Introduction to classical political philosophy

13 principles & observations

I The classical paradigmi. ten key dramatis personae

1. the law-founder: closest to philosopher: Solon, Lycurgus—what Plato’s Athenian Stranger is in his Laws; how Cicero presents himself rhetorically in his Laws II and III: “Let there be …”• Biblical paradigm/parallel: Moses, maker of entire code2.The statesman (law-maker): embodiment of political (as against philosophical) wisdom,

maker of new laws responding to circumstance and need• Biblical paradigm/parallel: Solomon.3. The law-finder: “just judge”, magistrate (interprets existing laws)4.The philosophical or poetic advisor-counsellor (Xenophon’s Simonides in Hiero, Plato to

Dionysius, Aristotle to Alexander, Seneca to Nero [all fail!]), priest, eunuch, courtier …

5.Cicero, Socrates, Epaminondas: the philosophical defender of the republic• Biblical parallel: the prophets (parallel does not mean equivalent!)

6. Poets, rhetoricians, priests, or philosophers?

• Poets, rhetoricians, priests, or philosophers: compete to shape the ideals of the people, and thereby the regime’s politeia; and to frame and make sense of the nation/city’s laws.

= who are our heroes?= where did we come from?= what stories do we pass from generation to generation?= what characters do we admire, and why?= what common good do we envisage, if any?

& the bad guys (the mob, the tyrant, the demagogues and the sophists)

7.The tyrant: thought by most to be the best of men, as able to limitlessly satisfy own desires; enslaved to his own passions, becomes prey to his own fears about the anger of those he has mistreated (Xenophon’s Hiero, Plato’s Rep. IX…)

8.The mob: figure of aristocratic disdain: as below, people who need to work for living have no time to educate themselves, or become politically informed; hence, easily swayed by tyrants and demagogues who can appeal to short term and base goals (promise of wealth, envy of the noble)

9.The demagogues: populist leaders who win power by appealing to the lowest common denominators: short term fears and hopes, rancour against the aristocrats.

10.Sophists: teachers of rhetoric, seemingly also convinced cultural relativists: where nature is one, laws are many—many taught that ‘by nature’ then the strongest or most cunning or most daring could and should rule, and that law and equality are fictions devised by the weak to keep the strong at bay.

I.ii the key means: how are people in regimes bound together to act in common?

1. Violence and fear (lowest, in tyrannies--lawless rule of one Man)

2. Laws, good or bad (in other regimes)2.1= product of reasoning, codification2.2 But always backed by force, disincentive; possibility of physical or other punishment (Weber): police and surveillance.2.3 = always minimally blind, general: admitting no exceptions, when practical life admits many.3. Material or other inducements: utilitarian calculation of mutual gain.

Paideia (education), paradosis (tradition) and peitho (persuasion)

4. Education: ‘get ‘em young’: first formation of characters is always the strongest.5. Tradition or conventions, unspoken laws, backed by cultural censure what is ‘handed down’: paradedomenos., synethos- inculcated by religion and tradition.6. & by political persuasion: our good friend the orator, also the poets:

• Positive rhetoric: ideals (goals, ends): heroes, common causes, remembrance of tribulations and virtues of ancestors• Negative rhetoric: threats, attacks on enemies.

• A better regime would seem to be one in which people were bound together peaceably--one has recourse to the strong arm of the law when these means fail.

• And when recourse to the law is ineffective, one has recourse to force, failure (a sign of weakness).

• This is why Cicero De Rep IV and V are given over to considering poetry and education, as are Aristotle’s Politics VII and VIII, and Plato’s Republic III-IV

I.iii the key goals of government

• Physical security (lowest): defence against “existential threats”, securing of adequate resources for reproduction of populations.

• Justice: in which sense? i.e. Equity or equality based on:• contribution (rich pay more taxes, thus should receive more rewards) ?• opportunity (‘redistribution’ of opportunities)?• outcome (redistribution of wealth)?

• Production of certain types of people: hopefully, happy and flourishing human beings• Freedom (in which sense?), may be a goal (democracies, republics)• Nobility or virtue (monarchies, aristocracies) may be a goal.• Sheer monetary wealth may be a goal (oligarchies, plutocracies).

Justice: “giving equal to equals”--but by what decisive, politically salient measure?

• Yes, but if justice is “giving equal to equal”, all different groups: “…offer judgments about what is most important politically, but neither of them gets it right, because the judgment concerns themselves, and most people are bad judges concerning their own things." (Aristotle, Pol. 1280a14).

i.e. “All men have a claim in a certain sense, as I have already admitted, but all have not an absolute claim. 1.The rich claim because they have a greater share in the land, and land is the common element of the state;

also they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. 2.… the noble [because] are citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble, and good birth is always valued in a

man's own home and country. Another reason is, that those who are sprung from better ancestors are likely to be better men ….

3.Virtue, too, may be truly said to have a claim, for justice has been acknowledged by us to be a social virtue, and it implies all others.

4.Again, the many may urge their claim against the few; for, when taken collectively, and compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and better.

