LAST OF THE MOHICANS? JAMES MCCOSH ANDPSYCHOLOGY “OLD” AND “NEW”

Elissa N. RodkeyYork University

This paper addresses the history of a rhetorical tradition in psychology that made adistinct division between old and new psychology and denigrated the old. The viewsof James McCosh, a transitional old psychologist and Princeton’s president from1868 to 1888, are analyzed to evaluate the stereotypical view of old psychology asantiscience and dogmatic. The evidence of James McCosh’s writings and his actionswhile president of Princeton suggest the need for a more nuanced interpretation ofthe relationship between the old and the new. While McCosh did not share the newpsychologists’ valuation of experimental psychology, this was because of a dis-agreement over the correct methods of science, not a rejection of science itself.Therefore, the negative view of old psychology is better understood as a rhetoricalstrategy on the part of new psychologists who had professional reasons to distancethemselves from their old psychology heritage.

Keywords: James McCosh, old psychology, new psychology, mental philosophy,Scottish Realism, Princeton

In his 1952 history of American psychology, A. A. Roback called JamesMcCosh the “Last of the Mohicans” for his role as the last representative of theold Scottish Realist faculty psychology that characterized most of the 19th century(Roback, 1952, p. 94). The connotation of the Mohican title is that McCosh wasa quaint hold-over from earlier days; a dying breed, out of place in the modernworld.1 This is but a 1950s articulation of a longstanding rhetorical strategy whichemphasizes “new” or experimental psychology’s discontinuity with the “old”mental philosophy.2 In this narrative, the new psychology’s arrival is seen as atotal revolution in framework and method that freed psychology from the shacklesof religion and authority that had previously impeded its advance.

This article was published Online First May 30, 2011.Elissa N. Rodkey, Department of Psychology, York University.I thank Laura Ball, Christopher Green, David Murray, Alexandra Rutherford, Kelli Vaughn,

and Jacy Young for their invaluable comments on previous versions of this article. An earlierversion of this paper was presented at the 116th annual meeting of the American PsychologicalAssociation, Boston, MA, August, 2008.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Elissa N. Rodkey, Departmentof Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele St., Behavioural Science Building, Toronto, ON,Canada, M3J 1P3. E-mail: erodkey@yorku.ca

1 Roback deems McCosh “unduly forgotten” but says “his name, when mentioned amongpsychologists almost always brings up the association of “bosh”” (1952, p. 110).

2 In this paper I refer to the old psychologists’ discipline as mental philosophy, however the oldpsychology also incorporated and is sometimes called moral philosophy, intellectual philosophy andfaculty psychology. “Old psychology” itself was not a term used by the new psychologists, butwhich is implied in the rhetoric of “new psychology,” as in Boring’s designation of “the old school”(1929, p. 517) or Baldwin’s “the psychology of yesteryear” (1902, p. 129).

History of Psychology2011, Vol. 14, No. 4, 335–355

© 2011 American Psychological Association1093-4510/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0022815

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This view was articulated by a number of the ‘new psychologists,’ mostmemorably by James McKeen Cattell, when he declared that the history ofpsychology in America before 1880 “could be set forth as briefly as the allegedchapter on snakes in a certain natural history of Iceland—‘there are no snakes inIceland’”3 (1898, p. 536). Similarly, he later claimed that before 1880, “In so faras psychologists are concerned, America was then like Heaven, for there was nota damned soul there” (Cattell, 1929, p. 12).

In this paper, I trace the history of the tradition of rhetoric which disparagedold psychology, using examples from several histories of psychology to define thestereotypical view of old psychology which this rhetoric perpetuated. I then adoptold psychologist James McCosh as a case study, looking for evidence of theantiscience, dogmatic attitude predicted by the old psychology stereotype. Iconclude that James McCosh’s writings and his actions while president ofPrinceton4 undermine this stereotype in important ways. McCosh was receptive tothe new psychology, actively promoting it at Princeton and attempting to incor-porate its findings into his own more traditional mental philosophy system. WhileMcCosh did not share the new psychologists’ valuation of experimental psychol-ogy, this was because of a disagreement over the correct methods of science, notbecause of a rejection of science itself. I argue that the negative view of oldpsychology should be revised, and instead understood as a rhetorical strategy onthe part of the new psychologists who were concerned to distance themselvesfrom their old psychology predecessors.

New Psychology Rhetoric

The stereotypical view of old psychology is preserved in the early histories ofpsychology, imparted to the historians by their first generation teachers. EdwinBoring continued the traditional denigration of old psychology by starting his1929 history with William James, and by ignoring McCosh’s role as James MarkBaldwin’s mentor (Boring, 1929). In his paper Masters and Pupils among theAmerican Psychologists, Boring identifies Baldwin with George Trumball Laddand G. Stanley Hall as those who lacked “Principal Teachers” (Boring & Boring,1948). In fact, at least three of the 13 designated “orphans” were mentored orinfluenced by a psychologist of the old school (Richards, 1995).5

Boring made his views of old psychology explicit in his dismissive review ofFay’s 1966 American Psychology before William James, a book covering psy-chologists so forgotten that Fay begins his work with a quote from Pliny the

3 This is a reference to The Natural History of Iceland, which is famous for the fact that in itsEnglish translation, the chapter on snakes consists of a single sentence “No snakes of any kind areto be met with throughout the whole island” (Horrebow, 1758, p. 91). Cattell also put the legend inwhich St. Patrick drove the snakes from Ireland to a similar rhetorical use. In 1929 at the NinthInternational Congress of Psychology, Cattell said: “A history of psychology in America prior to thelast fifty years would be as short as a book on snakes in Ireland since the time of St Patrick” (Cattell,1929, p. 12).

4 Before 1896 Princeton University was known as the College of New Jersey. While the collegewas officially known as the College of New Jersey throughout McCosh’s tenure as president, hesometimes called it Princeton in that period (Thorpe, Myers, & Finch, 1978). In this paper I referto the school by its modern name for the sake of clarity.

