POSITIVE THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH

PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY

• Teori positif dikeluarkan untuk memahami fenomena-fenomena akuntansi dengan mengamati kejadian secara empiris dan hasil pengamatan tersebut digunakan untuk membuat prediksi kejadian di masa akan datang.

Philosophy

• Tujuan teori positif adalah mengembangakan teori atau hipotesa yang menghasilkan prediksi yang valid dan bermakna untuk prediksi atau phenomena yang belum pernah diamati.

Milton Friedman:

• Tujuan teori positif adalah memprediksi dan menjelaskan praktek akuntansi

Watt & Zimmerma :

PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY

Asumsi mengenai perilaku individu :

Para manajer, investor dan lender merupakan orang-orang yang rasional, menginginkan adanya

keuntungan dari sisi finansial

Manajer bisa memilih metode akuntansi yang secara langsung memaksimalkan kepentingan

pribadinya atau merubah kebijakan yang berkaitan dengan pendanaan dan produksi yang secara tidak langsung mensejahterakan dirinya

sendiri

Manajer memaksimalkan nilai perusahaan

STRENGTHS of POSITIVE THEORY

1• Menghasilkan hipotesis melalui pengujian empiris

2• Memberi pemahaman tentang bagaimana dunia ini

bekerja

3• Memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara

akuntansi dan harga saham

4

• Berusaha memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara informasi akuntansi, manajer perusahaan dan pasar serta menganalisa hubungannya

SCOPE of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY

Penelitian dampak akuntansi dan perilaku pasar modal.

Menjelaskan dan memprediksi praktek akuntansi dalam perusahaan. • Usaha untuk menjelaskan apakah perusahaan

menggunakan metode akuntansi tertentu untuk alasan oportunistik. Contohnya memindahkan kesejahteraan milik pemegang saham ke tangan manajer. Perspektif mengenai oportunistik ini sering disebut ex post.

• Mengasumsikan perusahaan memilih praktek akuntansi untuk alasan efisiensi. Sehingga kebijakan akuntansi ditempatkan sebagai ex ante untuk menurunkan biaya kontrak antara perusahaan dan pemegang saham.

Pengembangan teori akuntansi positif :

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

• Studi yang berusaha menentukan dampak perilisan informasi keuangan terhadap return saham

• Studi yang memikirkan efek dari perubahan kebijakan akuntansi terhadap harga saham

Penelitian pasar modal yang secara

khusus penting terhadap teori

akuntansi positif:

• – efficient markets hypothesis (EMH).

Sebagian besar penelitian

mengenai hal ini mengarah

pada satu paradigma ekonomi

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

Pasar efisien, asumsi:

Tidak ada biaya transaksi dalam perdagangan sekuritas

Informasi disediakan secara cuma-cuma bagi seluruh

peserta pasar

Ada perjanjian mengenai dampak informasi saat ini

terhadap harga sekarang dan pendistribusian harga pada

masa yang akan datang

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

Macam Inform

asiWeak

Semistrong

Strong

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

Sementara EMH adalah teori tentang mekanisme

harga pada pasar sekuritas,

VS

Capital market research (CMR) adalah penelitian

empiris yang menggunakan metode statistik untuk menguji

hipotesis yang berkaitan dengan perilaku pasar

modal. Kebanyakan CMR menggunakan market

model.

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

• Investor merupakan risk-averse• Return didistribusikan secara

normal dan para investor memilih portofolio mereka sendiri

• Investor memiliki ekspektasi yang sama

• Merupakan pasar sempurna

Asumsi dalam market model:

DAMPAK PENGUMUMAN LABA AKUNTANSI TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM

Salah satu tujuan teori akuntansi positif adalah mempelajari informasi yang dimiliki laba akuntansi terhadap harga saham.

Ball & Brown melakukan pengujian terhadap manfaat laba historical cost bagi investor.

Peningkatan laba akuntansi yang tidak diestimasi sebelumnya merupakan informasi baru bagi investor. Dalam pasar modal efisien, setiap perubahan aliran kas dari yang diharapkan akan mempengaruhi harga saham.

