An earlier version of a paper published as follows:BROCK, G. “How Does Equality Matter?” Journal of Social

Philosophy, Volume XLII, Number 1, 76-87, 2011. [An article which forms part of an exchange titled, “Global Justice and Equality: An Exchange” with Richard Miller and Darrel Moellendorf, pp. 76-109.]ISSN: 0047-2786 (Print), 1467-9833 (Online)DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01520.x.

How Does Equality Matter?

In Global Justice,i I develop a cosmopolitan model of global

justice that takes seriously the equal moral worth of

persons, yet leaves scope for defensible forms of

nationalism along with other legitimate identifications and

affiliations. In this article I focus on how equality

matters in my account and critically engage also with

Richard Miller’s and Darrel Moellendorf’s positions on how

equality matters for global justice, as discussed in their

important new books.ii

i Gillian Brock Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

ii Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and

Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and

1

1. How equality matters in Global Justice

It will help to set out in numbered form seven central

features of my account of global justice that have a bearing

on the issue of how our equality should matter. As I argue

in Chapter 3, global justice requires that all are

adequately positioned to enjoy prospects for a decent life,

which entails that we attend especially to (i) enabling need

satisfaction, (ii) protecting basic freedom, (iii) ensuring

fair terms of cooperation in collective endeavors, and (iv)

social and political arrangements that can underwrite the

important goods outlined in (i) - (iii).iii The basic account

Darrel Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters (Houndsmills,

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

2

of global justice has these four central components. In

addition, subsequent chapters also make clear that I endorse

a number of other views that have a bearing on how equality

matters. First, I am also committed to (v) an ideal of

democratic equality. This requires that we promote standing

in relations of equality with one another, notably those

that promote equal respect, recognition, and power. This

endorsement approximates to a commitment to promote equal

positive freedom. Furthermore: (vi) one of our basic needs

is for autonomy, which means we must be vigilant for ways in

which autonomy can be undermined by conditions conducive to

domination. It is also important to emphasize that (vii) the

commitment to fair terms of cooperation in collective

endeavors will often entail a concern for equality.iv

To illustrate how all of this works in favor of a

concern for equality within societies, let us start with a

specific form of the worry about inequality: is it

permissible to provide an unequal and inferior education to

girls in a particular society, when boys within that society

receive a much better education? If a good is being

3

provided to boys, there is much in my account -- at least

(i) – (vii) just outlined -- that would support the view

that it should be equally provided for girls. Consider the

idea that democratic equality requires standing in relations

of equality with one another. Standing in relations of

equality with others in the same society requires equal

provision of certain goods, such as voting and education.v

We also have a basic need for autonomy, which requires that

we eliminate ways in which features of our societal

arrangements might promote domination. Insofar as boys’

superior education fosters such opportunities, further

support can be marshaled against the idea of endorsing

inferior education for girls.vi Support for equal provision

can also be derived from the commitment to fair terms of

cooperation in collective endeavors.vii The fourth central

criterion that seeks social and political arrangements that

promote (i)-(iii) would require equal distribution as well

(at least in virtue of the need for autonomy and fair terms

of cooperation).

4

Concerns with relational equality, non-domination and

fair terms of co-operation that often yield a concern for

more equality within states attract parallel attention in

the global sphere. An important thesis explored and

illustrated in the book is that there is a significant need

for improved global regulation as an effective and neglected

way of honoring our commitments to (i)-(vii).

There is some profitable discussion to be had about

just how equality matters in the global realm. In the book

I claim to offer a plausible interpretation of what equality

requires in the global domain and one that is also entitled

to the label “egalitarian”. As I argue, fostering relational

equality – that is to say, standing in relations of equality

(rather than, say, relations characterized by domination or

exploitation) with one another -- is the goal.

