Post on 02-Feb-2023
Rejecting the Primacy of the UNSC: the Role ofRegional Organisations as Responders of Choice to
Gross Human Rights Violations
It is extraordinary that, in today’s world, UN
debates surrounding humanitarian intervention can engender
procrastination, provoke stalemate or render ineffectual one of
society’s most cherished values, the protection human rights.
In this respect, Normand and Zaidi (2008) detail the
significant complexity in legislating for humanitarian
intervention but, among the many ideas they proffer, one has
particular relevance to my topic.
“Cultural practices that transgress conventional notions of
human rights may invite humanitarian intervention; states that
deny the universal validity of human rights may become
international pariahs subject to regime change. The ‘may’ is
important, because it is common knowledge that not all abuses
and abusers are equal in practice. The theory of impartiality is
belied by the absence of consistently applied legal mechanisms
1
Sean Williams MISC13210161
interpreted and enforced by objective decision makers.”
(Normand & Zaidi; 2008: 9).
This, to me, is the nub of the argument surrounding
humanitarian intervention. Because international law provides
for action against human rights abuses (UN; 1945: Preamble),
especially initiatives and activities that address and remove
the root causes of humanitarian disasters, even where these
involve hostilities or the threat of them (Holzgrefe & Keohane;
2003: 18), one cannot presume any parity in the manner or scale
of any humanitarian operation with a comparable precedent.
For the purpose of this essay, humanitarian
intervention will be defined as:
“the use of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave
violations of fundamental human rights of individuals other
than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within
whose territory force is applied” (Holzgrefe & Keohane;
2003: 18).
There are three separate issues that feed into the debate on
armed humanitarian intervention and which determine its
effectiveness. Firstly, the precarious standing within
2
international law of any form of intervention; secondly, the
extent to which self-interest by powerful states may be a
motivating factor in the decision to intervene; and finally,
the incapacity of UN structures when faced with the need to
respond timely and decisively (and forcefully when necessary)
to gross violations of human rights. These three issues
conspire to render ineffectual the very institution whose
mission it is to act as guardian of human rights in all its
forms.
Firstly, the precarious nature of armed
intervention within international law rests on a fulcrum
between two contrasting interpretations of the UN Charter. The
‘restrictionist’ point of view asserts “no justification for
entertaining any interpretation other than the exact meaning of
the text” (Harhoff; 2001: 101). This doctrine is grounded in
the fear that should any deviation be permitted, it could
create a precedent for states to wage war in pursuit of their
own ideals and ends (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 146). Wars of
this nature are perceived as essentially wars of aggression,
accompanied by manipulative language arguing their legitimacy
under the banner of humanitarian intervention. In essence,
3
restrictionists believe in the absolute sovereignty of all
states, as a fundamental and inviolable principle.
“The concept of international society privileges the state as the
sole repository of sovereign authority and is based on the
assumption that international order can be best maintained if
states respect each other’s sovereignty by adhering to the
norms of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states”
(Ayoob; 2002: 81).
In contrast, the ‘counter-restrictionist’ interpretation relies
on a more flexible attitude to wording, whereby humanitarian
intervention may be deemed legal, even under Article 2(4), if
it does not seek to annex any territory or threaten a state’s
independence, and if humanitarian actions are undertaken
exclusively for the purpose of protecting human rights (Arend &
Beck; 1993: 134). Here, the UN Charter may be interpreted
flexibly to meet the needs and particular context of an urgent
or imminent humanitarian crisis. For instance, when a state is
in violation of its own citizens’ fundamental human rights, it
can, within international law, be deemed to have reneged on the
most basic obligation of sovereignty and, in so doing, have a
questionable claim of sovereignty (Kolodziej; 2000: 127). In
4
contexts of this type, ‘counter-restrictionists’ also point to
the prominence afforded to human rights in the UN Charter, and
particularly the statements that the organisation will
continually strive to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights” and “in the dignity and worth of the human person” (UN;
1945: Preamble).
