Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery:
Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh, 2009
Sebak Kumar Saha
July 2020
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University
© Copyright by Sebak Kumar Saha 2020 All Rights Reserved
iii
Declaration
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or
diploma in any university. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it contains no material
previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the
text.
Sebak Kumar Saha
July 2020
vii
Acknowledgements
This study would have not been possible without the encouragement and significant support I
have received from many people. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest
gratitude to my supervisory panel. I am especially indebted to my primary supervisor and
chair of the supervisory panel Professor Helen James who passed away on 30 April 2020. She
provided me with excellent guidance, invaluable comments on draft chapters and intellectual
inspiration throughout my PhD journey at the Australian National University until her death.
She also provided me emotional support and confidence in dealing with research-related
issues. She was a great person. She was and will always be an inspiration to me. I am also
indebted to Associate Professor Christopher Ballard (current primary supervisor and chair of
the supervisory panel) and Professor James Pittock (supervisor) for their excellent guidance,
insightful comments on draft chapters and encouragement. I am grateful to both for providing
me the much-needed advice and emotional support in a situation when my primary supervisor
was unable to guide me due to her health issues and the ANU moved from on-campus to
remote work and study due to the COVID-19 crisis, which severely disrupted normal study
life.
I am grateful to my parents who have made a lot of sacrifices in educating me and have
always inspired and supported me to achieve higher academic qualifications. I am indebted to
my wife Akhi Saha, my daughter Songhoti Saha and my son Souhardya Saha for their love
and all the support they have provided me during this study. I am also indebted to my wife’s
parents and her maternal uncle Mr Bholanath Saha, my siblings and all my close relatives for
their support and encouragement.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my wonderful research assistants: Sk Azmir
Hossain, Md Inzamul Haque, Ashraf Ahamed, Md Jubayer Mahmud, Rabiul Islam Robi,
Rhidoy Ahmed, Shafiqul Islam Mir, Tasnim Ahmed Chowdhury, Md Ahadur Rahman and
Tanvir Ahammed for their assistance during qualitative and survey data collection, data input
and preparing maps and graphs. I appreciate Md Inzamul Haque for his assistance in
preparing the maps and Ashraf Ahamed for his assistance during the survey and survey data
input. I would also like to express my gratitude to Md Nuruzzaman, Md Asadul Islam,
Shukantha Sarkar and Kamal Roy for their help during the survey. I would also like to
express my sincere gratitude to the research participants and survey respondents for providing
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useful data. I also want to extend my sincere thanks to Mrs Dipannita Gayen, Mr Mukunda
Roy, Mr Sushanta Roy, Mr Kamrul Sardar and his wife Mrs Laili Begum, Mr Masud Sarkar,
Mr Tapan Karmakar and Mr Abdul Gafur from the two studied villages for all sorts of
support during my fieldwork. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr Sumonkanti
Das, Mr Al Amin Rabby and Dr Atiqul Islam Raja for their support, particularly for their
assistance to recruit research assistants including survey data collectors.
I would like to thank Dr Tran Anh Thong who completed his PhD from ANU and my fellow
PhD colleagues including Luke Corbin at the School of Culture, History and Language
(CHL), ANU, for their friendship and support during my study. I would like to thank Dr
Janelle Stevenson, CHL, and the academics and administrative staff at CHL for their cordial
support during the study. I would also like to extend my thanks to John Mahony for
proofreading most of my thesis and Mrs Candida Spence for her assistance in formatting my
thesis. I am also thankful to Shahjalal University of Science and Technology (SUST), Sylhet,
for granting me study leave to pursue the doctoral degree. I am also grateful to Professor Md
Abdul Ghani and Professor Tulshi Kumar Das for providing me recommendation letters for
my admission at ANU and Endeavour Postgraduate Scholarship application and all my
school, college, and university teachers for their contribution to my life. I would like to thank
the Department of Education and Training, Australian Government, for awarding me an
Endeavour Postgraduate Scholarship (PhD) to undertake my doctoral study at the Australian
National University, Australia. I also express my gratitude to all the case managers and
program manager Monika Marzec of Scope Global Pty Ltd for their tremendous support
during the scholarship tenure. Finally, I would also like to thank ANU for offering me a
Postgraduate Research Scholarship for a short period of time to complete my doctoral study.
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Abstract
This thesis explores the role of social capital at household level in the response and recovery
process following Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh in 2009. The study focuses on the role of three
forms of social capital – bonding, bridging and linking – in the response and in the economic,
housing and psychological recovery processes of affected households. Social capital is
conceptualised here as the resources available to households through social networks.
