Spain: Euroscepticism in a Pro-European Country

Spain: Euroscepticism in aPro-European Country?Antonia M. Ruiz Jimenez & Alfonso Egea de Haro

Since its accession to the European Community in 1985, Spain has been considered a pro-European country. More recently however, the referendum on the European Constitutionrevealed the existence of some fractures among parties, while Spaniards’ acritical

acceptance of the relationship between Spain and Europe has also been denounced. Thearticle asks whether these developments suggest an increasing Euroscepticism among

Spanish political parties and citizens. It reviews the Euroscepticism of Spanish parties andcitizens and concludes with a reflection on the links between parties and citizens.

Keywords: European integration; political parties; party Euroscepticism; public opinion;

mass attitudes

For quite a long time, Spain has been highlighted as the only country among all those

which joined the European Community (EC) or European Union (EU) after 1957

whose political parties, including the communist party, were in complete agreement

(Sanchez-Cuenca 2001; Richards 1999, pp. 178–179; Alvarez Miranda 1996). After

Franco’s death, a new and unified political consensus emerged that identified

‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ with the desire to achieve a ‘modern’ and ‘European’ status.

The aspiration to become a full EC member was one of the fundamental issues on

which there was a broad consensus among Spanish political forces, making the

negotiated transition to democracy possible. Thus, ‘Europeanism’ became the officially

sanctioned national project, defended by the leading political figures of the transition

period (Del Aguila & Montoro 1994; Jauregui 2001; Bassols 1995; Moreno Juste 1998;Q1

Tamames 1999; Barbe 1999).

But ‘Europeanism’ had been debated within Spanish politics since at least the end of

the eighteenth century. While liberals saw the ideas of Enlightenment coming from

Europe as a recipe for civilised progress, conservatives conceived them as a dangerous

foreign heresy. Joaquin Costa, one of the leading intellectual figures in the nineteenth

century, proposed that Spain could only cure its decline if it assimilated Europe’s

ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13608741003594379

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South European Society and Politics

Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 121–147

rational mentality (a current of though known as ‘regenerationism’). But many otherssaw the adoption of ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ ideas as a dangerous threat to the Spanish

‘national soul’ and its Catholic spirituality. The opposition between European

modernisation and Hispanic traditionalism continued in the twentieth century,symbolised in a notorious public confrontation between Ortega y Gasset and

Unamuno.1 Within the same debate, Franco defined his 1936 uprising as a ‘nationalcrusade’ to protect the Catholic values of la patria, and as part of a larger struggle for

the preservation of ‘Europe’s Christian civilisation’, threatened by liberalism andcommunism. This official ‘European vocation’, which the subsequent Franco regime

tried to promote, was contested by the regime’s opponents, who began to unify under

the symbolic banner of a very different ‘Europeanism’, equated again with the fullmodernisation and democratisation of the country (Jauregui & Ruiz Jimenez 2005, pp.

80–83).At the citizens’ level, Spaniards continue to be among the Europeans most

supportive and less disapproving of the EU. The thesis that Spain is mostly a pro-Q2

European country remains largely true, at least at the surface. Percentages of support

for the EU are consistently higher than EU averages (Brinegar et al. 2004, p. 75).However, going deeper, we find that, in spite of their support for further integration,

Spanish political parties present different preferences over the current situation and

future trajectory of the EU; and, even though Spaniards are less unfavourable towardsthe EU than European averages, when Spanish attitudes are compared diachronically,

more Spanish citizens show concerns about the EU nowadays than in the past.Meanwhile, some authors have pointed to Spaniards’ acritical acceptance of the

relationship between Spain and Europe (Moreno Juste 2000, p. 109), or what Barreiroand Sanchez-Cuenta (2001) label ‘faulty Europeanism’. The percentage of citizens with

no clear/defined attitude toward the EU is higher than the EU average, while ignorance

and lack of interest are quite spread. The question is: do these differences over the EUQ3

suggest an increasing Euroscepticism among Spanish political parties and citizens?

Spain signed its Treaty of Accession to the European Community on 12 June 1985 inMadrid, under the democratic socialist government led by Felipe Gonzalez, 23 years

after Spain’s first approach to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1962.This first attempt received a lukewarm response from the European institutions, due

to the Francoist authoritarian regime. However, the EC finally agreed to a preferentialQ4

tariff agreement in October 1970. The death of General Franco on 20 November 1975

opened the way for political reform. The first democratic government officially

submitted its application for accession to the European Community on 28 July 1977and in November of the same year Spain joined the Council of Europe. The European

Commission submitted a favourable opinion on the Spanish application in November1978. Lengthy and extremely difficult negotiations began on 6 February 1979 and

culminated with the signing of Spain’s accession treaty on 12 June 1985.There have been some milestones with negative consequences for the pro-European

attitudes of Spanish parties and citizens. During the pre-accession period, the delays inthe negotiations as well as the terms imposed, especially regarding agriculture and

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122 A. M. Ruiz Jimenez & Egea-de Haro

fishery policies, generated criticism on the part of some political parties andpessimism among public opinion. In the early 1990s, the launch of the European

Monetary Union (EMU) project, along with the convergence criteria, coincided with adeep economic crisis in Spain, which fuelled negative attitudes towards the EU. In the

first decade of the twenty-first century, the European constitutional project revealedmore clearly the resistance of some parties to ceding sovereignty and the critical

attitudes of others towards the current economic model. Although the 2004 and 2007enlargements of the EU have not yet had any negative impact on Spanish pro-

European attitudes, we have to wait until their real effects are evident. In the followingsections we review, first, the Euroscepticism of Spanish parties and then theEurosceptic attitudes of citizens. We conclude with a summary and a reflection on the

links between parties and citizens and the future evolution of Euroscepticism in Spain.

Party Euroscepticism

In its most widespread definition, Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or

qualified opposition, as well as outright and unqualified opposition to the process ofEuropean integration (Taggart 1998, p. 365). Further refinements of the concept state

that Euroscepticism denotes an opposition to the EU ranging from the rejection of anytransference of power to this supranational institution (‘hard Euroscepticism’) to

critical discussion of the current /future model of integration (‘soft Euroscepticism’)(Taggart & Szczerbiak 2003; Kopecky & Mudde 2002).

In the following pages, we look at the evolution of Spanish political parties’discourse and attitudes from 1977 until the 2004 general elections. We check for theemergence and development of Eurosceptic discourses and behaviors, qualifying them

as hard or soft Euroscepticism, and describe the content of such discourses along threemain different dimensions: utility, principles and sovereignty.2 For analytical

purposes, we have broken down the period into three sub-periods, correspondingto the rebirth of Spanish democracy and the evolution of European integration.Q5

During the first sub-period, from the democratic transition in 1977 to Spain’s ECaccession in 1986, we can observe a general positive consensus among all political

parties regarding the positive impact of the EC. The second sub-period runs up to thesignature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, during which time we observe the firstsymptoms of consensus decline. The third sub-period continues until the present,

indicating a new complexity in the political parties’ assessment of the EU—anassessment in which criteria of national sovereignty, utility and principles are mixed.