Under current international law, the UNSC exercises
exclusive authority to sanction (or not to sanction)
humanitarian intervention and it is also the sole arbiter over
disputes relating to the legitimacy and/or legality of any
external intervention in the sovereign affairs of a member
state. However, there are strong reasons to support the belief
that the Security Council may not be the optimal body to
exercise exclusive authority in this matter and the record
shows in a significant number of cases that it has proved inept
and ill-suited to this task. The purpose of this paper is to
present an argument for rejecting the primacy of the UNSC in
this task and to explore a rationale for allowing regional
organisations greater autonomy to intervene, especially where
nearby human rights abuses require an immediate and resolute
military response.
5
The UNSC’s ineptitude at mediating intra-state
conflicts and humanitarian requirements is rooted in the
prescriptions of the UN Charter itself. The UN Charter, and
specifically Chapter VII, relies upon an organisational system
of action that prohibits intervention except as an action of
last resort. Sanctions are often considered as a laissez-faire
alternative to war because they do not involve any acrimonious
dispute about territorial integrity or the violation of state
sovereignty, nor require the use of UN troops to enforce its
decision. But, in any event, such action is rarely useful in
the face of an immediate humanitarian crisis. Sanctions and
embargoes have been shown to have a greater effect on civilians
rather than governments, or have unintended side effects for
civilians (Gordon; 1999: 388), as was the case with the arms
embargo during the Yugoslavian war of the early 1990s. The
persuasive logic is that the UN Charter’s wording is ambiguous
and defaults to recommending non-forceful measures prior to
armed intervention, and this often results in unfavourable
humanitarian outcomes for inhabitants. (Weiss; 2007: 45). My
view is that, where appropriate and warranted, and pursuant of
social justice, it would be more effective if neighbour states
6
and/or regional organisations were allowed to fast-track
intervention measures, thereby avoiding inevitably lengthy UNSC
deliberations about legality, sovereignty issues and resources.
The abject failures of UNAMIR (Rwanda) and UNPROFOR
(Former Yugoslavia) are cases in point and demonstrate UNSC’s
ineptitude in decision-making and oversight. Furthermore, the
UNSC’s reliability in determining which cases are worthy of
intervention has also been called into question, as is
evidenced from its response in Rwanda and Darfur. Rwanda, for
instance, was not of significance to any of the P-5 members,
and was repeatedly ignored during the genocide, despite
continuous appeals by UMAMIR leader, Romeo Dallaire, for a
stronger military presence. In the face of the emerging
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, the People’s Republic of China,
out of self-interest and to preserve the notional balance of
power among the P-5, exercised its veto. The ensuing stalemate
prevented military action against the government of Sudan,
thereby prolonging the humanitarian crisis. Even where the UNSC
sanctions military action, the convoluted command structure
under which UN forces operate present serious difficulties and
7
this problem is unlikely to improve in the near future (Weiss;
1994: 64).
UNSC decisions, even when unanimous, have always
been the subject of controversy chiefly because the Council, as
the sole validator of international security action, is
unrepresentative in its membership. Moreover, its undemocratic
perception is underlined by the fact that none of its permanent
members come from the Southern Hemisphere and, although its P-5
have a controlling influence over all its affairs, it is not
answerable or accountable to any other body, e.g. the General
Assembly or the International Criminal Court. Its structure is
also widely perceived to be unwieldy and ineffectual because of
the predictable and self-serving use of vetoes and, as
evidenced throughout the 1990s, the overall ineffectiveness of
its missions (Thakur; 2002: 334). The widely accepted
perception that it is predominantly a forum for rhetoric, not
action, reveals its chief weakness and, because of this, it
lacks sufficient political capital to dissuade member states
from using unilateral force. The UNSC’s lack of credibility in
this respect stems mainly from its inability to respond
flexibly, decisively and, above all, in a timely manner to
8
humanitarian needs. Condemning violence and urging restraint
through resolutions or sanctions are not credible alternatives
in the face of human rights violations. Past experience shows
that, in these situations, time is of the essence; civilians in
peril can ill afford to wait for sanctions or resolutions to
produce results, nor should they have to await the outcome of
discourse or for decisions regarding their immediate safety and
humanitarian needs. The Syrian conflict provides ample current
evidence of the above perceptions.
