Post on 01-Mar-2023
An earlier version of a paper published as follows:BROCK, G. “How Does Equality Matter?” Journal of Social
Philosophy, Volume XLII, Number 1, 76-87, 2011. [An article which forms part of an exchange titled, “Global Justice and Equality: An Exchange” with Richard Miller and Darrel Moellendorf, pp. 76-109.]ISSN: 0047-2786 (Print), 1467-9833 (Online)DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01520.x.
How Does Equality Matter?
In Global Justice,i I develop a cosmopolitan model of global
justice that takes seriously the equal moral worth of
persons, yet leaves scope for defensible forms of
nationalism along with other legitimate identifications and
affiliations. In this article I focus on how equality
matters in my account and critically engage also with
Richard Miller’s and Darrel Moellendorf’s positions on how
equality matters for global justice, as discussed in their
important new books.ii
i Gillian Brock Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
ii Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and
Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and
1
1. How equality matters in Global Justice
It will help to set out in numbered form seven central
features of my account of global justice that have a bearing
on the issue of how our equality should matter. As I argue
in Chapter 3, global justice requires that all are
adequately positioned to enjoy prospects for a decent life,
which entails that we attend especially to (i) enabling need
satisfaction, (ii) protecting basic freedom, (iii) ensuring
fair terms of cooperation in collective endeavors, and (iv)
social and political arrangements that can underwrite the
important goods outlined in (i) - (iii).iii The basic account
Darrel Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters (Houndsmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
2
of global justice has these four central components. In
addition, subsequent chapters also make clear that I endorse
a number of other views that have a bearing on how equality
matters. First, I am also committed to (v) an ideal of
democratic equality. This requires that we promote standing
in relations of equality with one another, notably those
that promote equal respect, recognition, and power. This
endorsement approximates to a commitment to promote equal
positive freedom. Furthermore: (vi) one of our basic needs
is for autonomy, which means we must be vigilant for ways in
which autonomy can be undermined by conditions conducive to
domination. It is also important to emphasize that (vii) the
commitment to fair terms of cooperation in collective
endeavors will often entail a concern for equality.iv
To illustrate how all of this works in favor of a
concern for equality within societies, let us start with a
specific form of the worry about inequality: is it
permissible to provide an unequal and inferior education to
girls in a particular society, when boys within that society
receive a much better education? If a good is being
3
provided to boys, there is much in my account -- at least
(i) – (vii) just outlined -- that would support the view
that it should be equally provided for girls. Consider the
idea that democratic equality requires standing in relations
of equality with one another. Standing in relations of
equality with others in the same society requires equal
provision of certain goods, such as voting and education.v
We also have a basic need for autonomy, which requires that
we eliminate ways in which features of our societal
arrangements might promote domination. Insofar as boys’
superior education fosters such opportunities, further
support can be marshaled against the idea of endorsing
inferior education for girls.vi Support for equal provision
can also be derived from the commitment to fair terms of
cooperation in collective endeavors.vii The fourth central
criterion that seeks social and political arrangements that
promote (i)-(iii) would require equal distribution as well
(at least in virtue of the need for autonomy and fair terms
of cooperation).
4
Concerns with relational equality, non-domination and
fair terms of co-operation that often yield a concern for
more equality within states attract parallel attention in
the global sphere. An important thesis explored and
illustrated in the book is that there is a significant need
for improved global regulation as an effective and neglected
way of honoring our commitments to (i)-(vii).
There is some profitable discussion to be had about
just how equality matters in the global realm. In the book
I claim to offer a plausible interpretation of what equality
requires in the global domain and one that is also entitled
to the label “egalitarian”. As I argue, fostering relational
equality – that is to say, standing in relations of equality
(rather than, say, relations characterized by domination or
exploitation) with one another -- is the goal.
