Post on 23-Jan-2023
Course: DSPS 6122 Political InstitutionsEssay Title: Can workplace democracy be justified by deliberative democracy?Student Name: Man Kong LiStudent ID: 116329
Can workplace democracy be justified by deliberative
democracy ?
Introduction
In this article, I will examine in what way workplace
democracy can be justified on the ground of deliberative
democracy. Joshua Cohen has famously employed his ideal
of deliberative democracy to support workplace democracy.1
I will argue that his arguments to justify workplace
democracy by his ideal of deliberative democracy are
defective. In this article, I hope to provide a more
plausible consideration of the way in which workplace
democracy could contribute to the ideal of deliberative
democracy.
1 Joshua Cohen “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy”, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 6 (02), 1989, pp. 25-50
I will also take a rather broad conception of
workplace democracy in this article. As long as workers
as a collective, within which the collective decisions
are determined by some form of democratic way that
workers have equal say, have a guaranteed substantial
influence in major decisions making of the enterprise, I
will take it as a manifestation of workplace democracy,
regardless of the ownership of the enterprise.2 In section
I of the article, I will first survey actual existing
examples of institutions that are self-claimed as
workplace democracy. I will argue that my conception
covers two major forms of existing worker participation
in the governance of enterprise, namely worker
cooperative and labor union participation. Certainly the
two forms of workplace democracy have important
differences. But I will show that they share important
politically relevant features to be coined as “workplace
2 Here I follow similar definition as used by a survey article written by Hsieh Nien-he. As will be covered in section I, I will explain why I think this definition would be more suitable to our discussion in this article. See Hsieh Nien-he, “Survey Article: Justice in Production”, The Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 16 (1), 2008, pp. 72-100. p. 82
democracy”.
Then in section II, I will examine Cohen’s arguments
to support workplace democracy by his conception of
deliberative democracy. I will argue that his conception
of deliberative democracy can indeed be satisfied without
the presence of workplace democracy. Other institutions
can also satisfy, if not better satisfy, what Cohen
considers to be the reasons to support workplace
democracy. Cohen’s own arguments, therefore, cannot
satisfactorily support workplace democracy as economic
institution of his ideal of deliberative democracy.
In section III, however, I will argue that indeed we
have reasons to think that workplace democracy as an
institution of deliberative democracy, if we consider the
incentive for organization and mobilization it generates.
It is true that the protection of workers’ and employees’
economic autonomy does not necessary require labor
mobilization, but the latter is the political guarantee
of the former. If these considerations are plausible,
then I will conclude that they indeed point to an
important omission in Cohen’s theory of deliberative
democracy, echoing some of the claims of his more radical
critics.
I. The definition and institutions of workplace
democracy
There have been diverse proposals of workplace
democracy, and by “workplace democracy”, or, more
loosely, “democratic” or “worker controlled/managed”
enterprises or firms, they do not necessarily refer to
the same thing. In this section, I will discuss some
major definitions of workplace democracy, as embedded in
different theorists’ relevant institutional designs, with
illustration of some of their existing examples. After a
brief survey of these proposals, I will propose a rather
broad understanding of workplace democracy, which I
consider could capture what makes most of these
institutions “democratic”, despite their other important
differences. I would also discuss the reasons why some of
these institutions should be excluded in this definition
of workplace democracy.
Workplace democracy as worker’s cooperative. Cohen
uses “worker-managed firms” and “workplace democracy”
interchangeably, referring that “workers in a firm have
the right to fix the terms on which they are managed”.3 He
considers that in an ideal deliberative democracy, the
economic sphere would be so organized that it would
contain “public control of investment, realized through a
scheme in which publicly owned means of production are
operated by worker-managed firms”. That means “a wide
variety of forms of association- small and large,
centralized and decentralized, cooperative and
atomistic”, where “different firms could be expected to
arrive at different views about the delegation of
3 Cohen “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy”, pp. 40-41, 46.
authority to managers, the extent of cooperation in work
itself, and the distribution of enterprise earnings”.4
Thus in Cohen’s proposal, as long as worker as a
collective can claim an exclusive control of a firm, it
can be qualified as workplace democracy. But it is not
entirely clear how the power should distribute, i.e.
