstanding was palpable when the
OECD presented a draft of its Development Strategy – a key element for determining
the direction of the organisation’s future activities. As the OECD secretary-general and
DAC chair asked developing countries to give their input and feedback on the draft
document, the representative of El Salvador invited the DAC to act as a “broker” in the
conflict between his government and European donors. Following disagreements about
the country’s development strategy, some donors had cut their aid to the country. But
this task is not part of the DAC’s mandate and common practice. As highlighted by an
OECD staff member who was in the room: “We only have our expertise on policy (…).
We’re not involved in giving and suspending aid”.
A degree of suspicion and discomfort towards the Partner Country Caucus could be felt
amongst DAC members because of its private and exclusive character – only
representatives of partner countries were allowed in meeting, whereas the DAC is
always expected to be transparent. “We are the parents, they are the children”, one
DAC delegate added. Suspicion was aggravated by the fact that the caucus was chaired
by Talaat Abdel-Malek, who was also co-chair of the WP-EFF and the delegate of
Egypt, a developing country29
.
A symbolic and material division of labour between Northern and Southern participants
was visible in DAC activities. At HLF4 in Busan, partner countries were equally
represented in the plenary sessions and the presentations of the different building
blocks. Yet very few of the side-events, mini-debates and workshops – which actually
made up a big share of the conference’s interest and vibrancy – were actually convened,
led or moderated by Southern delegates. During meetings, representatives of the WP-
EFF would frequently invite Southern delegates to “do their homework”. Southern
delegates interventions would predominantly be called for to provide insights about
realities “on the ground” or “country perspective” rather than opinions or reflections on
the features and future of aid from a broader, over-arching perspective. For example,
even when they talked on behalf of global institutions (public or private) in plenaries,
some of them were tempted to refer to the experience and situation of their “home”
country. This recurrent mise en scène has tended to confine Southern delegates to the
role of ‘local’ experts, as victims or witnesses of underdevelopment, or case-study
examples of a developmental meta-truth elaborated in the North. It has further tended to
fix and reproduce the traditional imaginary divides constitutive of aid logics, knowledge
and practice.
Invisible frontiers between participants of industrialised and developing countries
become evident by paying close attention to the mundane conditions of their
contributions in public speeches and to their postures during discussions and activities.
28
DAC Secretariat, interview 29
He was Economic Adviser and an Executive Director of the Centre for Project Evaluation &
Macroeconomic Analysis at the Minister of International Cooperation. Talaat Abdel-Malek, interview
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9
In fact, the participation of Southern delegates within the DAC has been a gradual
process: “Some were vocal. Others took a bit of time to get used to the setting and what
was going on, to prepare themselves (…). After a while, none acted as mere observers”.
Due to their lack of previous experience, Southern participants at first found it difficult
to understand the DAC’s technical language and were “a bit overwhelmed”30
. Being
proficient in English has surely been an asset for the delegates of Colombia, Honduras
and Mali. From a more informal and interactional perspective, one Southern delegate
asserted that “the DAC does not know how to deal with [them], i.e., how to handle the
new diversity of actors involved in the discussions. Another one ironized about the fact
that when sherpas met, Southern delegates around the table were sometimes physically
separated (their seats were moved apart from one another) between sessions because
they were exchanging and coalescing too much. “Like children at school”, he said. In
informal settings, DAC delegates or DCD staff occasionally made jokes about certain
developing countries. One Southern delegate initially felt that “DAC people, because
they are international civil servants and earn millions, looked down on [them]”.
Paying for airplane tickets to attend meetings of the Working Party – or getting
international sponsors to do so – is a chronic challenge for Southern governments with
limited resources, especially if they suspect that their leeway in the negotiations is
structurally restricted31
. Financing the participation of Southern delegates to WP-EFF
meetings grew problematic as the number of participants rose after Accra and became a
burden for DAC members32
. For the HLF4 in Busan, airfare to Korea for Southern
delegates was covered mostly through a trust fund established with contributions from
the UNDP (approximately 150,000 euro), but also from the governments of Canada,
Denmark, Japan, Australia, and Korea. However, there were major differences in the
traveling conditions of DAC staff as compared to those of partner country delegates.
Most of the former travelled with Korean Airlines from Paris to Busan via Seoul.
Southern participants had to make very long trips (usually two full days) from Central
or South America and Africa with long layovers in Europe and/or China. Because the
UNDP’s budget for partner country participation was limited, West African delegates
flew with China Eastern, which offers inferior on-board traveling conditions. This
meant that all participants were not in the same physical condition when they arrived at
the meeting. During the summit, some DCD staff had to supervise every dimension of
the event’s organisation and work on the outcome document’s draft, and did not sleep
for several days – a sign of their prominent role over agenda-setting and decision-
making.