Distributional issues are important to that goal, but they

do not, and should not, exhaust our concern with equality,

when other more important factors -- such as the quality of

regulation -- are more determinative.viii By looking at

where unequal provision does undermine standing in relations

5

of equality with one another and where it does not, and,

importantly, where other factors not related to individual

holdings undermine standing in relations of equality, we are

able to come up with a more nuanced account of when and how

our equality matters. The argument has to be made in

domain- and good-specific terms. For certain goods,

equality is part of adequacy. Education and voting would

seem to be paradigm cases. But equal provision need not be

important for all goods. Equal provision of housing may be

one example.ix

In many cases, concern with equality should guide us

toward a focus on improved regulation rather than

distribution per se, since what blocks the possibility of

standing in relations of equality is the exercise of unequal

power. Let me illustrate with the case of the need for

taxation and accounting reforms. In Chapter 5 I discuss the

need for extensive reforms to our global accounting and

taxation arrangements. I discuss several practices that are

detrimental to everyone, especially those in developing

countries. Our current arrangements contribute greatly to

6

the global poverty problem and inappropriately allow vast

amounts of taxable income to escape taxation, especially in

developing countries. Even modest changes in global tax

policy would mobilize revenue that is badly needed for

beneficial development.

I argue for reforms governing transparency,

accountability, and opportunities to escape tax. To take

some more easily explained examples, in contrast with

developed countries, the fact that there are no disclosure

requirements concerning sales prices for resources in

developing countries allows corruption to flourish and

facilitates leaders’ ability to siphon money away from

developing countries. The existence of so-called “tax

havens” and “transfer pricing schemes” allow much taxable

income to escape fiscal attention. Transfer pricing schemes

are accounting mechanisms that allow goods to be shifted to

low (or no) tax jurisdictions in ways contrived to ensure

minimal tax is paid; indeed, often it appears that goods are

sold at losses which has beneficial accounting consequences,

such as lowering overall taxes due. Because these

7

transactions occur within the company, there is wide scope

to trade at arbitrary prices instead of market-attuned ones,

with plenty of opportunity to disguise profits and report

instead losses that attract no fiscal obligations, indeed

often entail tax refunds. In these ways, transfer pricing

(and other complex financial structures) reduce

transparency, thus facilitating tax evasion. The scale of

the problems is often unappreciated. About half of all

world trade passes through tax haven jurisdictions, as

profits are shifted to places where tax can be avoided. It

is estimated that through such schemes developing countries

lose revenue greater than the annual flow of aid. Indeed,

according to Ray Baker’s analysis, for every dollar of aid

that goes into a country, $6-$7 of corporate tax evasion

flows out of it.x

Tax evasion and avoidance threatens both development

and democracy, especially in developing countries. Because

large corporations and wealthy individuals are effectively

escaping taxation, the tax burden is frequently shifted

onto ordinary citizens and smaller businesses. Governments

8

often thereby collect much-reduced sums insufficient to

achieve minimal goals of social justice, such as providing

decent public goods and services, which can also have a

dramatic effect on developing or maintaining robust

democracies.xi Furthermore, because most developing

countries are in competition in trying to attract foreign

capital, offering tax-breaks or tax havens may seem to

provide an attractive course. However, as states compete to

offer tax exemptions, the number of tax havens increases,

thereby making developing countries worse off than if they

co-operated to secure a more uniform tax arrangement in

similar jurisdictions. Corporations pay vastly reduced, if

any, taxes, and developing country citizens have to bear

more of the cost of financing the social and public goods

necessary for sustaining well-functioning communities,

which effectively means corporations are free-riding on the

efforts of the global worst off and not paying anything

like their fair share of costs required to sustain the

societies from which much of their profits arise.

9

It is often suggested that developing countries need to

provide tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment

(FDI), and so there are important benefits that accrue to

developing countries when they offer favorable taxation

arrangements.xii Many developing countries compete for FDI

and seem to encounter pressure to provide tax incentives or

exemptions. But evidence suggests there are limited, if

any, net benefits from such incentives, and that these tax

incentives play little part in investors’ decisions, so

their use may be futile.xiii Much more important to

investment in developing states are fundamental factors such

as: quality of institutions, basic infrastructure, stable

government, sound fiscal condition, available labor force,

respect for the rule of law, good accountability, and so

forth.xiv Beneficial development cannot occur without

attention to such factors, which practices surrounding non-

transparency and tax escape do nothing to secure and rather

too much to undermine.xv

I argue that addressing the problems identified

involves improving international regulation, and that we

10

should consider: (i) promoting cooperation among states to

reduce the destructive effects of tax competition; (ii)

developing systems of unitary taxation for multinationals to

stop the entirely false shifting of profits to countries

with low or no taxes; (iii) harmonizing tax rates and policy

for capital (that is currently highly mobile). I also

document some more recent progress on achieving these goals

and we come to see that there is substantial support for

some needed reforms, such as setting international standards

for transparency in certain accounting transactions

(notably, the sale of natural resources, without which

massive corruption opportunities are available), and a

world-wide uniform apportionment model for allocating

profits among numerous jurisdictions in which business is

transacted, which could put a stop to some of the most

egregious forms of tax escape currently available.xvi There

is thus a robust case for both the normative desirability

and the feasibility of the proposed reforms.