Bonding social capital refers to the resources available through bonding networks (relatives);
bridging social capital identifies resources available through bridging networks (neighbours,
friends and acquaintances); and linking social capital covers resources available through
linking networks (government and NGOs). The study is based on fieldwork in two Cyclone
Aila–affected villages of Khulna District in Bangladesh.
Employing a mixed methods approach, this study shows that bonding and bridging social
capital play significant roles in evacuation and search and rescue activities. Though they both
contribute to survival for only a very limited period, bonding social capital contributes to a
greater proportion of households than bridging social capital. However, both forms of social
capital play only a limited role in the longer-term economic and housing recovery process,
though they do greatly contribute to the psychological recovery process of the members of the
affected households. Bonding social capital also plays a more important role than bridging
social capital in the response and recovery process. Crucially, bonding networks with relatives
do not weaken over time, while bridging networks with neighbours, friends and acquaintances
within the village tend to become less active and often break down over time.
Affected households were unable to initiate recovery activities for a long period as their
villages were subject to prolonged flooding due to breaches in the river embankment. Most
households were unable to survive during this prolonged flooding period, either
independently or with the material and monetary aid they received from their bonding and
bridging networks. Instead, they were strongly dependent for their survival and recovery on
resources accessed through linking networks with the government and NGOs.
Although poverty and shared experience of the same disaster limit the capacity of bonding
and bridging networks, this study argues that bonding and bridging networks cannot generally
contribute to survival over longer periods or to substantial economic and housing recovery
due to poverty, even in situations where relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances are
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not directly affected themselves. The relative wealth embedded in these networks is thus the
critical factor in understanding their role in disaster response and recovery. The study
concludes that households affected by cyclones in coastal areas of Bangladesh will generally
require external assistance through linking social networks for their survival and economic
and housing recovery.
The study shows that the effectiveness of the post-Aila response and recovery operations of
the government and NGOs was undermined by a number of serious weaknesses. The findings
on the weaknesses of post-Aila response and recovery operations will be helpful for
policymakers and development practitioners in designing more effective post-disaster
response and recovery operations in Bangladesh and elsewhere in the future. Finally, the
study recommends policies that will enhance the resilience of coastal households to cyclone
hazards as well as help them to adapt to the adverse impacts of sea level rise in the short- and
medium-term. The study also recommends the development of plans for resettling displaced
populations in other places in the long-term, as sea level rise may force a large number of
coastal households in Bangladesh to relocate elsewhere.
Keywords: Social capital, Disaster response, Disaster recovery, Cyclone Aila, Government,
NGOs, Coastal area of Bangladesh
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Table of Contents
Declaration ................................................................................................................................ iii Dedication .................................................................................................................................. v Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. vii Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ix Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... xi List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ xv List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ xvii List of Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... xix Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Cyclone Aila ................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Social Capital in the Cyclone Aila Response and Recovery ......................................... 10
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions .............................................................................. 12
1.4 Significance of the Study .............................................................................................. 13
1.5 Thesis Outline ............................................................................................................... 14
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................................... 17 2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 17
2.2 Disaster Recovery, and Household and Community Recovery ..................................... 17
2.3 Disaster Recovery and Resilience ................................................................................. 25
2.3.1 Changing Definitions of Resilience ....................................................................... 25
2.3.2 Recovery as an Opportunity for Disaster Risk Reduction and Building Resilience27
2.4 Social Capital and Disaster Recovery ........................................................................... 30
2.4.1 Social Capital: Understanding the Concept ............................................................ 30
2.4.2 Social Capital: Levels of Application, Types, Measurement and Negative Consequences ................................................................................................................. 36
2.4.2.1 Social Capital: Various Levels of Application ................................................ 36
2.4.2.2 Social Capital: Various Types ......................................................................... 37
2.4.2.3 Social Capital: Measurement .......................................................................... 41
2.4.2.4 Social Capital: Negative Consequences .......................................................... 42
2.4.3 Application of Social Capital to Disaster Recovery ............................................... 42
2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 53
Chapter 3: Methodology ........................................................................................................... 55 3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 55
3.2 Selection of Research Areas ......................................................................................... 55
3.3 Research Approach ....................................................................................................... 62
3.3.1 Mixed Methods Research Approach ...................................................................... 62
3.3.2 Selection of the Suitable Mixed Methods Design .................................................. 64
3.4 Data Collection and Recruitment of Participants and Respondents .............................. 66
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3.4.1 Qualitative Data Collection .................................................................................... 67
3.4.1.1 Qualitative Procedure of Inquiry ..................................................................... 67
3.4.1.2 Qualitative Data Collection Methods .............................................................. 68
3.4.1.2.1 In-depth Interview .................................................................................... 68
3.4.1.2.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) ............................................................... 69
3.4.1.2.3 Observation .............................................................................................. 69
3.4.1.3 Recruitment of Participants for Collecting Qualitative Data ........................... 70
3.4.2 Quantitative Data Collection .................................................................................. 72
3.4.2.1 Household Survey ........................................................................................... 72
3.4.2.2 Recruitment of Survey Respondents and Administration of Survey ............... 74
