Post on 15-Mar-2023
Characteristics of a Democratic NationalAssembly and its Role in Combating Corruption
By
Cornelius Yamai Zidyep AyubaNational Assembly Budget & Research Office
yamaizidyep@gmail.com
Being an assignment submitted to the World BankInstitute in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Course “Parliaments and Anticorruption”.
February, 2015
1 | P a g e
Introduction
The National Assembly (Legislature or
parliament) is the arm of Government saddled
with the responsibility of making laws. As
Nwabueze has noted, the Legislature is the
distinctive mark of a country’s sovereignty, the
index of its status as a state and the source of
much of the power exercised by the executive in
the administration of government. The sovereign
power of the state is therefore identified in
the organ that has power to make laws by
Legislation, and to issue “commands” in the form
of Legislation binding on the community.
3 | P a g e
The legislature by virtue of its constitutional
responsibilities is the principal institution of
anticorruption, accountability, and probity. As
the bulwark of representative democracy, it is
germane to the consolidation of democracy. The
legislature is constitutionally and
strategically positioned to undermine
authoritarian tendencies on the part of the
executive, engender government effective and
adequate response to the delivery of public
goods and services, and enhance strict adherence
to constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Therefore, the legislature is critical to the
sustenance of popular trust in governance
processes, institutions, and improving
4 | P a g e
government legitimacy. Obviously, the state of
the legislature of a nation at any particular
point in time is a significant pointer to the
health of the social contract between the
government and its citizens.
The legislature as a significant institution of
democracy consists of elected representatives of
specific political constituencies
constitutionally empowered to make laws and
oversee the government (Lafenwa, 2009;
Loewenberg, 1995). Considering that the
legislature is ‘the collective defender and
watch dog of the aspirations, ideals and
collective will of the people’ (Odinga,
1994:124), it suffices that ‘any attack against5 | P a g e
the organization, composition or functioning’
(Bello-Imam, 2004: 408) of the legislature poses
serious obstacle to democracy.
This paper seeks to examine some of the
characteristics of the National Assembly and the
roles they play in fighting corruption.
Characteristics of the National Assembly and its
role in fighting corruption
Generally, the legislature differs in
composition, structure and function globally;
however it’s representational, lawmaking,
appropriation and oversight functions are
universal and germane to deepening democracy
(Lafenwa, 2009). Some of the characteristics of
6 | P a g e
the National Assembly as they relate with
corruption include:
a. Legislative Role
Of the core roles of parliament, it is likely
that the legislative role is the best
understood and most similar among countries.
Parliaments, constrained only by their
constitutions, have the authority to enact
any laws they wish and can therefore create
the necessary legal framework to prevent and
curb corruption. They can enact laws to
address what they consider inappropriate
behavior by citizens, businesses, and other
organizations, and they can provide for
surveillance and penalties. In addition,7 | P a g e
parliaments can focus on bolstering integrity
in governance—a broader perspective than
fighting corruption—by establishing not only
incentives to encourage appropriate private
sector behavior but also regimes for
financial and public service management,
transparency, and accountability in the
government sector. Thus, to the extent that
better laws would solve the problem of
corruption, parliaments—if they reflect well
the interests of the citizens and are not
captured by other forces—can be part of the
solution.
However, while appropriate laws may be a
necessary component in a country’s arsenal of
8 | P a g e
policies and interventions to curb
corruption, they are never sufficient. If
they were, corruption could be easily
eradicated. As Jeremy Pope points out, it
rarely is a lack of anti-corruption
legislation that impedes such efforts;
rather, it is often the weak qualitative
formulation and the lack of implementation of
such laws that need special attention.
Legislation must follow a key set of
principles— such as compliance with human
rights standards—in clear language,
minimizing areas of discretion and adapted to
the local circumstances. In civil as well as
criminal law, parliaments should address some
9 | P a g e
particularly relevant issues—such as
conflicts of interest, nepotism, and statutes
of limitation—not only to provide for the
necessary punitive measures but also to
promote an administrative and social
environment adverse to corruption.