At a deeper analytical level, we pay attention to some hypotheses regarding whysome political parties develop Eurosceptical discourses and attitudes. A first general

debate regards the importance of the traditional left–right axis. While some authorshave emphasised its importance (Hooge & Marks 2002; Gabel & Hix 2002), others

have proposed complementary ones, such as the integration–independence axis(Marks & Steenbergen 2002), or suggested that ideology does not play any relevantQ6

role (Szmolka Vida 1999). Alternatively, Szcerbiak and Taggart (2000) have suggested

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South European Society and Politics 123

that it is the parties’ position within their party system which affects the expression ofEuroscepticism. Core parties (i.e. governing parties or potential governing parties) are

less Eurosceptic than peripheral parties (i.e. opposition parties with a low probabilityof becoming governing parties). Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004) and Ruiz Jimenez

and Egea de Haro (2007) have also pointed out that national contexts may play a morerelevant role than ideology in parties’ discourses and preferences over the EU.

In Spain, political discourse does not hint at the possibility of a threat to nationalsovereignty as a consequence of integration. But, despite this overall agreement about

the positive impact of European integration, political parties have contested severalstructures of the EU. What is interesting is that this criticism has never implied aproposal for withdrawal from the EU or the use of any opt-out formula. Thus, we

must characterise the Spanish partisan perspective as closer to soft than hardEuroscepticism. We should also stress that Eurocritical attitudes towards different

aspects of the integration project are becoming increasingly more frequent amongSpanish political parties. But it is neither ideology nor the core–periphery location of

parties alone that structures discourses. National context and the symbolic character ofEurope as a community of principles play a large role in parties’ discourses (Jauregui &

Ruiz Jimenez 2005).

Political Parties in Spain

When analysing political parties’ discourses in Spain, it is important to pay attention

to the ideological (left–right) and the centre–periphery (nationalist) dimensions. Thelatter is most relevant in the Basque Country and Catalonia, where it has a long-lastingtradition, although nationalist and regionalist parties have also recently arisen in other

autonomous communities in Spain. Of course, centre–periphery competition alsoplays a relevant role within nationwide parties. It is worth noting that the number of

the latter decreased notably after the first democratic elections, and also that radicalparties are extremely weak in Spain.

Our analysis includes parties representing a wide range of ideologies as well as thecentre–periphery dimension. We pay special attention to two governing nationwide

parties, Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party)on the centre-left and Partido Popular (PP, People’s Party) on the centre-right of thepolitical spectrum. We also examine one leftist nationwide non-governing party

(Izquierda Unida [IU], United Left), and two nationalist governing parties in theBasque Country (Partido Nacionalista Vasco [PNV], Basque Nationalist Party) and

Catalonia (Convergencia I Unio [CiU], Convergence and Union) (Table 1). Otherparties will be mentioned when relevant—mostly, recent peripheral nationalist parties

characterised by soft Euroscepticism.Since the democratic transition in 1977, two large political parties on the centre-

right and centre-left have dominated the Spanish political spectrum. The Constituentand First democratic legislatures (1977–79 and 1979–82, respectively) were led by the

centre-right UCD (Union de Centro Democratico, Democratic Centre Union). Due to

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internal leadership problems, UCD disaggregated into a number of more or less

idiosyncratic parties, of which CDS (Centro Democratico y Social, Democratic and

Social Centre) was considered its main heir. Both parties weakened as a consequence of

disaggregation. The UCD lost the 1982 general election and disappeared, while CDS

was unable to capitalise enough votes to hold office. It was AP (Alianza Popular,

Popular Alliance), another conservative party to the right of UCD, which profited

from the disappearance of its main competitor for the conservative vote. Its vote share

increased dramatically after 1982, while its ideology also moderated. However, it was

PSOE that won the 1982 general elections, subsequently ruling the country for 14 years,

until 1996. The PP, as AP was renamed in 1989, won the 1996 election and held office

until 2004, when PSOE regained office, retaining it in the last general election in 2008.IU is a coalition initially created in 1986, in which the PCE (Partido Comunista

Espanol, Spanish Communist Party) is the main partner. This party stands to the left

of PSOE, and has been the third most voted-for nationwide party. PNV and CiU have

been the most important peripheral nationalist parties in the Basque Country and

Catalonia, respectively. Alone or in coalitions they have been governing parties for

most of the democratic period. PNV is a centre-right party, which controlled a

majority government in the Basque Country until 1986, and subsequently kept office

through coalitions until the last regional elections in 2009. CiU is also located on the

centre-right and was the foremost party in Catalonia until 2003, when a three-party

coalition government was formed, consisting of PSC (Socialist Party of Catalonia),

ERC (Leftist Republican Party of Catalonia) and ICV (Initiative for Catalonia Greens).

Besides their importance at the regional level, both PNV and CiU have played a very

important role in sustaining minority governments of PSOE and PP.3

In addition, some peripheral nationalist parties will be mentioned from time to

time, especially towards the end of this section. In particular, these are: the centre-right

Galician Nationalist Party (BNG), which gained two parliamentary seats in 1986, three

in 2000 and four in 2004; Coalicion Canaria (CC), a centre-right Canary Islands

regionalist party, which gained four parliamentary seats in both the 2000 and 2004

Table 1 Number of parliamentary seats won by main Spanish parties in general elections,1977–2008

1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008

PCE–IU* 20 23 4 7 17 18 21 9 5 2PSOE 118 121 202 184 175 159 141 125 164 169CDS – – 2 19 14 – – – – –UCD 15 168 11 – – – – – – –AP–PP† 16 9 107 105 107 141 156 183 148 154PNV 8 7 8 6 5 5 5 7 7 6CIU 11 8 12 18 18 17 16 15 10 10

*PCE until 1986 and IU since 1989.†AP (in different coalitions: CD in 1979 and CP in 1982 and 1986) until 1986 and PP since 1989.Source: Linz et al. 2005 and Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs (http://www.elecciones.mir.es/).

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legislatures; and Herri Batasuna (HB), a leftist Basque independentist party, whichwon two parliamentary seats in 1982 and five in 1986.

As Table 2 shows, the results of the European elections reproduce the dominantdomestic position of the PP and PSOE. As a rough approximation to Euroscepticism,Q8

expert surveys (Marks & Steenbergen 1999; Hooge et al. 2002) and the ComparativeManifestos Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingeman et al. 2006) can be used. We will

complement these sources with our own analysis of primary and secondary sources.