Many recipient countries (Honduras or Argentina) have long perceived the Paris
declaration as an imposition, and find the DAC to be “an elitist and exploitative
institution”33
. Some members of African delegations were critical of – and frustrated
30
Representative of a developing country, interviews 31
Representatives of developing countries, interviews 32
Representative of a developing country, interview 33
Richard Woodward, “The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development”: meeting the
challenges of the Twenty-first Century”, in Simon Lee and Steven McBride (eds.), Neo-Liberalism, State
Power and Global Governance, Springer Netherlands, 2007, 231-244
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10
about – the HLF4 held in Busan in 2011. They considered that this type of “big mass”
(“grand messe”), “hypocritical game” or “institutionalised mockery” was only there to
lecture them and to make new commitments that will not be met. One ironized the
relations between donors and recipients as follows: “I will let you do your things even
though you are not honouring your commitments, and then you will let me do my things
because I am aware that you are cheating, too (…) The preach is a sinner, too, but he
still preaches”.
Traditional identities of “donors” and “recipients” or “North” and South” were
questioned by the rising visibility and participation of middle-income and emerging
countries in the Paris agenda, Eyben and Savage have shown34
. But this has not
necessarily benefited or empowered LDCs. On the contrary, as the South-South
Cooperation (SSC) initiative developed, some African delegates had the impression that
SSC promoters sometimes treated them as mere “foils”. It was palpable in a meeting
dealing with SSC organised at the DAC in Paris in 2011. The need to invite aid-
recipient countries to upcoming discussions had not occurred to the Colombian
organisers until the representative of a European donor agency encouraged them to do
so. Interestingly, a few years down the line in Mexico in 2014, some aid-recipient
countries explicitly asked emerging donors to be more precise and transparent about the
conditions, objective and value-added of SSC35
. In doing so, they seemed to be more
assertive by using some standards inspired by DAC norms.
Despite the limits and caveats mentioned above, it would be erroneous to say that
Southern country participation in the works around aid efficiency was simply nominal,
superficial or ineffectual. What is true, though, is that the patterns and goals of countries
of the global South have differed. The next section draws a typology of the different
participation strategies and forms of engagement of Southern country representatives at
the DAC.
Strategies of participation: A typology of Southern countries at the DAC
The good partners in favour of the status quo: the cases of Ghana and Mali
Ghana and Mali represented LDCs on many occasions. Mali was selected by the OECD
to be a pilot country for aid reform in 1996. After a round-table with donors held in
Geneva in 2003, it was agreed that Mali’s experience would be taken into account in
DAC analysis about aid efficiency. Later, Mali was an observer at the WP-EFF and then
was elected as a sherpa by the African Union to represent the continent, together with
Rwanda. Ghana hosted the HLF3 in 2008, and later participated actively in the Partner
Country Caucus and in the cluster on country systems in preparation for the Busan
meeting.
Both West African countries have low levels of economic development and are highly
dependent on aid. Ghana is often singled out as a showcase of donor coordination, aid
34
Eyben and Savage, opcit. 35
Thomas Fues and DAC Secretariat, interviews
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11
harmonisation and efficiency in West Africa. Obama’s visit to Ghana in 2009
consolidated this image. Finally, both countries have long been seen as models of
democracy and stability in sub-Saharan Africa36
and enjoyed a status of “donor
darling”37
.
Because Mali and Ghana needed to protect their status as aid-recipients, during
discussions at the DAC they acted as good partners, i.e., they could be demanding but
not bold. They would not criticise the DAC or challenge aid’s status quo, instead
playing by the rules, valuing progress and always displaying good disposition for
reaching consensus. Publicly, Ghana was careful to be supportive and encouraging of
DAC’s inclusiveness efforts. At the WP in October 2011, one member of the Ghanaian
delegation highlighted that: “Some people say the DAC is not a legitimate forum to have
that discussion. Excuse me but if that was the case (…), why would we have more and
more countries interested in getting involved in the Paris declaration?”. She added that,
some years ago, some recipient country officials “did not dare to open their mouth”
during meetings held at the OECD headquarters – at the Château de la Muette, a
French-style castle in Paris’ wealthy 16th
arrondissement. Now, she said, they come to
OECD meetings stating, “this is what we want”. When the representatives of Mali and
Ghana were critical, it was always on the process – not the essence – of the WP-EFF,
and their appreciations would always leave room for improvement. For example, they
would call for a greater – not lesser – role for DAC, hence legitimising its existence and
action. At the WP in October 2011, Ghana’s representative declared: “We know that the
WP is not a sustainable system (…). We’d like the chairman to engage in our activities
at the country level”.
The conciliatory and compliant posture of Ghana was criticised by other African
constituencies, who accused them of not being progressive, strong and assertive
enough38
.