However, depending on how laws are enacted
and the credibility of the electoral process,
the laws might be seen as more or less
legitimate. Moreover, an appropriate
legislative base might not be enacted if the
public and parliamentarians are unaware of
the costs and benefits of doing so. In
addition, the government might well be able
to put pressure on parliament—or on a
10 | P a g e
sufficient number of parliamentarians—to
impede the enactment of certain legislation.
Finally, parliament will have to oversee the
implementation of the legislation by the
executive.
b. Oversight
Parliaments can also curb corruption by
fulfilling another key responsibility:
holding the government accountable. This can
be achieved through effective participation
in the budgetary process, the exercise of
parliamentary oversight through
anticorruption commissions, cooperation with
11 | P a g e
supreme audit institutions, and promoting a
media-friendly environment.
c. Financial Control
Because financial integrity is central to
anti-corruption efforts, it is helpful to
devote direct attention to parliament’s role
in the budget cycle. The budget cycle, which
involves the government, public service,
civil society, and the legislature, comprises
four stages: drafting, legislation,
implementation, and audit. In most countries,
the ultimate control over the national budget
rests with parliament, which may delegate
responsibility to government for budget
formulation. This “power of the purse”
12 | P a g e
constrains governments to tax and spend in
only specific ways and seeks to ensure
disciplined management of funds, disciplined
reporting, and transparency. It is one of the
most powerful parliamentary tools for holding
governments to account. It also provides a
means for parliamentarians to be heard on how
(and how much) money is to be obtained and
spent.
Once the budget has been allocated, the
parliament—and its specialized committees
(such as the public accounts committee)
considers the audit findings provided by
supreme audit institutions and provides
recommendations for the next budget. To
13 | P a g e
ensure transparency and accountability, such
a budget cycle must fulfill three conditions.
First, there must be a disciplined and
transparent assignment of authority for the
disbursal of funds granted by parliament.
Second, there should be a requirement for
clear standards of expenditure measurement,
their application, and the results associated
with those expenditures—all in relation to
the authorities granted and the commitments
made when the authorities were granted.
Third, there should be publicly accessible
controls. Such a regime of parliamentary
financial control is a key part of integrity
in governance.
14 | P a g e
These powers are important, but even in
mature democracies, parliamentarians lament
their loss of influence in financial and
budgetary matters. Their power varies,
depending not only on the constitutional
provisions regarding its role but also on a
number of other factors. Typically, an
enormous amount of money is being processed,
the expertise and detailed information on its
application and use rest within the
executive, extremely complex financial
instruments are applied, and pressures to
employ shortcuts to respond to crises are
compelling. In addition, in some countries,
finances are so stressed that financial
15 | P a g e
management is reduced to cash flow
management. Apart from issues of sufficient
material and human resource, there is the
question of the timing of the budget. It
should be tabled sufficiently in advance of
the fiscal year to allow for effective
scrutiny and analysis.
Another variable is the access to
information, which is crucial for parliament
to exercise its financial control function,
because only accurate, reliable, and timely
information can guarantee a proper analysis
and evaluation of proposals. Political
dynamics and power relationships between the
executive and the legislative and between
16 | P a g e
government and the opposition constitute a
final important variable. For all these
reasons, parliamentarians struggle to
understand the application and use of public
resources, to influence their use, and to
communicate financial matters and any
concerns to their constituents. This leads
directly to other oversight practices
employed by parliament, including the work of
parliamentary agents (such as auditors and
ombudsmen), mandatory executive reporting on
certain operations and performance, or the
direct authority to question ministers
publicly on the operations of their
departments.
17 | P a g e
This also includes the authority to review
departmental and program performance (usually
by parliamentary committees) by calling for
witnesses and documents, and doing all of
this in a transparent fashion in cooperation
with outside bodies.
Also, in some countries, parliaments have the
authority to review and approve appointments
of certain public officials. These practices
vary considerably and take various
institutional forms, even among jurisdictions
with apparently similar oversight structures.
Two oversight tools are of particular
interest here: supreme audit institutions and
anti-corruption commissions.
18 | P a g e
d. Representation
Representation is a combination of public
deliberation and consensus building within
parliament, as well as the engagement of
citizens on matters of public policy.