The Soft Euroescepticism of Spanish Political Parties

According to experts’ judgement, most political organisations in Spain have been fairly

or strongly in favour of European integration since the mid 1980s (Table 3): the meanposition of parties on the EU is separated by a narrow margin. Among nationwide

parties, experts have systematically perceived PSOE, CDS and PP as exhibiting strongpositive attitudes toward European integration, and these attitudes have also beenperceived as stable over time (with small standard deviations). Only IU, among

nationwide formations, has been clearly less favourable towards the Europeanintegration project and less stable in its attitude over time, with a higher standard

deviation. Compared to nationwide parties, peripheral nationalist and regionalistparties exhibit greater differentiation. While moderate nationalist and regionalist

parties (CiU, Par, Unio Valencia [UV], PNV, Partido Andalucista [PA]) are perceivedQ9

to have been strongly in favour of European integration, with only minor variations

over time (small standard deviations in Table 3), more extremist nationalist and

Table 2 Number of European Parliament (EP) seats won by Spanish parties in Europeanelections, 1987–2004

1987 1989 1994 1999 2004

IU* 3 4 9 4 2PSOE 28 27 22 24 25UCD 7 5 – – –AP–PP† 17 15 28 27 24CiU‡ 3 2 3 3 2PNV‡§ 0 1 2 2

*IU presented itself in 1999, in coalition with another party, under the name Izquierda Unida—Esqerra Unidad y Alternativa; in 2004, with two other parties, under the name Izquierdaa Unida—Inicitativa per Catalunya Verds.†AP until 1987 and PP since 1989.‡CiU and PNV presented themselves under the electoral coalition Galeusca/Pueblos de Europa in2004.§PNV presented itself in 1987, with two other parties, under the name Coalicion Union Europeısta—Europar Batasuna; in 1989, with five other parties, under the name Coalicion Nacionalista; in 1994,with two parties, under the name Coalicion Nacionalista; in 1993, with two other parties, under thename Europa de los Pueblos.Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (http://www.elecciones.mir.es/).

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regionalist parties are perceived to be less positive towards European integration over

the whole period (Eusko Alkartasuna [EA], Euskal Herritarok [EE], PSOE–EE,VERDE, VE, BNG, HE-EB), or as less stable over time (ERC). Among peripheralQ10

nationalist parties, the radical leftist nationalist party HE-EB is perceived as the leastpositive with regard to European integration. Data from the Comparative Manifestos

Project show essentially the same picture. Among nationwide parties, IU has keptbelow PSOE and PP figures (see Figures 1–3).Q11

Despite these positive perceptions and the general agreement in support ofEuropean integration, several authors have pointed to differences among parties. It

would be plausible to characterise IU and some peripheral nationalist parties (theGalician BNG) as soft Eurosceptic (Gomez-Reinero et al. 2002). The following sectionsdeepen the examination of partisan positions, seeking insights regarding the

dimensions that explain soft Euroscepticism (utility, principles and sovereignty).

Political Parties and the European Community Before Accession (1977–85)

During this first period, EC membership was perceived and presented in publicdiscourse as a required step in the socioeconomic modernisation of Spain after the

Francoist dictatorship. Principles related to the democratic normalisation of Spainwere at the centre of partisan position towards the EC, while at the same time

mitigating Euroscepticism. The economic perspective (expected economic benefits)was especially salient among conservative parties (UCD and AP), while on the left,

socialists (PSOE) and communists (PCE), expressed negative concerns about the

Table 3 Expert perceptions about overall orientation of parties’ leadership towardsEuropean integration, 1994–2000

Party Mean Standard deviation

PSOE 6.76 0.13CDS 6.60 0.16PP 6.13 0.24IU 4.36 0.77CiU 6.73 0.12PAR 6.34 0.13UV 6.33 0.09ERC 6.21 0.96PNV 6.20 0.28PA 6.17 0.00EA 5.73 0.37EE, PSOE–EE 5.67 0.29VERDE 5.63 0.25VE 5.25 0.00BNG 5.12 0.33HB, EB 3.01 0.08

Note: Scale ranges from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour).Source: Marks & Steenbergen 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002.

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capitalist and imperialist forces promoting European integration. In any case, from the

mid-1970s the utilitarian approach highlighted the negative consequences of not being

part of the EC. The economic costs of accession were perceived as high in the short

run, but benefits were expected in the future, and economic reforms were thought to

be inescapable anyway. Particularly notable is the position of the PCE, which, unlike its

IU PSOE AP/PP CiU PNV

Figure 2 Spanish net position on Europe, 1986–93.Source: Budge et al. 2001. Data points show the net percentage of sentences supporting theEU (percentage of sentences in favour of European integration minus the percentageopposing European integration). Nationwide parties are shown in black, regional partiesin white.

PCE PSOE UCD AP CiU PNV

Figure 1 Spanish net position on Europe, 1977–82.Source: Budge et al. 2001. Data points show the net percentage of sentences supporting theEU (percentage of sentences in favour of European integration minus the percentageopposing European integration). Nationwide parties are shown in black, regional partiesin white.

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sister party in Portugal, exhibited a moderate stance in its discourse on the EC (Alvarez

Miranda 1996; Aviles 2004). However, the negative rationale for integration was

stronger in that party (i.e. it was worse to be out of the integration process than to be

part of it), and some of its concerns towards the EU resurfaced after accession. It is

important to mention here the initial fears of AP regarding the loss of national identity

within a supranational entity such as the EC, and its concerns about European

interference in national affairs. These arguments were to re-emerge later on, under

Jose Marıa Aznar’s leadership of the PP during the 1990s.

Summarising, no evidence of either hard or soft Euroscepticism arises during this

pre-accession period. Political elites perceived European integration as a historical

opportunity for Spain to undergo the required economic reforms and to return to a

democratic path. In the context of the consensual style of the Spanish transition to

democracy and the perceived risk of political involution, the result was an overall

agreement about Spanish accession and the positive impact of the EC.If we focus on small divergences among parties, it seems that, during this first

period, office-holding had a greater impact than ideology on the net positive discourse

on the EC. Thus, on the ideological spectrium, UCD was closer to AP and PSOE to IU.

But on the EC, the two governing parties, UCD and PSOE, were closer together and

exhibited higher levels of net positive stances than either did in relation to AP and IU,

respectively. Meanwhile, peripheral nationalist moderate parties look even more

positive towards the EC than nationwide parties (see Figure 1).

IU PSOE PP CiU PNV

Figure 3 Spanish net position on Europe, 1996–2000.Source: Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006. Data points show the net percentage ofsentences supporting the EU (percentage of sentences in favour of European integrationminus the percentage opposing European integration). Nationwide parties are shown inblack, regional parties in white.