LDCs taking part in the WP-EFF did share a common agenda at the DAC39
: to
“increase the volume and quality of [the] aid” they receive. Even if aid-recipient
countries did not contribute to drafting the Paris declaration, many things included in
the document are favourable to the interests of aid-recipients countries, such as aid
harmonisation and donor coordination, the promotion of budget support, and the
principle of “ownership” – which some Southern governments have interpreted and put
forward as an equivalent to sovereignty40
. Consequently, what mattered to LDCs was to
see the Paris principles translated into a clear timeline for implementation and follow-up
36
On the construction and meanings of “models” and development success stories in the aid community,
see Paula de Almeida Cravo, What’s in a label? The aid community’s representations of success and
failure in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, doctoral thesis submitted at the Department of Politics and
International Studies, University of Cambridge, January 2012, 271 p.
37 For Mali, this was the case until March 2012, when a military coup was orchestrated and followed by a
multi-dimensional crisis that led to the de facto partition of the country. On this aspect, see: Bergamaschi
Isaline, "The fall of a donor darling: the role of aid in Mali's crisis", The Journal of Modern African
Studies, Volume 52, Issue 03, September 2014, p. 347 – 378.
38 African representative of an international NGO, interview
39 Representatives of African countries, interview
40 DAC Secretariat, interview
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12
indicators that they could then bring “back home”. This is why I argue that they adopted
a posture in favour of the status quo, which was still a source of embarrassment for
many traditional donors.
Before Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011, LDCs pushed for the reduction of aid
fragmentation, of the transaction costs generated by the proliferation of projects (e.g. the
global funds to fight specific diseases), more coherence and a clear division of labour
between donors at the country level. When donors argued that their reason for
establishing parallel structures of implementation are risk management concerns,
partners responded that donors “must use country systems to know if they work or
not”41
.
The influence and empowerment of aid-recipient countries is considered to have
reached a peak at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra,
Ghana, in 2008, where Southern governments voiced their “growing frustration (…)
that DAC members were not doing enough” to enhance aid efficiency42
. Under the
influence of developing countries, follow-up indicators were added to the Accra Action
Plan: “The DAC somewhat lost control (…) They had to move backward, to make more
detailed compromise, especially regarding mutual accountability”43
.
In the Busan Outcome Document, partner country participation is reflected in two main
commitments by donors. The first is to “accelerate [their] efforts to untie aid”
(paragraph 18) and the second is to “use country systems as the default approach for
development co‐operation in support of activities managed by the public sector”
(paragraph 19). Partner countries had initially lobbied for country systems to be referred
to as “the only option” for aid delivery. But several donors, including the United States,
opposed it, and on November 18, 2011, Rwanda and Ghana suggested the formula of
calling it “a default option”. The BOD reiterated that the Paris and Accra principles
were still valid – it put the emphasis on the country level and recipient “ownership” –
but did not add new material of interest for LDCs on to it44
.
Before Busan and Mexico, LDCs lobbied to keep the negotiating agenda narrow, i.e. to
stick to the principles and commitments of Paris and Accra. Firstly, when South Korea
attempted to "forge a new global consensus around development effectiveness as an
alternative to aid effectiveness”45
, Malian delegates felt that “we must keep the issue of
transaction costs in mind”46
. Likewise, as Nordic donors, the British Department for
International Development (DFID) and Southern providers were pushing to bring new
topics to the table (aid results, fragile states, SSC, middle-income countries), the
delegations of LDCs were eager to limit the scope of discussions and focus on the
41
Representatives of African countries 42
Alexsandra Trzeciak-Duval, interview 43
Representative of a developing country, interview 44
Representative of a developing country, interview
45 Hyuk-sang Sohn, “Busan High-Level Forum: From Dead Aid to Better Development? Current Issues in
U.S.-ROK Relations, Coucil on Foreign Relations Press, December 2011: http://www.cfr.org/south-
korea/busan-high-level-forum-dead-aid-better-development/p26790
46 WP-EFF meeting, Paris, October 2011
Draft. Please do not quote or circulate without permission
13
“unfinished business” that matters to them47
. “They did not want to add anything to the
Paris declaration. They want it to be implemented”48
. They felt that including these new
issues would dilute the agenda and offer donors opportunities to bypass their requests49
.
A member of the Malian delegation who was about to travel to the meeting of the First
Forum of the Global Partnership held in Mexico in April 2014 considered that the
private sector’s contribution to development did not need to be addressed in multilateral
settings such as the DAC’s because it usually follows the firms’ risk analysis and
discretionary decisions. Similarly, he argued that SSC agreements are made at the
highest political level, behind closed doors and on a bilateral basis – for example, when
the Chinese President goes on an Africa tour and meets directly with his African
counterparts. “It [SSC] is mostly political, we don’t need the DAC for that. What we
want to talk about at the DAC is our relationships with industrialised countries”, added
one of his colleagues50
.