• “But what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the other classes who make up a state, are all living together in the same city, Will there, or will there not, be any doubt who shall rule? … How are we to decide?” Aristotle, Politics III.13.

I.iv Classification of regime, according to a. how many rule; b. for whom & what they rule

"[T]hose regimes which look to the common advantage are correct regimes according to what is unqualifiedly just, while those which look only to the advantage of the rulers are errant, and are all deviations from the correct regimes; for they involve mastery, but the city is a partnership of free persons" (Arist., Pols. 1279a16).

Eg: in Cicero De Rep. I-II.

 

 Classification of Constitutions  

  Good, upright (orthos) Bad

One Kingship Tyranny

Few Aristocracy Oligarchy

Many democracy Mob rule

Characteristic principles of different regimes

Monarchy Honor

Tyranny Fear

Aristocracy Nobility

Oligarchy/plutocracy Wealth

Democracy Freedom (political)

Mob rule License

I.v. the ‘goods’ in dispute in political life: a. going up (the who) …

• Magistracies, offices, differentiated according:1. Firstly (who appoints?): …(A) All the citizens [vote], or (B) only some, appoint. 2.Secondly (from whom?): either (1) the magistrates are chosen out of all or (2) out

of some who are distinguished either by a property qualification, or by birth, or merit, or for some special reason ...

3.Thirdly (how?): They may be appointed either (a) by vote or (b) by lot or (c) by expertise.

4.Of voting, either private (more democratic) or by acclaim (‘let those in favour say ‘I’), more aristocratic/oligarchic/demagogic

• For the classical philosophers, appointment by existing authorities is monarchical, voting is more aristocratic than selection by lot, but less aristocratic than by expertise.

• Selection by lot (chance, rostered rotations) is most democratic (direct democracy).

The politics of time: how long do offices get held?

• Offices and institutions will be more ‘conservative’ if they are appointed by less people from less people; the periods of tenure are longer; people can hold the office more than once; and if they are elected by vote or appointment by those in magistracy already, rather than by lot; and if they are less subject to audit and scrutiny by the many.

• Mutatis mutandis, the other side of this coin—being:• Offices and institutions will be more democratic to the extent they are chosen by all, with all eligible to run for office; the office is held for a shorter period; people cannot hold them for more than a limited number of terms; and they are chosen more by lot than by election; plus they are open to scrutiny by other branches or the many.

• A huge issue in late Republican Rome: Caesar pushes for lengthening of dictatorship (6 months to lifelong), after issues concerning the renewal of his consulship and offices in Gaul.

I.v.b. Coming down: what is distributed, decided by the magistrates (the what)?

• decisions of war and peace; making and unmaking of alliances, foreign affairs: executive authority (think consuls, Kings)

• legislation and punishments; exile and confiscation of goods; election and auditing of officials in their period of tenure; creation of councils on specific issues; on-going material management of nation: deliberative, legislative authority(senate, parliament).

• Capacities to appoint magistrates and approve proposed legislation (Roman assembles, less than a parliament, more than nothing: the democracy of the football stadium)

• Guilt and innocence: judges, judicial authority

I.vi. the politics of time, again: who has the time, given that decisions require acquiring and weighing information,

and practical wisdom long experience (see below)?

• where people have to work more and more, they can participate in public office less and less.• One source of deep anti-democratic prejudices even in Cicero, a republican.• Decisions require knowledge; knowledge requires time; hence, the most leisured should rule.“For the citizens being compelled to live by their labour have no leisure; and so they set up the authority of the law, and attend assemblies only when necessary…” Ari, Pol. IV.6.

• Where people have too little time to inform themselves, at best, the rule of law should then prevail, in lieu of participation; or representatives should be chosen periodically.

• At worse, as in tyrannies, the promotion of private industry is the best means rulers have to cement lawless authority. What did Hitler say when he overtook Paris? Get back to work!

I.vii. From time to place: proximity to places of political deliberation

• Proximity to places of political participation are thus also a factor in determining the shape of a regime: will it be centralised or agrarian?

• Aristotle divides:1) democracy with predominantly agrarian population: “the finest democratic material”—why?• It will be least participatory: “not having much property, the masses have no time for frequent attendance at the popular assembly”.(1318b)

• Furthermore: “wanting the necessities of life they are always hard at work and do not covet their neighbour’s goods … the masses are more greedy for wealth than for honors, as is shown by the fact that they endured the ancient tyrannies …”

• (2) democracy with urban population: merchants, traders, workers: “In our own day, when cities have far outgrown their original size, and their revenues have increased, all the citizens have a place in the government, through the great preponderance of the multitude; and they all, including the poor who receive pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their rights, share in the administration.”

• A regime will be more democratic to the extent that it is more urban: cf. Max Weber on “the city” in Economy and Society.

I.viii. Paid or not paid?• A regime will be more democratic if people can be paid to hold office• The more they get paid, since ‘money is time’, the more people can feasibly ‘spend the time’.

• If people are not paid for jury or public service, the poorer can’t buy the time to participate, and must lay hope in laws and representatives from other classes, which often cements unjust decisions against them.

• The Roman Senators, until Caesar’s time, were exclusively from patrician (mostly rural or with rural ‘seats’, landowners, rentiers) or equites (‘middle class’) stock.

