Discussions in Egyptology 53,2002 rssN 0268-3083

A. David. 2000. De l'inferiorité à la perturbalion: L'oiseau du omalo et lacatégorisation en Ê.gypte ancienne. Wiesbaden: Gôttinger Orientforschungen IV.Reihe Àgypten 38. XI, 14 pp.; 14 f igs., 3 tables.

Tua BoorDedicated to the semiotics of the "bad bird" (G37), based on lexicography of the

Old Kingdom and the First Intermediate Period, the book reviewed here representsanother step towards the integration of Egyptology into the social sciences. Although notthe first product of a cooperative venture pursued by the Egyptological institutes at theGeorg-August-University in Gôtt ingen and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, i t is thefirst volunre published in a series on "Classification and Categorization in AncientEgypt".

The point of departure for this study is, therefore, the cognitive analysis ofcategories. Aside from Egyptian, various languages-such as Sumerian andChinese-use classifiers. Egyptian had one of the most advanced systems of linguisticclassification, and is, therefore, an appropriate object for an examination of thesi gnifi cance of categories.

The theme of the "bad bird" as a "classifier" is introduced (in a preface, anintroduction, and chapter I on the "origin of bad and the icon") and summarized withthree tables (pp. 6-9) where words determined by the sign are organized by semanticconcept. The author's choice of terms was based on culling Faulkner's Dictionary andthe Berlin Wrirterbuch. Her tables identify words in terms of "inferiority", "perturbation"and "[t]positive". The author correctly states that the "positive" category is "Jou.treserve". The "[t]positive" words can hardly be designated as indisputably positive,while some of the negative words are so clearly negative that the matter does not requiredebate.

This Standortbestimmung is followed by two chapters dedicated to the use of thebird in (2) the Archaic Period and the first half of the OK and (3) Dynasty V. The finalchapter (4) includes both the chronologically ordered references for Dynasty VI and theFIP as well as the conclusions about the term bin. The discussions of the individualtextual references in, e.g., the PT simply takes Faulkner's translation, and a similarprocedure is followed for the other references. Two tables (pp. 59-66; 67-73) detail theusage of the "bad bird" in the OK and FIP and precede the author's "last word". A list offigures, bibliography and list of abbreviations follow. The largest single part of the book(pp. 92- 144) is taken up with a list of terms determined with the "bad bird", divided byperiod, into the OK, MK and NK. This is preceded by an index (p. 89) which serves asan abridged list of the terms used during the OK and FIP.

TrTE "BAD BIRD"The fact of the matter is that virtually all of the words related to the "bad bird"

imply "small size", "limited supply", "need", "lack", "inferio(ity)", "evil","wrongdoing", of "something bad".

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And, indeed, the common sparrow, Passer domesticus aegyptictcu.r, seems to be athoroughly bad sort. Despite their diminutive size, the pests despoil the farmers of theirripening grain before the harvest, damage the fields with their droppings and multiplywith abandon while quaneling unceasingly and noisily.

Given this close agreement between the modern naturalist's description of the birdand the ancient Egyptians' use of the symbol, the matter would hardly appear to be wortha small monograph. Superlicially, it could be expected that any study would inevitablyand necessarily confirm that the Egyptians classified things according to their properties,which would hardly be a breath-taking realization (after all, even post Derrida, it cannotbe contended that language is completely devoid of meaning!).

However, David effectively argues that the use of the "bad bird" determinativewas restricted to contexts implying a "small", "diminutive" or "inferior" character duringthe greatest part of the third millennium. This "inferior" character was merely contrastedwith the larger size or higher social class of other social classes. It did not imply a ,.valuejudgement" in terms of absolute "good" and absolute "bad". According to David, thisdistinction only appeared later. From the end of the third mrllennium onwards. theconcepts of m3'.t andisf.t were opposed to one another, with dw supplementedby bin.l

DE'rERMlNATrvEs : UsAGE, DgveloplvtENT & M pehullc

While the general tenor of the conclusion may be correct, there may also be roomfor some legitimate quibbling. one issue concerns "writing", "language,' and"iconography". The "bad bird" is not present in the preserved inscriptions of the FIpwhen the word bin appears, and determinatives were rare in the OK when the word qfx,was used. Of more fundamental importance is the role of the determinative. Accordingto the author, G37 was not used to signify "evil" during the earliest period. There is,however, a slight nuance which the author does not address directly: according to herevidence, during the earliest period, G37 was not used as a determinative, but merely aspart of the phonetic spelling for nQs. And, the usage was not consistent. The authorpoints out repeatedly that there was little distinction between G36 (wr) and G37 (nQs)before Dyn. vI, and that the two were not only used interchangeably (e.g., pp. lg, zl,?8,31), but also did not contrast with one another (e.g., pp.20,22). lt is only by concludingthat since (a) after Dyn. V, G37 was used consistently as a determinative for "inferiority"that (b) this was the intended meaning before Dyn. V. It is only by avoiding rhe

t One problem ansing lrom David's lexicographical methodology is that the dictionariesand exisÙng translations were the point of departure. In an icJeal world, the author would have been obligeclto reconsider every single reference , since her methorlology demands that the interpretations invariablyfollow from previous accounts and dictionaries rather than from the isolation of the word. However, withone single, albeit significant, excepticn (bin au) dw,), this is not a serious shortcoming, as in this parlicularcase, the effort would hardly have been rervarded with major advances relevant to the central intent. Forthe fulure, however, it must be borne in mind that such a procedure may be necessary with morecomplicaæd issues.

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confusion and the lack of contrast between G37 and G36 that the author(pp. l&20) canimply that the usage suggests the conclusion.

After the OK, the "bad bird" is used to determine Isf.t, /w, dw.t, and numerousother terms with negative nuances, which existed with negative meanings during the earlypart of the third millennium, but were written without determinatives. Ultimately,therefore, the argument hinges on the assumption that the new word àin assumes the roleof y 'w, , but that dwwould nothavebeenwr i t tenwi ththe"badbi rd"determinat ivedur ingthe Old Kingdom. Since determinatives were used sparingly before the MK and lessfrequently on monuments than on papyrus, the material preserved from the OK also playsa role.