Although it is perhaps less tangible than the
other parliamentary roles, representation is
an important parliamentary instrument for
building integrity in public governance. It
occurs through a number of different
channels, such as the participation of civil
society or the formation of political
parties, and can have the effect of
empowering citizens to reject corrupt
practices and expose politicians and
19 | P a g e
officials who engage in corrupt activity. In
this way, parliamentarians can help establish
public standards for appropriate behavior.
In the most direct sense, parliamentarians,
as representatives of the people, are
mandated to represent the wishes and concerns
of their constituents. Especially in many
developing countries, it is likely that a
large number of these constituents will be
poor. However, because corruption threatens
and affects the poor in the worst way,
parliamentarians, as their representatives,
must prevent it. It falls to them to travel
back regularly to their home regions to
organize forums of discussions, listen to
20 | P a g e
their constituents, understand the causes and
effects of corruption, include this
information and awareness in the formulation
of anti-corruption policies, and monitor
their impact. However, parliamentary
practices and support services, regardless of
party affiliation, might affect the capacity
of individual parliamentarians to pursue a
public leadership role in fighting
corruption. Where public resources are
provided to individual Members to maintain an
office in their districts and funds for
travel to retain regular face-to-face
contact, this aspect of representation is
likely to be more effective. Such
21 | P a g e
constituency services are crucial for
parliamentarians to retain the necessary
legitimacy and public endorsement to pursue
their policies.
e. Public Questioning and Media Involvement
As the fourth estate, an independent and
attentive media can to a great extent support
these parliamentary oversight efforts.
Indeed, the media owe it to themselves and to
society to participate in the fight against
corruption and often do so effectively.
Parliament can follow up on public exposure
of corrupt officials, the prompting of
investigations, and the exhibition of
commercial wrongdoing by the media. While
22 | P a g e
ministers may be obligated to respond, they
do not always answer the questions posed by
parliament.
Nonetheless, where there are independent
media, such behavior attracts public
attention and thereby reinforces
parliamentary oversight. At the same time,
parliament has a key role to play in ensuring
a free and vibrant media to permit such
oversight. It can promote a diverse media
landscape, ensure the protection of
journalists, push for free access to
information, support media accountability,
and so forth. An excellent example of such
fruitful cooperation occurred during the
23 | P a g e
aftermath of the war in the 1990s in Uganda.
The collaboration between an active and
representative parliament and a free and
independent media, able to challenge the
government and provide coverage of corruption
scandals, allowed MPs to tackle several high
profile cases of fraud.
f. Specialized Agencies
As the complexity of government has grown,
complicated by globalization on one side and
devolution and decentralization of power on
the other, and as the range of financial
instruments used in public finance has
expanded, the need for professional expertise
and resources has led to the creation of
24 | P a g e
specialized parliamentary investigation and
accountability agencies in many countries.
The best-known of these agencies are supreme
audit institutions (SAIs).
Although their mandates vary considerably,
particularly among the differing governance
systems, SAIs can help to deter waste and
corruption by attesting to the financial
accuracy of the data provided by the
government; checking whether the executive’s
spending has complied with applicable
provisions, laws, and regulations; and
reviewing the government’s performance (that
is, whether it has delivered public services
in an effective manner). To be effective, an
25 | P a g e
SAI should feature a clear mandate, be
independent, continuously update its
expertise, and be allowed to report its
results to specialized parliamentary
committees such as the public accounts
committee—which should then consider making
recommendations to parliament for enactment.
In addition, the need for specialist
supporting organizations that are adequately
resourced and independent of the executive is
growing.
There has been a lot of debate surrounding
the role and efficiency of anti-corruption
commissions, another institution helping
parliament to control corruption.
26 | P a g e
Indeed, sometimes created as hollow
constructs, their sole purpose can be to
delay meaningful legal reforms and satisfy
the call for reforms from international
donors. To ensure their effectiveness, they
should be the result of a broad-based appeal
by constituents. Moreover, to work
successfully, anti-corruption commissions
must be independent, part of a broader anti-
corruption strategy, embedded in a reporting
hierarchy encompassing the legislative and
executive, and have the government enact its
recommendations.
g. Corruption in Political Parties and
Parliament
27 | P a g e
Little can be achieved by legislators on a
national level if they do not first confront
the specter of corruption within their ranks.
Two particular sets of issues come to mind:
political party financing and codes of
conduct for parliamentarians.