5 Ladd was influenced by Noah Porter and Hall by John Bascom (Richards, 1995).

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Younger: “I hold it a noble task to rescue from oblivion those who deserve to beeternally remembered” (1966, p. ii). Boring, however, questioned whetherMcCosh and his ilk merited rescuing and contested Fay’s genealogy. Accordingto Boring, the new psychologists owed no intellectual debt to the old: “‘AmericanPsychology Before William James’ died . . . without issue” (1940, p. 466).6

The strange and virulent rhetoric sometimes directed at old psychology canbest be illustrated by A.A. Roback’s, 1952, History of American Psychology.Although Roback deserves credit for being open-minded enough to actuallyinclude early American psychology in his history, he held a largely negative viewof old psychology in general, and Scottish Realism in particular. According toRoback, before 1880, psychology was “a mere stepping stone to logic, metaphys-ics, ethics or theology” rather than an end in itself (1952, p. 138). In Roback’sview, psychology had been at an impasse before experimental psychology:

It is clear that no empirical science could advance on the basis of postulates anddefinitions or logical derivations alone. So long as psychology remained thesuccubus of theology, as was the case throughout the 17th century, it could onlyrest on the authority of the past. (Roback, 1952, p. 37)

As Roback tells it, in this bleak scene there was yet hope: science, in the formof the new experimental psychology, would liberate psychology from the oppres-sive old psychology. Contact with the new German scientific method allowedpsychology to throw “off the yoke of philosophy” (Roback, 1952, p. 138), to “befreed from its bondage, and live a life of its own” (Roback, 1952, p. 109).Although some of his analysis about the state of pre-1880 psychology may beaccurate, Roback’s rhetoric—old psychology as “doomed to sterility,” “the suc-cubus of theology,” suffering under “the yoke of philosophy,” and in need ofbeing “freed from its bondage”—communicate the harsh views of old psychologythen accepted. While Roback’s inflammatory rhetoric is not necessarily represen-tative,7 because few histories included early American psychology, those that did,such as Roback’s book, had an inordinate impact on the field’s perception of old

6 Consistent with this attitude, in Boring’s own history of the discipline (Boring, 1929)McCosh, mentioned only in connection with Baldwin, is dismissed as “one of the last of the oldschool of philosopher-psychologists who therefore finds no other mention in this book” (Boring,1929, p. 517). Elsewhere Boring reiterates his firm position: “The ancients of American psychologywere not the prophets” (Boring, 1953, p. 652). Boring’s exclusion of old psychology should beunderstood in the context of his strict positivist outlook and his experiences at Harvard; his effortsto make psychology independent of the philosophy department did not succeed until 1936 (Cerullo,1988).

7 Richards warns that Roback is “idiosyncratic” (1995, p. 19), and indeed, many of the claimsRoback makes about old psychology are demonstrably false and appear to be the result of personalbias. In his review of Roback’s history Boring comments that Roback “seems to have no feeling thatthe historian should try to suppress his value judgments” (Boring, 1953, p. 651), although, becausethis is Boring’s review, this is not a critique of the book’s diatribes against old psychology. Roback’sapparent reason for his grudge against the old psychology is best summarized by his commentaryon Noah Porter: “No one can quarrel with a man about his religious beliefs, but to inject them intoscience is an unwarranted intrusion and an attack upon its sovereignty” (1952, p. 104). Roback’sidentity as a Polish-born Jewish scholar writing shortly after WWII perhaps explains his strongfeelings on the subject (Allport, 1965).

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psychology. Few scholars8 challenged the depiction of new psychology as throw-ing off “the shackles of a scholastic system pervaded by theological dogma, thusthrottling all progressive thinking” (Roback, 1952, p. 18).

More common but equally powerful was history books’ complete silence onthe subject, which effectively wrote old psychology out of disciplinary history. In1934 Christian Ruckmick contributed a piece to the American Journal of Psy-chology’s News and Discussions section in which he drew the journal’s attentionto James McCosh, who Ruckmick had discovered “quite accidentally”9 in hisresearch for a book on emotions (Ruckmick, 1934). Ruckmick had never beforeheard of James McCosh, and was surprised to find that McCosh’s The Emotions(McCosh, 1880a) included a passage that anticipated the James-Lange theory.Ruckmick expressed his astonishment that such a contribution could have been soforgotten: “I am really amazed to find so far absolutely no references to it in thehundreds of references that I have gone over” (Ruckmick, 1934, p. 506). In hisarticle Ruckmick reviewed the handful of references to McCosh he had found, andnoted McCosh’s conspicuous absence from well known histories, for examplecommenting, “It is surprising, too, that Titchener’s historical review fails tomention this contribution to the James-Lange doctrine ” (Ruckmick, 1934, p.508). Apparently unaware of the traditional bias against old psychology, Ruck-mick could not understand the exclusion of a legitimate contribution to the fieldfrom its histories.

Modern Scholarship on Old Psychology

More recently historians of psychology have challenged the traditional viewof old psychology and now early psychologists are generally given more credit fortheir contributions (see Fuchs, 2000; Richards, 1995, 2004). For example, GrahamRichards summarizes the old psychology’s response to the new psychology thus:

But far from remaining static, things change dramatically from 1860 onward.Instead of the university teachers being hidebound and dogmatic, and ignoringphysiology and experiment, we find an increasingly widespread effort to engageprecisely these issues. (Richards, 1995, p. 5)

Further, as O’Donnell notes, the stereotypical view of old psychology leavessome important questions unanswered:

It fails to explain, for example why many moral philosophers welcomed the newpsychology with open arms. . .The persistent notion of “the academic revolution”that occurred in the last quarter of the 19th century deflects attention from theessential continuities between the new psychology and old moral philosophy.(O’Donnell, 1985, p. 6)

These continuities have been emphasized by several modern historians ofpsychology, who offer convincing evidence of continuity in characteristics of the

8 The only scholarship contesting this version of events before Evans (1984) appears to be Fay(1939), and even Fay, who had a very positive evaluation of old psychology, did not question thediscontinuity narrative (Richards, 1995).

9 Ruckmick reports that he learned of McCosh’s The Emotions from an advertisement inBaldwin’s translation of Ribot’s German Psychology of Today (1886).

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old psychology which were retained far into the new psychology—notably itsmoral vision and introspective methods (Fuchs, 2000; Kosits, 2004; Pickren,2000; Richards, 1995).10

But origin-myths are slow to die, and informally within psychology thereremains a widespread tendency to regard the early 1800s as a sort of dark ages inwhich the only psychology which occurred was hopelessly corrupted by theologyand Scottish Realism. This attitude is facilitated by most psychology textbooks’silence on the subject, leaving students to assume that pre-1880 psychology isirrelevant, if not nonexistent, and giving them no reason to disbelieve earliertextbooks in which the new psychologists’ account of old psychology is repro-duced wholesale. A relatively modern articulation of the traditional view comesfrom a 1972 history of psychology:

American psychology had hitherto been saturated with the spirit of the Scottishschool; it had been dogmatic in its approach, disregarding both physiological andexperimental methods. Prior to 1880, the only important American contributionswere a few articles by William James during the seventies (Murphy & Kovach,1972, p. 175).

This, it should be noted, is in essence Cattell’s claim, lacking only the snakes and“dammed souls” hyperbole.