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Domestic Problems and European Solutions (1986–93)

During the second period, Spain experienced the impact of EC accession on the

national economic system. The launch of the Single Market programme and monetary

union (EMU) made the consequences of integration quite visible. Furthermore, the

need to comply with the EMU convergence criteria coincided in the Spanish case with

serious economic problems, such as a double-figure unemployment rate (reaching 23

per cent in 1993), negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth (21.2 per cent in

1993) and up to three devaluations of the national currency (going from 102 pesetas

per US dollar in September 1992 to 124 pesetas per US dollar in May 1993). Under

these circumstances, the emergence of some sort of Euroscepticism was more likely:

Europe could have been blamed.The PSOE government, however, considered that the solution was not to question

EC membership but to deepen European integration. Its determination to remain

within EMU despite the deep economic crisis led the socialist government to fight

hard for EU cohesion funds at the Edinburgh Council (1992). The structural and

cohesion funds received from Europe explain in part the continued confidence in

further integration: between 1994 and 1999 Spain obtained 27 per cent of EU cohesion

funds, against the 11.5 per cent each obtained by Greece and Portugal, and the 5 per

cent allocated to Ireland (Powell 2002). Thus, the socialist government committed to

fiscal adjustment in a period of internal economic crisis. The restructuring of the

Spanish economy was largely based on a flexibilisation of the labour market, strongly

opposed by trade unions, notably with the 14 December 1988 general strike, which

paralysed the country and forced Prime Minister Gonzalez to review his economic

programme.4 Negative economic factors had a depressing impact on public opinion.

In this context, the EU started to be a politically debatable issue. The conservative

PP criticised the socialist strategy as largely dependent on EU funds (Powell 2002). IU,

as well as some peripheral extremist nationalist parties, expressed deep concerns about

the Maastricht Treaty (Gomez-Reino et al. 2002). IU was worried about cutbacks in

social expenditure and the prevalence of liberalism implied in the convergence criteria.

To demonstrate its opposition to the Maastricht Treaty, IU presented a rejection

amendment and abstained in the parliamentary ratification vote. On the centre–

periphery axis, EE, an extreme-left Basque Country nationalist party, was the only one

to vote against ratification, arguing that the Treaty reinforced the powers of the

Spanish central government.5 This argument did not find much echo among

peripheral nationalist parties at that point, but it would re-emerge with force during

the next period: in the ratification of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties as well as

during the European Constitution referendum campaign.

Despite the growing controversy generated by the EU during these years, Spanish

political parties increasingly backed the integration process, as reflected in Figure 2.

Even in the case of IU, the net percentage of positive discourse toward the EU increased

from 0.79 (between 1977 and 1986) to 1.54 (between 1986 and 1993). The critical

position adopted by IU was specifically concerned with the prevailing neoliberal

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model of the EU: thus we see the emergence of a soft rather than hard Euroescepticism,which would continue and strengthen during the following years. After the 1993

general elections, the PSOE’s minority position forced that party to seek political allies.The conflicting views of IU and PSOE precluded any attempt at a left coalition. Instead,

PSOE decided to promote a coalition with regionalist parties (PNV and CiU). OnEuropean matters, those regionalist parties were closer to PSOE than IU, especially with

respect to the Single Market and EMU (Guerrero Salom 2003, p. 84); their support forthe socialist government fuelled the positive stance on European integration.

In summary, this period presented two differences. First, the impact of the EU wasmore visible, due to the measures to be taken during a period of economic crisis.Second, the previous consensus over European integration and the sacrifices

undergone in order to become part of the EC, brought on the first symptoms ofdecline in support with the launch of the EMU project. This increased criticism wasQ12

championed by IU, which denounced the lack of a social dimension in the Europeanintegration process. As a result, the EU became a more controversial issue along

ideological lines. It is possible to see also the first symptoms of controversy along thecentre–periphery axis, which intensify during the next period. Again we see that

PSOE, as the governing party, presented higher percentages of net positive discourseon the EU than either of the other two nationwide parties analysed here (Figure 2).Peripheral moderate nationalist parties, now part of the PSOE minority government,

show the highest percentages of net positive discourse. Thus, from the pre-accessionperiod, we see that all parties increased their percentage of net positive discourse on

the EU, but governing parties did so to a higher degree than non-governing parties.

Accommodation of the EU into National Discourse (1994–2000s)

During this period, the PP won two general consecutive elections (1996 and 2000). As

Figure 3 shows, as the party in government, PP exhibited the highest percentage of netpositive discourse on the EU during this last period. These years can be characterised

by the definitive incorporation of the EU into partisan debate, producing conflictingmodels of European integration, some parties strongly disapproving of the current

shape of the EU (Closa 2001; Torreblanca 2001; Gomez-Reino et al. 2002). Two mainarguments on principles were used by those more critical of the EU: the alleged lack ofdemocratic legitimacy and the strong liberal-economic orientation. The discussion

regarding the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ at the European level is particularlyrelevant in the case of IU. The negative assessment of this party was based on the

European Parliament’s minor role in the European legislative process and the absenceof essential mechanisms for citizens’ participation in EU politics. As can be seen in

Figure 3, IU exhibits the lowest percentage of net positive discourse on the EU duringthis last period.

Despite the interest in the democratic deficit, the main Spanish criticism of the EUfocuses on its economic model. The prevalent liberal model of the EU has been backed

by AP–PP and PSOE (Ruiz Jimenez 2002). Among nationwide parties, IU is the only

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soft Eurosceptic party to have adopted a highly critical attitude towards the neoliberaleconomic model of the EU decided at Maastricht. IU even rejects the model proposed

in the Growth and Stability Pact and Lisbon Strategy, as far as these agreements

represent the liberal paradigm. Based on, and reflecting, these principles, IU presenteda rejection amendment to the Amsterdam Treaty and voted against it in 1997.6

Similarly, and with the same arguments, the IU presented two amendments to the textof the Nice Treaty and abstained during the voting in 2001,7 and campaigned against

the European Constitution in 2005 (Capdevilla et al. 2005).8 The same kind ofarguments were also reproduced to justify the vote against the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.9

Another controversial partisan debate over the EU centres on concerns about theloss of national sovereignty, power or autonomy, as well as the loss of national cultural

identity within the EU. At the nationwide level, Spanish parties’ preferences

concerning the distribution of power between different levels of government dividebetween a federalist and an intergovernmental model for the European political

system. Within the general debate on Euroscepticism, intergovernmental preferencescan be understood as being more Eurosceptic than federalist preferences. Even if not

leading to outright opposition to the EU, they imply strong resistance to transfers ofpower from the nation- state to a supranational institution. The leftist parties, IU and

PSOE, reveal a stronger preference for the federalist model. PP is more in favour of an

intergovernmental EU (Ruiz Jimenez 2002). Fears concerning European interferencein national matters expressed during the pre-accession period resurfaced following the

refounding of AP as PP in 1989 and under the new leadership of Jose Marıa Aznar.According to Llamazares (2005, p.10), among Spanish politicians, only those from PP

show a net agreement on the statement, ‘Member states must keep the last word inimportant decisions’. A good illustration of PP attitudes in this regard was the role

played by Aznar in the European constitutional treaty negotiations. Despite

declarations in favour of the constitutional project, Aznar insisted that Spain shouldkeep exactly the same power within EU institutions that it had under the Nice Treaty.