As the strength of political parties has
increased over time, they have become a locus
of administrative power and therefore a
potential agent of corruption, particularly
where their accountability to their members
and the entire electorate is weak. Riccardo
Pelizzo illustrates this point in chapter 11,
showing how the weak institutionalization of
political parties in many developing
28 | P a g e
countries increases the temptation to quell
financial needs by illegal means. This
problem is particularly acute during the
electoral competition of political parties
for power, leading to a race for financial
resources, engendering the problem of party
political funding, examined by Michael Pinto-
Duschinsky. Corruption scandals in campaign
financing, often implicating the
parliamentarians themselves, abound and can
take a multitude of forms such as vote
buying, contributions from criminal sources,
illegal use of state sources, and so forth.
In many countries, this problem is compounded
by traditions of patron-client relationships.
29 | P a g e
The attitude of the electorate then becomes
another issue: although they might be
condemning corruption in general, they might
still sell their votes. Also, in some cases,
candidates for office believe that they have
no other choice but to engage in illicit fund
raising if they must pay for campaigning
without public subsidies (Bryan and Baer
2005). Although the problem might never be
completely solved, it is up to the
legislators to formulate laws regulating
campaign finances, including regulations on
the disclosure of interests, spending and
contribution limits, and the provision of
public subsidies. It is also up to
30 | P a g e
parliamentarians to pressurize the government
to enforce such laws, establish ethics
committees to monitor the political
campaigns, and so forth.
The legitimacy of democracy does not only
depend on the integrity of political parties.
Parliamentarians themselves must adhere to
strictly ethical behavior. Covering
everything from conflicts of interest and the
disclosure of assets to rules on post
governmental employment and nepotism, codes
of conduct and codes of ethics perform two
functions: internally, they improve the
behavior of legislators; externally, they
restore the often-shattered public confidence
31 | P a g e
in parliamentarians. To be effective, such
codes must be accompanied by enforcement
mechanisms and be based on a shared
understanding by parliamentarians of what is
appropriate behavior and what is not, because
otherwise they amount to little else then
empty promises. A practical insight into the
development and application of codes of
conduct is provided with Sir Philip Mawer’s
case study of the House of Commons’
Parliamentary Codes of Conduct and Registers
of Members’ Interests in the United Kingdom.
One of the key aspects of this code is the
open and publicly accessible disclosure of
the assets of Members of Parliament (MPs),
32 | P a g e
which provide the population with the
knowledge of the interests that might affect
the MP’s decision making.
Another important element is the relatively
effective means of enforcement. Although
ethical problems still do occur, it seems
that this code has managed to restore public
confidence in the parliamentary system in
many ways.
CONCLUSION
Together, these four approaches to oversight—
financial control, specialized agencies, public
questioning, and media involvement—can be a
powerful antidote to corruption. They are more
33 | P a g e
effective to the degree that they have
professional staff support and independent media
to ensure that the public is well informed as to
what is occurring—ultimately under their
“authority.” However, where parliament itself is
dominated by a corrupt executive or lacks
representative legitimacy, these theoretical
oversight powers might well not exist in
practice. Thus, as with legislative power, they
are only part of the parliamentary toolbox for
curbing corruption.
34 | P a g e
Bibliography Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa(Volume 15, No.6, 2013), “LEGISLATIVECORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION INTHE NIGERIAN FOURTH REPUBLIC” by Monday Aliu.
CICP Global Programme Against CorruptionConference, Vienna, December 1999,“Prevention: An Effective Tool to ReduceCorruption”.
“STATUS AND ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN ADEMOCRACY”, A public lecture delivered tomark the 47th Birthday of Michael OpeyemiBamidele, Esq. on the 27th of July, 2010.
WBI Developmental Studies, “THE ROLE OFPARLIAMENT IN CURBING CORRUPTION”, Edited byRick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston, RiccardoPelizzo.
Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa(2011 – 2016) By Governance and PublicAdministration Division (GPAD) of theEconomic Commission for Africa (ECA) inCollaboration with the African Union AdvisoryBoard on Corruption (AUABC) ProgrammeDocument, “Combating Corruption, ImprovingGovernance in Africa”.
www.google.com
35 | P a g e