jac

EditorSenior EditorOnline Editor

A quarterly journal for the interdisciplinary study ofrhetoric, writing, multiple literacies, and politics

Editorial Assistants

Patricia BizzellCollege ofthe Holy Cross

David BleichUniversity ofRochester

Lynn Z. BloomUniversity ofConnecticut

Linda BrodkeyUniversity ofCalifornia, San Diego

Judith ButlerUniversity ofCalifornia, Berkeley

Sharon CrowleyArizona State University

Peter ElbowUniversity ofMassachusetts, Amherst

Stanley FishFlorida International University

Elizabeth FlynnMichigan Technological University

Keith GilyardPennsylvania State University

Henry A. GirouxMcMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario

bell hooksIndependent Scholar

Lynn Worsham, Idaho State UniversityJulie Jung, Illinois State UniversityKyle Jensen, University ofNorth TexasTyler Chadwick, Chris Mays, Kellie Sharp-Hoskins

Susan C. JarrattUniversity ofCalifornia, Irvine

Min-Zhan LuUniversity ofLouisville

Susan MillerUniversity of Utah

Jasper NeelSouthern Methodist University

Richard OhmannWesleyan University

Gary A. OlsonIdaho State University

Jacqueline Jones RoysterOhio State University

John TrimburEmerson College

Victor VillanuevaWashington State University

W. Ross WinterowdHuntington Beach, Calif

Slavoj iekInstitutefor Social Studies, Slovenia

RSITYChicago, IL

&

jDEPAuLDepartment of

Writing,Rhetoric,Discourse

Master of Arts Degrees in* New Media Studi* Writing, Rhetori

with concentrations inProfessionalTeaching W

Graduate Certificate in TESOL

FacultyMatthew AbrahamJulie BokserDarsie BowdénAntonio CerasoRene Dc Los SantosLisa DushChristine TardyPeter Vandenberg

wrd.depaul.edu

Editorial Board

608 jac

Saintsbury, George. A History of English Prose Rhythm. 1912. Bloomington:Indiana UP, 1965.

Scott, John Hubert. Rhythmic Prose (1925). Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1970.

Scott, Fred Newton. “The Scansion ofProse Rhythm.” PMLA 20(1905): 707—28.

Response EssaysSteele, Joshua. An Essay Towards Establishing the Melody and Measure of

Speech. 1775. Menston: Scolar P, 1969.

Stewart, Donald and Patrica L. Stewart. The Lfe andLegacy ofFredNewton Scott.Pittsburgh: U ofPittsburgh P, 1997. “Statistics Don’t Bleed”:

Rhetorical Psychology, Presence,Stratton, Clarence. The Teaching of English in the High School. New York:

Harcourt, 1923. and Psychic Numbing in Genocide Pedagogy

Tempest, Norton R. The Rhythm ofEnglish Prose. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, David A. Frank, Paul Slovic, and Daniel Vastfj all1930.

Walker, Jeffrey. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Oxford, Oxford UP, 2000.Desperate to make present the unfolding Holocaust in central Europe,Arthur Koestler in a 1944 article in the New York Times Magazine

Walters, Patricia. TheAssumedAuthorial Unity ofLuke andActs: A Reassessment grouped himselfwith the “screamers” who were unheard as millions were

ofthe Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. murdered in the concentration camps.’ Seeking to explain why “a dog runover by a car upsets our emotional balance and digestion; three million

Wilkenson,L.P.GoldenLatinArtistry.Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1963. Jews killed in Poland cause but a moderate uneasiness,” Koestlerobserved: “Statistics don’t bleed; it is the detail which counts. We are

Williams, Joseph. Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace. 7hI ed. New York:Longman 2003. unable to embrace the total process of our awareness; we can only focus

on little lumps ofreality” (Yogi 92). MatthewJ. Newcomb struggles in his

Style: TenLessons in Clarity and Grace.NewYork: Longman, 1981. classroom and recent article, “Feeling the Vulgarity of Numbers: TheRwandan Genocide and the Classroom as a Site of Response to Suffer-