On the centre–periphery axis, it has been pointed out that member states’ centralgovernments are no longer able to control the policy-making process within the EU.

Hence, it is suggested that other political actors, such as peripheral nationalist parties,should play a greater role because this scenario increases their chances of having a say

in collective decisions. But regional governments are not always net winners in thisscenario (Bourne 2003) and thus their positive view of the EU would not be

straightforward. It has also been argued that European institutions are biased in favor

of central governments’ interests (Borzel 2002). Exactly this point was made by PNV’sseveral amendments to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties (although the party voted in

favour of ratification in both cases). The BNG was also quite critical on the samegrounds and in its amendments to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties proposed the

rejection of both texts. This argument was also used to support the party’s rejection ofthe Lisbon Treaty in 2008.

To summarise, during this last period, two lines of soft Eurocriticism are presentand clear among Spanish political parties. One concerns opposition on principle to the

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EU’s neoliberal economic orientation and its simultaneous lack of attention to socialmatters, which characterises IU. The second concerns regional representation at the

EU level, and characterises peripheral extremist nationalist parties in contrast to

peripheral moderate nationalist and nationwide parties. The campaign for theEuropean Constitution referendum illustrated this perfectly. Among nationwide

parties, only IU campaigned against the Constitution, for reasons already noted.Among peripheral nationalist parties, moderate ones (CiU, PNV and CC) campaigned

in favour, while more extremist ones campaigned against (ERC; BNG; the Aragonregionalist party, Chunta Aragonesista [CHA]; the Navarrese nationalist party, NB;Q14

and EA). Furthermore, ERC and BNG also opposed the ratification of the Lisbon

Treaty in 2008. Among the arguments, as already mentioned, was that in reinforcingcentral governments the European Constitution would not respect plurinational states

(their right to self-government, their own languages, cultures, etc.). Within this secondsovereign axis, PP could also be labelled as soft Eurosceptic towards a federal EU model

of integration. Meanwhile, in the Lisbon Treaty debate, both ERC and BNG, who againopposed ratification, mentioned the recent European directives on immigration and

working hours in order to criticise the absence of a ‘social Europe’.This general overview of the evolution of partisan positions on the EU points to

their evolution from a general consensus, based on the democratising and

modernising potential of European integration, to a more critical view based mainlyon issues of principle (specifically, the democratic deficit and liberal economic model).

The ideological axis, however, captures only part of the variance on these Euroscepticattitudes. IU’s criticism of the liberal model structuring the EU, or the centralised

model of state backed by the PP, can explain their vision of Europe along theideological axis. However, we also find that on EU matters PSOE, on the left of the

ideological spectrum, is closer to PP, PNVand CiU, all of them on the ideological right.Considering the second main axis of contention in Spanish politics (centre–

periphery), we do not find that peripheral nationalist parties are systematically either

more positive or more negative towards the EU than nationwide parties. In looking atparty manifesto data, we find that CiU and PNV present a positive view of the EU,

while other peripheral nationalist parties have been perceived by experts as being moreEU-critical. As has been mentioned, these parties have also expressed criticism of the

EU in their stands against European treaties, especially the Nice Treaty and theEuropean Constitution.

A closer look at the impact of being in government or opposition provides furtherelements for understanding Euroscepticism. Considering the different periods

analysed individually, it seems that there is some room to argue the positive impact of

being a governing party on the evaluation of the EU. The data (Figures 1–3) show,regarding the nationwide level at least, that governing parties (UCD, PSOE or PP) have

had the highest net positive level of discourses on the EU. However, analysing the datalongitudinally, we see that AP–PP shows a sustained increasing trend throughout the

period, while both PSOE and IU decrease their net percentage of positive discourse onthe EU after 1996. In the PP’s case, the causal relationship is not clear, i.e. whether the

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party increased its net percentage of positive discourse on the EU because it became apotential governing party over the period, or whether it became a potential governing

party because it increased its positive discourse on the EU, as it did on many otherQ13

issues (Garcıa Guereta 2001; Llamazares 2005). There is no significant correlation

between the percentage of votes obtained in national elections and the percentage ofpositive discourse about European integration.10 Therefore, contextual factors, theQ15

specific meaning and connotations of Europe and the EU in Spain, as well as thespecificities of the Spanish party system, may have played a significant role.

Popular Euroscepticism

Public opinions polls are the main tool for researching citizens’ opinions and attitudes,

and Eurobarometers (EB) are certainly the most widely used data when it comes topublic opinions towards the EU, especially in a comparative context. Spain, however,

has been included in EB only since the 1980s, after accession. Therefore, for thissection, we supplement EB with data from the national Centre for SociologicalResearch (CIS)11 to cover the pre-accession period. Using this data, we argue that,Q16

despite the high percentages of support for the EU among Spanish citizens, theirs canQ17

be labelled a ‘faulty Europeanism’. High percentages are magnified by the artificial

statistical recourse of discounting those who did not answer the questions (dk/da),while simultaneously ignorance and indifference towards the EU are very high.

Spanish ‘non-attitude holders’ constitute a reserve of voters that could be mobilisedQ18

either in favour or against the EU through political competition. We also explore the

most likely lines of ‘Eurosceptic fracture’, and, whenever the data allow us, we payattention to the dimensions of utility, principles and sovereignty.

Spaniards and the European Community before Accession (1977–85)

Taggart and Szcerbiak (2004, pp. 7–8) have proposed that there might be a link between

candidates’ prospects of accession to power and their level of Euroscepticism, in thesense that ‘as the process of accession . . . becomes more immediate, the specific costs

will become more apparent in the candidate states’ and popular Euroscepticism mighttherefore rise. The case of Spain tends to confirm this hypothesis to a certain degree.

Starting in 1968, CIS asked different versions of a question regarding support for

Spain’s future accession into the EC. The general trend during this first period showserosion: from the virtual absence of opposition in 1968 (CIS 1036), the percentage of

those who did not support accession rose to 20 per cent in 1985 (CIS 1453). Althoughsupport continued to be the majority position, it also decreased around 20 points in

these same years (from 73 to 53 per cent); all in all, net support for Spanish accessiondecreased by 30 points between 1968 and 198012 (Figure 4).