3.5 Qualitative and Quantitative Data Analysis .................................................................. 75
3.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 76
Chapter 4: Role of Bonding Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery ...... 77 4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 77
4.2 Kinship in Bangladesh .................................................................................................. 77
4.3 Aid Received Through Bonding Networks ................................................................... 80
4.4 Bonding Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery .............................. 89
4.4.1 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ....................... 89
4.4.2 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Survival ........................................................... 91
4.4.3 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery .................. 100
4.4.4 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Psychological Recovery ................................ 104
4.5 Why Bonding Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery ..................................................................................................... 107
4.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 111
Chapter 5: Role of Bridging Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery .... 115 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 115
5.2 Understanding Bridging Networks in the Research Context ....................................... 115
5.3 Aid Received Through Bridging Networks ................................................................ 119
5.4 Bridging Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery ........................... 125
5.4.1 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ..................... 125
5.4.2 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Survival ......................................................... 127
5.4.3 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery ................. 133
5.4.4 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Psychological Recovery ................................ 137
5.5 Why Bridging Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery ..................................................................................................... 142
5.6 Bonding Social Capital Versus Bridging Social Capital ............................................. 146
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5.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 156
Chapter 6: Linking Social Capital and Post-Cyclone Response and Recovery: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the Government’s Response and Recovery Operations ................................................................................................................................................ 159
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 159
6.2 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from the Government ...................................................................................................................... 160
6.3 Role of the Government in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery ............................. 166
6.3.1 Role of the Government in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ................................ 166
6.3.2 Role of the Government in Survival .................................................................... 168
6.3.3 Role of the Government in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery ..... 176
6.4 Major Weaknesses of the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations ................... 183
6.4.1 Lack of Aid During the Initial Period .................................................................. 183
6.4.2 Inadequacy of Major Aid Items Compared to Need: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka ..................................................................................................................................... 184
6.4.3 Problems Related to the Criteria of Aid Distribution: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka ..................................................................................................................................... 185
6.4.4 Lack of Livelihood Support ................................................................................. 186
6.4.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention ......................................... 186
6.4.6 Lack of Coordination ........................................................................................... 186
6.4.7 Exclusion of Poor Households ............................................................................. 189
6.4.8 Favouritism .......................................................................................................... 190
6.4.9 Less Amount of VGF Rice and Bribery ............................................................... 192
6.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 197
Chapter 7: The Role of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and Their Weaknesses in the Post-Cyclone Aila Response and Recovery Operations ........................................................ 201
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 201
7.2. NGOs that Participated in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations............ 201
7.3 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from NGOs .... 202
7.4 Role of NGOs in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery ............................................. 215
7.4.1 Role of NGOs in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ................................................ 215
7.4.2 Role of NGOs in Survival .................................................................................... 216
7.4.3 Role of NGOs in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery .................... 223
7.5 Weaknesses of NGOs’ Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations ....................... 228
7.5.1 Failure to Start Relief Operations Immediately After the Event .......................... 228
7.5.2 Quantity and Quality of the Relief Items ............................................................. 229
7.5.3 Coordination Among NGOs and Coordination Between the NGOs and the Government/Local Government ................................................................................... 230
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7.5.4 Less Livelihood Support and Houses Compared to the Needs ............................. 231
7.5.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention ......................................... 232
7.5.6 Preference to Implement Activities that Have Visible Outcomes ........................ 234
7.5.7 Lack of Consultation and Participation ................................................................ 235
7.5.8 NGOs Addressed Remote Areas Least ................................................................ 236
7.5.9 Places of Distribution and Exclusion of Households from Relief Items ............... 237
7.5.10 More of the Project Interventions to the Less Affected Project Areas ................ 239
7.5.11 Favouring Own Members/Borrowers and Pressuring Microcredit Borrowers for Repayment .................................................................................................................... 239
7.5.12 Avoidance of a Beneficiary of One NGO by Other NGOs ................................ 240
7.5.13 Exclusion of Upper-Middle-Class and Some Lower-Middle-Class Households 241
7.5.14 Corruption ......................................................................................................... 242
7.5.15 Aid Dependency ................................................................................................ 243
7.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 244
Chapter 8: Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research ... 247 8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 247
8.2 Key Findings of the Study .......................................................................................... 248
8.2.1 The Role of Bonding Social Capital .................................................................... 248
8.2.2 The Role of Bridging Social Capital .................................................................... 250
8.2.3 Linking Social Capital: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the Government’s Response and Recovery Operations ...................................................... 252