Although there is now consensus that this Whiggish assessment of oldpsychology ought to be abandoned, there is less agreement about how accurate thetraditional old psychology stereotype is. The fact that there was more continuitybetween the old and new psychology than previous acknowledged, or that newpsychologists used immoderate rhetoric to describe old psychology does notnecessarily disprove the view of old psychologists as dogmatic and antiscience. Infact there were legitimate differences between the old and new psychology; theydiffered significantly in terms of their emphasis, vocabulary, loyalties, aims, andmethod.

It is the difference in methods that seems to have been most important for newpsychologists. The essential difference between the old and new psychology,according to E. W. Scripture’s The New Psychology (Scripture, 1897),11 wasdisagreement over the proper method for studying the mind: “We have nowbefore us the point at issue between the old method and the new, namely: is simpleobservation of our minds adequate to the establishment of facts concerningmind?” (1897, p. 2). In the new psychology “unaided observation” (Scripture,

10 Richards (1995) argues that new psychologists continued to work on the same moral projectchampioned by old psychology; Fuchs (2000) highlights how mental philosophers and theirtextbooks influenced the content and social place of the new psychology; Pickren (2000) shows howthe new psychologists embraced religious language and issues in their popularization efforts; Kosits(2004) argues that the “faculty fallacy” criticism often leveled against the old psychology by the newwas largely based on caricature and both old and new psychology shared a concern about free willthat made faculty psychology attractive.

11 Incidentally, Scripture’s more moderate expression of the differences between old and newpsychology is an interesting counterexample to anti-old psychology rhetoric; Scripture’s bookdemonstrates that it was possible to describe these differences without being dismissive or derog-atory. (He even called old psychologists “observationalists” and new psychologists “psycho-physiologists” (1897, p. 10), avoiding the value judgment implicit in the “old” and “new”designations.

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1897, p. 2) was suspect, because “habit and sympathy” and “passions, ourprejudices, and the dominant opinion of the day” (Scripture, 1897, p. 4) influenceobservation.

The solution to these difficulties was the new method available, what Scrip-ture called “systematised observation” (Scripture, 1897, p. 1). Scripture soundeda triumphal note on behalf of the new psychology: “A new method, a natural-science method, has been found; it is the method of psychological experiment”(1897, p. 14). The importance of experiment was further emphasized by Scrip-ture’s dedication of the book to three important founders of psychological labo-ratories, Wilhelm Wundt, G. Stanley Hall, and George Trumbull Ladd, “InRecognition Of Their Invaluable Services In Establishing A New Science”(Scripture, 1897, p. ii). Scripture opined that the central principle of the newpsychology was “a deep distrust of man’s mind when left to itself, but a firm beliefin its reliability when working in true comradeship with carefully determinedfacts” (1897, p. 2), that is to say, facts that had been determined via scientificobservation and measurement. In this light old psychology was handicapped by itsmethod: although Scripture acknowledged that even scientists were influenced by“the dominant opinion of the day,” old psychology’s reliance on “unaidedobservation” and introspection12 left it dangerously vulnerable to the biasingeffect of its allegiances to religious orthodoxy and philosophical tradition.

As Capshew (1992) has noted, laboratories were essential to the discipline’searly identity and claims to scientific legitimacy, as reflected by new psycholo-gists’ preoccupation with laboratories; in addition to establishing their ownlaboratories, psychologists often visited other laboratories, wrote detailed ac-counts of laboratories’ setup and equipment, and engaged in priority disputes onthe subject. Indeed, it can be argued that the psychology experiment, as repre-sented by the fetishization of laboratories, was what was distinctively new about“new” psychology. Given the importance of laboratories and experimental meth-ods in new psychologists’ self-understanding, their denunciations of old psychol-ogy make sense, but this only reveals new psychologists’ biases, and does not helpadjudicate their claims.

Yet the new psychologists’ emphasis on their new scientific methods doessuggest a promising strategy for evaluating the accuracy of the old psychologystereotype: exploring old psychologists’ attitude toward the new experimentalpsychology. As we have seen, new psychologists antagonized the old, but werethe old equally hostile toward the new? The stereotypical view of old psychologyimplies that the old rejected the new experimental method; therefore a neutral orpositive attitude toward new psychology can be taken as evidence that at least thatpart of the traditional view of old psychologists is a caricature, better understoodas the result of the new psychologists’ own biases.

James McCosh: A Transitional Old Psychologist

To evaluate the traditional view of old psychology, I will focus on a specificold psychologist, James McCosh, Princeton’s president from 1868 –1888.

12 Certain forms of introspection were of course welcome in the new psychology, but thephilosophical variety practiced by old psychologists, which produced lists of mental faculties, waswidely seen as outdated.

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McCosh is a strategic choice because his Scottish Realist philosophy is consistentwith the views of earlier 19th century American psychologists, yet his historicallocation meant he encountered the new psychology. McCosh’s response to thenew psychology can offer insight into how old psychologists conceptualizedpsychology, and how receptive to the new psychology earlier figures might havebeen.

Many of McCosh’s personal attributes epitomize old psychology: he was aScottish Realist, an ordained minister affiliated with a Protestant denomination,and a college president. Most mental philosophers in the United States during theperiod between Jonathan Edwards and James McCosh were college administra-tors, generally college presidents who taught mental and moral philosophy in asenior level capstone course, and McCosh was certainly a college president in thismold. Not only does McCosh fit the image of the old psychologist as a ScottishPresbyterian, but Princeton, as the Presbyterian stronghold, was known as abastion of Scottish Realism, which provided the philosophical basis for much ofold psychology (Riley, 1915). McCosh was an enthusiastic apologist for ScottishRealism: his book The Scottish Philosophy (McCosh, 1875) did much to defineScottish Realism as a coherent philosophical school (Richards, 2004). McCosh isnow considered to be the last major figure in that tradition, a throwback to ScottishRealism’s glory days (Hoeveler, 1981), perhaps another reason for Roback’sepithet.13

Despite McCosh’s “Last of the Mohicans” designation, he was not, during histenure at Princeton, seen as so traditional as to be considered irrelevant. JamesMcCosh was a moderate voice among his peers, especially when compared to theconservative Noah Porter at Yale University and the liberal Charles Eliot atHarvard University. Taken together, the views of these three presidents provide apicture of the state of American education and psychology in 1885, the year theywere invited to participate in a debate on the elective system in education by theNineteenth Century Club of New York.14 Eliot, the only one of the three who wasa president but not a mental philosopher, represents the more liberal attitudestoward education that would coincide with new psychology, and Noah Porter, bestknown for his influential mental philosophy textbook, was reactionary in terms ofthe same trends. The Nineteenth Century Club’s selection of McCosh for thedebate, in conjunction with the other two figures, suggests that the Club sawMcCosh as a moderate voice—good evidence that he was not perceived asoutside the mainstream by his contemporaries.