whether every worker have an equal vote in voting and
election or managers.5
Elster and Ove Moene considers an ideal cooperative as
one that “all workers and only workers hold equal shares in
firm”, and consider labor union, as well as labor
participation in managing a firm, only as a means to
protect workers against “mutual harmful competitive
practices” among firms. Unions may have role in helping
to establish cooperatives in an economy consists of
mainly privately owned firm, but only the cooperatives
4 Ibid. pp. 40-415 It should also be noted that it is also not entirely clear to what extent the “public control of investment”, i.e. the control of the profit and plans of investment (of every firm? Or profit collected from all the firms?), by the democratic state, would interfere the decision of those worker-managed firms, thus weaken the scope of control of the firm by workers as a collective.
fit to their ideal of workplace democracy.6
Elster and Ove Moene also consider two forms of
cooperatives that can be regarded as manifesting worker
control, but with some qualifications. The first one is
cooperatives that workers do not own the majority of
shares of the firm, but fully control or have a majority
in the governing board of the firms, i.e. the firms
govern by “one man, one vote” rather than “one share, one
vote”. This can be also found in the cooperatives in
footwear, printing and clothing industries in Britain.7
Sometimes these cooperatives would hire wage workers that
do not have voting rights. Elster and Ove Moene consider
this practice, if excess and thus create unacceptable
inequality, would threaten democratic control.8
6 Jon Elster and Karl Ove Moene, “Introduction”, in Jon Elster and Karl Ove Moene eds. Alternatives to Capitalism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1-35. pp. 23, 34-35. It should be noted that Elster and Ove Moene also consider the question of workplace democracy in their broader ideal of market socialism, which is “a system of labor cooperatives”. But they also concede that in a economically realistic vision of market socialism would consist of both traditional capitalistic enterprises and labor cooperatives, andit is even possible to maintain a market socialist framework even if cooperatives are in a minority. This concession complicates their vision of both market socialism and workplace democracy. See Ibid. p.267 Ibid. pp. 22, 308 Ibid. pp. 25
The second form is firms that organized according to
the Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) in America.9
This form of worker control of firm indeed is widely
recognized as realistic realization of workplace
democracy.10 In a firm organized according ESOP, a “trust”
will be set up and hold stocks on behalf of its
employees.11 ESOPs allow unequal distribution of shares
among employees, usually proportional to their salaries,
and workers exercise their control mainly through their
shares, i.e. “one share, one vote”.12 But if the
inequality of shares, and thus inequality of voting power
in decision making, is excess, it would again also
threaten democratic control of the firm.13 Since in this
form of worker ownership workers do not directly own the
firm but control the firm via a trust, the indirectness
9 Ibid. pp. 2210 Gar Alperovitz, “The Pluralist Commonwealth and Property-Owning Democracy”, in Marin O’Neill and Thad Williamson eds. Property- Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 266-286. p. 271; Drew Christie, “Recent Calls for Economic Democracy”, Ethics Vol.95 (2), 1984, pp. 112-128. p. 11211 Alperovitz “The Pluralist Commonwealth and Property-Owning Democracy”, p.27112 Elster & Ove Moene, “Introduction”, p. 2213 Ibid. p. 25
in decision making process also weakens its democratic
accountability.14
Labor unions and labor participation as workplace
democracy. Labor unions and the institution of labor
participation are given more positive role in other
proposals of workplace democracy. Lansbury considers
workplace democracy as system that promotes “sharing of
power between workers and management”.15 Thus a means to
realize or to promote workplace democracy is by
introduction of the institution of collective bargaining,
so that representatives of labor (union) can have a
formal channel to bargain with the management over
various firm policies concerns the interest of the
workers.16 The German “co-determination” is an often-cited
14 Alperovitz, “The Pluralist Commonwealth and Property-Owning Democracy”, p. 271; For the relation between the level of hierarchy and democratic accountability, see Patrick NS Dumont and Frederic Varone, “Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies: smallness, proximity and short cuts”, in Braun, Dietmar and Gilardi, Fabrizio (eds.). Delegation in Contemporary Democracies (London and New York: Routledge/ECPR, 2006), pp. 52-76.15 Russell Lansbury, “Workplace Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis”, The Kingsley Laffer Memorial Lecture, University of Sydney, 2009. Freely retrieved online at http://www1.econ.usyd.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/18772/Laffer_Memorial_Lecture_160309.pdf. p. 416 Ibid. p. 3