8.2.4 Linking Social Capital: The Role of NGOs and the Weaknesses of the NGOs’ Response and Recovery Operations .............................................................................. 254
8.3 Contribution to Knowledge and Policies .................................................................... 255
8.4 Limitations of the Study ............................................................................................. 258
8.5 Implications of Climate Change and Sea Level Rise .................................................. 259
8.6 Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................... 260
8.7 Suggestions for Future Research ................................................................................ 267
References .............................................................................................................................. 269 Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................. 297 Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................. 301 Appendix 3 ............................................................................................................................. 303 Appendix 4 ............................................................................................................................. 305 Appendix 5 ............................................................................................................................. 307 Appendix 6 ............................................................................................................................. 329
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List of Tables
Table 1.1 Some major cyclones in Bangladesh .......................................................................... 4 Table 1.2 Damage and loss due to Cyclone Aila (as of 11 June 2009) ...................................... 6 Table 1.3 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila in Dacope and Koyra upazilas, Khulna .. 7 Table 3.1 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila to Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi Union ........................................................................................................................ 59 Table 3.2 Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi at a glance ...................................................... 60 Table 3.3 Strategic reasons for using the mixed methods approach ........................................ 63 Table 4.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250) .................. 81 Table 4.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid ................................................................ 82 Table 4.3 Total amount of money households received from their relatives (n=81) ............... 85 Table 4.4 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250) .................. 88 Table 5.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances (n=250)............................................................................................................ 119 Table 5.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid .............................................................. 121 Table 5.3 Percentage of the households that received aid from friends and acquaintances (n=250) ................................................................................................................................... 124 Table 6.1 Types of aid the affected households received from the government (n=250) ...... 161 Table 7.1 Major NGOs that participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations 202 Table 7.2 Types of aid the affected households received from NGOs (n=250) ..................... 204 Table 8.1 Research Objectives and Questions ....................................................................... 247
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List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Map of cyclone prone areas in Bangladesh .............................................................. 3 Figure 1.2 Track of Cyclone Aila ............................................................................................... 5 Figure 3.1 Study areas: Channirchak, Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Upazila, Khulna District ......................................................................................................................... 56 Figure 3.2 Map of Channirchak Village ................................................................................... 57 Figure 3.3 Map of Dakshin Bedkashi Village .......................................................................... 58 Figure 4.1 Aid received from relatives, Channirchak (n=70) .................................................. 83 Figure 4.2 Aid received from relatives, Dakshin Bedkashi (n=180) ....................................... 84 Figure 4.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from relatives in their survival (n=177) ................................................................................... 99 Figure 4.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=250) ....................................................... 103 Figure 5.1 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from neighbours in their survival (n=37) ............................................................................... 132 Figure 5.2 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from friends and acquaintances in their survival (n=44) ........................................................ 132 Figure 5.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from neighbours in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=230) ....................................................... 136 Figure 5.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from friends and acquaintances in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=161) ........................... 136 Figure 5.5 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in economic recovery ......................................... 149 Figure 5.6 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in housing recovery ............................................ 149 Figure 5.7 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in psychological recovery ................................... 150 Figure 6.1 A house constructed after Aila in Channirchak Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna) .................................................................................................................... 162 Figure 6.2 A house constructed after Aila in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna) .................................................................................................................... 163 Figure 6.3 People working in a government employment program in Channirchak Village 163 Figure 6.4 Women working in a government employment program in Dakshin Bedkashi Village .................................................................................................................................... 164 Figure 6.5 A road constructed by a government agency in Channirchak (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO) ...................................................................................................................................... 164 Figure 6.6 A road constructed by a government agency in Dakshin Bedkashi (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO) ................................................................................................................................. 165 Figure 6.7 A new government primary school-cum-cyclone-shelter constructed in Channirchak Village after Aila (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department) ............................................................................................................................ 165 Figure 6.8 A new government primary school building in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department) .................................. 166