Young, Richard F., and Alton L, Becker. “Toward a Modern Theory of Rhetoric: ing,” with the problem he, Koestler, and a host of others face whenA Tagmernic Contribution.” In New Rhetorics. Ed. Martin Steinmann, Jr. New attempting to move people to moral action in response to trauma that mayYork: Scribner s, 1967.

seem beyond the pale of representation.Embellishing Koestler’s claim that “statistics don’t bleed,” Newcomb

argues that numbers themselves are “vulgar” because they “fail to evokeeither strong affective responses that images often do or the potentfeelings that go with stories” (178). In considering the problem ofstatisticsand numbers as barriers to an ethical response to suffering, Newcombraises key questions and advances the conversation about how scholars

jac 31.3—4 (201])

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and teachers of rhetoric and writing studies should set forth a genocide

pedagogy. We seek to join and extend this conversation in an act of

collaboration between a scholar ofrhetoric and scholars ofsocial psychol

ogy. A genocide pedagogy designed for students of rhetoric and writing,

we argue, should be founded on the emerging discipline of rhetorical

psychology, which blends the best of both fields.Newcomb draws from his classroom experience and the journal

entries offered by his students to reflect on the role of affect and emotion

in response to the suffering of others. He and his students seek to

understand the genocide in Rwanda, and the meaning of the 800,000

deaths. Newcomb’s students, in theirjournals, reflect on their encounter

with genocide, eliciting queries about the very possibility of representing

the enormity of genocide, the numerical representations of trauma and

affect, the problem of attention, and the ethical obligations prompted by

genocide. Although we diligentlycompile the statistical measures ofharm,

Newcomb notes, “nothing is more difficult to measure than suffering” (177).

Our aspiration is to build from his essay to offer insights that might

contribute to this most important effort. Accordingly, we develop four

extensions ofNewcomb’ s essay. First, we believe the questions Newcomb

raises are best addressed by the field of rhetorical psychology. The field

yokes the concerns of rhetoric with those of psychology toward the end

ofunderstanding the dialogic nature ofthought and social expression, and

begins with an appreciation of the role played by affective psychology in

decision making and judgment. Second, the rhetorical notion of“presence”

lurks in the center ofquestions posed in Newcomb’ s essay and could serve

as the theoretical anchor of a genocide pedagogy. Third, research

conducted by social psychologists on concepts ofaffect, moral intuitions,

and psychic numbing could anchor the social-psychological principles

necessary for an effective response to genocide. Fourth, because moral

intuitions inevitably fail to motivate us to prevent genocide, we believe

rhetoricians and social psychologists should join forces to develop a second

mechanism to address the problem, which Paul Slovic argues is based on

the human capacity to reason and argue (“More Who Die”). In short,

when psychic numbing disables moral intuition, moral argument (rhetoric)

is needed, and this rhetoric should be grounded in the insights offered by

social psychology and anchored in the framework of law.

Affective Psychology

Underlying Newcomb’s essay is the recognition that great effort is madeto assess and communicate the size and scope of losses and suffering indisasters. This assumes that people can understand the resulting numbersand act on them appropriately. However, much recent behavioral research casts doubt on this fundamental assumption. Many people do not

understand large numbers. Indeed, large numbers have been found to lackmeaning and to be underweighted in decisions unless they convey affect

(feeling). As a result, there is a paradox that rational models of decisionmaking fail to represent. On the one hand, we respond strongly to aid asingle individual in need. On the other hand, we often fail to prevent masstragedies such as genocide or take appropriate measures to reducepotential losses from natural disasters. This occurs, in part, because asnumbers get larger and larger, we become insensitive; numbers fail totrigger the emotion or feeling necessary to motivate action.