relatively successful institutionalization of this kind
of worker participation: it is legally required that
large corporations must reserve half of the seats in the
supervisory boards for representatives of workers.17
Furthermore, the German co-determination also involve
industry-wide corporatist bargaining between industry-
wide labor unions and supervisory boards of
corporations.18
Workplace democracy with limited scope and organized
in sub-corporation level. On the other hand, there are
also some reform proposals, which claimed to be enhancing
workplace democracy, which are organized with limited
scope, and/or organized in sub-corporation level. In
Australia, it is legally required that enterprise to have
occupational health and safety committees that involve
worker participation. Thus democratic decision making, or
involvement of worker representatives, only covers some 17 Waheed Hussain, “Nurturing the Sense of Justice: The Rawlsian Argument for Democratic Corporatism”, in Marin O’Neill and Thad Williamson eds. Property- Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 180-200. p. 182; Heish, “Justice in Production”, p. 82; Christie, “Recent Calls for Economic Democracy”, pp. 112-11318 Hussain, “Nurturing the Sense of Justice”, p. 182
limited and predesigned aspects, most of them are related
to labor protection, but not major decisions (such as
investment) of the corporation. In Japan, there are
corporative reforms that more power in work design and
execution are delegated to some “semi-autonomous
workgroups”.19 Thus the scope of democracy is limited to
just some parts of the production processes, and involves
only part of the workers. In such workgroups, the level
of delegation is often decided only by the management of
the corporation.
It is quite obvious that although all these
institutional arrangements can in some senses be called
workplace democracy, they are constructed to pursue
diverse goals and take into account diverse
considerations, say promoting economic efficiency and/or
work incentive, or the protection of interest of the
workers. To manifest democratic accountability in their
institutional design is at most one of the goals that
19 Lansbury, “Workplace Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis”, p.3
those proposals aim to pursue, and only part of those
institutions can be qualified as manifesting democratic
values. But it is false to include all of these proposals
as workplace democracy simply because they have some
elements of self-governing among any subset of workers in
any subset of policy areas of a firm or of a corporation.
I believe it will stretch the concept of “democracy” used
in workplace democracy too much. To take workplace
democracy as a concept politically relevant to democratic
institution, institutional features that define the
concept of workplace democracy should sufficiently
parallel to those of a proper democratic state.
Modern democratic states have four defining features
for being “democratic”, namely that (1) major policies
and laws are more or less decided by majority rule, or at
least cannot be decided independent of the majority’s
will; (2) sufficient degree of freedom of speech on
matters of public concern; (3) citizens have roughly
equal opportunity to political influence; (4)
representatives are elected by equal votes assign to the
electorate to form the governing body, though it does not
exclude more direct form of participation of the
electorate in governing.20 If this interpretation of the
idea of democratic state is uncontroversial enough, then
we can stipulate a parallel definition of workplace
democracy: (i) major policies of the firm are deduced by
majority vote of the workers, or at least cannot be
determined independent of the will of the majority of the
workers; (ii) workers’ freedom of speech on the matters
of the corporation should not be restricted, or be
threatened by the employers by imposing unacceptable
costs to the employees; (iii) workers have roughly equal
20 Here I mainly borrow the Richard Arneson’s formulation in his “TheSupposed Right to a Democratic say”, but also the discussion from Philip Pettit, especially his understanding of democratic representation. See Richard Arneson, “The Suppoesed Right to a Democratic Say”, T. Christiano and J.Christman, eds: Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy. Chicester: Wiley and Blackwell, 2009, pp.197-212, pp. 198-199; as cf. Philippe Pettit, “Varieties in publicrepresentation”, in Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, E. J. Wood and Alexander Kirshner (eds), Political Representation. (New York: Cambridge University Press,2010), pp. 61-89. pp. 61-62. Surely there are other relevant parallels as well as important differences between state anda firm, and they are relevant in considering the merit of workplace democracy. Here I only concern the parallel features in the “democratic” aspect, and postpone the discussions of other parallels and differences to section II of the article.
opportunity to influence major decisions of the firm;
(iv) the governing body is constitutive of or the
representatives of workers as a collective.