As a result of contradictory interests and initiatives, the final communiqué included
about forty initiatives dealing with a wide range of topics such as aid for taxes, Arab
donors, the private sector and foundations. A network of NGOs, INTRAC, argued that
“the Paris and Accra commitments (…) have watered down”, that no “tangible
commitments” were reached and that “no indicators or targets” were annexed to the
communiqué concerning aid predictability, untying or alignment 51
. The agenda of the
Forum was clearly “not owned by developing countries”52
.
Wooed but unwilling partners: the BRICS53
Immediately after the adoption of the Paris declaration, DAC efforts to associate NMC
of the global South were initially geared towards the aid-recipient countries of sub-
Saharan Africa and Central America. But in the following years, DAC’s interest and
attention have increasingly targeted emerging countries, especially the BRICS. At the
WP-EFF meetings held in Paris in 2011, the co-chairs would always thank delegates
from the BRICS for attending meetings and making contributions.
The DAC hoped that the SSC initiative led by Colombia and Indonesia would provide
an opportunity to reach the BRICS and entry point for them to participate in the Paris
agenda-related discussions54
.
47
Abdel-Malek Talaat, “The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: What next for a
global architecture?”, op. cit. 48
DAC Secretariat, interview 49
OECD, interview
50 Representatives of developing countries, interviews
51 Hayman Rachel/ INTRAC, op. cit., p. 9-11 and 14
52 Member of the Partner country causus, interview
53 This section builds extensively on Bergamaschi, Isaline, Soulé-Kohndou Folashadé, « Les émergents
du Sud face à la gouvernance mondiale de l’aide au développement : stratégies réformatrices,
concurrences et tâtonnements, Foro Internacional, 2015 (forthcoming), pp. 11-14 and 16-17.
54 Representative of a developing country, interview
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14
In return, the BRICS have behaved as unwilling partners towards the DAC. There has
been no common or coordinated strategy, but their postures shared several
characteristics: they would send delegates to attend WP-EFF meetings erratically, and
were reluctant to make firm commitments. Overall, their participation has remained
ambivalent all throughout the process and none of them clearly endorsed the pillars of
the Paris agenda. Brazil, China and India have always questioned the legitimacy of the
WP-EFF. Representatives of the Chinese embassy in France would sometimes
participate but could not make any contribution, on the grounds that they were tied up
by instructions coming directly from Beijing. India would usually send a delegate, who
would deliver a ceremonial speech at the beginning of the meeting and disappear
immediately afterwards. The Republic of South Africa was active and played a
constructive role, but due to its reduced volumes of aid, South Africa was ironically of
less interest to the DAC. The BRICS were allowed to join the Partner Country Caucus
but never did55
.
Important concessions regarding content were made in order to accommodate the
BRICS and invite them to endorse the documents. Under the influence of Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia and the Republic of South Africa, the BOD indicates that “the nature,
modalities and responsibilities that apply to SSC differ from those that apply to NSC
[North-South cooperation] (…). The principles, commitments and actions agreed (…)
shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis” (paragraph 2).
After Busan, the ambiguity has remained. At the first meeting of the Post-Busan Interim
Group, 13-14 February 2012, “Brazil, India and China informed the group that they
were attending the meeting as observers”. Brazil and Mexico emphasized “the
differential and voluntary nature of commitments”56
.
The WP-EFF’s greatest efforts were oriented towards China, given its large aid volume.
Over the years, China’s spokespersons projected an image of non-negotiability,
conditional commitment and unpredictability, and conveyed the impression to be “her
own master”57
. During the WP-EFF in October 2011, its delegates systematically called
for deleting all parts of the draft outcome document that did not conform to its aid
principles and interests, leaving other country delegates – who were desperately trying
to find suitable and constructive formulations – puzzled. At the plenary at the WP
meeting in October 2011 for example, they made it clear that “the Paris principles
should not apply to SSC” and simply asked to delete references to “transparent and
responsible cooperation” in the draft BOD, arguing that “different countries have
different responsibilities and different natures of cooperation”.
In Busan, China agreed to taking part in the sherpas - unlike Brazil – but refused to
formally embrace the SSC agenda. Some DCD staff in fact became concerned and
anxious every time that Chinese delegates attended an activity that they organised.
Before the meeting, representatives of the OECD and of the Republic of Korea (host of
the Forum) went to China several times to convince the country’s authorities to attend
55
Member of the Partner country causus, interview 56
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, revised draft summary record, First meeting of the Post-Busan
Interim Group, 13-14 February 2012 - DCD/DAC/EFF/M(2012)1/PROV/REV121/03/2012, p. 2-6 57
Representative of an African country, interview
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15
the meeting58
, to the point that getting China on board appeared to be the Forum’s real
but hidden purpose.