Lastly, the UNSC dithered as genocide and ethnic
cleansing took place in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan
and did little to mitigate the civil wars in both Liberia and
Somalia, with the latter having yet to be resolved. We know
that, within the international community and the UNSC, there is
a systematic and deliberate avoidance of the use of the word
‘genocide’ (Melvern; 2000: 138) because, once acknowledged, it
would engender a legal obligation to act fast and decisively in
accordance with the UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (United Nations; 1948:
Article 1). “The reluctance by some states to use the term
‘genocide’ [is] motivated by a lack of will to act” (United
9
Nations; 1999: 38). This becomes an endemic situation where
self-interest motivates too literal and too rigid an
interpretation of international law. This has had the effect of
stultifying UN response capability and explains its poor record
of enforcing its human rights obligations.
The interventions, by NATO in Kosovo and by the UN
in Rwanda, are interesting, if contrasting, cases relevant to
my topic. In both cases, the humanitarian need was real and
peremptory and required an urgent response. However, as with
all interventions, actors must face the dilemma which was
succinctly framed in a question posed by the then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan: “How could the international community
reconcile respect for state sovereignty with the need to
intervene to prevent human suffering and systematic human
rights violations?” (Beswick and Jackson; 2011: 94) Given the
scale and nature of the problems in both instances, the answer
to this question was crucial. NATO defended its strong and
decisive response as legitimate in the face of an imminent
human catastrophe. Time did not allow it wait for the legal
authority that, when acquired, may not have been adequate to
end the crisis. In the case of Rwanda, all international legal
10
requirements were secured and the response was both late and
inadequate with an appalling outcome. If there is any lesson to
be learned from both experiences, surely it is that the better
outcome is achieved when ‘legitimacy’ has primacy over
‘legality’.
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine,
formulated by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, seeks to bring clarity to
the problem of intervention when humanitarian issues present
themselves to the international community. In a nutshell, R2P
argues that whereas sovereignty confers rights – principally to
non-intervention – it also imposes responsibilities, the most
fundamental of which is to protect citizens. When a state
reneges on this fundamental duty, the R2P principle imposes a
responsibility on the international community “to prevent
conflict and other crises which put populations at risk; to react
to human suffering … and to rebuild providing resources and
support as necessary” (Beswick and Jackson; 2011: 94).
Consequently, if a sovereign state cannot uphold its
responsibility to protect its citizens from widespread abuses
of human rights, the international community has a moral duty
11
to intervene forcibly, if necessary, in order to protect human
rights (ICISS; 2001a: 12).
However, some contend that, since the adoption of
the R2P principle, world events show an emerging “gap between
promise and reality” (Chandler; 2009: 27) and cite the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003 in support of their view. McFarlane et
al (2004: 979) argue that powerful states will determine whose
human rights justify departure from their traditional policy of
non-intervention and, cognisant of this, in order to alleviate
fears about the misuse of R2P by strong belligerent states
against small states, the version of R2P that was accepted at
the 2005 World Summit was watered down from that advocated in
the original ICISS report. Chandler states that:
“as long as state institutions fail to create a framework that
enables conflicts to be ameliorated and the rule of law and
human rights to be enforced, it is inevitable that actors will
attempt to take advantage and that the incentive to assume
state responsibilities of protection will be lacking”
(Chandler; 2009: 38).
It was hoped that the R2P principle would establish a bridge
between ‘restrictionist’ and ‘counter-restrictionist’
12
interpretations of the UN Charter but, from the evidence of the
ongoing crisis in Darfur and the new crises in the Central
African Republic and in Syria, it would appear to have achieved
considerably less than had been envisaged.
In human rights interventions, regional
organisations have a number of significant advantages in
comparison to the UN. Firstly, regional organisations often
have a “higher stake” in preventing and/or ending conflict
within their sphere of influence (MacFarlane & Weiss; 1994:
283). Member states within these spheres feel the effects of
regional conflict more acutely, such as population
displacement, a downturn in foreign direct investment from
abroad and, in general, regional instability. MacFarlane &
Weiss explain that regional organisations have a higher stake
in ensuring near-neighbour stability and are more likely to act
promptly and decisively in pursuit of these ends. (ibid). They
conclude that, whereas regional interventions have some obvious
limitations, they convey humanitarian benefits more efficiently
and more effectively than non-regional actors.