The fact that the "bad bird" is written as a partial phonogram for n/s wouldsuggest that its restricted use in the early third millennium was related to the generalsystem of writing and not to the concept of the development of categories as such. Thismeans that the present study must be executed in terms of a general survey of the use ofdeterminatives in texts before Dyn. VI.

The logic is, therefore, to some extent circular, and thus the distinction between"small" and "evil" may be partly illusory. The author seems to move f,rom an assumptionof "inferior class" and "small size" to the implicit assumption of "limited means". ndswill have played a role in defining a social class which was not part of the rulingaristocracy during the OK. P. Westcar demonstrates clearly that a ny's could haveenjoyed wealth, health and prestige. They were simply an inferior class, but notnecessarily of "limited means", i.e., "commoners": a social class which is not byhereditary right part of the ruling class. At the same time nds was also used to identify'Junior" members of a family of the ruling class. They were, therefore, in each case, at a"lower level".

HlsronrcAl CoNTEXTThe catastrophic developments at the end of the OK included the plundering of

the necropoleis, the collapse of central power, and incursions of Asiatics. Accompanyingthis was also a famine which must have been at least partially real. Ltke isf.t and bin, theword hkr is also determined with G37 after the OK. It can, however, also be pointed outthat hunger is painful, but not every word later identified with "lack" or "emptiness"(e.9., 'h",

hb) was modified by the "bad bird" used to determine "hunger". It was,therefore, not invariably the scarcity (the "inferior") which was important, but theconsequence of the scarcity, the suffering and the evil linked to suffering, through "p"in"and "famine" and "wrongdoing".

Of slightly greater weight is another issue relating to the FIP. The linguisticassumptions about bin and n/s become a socio-economic phenomenon, which is perhapsdebatable, but not in a relevant fashion. On the other hand, however, this is linked toclimatic change and desiccation. And then,

le hoche-Orient tout entier lut plongé à la même époque et pour la mêmeraison dans une période d'anarchie, de violence, d'incendies, d'invasions etde destruction de grande ampleur et aurait vécu une décroisseance générale

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de la propsperié due a Ia sécheresse. C'cst la l 'aminc qui aurart été la cuuscdes troubles sociaux. (David p. 55)

This is possible, but i t has not been demonstrated, although repeatedly maiptaine:rl(part icularly by H.Weiss on every possible platform).2 It is, however, equally possiblethat the collapse of the centralized state led to some difficulties in Egypt which werecontemporary with other diff icult ies. I t is also possible-as Seidlnrayer has poirrteclout-that things were not quite so bad as Ankhtify would have us believe.

Monel Cre,sstncATloNOn the theological plain, i t is clear that P. Westcar maintains some menrory of the

sun-god's direct intervention in sovereignty during the OK. Baines remarks that theconcept of the withdrawal of the sun-god is "attested in texts from the Middle Kingdomand later."3 The concept of a court which judges men and kings on the basis of theirdeeds dates to the FIP. It is thus clear that according to contemporary Egyptianunderstanding, human rebellion led to the expulsion of divine rule. and that people weresomehow conscious of both its introduction and its end by the time the central stateapparatus had decayed. The idea of a transformation wrought by the misbehavior ofmankind can be seen both in the textual references and lcxicogLaphical usage. It is,therefore, not necessary to appeal to climatic forces to explain the acts of man which theparticipants clearly understood as being inllicted on mankind by mankind.a The FIPbrought about not only a social revolution, but a consciousness of evil created by man,and eyen kings.

It should be evident that this is a system of moral classification, and that the "badbird" plays a prominent role in it, and that there is more involved than mere"insufficiency". The contrast between the confusion surrounding G36 and G37 (beforethe MK) and its subsequent disappearance underlines the new significance of the "badbird" as a determinative of a new type of evll. bin may be a more "worldly" type of evilthan the absolute evil of dw: a new evil appearing in a new context. Given hermethodology of using existing dictionary definitions, and orientation towards the

2 This generalization is amplified by the fact that the chronological synchronizations may

ultimately counter the conclusion that "the entire Near East was plunged into anarchy at the same time for

the same reason". Evidence from Central Asia, Anatolia and the Indus imply that diflferent factors were at

work in different regions, and that regions which should have enjoyed plentiful rainfall and would therefore

have been ideal refuges from climatic change (such as Anatolia) declined, while those which should have

suffered from desiccation began (e.g., the BMAC in Central Asia) or continued (e.g., the Indus) to flourish.

It may be difficult to stomach, but the catastrophe at the end of the Early Bronze Age may have

been entirely man-made.3 J. Baines, "Kingship, Definition of Culture and Lægitimation," in D. O'Connor & D.

Silverman (eds.), Ancient Egyptian Kingship ([æiden, 199), p. la.o The contrast with contemporary Mesogrtamia could not be clearer since Naram-Sin was

later given responsibility for acts which angered the gods, whereas the Egyptian tradition cleady made

mankind-as a collective-the culpnts.

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"classificatory", David did not investigate either (a) the issue of the difference betweenbin and dw or (b) the use of words meaning "lack" or "inferior" which were notdetermined with her "bad bird". In the strictest sense, it was beyond her scope since theissue is lexicographical and philosophical rather than "classificatory". After all, both qhryand bin are determined by the "bad bird" after the OK, and both mean "evil".s

Whether or not bïnhas a meaning which differs fundamentally from that of dw (asthis reviewer suggests), the "bad bird" assumes a new role at the end of the OK, and thishas been clearly documented by the author. The basic conclusion that the "bad bird" G37came to signify "evil" after the end of the OK cannot be doubted. The idea that this waslinked to "small size" can be argued, but cannot be either demonstrated or refuted. Asidefrom n!s, there is no other point of departure, and thus one can hardly criticize the authorfor taking full advantage of the only material available, even if it is not necessarilyentirely persuasive. On the other hand, the idea that the "bad bird" can be examinedindependently of the use of determinatives is open to doubt.