PENGARUH PENELITIAN INFORMASI LABA TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM ( BALL & BROWN’S)

Laba akuntansi historis

mengandung informasi yang cukup berarti.

Dari hasil penelitian

diketahui adanya informasi yang

berkelanjutan di pasar, jadi

akuntansi bukan satu-satunya

informasi mengenai

perusahaan.

Pasar secara konsisten

mengantisipasi informasi laporan

akuntansi.

KETIDAK SEIMBANGAN INFORMASI DAN BESARNYA PERUSAHAAN

Kandungan informasi pengumuman laba yang tidak diharapkan mungkin berlawanan dengan ukuran perusahaan.

Semakin kecil perusahaan, semakin banyak informasi yang terkandung pada perusahaan.

Argumentasi yang diberikan Freeman:

• Perusahaan memberikan informasi yang lebih bervariasi• Perusahaan besar mempunyai tingkat informasi yang lebih

besar yang dilakukan oleh para peneliti dan pemberitaan.Investor institusi umumnya lebih menyukai bertransaksi dengan perusahaan besar, untuk alasan likuiditas dan masalah kontrak.

BEBERAPA FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUHI EARNING RESPON COEFICIENT

Faktor

Risiko dan

ketidak pastian

Kualitas audit

Industri

Tingkat Bunga

Financial Leverage

Tingkat Pertumbu

han Perusaha

an

Laba permane

n dan temporer

STRATEGI PERDAGANGAN

Berdasarkan bukti

empiris ternyata

pasar dapat dipengaruhi

data akuntansi

•Perubahan informasi setelah pengumuman•Winner-losser strategies dan sikap optimis para analis keuangan.

MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT

Cosmetic accounting Leftwich

Two hypotheses Market reacted mechanistically to changes in

accounting numbers, regardless whether they were cosmetic or whether they had cash flow implications

Market ignored accounting changes which had no cash flow consequences

MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT

Manipulating accounting numbers:

MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT

Detecting the quality and probability of accounting management :

A POSITIVE THEORY OF ACCOUNTING DISCRETION

BACKGROUND: EARLY DEMAND FOR THEORY

Capital markets research

inconclusive

Observations of accounting policy choice•Why do managers prepare financial reports?•How are accounting policy choices made?

Information hypothesis could

not explain all observations

CONTRACTING THEORY

The firm as a legal ‘nexus’ of contractual relationships

Organising economic activity to reduce contracting costs

• management contracts• debt contracts

AGENCY THEORY

Jensen & Meckling (1976)

Contract where one party (the

principal) engages

another (the agent) to act on

their behalf

e.g. where there is a separation of management and

control. Managers have remuneration

contracts

Utility maximisation by

both parties

Agent may act on her/his own behalf (self-

interest)

Firms can be characterised as a nexus of contracts

• Between consumers of products and the suppliers of factors of production

Firms exist because they reduce contracting costs,

• Firms provide an efficient means of organising economic activity

Contracts include all types of agreements between two or more parties

AGENCY THEORY

Agency costsDue to self interest, the agent might act in his/her own interest rather than that of the

principal (moral hazard)

Agents may undertake certain Divergent Behaviours

This agency problem gives rise to Agency Costs (monitoring, bonding and residual

loss)

AGENCY THEORY

Agency costs can be categorised into:

1. Monitoring Costs – the cost of observing the agent’s behaviour

Auditing costs

2. Bonding Costs – Costs borne by the agent (e.g. manager) as a result of aligning their interests with the principal (e.g. owners)

Manager has to prepare financial reports (a cost to the manager in terms of time and effort)

AGENCY THEORY

Agency costs can be categorised into (continued):

3. Residual Loss – loss associated with not being able to fully align the interests of the principal with the agent

AGENCY THEORY

• The principal reduces the remuneration paid to the agent in anticipation of agency costs

• Cost of dysfunctional behaviour built into remuneration

Price Protection (ex ante – up front)