Secondly, regional organisations can offer ‘better’
intervention than the UN. Whereas some UN interventions, most
13
notably in Somalia, have not been cognisant of the cultural and
societal intricacies pertaining to the target country, regional
actors are more aware of local customs and beliefs. They
understand the nature of strife and ethnic tension in their own
immediate area, making them better mediators of local
conflicts. (ibid). Busumtwi-Sam argues that many of Africa’s
longest and most deadly conflicts are the result of a litany of
issues, and cannot be described by monocausal means (2002: 93).
Furthermore, these conflicts also involve a number of exogenous
actors including rival governments, mercenaries and various
militias, all of which have their own agenda. In these
circumstances, conflicts may span across entire regions and
involve complex arrangements of actors and roots, which make
regional actors best suited to mediating the nuances and
intricacies involved (ibid). Moreover, regional actors’ agendas
are seldom overloaded with the many global problems the UN
faces, thus allowing them focus exclusively on the crisis at
hand. Also, their response comes quicker and is better
targeted, especially if the intervention is undertaken by a
regional power “with the right mix of knowledge and capability”
(Welsh; 2002: 516).
14
Since the African continent is the most frequently
hit by humanitarian disasters, this particular context deserves
further attention. The African Union (AU) first began to codify
a norm of humanitarian intervention in 1998, under the
‘Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peace and Security’, which entitles it
to deploy peacekeeping forces into internal conflicts that pose
serious threats to peace in the region (ICISS; 2001b: 169).
Since then it had emerged as the regional guarantor of African
security. By embracing the creation of the Peace and Security
Council, it became the first regional organization to formally
ratify the normative right to intervene in the internal affairs
of member states when the UN is either unwilling or unable to
react. Furthermore, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) also deserves credit for attempting to solve
humanitarian crises in West Africa, despite some shortcomings
in the interventions it authorised. ECOWAS has intervened
militarily more than any other regional organization to stop
conflict (Taft & Ladnier; 2006: 17). Like the AU, ECOWAS
declared its normative right to intervene in regional conflicts
through the adopting of a protocol in 1999, which allows it to
15
intervene militarily in a member state in response to
humanitarian emergencies that threaten the security of the
region (Taft & Ladnier; 2006: 18).
However, Pattinson (2008) warns of the problems
facing regional organisations that undertake humanitarian
missions without UN sanction. While he accepts that many
Western states have both the military and logistical support
capability to deploy forces on a scale that are likely to be
effective, he draws attention to how humanitarian interveners
are perceived and accepted within the zone of need (Pattinson;
2008: 408). History reveals that most Western penetrations into
the global south and Middle East are likely to be faced with a
large level of local resistance. For example, in the aftermath
of the Iraq War, the US and Western democracies generally “do
not have the credibility in the eyes of the world to carry out
humanitarian intervention” (ibid). Similarly, ex-colonial
powers intervening in former colonies run the risk of being
perceived as pursuing colonial self-interest. Pattinson’s point
is convincing in that a potential intervener must carefully
weigh up whether or not it is likely to provoke an escalation
of a problem by creating more fighters than it disarms. In this
16
respect, he sees greater merit in using regional organisations
but warns that, with the exception of NATO and the EU, most
others, such as the AU and ECOWAS, suffer from massive
shortfalls in military funding and equipment, rendering
prolonged operations difficult (Pattinson; 2008: 409). He
considers the EU’s potential as an effective humanitarian actor
but acknowledges that, currently, it does not have agreed
structures to allow it to rapidly deploy a large force off
continent (ibid). The capacity of NATO to conduct successful
humanitarian operations has been demonstrated in Bosnia,
Kosovo, and most recently, in Libya. However, since NATO is
primarily a defence pact, any decision to deploy its troops in
humanitarian activities, especially outside of its zone of
influence, is perceived to be for reasons of self-interest
(Pattinson; 2008: 408).