Throughout the book, David touches briefly on most of the central issues. Shehas, however, basically restricted her study and conclusions to the linguistic andiconographic evidence. In her "final word", she identifies the "bad bird" as a metaphoridentifying and symbolizing the category of the "^nti-meat", which developed out of theFIP. Moving on to the final stage of her work, she cites (p. 75) L:koff concerning "asubset of nouns" with an "Important Property", as well as (p. 76) Rosch on the categoryof "prototypes". She then returns to the Egyptian categories and the "misery" associatedwith the "bad bird" and the swallow. She is thus able to round off her survey by linkingcognitive theory with the actual material. While applying cognitive theory usefully, shehas refrained from developing (or at least presenting) any far-reaching conclusions aboutthe cognitive significance of her work, noting

Il est remarquable d'observer la façon dont les Egyptiens ont déterminé lapetiæsse et la grandeur, en choisissant deux oisseaux que seul la bout de leurqueue perrnet de différencier. Il semble que ces deux protofypes arent étéadmirablement choisis... (p. 76)

Trre COCNITryE Mg-rHOoOn the level of the meaning and use of the words and the determinatives, David is

doubtless along the right track. She is, however, obviously conscious of the furtherimplications. Although it transgresses the normal limits of a review, the importance ofthe issue suggests that it is legitimate to proceed to examine aspects and possibilities

t David (p. 39, n. 175) cites Goedicke who assumed that /w was simply the older term with

the same meaning, and that both bin and fu, were to be distinguished from "wrongdoing" which could be

ludicially apprehendcd ir-s opposed to the morally wrong. In fact, however, there is probably a signilicant

drstinction betrveen the two, with ôlz having more nuances of evil in this world and /w having more

nuanccs ol'evil as an abs<llute. This issue requires investigation, but such an investigation is not only

bcyrrnd the sctipe of- David's monograph, but could also only be begun or considered in light o[ the

conclusions in this small nronosritph.

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implicit in her method and purpose. Cognitive methods and linguistic categories lie at rhecore of this.

Lakoff points out that the categories of the human mind expressed in linguisticgroupings are real and logically coherent: they are not the creations of anthropologiststrying to establish order where there is none.6 Lakoff and Johnson have argued thathumanity widely employs metaphors using verticality, with "up" implying "superior"moral values, and "down" or "low" associated with negative moral values.T With thelexicographical approach, David has demonstrated that the words can be treated in thisfashion. She has also demonstrated that this metaphorical interpretation is entirelyreasonable in the Egyptian usage of "small" and "large". This would then imply that herapproach confirms the general tenor of the cognitive approach to morality and metaphors.

The central issue is thus the moral and linguistic plane. Here there is a greatdivergence between David's conclusions and those employed in cognitive methods.Neither l-akoff nor Johnson seem able to demonstrate that a moral category (e.g., oneimplying that G37, the "bad bird" as an indicator of the category of "evil") couldnecessarily exist on it own, intimately linked to a substantive; at least not as a linguisticphenomenon in its role as "classifier". Nor can Johnson dispute Gardiner's statement that

there is no grammatical difference between a statement which is true and a statement

which is false: syntax and grammar do not distinguish the real from the unreal. You can,

therefore, have grammatically incorrect sentences which express a truth and correct

sentences which are untrue.E Linguistic categories do not include moral values.

Johnson's whole argument is that cognitive science cannot confirm a single absolute

morality. There can, however, be no doubt, that-linguistically-the moral categories

are expressed through metaphors. David has, therefore, correctly linked the "bad bird" to

a "classifier concept", and also to the metaphors which are the only human means of

expressing morality. This breaks new ground.

"CIASSIFIERS"

The "classifiers" used in linguistic systems like Dyirbal (an Australian Aboriginal

dialect, mentioned by Lakoff whose discussion is quoted by Goldwasser) are used to

define substantives, and not concepts, except as abstracts are defined in concrete terms,

and not based on moral criteria. In, e.g., Sumerian (and therefore Akkadian) and Chinese

(and therefore Japanese), the "classifiers" pluy a similar role. This means that the

Egyptian material is quite different, when comparisons are made on the level of the

"classifiers".In Egyptian-in contrast to, e.g., languages like Sumerian and Chinese-(a) the

"classifiers" did not form an essential part of the word, and thus they could be used to

express additional nuances not visible in the actual word; (b) any word-and not just a

6 G. lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (Chicago, 1990)' 9l-l14.7 G. l-akoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors we live By (Chrcago, 1980) and M. Jr.rhnson, Moral

lmagination: Implications oJ Cognitive Science for Ethics (Chicago, 1993), pp. 50-52.

8 A. H. Gardiner, The Theorv of Speech ond Innguage (Oxlbrd, 1963)' pp' ?96-297 '

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substantive-could be assigned a determinative; and, (c) the omission of thedeterminative from a substantive could provide a nuance, rather than a grammatical error,or a different meaning. The radicals used for an individual Chinese character (and not themeasure words) play a function similar to that of the Egyptian determinatives. Thegraphic use of the Chinese radicals could, therefore, be compared to Egyptian. (And itwould be interesting if Chinese should prove to be devoid of a radical with moral value,as this would demonstrate another unique characteristic of Egyptian). In order to makeany comparison it will be necessary to investigate the extent to which the role played byChinese radicals is lexicographical as opposed to conceptual. This will be a morevaluable approach than pursuing the classifiers themselves, as the categories will be quitedifferent.

The fundamental idea that the "bad bird" can be linked to social values and"classification" is indisputable. The thinking of the ancient Egyptians has frequentlybeen labeled concrete. An important nuance has now been established. The uniquenessof the Egyptian system of "determination" means that it will be difficult to compare withother systems, but also promises to reveal something deeper about the thinking of theancient Egyptians. Other languages evolved grammatical and metaphorical means ofexpressing aspects conveyed silently in Egyptian. Hitherto, abstracts have proven moredifficult to isolate in the context of lexicographical research because the words wereordinarily quite concrete in meaning. When translating an Egyptian text into any otherlanguage (whether l-atin, English or Chinese), the concrete flavor was evident. Given theuse of the determinatives as demonstrated in David's study, one can see that theapplication of cognitive methods promises another means of entering into the abstractthinking of the Egyptians, one which would be impossible on the lexicographical plane.