Distributional issues are important to that goal, but they
do not, and should not, exhaust our concern with equality,
when other more important factors -- such as the quality of
regulation -- are more determinative.viii By looking at
where unequal provision does undermine standing in relations
5
of equality with one another and where it does not, and,
importantly, where other factors not related to individual
holdings undermine standing in relations of equality, we are
able to come up with a more nuanced account of when and how
our equality matters. The argument has to be made in
domain- and good-specific terms. For certain goods,
equality is part of adequacy. Education and voting would
seem to be paradigm cases. But equal provision need not be
important for all goods. Equal provision of housing may be
one example.ix
In many cases, concern with equality should guide us
toward a focus on improved regulation rather than
distribution per se, since what blocks the possibility of
standing in relations of equality is the exercise of unequal
power. Let me illustrate with the case of the need for
taxation and accounting reforms. In Chapter 5 I discuss the
need for extensive reforms to our global accounting and
taxation arrangements. I discuss several practices that are
detrimental to everyone, especially those in developing
countries. Our current arrangements contribute greatly to
6
the global poverty problem and inappropriately allow vast
amounts of taxable income to escape taxation, especially in
developing countries. Even modest changes in global tax
policy would mobilize revenue that is badly needed for
beneficial development.
I argue for reforms governing transparency,
accountability, and opportunities to escape tax. To take
some more easily explained examples, in contrast with
developed countries, the fact that there are no disclosure
requirements concerning sales prices for resources in
developing countries allows corruption to flourish and
facilitates leaders’ ability to siphon money away from
developing countries. The existence of so-called “tax
havens” and “transfer pricing schemes” allow much taxable
income to escape fiscal attention. Transfer pricing schemes
are accounting mechanisms that allow goods to be shifted to
low (or no) tax jurisdictions in ways contrived to ensure
minimal tax is paid; indeed, often it appears that goods are
sold at losses which has beneficial accounting consequences,
such as lowering overall taxes due. Because these
7
transactions occur within the company, there is wide scope
to trade at arbitrary prices instead of market-attuned ones,
with plenty of opportunity to disguise profits and report
instead losses that attract no fiscal obligations, indeed
often entail tax refunds. In these ways, transfer pricing
(and other complex financial structures) reduce
transparency, thus facilitating tax evasion. The scale of
the problems is often unappreciated. About half of all
world trade passes through tax haven jurisdictions, as
profits are shifted to places where tax can be avoided. It
is estimated that through such schemes developing countries
lose revenue greater than the annual flow of aid. Indeed,
according to Ray Baker’s analysis, for every dollar of aid
that goes into a country, $6-$7 of corporate tax evasion
flows out of it.x
Tax evasion and avoidance threatens both development
and democracy, especially in developing countries. Because
large corporations and wealthy individuals are effectively
escaping taxation, the tax burden is frequently shifted
onto ordinary citizens and smaller businesses. Governments
8
often thereby collect much-reduced sums insufficient to
achieve minimal goals of social justice, such as providing
decent public goods and services, which can also have a
dramatic effect on developing or maintaining robust
democracies.xi Furthermore, because most developing
countries are in competition in trying to attract foreign
capital, offering tax-breaks or tax havens may seem to
provide an attractive course. However, as states compete to
offer tax exemptions, the number of tax havens increases,
thereby making developing countries worse off than if they
co-operated to secure a more uniform tax arrangement in
similar jurisdictions. Corporations pay vastly reduced, if
any, taxes, and developing country citizens have to bear
more of the cost of financing the social and public goods
necessary for sustaining well-functioning communities,
which effectively means corporations are free-riding on the
efforts of the global worst off and not paying anything
like their fair share of costs required to sustain the
societies from which much of their profits arise.
9
It is often suggested that developing countries need to
provide tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment
(FDI), and so there are important benefits that accrue to
developing countries when they offer favorable taxation
arrangements.xii Many developing countries compete for FDI
and seem to encounter pressure to provide tax incentives or
exemptions. But evidence suggests there are limited, if
any, net benefits from such incentives, and that these tax
incentives play little part in investors’ decisions, so
their use may be futile.xiii Much more important to
investment in developing states are fundamental factors such
as: quality of institutions, basic infrastructure, stable
government, sound fiscal condition, available labor force,
respect for the rule of law, good accountability, and so
forth.xiv Beneficial development cannot occur without
attention to such factors, which practices surrounding non-
transparency and tax escape do nothing to secure and rather
too much to undermine.xv
I argue that addressing the problems identified
involves improving international regulation, and that we
10
should consider: (i) promoting cooperation among states to
reduce the destructive effects of tax competition; (ii)
developing systems of unitary taxation for multinationals to
stop the entirely false shifting of profits to countries
with low or no taxes; (iii) harmonizing tax rates and policy
for capital (that is currently highly mobile). I also
document some more recent progress on achieving these goals
and we come to see that there is substantial support for
some needed reforms, such as setting international standards
for transparency in certain accounting transactions
(notably, the sale of natural resources, without which
massive corruption opportunities are available), and a
world-wide uniform apportionment model for allocating
profits among numerous jurisdictions in which business is
transacted, which could put a stop to some of the most
egregious forms of tax escape currently available.xvi There
is thus a robust case for both the normative desirability
and the feasibility of the proposed reforms.