The search to identify a fundamental mechanism in human psychologythat causes us to ignore mass murder and genocide draws upon atheoretical framework that describes the importance of emotions andfeelings in guiding decision making and behavior. Perhaps the most basicform of feeling is affect, the sense (not necessarily conscious) thatsomething is good or bad. Positive and negative feelings occur rapidly andautomatically—note how quickly feelings associated with the word “joy”or the word “hate” are elicited. A large research literature in psychologydocuments the importance of affect in conveying meaning upon information and motivating behavior. Without affect, information lacks meaningand won’t be used injudgrnent and decision making (Loewenstein, Weber,Hsee, and Welch; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor; Zajonc).

Affect plays a central role in what are known as “dual-processtheories” of thinking. As Seymour Epstein has observed: “There is nodearth of evidence in everyday life that people apprehend reality in twofundamentally different ways, one variously labeled intuitive, automatic,natural, non-verbal, narrative, and experiential, and the otheranalytical,deliberative, verbal, and rational” (710).

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Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West labeled these two modes of

thinking System I and System 2. One of the characteristics of System 1,

the experiential or intuitive system, is its affective basis. Although

reasoned analysis (System 2) is certainly important in many decision-

making circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion is generally a

quicker, easier, and more efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain,

and sometimes dangerous world. Many theorists have given affect a direct

and primary role in motivating behavior.Underlying the role of affect in the experiential system is the

importance of images, to which positive or negative feelings become

attached. Images in this system include not only visual images, important

as these may be, but words, sounds, smells, memories, and products ofour

imagination. Daniel Kahneman notes that one of the functions of System

2 is to monitor the quality ofthe intuitive impressions formed by System 1.

Kahneman suggests that this monitoring is typically rather lax and allows

many intuitivejudgments to be expressed in behavior, including some that

are erroneous. This point has important implications developed below.

In addition to positive and negative affect, more nuanced feelings such

as empathy, sympathy, compassion, and sadness have been found to be

critical for motivating people to help others (Coke, Batson, and McDavis;

Dickert and Slovic; Eisenberg and Miller). As C. Daniel Batson put it,

“Considerable research suggests that we are more likely to help someone

in need when we ‘feel for’ that person . . .“ (339).A particularly important psychological insight comes from Jonathan

Haidt, who argues that moral intuitions (akin to System I) precede moral

judgments. Specifically; he asserts that

moral intuition can be defined as the sudden appearance inconsciousness ofa moral judgment, including an affective valence(good—bad, like—dislike), without any conscious awareness ofhaving gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, orinferring a conclusion. Moral intuition is therefore . . . akin toaesthetic judgment: One sees or hears about a social event and oneinstantly feels approval or disapproval. (“Emotional” 818)

In other words, feelings associated with moral intuition usually dominate

moral judgment, unless we make an effort to usejudgment to critique and,

ifnecessary, override intuition.

Not that our moral intuitions aren’t, in many cases, sophisticated andaccurate. They are much like human visual perceptions in this regard,equipped with shortcuts that most ofthe time serve us well but occasionallylead us seriously astray (Kahneman). Indeed, like perception, which issubject under certain conditions to visual illusions, our moral intuitions canbe very misguided. In particular, our intuitions fail us in the face ofgenocide and mass atrocities. This points to the need to create laws andinstitutions, designed to stimulate reasoned analysis, that can help usovercome the deficiencies in our ability to feel the need to act. Thisappreciation of the importance of reason provides a foundation forrhetorical psychology, to which we now turn.

Rhetorical Psychology

The field of rhetorical psychology finds its most complete expression in thework ofMichael Bil hg. Joining the disciplines ofrhetoric and psychology,Billig outlines a rhetorical approach to social psychology. In so doing, hepairs the humanistic study of argumentative reason with the socialscientific approach to human relations. In this section, we explain how thepairing of the fields of rhetoric and psychology can serve as a foundationfor genocide pedagogy.

Rhetoric and Genocide PedagogyJonathan Glover in Humanity: A Moral History of the TwentiethCentury searched for a mechanism that encouraged resistance to genocide. He confirmed the position that in the face of the failure of moralintuition, reason and argument can inculcate the values needed for peopleto oppose genocide. Citing the work of Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M.Oliner, Glover found that those who resisted the Nazi tyranny tended tocome from homes in which children were encouraged to ask questions andreason through argument: “The emphasis was on reasoning rather thandiscipline. It was the exact opposite for the leading Nazis” (Glover 351).