• The principal reduces the remuneration paid to the agent

• Remuneration based on observed agent performance

Ex post settling up (ex post – after the

fact e.g. at the end of each year)

AGENCY THEORY

MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

Managers as agents of owners can act in

own interest

The smaller

the manager

ownership in the firm the more

likely divergent behaviour

s

Manager has

incentive to

contract with firm to reduce divergent behaviour

s to reduce price

protection

Manager bear cost of owner monitorin

g

Agency

Costs of

Equity

Risk-Aversion • – limited

incentive to increase value of firm through investment in risky projects

Dividend Retention • – reduced

incentive to pay dividends or take on optimal levels of debt

Horizon Problem • – short term

focus on performance of firm

Over-consumptio

n of Perquisites

MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

Reducing the agency costs of equity Bonuses are usually tied to firm

performance in some way to motivate managers to act in the owners’ interest

Bonuses can be paid in cash and/or shares/share options

Bonuses can be tied to: 1. Accounting numbers(such as net

income, sales, return on assets) 2. Share price (market based performance

measure)

MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

• Excessive dividend payments-reducing debtholder’s security

• Asset substitution-firm invests in higher risk projects (no benefit to debtholder)

• Under investment-where no incentive to invest in positive NPV projects

• Claim dilution-issuing higher priority debt

Agency

costs of

debt

Debt-holders can Price Protect via increased interest charges or reduced amounts provided

The interests of shareholders can be bonded to those of debtholders via restrictions in lending agreements (Loan Covenants)

Covenants often rely on numbers contained in financial statements

Covenants usually restrict the behaviour of managers acting on behalf of owners

SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUSEX ANTE EFFICIENT CONTRACTING

Contracts provide incentives for agents to act against principals interest

Opportunistic perspective ex post (after contracts finalised) incomplete contracts bonus plan hypothesis debt-equity hypothesis

Efficient contracting perspective

Efficient contracting perspective

Efficient contracts

align interests of agent

with principal

Actions that

benefit agent also

benefit firm

Ex ante – before

contracts are

finalised

EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUSEX ANTE EFFICIENT CONTRACTING

INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE AND SIGNALLING

Holthausen

Derived from

signalling theory

Managers provide informati

on to investors to assist in their decision making

Similar to

efficient contracti

ng

Accounting

information

precedescash flows

Aligned with the information hypothesis

Managers use the accounts to signal expectations and intentions regarding the future

Incentives to signal good, neutral and bad news

INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE AND SIGNALLING

POLITICAL PROCESSES

The firm and parties interested in the firm

Political market v. capital market• Less demand for information in

political market• Less benefit from information

gathering• Heterogeneity of interests

Political costs – wealth transfers• Size hypothesis

Implications for firm behaviour• e.g. banking sector in

Australia

POLITICAL PROCESSES

EMPIRICAL TESTS

Testing the opportunistic and political cost hypothesis

Watts & Zimmerman

Zmijewski & Hagerman

provided little insight

Empirical tests – tests using contract details (Healy)

Figure 10.1: Allocation of funds to the bonus pool,based on accounting profit

EMPIRICAL TESTS

Empirical tests – tests using contract details (Healy)

Figure 10.2: Accounting accruals as a function ofbonus plan specifications

EMPIRICAL TESTS

Refining the specification of political costs• Liberty & Zimmerman• Godfrey & Jones• DeAngelo• Wong• Lemke & Page• Panchapakesan &

McKinnon• Ali & Kumar

EMPIRICAL TESTS

Tests of efficient

contracting hypotheses

interest capitalisation

voluntary consolidated financial reporting

changes in CEO

other studies

EMPIRICAL TESTS

EVALUATION OF THE THEORY

Methodological and statistical criticisms• empirical evidence weak and

inconclusive• McKee, Bell & Boatsman• Christie• Leftwich

EVALUATION OF THE THEORY

Philosophical criticisms

Tinker, Merino and Neimark

Christenson

Watts and Zimmerman