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, a
number of humanitarian intervention case studies appear to
support the claim that regional organisations offer a better
and more viable alternative to UN involvement. The NATO
intervention in Kosovo and the UN intervention in the former
Yugoslavia were similar in that they were both deployed in
17
order to uphold human rights. Both missions necessarily
violated the territorial integrity of the target state, and
both involved complex military operations as well as civilian
components. However, UNPROFOR’s experience in the former
Yugoslavia was characterised by inaction and UN peacekeepers
were thrust into a conflict under-prepared and under-
resourced. Its peacekeepers’ mandate was inappropriate because
there was, at that time, no effective peace to keep. As a
result, the consequences were predictably catastrophic and
culminated in the horrific massacre at Srebrenica. NATO’s
action in Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was a peace
enforcement intervention and the alliance successfully
prevented Serbian forces from ethnically cleansing Kosovo of
its native Albanian population.
In their analysis of the totally inadequate
response to the conflict in Darfur, Bellamy & Williams (2006)
suggest how future reactions by the international community
might be rendered more effective. They recommend that states
should force the issue by rejecting the primacy of the UNSC
when decisions about intervention are necessary (Bellamy &
Williams; 2006: 157). Byers (2005) concurs and furthers the
18
argument by citing the example of NATO in Kosovo. Although
initially lacking UNSC authorisation, NATO succeeded in
acquiring a somewhat ‘ambiguous authorisation’ post the event
when the UNSC belatedly accepted that the situation
represented a grave threat to international peace and security
(Byers: 2005: 40-51). This ‘ambiguous authority’, sufficed to
confer legitimacy on NATO’s forceful intervention which, had
it not occurred, might have resulted in the kind of genocidal
atrocities reminiscent of Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica
1995. By forcing the issue and by reacting unilaterally, but
timely, NATO restored human security and prevented any further
escalation of the suffering.
In discussing issues of consent and legitimacy,
Glanville (2013) offers a different perspective on the role
of regional organisations in humanitarian intervention. He
proposes less dependence on the sovereign consent of the
troubled state and a greater reliance on consent from the
relevant regional organisation when making UNSC decisions
about Chapter VII interventions, particularly where human
rights abuses are relevant (Glanville; 2013: 326). In
examining the route to the NATO intervention in Libya,
19
Glanville analyses the rhetoric emanating from organisations
such as the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organisation of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the AU, all of which helped
procure the UN resolution authorising ‘all necessary means’
in response to gross violations of human rights by Libyan
government forces. He notes that, in their submissions to
the UN, these organisations demonstrated a deep
understanding of the nature of the Libyan conflict, the need
for immediate military action and the necessity in this
particular case to transcend legal issues relating to
sovereign consent (Glanville; 2013: 336). Summarising, he
concludes that the UNSC “should be guided by the opinions of
relevant regional organisations” and he notes how, in this
instance, “Western permanent members pushed this resolution
through once their pragmatic requirement for regional
consent had been met” (ibid). This example is crucial and
reveals an important precedent for allowing regional
organisations a role in securing authorisation for
intervention. Even when regional actors lack the necessary
military capability and resources to intervene decisively in
a neighbouring conflict, Glanville has shown that they can
20
exercise a crucial influence on events and this can be an
important resource to be capitalised on in deciding the
nature and strength of humanitarian interventions and in
avoiding self-interest, rigid interpretations of
international law and weakly-framed mandates.
Clarifying the roles of international and regional
organisations, Weiss theorises that in international
organisations, member states pursue national interests, even
when collective decisions are being made, making consensus
difficult because their priorities are not aligned. In
regional organisations, member states tend to have like
interests making agreement around common goals more likely
(Weiss; 2001: 424). Consequently, in Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR was
rendered paralysed by the diverse range of interests in the
UNSC. The Western countries backed the Croats in their fight
against Serbia, whereas Russia supported their Slavic
counterparts, the Serbs (while China remained ambivalent). In
Rwanda, the problem was not competing foreign policy
priorities, but a lack of priorities in general. The P-5 could
not agree on force deployment largely because there was no
strategic interest in the region. Conversely, NATO was
21
successful in Kosovo and Libya because the goals of its
members were aligned and it had sufficient support from its
Arab counterparts in the region. Although members did not make
equal contributions to the mission, they all agreed that the
mission was worthwhile and in their overall strategic
interest. In Liberia, ECOWAS intervened to bring stability to
the region because its members feared the economic impact of a
large-scale humanitarian disaster. All members were
stakeholders in a positive outcome. Weiss’s theory is
convincing and brings significant meaning to my topic. Unlike
the UNSC, most regional organisations are streamlined and
efficient in their structure, their member states have closely
aligned interests, are culturally compatible and are more
likely to have a common understanding of their goals and
responsibilities (Weiss; 1994: 64). For these reasons they are
best placed as responders of choice when faced with
humanitarian conflicts within their own zone of influence.
