Post on 29-Mar-2023
‘Big Bang’ Planning and Urban Design: Imperatives and Outcomes
in Sydney and Melbourne’s Old Port Areas
Assoc. Professor Glen Searle
University of Queensland,
Brisbane, Qld 4072 Australia.
Email: g.searle@uq.edu.au
Assoc. Professor Robin Goodman
RMIT University,
GPO Box 2476 Melbourne, Vic 3001 Australia.
Email: robin.goodman@rmit.edu.au
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Paper Presented in Track 10 (Urban Cultures, Heritage and Urban Design) atthe
3rd World Planning Schools Congress, Perth (WA), 4-8 July 2011
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‘Big Bang’ Planning and Urban Design: Imperatives and Outcomes
in Sydney and Melbourne’s Old Port Areas
Abstract
This paper uses an exploration of the imperatives that favour contemporary ‘big
bang’ urban planning (characterised by large scale, rapid planning and
development processes) to show how this drives production of precincts that fail to
deliver high quality urban design. The key imperatives focus on the evolution of the
property development industry leading to the development of very large property
development corporations, the hegemony of financial and employment dimensions
in current state city-making, and the related subordination of urban design
considerations. This situation is contrasted with the distilled wisdom of foundational
contributors to planning thought such as Geddes and Jacobs who advocated careful,
slow and iterative planning in order to produce the best urban outcomes. Two case
studies are used to illustrate the paper’s propositions: the near-CBD redevelopments
of the Docklands area of Melbourne and the Barangaroo dockside area in Sydney.
In both cases there has been a state government focus on large scale development
over a relatively short period, where development returns have been intended to pay
for state infrastructure costs, and that have involved state development corporations
and very large property developers to drive development forward. The result in each
case has been the production of precincts with development that has been attacked
as over-scaled by urban design professionals and local council planners, and that
has failed to produce the human scale, pedestrian intimacy and visual variety, inter
alia, that characterise the adjacent Central Business Districts.
Key words:
Urban mega-projects; Melbourne Docklands; Sydney; Barangaroo;
development corporations
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Introduction
Urban mega-projects have become increasingly significant
within overall city development over the last three decades,
as forces of global competition between cities and greater
willingness to mobilise private sector funds for urban
planning ends have intensified. Yet conceptualisation of this
tendency has focused on institutional and governance aspects
and community impact/participation. Analysis of such projects
in terms of critical concerns originally voiced by Jacobs
(1965), notably urban design issues, has been largely absent.
This paper is an initial attempt to address this lack. It
uses two case studies to understand how central
characteristics of major urban projects can lead to deficient
urban design outcomes such as excessive scale and/or lack of
enclosure, lack of connection to the existing urban fabric,
lack of variety, and so forth. We relate the case study
outcomes back to conceptualisations of appropriate urban
design outcomes as enunciated by Jacobs and Geddes in
particular. The case studies are two former docklands areas in
Australian cities: Barangaroo in Sydney, and Docklands in
Melbourne.
‘Big Bang’ projects and planning
The rise of large scale urban development projects has been
associated with intensified globalisation and a turn to a more
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neo-liberal governance across much of the West (Swyngedouw,
Moulaert and Rofriguez, 2002). These developments have been
used to spatially ‘fix’ mobile global capital in inter-city
competition. They have increasingly involved ‘exceptionality
measures’ in planning, and been characterised by less
democratic and more elite-driven priorities (Swyngedouw,
Moulaert and Rofriguez, 2002, p. 195). Thus the usual checks
and balances of standard planning controls and processes have
been reduced.
The most famous critic of large scale urban development
projects is Jane Jacobs, who argued for ultimate maximum
densities of around 200 dwellings per net acre (around 500 per
net hectare), or about eight storeys with a site coverage of
two thirds. More than this brings a considerable danger of
standardised buildings, of ‘rank upon rank of virtually
identical massive elevator apartment houses’, generating large
open areas in Jacobs’ conceptualisation (Jacobs 1965, p228).