Regulatory reform of the kinds proposed would

considerably enhance our standing in improved relations with

11

each other in the global sphere, that is to say, ones which

begin to express the equal respect, recognition, and power

we all deserve. Blocking the rampant opportunities for tax

escape from developing countries and allowing citizens in

those countries to help themselves expresses the right kind

of attention to equality, by promoting an institutional

structure which can meaningfully support our equal

recognition, power, and respect.

Though I will not have space to discuss other cases,

my claim is that regulatory reform in a variety of areas

will considerably assist developing countries in their

efforts to help themselves, and importantly, is most

consistent with our commitment to give equal consideration

to others’ interests and our other legitimate concerns with

equality. (Other examples include international agreements

concerning the recruitment of health care professionals and

other fair migration practices, agreements that respect

everyone’s entitlements to reasonable opportunities for

development -- which may mean more protectionist policies

for developing countries are justified -- and agreements

12

that incentivise improving labour standards through “just

linkage” programs. Part II of Global Justice contains many

other examples.) A basic point to highlight is that for

too long the debates about egalitarianism and global

justice have focused rather too much on the wrong objects,

such as whether or not a Rawlsian Difference Principle

should apply globally or not. I present an alternative,

more attractive account of what we should be concerned with

when we turn our attention to issues of equality in the

global domain. Ensuring we stand in the right kinds of

relations with one another can also provide a useful focus

when we turn to look at recommending policy changes in a

range of domains.xvii

2. Too little concern with our equality?:

Richard Miller on Globalizing Justice

Miller rejects worldwide economic interdependence as a

promising basis for generating demanding duties to non-

compatriots. In tracing our global responsibilities, Miller

13

explores different kinds of interaction among developed and

developing countries. A central concern is the way in which

individuals, firms, or governments in developed countries

take advantage of people in developing countries, and

thereby derive benefits from others’ inferior capacities to

pursue their interests in relevant interactions. This shows

inadequate regard for others’ autonomy and equal worth.

In matters of transnational production and exchange,

those in developed countries take advantage of people in

developing countries when they derive benefits from

bargaining weaknesses that result from desperate neediness.

In expressing due regard for person’s equal worth and

respect for their autonomy, those in developed countries

should be willing to use the benefits derived from

bargaining weaknesses to relieve the conditions that give

rise to that weakness, namely vast unmet basic needs. On

Miller’s view this relief effort should have as its target

the global poor wherever they reside, otherwise addressing the

problem in one location might simply shift it to another.

14

In addition, the unjust processes whereby governments

forge agreements that determine the rules or frameworks for

global commerce need reforms. Developed countries take

advantage of bargaining weaknesses of citizens of developing

countries when they press for arrangements that are

advantageous to developed countries but not to developing

ones, which reasonable deliberations would not sustain.

Furthermore, some developed countries, especially the US,

exert vast influence in international affairs that can lead

to opportunities to take advantage of others, such as

through exploitation and negotiations that involve a

significant amount of bullying.xviii The US is able to

dominate international affairs and uses its influence in

distinct ways. One important way is that the US has

enormous influence when it exercises its prerogatives. The

result is that the United States has considerable threat and

destructive power. Miller investigates the political

responsibilities that are generated through exercising that

power.

15

In cases where the United States steers the local

course of development by manipulating local weaknesses (such

as in the case of Structural Adjustment Programs where

conditions – such as privatization of state assets -- are

specified as required for loans to be granted), it inherits

duties to act responsibly in shaping those lives.