The emphasis on questions and reasons seems to prompt a moralconcern for others. Based on a set ofquestionnaires, the Ohiners found: “Itis their reliance on reasoning, explanations, suggestions ofways to remedythe harm done, persuasion, and advice that the parents ofrescuers differed

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most from nonrescuers” (1 81). Ultimately, an emphasis on moral reason

ing in all ofour institutional, legal, and political institutions will help inoculate

against genocidal logic and rhetoric and overcome the problem ofpsychic

numbing.In contrast, as Hannah Arendt has demonstrated, totalitarian modes

of thinking can lead to and justify genocide. Such thinking tends to resist

empirical confirmation, is expressed through deductive logic, with a ruling

major premise that does not allow for exception, and obeys the law of non-

contradiction. Totalitarian thought and reasoning provide complete expla

nations of the world, and do not foster a concern for others. Rhetorical

reasoning, expressed in argumentation and dialogue, offers an alternative.

Those who study rhetoric seek to illuminate how audiences are

persuaded with reasoned discourse, which ChaIm Perelman and Lucie

Olbrechts-Tyteca and a host ofothers believe is a source of moral action.

Stressing the “importance of the argumentative and dialogical nature of

thinking,” Bil ligcalls on social psychologists to considerthe role played by

rhetoric in the creation of meaning, one they rarely consider (22, 39).

Bill ig’s account ofargumentative reason assumes the importance of lived

experience, which is open to study and verification. The logic of this

expression ofreason presumes division and contraction, that a “rhetorical

approach stresses the two-sidedness of human thinking and of our

conceptual capacities. A rhetorician is brought face to face with the

contrary aspects of thought. . .“ (Billig 79).

The tradition and discipline of rhetoric assumes the plurality ofvalues

and human reasoning. There are, in this tradition, multiple expressions of

reasonability. Explanation and the proofjustifying claims are at the center

of argument and dialogue. The assumptions of rhetoric and argument

feature experience outside the self, with the aspiration of joining the

speaker and audience. The act of reasoning together can cultivate moral

responses to suffering.The study ofargumentation, a subfield within the larger discipline of

rhetoric, features the analysis of argumentative exchanges and the

reasons people offer to persuade and justify claims, and in the Western

culture begins with the works ofAristotle. Within this field, much has been

written about the relationship between and among examples, illustrations,

and generalizations, reflecting the more general concerns to establish

principles of good reasoning, a central issue in the development of agenocide pedagogy. While Newcomb may be right about the vulgarity ofstatistics, that generalizations expressed in numbers have little persuasivepower, there is a vulgarity inherent in the example that may give theparticular undue influence. The key is to create a properly calibratedmessage that includes the example and the statistic. Unfortunately,scholars ofrhetoric and argumentation have yet to fully embrace researchoffered by social psychology, a need Billig addresses in his scholarship, toexplain how people come to categorize and particularize. Social psychologists study the social world of humans using the methods of science. Theoverlap between the fields of rhetoric and social psychology is mostpronounced in the division social psychologists make between two typesof cognitive processes discussed above.

Social Psychology and Genocide PedagogyHow should we value the human lives that are threatened by genocide orother catastrophes? Reason would have us look to basic principles orfundamental values for guidance. For example, Article I of the U. N.Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that “[ajil human beingsare born free and equal in dignity and rights.” We might infer from this theconclusion that every human life is of equal value. If so, then—applyinga rational calculation—the value ofsavingNlives is Ntimes the value ofsaving one life, as represented by the linear function in Figure 1.

616 jac Response Essays 617

An argument can also be made for judging large losses of life to be

disproportionately more serious because they threaten the social fabric

and viability of a group or community, as with genocide (see Figure 2).

Debate can be had at the margins over whether one should assign greater

value to younger people versus the elderly, or whether governments have

a duty to give more weight to the lives of their own people, and so on, but

a perspective approximating the equality of human lives is rather

uncontroversial.