Regulatory reform of the kinds proposed would
considerably enhance our standing in improved relations with
11
each other in the global sphere, that is to say, ones which
begin to express the equal respect, recognition, and power
we all deserve. Blocking the rampant opportunities for tax
escape from developing countries and allowing citizens in
those countries to help themselves expresses the right kind
of attention to equality, by promoting an institutional
structure which can meaningfully support our equal
recognition, power, and respect.
Though I will not have space to discuss other cases,
my claim is that regulatory reform in a variety of areas
will considerably assist developing countries in their
efforts to help themselves, and importantly, is most
consistent with our commitment to give equal consideration
to others’ interests and our other legitimate concerns with
equality. (Other examples include international agreements
concerning the recruitment of health care professionals and
other fair migration practices, agreements that respect
everyone’s entitlements to reasonable opportunities for
development -- which may mean more protectionist policies
for developing countries are justified -- and agreements
12
that incentivise improving labour standards through “just
linkage” programs. Part II of Global Justice contains many
other examples.) A basic point to highlight is that for
too long the debates about egalitarianism and global
justice have focused rather too much on the wrong objects,
such as whether or not a Rawlsian Difference Principle
should apply globally or not. I present an alternative,
more attractive account of what we should be concerned with
when we turn our attention to issues of equality in the
global domain. Ensuring we stand in the right kinds of
relations with one another can also provide a useful focus
when we turn to look at recommending policy changes in a
range of domains.xvii
2. Too little concern with our equality?:
Richard Miller on Globalizing Justice
Miller rejects worldwide economic interdependence as a
promising basis for generating demanding duties to non-
compatriots. In tracing our global responsibilities, Miller
13
explores different kinds of interaction among developed and
developing countries. A central concern is the way in which
individuals, firms, or governments in developed countries
take advantage of people in developing countries, and
thereby derive benefits from others’ inferior capacities to
pursue their interests in relevant interactions. This shows
inadequate regard for others’ autonomy and equal worth.
In matters of transnational production and exchange,
those in developed countries take advantage of people in
developing countries when they derive benefits from
bargaining weaknesses that result from desperate neediness.
In expressing due regard for person’s equal worth and
respect for their autonomy, those in developed countries
should be willing to use the benefits derived from
bargaining weaknesses to relieve the conditions that give
rise to that weakness, namely vast unmet basic needs. On
Miller’s view this relief effort should have as its target
the global poor wherever they reside, otherwise addressing the
problem in one location might simply shift it to another.
14
In addition, the unjust processes whereby governments
forge agreements that determine the rules or frameworks for
global commerce need reforms. Developed countries take
advantage of bargaining weaknesses of citizens of developing
countries when they press for arrangements that are
advantageous to developed countries but not to developing
ones, which reasonable deliberations would not sustain.
Furthermore, some developed countries, especially the US,
exert vast influence in international affairs that can lead
to opportunities to take advantage of others, such as
through exploitation and negotiations that involve a
significant amount of bullying.xviii The US is able to
dominate international affairs and uses its influence in
distinct ways. One important way is that the US has
enormous influence when it exercises its prerogatives. The
result is that the United States has considerable threat and
destructive power. Miller investigates the political
responsibilities that are generated through exercising that
power.
15
In cases where the United States steers the local
course of development by manipulating local weaknesses (such
as in the case of Structural Adjustment Programs where
conditions – such as privatization of state assets -- are
specified as required for loans to be granted), it inherits
duties to act responsibly in shaping those lives.