22
Bibliography:
Arend, Anthony C. & Beck, Robert J. 1993. International Law and the
Use of Force. London: Routledge.
Ayoob, Mohammed. 2002. “Humanitarian Intervention and State
Sovereignty.” The International Journal of Human Rights. 6; 1: 81-
102.
Bellamy, Alex. J. & Williams, Paul. D. 2006. “The UN Security
Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in
Darfur.” Journal of Military Ethics. 5; 2: 144-160.
Beswick, Danielle & Jackson, Paul. 2011. Conflict, Security and
Development: An
Introduction. London: Routledge.
Busumtwi-Sam, James. 2002. “Sustainable Peace and Development
in Africa.” Studies in Comparative International Development. 37; 3: 91-
118.
23
Byers, Michael. 2005. War Law: International Law and Armed Conflict.
London: Atlantic Books.
Chandler, David. 2009. “Unravelling the Paradox of ‘the
Responsibility to Protect.’” Irish Studies on International Affairs. 20:
27-39.
Glanville, Luke. 2013. “Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign
Consent to Regional Consent.” International Studies Perspectives.
14: 325-342.
Gordon, Joy. 1999. “Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and
the ‘Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian Dead’.” Cross Currents.
49; 3: 387-400.
Harhoff, Frederick. 2001. “Unauthorised Humanitarian
Intervention – Armed Violence in the Name of Humanity?”
Nordic Journal of International Law. 70; 65-120.
Holzgrefe, J. L. & Keohane, Robert. O. 2003. Humanitarian
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: University
Press.
International Commission on Intervention & State Sovereignty.
2001a. The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: International
Development Research Centre.
24
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
2001b. The Responsibility to Protect. Supplementary Volume. Ottawa:
International Development Research Council.
Kolodziej, Edward A. 2000. “The Great Powers and Genocide:
Lessons from Rwanda.” Pacifica Review. 12; 2: 121-145.
McFarlane, Neil S., Thielking, Carolin J., & Weiss, Thomas G.
2004. “The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in
Humanitarian Intervention?” Third World Quarterly. 25; 5: 977-
992.
MacFarlane, Neil S. & Weiss, Thomas. 1994. “The United
Nations, Regional Organisations and Human Security:
Building Theory in Central America.” Third World Quarterly.
15; 2: 277-295.
Melvern, Linda. 2000. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s
Genocide. London: Zed Books.
Normand, Roger & Zaidi, Sarah. 2008. Human Rights at the UN: The
Political History of
Universal Justice. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Pattinson, James. 2008. “Legitimacy and Humanitarian
Intervention: Who Should Intervene?” The International Journal of
Human Rights. 12; 3: 395-413.
25
Taft, Patricia & Ladnier, Jason. 2006. Realising ‘Never Again’: Regional
Capacities to Protect Civilians in Violent Conflicts. The Fund for Peace Project.
Washington: The Fund for Peace.
Thakur, Ramesh. 2002. “Intervention, Sovereignty and the
Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS.” Security
Dialogue. 33; 3: 323-340.
United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI.
Retrieved November 1, 2013
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/).
United Nations. 1948. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. Retrieved November 2, 2013
(http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html).
United Nations. 1999. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of
the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, December 15,
1999.
Weiss, Thomas. G. 1994. “Triage: Humanitarian Interventions in
a New Era.” World Policy Journal. 11; 1: 59-68.
Weiss, Thomas. G. 2001. “Researching Humanitarian
Intervention: Some Lessons.” Journal of Peace Research. 38; 4: 419-
428.
26