How do we actually value human lives? These descriptive models

demonstrate responses that are insensitive to large losses of human life,

consistent with apathy toward genocide. There is considerable evidence

that our affective responses and the resulting value we place on saving

human lives follow the same sort of “psychophysical function” that

characterizes our diminished sensitivity to changes in a wide range of

perceptual and cognitive entities—brightness, loudness, heaviness, and

wealth—as their underlying magnitudes increase (Slovic, “If I Look”). As

psychophysical research indicates, constant increases in the magnitude of

a stimulus typically evoke smaller and smaller changes in response.

Applying this principle to the valuing ofhuman life suggests that a form of

psychophysical numbing may result from our inability to appreciate

losses of life as they become larger. The function in Figure 3 represents

a value structure in which the importance of saving one life is great whenit is the first, or only, life saved but diminishes as the total number of livesat risk increases. Thus, psychologically, the importance ofsaving one lifepales against the background of a larger threat: we may not “feel” muchdifference, nor value the difference, between saving 87 lives and saving88. In other words, the human brain is equipped to understand whatKoestler called the “small lumps” of reality, but the larger the numbersinvolved, the more difficult it is to respond with affect. Slovic explains:“When appl led to human lives, the value function implies that the subjectivevalue of saving a specific number of lives is greater for a smaller tragedythan for a larger one” (“If I Look” 85). Moreover, research alsodocuments that feelings “are lacking when large losses of life arerepresented simply as numbers or statistics” (“If I Look” 83). The imagesand symbols designed to elicit action in the face of genocide need to beconstructed with an appreciation of the challenges posed by this pattern,one that is captured in the notion of “psychic numbing.”

Robert J. Lifton coined the term “psychic numbing” to describe howvictims of great trauma block out certain painful experiences in order tosurvive. The psychological literature suggests that witnesses and bystanders to genocide are effectively “numbed” by a “compassion fatigue.” Thisfatigue, in turn, is a function of cognitive processing in which affect andsympathy decreases as the numbers of those suffering increases. Psychicnumbing and compass ion fatigue become profoundly rhetorical problems

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for activists and officials who seek to mobilize people and governments

against genocide and must construct messages to overcome the bias in

System 1 processing.Scholars and teachers seeking to develop a genocide pedagogy will

need to feature System 2 cognitive processing, for

as powerful as System 1 is, when infused with vivid experientialstimulation (witness the moral outrage triggered by the photos ofabuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq), it has a darker side. Wecannot rely on it. It depends upon attention and feelings that maybe hard to arouse and sustain overtime for large numbers ofvictims,not to speak of numbers as small as two. Left to its own devices,System I will likely favor individual victims and sensational storiesthat are closer to home and easierto imagine. It will be distracted byimages that produce strong, though erroneous, feelings, like percentages as opposed to actual numbers. Our sizable capacity to carefor others may also be overridden by more pressing personalinterests. (Slovic, “If I Look” 91)

Newcomb quite rightly suspects the vulgarity ofnumbers, but there is also

danger in the powerful example. The singular story can determine the

narrative ofa genocide, severely distorting its meaning and history (Picart

and Frank). Indeed, given the almost primordial roles played by System 1

cognitive processing, there is a certain vulgarity in its reliance on the

singular example or illustration when they are not representative.

To account forthe insensitivity in System 1 processing of information,

we must step back from intuitive judgments and allow the process of

reasoning to illuminate needed correctives, but to do so without losing

affect. To accomplish this goal, we will need to acknowledge that affect

and judgment are intertwined, that System 2 cognitive processes should

account for the role of emotion and feeling injudgment, and that we need

to scale up from the example to the statistic without losing the affect. One

way to view this is to view the statistic through the lens of the individual.