Jacobs saw the key problem of major urban redevelopment
schemes as standardisation, which reduces building variety and
thus urban vitality. Standardisation ‘is fatal because great
diversity in age and types of buildings has a direct, explicit
connection with diversity of population, diversity of
enterprises and diversity of scenes’ (Jacobs 1965 p225). A mix
of old and new buildings allows for people of different
incomes to live together, and for businesses to start up with
relatively little capital. Older buildings can enable lower
rents particularly in areas dominated by new expensive
developments, and these allow for new business ventures
5
particularly for the young and innovative (Soderstrom 2008, p.
65).
The rapid timeframe and large scale of the ‘big bang’
project could not be further from the process of planning
advocated by Patrick Geddes (1915), arguably one of the
foundational thinkers of urban planning. Geddes’ approach is
worth revisiting as it resonates surprisingly well with
current sustainability agendas. His recommended process of
conducting a comprehensive survey and analysis before
developing a plan compelled the planner to develop a real
understanding and appreciation for not only the existing urban
form, but all other elements. His premise was that people, the
environment and the local economy all contribute to the
complexity of any place and that these elements influence and
are influenced by each other (Golany 1995, 115). Therefore
each place is different and cookie cutter plans will not work.
Geddes advocated the use of ‘conservative surgery’ – that is
careful and iterative change which conserved and respected
heritage rather than wholesale redevelopment. He believed that
the involvement of the community and the preservation of its
history were key (Sutcliffe 1980, p.205). His emphasis on
process was radical in the early part of the 20th century when
other urban thinkers were concentrating either on civic design
at a local level, or ideal cities on a blank slate. Eleanor
Smith Morris suggests that his influence extended to the
conservation movement of the 1970s and 1990s (Morris 1997,
p.47).
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Arising from such thinking is a recurring criticism of
major stand-alone urban development projects: their lack of
connection and integration with the existing city, and the
resulting fragmentation of the urban fabric and built form.
Dovey has critiqued Melbourne’s Docklands development on this
account (Dovey, 2005), which we take up further below.
The imperative for major developer-driven precinct
construction to produce negative urban design outcomes has
intensified as state planning for metropolitan areas has
increasingly prioritised economic competitiveness, which has
come to define the parameters of other dimensions of urban
policy (Brenner, 2004, p. 254). This has generated customised
state administrative arrangements, such as the development
corporations in the two case study areas here, to accelerate
economic growth within strategic urban zones (Brenner, 2004,
p. 216). These frequently involve the suspension of existing
planning regulations intended to produce good urban design
outcomes, inter alia. Such special authorities are usually
given high development targets to be attained over relatively
limited timeframes. The related contracting of development to
major corporations in just a handful (or less) of major
tranches, to speed up overall development, produces financial
pressure to complete a large amount of construction in as
short a time as possible. This in turn encourages the
development agency to limit planning controls for the sake of
more rapid development. It also encourages developers to
bargain for development scales beyond those allowed under the
simplified planning regimes that attempt to set minimum urban
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amenity outcomes. As Farrelly has observed, the inherent
conflict in such development authorities between their
developer and consent roles makes them prefer economic over
civic values (Farrelly, 2011b). The imperatives of rapid
development mean that incremental, ‘organic’ Jacobs-style
growth, which generates precincts with built environments that
have a rich variety of age, texture, style and affordability,
and resilience in general, cannot be achieved. Proceeding
quickly to predetermined ‘solutions’ forecloses possibilities
for developing alternatives through which adaptability and
transformability can emerge (Hillier, 2011, p. 220).
Barangaroo, Sydney
Like Melbourne’s Docklands, Sydney’s Barangaroo project was
impelled by a need to generate increased economic development,
using value capture of redeveloped state dockside land to pay
for necessary infrastructure. The years following Sydney’s
Olympic Games in 2000 saw the city’s economic development fall
back, with a lack of major new projects to return growth to
1990s levels. Metropolitan population growth was exceeded by
that of Melbourne for the first time in many decades.
The Barangaroo project involves the redevelopment of the
last wharf and associated dockside land in Darling Harbour,
totalling 22 ha, on the western side of Sydney’s CBD. A prime
objective is to ‘secure Sydney’s role as a global financial
services hub in the Asia Pacific region’ (Barangaroo Delivery
Authority, 2010a).