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Figure 6.9 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from the government in their survival (n=222) ...................................................................... 173 Figure 6.10 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of VGF rice in meeting the daily food necessity of the households (n=229) ...................................................................................... 175 Figure 6.11 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from the government in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=248) ................................................... 178 Figure 6.12 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in cash for work program and food for work program or any of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=135) ............................................................................................. 180 Figure 7.1 A water storing earthen pot or matka given by an NGO in Channirchak ............. 205 Figure 7.2 A water storing container given by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi ...................... 205 Figure 7.3 A dochala (two roofed) house with a veranda constructed by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in Channirchak ................................................................. 206 Figure 7.4 A modified version of a dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi (an extra layer of fence was given outside the original bamboo fence by the recipient so that rainwater cannot enter inside) ................................... 206 Figure 7.5 A chouchala (four roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi ................................................................................................................... 207 Figure 7.6 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi (without the originally included rooftop rainwater harvesting facility) ................................................................................................................................... 207 Figure 7.7 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi ................................................................................................ 208 Figure 7.8 A latrine given by an NGO in Channirchak ......................................................... 208 Figure 7.9 A latrine given with the dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi ........................................................................................... 209 Figure 7.10 A latrine given with the UNDP house in Dakshin Bedkashi .............................. 209 Figure 7.11 A road constructed by an NGO in Channirchak ................................................. 211 Figure 7.12 A road constructed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi ........................................ 211 Figure 7.13 A school-cum-cyclone shelter constructed in 2012 by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in the adjacent village of Channirchak ........................................... 212 Figure 7.14 A previous cyclone shelter and multipurpose community centre (constructed by Caritas in 1992) in Dakshin Bedkashi repaired by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as school-cum-cyclone shelter ........................................................................................................................ 212 Figure 7.15 A pond sand filter (PSF) installed by an NGO in Channirchak .......................... 214 Figure 7.16 A tubewell installed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedakshi ...................................... 214 Figure 7.17 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from NGOs in their survival (n=237) ..................................................................................... 219 Figure 7.18 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from NGOs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=249) ....................................................... 224 Figure 7.19 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs or any one of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=244) .................................................................................................................... 226
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List of Acronyms
ADP Annual Development Program BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board CBO community-based organisation CFFW cash and food-for-work CFS Child Friendly Space CFT cash-for-training CFW cash-for-work DSK Dushtha Shasthya Kendra EC European Commission EGPP Employment Generation Program for the Poorest FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FFW food-for-work FGD focus group discussion GR gratuitous relief
IFRCRCS International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGA income-generating activities
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change NGO non-government organisation PSF pond sand filter SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences TR test relief UDMC Union Disaster Management Committee UDRCG Upazila Disaster Response Coordination Group UK Aid Department for International Development, United Kingdom UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction UNO Upazila Nirbahi [executive] Officer UP Union Parishad USAID United States Agency for International Development UzDMC Upazila Disaster Management Committee VGD vulnerable group development VGF vulnerable group feeding WDMC Ward Disaster Management Committee WFP World Food Programme
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Cyclone Aila
The coastal area of Bangladesh is extremely susceptible to deadly tropical cyclones and
associated storm surges (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1) (MoEF 2005, 2009; MoFDM 2010a;
Paul & Rashid 2017).1 Tropical cyclones form in the Bay of Bengal mostly during pre-
monsoon and post-monsoon periods and strike Bangladesh mostly in the months of April,
May, October, November and December (UNDP 2007, 2012). A severe tropical cyclone
strikes Bangladesh every three years on average (MoEF 2009). Climate change is expected to
contribute to an increase in the frequency and severity of tropical cyclones with higher storm
surges and wind speed (MoEF 2009).2 Cyclones have killed more than 450,000 people in
Bangladesh since 1970 (UN 2010).
Cyclone Aila, a category 1 cyclone, struck the southwest coast of Bangladesh on 25 May
2009 with a maximum wind speed of 120 km/hour (see Figure 1.2) (UN 2010; Paul & Rashid
2017).3 The cyclone struck Bangladesh during the high tide cycle, resulting in a tidal surge of
up to 6.5 metres (UNDP 2012; UN 2010; ECHO 2009). Ultimately, Cyclone Aila affected 11
coastal districts and over 3.9 million people and caused 190 deaths and approximately 7,100
injuries (UNDP 2012).
Although Cyclone Aila caused a significantly fewer number of deaths than some earlier
cyclones in Bangladesh, it created a humanitarian crisis in the severely affected areas of
1 The coastal area of Bangladesh includes about 30 percent of the total area of Bangladesh and has a population of 39.41 million (about 27 percent of the total population of the country) (Paul & Rashid 2017). The landward boundaries of the coastal area have been determined based on three indicators: tidal waters, salinity intrusion and cyclones/storm surges. The coastal area of Bangladesh includes 19 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh (MoWR 2005). Eleven districts are considered as exposed coast as these districts have a coastline on the Bay of Bengal. Eight districts are considered as interior coast as these districts do not have a coastline on the Bay of Bengal. The coastal area contains more than 70 islands, most of them small islands. Khulna District which includes the two villages of this study is in the exposed coast and southwest coastal region (Paul & Rashid 2017). 2 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assumes that tropical cyclone frequency is likely to decline or stay unchanged globally in the future although it is likely that global mean tropical cyclone maximum wind speed and precipitation rates will increase (IPCC 2014, p. 370). Tropical cyclone frequency in the Bay of Bengal decreased over the period of 1891 to 2007. However, the frequency of high magnitude tropical cyclones along the Bangladesh coast increased since 1960 (Paul & Rashid 2017). 3 Cyclone Rashmi in October 2008 and Cyclone Sidr in November 2007 also struck the southwest coast of Bangladesh (UN 2010; UNDP 2012). According to MoFDM (2010a) and MoDMR (2013, 2014), the maximum wind speed of Cyclone Aila was 92 km/hour. The UNDP (2012) reports that tidal surges of Cyclone Aila were up to 6 metres and ECHO (2009) reports that tidal surges of Cyclone Aila were up to 22 feet or 6.71 metres. MoDMR (2014) reports that storm surge height of Cyclone Aila was more than 3 metres and Paul and Rashid (2017) mention that storm surge height of Cyclone Aila was 2 to 3 metres.