If we take this four features as defining features of
workplace democracy, then worker’s cooperatives which all
the productive assets are collectively owned by workers,
and that the decision is made, or the governing body is
elected, according to the principle of “one worker one
vote”, is qualified to be democratic corporations. The
institution of collective bargaining between management
and labor representative as specified by the co-
determination system can arguably satisfy feature (i) and
(ii), but hardly be seen as satisfying (iii) and (iv).
But given the economic reality that most of firms are
organized in the traditional capitalistic way, we can
reasonably concede that collective bargaining and co-
determination is sufficiently democratic, though not
through and through democratic as worker cooperatives
where workers have equal votes in decision making and in
election of the governing bodies of the corporations.
Similar reasoning can be applied to those unequal vote
variants of existing workers’ cooperatives: as long as
the inequality in the control of major decision makings
of the cooperatives is restricted in a tolerable degree,
they can be qualified as sufficiently manifesting
workplace democracy. “Tolerable degree” is certainly a
vague description. But it suffices for our purpose here
as we can rule out, say, some ESOPs that the inequality
of shares is so large, and /or the trust which owns the
corporation is not involve in daily management. Consider
the parallel case in existing democratic states: we all
know that capitalists and those who born in the upper
class have larger opportunity to political influence than
ordinary citizens, but we nevertheless consider those
states as democratic states, although not ideal ones.
What should clearly be ruled out are those
institutions which only very limited policy aspects of
the corporations are delegated to a limited set of
employees, say, a group of workers of the same production
line. It is because they satisfy none of the features
(i), (iii) and (iv), and only arguably satisfies (ii).21
Not all employees are granted the right to have a say in
those policies, and those policies are hardly major
decisions concerning the fate of the corporation. Thus
“semi-autonomous workgroups” as a form of institution
cannot be counted as workplace democracy in a politically
relevant sense. Having committees that would involve
labor participation focusing only on limited aspects, say
occupational safety, as delegated by the management, can
be seen as more democratic than not having those
committees at all. To have those committees can be seen
as improvement of workplace democracy, but having only
those committees can hardly be qualified as sufficiently 21 It is surely true that people’s formal freedom of speech is protected by the law of the state. But without sufficient labor participation in major decision making such as hire and fire employees, it seems it is still within the power of the employers to fire an employees who openly disagree with the corporation’s policy. Or at least he will be under the threat to be fired for openly challenging the policy of the corporation. This situation seems wouldbe less likely to happen in workers cooperatives and corporations with legally protected collective bargaining institutions, provided the employees or workers have more equal influences in the hiring andfiring decision, and thus larger power to protect their own freedom to challenge corporation policies.
democratic in a politically relevant sense.
To sum up our discussions so far: a corporation is
sufficiently or reasonably qualified as manifesting
workplace democracy if workers or employees as a
collective, within which the collective decisions are
determined by some form of democratic way that workers
have equal say, have a guaranteed substantial influence
in major decisions making of the enterprise regardless of
the ownership of the enterprise. This definition covers
the most important institutional designs that enhance
democratic participation of employees in the management
of corporations, namely the collective bargaining in
general, as well as the co-determination system, and
different variants of worker’s cooperatives where the
inequality of voting power among workers are within
tolerable level. From now on, unless indicate otherwise,
I will simply use “workplace democracy” in this article
to mean institutions that are sufficiently or reasonably
qualified as manifesting workplace democracy. So, then,
can workplace democracy so conceived be justified by
deliberative democracy?
II. Joshua Cohen’s ideal of deliberative democracy
and workplace democracy
Having laid out a more concrete understanding of
workplace democracy, I will in this section examine
Joshua Cohen’s support of workplace democracy from the
view point of his ideal of deliberative democracy. As we
have seen in the opening of section I, Cohen’s own
understanding of workplace democracy is both narrower and
more ambiguous than the definition I gave here in this
article, as he only regards firms that the workers have
the full control of management as workplace democracy,
but at the same time does not specify if workers in those
firms need to have equal influence in decision. I will
argue in this section that his ideal of deliberative
democracy does not support even his own understanding of
workplace democracy. I will also add that it does not
support workplace democracy as defined here either.
Cohen’s ideal of deliberative democracy. Cohen argues
that to be qualified as democratic polity, a society must
contain institutions that manifest three features, namely
public deliberation focuses on the common good,
manifested equality among citizens, and that the
democratic politics must shape the identity and interests
of citizens in way that contribute to the formation of
common good.22 He argues that these three features are
elements of “an independent and expressly political
ideal”, which actual institutional arrangements of a
society should “mirror”.23 This ideal is his normative
ideal of deliberative democracy.