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An international design competition for the site was held
in 2005. A consortium led by local firm Hill Thalis Architects
won the competition. A concept plan based on the winning
design was approved by the state government in early 2007,
using Part 3A powers under the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act which allows the Minister to approve major
projects instead of the local council. This plan divided the
site into three parts: Headland Park, Barangaroo Central, and
Barangaroo South. The latter precinct was earmarked for major
high rise office development, together with residential,
tourism and retail uses, opening on to a public waterfront
promenade. The maximum approved floor space was 388,000sm. The
multinational corporation Lend Lease was awarded development
rights and a 99 year lease for this precinct, in return for
providing waterfront plaza infrastructure and making payments
to the (subsequent) Delivery Authority that would fund
development of Headland Park, pay the state’s Sydney Ports
authority for the transfer of land, build a pedestrian tunnel
from nearby Wynyard rail station, and relocate the passenger
cruise terminal further west on the harbour, at a total
estimated cost of $521m (Barangaroo Delivery Authority,
2010b). The central precinct was to be a large civic space
with unnamed community uses, plus medium rise civic,
residential and commercial buildings.
In late 2008, the government announced it would establish
a special authority to manage the precinct’s development,
including the provision of infrastructure. It passed the
Barangaroo Delivery Authority Act in early 2009, setting up
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the BDA as a development corporation with a board of public
and private sector members, but concept planning and
development approval powers over the precinct were assumed by
the minister, using Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act.
In early 2009 the concept plan was modified to increase
the maximum floor space by 120,000sm. Soon after, the design
excellence review panel, led by former Prime Minister Paul
Keating, revised the original concept plan incorporating the
winning design to ‘reinstate’ the Headland Park and Northern
Cove elements of the project into a more ‘natural’ physical
form in which the shoreline and profile would closely resemble
the landscape as it existed in 1836. This reflected Keating’s
long-standing inclination to return Sydney Harbour to a less
urbanised state, as exemplified by his earlier desire to
demolish the century-old Woolloomooloo finger wharf. The
consequence of this decision, however, was that extra
development was required at the southern end to offset the
increased costs of reproducing a more natural foreshore.
In 2010 Lend Lease lodged a concept plan amendment to
increase the floor space by a further 60,000sm (taking total
floor space nearly 50 per cent above the original approval),
and to increase in the height of the towers to a maximum of
209m. Much of the extra floor space would be located in a new
high rise hotel to be built on a new pier. After intense
community opposition, the government approved a modified
version of the application that reduced the commercial towers
from four to three (but kept total floor space at 490,000sm),10
reduced the hotel height to a still significant 170m and
reduced the pier length to 85m. The Delivery Authority
justified this as necessary to preserve Sydney’s financial
services hub status in the south Asia Pacific region and to
provide the floor plates required by global companies
(Barangaroo Delivery Authority, 2010a). The hotel was
justified as ‘cement[ing] Sydney as an international tourism
destination’ (Premier of New South Wales, 2010). These
justifications appear to be a cover for Lend Lease’s ability
to persuade the government to increase its revenue and profits
from the project, however, since hub status and floor plate
considerations existed when the original project brief was
determined. This reflects a long-standing process by which
developers have been able to obtain floor space above that
allowed originally under prevailing plans and controls: ‘By a
process of attrition, community endorsed Development Control
Plans or Master Plans are amended again and again until
developers get the building heights they want’ (Moore 2002).
In the case of Barangaroo, the need for more revenue to pay
for the revised Headland scheme was also significant.
In response, in early 2011 fifty architects and planners
produced an alternative plan for Barangaroo that reinstated
the straight edge of the existing wharf, kept the
international cruise ship terminal in the central precinct,
eliminated the hotel and its pier, aligned roads with the city
grid, and instituted stepped towers (Munro, 2011). In turn,
this plan was criticised by the deputy chairman of the design
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panel as sacrificing proposed parkland, and blocking views to
the harbour (Johnson, 2011).