THs Locrc oF THE Ms-rHonGoldwasser has summanzed the method:

Indeed, it is my belief that ody once we pass the magic "wand of metapho/'over the hieroglyphs do redundancy and surfeit reveal to us those qualitieswe most treasure in a text - richness, even opulence, and a multiplicity ofoptions at every stratum of the linguistic system."

According to David and Goldwasser, and interpreting from the determinatives andthe metaphors, one could paraphrase the line from the miscellany as "the evil fowl is thepeasant's harbinger of ill", rather than translate "the sparrows take lack to thecultivators."ro This would be a vast improvement and is, therefore, significant from anaesthetic standpoint, quite aside from the linguistic one, and means that the method mustbe explored and possibilities exploited.

It is a promising approach. One must, however, be conscious of the very fragilebasis upon which the theoretical system is erected. David's book is one of a series on

n O. Goldwasser, Frotn lcon to Metaphor (Fribourg: OBO 142, 1995),p.25.'0 D. Warburion, State and Economy- itt Ancient Egypt (Fribourg: OBO l5l, 1997), p. 133;

R. Camin<>s, Inte Egyptian Miscellanies (Oxford, 1954), p. 247.

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Egyptian systems of classification, of which Goldwasser's represents a nrature effort ot'the preliminary stage.

There is, however, a more profound problem in the issue of how conclusions arereached. In analyzing a Dyn. V. inscript ion, Goldwasser is able to confidently concludeof the "door-bolt.f' that

the iconographic signified should be completely' discardcd here duc to thc"phonetic metaphor" process (Goldwa;ser lV) 5: 23)

Concerning the "lung and windpipe", she emphasizes

This is one of those numerous cases where it is hard ftrr us to dccitic whichmetaphorical process came first... (Goldwasser 1995: 231

Conceming two standing goats, there is, however, no doubt:

This is clearly the representation o[ a metaphor. (Goldrvasser 199-5: 23)

Since the reviewer is not at al l persuaded that this is clear, one must establish justwhy she is so certain. Before doing so, we can take a leap forward, to the concludingpages of her text. After discussing Lakoff's system, Goldwasser accounts for varioustypes of determinatives, using "vertical" and "l,rfizontal" axial categories ofmetaphorical analysis. She then turns to the final "ed hoc" group, and observers:

The most fascinating kind of relationship between uord and determinativeappears in a limited number of words in the script- On our unintemrptedjoumey on the categorical-metonymic path, we are suddenly confronted witha somewhat confusing set of determinatives, which, when related to thedetermined word, seem to be neither on the categorical axis of the word, norexactly on the metonymic scheme. (Goldwasser 19Ê5:94)

In order to account for these, she must seek specific explanations, and the case oftr" "smooth" provides a good illustration, as she then concludes that the use of thescribe's equipment and the papyrus scroll to determine this word must be related to the"surface of the scribe-palatte" (Goldwasser 1995: 96). V/ithout the papyrus roll thismight be reasonable, but it would seem that this particular case actually eludesexplanation in terms of metaphors.

This inadequate account is at the close of the book. In order to understand thebasis on which she established the method, we must return to the start. We can trace backthe logical and scientific premises which allowed her to reach her conclusions. We find:"I hope", "in my opinion", "l view", "l agree", "it seems that", "l believe", "in my view","Plainly", "presumably", etc. (Goldwasser 1995: 2, 6, 10, 12, 14, 15,21). Superficially,it would appear that the "cognitive method" is derived from"cogito".

There is, of course, more to it than this. Some bold assumptions are necessarywhen blazing a new trail, for othenvise, the path is abandoned in a tangle before the goaleven comes into view. Goldwasser (1995: 25,29) has affirmed that the key developmentin Egyptian thought was the "intellectual leap" ... "when they were able to relocate theirdescriptive efforts from one specific object, from the unique occurrence, to the word". Itwould be impossible to dispute this. She then shows how this was further broadened viametaphor and figurative meanings and practical applica'.ions and written forms. Indiscussing the actual system, distinguishing "concepts", "signs", "referents", "signifiers",

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etc., Goldwasser ( 1995: 28-51;66) employs an impressive array of triangles to show howthe Egyptian concepts came to be crystallized with a specific meaning.

This is an admirable combination of methods, but misses one key element: theEgyptians understood that each word had one key meaning which was generallyrecognized, they did not work in a vague semantic field where a word could mean anynumber of things. We confuse the various writings of different words as representingsome concept or semantic field. Semantic fields do exist; but so do homonyms. Wesuffer from this, but the ancient Egyptians were not lost in hermeneutic triangles,composing dictionaries, or writing articles on "The First Two Pages of the Wôrterbuch"(JEA34). We may have difficulties getting at what they meant, but that is our problem: itis inconceivable that anyone could have built such a civilization if no word and no signhad any specific meaning,rr One of the most important conclusions which can be drawnfrom Goldwasser's study is the demonstration that each age and approach will find itsown analysis of the Narmer Palette.'2 The fact of the matter is that the Narmer Palette isa more perfect accomplishment (being simultaneously transcendent and succinct) thanany of the discussions published hitherto.

With her triangles, Goldwasser clarifies in excruciating detail just how a conceptis specified according to a series of thought processes. Given this basis, it should bepossible to demonstrate virtually anything, and state the conclusions in purely logicalterms. That she failed to do so should in fact serve as a warning, since the methodologyis impeccable. The open concession of some minor inadequacies should, however,emphasize the "cognitive" significance of those items which fail to fit into the system.13

Usncp & MEaxwcSince the method does not actually account for all cases, it should be evident that

this is not the entire story. [n fact, the method is reasonable to some extent, but one canactually see that she is conflating two different processes. On the one hand was theauthor, who knew exactly what was meant and on the other, the reader who had to figureit out. One can just as easily imagine that a tâtonnemenl between the two eventuallyresulted in the writings we recognizetoday.