Probably delays in the membership negotiations as well as the tough conditionsimposed by the EC played a role in this general erosion, especially considering how

much importance Spaniards attached to this end and the symbolic meaning of

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accession. Perhaps a symptom of public opinion fatigue, we observe that as late as 1984

(only one year before accession) only 12 per cent of citizens thought that Spain would

join the EC soon, while 45 per cent thought it would still take a long time, and 16 per

cent considered it unlikely that Spain would join at all (CIS 1381).Utilitarian arguments seem to have played only a modest role in the deterioration of

support during this pre-accession period. A survey carried out in 1971 (CIS 1046),

shows that despite the presence of an instrumental rationale behind support, it was notQ19

entirely instrumental. Almost 20 per cent of those interviewed considered that Spain

should join because Spaniards were European, regardless of the benefits or

improvements implied in accession. The perception of benefits was, on the other

hand, very diffused. Thus, the perception that Spain would not benefit in economic

terms from integration was not turned into a reason for Euroscepticism; the

percentages of support remained high even though the percentage of citizens who

thought that the integration of Spain would be negative rose from a mere six per centQ20

in 1979 to 20 per cent in 1985 (CIS 1193 & 1453). A considerable percentage of

Spaniards were even willing to made sacrifices in order to join the EU: if in 1979 only

nine per cent were in favour of accession even ‘if Spain was to pay a high price’, in 1984

the percentage had doubled (18 per cent) (CIS 1193 & 1146).

If we focus on ideology, at the beginning of the period, support for accession was

higher among leftist (socialist and communist) than among rightist voters, but it is

Figure 4 Net support for Spain’s accession into the EEC.Source: CIS (www.cis.es) and REIS (no. 29, 1985, pp. 289–396). Author’s own elaboration.Q38

Note: In the years 1976, 1978 and 1983 the question asked was, ‘Are you in favour, againstor indifferent towards Spanish accession into the European Economic Community?’ In theyears 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1985 the question asked was, ‘How much do you supportSpanish accession into the EEC? (very much, quite a lot, not very much, not at all).’ ‘Verymuch’ and ‘quite a lot’ are computed as in favour; ‘not very much’ and ‘not at all’ arecomputed as against.

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among these that we observe the most notable upward shift in support. While in 1978Q21

only 43 per cent of AP voters supported accession (24 points below socialist and

communist voters), by the end of the period support among rightist and leftist voterswas averaged. Opposition to accession was more frequent among citizens close toQ22

peripheral nationalist parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia: 19 per cent amongvoters of moderate regionalist parties (CiU and PNV) and 27 per cent among voters of

radical regionalist parties opposed accession in 1978 (CIS 1141) (against a mean ofseven per cent for the whole population). In 1984 (CIS 1428) these percentages

reached 22 and 46 per cent, respectively (against a mean of 15 per cent for the wholepopulation). Opposition was moderately high also among communist voters, wherethe polarisation in favour and against accession was higher.

In summary, during this first period, support decreased as accession seemed toremain out of reach. Utilitarian arguments conversely were not the most important

reason for decreasing support. It seems that the nationalist dimension played a moreimportant role in Spanish public Euroscepticism than the ideological one. AP voters

moved from the lowest percentages of support at the beginning of the period toaverage figures close to the level among socialist voters. Only communists continuedQ23

to be among citizens with the lowest percentages of support.

Support after Accession: A Faulty Europeanism (1986–2000s)

It is difficult to establish a temporal connection between pre- and post-accession

periods using different data. It seems, however, that public support improved afteraccession (Moral 1989; Szmolka Vida 1999). Between 1986 and the first half of 1991,the net positive evaluation of Spanish membership increased by 17 points, from a net

percentage of 58 per cent of the population in favour of unification in 1986 to 75 percent in 1991 (Barreiro & Sanchez-Cuenca 2001).13

If we focus on the percentage of Spanish citizens who considered Spanish ECmembership of Spain ‘a bad thing’, negative attitudes were quite low between 1986 and

1991. Between 1991 and the first half of 1995 these negative attitudes increased veryrapidly, reaching percentages above EU averages. After 1995, negative attitudes

decreased steadily to only four per cent in 1999, to increase then again very moderatelyin the 2000s.

The increasing dissatisfaction with the EU between 1991 and 1995 clearly overlapsQ24

with the Maastricht Treaty, but it is not clear that Maastricht alone caused theperturbation, since this period was also marked by an important economic crisis.

Barreiro and Sanchez Cuenca (2001) have demonstrated that unemployment (anddomestic factors in general) had a statistically significant effect on citizens’ attitudes

towards the EU during this period—stronger than the evaluation of specificitiesQ25

related to the EU. Afterwards, we do not observe any sign of ‘crisis’, either after the

conservative governments of PP (1996–2004) or after the debate on the EuropeanConstitution. Even more, since 1994 the percentage of citizens who think that

membership is a bad thing has remained well below the EU average.

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Thus, in the same line of argumentation put forward by Barreiro and Sanchez-Cuenca(of a ‘faulty Europeanism’), we can argue that, although Spaniards cannot be qualified as

straightforward Eurosceptic, their pro-Europeanism has been exaggerated at timesbecause studies tend to discount the very high percentages of ignorance and indifference

toward the EU. The percentage of citizens indifferent to the scrapping of the EU, forexample, has been quite high in Spain, and higher than the EU average (Figure 5).

Utilitarian Popular Euroscepticism in Spain

It is quite interesting to note the low correlation between support for the EU and theperception of benefits from the membership of Spain (Figure 6). Some in-depth

interviews and focus groups carried on within the EURONAT research project14 showQ26

the relevance of the perception that Spain had made too many economic sacrifices(especially in agriculture and fisheries) to gain accession to the EC. These were,

however, justified and seen in a positive light in the long run, mainly because theyallowed Spain to overcome its political isolation and consolidate democracy.

A question regarding Spanish benefits from the EC/EU, included in CIS 2204 (year1996), shows that economic development was regarded as the area with the most

modest benefit. The most beneficial aspect was seen as Spain’s increased politicalimportance in the world. In second place was the perceived positive impact on the

functioning of democracy and third was the modernisation of Spanish society. Theseperceptions vary along the ideological as well as the centre–periphery dimensions.Among PSOE and CiU voters in 1996, the perception that Spain benefited from

integration was significantly more frequent than among other voters, while the

Spain EU

Figure 5 Percentage of citizens who say they are indifferent or don’t know what they wouldfeel if the EU were scrapped)Spain and EU: 1986–2003).Source: CIS (www.cis.es). Author’s own elaboration.

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perception that Spain had suffered was relatively higher among PP and radical

nationalist voters. As time passed, however, Spanish citizens have become aware ofsome benefits. Currently the percentage of citizens who believe that Spain has not

benefited from membership is quite low (around ten per cent), and thus utilitarianEuroscepticism is less likely to develop. The idea that Spain owed much to the EU was

in fact widely used by the PSOE in its campaign for a positive vote in the referendumon the European Constitution (Sampedro et al. 2005).