Importantly, the US duty is limited to meeting any gap in

local provision for basic needs and then only in such a way

that this does not intrude on local agents’ duties of self-

reliance. The target responsibility is to meet unmet basic

needs, and this is appropriate because it achieves the goal

of providing access to an autonomous life. The basic needs

identified are needs for subsistence, basic healthcare, and

physical security (though perhaps Miller means this list to

be indicative rather than exhaustive). Miller notes that

these three needs might give rise to others which may be

pre-requisites for satisfying the needs specified. For

instance, the need for security might entail that due

attention to governance policies is appropriate, especially

if they lead to instability or repression. Miller believes

16

that the focus on basic needs would give rise to extensive

demands. Though meeting basic needs does not advance all

valuable human goals, it is the right focus of the

responsibility because of the steering process that creates

iii In arguing for what we are all owed as human beings, I

argue for what our reasonable expectations of one

another should be, especially in situations of ongoing

cooperation. The set-up of a normative thought

experiment that I deploy aims to make this more vivid

to us, but the basic idea can be argued for

independently of that framework. I will not be able to

cover the details of the normative thought experiment,

but I give a brief sketch. An easy way to enter the

thought experiment is to imagine that a global

conference has been organized. You have been randomly

selected to be a decision-making delegate to this

conference. You are to participate in deciding what

would be a fair framework for interactions and

relations among the world's inhabitants. Though you

17

the needs. Once the local people are able to provide for

local basic needs, the duty is discharged.xix

When domineering influence has involved the propping up

of client regimes, the duty is to promote prosperity in

subordinate territories beyond basic needs.xx And when

have been invited to the decision-making forum, you do

not know anything about what allegiances you have (or

may have after the conference concludes), but you do

know that decisions made at this conference will be

binding. It may turn out that you belong to a

developing nation, occupy a territory with poor natural

resources, and so forth. Given these sorts of

possibilities, you are provided with reasons to care

about what you would be prepared to tolerate in a range

of different circumstances. The main issue delegates

must entertain concerns what basic framework governing

the world’s inhabitants we can reasonably expect to

agree on as fair. After considerable argument about

what that entails, I endorse the following position:

Global justice requires that all are adequately

18

destructive power has been exercised, full restoration

(compared with what existed preceding the destructive

intervention) is then the appropriate target goal. Miller

also addresses the question of the efficacy of help, and he

draws attention to evidence that suggests foreign aid has

limited effectiveness. Rather, sometimes policies such as

positioned to enjoy prospects for a decent life, which

requires we attend especially to (1) enabling need

satisfaction, (2) protecting basic freedom, (3)

ensuring fair terms of cooperation in collective

endeavors, and (4) social and political arrangements

that can underwrite these important goods are in place.

All four of these constitute the basis for

grounding claims of entitlement. The detail of which

claims they ground is begun in Part II by considering

five domains in which our entitlements can be specified

in more particular terms, concerning global poverty,

taxation, liberty protections, humanitarian

intervention, immigration, and the global economic

order.

19

more liberalized trade and migration policies would assist

more effectively.

One central problem with Miller’s account is that

equality does not seem to matter enough on his view. Like

Miller, I believe focusing on basic needs can get us to some

iv What I mean by “fair terms of cooperation in

collective endeavors” is discussed in further detail

throughout the book and is best elaborated in domain-

specific terms. For one thorough example of what this

means for the global economic order, see Global Justice,

Chapter 9. Some examples are also discussed below.

v In Global Justice, Chapter 12 I discuss relational equality

and its requirements in more detail.

vi There may certainly be good reasons to provide

education other than the avoidance of domination. As I

discuss in Global Justice, Chapter 3, our basic needs are

for a sufficient level of (1) physical and

psychological health, (2) security, (3) understanding,

(4) autonomy, and (5) decent social relations.

Opportunities to gain knowledge may be instrumentally

20

quite demanding duties, especially if we take the

institutional theory (explained briefly below) seriously,

but focusing on residual basic needs when we have exercised

steering power, or more extensive remedial concerns when we

have exercised destructive power, does not seem to exhaust

our appropriate concerns with equality. I believe I go

further than Miller does in several ways, and I think on

important to all of these needs and acquiring

fulfilling knowledge may also be intrinsically

valuable. The focus on the need for autonomy and to

avoid domination gives us the important link necessary

to show that equal provision of these goods in a

society is required.

vii It is hard to see how we really do have fair terms

of co-operation for women and men in a society in which

core goods such as education and voting are allocated

radically differently for males and females, despite

attempts to justify patriarchal societies.

viii I offer some defense of this view in Global Justice,

Chapter 12, especially section 12.5.