Importantly, the US duty is limited to meeting any gap in
local provision for basic needs and then only in such a way
that this does not intrude on local agents’ duties of self-
reliance. The target responsibility is to meet unmet basic
needs, and this is appropriate because it achieves the goal
of providing access to an autonomous life. The basic needs
identified are needs for subsistence, basic healthcare, and
physical security (though perhaps Miller means this list to
be indicative rather than exhaustive). Miller notes that
these three needs might give rise to others which may be
pre-requisites for satisfying the needs specified. For
instance, the need for security might entail that due
attention to governance policies is appropriate, especially
if they lead to instability or repression. Miller believes
16
that the focus on basic needs would give rise to extensive
demands. Though meeting basic needs does not advance all
valuable human goals, it is the right focus of the
responsibility because of the steering process that creates
iii In arguing for what we are all owed as human beings, I
argue for what our reasonable expectations of one
another should be, especially in situations of ongoing
cooperation. The set-up of a normative thought
experiment that I deploy aims to make this more vivid
to us, but the basic idea can be argued for
independently of that framework. I will not be able to
cover the details of the normative thought experiment,
but I give a brief sketch. An easy way to enter the
thought experiment is to imagine that a global
conference has been organized. You have been randomly
selected to be a decision-making delegate to this
conference. You are to participate in deciding what
would be a fair framework for interactions and
relations among the world's inhabitants. Though you
17
the needs. Once the local people are able to provide for
local basic needs, the duty is discharged.xix
When domineering influence has involved the propping up
of client regimes, the duty is to promote prosperity in
subordinate territories beyond basic needs.xx And when
have been invited to the decision-making forum, you do
not know anything about what allegiances you have (or
may have after the conference concludes), but you do
know that decisions made at this conference will be
binding. It may turn out that you belong to a
developing nation, occupy a territory with poor natural
resources, and so forth. Given these sorts of
possibilities, you are provided with reasons to care
about what you would be prepared to tolerate in a range
of different circumstances. The main issue delegates
must entertain concerns what basic framework governing
the world’s inhabitants we can reasonably expect to
agree on as fair. After considerable argument about
what that entails, I endorse the following position:
Global justice requires that all are adequately
18
destructive power has been exercised, full restoration
(compared with what existed preceding the destructive
intervention) is then the appropriate target goal. Miller
also addresses the question of the efficacy of help, and he
draws attention to evidence that suggests foreign aid has
limited effectiveness. Rather, sometimes policies such as
positioned to enjoy prospects for a decent life, which
requires we attend especially to (1) enabling need
satisfaction, (2) protecting basic freedom, (3)
ensuring fair terms of cooperation in collective
endeavors, and (4) social and political arrangements
that can underwrite these important goods are in place.
All four of these constitute the basis for
grounding claims of entitlement. The detail of which
claims they ground is begun in Part II by considering
five domains in which our entitlements can be specified
in more particular terms, concerning global poverty,
taxation, liberty protections, humanitarian
intervention, immigration, and the global economic
order.
19
more liberalized trade and migration policies would assist
more effectively.
One central problem with Miller’s account is that
equality does not seem to matter enough on his view. Like
Miller, I believe focusing on basic needs can get us to some
iv What I mean by “fair terms of cooperation in
collective endeavors” is discussed in further detail
throughout the book and is best elaborated in domain-
specific terms. For one thorough example of what this
means for the global economic order, see Global Justice,
Chapter 9. Some examples are also discussed below.
v In Global Justice, Chapter 12 I discuss relational equality
and its requirements in more detail.
vi There may certainly be good reasons to provide
education other than the avoidance of domination. As I
discuss in Global Justice, Chapter 3, our basic needs are
for a sufficient level of (1) physical and
psychological health, (2) security, (3) understanding,
(4) autonomy, and (5) decent social relations.
Opportunities to gain knowledge may be instrumentally
20
quite demanding duties, especially if we take the
institutional theory (explained briefly below) seriously,
but focusing on residual basic needs when we have exercised
steering power, or more extensive remedial concerns when we
have exercised destructive power, does not seem to exhaust
our appropriate concerns with equality. I believe I go
further than Miller does in several ways, and I think on
important to all of these needs and acquiring
fulfilling knowledge may also be intrinsically
valuable. The focus on the need for autonomy and to
avoid domination gives us the important link necessary
to show that equal provision of these goods in a
society is required.
vii It is hard to see how we really do have fair terms
of co-operation for women and men in a society in which
core goods such as education and voting are allocated
radically differently for males and females, despite
attempts to justify patriarchal societies.
viii I offer some defense of this view in Global Justice,
Chapter 12, especially section 12.5.