Cohen’s ideal of deliberative democracy, or as he
calls it the “ideal deliberative procedure”, consists of
five formal features (D1 to D5) and four substantive
features (I1 to I4). The formal features are, first, the
deliberative democratic polity must be an independent and
22 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberative Democracy and Democratic Legitimacy”, in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (eds.), The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17–34. p. 1923 Ibid. p. 20
self-standing association (D1); Citizens of the polity
must share a commitment to co-ordinate their activities
within the institutions of deliberative democracy,
following their rules and norms (D2); Deliberative
democracy allows pluralistic preferences among citizens,
i.e. no pre-institutional similarity of preference
profiles is required (D3); The institutions should not
only guarantee the result of collective decision be the
same as that of deliberation, but also the process of
citizens engagement must also manifest the virtue of
deliberation (D4); Citizens recognize one another as
having deliberative capacities, i.e. the capacities for
public reasoning.24 From these five formal features, Cohen
suggests four further substantive features that suit
these formal features: first, citizens in a deliberative
democratic polity is free, in a sense that they are
bounded only by the results and preconditions of the
deliberation, and that regard simply for the fact that
the result is arrived at a process of deliberation would
24 Ibid. p. 21
sufficient to motivate them to act according to it (I1).
Second, deliberation results can only be settled by
public reasoning among citizens, i.e. as Cohen quotes
from Habermas, “no force except that of the better
argument is exercised” (I2). Third, citizens should be
equal, in the sense that every citizens with deliberative
capacities should have equal standing in deliberation,
and that the unequal distribution of power and resources
among them should be barred from influencing their equal
standing and chances to contribute to deliberation (I3).
Finally, the deliberative process should aim at a
consensus guided by public reason, but if for practical
reason such consensus cannot be reached, the result could
also be determined by majority rule (I4).25
Cohen argues that this ideal deliberative procedure
provides the abstract framework how a polity’s
institutions can be arranged so that to promote both
citizens’ autonomy and the polity’s common good.26 It is
25 Ibid. pp. 22-2326 Ibid. pp. 23-24
because the five formal and four substantive features of
the ideal deliberative procedure normatively exclude any
possibilities of adaptive preference and accommodative
preference by ensuring citizens’ free and equal standing
in deliberative democratic polity.27 Furthermore, the
constraints of public deliberation procedure require
citizens advance only public reasons, or reasons that are
acceptable to others, in decision makings for public
affairs, and thus could transform people’s reasons for
holding certain preferences, or even the priority of
preference.28 Thus the decision outcome is not aggregation
of pre-institutional individual preferences but decisions
expressing collective rationality. Citizens are
motivated, so Cohen argues, to forgo personal preference
for the sake of collective rational decisions, and thus
enhancing a polity’s common good.29 Since those
constraints of public deliberation are grounded by
ensuring citizens’ free and equal standing, this
27 Ibid. p. 2528 Ibid. p. 2429 Ibid. pp. 24-25
transformation of preference and reasons is thus
consistent with citizens’ individual autonomy.30 Cohen’s
ideal of deliberative democracy thus brings together the
ideal of individual autonomy of citizens and the ideal of
attainment of common good for a polity.