21

Miller’s own account, he ought to as well. I raise four

points next aimed at showing how Miller’s position should be

made more demanding in several ways to reflect better how

equality should matter at the global level, and these points

ix How much inequality in such goods is compatible

with maintaining the social bases of self-respect could

be a further constraint on which inequalities beyond

adequacy are permissible.

x Ray Baker Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirt Money and How to

Renew the Free-Market System (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and

Sons, 2005).

xi Juan Hdez. Vigueras Tax Havens: how offshore centres undermine

democracy (Spain: Akal, 2005).

xii Austin Mitchell and Prem Sikka (2005) “Taming the

Corporations” Association for Accountancy and Business

Affairs. ISBN #1-902304-09-01, pp. 1-59.

xiii Charles Oman “Policy Competition for Foreign

Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among

governments to attract FDI” (OECD Development Centre –

22

can all be derived by considering the implications of

Miller’s own views.

First, which basic needs deserve attention? The answer

seems to be that because subsistence, health, and physical

security have basic value in every culture, they can provide

a core set of basic needs with universal authority. On my

view not just health, subsistence, and security matter but

see tax paper for ref.); see also McKinsey report

available at:

http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/McKisney_Repor

t_summary.pdf.

xiv Ibid.

xv For more on these arguments see Global Justice,

Chapters 5 and 9.

xvi For more detailed discussion and progress on these

initiatives see Global Justice, Chapter 5.

xvii This approach is discussed further in Global Justice,

Chapter 12.

xviii Richard Miller elaborates on what he means by this

in Globalizing Justice, Chapter 3.

23

also understanding, autonomy, and decent social relations.

These last three might all be derived from the first three

Miller identifies and perhaps he means for them to be

included. At any rate, Miller ought to include them, if he

does not, because if access to an autonomous life is the

goal, there are more prerequisites than the three

identified. Meeting needs for health, subsistence, and

security still leaves unmet other ingredients necessary for

access to an autonomous life. Miller believes that stopping

at those three is justified because they are universally

endorsed and therefore can command universal authority. But

this argument does not proceed smoothly. Large numbers of

religious fundamentalists might not particularly value

security over following their understanding of God’s will,

but that does not mean security should be jettisoned from

the list. Rather, we need more arguments as to why these

core needs are important for access to an autonomous life

even in the face of apparent rejection.

Second, the kind of policy implications that are

entailed by focusing on needs could be further developed.

24

Even if we just focus on needs, this will create rather

extensive commitments. According to the institutional

view, a key factor in addressing poverty is improving the

quality of local institutions, for instance the rule of law

that operates in the country, which includes institutions

that provide dependable property rights, can manage

conflict, maintain law and order, enable social and

political stability, and sustain its regulatory capacity.xxi

Institutions that promote the rule of law make for an

environment conducive to growth and innovation (which some

maintain are key drivers of prosperity),xxii but also make

for an environment conducive to investment in education,

health, and infrastructure, all key ingredients for lifting

people out of poverty. Creating better institutions is a

significant component in helping people out of poverty. I

am unclear whether Miller endorses responsibilities to

improve any of these institutions (though I suspect not,

given recent discussion),xxiii but at any rate, I think the

force of the argument pushes him in this direction.xxiv

25

Third, Miller sometimes has inconsistent views on the

scope of justice issue. For the most part, he has the view

that the kind of attention we owe others as a matter of

justice requires tracking the relevant special relationships

and histories and is determined by these special relations

and histories of interactions. However, Miller concedes at

several places that our concern as a matter of justice must be

wider and does not seem to track special relationships and histories

exclusively. For instance, even if we tidy up one mess that we

helped create, without global attention to neediness

(irrespective of special relationships), we might just

effectively transfer the problem elsewhere (such as in cases

where we secure improvements in wages in one country, with

the result that corporations simply relocate to other

countries with lower wage rates).xxv

Fourth, a case can also be marshaled that

considerations Miller himself finds compelling should draw

him to endorse the position that the scope of our concern

with justice is global, irrespective of current special

relationships. On my account (explored in Chapter 12), we

26

all co-operate in producing one of the most valuable goods,

namely security, by refraining from doing all sorts of

things that would compromise security. If, as Miller

concedes, security is a basic need, then we all deserve the

relevant level of attention, since we all have a role to

play in maintaining security. Indeed, I think on Miller’s

own account, one could argue that failing to recognize

everyone’s contribution to producing security when there is

desperate neediness which might require special sacrifices

in restraint, would fail to respect their equal worth and

autonomy. Failure to attend to everyone, whether we are

currently in special relationships with them or not, takes

advantage of their cooperation in producing the good of

security. In virtue of requirements to refrain from taking

advantage, the scope of justice extends to all.xxvi

3. Moellendorf on Global Inequality Matters :

Does global equality of opportunity matter?