2
Khulna and Satkhira districts of Bangladesh (UNDP 2012).4 This was due primarily to
prolonged flooding due to waves breaking the embankments, with villages subject to daily
inundation during high tides until the embankment was repaired (UN 2010; UNDP 2012;
ECHO 2011). The affected households were unable to start recovery activities until the
villages were dewatered, which took a long time (UN 2010; UNDP 2012); recovery following
Cyclone Aila was thus much slower than that of Cyclone Sidr, even though the intensity of
Cyclone Aila, as a category 1 cyclone, was much less intense than the category 4 Cyclone
Sidr, and the impact in terms of the overall numbers of affected areas and households was
much lower (UNDP 2012; TNH 2009).
This study attempts to understand the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and
recovery process of households in Bangladesh affected by Cyclone Aila. The study addresses
this objective in the context of two Cyclone Aila–affected villages of two upazilas (sub-
districts), namely Dacope Upazila and Koyra Upazila of Khulna District, Bangladesh.
4 The Bhola Cyclone killed about 300,000 people in then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) on 12 November 1970 (MoDMR 2013; Paul & Rashid 2017). Some experts claim that the non-existence of an early-warning and cyclone-tracking system was the key cause for the massive loss of life caused by the Bhola Cyclone (Paul & Dutt 2010). Cyclone Gorky in April 1991 and Cyclone Sidr in November 2007, both category 4 storms, killed almost 140,000 and 3,400 people respectively (MoDMR 2013; Paul et al. 2010). Timely early warnings and evacuation of potential victims successfully, along with other reasons such as the protective Sundarbans Forest, timing of landfall, the number of surges and coastal embankment, contributed to the relatively lower number of deaths caused by Cyclone Sidr (Paul 2009; Paul & Dutt 2010; Paul et al. 2010; Saha & James 2017).
4
Table 1.1 Some major cyclones in Bangladesh a, b, c, d
Year Date Number of Deaths
Main Affected Districts
1965 11 May 19,279 Barisal 1965 15 December 873 Cox’s Bazar 1966 01 October 850 Noakhali 1970 12 November (Bhola Cyclone) 300,000 Bhola 1985 25 May 11,069 Noakhali 1988 29 November 5,708 Bagerhat, Barguna, Bhola,
Jessore, Khulna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur, Satkhira
1991 29 April (Cyclone Gorky) 138,882 Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar 1997 19 May 155 Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar 2007 15 November (Cyclone Sidr) 3,363 Bagerhat, Barguna, Pirojpur,
Patuakhali 2009 25 May (Cyclone Aila) 190 Khulna, Satkhira 2013 16 May (Cyclone Viyaru/Mahasen) 17 Barguna, Bhola, Patuakhali 2015 30 July (Cyclone Komen) 7 Bandarban, Bhola, Chittagong,
Cox’s Bazar, Feni, Noakhali 2016 21 May (Cyclone Roanu) 27 Barguna, Bhola, Chittagong,
Cox’s Bazar, Lakshmipur, Noakhali, Patuakhali
2017 30 May (Cyclone Mora) 7 Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar 2019 10 November (Cyclone Bulbul) 26 Bagerhat, Khulna, Satkhira
Notes: a Bhola Cyclone is known as ‘the killer storm of the twentieth century’ (Paul & Rashid 2017). Deaths for Bhola Cyclone numbered between 300,000–500,000 (UNDP 2012) and 500,000 (MoEF 2009; MoDMR 2014; IOM 2010a; Ali 1999; Paul & Dutt 2010). b The number of deaths for Cyclone Sidr is 4,000 (UNDP 2012). c The number of deaths for Cyclone Aila is 300 (Rashid & Paul 2014). d In addition to 7 deaths, the number of people reported to be missing due to Cyclone Komen was 38 (IFRCRCS 2015).