Barangaroo assessed
A weighting of 35 per cent was given to urban design in
determining the winner of the design competition. Despite
this, the design of the project has been strongly criticised
by professionals, the council, and active community groups
(Friends of Barangaroo; Barangaroo Action Group; Australians
for Sustainable Development). This criticism has intensified
after the significant increase in the scale of proposed
development in the southern precinct, culminating in an 11,000
signature petition to the new state government after the March
2011 election to review the project. Leading architectural
critic Elizabeth Farrelly considers that the government’s
commitment to a given bulk (floor space) has meant that it has
relinquished ‘all real control over design’ (Farrelly, 2011a).
For her, Barangaroo is thereby ‘too boring’ rather than too
big. The planning minister at the time the original concept
plan was approved considered that the constant growth of the
project meant the ‘buildings are bigger than they need to be
and the public domain has been diminished, [and] the public
spaces have been lowered in quality’ (Moore and Robins, 2011).
The most telling critique of the revised plan has come
from Sydney City Council, from which planning control over the
project was taken by the government. The critique centred on
typically problematic outcomes of rapid large scale urban
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development concerning scale and lack of relationship to
existing urban morphology (City of Sydney, 2010a). The two
residential towers were seen as too tall and incompatible with
the adjacent proposed innovation centre. The Council also
considered the heights of the three major commercial towers
should be adjusted to reduce excessive bulk and to provide
height differentiation. Similarly, the building floor plates
were considered too large above lower levels because of their
bulk and negative visual impact. The proposed street widths
were considered to be too narrow and lacking in ‘refinement’,
while streets connecting with the city grid were not properly
aligned with existing streets in the grid. The high rise tower
proposed beyond the existing shore line in Darling Harbour was
considered by the Council as an unacceptable departure from
the approved concept plan, weakening the ‘distinctive western
edge of the compact high-rise city’ (City of Sydney, 2010b).
The Council’s critique also highlighted the lack of
transport capacity to and from the project site. The original
plan was proposed to be served by a station on the proposed
CBD Metro line. However, this proposal was abandoned before
the expanded project size. A proposed pedestrian link to the
existing heavy rail station at Wynyard was considered
uncertain by the Council because of a failure by the
government to unreservedly commit to the $100m cost.
Consequently the Council saw the originally approved concept
plan as generating too much traffic for existing public
transport links to cope with. The proposed increase in the
project scale would further exacerbate this situation. It
13
seems extraordinary that such a major expansion of the CBD
could be proceeding, with approvals already given for early
construction stages, without funding for the necessary
transport infrastructure having been designated. It is not
clear whether future payments by Lend Lease to the state will
be enough to fund any public transport infrastructure beyond
the pedestrian link.. Here, the Barangaroo project has
demonstrated the extent to which the need to hurry such ‘big
bang’ projects can result in studied neglect of basic urban
planning principles.
Docklands, Melbourne
The Docklands area was first identified as an area for
development by the state government in 1987 in planning and
economic strategies and the first strategy for it was produced
in 1989 as the location of the Olympic Village for Melbourne’s
ultimately unsuccessful bid for the 1996 Olympic Games. The
aims for the development articulated in this first document, a
strategic planning framework, were to continue the connection
to Melbourne’s waterfronts (which had begun with the Southbank
development), enable an expansion of the CBD with retail and
entertainment facilities, assist in the policy of urban
consolidation by providing a site for housing and attract
people back to live in central Melbourne (MPE 1989 p. 5). The
scale of development was to be moderate with mixed use
developments of 3 to 4 storeys to avoid overshadowing the
water and keep a human scale. There was to be “a diversity of
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housing, social mix and tenures which reflect the
characteristics of the existing inner suburbs. In particular,
the provision of public housing, private rental and affordable
owner-occupied housing are important elements” (MPE 1989
p.14). The development was to occur in stages over time and
more detailed plans needed to be produced.