This has a dual impact on the interpretation of David's study and the means ofreaching the next step. First of all, one needs to recall that the value of the determinatives

" Jacques Derrida is only useful once the Elysée Palace is securely in place. As an inviæd

guest, he can sen'e a purpose, the present revierver doubts that he would be equally valuable as an architect.

There must be very strong li>undations to resist such an assault. (lt is perhaps not entirely irrelevant that

reason did not olav a role in erectins the foundations).

Not lust H. Groenew'egen-Frankfort (Arresl and Movemerl, [-ondon, 1951), but also, e.9.,

J. Assmann (Agtpt.tr: l',ine Sinngeschichte, Darmsladt, 1996) or R. Gundlach (Der Pharao und sein STaal,

Darmstadt. 1998).'' The ;,r,redure dil'fers remarkably from that employed by E. Bleiberg (The Olfcial Gift in

Artcient L.gvpt, Norman 1996) where the philological analysis o[erceptions confirmed the veracify of the

hr'çrxrthcsrs br ussuming that thc thct>ry *as valid rather than stâtlng explicit lv that there were exceptions.

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will have been more widely appreciated by the end of the third millennium than at thebeginning. Although scholars have now educated thousands of students who can readhieroglyphic texts, the number of people who could actually read a text in the thirdmillennium will have been quite limited. Readers and writers will have been in closecommunication, quite aside from belonging to a small social class.ro During the secondmillennium the number will have jumped and the means of facilitating communicationclarified by experience and discussion.

Cr-qssrFrcATroN IN THE Covrgxr oF REASoNThe second level is that of the classes of linguistic artifacts selected from other

languages. It was mentioned above that the Chinese radicals served a purpose similar tothat of the determinatives in ancient Egyptian. The Chinese classifiers are similar tothose of the categories used in Dyirbal (discussed by Lakoff and Goldwasser 1995: 99-l0O), but the equivalents to the Chinese classifiers in Egyptian are items in lists, e.g.,"man, 2", etc. Therefore, two different systems of classilication are being compared, ofwhich Chinese represents a sophisticated form which is far more "advanced" thanEgyptian in both directions (that of "classiflers" and "radicals"). All of these aspectsneed to be compared.rs

This is a new field at a stage of experimentation. Each approach must bedifferent. Goldwasser has tried and David's differs distinctly from Goldwasser's, butboth refer to l-akoff and Johnson. Lakoff (e.g., 1990: 154) specifically states that hiscognitive approach to categories diverges from and goes beyond "objectivist"rationalism. Johnson (1993: 6t77) argues that Kantian metaphysics are metaphorical.This would appear to open the door to David's approach. The idea that "cognitiveanalysis" can lead to the identification of the emergence of a "category of evil" in theiconographic record would indicate that the conclusions are compatible with Kantianmetaphyisics as understood by the cognitive experts.

Equally important, Johnson (1993: 10& 126) argues that the cognitive approachreveals that Kantian "moral absolutism" suffers from "excessive abstraction". Lakoff'sdiscussion of categories certainly reveals that the human mind creates readilyunderstandable abstract images which are not rational. From this, Johnson (1993: 244260) concludes that the moral values of the Enlightenment can be preserved, but only ifdeprived of their rationalism and absolutism. He then reduces morality to ethics,seemingly on the logical basis that "morality" cannot be rationally argued. The origin ofthis procedure can be found in Johnson's (1993: 12Ç128) summary of the shortcomings

t4 The degree to which such details are forgotten can be deduced from Goldwasser's ( 1995:

32) remark that the verb "'spends the night'(EG A5t had to be written with the pictograph of a mau lying

on a typical Egyptian bed, probably never available to many Egyptians... ". The lact ol- the matter was that

there may have been more owners of beds than literate people in ancient Egypt, so that- for that class- the

pictograph will have been as relevant as it is for us.rs And, N.B. !, the Chinese system is far more complicated because the grammar is bascd on

syntax and not inflection, so that the grammatical system had a decisive impact on the rvrit ing system.

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of rational moral absolutism. There, he specifies that this approach leaves no room for"moral imagination". By this means, he assumes that one can link "moral imagination"and "linguistic metaphors" into a rational framework based on cognitive science. This ishis procedure for failing to distinguish between the linguistic expression of moralitythrough metaphors (a legitimate procedure in cognitive science) and the linguisticmetaphorical origin of morality (quite a different matter entirely). On this basis,therefore, one has the impression that Johnson is pursuing an argument intended todemonstrate that Western Enlightenment values are compatible with cognitive science,rather than to follow the logic of the evidence, that the values remain the same, but areexpressed differently.

Monel RsesoNrNcThis is quite different from recognizing that the "values" are somehow "there",

and that they are expressed in metaphors.

Geht der groBe Sinn zugrunde / so gibt es Sirtlichkeit und Pflicht...Geraten die Staaten in Verwimrng / so gibt es die treuen Beamten.16

What l-aotse described (during the chaos of the later Zhou in China) was the sameas the situation at the end of the OK: the character of "morality" appears when it isviolated. The fact that ïpw-wr perceived this long before Jaspers's "AxialAge"-letalone the Enlightenment-suggests that the values can be expressed cognitively, but thisdoes not demonstrate that they are cognitive in origin, which seems to be the implicationof the metaphorical argument, as pursued by Johnson and t akoff.