13 The fact that McCosh began his tenure at Princeton exactly 100 years after John Wither-spoon began his term as Princeton’s president invited comparison of the two Scots. Indeed, theyappear to have had very similar philosophical views, despite their 100 year distance; Witherspoonalso battled against skepticism and idealism using the resources of Scottish Realism (Evans, 1984).

14 The introduction of an elective system of education was the hot pedagogical issue of the day,and in this debate McCosh was a moderate. McCosh argued for a relaxation of the classicalcurriculum to allow for upperclassmen to take some electives, while retaining those required courses“which the wisdom of the ages has pointed out as being at the foundation of all true education”(Sloane, 1896, p. 202). In contrast, Porter advocated no changes to the curriculum, and Elioteliminated required courses altogether, which, in McCosh’s estimation, resulted in a school in which“everything is scattered like the star dust out of which worlds are said to have been made” (Sloane,1896, p. 202).

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Yet McCosh was also a transitional figure in terms of old psychology. In thecourse of his lifetime, American secondary education changed dramatically, theintroduction of the elective system being but one aspect of its transformation.College instructors went from being generalist tutors to specialists in a particularfield, textbooks proliferated, and curricula expanded from their classical origins toinclude the burgeoning sciences (Evans, 1984). Science’s more prominent rolecan be seen in the amount of funding allocated to scientific equipment: anantebellum college might possess a couple of hundred dollars worth of equipment,whereas in the second half of the century Wesleyan University’s $7,394.20inventory of apparatus was more typical (Guralnick, 1976).15

While McCosh happily helped usher in these sorts of changes at Princeton,the period also brought new philosophical ideas to America, which posed aserious challenge to the credibility of McCosh’s Scottish Realist ideals. Unlike hisold psychology forebearers, McCosh had to come to terms with the challenges ofnew philosophers such as Kant and Berkeley as well as with the theologicalimplications of Darwin’s theory of evolution. These encounters make him distinctfrom old psychology predecessors, yet there is a basic continuity between them.Returning to Roback’s “Last of the Mohicans” designations provides a helpfulanalogy: Uncus, “The Last of the Mohicans” in James Fenimore Cooper’s novel,set in 1757, was not the ‘pure,’ unspoilt Indian of earlier generations, but one whohad encountered white settlers, adjusting to their customs and appropriating someof their more useful tools (such as the rifle), while still remaining undeniablyMohican (Cooper, 1826). In the same way McCosh was changed by his contactwith new developments in science and philosophy, and his struggles to integratethese new insights differentiate him from earlier old psychologists, yet he retainshis old psychology identity. In fact it is his decisions about what parts of the newpsychology to accommodate and appropriate, and what had to be rejected in orderstay true to his identity, which make him such a useful and interesting case study.

If McCosh can be taken as a reasonable representative for old psychology,then his beliefs and actions may be used to judge the accuracy of the traditionalnegative stereotype. Based on the stereotype perpetuated by Scripture, Boring,and Roback, we should evaluate the role of religion in McCosh’s thinking, hisattitude toward science and his response to the new psychology. The evidence forMcCosh’s stance comes from two main sources: his philosophical and psycho-logical writings, and his actions while president of Princeton. Both types ofevidence are important because, on the one hand, it would be possible for McCoshto pay lip service to experimental psychology without taking any action thatsupported it, or, on the other hand, to act in ways that encouraged the newpsychology but to have produced no writings that communicate a philosophicaljustification for it. The best evidence for old psychologists’ positive attitude

15 Guralnick debunks various myths about the role of science in 19th-century Americancolleges; like the old psychologists, these earlier colleges have often been taken to be anti-science,elitist, and narrowly classicist and orthodox. This suggests that the old psychology stereotypes canbe understood as a part of a wider misunderstanding of this period, which Guralnick attributes to acombination of ignorance and historians who imposed their modern expectations of a German-styleuniversity on the era (Guralnick, 1976).

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toward new psychology would be if McCosh demonstrated support of the new inboth his writing and actions.

McCosh’s Opinion of New Psychology

James McCosh was born in Scotland in 1811, where he benefited from theafter effects of the Scottish Renaissance and received a superior education(Sloane, 1868). He spent several years as a village pastor before being offered aposition teaching philosophy at Queen’s College in Belfast. His philosophicalwriting (generally on psychological subjects) was widely read and when McCoshvisited America in 1866 he found that he was a popular figure there. Soon after,when the trustees of Princeton were looking for a president who would satisfy allfactions, they thought of McCosh (Hoeveler, 1981).16 McCosh was theologicallyorthodox yet proscience, and the trustees hired him in large part because theybelieved he would work to integrate traditional Presbyterian doctrine with newscientific findings (Maier, 2005).

McCosh arrived at Princeton in 1868, to an extremely warm welcome andquickly set about reforming the school. McCosh called for an elective program ofstudies, launched an energetic building campaign, and strengthened the faculty,recruiting prominent scholars rather than relying on the Presbyterian ranks to fillvacancies, as had been the traditional practice (Hoeveler, 1981). His ideal was forhis former students, “me bright young men,” to receive the latest training in theirfields and return to “me college” as professors (Maier, 2005, p. 14). The Princetoncommunity was largely enthusiastic about these initiatives, as McCosh reports:“In those days I was like the hound in the leash ready to start, and they encouragedme with their shouts as I sprang forth into the hunt” (Sloane, 1896, p. 191).

These reforms were motivated by McCosh’s high view of science. McCosh wasa staunch Scottish Realist, believing in the accuracy of perception and the promise ofBaconian science. A devout Christian, science was not a threat to McCosh but yetanother form of God’s truth that would not ultimately (once all the facts werediscovered) contradict revealed truth (Sloane, 1896). Science and religion were to beindependent, neither subjected to the other’s approval. According to McCosh, “Ourfirst inquiry, when an asserted discovery in science is announced, should be, not is itconsistent with Scripture, but is it true?” (McCosh, 1880b, p. 209). McCosh practicedwhat he preached when he embraced and promoted theistic evolution at a time whenmost Protestants were hostile toward Darwinism.17

McCosh’s approach to psychology was consistent with this embrace ofscience, but he held inductive introspection as the scientific method through whichthe mind was to be explored. McCosh defined psychology as “that science which

16 McCosh was favorable to Princeton’s offer since he had recently lost the University ofAberdeen chair of logic to Alexander Bain (Pillsbury, 1929).