In 1990 the Docklands Task Force, based in the state
government Office of Major Projects, produced an options
paper, a draft strategy and then a final strategy in 1992. A
wide variety of urban planners and other consultants were
involved in one way or another in the development process for
this strategy. It emphasised the need to increase densities to
an average of 67 dwellings per ha but keep most housing to low
rise (one or two storeys) with the occasional tower over 10
storeys (Docklands Task Force 1992 p.33), to increase public
transport use to at least 50% of all trips from the area
(p.46) and keep at least one third of the area as public open
space (p.37). Heritage preservation was also considered
important, and it was noted that this should not lead only to
the preservation of individual buildings isolated from their
context, but should be well integrated to give a sense of
context and identity (Docklands Task Force 1991 p.95). The
urban design principles within the strategy were influenced by
the theories of Jane Jacobs and Kevin Lynch “with a focus on
mixed use, human scale, legibility, permeability and
livability” (Dovey 2005 p.130).
However, this plan was never implemented. A Docklands
Authority was established in July 1991 to take responsibility15
of the future development following a model proposed first by
the boosterist Committee for Melbourne. The new Authority
rejected the Task Force’s Strategy and proceeded with the idea
of developing the area in precincts with far less government
prescription. This was supported by the Kennett Government
elected at the end on 1992 with a neoliberal reform agenda
particularly directed at planning (Buxton and Goodman 2004).
By 1993 the Authority had identified itself as a development
agency rather than a planning authority, adopting a “‘real-
world’ perspective that was cast against the world of public
planning” (Dovey 2005 p. 135). The process determined for the
development of Docklands was to be private sector driven with
little specific requirements placed upon them by government
and no input from the public.
Planning process and the role of large developers
A Docklands Plan was released in 1993 which divided the site
into 6 precincts which were to be development separately by
developers who would also provide the necessary infrastructure
(Docklands Authority 1993). This was further developed in 1995
with a plan for 7 precincts of varying sizes. The idea was
really to give developers a free hand to design their
individual precinct as they wished. A planning scheme
amendment had been passed in 1995 which included details such
as roads, developable lots, heritage and height controls.
However permits could also be given to any proposal that made
a positive contribution to the overall development of
16
Docklands. It was a planning scheme “with which compliance was
voluntary” (Dovey 2005 p.138). One requirement which was
deemed to be essential however was a short time line, with
full development of the site expected in 10 to 12 years.
Initially two preferred bidders were announced for each
of the precincts in 1997, however these were announced, and
then re-announced over the next two years, as the initially
bids were withdrawn or collapsed. Success bids collapsed in
six out of the seven precincts (Millar 2006). The developers
and development proposals for each precinct were finally
determined in the early years of the new decade. The first
development to take place was the football stadium which began
in 1997 and was opened in 2000. The first apartments were
completed in 2001.
The major characteristics of the development process is
that it was piecemeal, in that the planning for each precinct
occurred in isolation, and it was developer-led with little
adherence to an overall plan. The usual manner of development
where the parcelling of land and infrastructure provision is
determined first by the planning authority was reversed. This
occurred due to a “mixture of philosophy and pragmatism”,
according to one critic, which produced “a unique laissez-
faire development process inconceivable prior to the
Regan/Thatcher years” (Styant-Browne 1996 p.87). The transfer
of public land into private hands represented an unprecedented
opportunity for developers with very little requirements
demanded of them in return other than to get on with it.
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The governance arrangements for Docklands have been
unusually dominated by development priorities. In 1998
municipal powers for the area were transferred from Melbourne
City Council (MCC) to the Docklands Authority. In 2003 the
Docklands Authority was merged with the state government owned
Urban Land Authority to become VicUrban. MCC only regained
control over the area in 2007 finally giving residents some
access to democratic representation.
Docklands assessed
Development at Docklands has progressed rapidly. By 2009
Docklands had 6,000 residents in 3,400 dwellings over four
precinct areas (VicUrban 2009 p 27). Almost all these
dwellings (97%) are apartments and most are in highrise
towers. About 45% of development at Docklands has been for
commercial office space with an estimated 19,000 people
working there and 500,000 m2 of offices completed or under
construction as at 2009 (VicUrban 2009 p 37). Almost all of
the developable land (98%) has been contracted to private
developers and just under half (44%) of the approved
development has been constructed (VicUrban 2009 p 65). All
these figures suggest considerable achievement and if the main
priority was to get development occurring speedily then
Docklands has indeed been successful. The publicly expressed
opinions on Docklands have not however been universally, or
even substantially, favourable. Criticism ranges from the
general - there is a lack of overall design and unifying theme
18
– to the more specific, problems with the overshadowing and
wind tunnel effects of high rise, the lack of heritage
preservation, complete absence of affordable housing etc.