The possible development of an instrumental Euroscepticism among Spanishcitizens still remains open. In the future, the country is expected to lose many of the

economic advantages it has derived from cohesion funding. Spanish citizens seem tobe aware of these costs, although so far for most people this does not seem to betransforming into Euroscepticism. Spanish citizens of a right-wing orientation are,

however, more inclined to share concerns about the economic consequences ofenlargement (Ruiz Jimenez & Noya 2004).

In summary, purely economic criteria have not been the most important reasonbehind Spanish citizens’ support for the EU, and thus it is unlikely these instrumental

criteria will develop into a reason for popular Euroscepticism. It is possible that theconsequences of EU enlargement will affect the importance of this utilitarian

dimension: although citizens seem to be prepared for the consequences of accession atthe most abstract level, they are at the same time ill informed about the realconsequences that it will have on they daily lives.

Sovereign Popular Euroscepticism

Following Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2003) definition of the rejection of anytransference of power to the EU as ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, preferences for an inter-

governmental EU are of a Eurosceptic nature, to the extent that such preferences are

Not benefited Membership a bad thing

Figure 6 Percentage of Spanish citizens who think that Spain has not benefited frombelonging to the EU and percentage of those who think that membership in the EU is a badthing, 1986–2006.Source: Eurobarometers. Author’s own elaboration.

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related to a resistance to giving up (or even sharing) national sovereignty. We thinkthat this can be also understood as soft Euroscepticism, since it rejects a contingent

model of federal union and not the EU in itself. In any of these senses, largepercentages of Spanish citizens could be considered Eurosceptic, showing a strong

preference for an intergovernmental organisation of the EU.In 1996 (CIS 2204), 76 per cent of Spaniards declared that they preferred a model of

EU government in which member states ‘have the last word’, against only 24 per centwho supported a model in which the EU makes its own decisions. In 2004 (BRIE 7thQ27

wave, www.realinstitutoelcano.org), a majority of 55 per cent still preferred theintergovernmental model, against 31 per cent who supported a federal one. Partyaffiliation plays a role in these preferences. Thus, preference for an intergovernmental

EU is more frequently found among PP voters.If we take cultural identity into account, the number of Spaniards who fear a

possible loss of national identity/culture as a consequence of European integration15

has lagged behind the EU average. However, and although the trend is not quite clear,

the percentage of Spanish citizens actually sharing these worries increased between1995 and 2000, and again between 2001 and 2004, reaching peaks of more than 40 per

cent. This fear was much more widespread among voters of Basque and Cataloniannationalist parties (Ruiz Jimenez & Noya 2004).

In summary, it seems that the development of popular Euroscepticism in Spain

would be more likely to take place along the sovereignty dimension than the utilitarianone, and it would do so along a double axis. On the ideological axis, rightist voters are

less inclined to share national sovereignty, while on the centre–periphery axis Basqueand Catalonian nationalist voters are more afraid of the consequences of integration

for culture and identity.

Principled Popular Euroscepticism

If we take as an indicator of principle-based Euroscepticism the dissatisfaction with the

way in which democracy works at the EU level, we see that the percentage ofdissatisfied citizens has actually decreased both at the European (slightly) and the

Spanish level, most notably between 1994 (EB 41.1) and 2006 (EB 65). However, it isinteresting to note that, despite the reduction in the number of citizens who are notsatisfied with democracy, one-fifth of the Spanish population remains unsatisfied. This

means that there is a large reserve for Eurosceptic mobilisation should this topic enterthe interparty debate.

Another type of criticism on principle refers to the EU’s economic policies. A surveycarried out on what was then the forthcoming European Constitution referendum in

Spain (BRIE 7th wave) included a question of whether citizens considered theConstitution would strengthen a capitalist Europe to the detriment of a social Europe.

Almost half the population agreed with this statement (48 per cent), compared withless than one-third (28 per cent) who disagreed. The likelihood of sharing this type of

criticism was much higher among voters for Catalan and Basque nationalist parties.

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Among nationwide parties, IU voters raised this criticism much more frequently thanPSOE and PP voters.

In summary, taking into account both the percentage of citizens who do not holdclear attitudes regarding their satisfaction with the EU’s democratic working, and the

widespread perception among some parties’ voters that the EU is too economicallyliberal, there is room for the development of Euroscepticism in Spain along both these

lines of principles.

Conclusions

Hard Euroscepticism has not been a characteristic of Spanish partisan discourse.

During the accession negotiations, political parties promoted the view that ECmembership was a must in order to overcome international isolation and bringeconomic recovery. Furthermore, the EU represented a reference for the young

democracy and a guarantee for its consolidation. Later on, the Single European Actand the Maastricht Treaty raised further arguments about the benefits of European

integration and its liberal economic nature. This emergence of soft Euroscepticism canbe understood as part of the ‘normalisation’ of Spanish politics after dictatorship.

Although an increase in public contestation is to be expected, informed support forthe EU is also likely to become stronger in Spain, as the large percentages of citizens in

the group of dk/da form an opinion and step into the pro- or anti-EU group.We have also tried to characterise the Euroscepticism of parties and citizens along

several dimensions. The utilitarian criterion has been a commonplace in political partydiscourse on the EU, producing mainly positive discourses about the net results ofmembership, even for example when confronting the challenges of the 2004 and 2007

enlargements. Usually the long-run benefits have been emphasised over costs. Despitethe positive net result of Spanish membership, political parties defend different

economic and political models that have an impact on their assessment of the EU. ThePP’s soft Euroscepticism is mainly directed against a federal model of the EU, while

leftist parties are more prone to criticism on principles. PSOE and especially IUcriticise the underdevelopment of social policy and the democratic deficit at the

European level. Peripheral nationalist parties also exhibit a soft Euroscepticism relatedto their frustration with the EU for not fulfilling their expectations of politicalparticipation within European Institutions.

So far in the Spanish case, we have only witnessed the emergence of limited softEuroscepticism, which spreads along the two main dimensions of political conflict in

Spain (left–right and centre–periphery). It remains to be seen how far this discoursewill be carried as well as the impact it will have on citizens and voters. Spanish citizens

usually pronounce themselves pro-European, but this conclusion is usually reachedQ28

only after taking into account a valid percentage of support for the EU (that is leaving

dk/da out of the calculation). Looking deeper into Spaniards’ attitudes, we observe aless positive picture. Among Spanish public opinion the percentage of citizens with no

clear/defined attitude toward the EU is larger than at the EU level, while ignorance and

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’svo

‘has

r’an

er’.