Cohen’s justification of workplace democracy by the
ideal of deliberative democracy. Cohen then employs this
ideal deliberative procedure to justify workplace
democracy, or “worker self-management”.31 First, he argues
that workplace is sufficiently parallel to that state,
and since we would consider state should be deliberative
democratic, it is also the case for workplace. We
consider a state should be democratic because it is a
collective cooperative activity that governed by mutually
recognized rules to achieve mutual advantage of the
members. Since it is a joint enterprise, everyone
involves in the cooperation should have an equal right to
participate and excise their deliberative capacities in
30 Ibid. pp. 25-2631 Cohen “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy”, pp. 46
determination of those rules. This is the normative
foundation of the ideal deliberative procedures. Cohen
argues it is also the case of economic enterprises, “the
deliberative ideal of justification carries over from the
state to firms”.32
Second, workplace democracy provides an arena for
citizens to exercise and develop their deliberative
capacities (D5), i.e. citizens’ active character and the
focus on common good.33 Thirdly, ideal deliberative
procedure requires citizens to have equal standing in the
deliberation, in the sense that their material and
economic inequalities are barred from influencing the
deliberation (I3). Since it is expected that in workplace
democracy (worker managed firms) workers would distribute
the profit among them more equally, enhanced material
equality among citizens thus could be achieved, and thus
enhancing their equal standing in a deliberative polity.34
It seems reasonable to consider Cohen’s three
32 Ibid. pp. 27, 4633 Ibid. pp. 4634 Ibid. pp. 47
arguments to support worker managed firms would also
extend to the wider definition of workplace democracy we
employ here in this article. First, in co-determination
and collective bargaining, employees are granted the
right to participate in the major decision making of the
firms via their representatives in labor union. Secondly,
since employees and workers have relatively equal
opportunity to influence the union or the worker
collectives, they would also have more chances to
exercise their deliberative capacity than when they are
in traditional privately owned capitalist firms. Thirdly,
though maybe less successfully, co-determination and
collective bargaining also would bring more equal
remuneration among employees and higher managers,
following the same line of reasoning that bring income
equalization in worker managed firms.
Refutation of Cohen’s three arguments for workplace
democracy. However, Cohen’s three arguments to support
workplace democracy by his ideal of deliberative
democracy indeed fail. It is because, on the one hand,
the parallel between state and enterprise is not
convincing, and on the other hand, there may well be
other institutions that serve better to attain those
effects that Cohen ascribes to workplace democracy. .
First, it is hardly true that a single firm has to be
conceived as sufficiently parallel to the state. One’s
citizenship to a nation state is largely involuntary. We
would have too much at stake in our home country, for
example our cultural ties to the place. To leave a
country, i.e. to emigrate, is by no means an easy option,
and it is hard to find a person who would change her
citizenship for several times in a life. But on the
contrary, we do not have similar stake in a firm. Usually
what is at stake when we choose to quit a job is that we
would lose our income from it. But as long as a society
can provide sufficient unemployment pension and re-
employment assistances, it seems that nothing substantial
one would really lose, even one changes jobs for a few
times a life.35 At the very least, we know that what one
could lose in this situation has nothing important that
is comparable to leaving our home country.
It seems it would be more appropriate to conceive the
employment relation as market relationship, where
employees are the seller of their labor and service,
while employers are buyers. Provided that it is a fair
market, i.e. the sellers and buyers have relatively equal
bargaining power (there are sufficient state pension for
unemployment, for example), and that the enforcement of
contracts are guaranteed by the state, it seems we do not
have good reasons to argue that market relation have to
be governed by democratic means. If the market is fair,
why can the sellers (employees) have a collective say on
a buyer’s (firm’s) decision to use her money? This
implies that the employees’ autonomy and rights can be
sufficiently protected if their bargaining power in the
labor market is sufficiently protected, for example by an
35 Here my arguments are mainly drawn from Richard Arneson, “Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Level”, pp. 118- 148 in David Copp, Jean Hamption and John Roemer eds, The Idea of Democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 139.
extensive social security scheme. Workplace democracy is
at least not necessary to protect people’s right.
Bowles and Gintis argue that in the employment
relation there is inherent inequality of power between
employers and employees, and this inequality of power
generates for the employees’ part a moral claim for
democratic accountability of the decision making of the
firm. It is because an employer may dismiss employees as
she wishes, and it is always a substantial financial
loss, and thus a substantial loss of well being, on the
employees’ part.36 Thus even though state and firm are not
sufficiently parallel, we could still argue for workplace
democracy on the ground of democratic accountability.
But mere inequality of power is not sufficient to
generate democratic claims. Many forms of human relations
would involve unequal power and authority, for example
the authority of parents over their children and teachers
over their students. But as long as the human rights of
36 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the democractic Enterprise”, pp. 375-399 in David Copp, Jean Hamption and John Roemer eds, The Idea of Democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.), pp. 375, 382-383
those under authority are protected, it is not clear why
those who have less power must have a claim of democratic
accountability. Labor regulations can impose constraints
on employers so that they cannot unreasonably terminate
the contract. And as long as there is enough social
support for unemployment such as those listed in the
previous paragraphs, it seems unlikely that the fired
employees must have a substantive loss in well being.