Understanding this need, Arthur Kurzweil has observed: “Six million

Jewish people is one Jewish person six million times” (243). Folding the

statistic into the illustration calls for the integration of rhetoric and social

psychology established in the field of rhetorical psychology. In what

follows, we draw from rhetoric the concept of presence and moral

argumentation and from psychology the construct of the “warm glow” to

chart a path between the vulgarity of the number and the example.

Presence and Moral Argumentation

Rhetoricians have intuited from persuasive practices the importance of

organization, delivery, and the framing of evidence for the purposes of

moving an audience to action. In their 1958 masterwork, Perelman and

Olbrechts-Tyteca write that the choice of foregrounding an image or

symbol vests them with “presence” in acting on the perception of the

audience. Citing the work ofJean Piaget, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

implicitly recognized the role played by System 1 in perception: “The thing

on which the eye dwells, that which is best or most often seen, is, by that

very circumstance, overestimated” (116—17). Perelman and Olbrechts

Tyteca’s observation provides a theory of rhetoric explaining Slovic’sobservation: “The foibles of imagery and attention impact feelings in amanner that can help explain apathy toward genocide” (“If I Look” 83),

namely, that as the numbers of those suffering increases, attention

decreases, and so does compassion. In turn, the two systems ofcognitive

processing establish the psychological foundations of presence.The rhetorical construction of presence is a function of five charac

teristics. First, it is the result of an advocate gaining and sustaining the

attention of an audience, no small matter. Second, the advocate who has

secured the attention of the audience reinforces and changes beliefs and

perceptions. Third, the advocate must exercise imagination to create and

sustain presence. Fourth, the successful construction of presence by an

advocate should elicit action by the audience. Fifth, presence is createdwith artfully constructed and calibrated images and symbols. An under

standing of presence can help address the vulgarity of numbers.To achieve presence, images and symbols should be constructed to

convey and elicit feelings. Intuitive processing inherently diminishes the

affect of large numbers, suppressing the individual faces and tragedies

associated with genocide. Similarly, the use of a graphic example maysuppress accurate generalizations. The use of ideological laws to suppressthe individual helps underscore this point. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

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cite Arthur Koestler’s essay in The God that Failedto illustrate how thepresence oftwo friends, falsely accused by the communists ofcollaborat

ing with the Nazis, caused him to renounce his allegiance to communism.When he was forced to choose either an abstract communist ideology ortwo concrete individuals, Koestler opted for the latter. There is, ofcourse,the danger that unrepresentative examples and illustrations can inviteoverreactions, which is the claim Sartre made when he defended thecommunist project in the face of the “errors” of the moment (Judt 122).The problem we face in constructing a genocide policy is, unfortunately,one of severe under-reaction. Psychology can offer insights on how

symbols and images can be constructed to convey the affect and feelingnecessary to give them presence.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca identify many rhetorical strategiesused to enhance or diminish presence. These strategies include repetition,illustrations, accumulation of material, evocative details, and the use ofmetaphor and analogy. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s innovativeanalysis of illustration directly answers the problem of the vulgarity ofnumbers and the danger ofusing the example. According to Perelman andOlbrechts-Tyteca, examples build to a general rule; the illustration assumes a general rule, and “seeks to increase presence by making anabstract rule concrete by means ofa particular case” (360). The rhetoricaltechnique of illustration “does not lead to a replacement ofthe abstract bythe concrete, or to the transposition of structures into another sphere. Itreally is a particular case, it corroborates the rule, it can even, as inproverbs, actually serve to state the rule” (360). For the purposes of agenocide pedagogy, it is important to understand that illustrations “areoften chosen for their affective impact” (360). Kurzweil’s statement, “Sixmillion Jewish people is one Jewish person six million times,” folds oneperson into six million and back again, demonstrating the potential of theillustration to navigate between the danger of statistics and the example,while retaining the affective connection to the individual. In addition topresence, moral argumentation is a necessary condition for action againstgenocide.

Moral Argument and Genocide

As Slovic and others have demonstrated, intuitive judgment and moralargument are the two cognitive mechanisms available to confront genocide. Hannah Arendt’s chilling portrait ofAdolph Eichmann, the architectof the final solution, portrayed him as an official who was not confrontedwith the evil ofhis deeds. No one argued with him, and his moral intuitions,as well as those of many Germans, failed. The second mechanism, moralargument, offers a check beyond System 1 cognitive processing.