27

In endorsing a strong commitment to relational

egalitarianism (among other ways in which I affirm the

importance of equality), I believe my position is closer to

Moellendorf’s than is perhaps at first apparent. Moellendorf

admits that equality is not some free-standing value which

demands our allegiance come what may. Equality is not

intrinsically valuable.xxvii So far, so good. So why does

equality matter for Moellendorf? If we take seriously the

idea that all persons possess inherent dignity, then

constructing institutions that aim to reduce inequality

follows from this commitment. I think the basic strategy he

uses to argue for these claims is plausible. As he

indicates, recognition respect and justificatory respect

both require that all persons can legitimately demand that

institutions affecting them be appropriately constrained and

rules governing our interactions be justified on terms we

could find reasonable. We could all find reasonable the

principle that institutions should be arranged so that they

realize equally the interests of all those living under

them.

28

For some years now, Moellendorf and I have been engaged

in a discussion about the importance of equality of

opportunity in ideals of global justice.xxviii In the last

round of debate, Moellendorf indicates that by specifying a

list of cross-culturally valuable goods, my skepticism about

whether equality of opportunity can be achieved in the

global sphere has been addressed. I think the skepticism

can linger and is not rebutted through this strategy. The

worry is not that we cannot come up with some plausible list

of cross-culturally valuable goods. Rather, the difficulty

concerns determining when situations are sufficiently similar that we can be

confident we have instantiated the ideal. Given our current world,

there are plenty of cases where we know the ideal is not

achieved, of course, such as the comparisons between Mali

and the USA, which Moellendorf cites. My worry is perhaps

entirely theoretical, but still not out of place in

philosophical reflections on the matter.

Evaluating whether opportunities are equal is much harder

than judging whether outcomes are equal. Without almost

identical educations, formal and informal (such as cultural

29

immersions) it will be difficult to assess whether

opportunities really are equal. But we cannot have

identical education as a reasonable goal (as Moellendorf

himself appreciates) so already we must relax the idea of

equal opportunities to something like equivalent

opportunities or “equal enough” opportunities.

According to Moellendorf:

“Equality of opportunity in the global economic association, then, is directed toward ensuring that differences in initial condition [particularly socio-economic condition] do not affect the opportunities of persons (of the morally relevant equal endowments) across a range of goods, including income, wealth, meaningful productive activity, leisure time, health, security, housing, education and basic liberties”.xxix

Let us look at some outcomes as a way of trying to

examine whether the opportunities that typically produce

them are sufficiently equivalent. (This will be an easier

way of making the parallel point about opportunities.) The

businessman in New York might score well on some of the

listed goods, such as income and wealth, and poorly on

others, perhaps leisure time, meaningful work, and health

(because of high stress and long hours of work). And the

30

businessman in Kolkata, might score reasonably well on all

five of the goods just listed, though much less well on

income and wealth than leisure time or health. In aiming at

equivalence, would we be aiming to aggregate over “life

packages”, i.e. trying to aggregate scores across all goods

on the list? If so, the businessman in Kolkata may well be

better off than the New York businessman, depending on how

we aggregate (for instance, if each category is weighted

equally).

xxi For discussion of the institutional view and some rival

hypotheses see Global Justice, Chapter 5.

xxii Douglas North Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic

Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1990); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson

“The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development An

Empirical Investigation” American Economic Review 91 no. 5

(2001): 1369-1401.

xxiii The discussions to which I refer occurred at the

American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division

Meetings, April 2010 in San Francisco.

31

If we are aiming to equalize over each good, we face

the problem of people themselves not caring about some

dimensions and being willing to make trade-offs for the sake

of gains in other areas (such as foregoing a higher income

for the sake of more leisure time). This problem can

perhaps be easily overcome, in theory at least: we position

individuals so they can adequately choose to make such

trade-offs by ensuring high sufficiency in capability for

each category. However, on this strategy, we will confront

problems posed by the role that unequal cultural background

xxiv Reliable provision for needs-meeting requires

institutional changes of a pervasive kind, and as I

argue, might require attention be paid to ensuring a

free press, independent judicial courts, numerous

aspects of international regulation including tax

matters, and so forth. There are more and less

intrusive ways of securing these, but attention to

some aspects of these elements might be unavoidable.