Concerning Cohen’s argument that workplace democracy
provide an arena to exercise and develop the deliberative
capacity, the direct refutation will be that empirical
studies reveal that it needs not be the case. Long
conceived as the most successful worker’s cooperative,
studies show that workers work at Mondragon Corporacion
Cooperativa (MCC) does not have substantive different
experience to those workers work in traditional
capitalist firms.37 Indeed, severe market competition may
lead democratic firms to forgo democracy for the sake of
efficiency, for example hiring non-voting workers or out-
37 Heish, “Justice in Production”, pp. 82-83.
sourcing the jobs. As proponents of workplace democracy,
Bowles and Gintis also admit that if the workforce does
not receive appropriate democratic education, the
inefficiency caused by democratic process may be
prohibitive. The inefficiency may even discourage
workers’ motivation and interest to democratic process.38
On the other hand, workplace is by no means the only
place that people can exercise and develop deliberative
capacities. Neighborhood-assemblies to discuss and decide
local policy issues may also serve as arena to exercise
and develop those capacities.39 In short, workplace
democracy seems neither sufficient nor necessary to
develop deliberative capacities.
Finally, workplace democracy is not the only way to
reduce economic inequality. Progressive income and salary
taxes, extensive public education and public health care
system, and laws to limit salary ratio between highest-
paid and lowest-paid employees in a firm may also ensure
38 Bowles & Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the democracticEnterprise”, pp. 392-39339 Benjamin, Barber, Strong Democracy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 270-271
citizens’ social and economic equality.40 Compare to the
rather uncertain distributional effects within worker
cooperatives that are subject to bargaining, discussion
and constraints of economic environments, these
protections of economic equality by state direct
redistributive policies seem more promising and
effective. In short, it seems that workplace democracy,
no matter under Cohen’s own definition or under the
definition I adopt in this article, is by no means
necessary or sufficient to satisfy or contribute to
Cohen’s ideal of deliberative democracy.
III. Workplace democracy as institutionalized
mobilization, and its contribution to
deliberative democracy
But although Cohen’s arguments to justify workplace
democracy by deliberative democracy fail, here I will
argue that there are other important reasons to support
workplace democracy as contributing to deliberative
40 Christie, “Recent Calls for Economic Democracy”, pp. 120-121
democracy. I will argue that workplace democracy provides
institutionalized incentives to labor mobilization and
organization, and the latter are political guarantees of
state policies that promote workers’ equal standing as
democratic citizens. In this sense workplace democracy is
an institution that promotes deliberative democracy. I
will also argue that if this is the case, then it shows
that Cohen’s ideal of deliberative democracy put too
little attention to place of social mobilization and
organization in achieving deliberative democracy.
Workplace democracy as institutionalized mobilization.
Although we could protect worker’s economic autonomy, and
thus their democratic citizenship, by state policies that
ensure labor rights and protection as well as various
forms of social pension, these policies are, historically
speaking, the result of social movement and labor
movement. For example, the introduction of economic
policy of welfare state in Britain is largely the
achievement of the post-war Labor Party.41 And the rise of
Labor party is the direct result of the labor movement in
late nineteenth century. Indeed, large scale labor
movement is the basis of most left-leaning socialist and
labor parties across Europe, and those pasties eventually
come to power and in turn introduce most of the welfare
state policies.42 The success of Nordic social democratic
regimes is also highly depended on their long history of
union movements.43 Thus organized labor is the political
guarantee of policies and institutional designs that
protect workers from dependence and mistreatments from
their employers. This independence, as we have seen in
Cohen’s ideal, is an essential element to make
deliberative democracy works.
Workplace democracy is the institutionalization of
this sort of social and labor movements, and sometimes
41 Ben Jackson, “Property-Owning Democracy: A Short History” in Marin O’Neill and Thad Williamson eds. Property- Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 33-52. pp. 44-4542 For an excellent summary of this history, see Eric Hobesbawm, How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism, (London: Little Brown, 2011), pp.401-402, 404-40943 John Roemer, Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosophical Economics. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 330
even their result too. Elster and Ove Moene cite that
trade unions have played important role in transforming
enterprises into cooperatives, often when the enterprises
go bankruptcy.44 The system of co-determination also
provides incentives for employees to be organized into
labor unions. Thus workplace democracy promotes workers’
level of mobilization and organization, which turns the
power of separate and otherwise unorganized individuals
into a social force with shared interest and capacities
for collective actions. If organized labor movement is
the political guarantee of progressive social policies
that ensure people’s equal standing as deliberative
democratic citizens, and if workplace democracy
institutionalizes and provides incentive for organized
labor movement, then workplace democracy is qualified as
contributing to deliberative democracy.