21
Miller’s own account, he ought to as well. I raise four
points next aimed at showing how Miller’s position should be
made more demanding in several ways to reflect better how
equality should matter at the global level, and these points
ix How much inequality in such goods is compatible
with maintaining the social bases of self-respect could
be a further constraint on which inequalities beyond
adequacy are permissible.
x Ray Baker Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirt Money and How to
Renew the Free-Market System (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and
Sons, 2005).
xi Juan Hdez. Vigueras Tax Havens: how offshore centres undermine
democracy (Spain: Akal, 2005).
xii Austin Mitchell and Prem Sikka (2005) “Taming the
Corporations” Association for Accountancy and Business
Affairs. ISBN #1-902304-09-01, pp. 1-59.
xiii Charles Oman “Policy Competition for Foreign
Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among
governments to attract FDI” (OECD Development Centre –
22
can all be derived by considering the implications of
Miller’s own views.
First, which basic needs deserve attention? The answer
seems to be that because subsistence, health, and physical
security have basic value in every culture, they can provide
a core set of basic needs with universal authority. On my
view not just health, subsistence, and security matter but
see tax paper for ref.); see also McKinsey report
available at:
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/McKisney_Repor
t_summary.pdf.
xiv Ibid.
xv For more on these arguments see Global Justice,
Chapters 5 and 9.
xvi For more detailed discussion and progress on these
initiatives see Global Justice, Chapter 5.
xvii This approach is discussed further in Global Justice,
Chapter 12.
xviii Richard Miller elaborates on what he means by this
in Globalizing Justice, Chapter 3.
23
also understanding, autonomy, and decent social relations.
These last three might all be derived from the first three
Miller identifies and perhaps he means for them to be
included. At any rate, Miller ought to include them, if he
does not, because if access to an autonomous life is the
goal, there are more prerequisites than the three
identified. Meeting needs for health, subsistence, and
security still leaves unmet other ingredients necessary for
access to an autonomous life. Miller believes that stopping
at those three is justified because they are universally
endorsed and therefore can command universal authority. But
this argument does not proceed smoothly. Large numbers of
religious fundamentalists might not particularly value
security over following their understanding of God’s will,
but that does not mean security should be jettisoned from
the list. Rather, we need more arguments as to why these
core needs are important for access to an autonomous life
even in the face of apparent rejection.
Second, the kind of policy implications that are
entailed by focusing on needs could be further developed.
24
Even if we just focus on needs, this will create rather
extensive commitments. According to the institutional
view, a key factor in addressing poverty is improving the
quality of local institutions, for instance the rule of law
that operates in the country, which includes institutions
that provide dependable property rights, can manage
conflict, maintain law and order, enable social and
political stability, and sustain its regulatory capacity.xxi
Institutions that promote the rule of law make for an
environment conducive to growth and innovation (which some
maintain are key drivers of prosperity),xxii but also make
for an environment conducive to investment in education,
health, and infrastructure, all key ingredients for lifting
people out of poverty. Creating better institutions is a
significant component in helping people out of poverty. I
am unclear whether Miller endorses responsibilities to
improve any of these institutions (though I suspect not,
given recent discussion),xxiii but at any rate, I think the
force of the argument pushes him in this direction.xxiv
25
Third, Miller sometimes has inconsistent views on the
scope of justice issue. For the most part, he has the view
that the kind of attention we owe others as a matter of
justice requires tracking the relevant special relationships
and histories and is determined by these special relations
and histories of interactions. However, Miller concedes at
several places that our concern as a matter of justice must be
wider and does not seem to track special relationships and histories
exclusively. For instance, even if we tidy up one mess that we
helped create, without global attention to neediness
(irrespective of special relationships), we might just
effectively transfer the problem elsewhere (such as in cases
where we secure improvements in wages in one country, with
the result that corporations simply relocate to other
countries with lower wage rates).xxv
Fourth, a case can also be marshaled that
considerations Miller himself finds compelling should draw
him to endorse the position that the scope of our concern
with justice is global, irrespective of current special
relationships. On my account (explored in Chapter 12), we
26
all co-operate in producing one of the most valuable goods,
namely security, by refraining from doing all sorts of
things that would compromise security. If, as Miller
concedes, security is a basic need, then we all deserve the
relevant level of attention, since we all have a role to
play in maintaining security. Indeed, I think on Miller’s
own account, one could argue that failing to recognize
everyone’s contribution to producing security when there is
desperate neediness which might require special sacrifices
in restraint, would fail to respect their equal worth and
autonomy. Failure to attend to everyone, whether we are
currently in special relationships with them or not, takes
advantage of their cooperation in producing the good of
security. In virtue of requirements to refrain from taking
advantage, the scope of justice extends to all.xxvi
3. Moellendorf on Global Inequality Matters :
Does global equality of opportunity matter?