Rather abruptly, Chinese delegates left the negotiating table on the Forum’s very first
day, arguing that they had taken part in the Paris agenda as an aid-recipient country, and
that they were not ready to endorse it as a donor. On the Forum’s second day, the
atmosphere was gloomy. Thanks to the diplomatic mediation of the United Kingdom
and Korean diplomats, China agreed to endorse the outcome document. Busan was
subsequently considered a “success” by its organisers. During the final plenary, civil
society organisations regretted that the urge to co-opt China had weakened
commitments concerning the respect of human rights.
The first High-level Meeting of the GPEDC held in Mexico in 2014 was a setback
regarding the BRICS group and China in particular59
. Jonathan Glennie (ODI) summed
up Southern country participation at the summit as follows:
“China was the elephant not in the room (...) Russia turned up (…), but
there was disappointment that South Africa did not send a weightier
delegation, and India didn't bother as usual – though it does have elections
under way. Brazil, which also has major reservations about the GPEDC,
stating in the plenary that it was not a part of the partnership but then
engaging in mobile phone diplomacy over the communiqué, implying an
appreciation of the meeting's importance”60
.
India and China boycotted the event on the grounds that they had permanent “issues of
concern on aspects relating to developing countries especially with regards to South-
South cooperation”. They also feared that the final Communiqué “would become a
"binding input" to UN processes especially when all member states were not present at
the meeting”61
. Some OECD staff were equally frustrated that “[they] give China a lot,
and don’t get anything in return”. Brazil’s statement that they are not part of the
Partnership came as a “nasty surprise” to many62
. After Mexico, Brazil, China and India
attended the Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG) meetings as ‘active observers’ and
showed “less interest on how the partnership was developing”. Brazil, China, India,
Mexico and South Africa did not integrate the Partnership’s Steering Committee, and
were replaced by Indonesia and Peru63
.
58
Representative of a developing country, interview 59
Fues Thomas and Klingebiel Stephan, “Unrequited love: What is the legacy of the first Global
Partnership summit?”, The Current Column, 17/04/2014. 60
Jonathan Glennie, “Development partnership conference: what did we learn?”, The Guardian,
22/04/2014: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/apr/22/development-
partnership-co-operation-conference
61 Economic Times, “India, China boycott high-level meeting on global partnership”, 17/04/2014:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/33856239.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_me
dium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
62 Member of a Partner country causus, interview
63 Assunção Manaíra and Esteves Paulo, “The BRICS and the Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation (GPEDC)”, BRICS Policy Center Brief, V. 4. N. 03, Feb- Mar/2014. Rio de
Janeiro: PUC, p. 5.
Draft. Please do not quote or circulate without permission
16
Several factors account for the reluctance of BRICS to participate. Initially, they saw
the Paris declaration as a document devoid of interest (for they are not dependent on
aid) or a Northern imposition, and refused to endorse it as donors. As with the OECD in
general, NMC “do not see why they should be constrained by rules developed by an
organisation of which they are not a member and that they have no part in framing”64
.
China and some Southern delegates considered that the DAC is not legitimate to lead
the Paris agenda. Furthermore, Brazil is reluctant to be perceived as closely associated
to “developed” economies via the DAC since it claims to represent or lead the Third
World in other multilateral arenas such as the G7765
. Together with Mexico, the
Brazilian government makes the case that, contrary to traditional, North-South aid, SSC
is based on horizontality and equality.
In brief, the DAC’s will and efforts to ensure the BRICS’s participation in shaping and
implementing the Paris agenda have largely failed. However, DAC efforts and
initiatives have created a different scenario, with unintended effects. The opportunities
provided by the DAC have been seized by ambitious “second-bests” such as Rwanda
and Colombia, which have made strategic uses of DAC spaces to promote their specific
views and interests.
Bold “second bests” pushing for change: Colombia and Rwanda
Rwanda participated in DAC processes and exercises significantly after 2008 and acted
as a sherpa before and during the HLF held in Busan in 2011. Rwanda was a vocal
spokesperson of aid-recipient countries. The Rwandan sherpa pushed for reinforcing
donor commitments regarding aid predictability and the use of country systems66
. At the
senior post-Busan meeting held in Paris in April 2012, the Rwandan representative
invited donors to better coordinate aid, to reduce transaction costs, and to provide more
capacity-building activities to strengthen recipient administrations.