Source: Saha & James (2017); IFRCRCS (2017); UNDHA (1988); Ali (1999); JRA (2019);
Daily Star (2019); Paul & Rashid (2017)
5
Figure 1.2 Track of Cyclone Aila
Source: UNDP (2012)
Aila destroyed some 243,191 houses completely and 370,587 houses partially. It also caused
the deaths of some 150,000 livestock and the complete and partial destruction of nearly
324,000 acres of crop land, as well as substantial infrastructure losses (UNDP 2012) (see
Table 1.2). The tidal surge of Aila damaged and washed away about 1,743 km of
embankments (UNDP 2012). The estimated economic damage from Aila was US$300 million
(in 2015 dollars) and the original damage estimate in 2009 was US$270 million (Paul &
Rashid 2017). Aila also caused massive displacement of the affected people (IOM 2010a; UN
2010; UNDP 2012; ECHO 2009, 2011; Rashid & Paul 2014).
6
Table 1.2 Damage and loss due to Cyclone Aila (as of 11 June 2009)
Affected districts (nos) 11 Affected upazilas (nos) 64 Affected unions (nos) 195 (completely), 334 (partially) Affected population (nos) 3,928,238 Affected households (nos) 948,621 Reported deaths (nos) 190 People injured (nos) 7,103 Damaged houses (nos) 243,191 (completely), 370,587 (partially) Damaged crops (acres) 77,486 (completely), 245,968 (partially) Livestock deaths (nos) 150,131 Damaged educational institutions (nos) 445 (completely), 4,588 (partially) Damaged roads (km) 2,233 (completely), 6,621 (partially) Damaged bridges/culverts (nos) 157 Damaged embankments (km) 1742.53
Source: UNDP (2012)
Among the 11 districts struck by Aila, two districts, namely Khulna District and Satkhira
District, were the worst affected (UNDP 2012). Many of the affected areas of Khulna and
Satkhira became flooded after the main protecting embankments broke (UNDP 2009, 2012).
Aila affected 76 percent of households and damaged 90 to 100 percent of houses either
completely or partially in the four worst affected upazilas of Khulna (Dacope and Koyra
upazilas) and Satkhira (Ashasuni and Shyamnagar upazilas) districts (UN 2010), and
displaced a total of 76,478 households across these two districts (IOM 2010a).
In the two worst affected upazilas in Khulna, Aila killed 16 people in Dacope (with 7 more
missing) and 41 people in Koyra.5Aila affected about 296,000 people and destroyed about
49,000 houses completely and 27,000 houses partially in these two upazilas (PIOD 2009;
PIOK 2009) (see Table 1.3). Aila displaced a large number of households in both upazilas
(UN 2010; ECHO 2009, 2011; Saha 2017; Kumar et al. 2010). The livelihoods of the majority
of households in both upazilas were dependent on agriculture, fishery, livestock, forestry, and
selling labour (ECHO 2009; Kumar et al. 2010). In both upazilas, Aila caused substantial
5 Dacope consists of nine unions and one pourashava (municipality) and Koyra consists of seven unions. A union is the lowest level of the rural local government and the smallest rural administrative unit. It consists of villages. Each union has nine wards. A ward generally includes one or more villages. To varying degrees, Aila affected all nine unions and a pourashava of Dacope (PIOD 2009). The damage report (D form) from Project Implementation Office, Koyra (PIOK) (2009) identifies six unions of Koyra as affected (Bagali, Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Sadar, Maharajpur, Maheswaripur, and Uttar Bedkashi). The damage report does not list Amadi Union of Koyra as affected.
7
damage to, and losses in, major livelihood sectors such as agriculture and fishing (including
shrimp farming) sectors (UN 2010; Kumar et al. 2010).
Table 1.3 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila in Dacope and Koyra upazilas, Khulnaa
Items Dacope Koyra Affected population (nos) 143,700 152,496 Affected households (nos) 29,832 41,043 Reported deaths (nos) 16 41 Houses fully damaged (nos) 25,067 23,820 Houses partially damaged (nos) 8,349 18,620 Crops fully damaged (acres) 1,680 503 Crops partially damaged (acres) 1,600 20 Loss of poultry (nos) 13,400 57,000 Loss of livestock (nos) 211 1,562 Shrimp ghers/ponds damaged (acres)
17,640 20,300
Educational and religious institutions damaged (nos) b
266 educational and religious institutions partially damaged
9 educational institutions completely and 70 educational institutions partially damaged; 192 mosques/temples damaged
Drinking water sources damaged (nos)
11,200 1,103
Latrines damaged (nos) 16,320 27,350 Roads damaged (km) 274 108 Embankments damaged (km) 118 80
Notes: a The damage report from Project Implementation Office, Koyra (PIOK) in 2009 inaccurately summarises the number of the losses of poultry and losses of livestock. The number of the losses of poultry in the total cell of the table for the upazila does not match with the number of the losses of poultry given within the cells against each union. The same problem also exists in the case of the losses of livestock. The data in Table 3 present the total number of the losses of poultry and the total number of the losses of livestock for Koyra Upazila based on the summation of the numbers given within the cells for each union. b It was observed during fieldwork in both upazilas that many schools and mosques/temples that were partially damaged by Aila were fully damaged later due to the prolonged inundation of the villages.