I.ix. The role of the non-rational, the limits of political utopianism, social engineering

• Peoples vary according to • Traditional factors: history, education, national character• Geographical factors: climate, location (hills or flats, coastal or inland), open or closed to outsiders.

“It is evident then that there must be many forms of government, differing in kind, since the parts of which they are composed differ from each other in kind. For a constitution is an organization of offices, which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess, for example the rich or the poor, or according to some principle of equality which includes both. There must therefore be as many forms of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to the superiorities and differences of the parts of the state.”

• i.e. in Politics IV, as against III, we get a massive multiplication of possible regimes, beyond 6 or 7.

One size does not fit all• Thusa)it is impossible for any one type of legislation to work for all; & b)it is impossible to develop a “science” capable of producing “any simple

rule for everything and all times”: politics is not mathematisable.c)The price of asking too much too change too quickly is that politics

will cede to violence.

The political “scientist” or wise statesman will recognise these differentia, and tailor prescriptions according to what is politically possible, not what is philosophically ideal.

I.x the limited role of philosophical portraits of utopias …

(1) As a model of which other regimes are approximations and with a view towards which other regimes should be perhaps oriented, remembering that: (2) the ideal conditions necessary for the realization of the ideal regime cannot ever be orchestrated all at once, certainly not by political will alone.(3) In Cicero, as in Plato and Aristotle, there is thus i. The ideal regime according to nature/physis (ideal, counterfactual, heuristic)ii.The best possible regime (may be real, as Cicero’s mixed constitution modelled closely on

republican Rome)iii.The best possible regime at any given time and place and for any given people.

The political statesman will know by experience, his observations, and his learning at least iii.The philosopher may know i. and ii. but will tend to be less than happy with iii.

It really isn’t rocket science—or in fact, astronomy or math …“Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.” Aristotle, NE I.3

I.xi. There is a tension between philosophical/theoretical wisdom and practical/political wisdom

theoretical wisdom (a) can be learnt from books and observations, (b) aims at knowledge of timeless things = (c) universal natures, laws, principles (d) supposedly freer from passions

Cicero on practical wisdom, based in experience

• Cic. Rep I: “in these affairs, since it has been our good fortune to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our country, and to acquire some facility of explaining the powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject [152] with the weight of personal experience, and the habit of instruction and illustration. Whereas before us many skilful in the theory, have not been able to illustrate it by practice; and many practical statesmen have been unfamiliar with the arts of literary exposition.”

• By contrast, “Is it reasonable for men who are so totally devoid of experience, to promise their assistance to the state, when they shall be compelled to it by necessity, while unequal to a much easier task, they know not how to govern, when the state is free from all such perils?” loc cit.

Practical wisdom(a) shaped by habituation/experience, (b) issues in actions, (c) concerns changeable particulars (d) disturbed/distorted by passions

I.xii. Metaphorical approximations and their limits

• Philosophers are timelessly inclined to confuse the city with a single unit, as if it were the object of exact theoretical knowledge, like:1. Captaining a ship (de Rep. I)(2. The human psyche (de Rep. I)3. Understanding nature (cf. Cicero de Rep I and VI)4. A natural organism, plant or animal5. Shepherding a flock6. Being the paterfamilias in a private household7. Being the ‘economic manager’ of an estate.8. Managing an army,

When theory triumphs over practice, monarchy and tyranny inescapably recommend themselves

• Each of these metaphors, if it becomes ‘constitutive’, also becomes untrue: for “a city, by its nature, is some sort of plurality. If it becomes more of a unit, it will first become a household instead of a city, and then an individual instead of a household; for we should all call the household more of a unit than a city, and the individual more of a unit than the household. It follows that, even if we could, we ought not to achieve this object: it would be the destruction of the city. (Ari. Pol. 1261a, 1263b)

• The continued danger of untempered philosophical ambition in politics is licensing forms of tyrannical government: for each of these metaphors concludes for Rule by One Man over subjects equated with animals, drives, underlings in a workplace, children, soldiers or slaves.

• Eg: Scipio’s preference for monarchy as second best regime (as per Aristotle also): comes through adducing one by one metaphors of polity as Nature, shepherding, conducting war, captaining a ship or conducting a technical craft (de Rep. I)

I. xiii. There are two roads you can go by, or is there a third?

1. The theoretical life: of scholia, otium, leisure: for theoretical inquiry: is this the best way of life? • Paradigm: the philosopher, the sage (Aristotle, Epicurus in own non-Aristotelian way)• The political advisor or prophetic law-founder.2. The political life: of negotium, praxis, action: is this the best way of life? • Paradigm: the statesman, the advocate of the republic.

• We know Cicero wants the two to come together, via rhetoric: “we often find that men distinguished in politics are deficient in philosophy, and those celebrated for philosophy are remarkably ignorant in legal affairs. I hardly know where we could find another man of genius, who excels in the theory and practice of jurisprudence, so as to be at once a prince of learning and of political government.

• Atticus. —I think I could show you such a man, if I were to point to one of us three; but pray continue your discourse.” de leg. III