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lack of interest are still quite large. The calculus of percentages of support for the EU,which give a surprisingly high figure of Spanish pro-Europeanists, tends to ignore the

former group. The 42 per cent turnout in the referendum on the EuropeanConstitution offers a good illustration. The 76 per cent of positive votes among those

who voted reduces to a mere 32 per cent of the total electorate (see http://www.elecciones.mir.es/refeur2005/resultados/retop.htm): quite a different picture of

Spanish pro-Europeanism!It is probable that non-attitude holders represent such a large group in Spain due to

the low salience of political debate on European topics. It is likely that contestationagainst the EU and thus Eurosceptic attitudes would increase in Spain if such debatewere to develop, as indeed seems to be happening. But positive attitudes could also be

reinforced. In any case, political debate, information and discussion are desirable endson their own and would result in the strengthening of the EU and the quality of itsQ29

democracy.Considering the possible emergence of Euroscepticism along diverse dimensions,

citizens and parties seem to be quite close in their Eurosceptical attitudes. Left-oriented citizens tend to criticise the EU on the basis of principles (lack of democracy

and strong economic-liberal orientation). Rightist citizens tend to be more criticalregarding the economic consequences of integration and enlargement. They also tendto be more sovereignty Eurosceptic, less favourable than others to ceding national

power and competences to the EU and more inclined to favour intergovernmentalism.Finally, Basque and Catalonian nationalists are more afraid of the cultural

consequences of integration than are other citizens. This diversity shows thelimitation of using just single-item questions to measure support/opposition for the

EU. We end up with measures too rough to be able to distinguish different types ofEuroscepticism along either the ideological or the centre–periphery axis.

If we summarise the distances between parties and their voters on EU matters usingthe 2004 European Election Studies, we find that, among nationwide parties, PP and

PSOE are slightly more pro-European than their voters, while the opposite is true forIU. Distances are smaller between peripheral nationalist parties and their voters.However, looking at the table more generally, what is striking is the small size of these

differences. Thus, the divorce between elites and citizens on European matters issmaller than expected (Table 4).

This means that popular Euroscepticism is to be expected if and when parties decideto mobilise it. As we have seen, the likelihood of this mobilisation has increased over

recent years along different dimensions. Our prediction for the future is that it mayfurther develop as the consequences of EU enlargement become evident.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Jose Ignacio Torreblanca for his careful reading of a previous version ofthe text as well as his helpful and enriching criticisms and suggestions. Interesting comments andfurther criticisms have also been raised by Susannah Verney, Ann Faber and Catherina Sorensen, to

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whom we express also our gratitude. We would also like to thank Marina Costalobo and Jose Pereira for

processing the data from the Manifesto Project, as well as Andrea Volkens for kindly giving us access to

the last updated version of the data. Furthermore, we thank Alejandro Medina Bermudez and the

journal’s two anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and useful suggestions and criticisms.

[1] These two intellectuals led the debate over Europeanisation and the modernisation of Spain.

While Unamuno developed a hostile attitude towards Europeanisation, Ortega y Gasset fully

embraced it (Jauregui and Ruiz Jimenez 2005).

[2] ‘Utility’ refers to arguments about expected gain and losses. ‘Principles’ refer to arguments

about moral or ideological principles (equality, democracy, etc.). ‘Sovereignty’ refers to

resistance to cede powers as well as concerns about the loss of national identities.

[3] For a list of Spanish parties, please see the Appendix. For a summary of the Spanish party

system see Jimenez (2006).

[4] For an analysis of the ‘socialist decade’ see, among others, Guerra and Tezanos (1992), TusselQ35

and Sinova (1992), Marın Arce (2000) and Bosh and Riba (2005).

[5] See the parliamentary process of ratification on the Spanish Parliament’s webpage (http://www.

congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Iniciativas). Read the parties’ amendments

in BOGC A-098-03 (30/09/1992), p. 121; read the parties’ discourse and voting results in DS

224 (29/10/1992), from p. 11084 onwards.

[6] See the process of parliamentary ratification on the Spanish Parliament’s webpage. For the

parties’ amendments, see BOGC A-117-4 (22 September 1998), p. 77; for parties’ discourses

and voting results see DS 184 (1 October 1998), from p. 9880 onwards.

[7] See the Spanish Parliament’s webpage. For the parties’ amendments, see BOGC A-39-3 (29 June

2001), p. 49 and BOGC A-39-4 (7 October 2001), p. 53; for parties’ discourses and voting

results see DS 111 (04/10/2001), from p. 5416 onwards.

[8] Since the referendum was not binding, the parliamentary process of ratification took place

afterwards by the one reading, urgent procedure. See the Spanish Parliament’s webpage forQ36

parties’ discourse and voting in DS 87 (28 April 2005) from p. 4258 onwards.

[9] As with the European Constitution, the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty took place

by the one reading, urgent procedure. See the parliamentary process of ratifation on theQ37

Spanish Parliament’s webpage, DS 20 (26 June 2008), from p. 14 onwards.

[10] We use the percentage of votes obtained in general elections in order to have a quantitative

continuous variable for correlation analysis, since holding power or not is not valid for this

kind of analysis, being a qualitative variable. For measuring parties’ Euroscepticism, we use the

percentage of positive discourse in European election manifestos (from the Euromanifestos

project; see http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net/). The result of the correlation using these

two variables was very low and statistically not significant. It increased, but continued to be

statistically not significant, when controlling for nationwide versus peripheral parties.

[11] Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas is a publicly owned institution that conducts regular

public opinion surveys on matters of national interest. See www.cis.es and CIS (1985) for

details of the surveys mentioned in the text.

[12] Net support is computed by subtracting the percentage of citizens against accession from the

percentage of citizens in favour of accession. Those who answer ‘don’t know’ or who don’t

answer the question (dk/da) are thus left out of the calculations.

[13] The net percentage in favour of unification is the result of subtracting the percentage of citizens

against unification from the percentage of citizens in favour of unification.

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[14] Project funded by the European Commission Research DG, Key Action Improving the Socio-

economic Knowledge Base (contract no. HPSE-CT2001-00044) and UNED Vicerrectorado de

Investigacion (reference 2003i/PUNED/05). For details, see http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/

Research/EURONAT/Index.shtml.

[15] The linkages between national identities and European integration have been studied in depth

by several authors. See, among others, Dıez Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), Dıez Medrano

(2003) Menendez-Alarcon (2004).

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Appendix. Acronyms of Spanish Political Parties

Nationwide Parties

AP Alianza PopularCDS Centro Democratico y Social

IU Izquierda UnidaPCE Partido Comunista Espanol

PP Partido PopularPSOE Partido Socialista Espanol

UCD Union de Centro Democratico

Peripheral Nationalist and Regionalist Parties

BNG Bloque Nacionalista Gallego

CC Coalicion Canaria

CHA Chunta Aragonesista

CiU Convergencia I’ Unio

EA Eusko Alkartasuna

EE Euskal Herritarrok

ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya

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EV Els Verds

HB Herri Batasuna

IC–V Iniciativa per Catalunya—Els Verds

LV Los Verdes

PA Partido Andalucista

AR Partido Aragonesista Regionalista

PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco

UV Unio Valencia

V Verds

#Websites

Webpage of the Spanish Parliament:

(http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Inicia-tivas).

FSES 459946—8/3/2010—MADHAVANS—363724

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