Part II of my book is devoted to drawing out such

policy implications.

32

conditions play in influencing capability. Consider an

example: Arguably, the Indian businessman, surrounded by a

culture which emphasizes the importance of non-material

goods, may be at a significant advantage in securing some

goods over others, such as psychological health, the

importance of a meaningful spiritual life, friendship, and

so forth. The New York businessman, surrounded by a culture

that values aggressive pursuit of material goals and

assertiveness, will probably be at an advantage in securing

others (such as income and wealth). Which, if any,

interventions are permissible to neutralize (or equalize?)

background conditions provided by these two different

cultural influences which so heavily influence capabilities

for securing various goods?

It seems, then, we either have a problem as a result of

aggregation (with some possibly counter-intuitive results

about who is better off in the global sphere), or if we aim

xxv For instance, see Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The

Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2010), p. 68.

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for equalizing in each individual dimension of well-being

(or capabilities or some such), we have a problem deciding

about which (if any) cultural background conditions to

neutralize or strengthen in pursuit of equality. I state

the problem in terms of a dilemma next, moving from

considering outcomes and back to the issue of global

equality of opportunity more directly.

A dilemma would seem to present itself in attempting to

determine whether we have adequately instantiated the ideal

of global equality of opportunity: Either we assess

opportunity for equivalent life packages (bundling up

dimensions of well-being), then we face a problem of

aggregation, with some possibly counterintuitive results

depending on our metric for aggregation, or we assess

opportunity for each dimension of a good life, then problems

concerning intervening in cultural background conditions

seem relevant. (There are multiple problems associated with

such intervention, such as: Which cultural background

conditions may be the target of interventions? Do we aim to

neutralize their effects? Should we aim to strengthen some

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cultural influences that facilitate securing various goods

or capabilities, while diminishing corrosive influences? And

so on.) At any rate, I think there is still more to be said

about the ideal of equal opportunity in the global sphere,

and I look forward to Moellendorf’s further reflections on

this topic.

Despite many apparent differences, I think my account

has much in common with Moellendorf’s. We both are

concerned with institutional structures that give equal

consideration to everyone’s interests, that promote equal

respect, recognition and power, and standing in relations of

equality with one another. Though I am a bit skeptical about

an over-emphasis on equality of opportunity as a stand-alone

target goal of global justice, I believe equality does

matter, especially fostering relational equality. The focus

on relational equality probably converges with

recommendations Moellendorf would make via concern for

equality of opportunity. My critical views about equality of

opportunity entirely surround the confidence we are entitled

to have in our being satisfied that we have achieved the

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goal of genuinely equal opportunities – which, admittedly,

is a fairly theoretical worry given our current

circumstances.

xxvi In addition, on Miller’s view, exploiting people

fails to respect their equal worth. Arguably, a

similar concern comes into play when we ignore them

when there is no special relationship. Ignoring people

in such situations also seems to fail to respect their

equal worth. One final problem I mention here is that

created by different foci for remedial action that are

offered. Sometimes, with steering power, the focus is

on securing the means to meet basic needs, but when

destructive power is at issue the focus broadens. I

think this creates some tension for particular cases.

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Endnotes

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xix Perhaps lack of appropriate political participation is

also a basic need, given its connection to security.

xx Miller does not specify how much prosperity is to

be targeted.

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xxvii While certain kinds of inequalities should command

our normative attention, not all are worrisome.

Consider the inequalities between different

billionaires, in which one has 3 billion and another 10

billion. We could try to equalize these inequalities

but this is not where the normative action is, nor

should it be. Furthermore, equality is valuable

because of the way in which it promotes valuable

relations between people and states of affairs. Simply

pursuing equality in the absence of it having any

bearing on relations or states of affairs is not

valuable, in my view. See Chapter 12, Global Justice for

more on these views.

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xxviii See, for instance, Gillian Brock “Ideals,

Egalitarianism, and Cosmopolitan Justice” Philosophical

Forum 36 (2005): 1-30; Darrel Moellendorf “Equality of

Opportunity Globalized” Canadian Journal of Law and

Jurisprudence XIX (2006): 301-318; Brock, Global Justice,

Chapter 3; Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters, Chapter 4.

xxix Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters, p. 75.

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