Moral argument is a social act, one conducted in community. Giventhe flaws in moral intuition, moral argument provides a needed, but not aninfallible, check. Moral argument assumes the desirability ofdivision in acommunity and the value ofdisagreement, while nesting both in systemsof reason allowing for judgment. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecawrite, there is something inherently moral about arguing with othersinstead of using violence (see Frank), a claim backed by the Oliner’sresearch demonstrating that the use ofmoral argument, instead ofcorporalpunishment, helps prepare children for moral action.

Beyond the individual and family, moral argument is needed to pressnational and international governments to prevent and work againstgenocide. In the face of the failure of intuitive judgments to preventgenocide, particularly in nations ravaged by civil war and internal conflict,national and international law should require officials to publicallyjustifytheir actions or inactions. Justification is at the heart ofmoral argument andethics; by making public the reasons for acting against or ignoringgenocide, the larger public can act (Slovic, “Can International Law”). Ifenforced, a requirement for public justification would likely heightenpressure to act to save lives rather than allowing innocent people to die.

Newcomb is likely correct when he observes that “nothing is moredifficult to measure than suffering” (177). Psychological research certainly demonstrates the inability of feelings to adjust appropriately toproblems of great magnitude. Affect seems not to have been shaped byevolution to respond to scope (Hsee and Rottenstreich), and in fact maysimply be ordinal in its calibration (Pham, Toubia, and Lin). Newcombconcludes, and we concur, that “the impossibility of responding in ameasured or completelyjust way to the suffering ofothers does not mean

622 jac Response Essays 623

that questions of justice should be ignored . . . “(209). Although our Epstein, Seymour. “Integration oftheCognitive andthe Psychodynamic Uncon

affective responseto large numbers is muted and imprecise, we certainly scious.”AmericanPsychologist49(1994): 709—24.

should recognize when a situation is so bad as to demand a response. If Frank, DavidA. “Afterthe New Rhetoric.” QuarterlyJournal ofSpeech 89(2003):killing one is bad, killing thousands must be at least equally bad, even with 253—61.numbing. The problem then is to ensure that, when this recognition occurs,

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Quantifying Genocide:What Are We Really Counting (On)?

Emil B. Towner

One death is a tragedy; a million is a statistic.—Joseph Stalin

Between July 11 and July 1 8,2010, the government ofRwanda celebratedWorld Population Week, which raises awareness about the role ofcensusdata in development planning. The theme of the celebration was simple:Everyone Counts. In his comments about the celebration and importanceofpopulation data, Rwanda’s Finance Minister John Rwangombwa notedthat World Population Week took place at a time when Rwanda was“celebrating 16 years of liberation, therefore it is very important for us tolook back and see if our country is progressing in terms of socialdevelopment” (Kanyesigye).

Those comments underscore an important reality about Rwanda. TheRwandan government looks to the country’s future in the same way manypeople view its past—through numbers. Take, for example, the conversations on the popular social networking site Twitter last April duringthe 1 6th

commemoration of the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda. April is a time ofsolemn reflection not only for Rwandans who are still grieving and comingto terms with their losses, but also for the larger international communitythat still has very little idea what actually transpired or how we failed—once again—to take any real steps to halt the countless (yes, countless)number of rapes and murders committed in the name ofethnic cleansing.As may be expected, social networking sites were flooded with messagesof remembrance and even of hope. But two types of messages stood outthe most to me. Both were messages that attempted to quantify the 1994Rwandan genocide. One type of message consisted of tweets about thenumber of victims up to that point or on a certain date in a specific city orvillage in Rwanda. The second message attempted to solicit a number ofresponses (or retweets on Twitter) that would equal the number ofdeathsthat occurred. In other words, groups attempted to generate 800,000retweets, one for each Rwandan life that was cut short between April and