But some of the points made by Rwanda went beyond the technical aspects of the Paris
agenda and challenged the broader status quo of aid. Its language was bolder and its
posture more ambitious in comparison with the role played by Ghana and Mali. At WP-
EFF meetings in 2011, the Rwandan representative called for setting the deadline to
untie aid for 2013 instead of 2015. In Busan, Rwandan President Kagame – the only
African president who agreed to attend the meeting – delivered an assertive speech
which pointed to donors’ own incapacity to meet their commitments, their “unending
questions that no answer can fully satisfy” and the burden that this generates for
recipient leaders and their administrations. In the BOD, Rwanda pushed to add a
reference to Western practices and responsibility (in particular, multinationals) in
fomenting corruption in poor countries.
Rachel Hayman’s work is useful for understanding the Rwandan participation in the
discussions about aid effectiveness at the OECD/DAC. It is better understood in the
64
Woodward, opcit., p. 239. 65
In OECD circles, it is believed that joining the OECD came at a symbolic and diplomatic cost for
Mexico and Chile, especially amongst the developing country constituency within the UN system. 66
Ronald Nkusi, interview. The use of country system refers to the use of national systems and
procedures of recipient countries for the delivery, implementation and evaluation of aid resources and
projects, as opposed to the establishment of ad hoc, parallel implementation units that tend to bypass
public administrations.
Draft. Please do not quote or circulate without permission
17
context of the country’s post-genocide context both domestically and diplomatically. In
1994-5, aid came “disorganized through multilateral channels and international NGOs
in the form of emergency assistance”67
. After a period of transition, the government
wished to regain control over the management and allocation of external funds aid, and
to centralize and align it around their policies, priorities and procedures68
. It is
interesting to note that the Paris agenda was one of the resources that they used to reach
that goal. Since 2005, Rwandan authorities have established a Development Partners
Forum and website, organized annual retreats with donors, created a development
assistance database and published an Annual Aid effectiveness report69
.
In parallel, in the 2000s the government has deployed an “ambitious path to long-term
sustainable development”, promised to reduce its dependence on external assistance70
and adopted an Aid Policy (2006) which seeks to “assert genuine ownership and
leadership in development activities – and the external resources on which they rely”71
.
Since then, the Rwandan representative at the DAC, Ronald Nkusi (from the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning) supported and promoted the government’s will “to lay
the foundations to get out of aid dependency”72
and turn Rwanda into a middle-income
country.
On the other hand, Colombian authorities signed the Paris Declaration in November
2007. They represented 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries in the second phase
of its global assessment73
. After Accra, Colombia became a member of the WP-EFF and
of the Partner Country Caucus. Colombia has made two contributions to the WP-EFF.
Together with Indonesia, they led the Task Team on South-South and Triangular
Cooperation starting in March 2009 and the Building Block dedicated to this topic in
advance of Busan. During the meeting, the topic of SSC was high on the agenda.
Rwandan and Colombian officials used the DAC spaces to promote specific diplomatic
objectives, too, i.e., as a platform to re-negotiate their international status. Both
countries have pro-West postures and neoliberal economic policies (regarding trade in
particular)74
. But because their records in terms of democracy and human rights are less
than ideal, the two governments are treated as “pariah states” in many multilateral
organisations75
. Therefore, they welcomed the DAC invitation and seized the
opportunity to promote a better image of their country. Rwanda has confirmed its status
as a model of ownership and leadership in the aid community. In about one decade,
Kagame has successfully projected the leadership and political will appreciated in DAC
67
Hayman Rachel, “From Rome to Accra via Kigali: “Aid Effectiveness” in Rwanda”, Development
policy review, 2009, 27(5): 584. 68
Ibid, p. 2. 69
Hayman Rachel, “From Rome to Accra via Kigali…”, opcit., p. 581. 70
Hayman Rachel, “From Rome to Accra via Kigali…”, opcit., p. 581.
71 Republic of Rwanda, “Rwanda Aid Policy” as endorsed by the cabinet, Kigali, 26
th July 2006:
http://devpartners.gov.rw/docs/H%20&%20A/H%20&%20A%20Local/Aid%20Policy/Aid_Policy.pdf, p.
1.
72 Ronald Nkusi, interview
73 Castaňeda-Lefèvre Dorly, Peace laboratories in Colombia : the European approach to peace-building,
doctoral thesis defended at SciencesPo/ CERI, 2012, p. 234-5 74
Hayman, “Milking the cow…”, opcit., p. 175
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18
circles and become “the global elite’s favourite strongman”76
, despite chronic tensions
about human rights records in Rwanda.
Colombian authorities were also interested in transforming the country’s image from a
conflict-ridden country to a victim of terrorism and drug trafficking77
and a willing
partner for the West. Their initiative to promote SSC held the promise to reconcile non-
traditional aid with the principles of the Paris agenda. Via the SSC initiative, the DAC
has become “an opportunity to project internationally and propose an alternative to
leftist SSC in Latin America”78
, and hence to counter-weight the diplomacies of Brazil,
Cuba or Venezuela79
.