Even before most of the existing development had been
built the lack of unifying design resulting from the swift and
separate development of all precincts was being identified as
potentially problematic. “The permissive Docklands process has
produced a collection of singular and disparate precincts,
each with its own urban pattern, program and typology”
(Styant-Browne 1996 p.90). A number of prominent critics see
faults in the design of both buildings and public spaces as
resulting directly from the process, describing the end result
as lacking in soul or grit, or “bleak at best” (Millar 2006
p.6). The rapid approach to development has meant the loss of
detail, “an absence of ‘stuff happening’ – an absence of that
fine-grain, gritty culture” (Kalms p. 40). Slower more
iterative change would have provided more satisfactory
results. “Unfortunately, the possibility of a gradual
transformation for Docklands was removed long ago, and this
has come at a great cost to the public domain. What was
removed through demolition is virtually impossible to recreate
with new construction”, (Giannini 2003 p. 80).
The financial model of development utilised at Docklands
“driven by high yields expected from towers with expansive
views” have worked against a better urban design outcome
according to Maher (2009 p.9). The market driven approach
meant that height limits originally recommended in the early
strategy for Docklands were abandoned. This has resulted in19
significant overshadowing of public areas and the waterfront,
most noticeably in the New Quay precinct. The tall apartment
towers also create wind tunnels which add to the sometimes
desolate feel of the waterfront promenade. Dovey summed up the
problem as a lack of “vital and integrated urbanity”,
suggesting that Docklands consists instead of a “bunch of
disparate projects in search of an urban district” (Dovey 2009
p. 6).
Part of the apparent bleakness stems from the stark
newness of most of the development with few remnants remaining
of the original uses of the site as a number of critics have
pointed out. “The history of the place largely has been erased
and increasingly there is pressure on the physical fragments
which survive…. The heritage of Docklands which existed in
1991 has now long gone. The city is left with a place which,
like the burgeoning cities of Asia, is unrecognisable from 15
years ago,” (Lovell 2009 p 39). Even some of the remaining
heritage buildings are under threat. The National Trust has
recently highlighted the impending destruction of one of the
few remaining 250-metre long cargo sheds in an article in The
Age, and has called upon the newly elected Baillieu government
to save it, (Dobbin 2010). ''They are developing Docklands as
though it is a greenfield site with nothing there, not as the
earliest and prime heritage place in our city,'' David Moloney
of the National Trust was quoted as saying. ''They've knocked
down some of the most visually interesting buildings in
Melbourne so they could turn it into something that looks like
a Pattersons Lakes business park in the city.”
20
There has been considerable criticism of the exclusive
nature of the residential developments at Docklands. There are
no apartments that could reasonably be considered affordable.
The expensive nature of the apartments at Docklands is seen by
some as a resulting directly from the rushed nature of the
development which meant developers needed fast returns on
major investments (Millar 2006 p.2). There is a widely
expressed view that “a residence and even a meal at Melbourne
Docklands in is really for the rich” (Shaw 2008 p. 193). The
lack of affordable housing in the development “prevents the
social and cultural diversity” existing in other parts of
Melbourne, according to Mary Crooks who was a participant in
the production of the original 1992 Docklands Strategy,
(Millar 2006 p7).
Conclusion
The two case studies indicate that a number of aspects of ‘big
bang’ urban projects can lead to deleterious urban design
outcomes. The imperative for rapid development can lead to
overscaling of development and loss of fine urban grain. The
associated need to deal with as few development corporations
as possible also produces lack of variety. Such urban mega-
projects can also result in lack of connection with the
existing urban fabric and streetscape, as a result of
development control being taken away from local councils as
well as the need for these projects to quickly develop
profitable building space that is not overly constrained by
21
local contextual considerations. It would appear that planners
collectively have forgotten some of the key lessons of the
profession’s foundational thinkers. Large scale rapid
development, wholesale and speedy change which ignores
existing heritage and sense of place, is never going to result
in liveable human scale precincts which will retain their
value well into the future.
22
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