17 It could be argued that McCosh neglected to extend this dictum to philosophical advances,with the result that he became philosophically outmoded. Richards (2004) points out that Porter andMcCosh failed to pursue their insights on the language problem because their philosophical projectwas set up so that they were incapable of producing results which were at odds with the orthodoxPresbyterian/Scottish Realist conception of the human mind. This want of philosophical toleranceon McCosh’s part certainly contributed to his particular views about the proper role of physiologicalpsychology (as compared to inductive findings), but does not diminish his positive attitude towardsscience.

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inquires into the operations of the conscious self with the view of discoveringlaws” (McCosh, 1886, p. 1) and this discovery of mental laws was to occurthrough the observation of mental actions by the conscious self. This optimisticview of introspection was justified by the central tenet of Scottish Realism, thedirect perception of reality. The realists saw observation of the mind as a logicalextension of scientific observation of the natural world, since they held that man’sknowledge of both mind and matter was immediate, leading to an equally“positive, though limited knowledge” (McCosh, 1871, p. 104) of both realms.Against Kantian idealism and Humean skepticism, McCosh declared: “I affirmthat we know mind, just as we know matter, directly” (1871, p. 102).

Physiological psychology was just getting its start but McCosh thoughtphysiological research might be the “next great addition to psychology” althoughnot yet able to “furnish much aid in explaining mental phenomena” (1875, p. 5).Experimental psychology was to supplement and enhance the insights ofmental philosophy, not do away with it—a development that might lead tomaterialism. In his 1860 mental philosophy textbook Intuitions of the Mind,McCosh was cautiously optimistic about those who would “explain mentalphenomena by physiological processes” (1860, p. 8): “If premature theoriesare not constructed and inferences are kept from outrunning facts, the re-searches prosecuted are worthy of all encouragement” (McCosh, 1860, p. 8).However, he says, nerves and physical forces will never be able to explaincertain mental phenomena, “such as consciousness, intelligence, emotion, theappreciation of beauty, and the sense of moral obligation” (1860, p. 8).Because these are spiritual, rather than physical phenomenon, the propermethod for studying these phenomena is through “careful self inspection,”“not by any method of sensible observation, or of weighing and measuring”(McCosh, 1860, p. 8). “In particular,” he concludes, “physiology can neversettle for us the ultimate laws of thought and belief” (McCosh, 1860, p. 8).

McCosh was concerned that experimental psychology would be reductionist, thatit would leave the idea of the soul as barren as the moon, “without atmosphere,without water, without life” (1871, p. 178). However, McCosh emphasized that it wasnot natural science itself, or as he put it, the “extensive studies of science” that heobjected to, but the “exclusive” study of science (1871, p. 181). His concern was thatstudents of the sciences “be reminded that they have souls, which they are very apt toforget when their attention is engrossed with the motions of stars or the motions ofmolecules, with the flesh, the bones, the brain” (1871, pp. 181–182).

McCosh was confident that the physiological evidence thus uncovered wouldbe consistent with a Christian worldview, the danger was with an incorrect,materialistic interpretation of the facts. For this reason, it was essential for mentalphilosophers such as McCosh to engage with the new psychology:

The metaphysician must enter the physiological field. He must, if he can, conductresearches; he must at least master the ascertained facts. He must not give up thestudy of the nervous system and brain to those who cannot comprehend anythingbeyond what can be made patent to the senses or disclosed to the microscope.(McCosh, 1875, p. 458)

McCosh’s chief criticism of the new psychology was its narrowing concep-tion of causality. McCosh embraced Aristotle’s four part explanation of causality

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and believed the new psychology was exclusively addressing the efficient cause,while neglecting the all-important final cause (Robinson, 1979).

In McCosh’s view, metaphysicians were better equipped to distinguish be-tween the various types of causes, qualifying them to study mind. They were alsomost familiar with the method of induction, which was the key to understandingmental structure, not physiological observation: “The microscope has not yet beeninvented which is fitted to show us the working of perception of any intelligent actof the mind. To get information we now have to use, not the senses, but theconsciousness” (McCosh, 1886, pp. 58–59). Physiological psychology could beuseful, but its practitioners needed to know its limits:

Let physiology penetrate as far as it can into the secrets of the organism, say insight, into the structure of the eye, of the optic nerve, and it may be of the angulargyrus in the brain. But let it modestly stop when it comes to something whichcannot be seen or touched, which cannot be weighted or measured. At that pointlet psychology take up the investigation and inquire what is the nature of percep-tion, memory, reasoning, and other conscious acts. (McCosh, 1886, p. 59)

The new psychology, in McCosh’s view, was to provide new insights into therelation between mind and brain, but it was to limit itself to establishing physi-ological matters-of-fact. The interpretations of such facts, especially those relatedto the nature of mind, was to be left to metaphysicians such as McCosh, who wereuniquely qualified by their long years of experience in dealing with philosophicaldistinctions and their knowledge of philosophical tradition.

McCosh’s Actions at Princeton

Despite his allegiance to the old psychology, McCosh intentionally fosteredan environment at Princeton where the new psychology would flourish. Much ofthis resulted from his own fascination with the field, as he attested in hisautobiography: “Following my tastes, I have endeavored to create and sustain aninterest in all branches of Mental Philosophy” (Sloane, 1896, p. 14). McCosh tookan active hand in psychology at Princeton, instituting new psychology electives,and elaborating his views in the several courses he taught—most notably arequired junior-level mental philosophy course that he renamed “Psychology”(Maier, 2005). By all accounts it was a lively and inspiring class, in which,according to Baldwin’s later remembrances, empirical psychology was the “nu-cleus of all his instruction” (Baldwin, 1930, pp. 1–2).

Later on, McCosh revamped the psychology curriculum, inaugurating aphysiological psychology class that he team-taught with two Princeton graduateswho had been trained in science in Europe, and newly recruited to Princeton’sfaculty. According to Baldwin, the course included reading Wundt and demon-strations by the young professors, biologists Henry Fairfield Osborn and WilliamBerryman Scott (Baldwin, 1930). Although McCosh certainly gave the first partof the course a Scottish Realist orientation, in the rest of the course Osborn andScott were expected to introduce students to the new psychology by means of themost relevant physiological research. Eventually, in 1886, McCosh turned theclass over to Osborn and Scott entirely (Maier, 2005).

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Consistent with his scheme to encourage Princeton graduates to seek furthereducation, in 1869 McCosh obtained funds for the creation of the Mental ScienceFellowship, a $600 award that allowed students to pursue graduate studies abroad(Wetmore, 1991). The Mental Science Fellowship’s purpose was to enableMcCosh’s “bright young men” to receive the latest the new psychology had tooffer, so that they could return and enrich Princeton with their expertise. The firstrecipient of the fellowship went to study physiological psychology in Prussia, andlater Baldwin used the award to visit Wundt and study under Friedrich Paulsen inGermany; both students received McCosh’s full blessing on their choice (Wet-more, 1990). There is every indication that McCosh encouraged Baldwin in hisphysiological interests, and allowed the award recipients freedom to choose theirarea of study. William Scott, the biologist, upon graduation from Princetonreceived vague instructions that indicated both that freedom and the mania forEuropean training in that era: “Go to England and study something with some-body, and then go to Germany and study something else with some other body”(Scott, 1939, p. 85). The important thing was to have some continental training,it mattered less in what or for how long.