Certainly, as we have seen from my refutation of
Cohen’s argument in section II, workplace democracy is
44 Elster & Ove Moene, “Introduction”, p. 34; Alperovitz, “The Pluralist Commonwealth and Property-Owning Democracy”, p.271
not alone sufficient. As institutional extension of
workplace democracy, a democratic corporatism that
exercise co-determination in a industry-wide level can
both expand the scale of labor mobilization and reduce
market competition. It is because the rules to regulate
the production of the industry are the result of
deliberation among the actors rather than strategic
actions to beat the market competitors.45 And as Bowles
and Gintis rightly argue, to avoid workplace democracy
being prohibitively inefficient, we have to introduce
democratic education in school. But still, workplace
democracy provides institutional incentives for workers
to be mobilized and organized into social forces to
secure progressive policies.
Other forms of associations may also serve the role to
mobilize and organize people, but in such cases people
are not mobilized so directly for the goal to protect
economic interest and economic independency as workplace
45 Hussain, “Nurturing the Sense of Justice”, p. 196; also cf. Elster and Ove Moene’s claim that “unions are needed to protect workers against mutually harmful competitive practices.”, as I cited earlier in this article.
democracy. If we take into account the development of
Multi-national Corporations and their influence to our
economic life, workplace democracy can organize along the
line of the identity of employees/workers rather than
national or local identity. This, if possible, seems more
promising in securing people’s economic equality and
independency than other more locally based or voluntary
forms of social organizations in the era of
globalization.46
Implication to Cohen’s ideal of deliberative
democracy. If my arguments above are plausible, then both
Cohen’s ideal of deliberative democracy and his support
of workplace democracy overlook an important element of
deliberative democracy. That is the mobilization and
organization of citizens. Vibrant discussions and
engagements of common good cannot be achieved if absent
of an active civil society, which in turns means a high
46 For some of the difficulties and prospects of cross-national non-government organizations, see James Rosenau, “Governance and democracy in a globalizing world”, pp. 28–57 in Daniele Archibugi, David Held & Martin Kohler (eds) Reimagining Political Community, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
level of social mobilization and organization on issues
of public affairs. Deliberative democracy as depicted by
Cohen is a polity in which individuals freely use their
public reasoning to discuss and reach agreements on
public affairs. But in the real world, organization and
mobilization matter in organizing collective interests
along different lines, in forming different political
agendas, and most importantly in confrontations against
the state and those who are in power. These social
organizations and mobilization are crucial to promote and
to push policies and institutions in favor of a more
equal and more inclusive society.
In short, mobilization and organization are important
social conditions to sustain the ideal of deliberative
democracy. In the case of workplace democracy, we can see
that how this dimension is overlooked in Cohen’s
framework. Here my arguments echo with radical critics of
the dominant liberal deliberative democratic model such
as John Dryzek, who argues that liberal deliberative
theory concerns too much on constitutional and state
official institutional features, but neglects the
importance of real political dynamics and confrontations
in the public sphere, i.e. civil society.47
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, workplace democracy, as defined by the
broad definition as used in this article, can be
justified on the ground of deliberative democracy. It is
because it provides institutional incentives for workers
mobilization and organization that are important to
secure workers’ economic autonomy, and thus their equal
standing as democratic citizens. I have also argued that
Joshua Cohen’s defense of workplace democracy as
deliberative democratic institution overlooks this
aspect, and his own reasons to support of workplace
democracy are indeed shaky. It is clear thus that
workplace democracy, for its organization and
47 John Dryzek, “Discursive democracy vs. liberal constitutionalism”,in M Saward (ed.), Democratic Innovation: Deliberation, representation and association, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 295-308. pp. 304-306
mobilization power, has an important role in deliberative
democracy, no matter in Cohen’s conception or in a
broader conception of deliberative democracy as some of
his radical critics suggest.
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