This initiative has fuelled into the government’s efforts to attract foreign direct
investment, and served as a springboard to achieve the country’s project to join the
OECD80
, which was formalized when President Santos sent a membership letter to the
organization in 2011. One of its main promoters argued that “the task-team has given
Colombia unprecedented visibility in the organisation”81
and helped the country’s
authorities to show interest in the topics, and compliance with the norms produced at the
Château de la Muette82
.
In return, the DAC was eager to open its doors to Colombia, as it seeks to increase their
“reach” in South America. After Latin America’s turn to the left in the 2000s, Colombia
has been one of the few countries in South America to implement and support neoliberal
economic policies and adopt a pro-West posture. It has remained an important political
and economic ally of the United States, as showcased by the implementation in 2012 of
a bilateral free-trade agreement.
Concluding remarks: a failed encounter?
The efforts and strategies deployed by the DAC towards the global South have
produced mixed outcomes. The participation of NMC has been institutionalized. But the
process has remained ambiguous and limited for two main factors. Due to the DAC’s
lack of experience and institutional capacity, its multiple initiatives have not challenged
the traditional division of labour between donors and recipients. Secondly, the BRICS
have been reluctant to buy into the Paris agenda. Since Busan in 2011, it seems that
South-South providers will not fully adopt the DAC’s aid effectiveness principles, and
prefer to discuss SSC-related issues at the UN83
. In any case, it is clear that they will
75
DAC Secretariat, interview
76 Gettleman Jeffrey, “The Global Elite’s Favorite Strongman”, The New York Times, 4.12.2013:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html?pagewanted=all 77
Casteneda-Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 224 78
Enrique Maruri, interview 79
DAC Secretariat, interview 80
Casteneda-Lefèvre, opcit., p. 231. 81
Enrique Maruri, interview
82 Claudia Florez, interview
83 On this, see: Assunção Manaíra and Esteves Paulo, opcit., p. 8; Paulo Esteves and Manaíra Assunção,
opcit., Weinlich, Silke, opcit.
Draft. Please do not quote or circulate without permission
19
have to answer ever-pressing questions regarding the impact and added-value of their
aid, and their accountability as donors.
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that DAC’s strategy has completely failed.
Forms and trajectories of engagement with NMC countries of the global South within
the DAC have multiplied since Busan. Representatives of aid-recipient countries have
been included in discussions about aid effectiveness and found a unique platform of
dialogue with traditional donors outside their capital cities. Delegates of Rwanda or
Mali hence reckon that the DAC is a legitimate space to discuss aid issues, and feel
personally very committed and attached to the Paris agenda84
. The typology of Southern
country engagement with the Paris agenda shows a great variety ranging from unwilling
partnership (emerging donors) to full commitment to (position of recipient countries),
and strategic use of DAC norms by ambitious “second-bests” such as Colombia and
Rwanda eager to promote their agendas and renegotiate their international status.
Even with the BRICS, some elements point to a progressive socialization to DAC
practices85
. For example, China has published a white paper on foreign aid strategy
(2011) which is not very detailed but corresponds to the spirit of transparency instilled
by the DAC. In Busan, representatives of China’s Ministry of Commerce spoke about
aid, which they have been reluctant to do for decades. China participated in the last aid
monitoring survey, thus providing some information about its practices as a donor86
.
Likewise, Brazilian officials are talking about “ownership” and “best practices”.
As a consequence, the DAC’s strategy has generated important – if unintended and
limited – outcomes, in particular an imperfect institutionalisation of Southern country
participation, which holds some potential to deeply change the committee’s profile,
functioning rules and role.
84
Mary Ann Addo and Modibo Macalou, interviews
85 This remark was inspired by the works of David Ambrosetti on the role of practical, social norms in the
negotiations at the United Nations Security Council. See, for example: Normes et rivalités diplomatiques
à l'ONU. Le Conseil de sécurité en audience, Bruxelles, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009. 349 p.