McCosh also promoted psychological thought at Princeton by the creation of“library meetings.” These meetings, held in McCosh’s residence and attended byfaculty, graduate students, and invited undergraduate upperclassmen, offered anacademic forum for the discussion of psychological and philosophical ideas.Princeton faculty, alumni or invited speakers would present a paper, followed bylively discussion. Although McCosh presided at these meetings, and felt free tocorrect any erring opinions, the existence of the group helped to spur thepsychological thinking of students such as Baldwin.

A more spontaneous society was the Wundt Club, a Friday night gatheringstarted in 1881 by several young Princeton professors including Osborn and Scott,intended to help them keep up with the latest psychological advances. Meeting inPrinceton’s zoological laboratory, the young professors discussed new scientificfindings and gave demonstrations on the brain and nervous system. Upon becom-ing aware of the club’s existence McCosh enthusiastically began attending itsmeetings. McCosh’s interactions with Osborn and Scott in the Wundt Club seem tohave inspired the creation of the physiological psychology class they taught together(Maier, 2005). McCosh was genuinely proud of the Wundt Club, asking, duringBaldwin’s time abroad, that Baldwin mention the club to Wundt (Maier, 2006).

McCosh’s enthusiasm for the new psychology also meant that he was eager to beassociated with cutting-edge research. He became involved with Henry FairfieldOsborn’s research on memory imagery, which used a questionnaire format based onFrancis Galton’s research, after Osborn presented his preliminary results at thePhilosophy Club (Galton, F., 1612–1926, H. F. Osborn to Galton, April 9, 1881).18

This research, which is generally regarded as the first psychological questionnaireresearch in North America, was the result of Osborn meeting Galton during hisgraduate studies in England, and their ensuing correspondence. Although Osborncarried out the actual research himself, the results were published jointly by McCoshand Osborn in 1884 as A Study of the Mind’s Chambers of Imagery (McCosh &

18 Thanks to Jacy Young for generously sharing the results of her investigation of the FrancisGalton Papers.

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Osborn, 1884). McCosh wrote the introduction and conclusion to the work, andpromoted it in his 1886 textbook Psychology: The Cognitive Powers.

McCosh’s collaboration with Osborn demonstrates that McCosh recognized theimportance of the new psychology, and wanted Princeton and his name associatedwith it. Although he was not qualified to conduct the research himself he couldsupport the research of his “bright young men,” and use his considerable reputation topopularize their work. McCosh’s involvement in Osborn’s research should be regarded aspatronage rather than collaboration, because it was clearly his name and influence thatMcCosh had to offer when he insinuated himself into Osborn’s questionnaire project.19

It seems that McCosh often took an active hand in advancing the careersof the most promising Princeton graduates, as a letter to William Scott duringhis graduate studies in Europe demonstrates. McCosh expressed his optimismat Scott’s prospects and expressed his willingness to aid Scott in finding ateaching position: “For myself I feel that I am bound to promote your interestsin every way I can” (Thorpe, Myers, & Finch, 1978, p. 18). He requested ashort summary of Scott’s studies in London, Cambridge, and Germany, as“This will help me in my effort to aid you” (Thorpe, Myers, & Finch, 1978,p. 19). Although McCosh no doubt promoted many of his graduates, men likeScott were of particular interest to McCosh, because they were engaging withthe new sciences. As he wrote to Scott, “I am glad you are devoting yourselfto comparative zoology and biology generally. It is the science of the day”(Thorpe, Myers, & Finch, 1978, p. 19).

McCosh offered patronage of a similar kind to James Mark Baldwin. In hisfirst year of graduate studies at Princeton, shortly after returning from Germany,Baldwin translated Theodule Ribot’s German Psychology of To-Day into English.This was clearly an effort in line with the aims of empirical psychology, asBaldwin noted in the translator’s note that the translation “was undertaken withthe feeling that no greater service of the kind could be rendered to the “newpsychology”” (Ribot, 1886, p. v). McCosh encouraged Baldwin in this effort andwrote the introduction to the translation, enthusiastically promoting Baldwin:“The work has been well translated by one who was a distinguished student andFellow in Mental Science of Princeton College, and who has since studied underthe great masters in Germany” (Ribot, 1886, p. xv).

Yet McCosh’s introduction to the translation shows that McCosh’s definiteviews on the role of physiological psychology had remained unchanged:

The particular excellence of this new branch of inquiry is that it uses the same meansas those by which physical science as reached with such certainty, particularlyexperiments conducted by instruments devised for the purpose, and to test theresults reached by measurement capable of being expressed numerically. Thesehave therefore a definiteness which cannot be secured by the more immediate butlooser observations of consciousness. I claim, indeed, that we have so far acompensation for this, in that we have a more direct and a much fuller knowledgeof mind by the inner sense; but this cannot be put in so scientific a form. The resultwe reach is that we are to attain a knowledge of mind by the judicious combination

19 Whether or not McCosh’s patronage actually enhanced Osborn’s career, McCosh couldcertainly claim him as one of his successes: Osborn went on to become one of America’s mosteminent evolutionary biologists.

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of the two processes, the one aiding the other. But the impression should not be leftthat we can gain a true knowledge of mind, of its lofty ideas, say of order anddesign, of perfection and infinity, or of its sentiments of reverence, benevolence,hope and love by mere experimenting on its material adjuncts which act and areacted upon by it. (Ribot, 1886, p. x–xi)

Although the new psychology was valuable because of its ability to expressfacts about the mind empirically, it needed to be conducted in conjunction withthe old mental philosophy. McCosh had no qualms about calling one of the “greatmasters” to account for overstepping these bounds:

Wundt is the most eminent living representative of the school of physiologicalpsychology. When he brings in metaphysics, however, exception may be taken tosome of his conclusions. Thus he will find few to follow him when he says that oursense perceptions are the conclusions of a process of reasoning instead of beingimmediate, as if we could by any legitimate process of reasoning get the perceptionof an extended thing from that which has no extension. (Ribot, 1886, p. xiv)

According to McCosh, when Wundt limited himself to “his own subject, therelation of the cerebro-spinal mass to mind, he has shown much ability, discriminationand wisdom” (Ribot, 1886, p. xiv). McCosh’s strict demarcation of physiologicalpsychology’s boundaries was because of his distinction between mind and brain:

Man does not consist of mind alone: he consists of soul and body. This is all thatmodern physiology has established, throwing a little, and only a little light upon it,no, not on the connection between the soul and the body, but on the bodily organsmost intimately associated with mental action. (McCosh, 1871, p. 184)

Despite these strong opinions about the limitations of new psychologyMcCosh recognized its relevance for mental philosophy, and, according to hisbiographer, was “busy at 80 incorporating some of the latest results of Germanresearch in a new edition of his Psychology” (Sloane, 1896, p. 263). McCoshhired Baldwin to help him integrate the latest in physiological research into histextbook Psychology: The Cognitive Powers, published in 1896, which alsoincluded nine anatomical illustrations—an innovation for McCosh (Maier, 2006).