The implication of virtually every moral teaching (from Buddhism to Socrates) isthat "correct values" are evident, and that they are based on selflessness, while humanbehavior is based on selfishness. The fact that the values do not change but are merelyrepeated in a different context and expressed in different wâys appears to opposeJohnson's (1993: 260) conclusion that

It looks as though we had better leam to live, therefore, not only withmultiple moral systems, but also with the multiplicity of values and goodsthat we experience in our own lives. That there exists an irreducible andsometimes conflicting diversity of goods, values, and ideals, and that there isno single criterion against which to rank order them, will seem obvious oncewe have managed to free ourselves from the spell of a totalizing moralabsolutism. (Johnson's 1993: 2&)

This is quite different from the conclusions which can be drawn from David'sbook. 'fhe concept of /w as "absolute evil" and bin as "evil committed by man" wouldimply that the Egyptians did deal with an absolute moral scale, distinguishing ethics frommorality. That this was expressed with the help of a metaphor need not surprise, but itcan hardly demonstrate that the concept of morality was derived from the metaphor.

The key to morality may lie in the difficulties of discussing the self. Johnson(1993: l2!l49) clearly identifies the incompatibility of "objectivist self's" with the

'o R. Wilhelm (trans.), laotse Tao Te King (Cologne, 1978), p 58.

checked Gu Zhengkun's bilingual version (lno Zi: The Book of Tao and Teh, Beijing

and ascertained that Wilhelm's aesthetic version corresponds to the original].

ffhe reviewer has

1e95, pp. 108-109)

r46

modern understanding of identity. However, he fai ls to recognize the possibi l i ty that theself is not a merely "self- in-process", but i tself a construct. Jenkins has clearlydemonstrated that the self is an identity based on "difference and similarity", and it canbe argued that these things are partially chosen, partially forced, but always construos.r?The creation of the self as a construct is not an act of rat ionaljudgement: the values arepart of the construct and acquired vicariously.

Johnson provides an example which enables us to understand the importance ofthe acquisit ion of value systems. Johnson (1993: 185-186; 215-216) builds his Chapter 8around the moral dilemma he faced when considering the possibility of service inVietnam.rs He summarizes his problem by stating that he suffered from conflictingmoralities: at the one end of the spectrum, the obligation to use violence to maintainfreedom (what this reviewer would call the heroic Greek tradition); at the other, theobligation to counter violence and injustice with peace (what the reviewer would term themeek Christian tradition). These were accompanied by rational logical approaches toproblem-solving which avoided violence, providing various positions between the twoextremes. He, therefore, concluded that he faced conflicting systems of values and thatthere were no moral absolutes. Superficially, it would appear that his logic is complete.

However, Johnson fails to realize that the common point of the two extremes isthe exhortation to sacrifice of the self in the interest of something greater: the belief or thecommunity. In the one case, the self is sacrificed for the good of the community. In theother, the self is sacrificed in the name of the belief. In the former, one gains fame, in thelatter, salvation. The rational approaches are merely differentiated versions of these twoforms of service through self-sacrifice, providing a logical underpinning for a counter-intuitive argument (which appeals to those who prefer to enjoy their fame whileremaining alive). It is this selflessness (common to all the moral teachings) whichcontrasts with the ordinary behavior of the human race (which depends upon the rejectionof the other and the paramount importance of the self).

Humans are devoted to the preservation of the self, only sacrificing self-interestwhen coerced by force or legal obstacles (itself not "enlightened self-interest" but rathermere "self-preservation with a restricted range of alternatives"). Philosophers cannothope to persuade humanity of the value of selflessness (it is counterintuitive), andtherefore simply appeal to the prevailing framework to encourage people to behave: in

China, it was "responsibility" to the state; in Greece, "valor" in defense of thecommunity; in Christianity, "salvation" of the soul; in the Enlightenment, "reason". In

cognitive science, it is "situation ethics". Both the fundamental problem (selfishness) andthe goal (selflessness) always remain the same; it is only the form of reasoning whichchanges. In a poverty-stricken society, Buddha explained that the ultimate goal was the

't R. Jenkins, Social ldentiry (tlndon, 1996).'t The reviewer reminds readers that this particular dilemma was nol a purely theoretical

l inguistic issue lor many.

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abolition of the self; in a wealthier community Rawls modified this by defining justice,

freedom and liberty in terms of the rights of the self and of others.reMany forms of "identity" are formed either to maintain restricted access to "their

rights" or to defend other groups from those who aspire to despoil them of "their rights".Concerning themselves, the philosophers refer to imperatives and obligations; theordinary people demand their rights, and the philosophers recognize that these are theonly way to reach the people. Each appeals to the baser instincts of the human race, andphilosophers face this. The fact that there are heaps of apparently conflicting moralitiesis merely the result of the fact that the last argument was not discarded when the new onewas developed, and thus a modern moralist can find heroic, Christian, Taoist, Platonic,Kantian, nationalist, democratic, Marxist, and cognitive moralities (etc.) in his own rnind.The common denominator is the expectation that the individual as a moral agent isexpected to deny or sacrifice the self, in the interest of something greater.æ

Johnson found a contradiction in the Greek and Christian traditions, whereas bothemploy different forms of argument in favor of self-sacrifice. The fact that the two arelogically incompatible does not demonstrate a logic in favor of conflicting moralities, itmerely demonstrates that the human mind does not handle morality as a logical matter.Johnson's (1993: 260) assertion that there is an "irreducible and sometimes conflictingdiversity" of values is based on the fact that the various systems are amalgamated and notdiscarded when supplementary systems are adopted. A practical approach and rationalpolicy could have spared (the cognitive) Johnson his moral dilemma, since-before theVietnam War had become "real" for Americans-MacArthur clearly stated thatAmericans should be required only to fight as patriots for the protection of theirhomeland, and not in the name of philosophical idealistic goals.tr This was a realisticappraisal of what one could reasonably expect from others, and accorded with bothLaotse and Socrates, if not quite with MacArthur's professed Christianity. The fact thatthe moral appeal is based on a particular set of premises should not blind one to the factthat the moral assertion always calls for self-sacrifice and selflessness. The fact thatpeople desire to preserve their selves and "increase their shares" (presumably at theexpense of others) while living in a conrmunity means that sacrifices are inevitable, sincernankind cannot exist without the community.22

'n J- Rawls, ATheory oJJustice (Cambridge Mass., 1971).20 lt is probably not accidental that the appeal of popular universal religions like Chrisùanity

and Islam is that devr.rut self-el'facing piety is rewarded with the salvation of the soul in the Beyond, and

thus thc rcligion appeals to the innate selfishness of the human, while endeavoring to induce selfless

bchavior. This is radicallv dil ' lèrent to relying on a mere conceptual ideal (such as the community or

idcokrgl ) lor u'hich the self is sacrif iced, rvith the sacrif ice the reward in itself.l Gcneral Douglæ MacArthur, Reminiscences (New, York, 1964), pp. 414-415. N.B.