27
In endorsing a strong commitment to relational
egalitarianism (among other ways in which I affirm the
importance of equality), I believe my position is closer to
Moellendorf’s than is perhaps at first apparent. Moellendorf
admits that equality is not some free-standing value which
demands our allegiance come what may. Equality is not
intrinsically valuable.xxvii So far, so good. So why does
equality matter for Moellendorf? If we take seriously the
idea that all persons possess inherent dignity, then
constructing institutions that aim to reduce inequality
follows from this commitment. I think the basic strategy he
uses to argue for these claims is plausible. As he
indicates, recognition respect and justificatory respect
both require that all persons can legitimately demand that
institutions affecting them be appropriately constrained and
rules governing our interactions be justified on terms we
could find reasonable. We could all find reasonable the
principle that institutions should be arranged so that they
realize equally the interests of all those living under
them.
28
For some years now, Moellendorf and I have been engaged
in a discussion about the importance of equality of
opportunity in ideals of global justice.xxviii In the last
round of debate, Moellendorf indicates that by specifying a
list of cross-culturally valuable goods, my skepticism about
whether equality of opportunity can be achieved in the
global sphere has been addressed. I think the skepticism
can linger and is not rebutted through this strategy. The
worry is not that we cannot come up with some plausible list
of cross-culturally valuable goods. Rather, the difficulty
concerns determining when situations are sufficiently similar that we can be
confident we have instantiated the ideal. Given our current world,
there are plenty of cases where we know the ideal is not
achieved, of course, such as the comparisons between Mali
and the USA, which Moellendorf cites. My worry is perhaps
entirely theoretical, but still not out of place in
philosophical reflections on the matter.
Evaluating whether opportunities are equal is much harder
than judging whether outcomes are equal. Without almost
identical educations, formal and informal (such as cultural
29
immersions) it will be difficult to assess whether
opportunities really are equal. But we cannot have
identical education as a reasonable goal (as Moellendorf
himself appreciates) so already we must relax the idea of
equal opportunities to something like equivalent
opportunities or “equal enough” opportunities.
According to Moellendorf:
“Equality of opportunity in the global economic association, then, is directed toward ensuring that differences in initial condition [particularly socio-economic condition] do not affect the opportunities of persons (of the morally relevant equal endowments) across a range of goods, including income, wealth, meaningful productive activity, leisure time, health, security, housing, education and basic liberties”.xxix
Let us look at some outcomes as a way of trying to
examine whether the opportunities that typically produce
them are sufficiently equivalent. (This will be an easier
way of making the parallel point about opportunities.) The
businessman in New York might score well on some of the
listed goods, such as income and wealth, and poorly on
others, perhaps leisure time, meaningful work, and health
(because of high stress and long hours of work). And the
30
businessman in Kolkata, might score reasonably well on all
five of the goods just listed, though much less well on
income and wealth than leisure time or health. In aiming at
equivalence, would we be aiming to aggregate over “life
packages”, i.e. trying to aggregate scores across all goods
on the list? If so, the businessman in Kolkata may well be
better off than the New York businessman, depending on how
we aggregate (for instance, if each category is weighted
equally).
xxi For discussion of the institutional view and some rival
hypotheses see Global Justice, Chapter 5.
xxii Douglas North Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson
“The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development An
Empirical Investigation” American Economic Review 91 no. 5
(2001): 1369-1401.
xxiii The discussions to which I refer occurred at the
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division
Meetings, April 2010 in San Francisco.
31
If we are aiming to equalize over each good, we face
the problem of people themselves not caring about some
dimensions and being willing to make trade-offs for the sake
of gains in other areas (such as foregoing a higher income
for the sake of more leisure time). This problem can
perhaps be easily overcome, in theory at least: we position
individuals so they can adequately choose to make such
trade-offs by ensuring high sufficiency in capability for
each category. However, on this strategy, we will confront
problems posed by the role that unequal cultural background
xxiv Reliable provision for needs-meeting requires
institutional changes of a pervasive kind, and as I
argue, might require attention be paid to ensuring a
free press, independent judicial courts, numerous
aspects of international regulation including tax
matters, and so forth. There are more and less
intrusive ways of securing these, but attention to
some aspects of these elements might be unavoidable.