New Psychology’s Opinion of McCosh

Increasingly McCosh’s definition of psychology as the study of the soul wasseen as outdated and his last textbook, although containing a smattering ofempirical research, received a scathing critique from G. Stanley Hall in the firstissue of The American Journal of Psychology.20 After praising McCosh’s engag-ing writing, Hall says, “Judged from a scientific standpoint, however, little that isgood can be said of the book” (Hall, 1887a, p. 147). Hall marvels that McCosh has

20 McCosh was not the only philosophically inclined author singled out for ridicule; BordonBowne’s Introduction to Psychological Theory also received harsh negative reviews in the sameissue, setting the precedent for how Hall would use the reviews section of the American Journal ofPsychology, most famously attacking William James’ Principles of Psychology. According toEvans, Hall treated the journal’s reviews section as “his bully pulpit for experimental psychology”as a part of his “program of separating experimental psychology from philosophical psychology”(Evans, 2005).

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maintained such an open mind to the new developments in what he calls “therapidly widening world of psychology,” yet derides his physiological descriptionsas “inexcusably careless,” which he speculates is because of McCosh’s “advancedyears, his heavy educational cares and responsibilities” (Hall, 1887a, p. 147).

Hall’s critique clearly arises from his new psychologist identity, for he addsMcCosh’s “early absorption in the Scottish philosophy” (Hall, 1887a, p. 147) tothe list of the handicaps that prevented McCosh from treating the science in hisbook properly. Scottish Realist philosophy is irrelevant in Hall’s vision ofpsychology; his full indictment of McCosh’s views reads “his early absorption inthe Scottish philosophy, the limitations of which those who most directly inheritits traditions now best see” (1887a, p. 147). Hall blasted McCosh for his failureto incorporate recent philosophical developments which were important for thenew psychology: “A still more grave defect of the book is the essential failure ofthe author to profit from both Greek and German philosophy” (1887a, p. 148). Inparticular, it is McCosh’s neglect of “Kant, whom our author cannot abide” (Hall,1887a, p. 148) that Hall finds particularly grievous. Hall believes Kant and Hegelto be “deep sources of wisdom” and McCosh’s neglect of them he pronounces“deplorable to the real interests of religion, as well as of science” (1887a, p. 149).

While it is true that Kant does not figure in The Cognitive Powers, it isprobably not true that McCosh had “never taken the trouble to acquaint himself”with the idealists, as Hall alleges (1887a, p. 148) since Kant features prominentlyin McCosh’s other philosophical works, but as a villain:

I wish it to be understood that I look on Kant as one of our great thinkers. There nevercan come a time when certain truths of Kant and the German philosophy are to beregarded as superseded. But Kant was guilty of one great oversight. He did not startwith Reality in his primitive assumptions. While we cannot dispense with him, thecrisis has come in which the Critical Philosophy should be critically examined, whenit will turn out that its supremacy should be set aside. (McCosh, 1894, p. 4–5)

McCosh cannot accept Kant into his philosophical system because Kant’sassumptions strike at the root of McCosh’s Scottish Realist beliefs: “A philosophywhich does not thus begin with Reality must always have something insecure inits foundation” (McCosh, 1894, p. 5). For Hall this failure to incorporate idealismis fatal and marks McCosh’s work as outdated. McCosh and Hall’s disagreementover the importance of Kant thus encapsulates the philosophical differencesbetween old and new psychology.

McCosh and Hall’s differing valuing of physiological findings is also telling.In the preface to The Cognitive Powers McCosh had avowed his hope to “avoiddryness by illustrating mental laws by examples taken from human nature” sincemental science could not be illuminated “as in the old missals” by figures, because“our thoughts have neither forms nor colors” (1886, p. iii).21 Hall uses thisreference to religious texts to skewer McCosh’s scientific figures: “The wood-cuts

21 McCosh’s assertion that mental science could not be illustrated is in itself revealing ofMcCosh’s distance from new psychology thinking. In contrast, George Trumbull Ladd’s Elementsof Physiological Psychology, which was published just a year after The Cognitive Powers and whichreceived a favorable review from Hall in the same issue of the American Journal of Psychology,reportedly had 114 woodcut illustrations, primarily anatomical (Hall, 1887b).

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of brain and sense organs that are inserted are but little more related to the textthan the marginal figures with which ancient missals were illuminated were wontto be” (1887a, p. 147). This disagreement about the role illustrations ought to playin psychology textbooks demonstrates the more profound disagreement about theimportance of physiological psychology. For McCosh it was an important newdevelopment that could supplement valuable mental philosophy insights and wastherefore worthy of some cursory remarks and illustrations. For Hall the newphysiological psychology was psychology, making scientific inaccuracies and afew haphazard figures “inexcusably careless” (Hall, 1887a, p. 147).

McCosh’s textbook proved a best seller, but his views were clearly beingdismissed in favor of the new psychology. “They won’t give me a hearing” hecomplained to his publisher, and later lamented “I feel at times laid aside” (Maier,2006, p. 114). Baldwin found himself in danger of suffering the same fate whenhe published his Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect, in which he citedMcCosh’s The Cognitive Powers and thanked him in the introduction. Thereviewer from Mind identified Baldwin as a “follower of McCosh” and charac-terized Baldwin’s approach as “a general willingness to take up all results ofscientific psychology that can be incorporated in the traditional scheme, philo-sophical and psychological” (Maier, 2006, p. 113).