86 OECD, interview
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20
ANNEXES
Annex 1. List of interviews
Brian Atwood, DAC chair, Paris, 23.4.2013
Claudia Flórez, Cultural aggregate, Colombian embassy to France, Paris, 18.12.2011
Hubert de Milly, Senior Policy Analyst, coordinator of the "Working Party of Aid
Effectiveness", OECD, September 2007 – October 2012, Paris, OCDE, 20.09.2011
Eduardo Gonzalez, Governance Advisor at OECD – OCDE, Paris, OCDE, 20.09.2011
Sara Fyson, Development Cooperation Directorate, Policy Advisor, Aid Effectiveness,
OECD, Paris, 13.09.2011
Enrique Maruri Londoňo, former director of International Cooperation, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia, Bogota, 21.08.2012
Jan Schuijer, OECD's Centre for Co-operation with Non-members, Paris, 23.04.2013
Jorge Carbonell, Policy analyst, Latin America and the Caribbean, Global relations,
Paris, 15.1.2013
Juana C. García Duque, former director of International Cooperation, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia, Professor, School of Management, Universidad
de los Andes, Bogota, 14.08.2012
Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval, Head, Policy Division, Development Co-operation
Directorate, OECD, skype, 22.7.2013
Pedro Sousa, consultant, Policy Analyst for Latin America – OECD, Paris, 18.12.2012
Sandra Wilson, Counsellor, Global Relations Service, OECD, Paris, 19.12.2012
Ronald Nkusi, Director, External Finance Unit, Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, delegate of Rwanda at the WP-EFF, Busan, 2.12.2011
William Hynes, Policy Analyst in the Development Co-operation Directorate at the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Adjunct
Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
and Research Associate at the Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS) at
Trinity College, Dublin. Paris, 10.12.2011
Mary-Anne Addo, Director at Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, delegate of
Ghana in the WP-EFF, phone, 28.5.2014.
Thomas Fues, Economist, Head of the Training department, German Development
Institute, Bonn, 6.5.2014
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21
Christine, Hackenesch, Political Scientist, Researcher at the Bi- and Multilateral
Development Cooperation Department, German Development Institute, Skype,
12.05.2014
Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC),
London, 23.11.2012
Simon Mizrahi, Senior Policy Adviser, Aid Effectiveness, OECD from September 2001
– June 2007, phone, 15.09.2011
Talita Yamashiro Fordelone, consultant in the OECD Development Co-operation
Directorate, in Busan in December 2011 and Paris, 23.4.2014
Farida Tchaitchian Bena, Policy Analyst Joint OECD/UNDP support team, Paris,
23.4.2014
Gilles Eric Foadey, public communications Manager, NEPAD, Busan, 2.12.2011
Meja Vitalice, Kenya - Development Policy Analyst at Reality of Aid Africa, phone,
13.12.2011
Gerardo Bracho, Mexican Delegation to the OECD, Paris, 6.6.2013.
Modibo Macalou, Head of the Development and Cooperation Unit, President’s Office,
Republic of Mali, in Busan in September 2013 and 22.6.2013 in Bamako.
Pierre Nébié, coordinator of the donor technical pool, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
technical Unit, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Mali, Bamako, 17.9.2013
Mr Dembelé, Secretariat for Aid Harmonisation, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Mali,
Bamako, 01.04.2014
Philippe Besson, Swizz delegate at the DAC, 12.11.2011, 11.05.2012, Paris
Philipp Schronk, director of the Centro de Pensamiento Estratégico Internacional, a
Bogota-based think-tank, Skype, 14.5.2014
Talaat Abdel-Malek, former co-chair of the WP-EFF, Skype, 26.5.2014.
George Carner, formerly U.S. Representative to the OECD/DAC (2003-2008), Skype,
27.09.2011
Michel Reveyrand de Menthon, former advisor for African Affairs at the French
Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, former French delegate at the DAC, Paris,
09.09.2011
Jennifer Moreau, Governance Advisor, Governance for Development and Peace Team
(G4DP), Global Partnerships and Policy Division, OECD-DCD, Paris, 27.06.2014.
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Annex 2. Countries of the global South Adhering to the Paris Declaration (2005)
and Accra Agenda for Action (2008)
Afghanistan Argentina
Bangladesh
Benin Bolivia
Botswana Brazil* Burkina Faso
Burundi Cambodia Cameroon
Cape Verde Central African Republic
Chad China Colombia
Comoros Congo, Republic of Congo D. R.
Cook Islands
Djibouti Dominican Republic
Ecuador Egypt El Salvador
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon Gambia, the
Ghana
Guatemala Guinea Guinea Bissau
Haiti Honduras
India
Indonesia Iraq
Italy Ivory Coast
Jamaica Jordan
Kenya Korea
Lao PDR
Lesotho Luxembourg Madagascar
Malawi Malaysia
Mali Mauritania Mexico
Moldova Mongolia Morocco
Mozambique Namibia Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger Nigeria
Pakistan Palestinian Territories Panama
Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Samoa Sao Tomé & Principe
Senegal Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
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South Africa Sri Lanka
Sudan Swaziland
Syria Tajikistan
Tanzania Thailand Timor-Leste
Togo Tonga Tunisia
Turkey Uganda
Vanuatu
Vietnam Yemen Zambia
* Confirmation pending
Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/countriesterritoriesandorganisationsadheringtotheparisdeclarationa
ndaaa.htm