Part II of my book is devoted to drawing out such
policy implications.
32
conditions play in influencing capability. Consider an
example: Arguably, the Indian businessman, surrounded by a
culture which emphasizes the importance of non-material
goods, may be at a significant advantage in securing some
goods over others, such as psychological health, the
importance of a meaningful spiritual life, friendship, and
so forth. The New York businessman, surrounded by a culture
that values aggressive pursuit of material goals and
assertiveness, will probably be at an advantage in securing
others (such as income and wealth). Which, if any,
interventions are permissible to neutralize (or equalize?)
background conditions provided by these two different
cultural influences which so heavily influence capabilities
for securing various goods?
It seems, then, we either have a problem as a result of
aggregation (with some possibly counter-intuitive results
about who is better off in the global sphere), or if we aim
xxv For instance, see Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The
Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), p. 68.
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for equalizing in each individual dimension of well-being
(or capabilities or some such), we have a problem deciding
about which (if any) cultural background conditions to
neutralize or strengthen in pursuit of equality. I state
the problem in terms of a dilemma next, moving from
considering outcomes and back to the issue of global
equality of opportunity more directly.
A dilemma would seem to present itself in attempting to
determine whether we have adequately instantiated the ideal
of global equality of opportunity: Either we assess
opportunity for equivalent life packages (bundling up
dimensions of well-being), then we face a problem of
aggregation, with some possibly counterintuitive results
depending on our metric for aggregation, or we assess
opportunity for each dimension of a good life, then problems
concerning intervening in cultural background conditions
seem relevant. (There are multiple problems associated with
such intervention, such as: Which cultural background
conditions may be the target of interventions? Do we aim to
neutralize their effects? Should we aim to strengthen some
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cultural influences that facilitate securing various goods
or capabilities, while diminishing corrosive influences? And
so on.) At any rate, I think there is still more to be said
about the ideal of equal opportunity in the global sphere,
and I look forward to Moellendorf’s further reflections on
this topic.
Despite many apparent differences, I think my account
has much in common with Moellendorf’s. We both are
concerned with institutional structures that give equal
consideration to everyone’s interests, that promote equal
respect, recognition and power, and standing in relations of
equality with one another. Though I am a bit skeptical about
an over-emphasis on equality of opportunity as a stand-alone
target goal of global justice, I believe equality does
matter, especially fostering relational equality. The focus
on relational equality probably converges with
recommendations Moellendorf would make via concern for
equality of opportunity. My critical views about equality of
opportunity entirely surround the confidence we are entitled
to have in our being satisfied that we have achieved the
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goal of genuinely equal opportunities – which, admittedly,
is a fairly theoretical worry given our current
circumstances.
xxvi In addition, on Miller’s view, exploiting people
fails to respect their equal worth. Arguably, a
similar concern comes into play when we ignore them
when there is no special relationship. Ignoring people
in such situations also seems to fail to respect their
equal worth. One final problem I mention here is that
created by different foci for remedial action that are
offered. Sometimes, with steering power, the focus is
on securing the means to meet basic needs, but when
destructive power is at issue the focus broadens. I
think this creates some tension for particular cases.
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xix Perhaps lack of appropriate political participation is
also a basic need, given its connection to security.
xx Miller does not specify how much prosperity is to
be targeted.
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xxvii While certain kinds of inequalities should command
our normative attention, not all are worrisome.
Consider the inequalities between different
billionaires, in which one has 3 billion and another 10
billion. We could try to equalize these inequalities
but this is not where the normative action is, nor
should it be. Furthermore, equality is valuable
because of the way in which it promotes valuable
relations between people and states of affairs. Simply
pursuing equality in the absence of it having any
bearing on relations or states of affairs is not
valuable, in my view. See Chapter 12, Global Justice for
more on these views.
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xxviii See, for instance, Gillian Brock “Ideals,
Egalitarianism, and Cosmopolitan Justice” Philosophical
Forum 36 (2005): 1-30; Darrel Moellendorf “Equality of
Opportunity Globalized” Canadian Journal of Law and
Jurisprudence XIX (2006): 301-318; Brock, Global Justice,
Chapter 3; Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters, Chapter 4.
xxix Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters, p. 75.
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