Unhappy with being so closely identified with “the traditional scheme,”Baldwin responded in the introduction to the second edition, published the nextyear, that he must “strongly disclaim having made a declaration of discipleship inthe acknowledgments made to former instructors in my first preface” (Maier,2006, p. 115). After this incident, Baldwin rarely referenced McCosh in hiswriting, and in his address Psychology Past and Present at the World’s Colom-bian Exposition in 1893 he clearly distanced himself from “the psychology ofyesteryear” which he called “a propaedeutic to a philosophy and to a theology,both of which, as far as their demands upon mental science were concerned, weredogmatic and illiberal” (Baldwin, 1902, pp. 129). While Baldwin did mentionMcCosh in this speech, it was in an attempt to rehabilitate his reputation withinnew psychology. McCosh, Baldwin said,

welcomed and advocated the two new influences which I have taken occasionabove to signalize as the causes of the better state of things: the influence of theGerman work in psychology (see Preface to Ribot’s German Psychology ofTo-day, 1886) and that of the evolution theory in biology (see Religious Aspect ofEvolution, 1888). (Baldwin, 1902, p. 137–138)

Conclusion

Baldwin’s suppression of his association with McCosh points to the powerand early origin of the old psychology stigma. The notion of a sharp divisionbetween old and new psychology was not dreamed up by Boring, but wasconsistently articulated by the first generation of new psychologists, such asCattell and Hall, who appear to have been genuinely hostile toward the old. Whilemost were personally acquainted with the old mental philosophy, and thereforemight reasonably be expected to accurately describe it, the new psychologists’reliability as witnesses should be suspect, given their immoderate rhetoric andobvious motive to denigrate the old.

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It is generally held that at this point in history the new psychologists wereunder considerable pressure to legitimize their discipline as a science (Leary,1987; Pickren, 2000); therefore, it seems that their invective was an expedientrhetorical device, allowing them to define themselves against an antiscienceenemy, thereby emphasizing their scientific credentials and loyalties. Associologist of science Thomas Gieryn (1983) has shown, excluding rivals bylabeling them nonscientific is a common strategy in disciplines attempting tosecure a monopoly on scientific authority. Scientists seeking legitimatizationoften “move flexibly among repertoires of self-description” (Gieryn, 1983, p.783), choosing to represent themselves in ways which contrast favorably withtheir competition. In a similar vein Brown (J. Brown, 1992) describes howmetaphors function to protect privileged disciplinary knowledge while simul-taneously popularizing it. New psychology chose metaphors (such as medicineand engineering) that would give them authority and differentiate themselvesfrom traditional old psychology. In combination with these metaphors, theexperimental method so lauded by Scripture provided new psychology withthe credibility necessary to monopolize the authority on the mind, whichtheology and philosophy had previously shared.

By the end of McCosh’s life psychologists were aggressively and intention-ally engaged in professionalization through the establishment of journals, labo-ratories, professional organizations, and annual meetings modeled on successfulscientific disciplines such as chemistry and physics (Camfield, 1973). Choosingfields that were already well respected was a strategic move: “These practices ofrepresentation aligned psychology with the dominant habitus of instrumentalscientism, and created an occult vocabulary of expertise that excluded nonspe-cialists from the status and privileges of the emerging discipline” (R.H. Brown,1992, p. 58). As Leary describes the situation, legitimizing the new psychologyprovided a clear motive for slandering the old:

At times it was also necessary to discredit the credentials of those competing forthe same position in the job market and in the marketplace of theory and practice.Even as the New Psychologists were learning the argot of nerves and reactiontimes, others continued to speak of souls and faculties, and still others werebecoming fluent in discussing spirits and trances, alternate selves and mind cures.If the New Psychologists were to become the acknowledged authorities on mindand action, they had to make certain that theirs was the language-and the voices-that would be heard. (Leary, 1987, p. 320)

Given our consideration of McCosh’s views, it appears that while the newpsychology had a substantive quarrel with their moral philosopher forbearers, itwas over the methods of science, not science’s ultimate value. To return to E. W.Scripture’s The New Psychology, “the point at issue between the old method andthe new” was indeed a question of methods: “is simple observation of our mindsadequate to the establishment of facts concerning mind?” (Scripture, 1897, p. 2).McCosh, consistent with his Scottish Realist principles, would answer a firm‘yes’, while the new psychologists would answer a resounding ‘no.’ McCosh wasconfident that “unaided observation” (Scripture, 1897, p. 2) was the key tounderstanding the mind, whereas for new psychology inductive introspection was

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a dead end, impossibly influenced by “passions, our prejudices, and the dominantopinion of the day” (Scripture, 1897, p. 4).

Yet however old fashioned McCosh may have seemed to the new psycholo-gists, as we have seen, he was certainly not antiscience, he simply insisted on theimportance of philosophy in psychology, and did not have the luxury of access tophysiological methods throughout most of his career. Although his vision ofpsychology was influenced by his Christianity, it was not in the rigid, dogmaticmanner of stereotype. McCosh’s ideals were scientific, even if his method wouldnot long be considered so.

McCosh was enthusiastic about new psychology, taking action at Princetonthat facilitated his students’ exposure to and engagement with the new psychol-ogy. He created the Mental Science Fellowship and encouraged graduates topursue further study, giving them jobs at Princeton, and promoting their empiricalwork. McCosh understood the value of the new psychology and wanted to beinvolved with it himself, consistent with his view of the importance of metaphy-sicians being involved in the correct interpretation of new physiological researchresults. Though his writings show that he believed that physiological psychologyought to be kept within its own realm and not usurp metaphysics, he believed thatthe new psychology represented a significant advance in the knowledge of mind,if interpreted nonmaterialistically.

Based on this evidence, I propose that the idea of a drastic break between oldand new psychology should be understood primarily as a rhetorical strategy on thepart of the new psychologists that obscures the continuities that clearly existed.Old psychologists, exemplified by men like McCosh, attempted to adjust to thenew knowledge being advanced, and the men of new psychology got their start inand were thus influenced by the old psychology. In retrospect the discontinuitybetween old and new psychology appears to have been overemphasized by thenew psychologists who had a vested interest in differentiating themselves fromtheir intellectual heritage.

Perhaps one last reference to McCosh’s Last of the Mohicans status is helpfulhere. Cattell sometimes spoke about the rapid growth of psychology in agricul-tural analogies, for example attributing its success in America to “conditions ofthe soil as well as to the vitality of the germ” (Cattell, 1896, p. 135). Followinghis famous comparison of pre-1880 America to a snakeless Iceland, Cattell goeson to briefly mention old psychologists such as Edwards, Porter, and McCosh butdismissively concludes “But the land lay fallow” before William James (Cattell,1898, p. 536). Just as early American settlers claimed to have found a fertile landlying empty and unused, ignoring or blind to the presence and even agriculturalactivities of the Native Americans, it was convenient for new psychologists likeCattell to claim that they were cultivating land that had been lying fallow. Indismissing and ignoring the contributions of the old psychologists, the newpsychologists did their best to insure that their voices would be the voices thatprevailed, theirs the history that would be remembered.

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Received May 13, 2010Revision received October 14, 2010

Accepted December 1, 2010 yy

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