[.rrotsc. "Dcr Bcrul'enc hii l t srch an seine Pflicht / und verlangt nichts von anderen" (Wilhelm 1978: 122).tt It rs no surprise that Johnson failed to note this, since his orvn consciousness of self

rneludcs rcl 'crenccs to his pcrsonal rolc i.a. as a potential draftee (Johnson 1993: 185-216), bridegroom (p.

176). anti lathcr (p. l-5 l), rn his account of mr>ral imagination. This awareness of the self leads him to

148

A SrnucruRAt-rsr VrEwSimply on the basis of lakoff and Johnson's method of reasoning, it can,

therefore, be argued that their cognitive approach is simply an extension of Kantianrationalism on a structuralist plane. Conceptually, this use of structuralism is intendedmerely to underline that various different societies use different arguments in order toenjoin selfless behavior, and thus the basic tenet remains the same while the reasonsdiffer. This is analogous to Cl. Lévi-Strauss's concept of structuralism as illustrated inhis analysis of kinship relations:

Thus we find a profound difference between the system of terminology andthe system of anindes, and we have to disagree with A. R. Radcliffe-Brownif he really believed, as has been said of him, that attitudes are nothing butthe expresiion or transposition of terms on the aflective level.r3

l-évi-Strauss found that various societies explained various animosities anddependency relationships in different ways, but established that the underlying kinshipstructure was similar in different societies. What Radcliffe-Brown allegedly assigned to"emotion" or "feelings" is analogous to what l:koff and Johnson assign to reason. Justas Uvi-Strauss perceived a structural system determining specific relations within akinship system, this reviewer suspects that the moral structure is given, while theprevailing mode of reasoning determines the fashion in which this is expressed. Lakoffand Johnson try to reconcile conflicting rational and moral attitudes by analyzing them todeath, and then asserting that they are "excessively abstract". A stnrcturalist analysiscould hope to break through the confusing complexity of cognitive thought which isfrequently based on rather exotic assumptions and examples, by demonstrating thatmorality is simply based upon the expectation of self-denial and couched in a frameworkcorresponding to the contemporary system of values. A breakthrough combiningstructuralism and rationalism with cognitive approaches could promise substantialrewards.

TFm "BAD BIRD" AND MoRAL CHANGE

Far-fetched as it may seem, this can be relevant to Egyptology, and the book athand. David has shown that the FIP represented a decisive phase in the transformation ofthe "bad bird". The F-IP was a major event in human history. Up to that moment, it wasgenerally recognized that it was in everybody's interest to support the state which hadcreated unprecedented prosperity. The collapse of the state brought about a catastrophewhich gave Ptahhotep's platitudes a hollow ring. They did not sound that way in thethird millennium. The challenges would come later. Until that moment, it had been

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Iassume that the personal narrative has a "central role in the human experience" (Johnson 1993: l&1).

He therefore confused the recommended behavior pattern rvith an instruction, concluding that "Goals are

values for us" (Johnson 199 3 172), which implicit ly means that he must erist in order to have values. This

self-centered approach blinded him to the fact that the underlying structure of moralitv lr':r-s the negation ttf

self.o CI. lévi-Strauss, Strucùral Anthropologv (Harmondsrvorth, 1963), p.38.

L49

enough "to obey orders" and "listen to your betters". It was enough to deny the self inthe interests of the state (and personal advancement in the service of the state). Once thestate fell apart, such an attitude appears idiotic. L,aotse's "honest officials" are theadmirable but unheeded exceptions in the midst of moral decay, whereas they were takenfor granted until their behavior became exceptional.

But in the Egypt of the FIP-up to that moment-this had never happened before.The state had been the guarantor of prosperity and security for almost a millennium. Itwas in everyone's interest to serye the state. Suddenly, private self-interest was not onlyencouraged, but also permitted unbounded freedom as the "honest officials" were unableto stem the tide. Moral values of self-sacrilice in the interest of society no longer servedany practical purpose. There were empty abstractions. This was unknown. It had neverhappened before. Never ever. n 3p. lt is diflicult for us to imagine just how momentousthis was, even after the fall of the Berlin wall. When the collapse was complete, the good

old days of the OK were far brighter than they had been, let alone the darkness of the evilof the FIP. By destroying the established order, a new kind of evil had been brought intothe world. As long as the exiting order was commendable, there would be little reason toimprove on Rahhotep's advice. Once the state collapsed, the advice sounded absurd anda new analysis was required.

This cannot be treated here, but it should be evident that the later "instructions" donot seem to incorporate the moral experience in the same way as the literature of despairrepresents a very different appraisal of reality. A great many original thinkers haveattempted to demonstrate either (a) the completely superficial character of the Egyptianreligion and thought or (b) its profound depth. To some extent, the failure of Egyptianphilosophy to satisfy modern demands may simply demonstrate the reluctance of thehuman race to learn from experience. Given the antiquity of their civilization, and itsorigins in the pristine depths of time, they never adjusted to their own catastrophicexperiences.æ They, therefore, saw no reason to change their forms of morality toaccommodate change. Both Greek and later Chinese civilizations were born of turmoiland aware of the limitations of the human soul, virtually before there was any civilizationto speak of. They were, therefore, in a position to incorporate these harrowingexperiences from the very beginning and to form a sterner moral code, more conscious ofthe importance of human weakness than ftahhotep. None of the ancient ways of thoughtever dispensed with all the baggage of earlier traditions. The same method ofamalgamation goes on today. This is ultimately the source of Johnson's Vietnamdilemma, since the moral codes were not brought up to date and organized, but merelyamalgamated. Our modern codes started with a very different appreciation of thepotential evils of humanity than that present in third millennium Egypt

The existing language had to be adjusted to describe this. The cognitive approachbecomes important at this level, for the language had to be used metaphorically, and the

u It is worth emphasizing that this tradition of trying to conceal the awful character of the

human soul continues today in assumptions that e.g., (a) climatic change brought about the catastrophic end

of the Early Bronze Age or that (b) earthquakes were responsible for the destntction of the Cretan palaces.

150

Egyptians created a concept of "evi l" which is not an inherent characterist ic of eitherhuman thought or language.

LeNrcuncE, & MonalnvThe cognit ive method is also important on a yet higher level. The fact that there

is no l ink between grammar and syntax and truth or falsehood shows that the human rninddoes not have a direct link between language and morality. Lakoff (1990: 586-,587)emphasized that he was hardly alone in realizing that the "objectivist" model of humanthinking was inadequate. However, neither l-akoff nor Johnson seem to have appreciatedthe implications of the fact that language is inherently ambivalent on the moral level.

Despite the superficially critical remarks on her method mentioned above,Goldwasser is probably on the right track with the use of metaphors. In Egyptology, theidea that this same "category of evil" is anchored in both art and language couldpotentially point to a structural interpretation, far beyond the philosophical explanationnoted above. The idea that the Egyptians had a linguistic concept of morality expressedin metaphor would correspond to prevailing theory. The idea that this was an individualcategory would place Egyptian in a linguistic category on its own.

The idea that the metaphor was used to express the concept of "evil" after theappearance of evil (during the FIP) would suggest that the linguistic category was not theorigin of the moral value, but merely its expression. This would apparently contradictI^akoff and Johnson's approaches which suggest that the metaphors lie at the origin andheart of morality. It is probably also the reason why Goldwasser is unable to account forall the examples she introduced, nor to present a logically coherent and compelling casein favor of her argument. The argument may be largely correct, but is maned by thefailure to realize that-to a considerable extent-the language of metaphor is used toexplain existing phenomena, and not at the origin of the thought.

This morality is expressed through metaphors. We have cited some of Laotse'smore comprehensible statements above, but the metaphors of his language frequentlydefy understanding. Jacques Gemet has observed that the Taoteking consists of

Sybilline sayings probably intended to serve as themes for meditation. Theobscurity oithese sayings has tempted numerous lranslators.2s

In this reviewer's opinion, this overstates the case, as l,aotse had a profound

message about service to the state and society on the deepest philosophical level. It is

extremely difficult for a modern Vy'estern scholar to grasp the difficulties of comings togrips with the collapse of morality and the importance of maintaining and expressing itsessence by those who are conscious of it. The morality of selflessness is an elevatedappeal which is unrecognizable or suspect to modern eyes. Rahhotep renders it banaland absurd; [.aotse, incomprehensible. The metaphors used to express this moralityreflect the use of an existing linguistic pattern to describe an existing situation. Ptahhotephad one problem, l-aotse another. The metaphors are not the source of the morality, but

more than description.

J. Gemet, A History of Chinese Civilization (Cambridge, 1997),p.93.

r5r

MB-repsoRrcAL CnEnrrv rryThere is a level on which metaphors and language do create. It is extremely

important for our purposes that l-akoff works on the assumption that cognitive sciencecan deny that "concepts" correspond to an "external reality". Goldwasser (1995: 8) citesothers on the issue that cognitive systems can designate, define and identify "possibleworlds", i.e., constructs. One can be a cultural construct which exists, but others can beimaginative constructs which uan be created.

For Egyptology, this view is extremely valuable, since the Egyptian hieroglyphswere used to describe and define a physical and ideological world which existed aroundthem (e.g., as in the "bad bird world"), while the system of writing allowed Egypt tocreate a culture which did not exist (e.g., "kingship") until they defined it. The system ofwriting will have made a major contribution to this, and thus the system is both a reflectorof cognitive concepts and a motor of cultural change. This is what the Egyptians did.

It is, however, unlikely that the Egyptians were obliged to turn to linguisticmetaphors to create the concept of "immoral behavior": the example lay before them, andtheir problem was merely using the existing linguistic structure to express it.

Our first problem is trying to identify what they did, and this can be done inchronological and typological terms. It can also be done in cognitive terms, but here, weare ourselves creating a new construct which did not exist before. And, the dangerremains the same as that Kemp defined some time ago:

Modern books and scholarly articles on ancient Egyptian religion areprobably adding to the original b$y of thought as much as simplyexplaining it in modern western terms.^

Here, we are either walking on water or on very thin ice. We must work out whathappened in ancient Egypt and interpret that, without making new contributions toEgyptian thought (they were original enough without unser Senfl. Then we have to workout how that fits into modern methodology. Our framework has generally beentypological or philological without any real clear theoretical basis (let alone purpose).

Cottct-usloNsDespite its length, this review has not even scraped the surface of the issue.

David and Goldwasser have initiated studies suggesting the implications of using thecognitive approach and hinted at both the theoretical value and its relevance for ancientEgypt. Although the possibilities for controversy are substantial, the rewards arepotentially great and efforts must be made.

David's book shares the same difficulty as any other Egyptological publicationwhich endeavors to move beyond the most superficial interpretation of the texts.However, it demonstrates that valuable and significant new insights can be gained bystudying published texts using out-dated dictionaries and translations. This in itself is animportant accomplishment which should encourage others to undertake similar projects.The author shows that a suitably scrupulous method means that one must not wait until

B. Kemp, Artcient l8.ypl ([.ondon, 1989), p. 5

J .52

"the last word is in" before interpreting. It is also an admonition that future work shouldbe judged by the theoretical framework and methodology as well as content.

David's book is an important contribution in an important project. It confirms theskill of the author, the validity of the method and the value of the project, as well asinspiring a hope that Egyptology may be able to make significant contributions to thesocial sciences as well as merely benefiting from the experimental use of new methods.

David Warburton