Sources: PIOD (2009); PIOK (2009); UN (2010)
The situation following Aila improved quickly in the nine other affected districts. However,
the situation deteriorated in the severely affected areas of Khulna and Satkhira districts as the
areas were subject to regular flooding due to the delays in the repair of the broken sections of
the embankments and the resultant prolonged flooding (UNDP 2012). Thus, the affected
households were unable to restore their livelihoods and the displaced households could not
return to their homes until the embankment was repaired. More than 201,982 displaced people
in both districts were living in temporary accommodation five months after Aila (ECHO
8
2009). About 14,000 households were living on embankments in the 13 affected unions of
four upazilas of Khulna (Dacope and Koyra) and Satkhira (Ashasuni and Shyamnagar)
districts one year after Aila (UN 2010). About 8,321 households were living on embankments
and about 2,585 households were living on the outside of the ring embankment in 11 severely
affected unions of four upazilas of Khulna (Dacope and Koyra) and Satkhira (Ashasuni and
Shyamnagar) districts almost two years after Aila (ECHO 2011).6 Moreover, in these 11
severely affected unions of the four upazilas, about 42,250 households (including households
living on the embankment and outside the ring embankment and households that returned to
homes) did not have adequate income for recovery; 66 percent of these households (27,885
households) were still unable to have three full meals in a day, almost two years after Aila
(ECHO 2011).
Households in the severely affected unions of Dacope and Koyra were not able to restore
livelihoods, mainly farming and fishing, as their agricultural fields, shrimp ghers (ponds) and
sweet fishponds were subject to continuous inundation until the embankment was repaired
(ECHO 2009; UN 2010; UNDP 2012). The failure to restore livelihoods limited the
opportunity for income in the affected areas and caused significant increase in seasonal
migration (ECHO 2009). About 18,000 people from Dacope and about 40,000 people from
Koyra migrated to different places to find work by October 2009, almost five months after
Aila (ECHO 2009). In addition to seasonal migration, many households migrated to other
places permanently (Saha 2017; Kumar et al. 2010). A study conducted one year after Aila
shows that 800 households from Dacope and 1,200 households from Koyra permanently
migrated to other places (Kumar et al. 2010). Lack of income opportunities, along with other
factors such as destruction of houses, and scarcity of food and water, forced them to migrate
permanently to other places (UN 2010; Saha 2017).
Displaced households in Dacope and Koyra were unable to return to their homes before the
repair of the breaches in the embankment (UN 2010; ECHO 2009, 2011; UNDP 2012). For
instance, about 10,500 households were living on embankments in the eight affected unions
of Dacope and Koyra almost one year after Aila (UN 2010).7 Likewise, 7,406 households
were living on embankments and 1,447 households were living on areas outside of the ring
6 Ring embankments were constructed in many Aila-affected areas to protect villages temporarily, until the main embankment was repaired. These were constructed because the tidal river flows were so fast that they prevented repairs of the main embankment (ECHO 2011). 7 These eight unions were: Kamarkhola and Sutarkhali unions of Dacope and Bagali, Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Sadar, Maharajpur, Maheswaripur, and Uttar Bedkashi unions of Koyra.
9
embankment in the severely affected unions of both upazilas almost two years after Aila
(ECHO 2011).8 Moreover, about 30,468 households (8,853 displaced households and 21,615
households that returned home) in the severely affected unions of these two upazilas did not
have adequate income for recovery. Many of these households were unable to have three full
meals in a day, almost two years after Aila (ECHO 2011). In general, households in the
severely affected unions of both upazilas were living either on embankments and other places
in makeshift houses or in flooded homes without having secure access to food, drinking
water, sanitation, or livelihoods until these unions became dewatered (ECHO 2011; Saha
2017; UN 2010). The prolonged flooding situation after the event impeded the high levels of
self-recovery usually observed in Bangladesh after floods and cyclones (UN 2010). The
affected households lost confidence and became fearful about their survival in the flooded
villages (ECHO 2011; UNDP 2012). The hopes of the displaced households to return to their
homes faded as the breaches became wider over time due to tidal flows (UNDP 2012; UN
2010).
The inability of the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) to repair the breaches in
a timely manner created a humanitarian crisis (UNDP 2012). In some cases, although the
embankments were repaired, they did not last more than a few weeks or even days, with some
collapsing several times (IOM 2010b; ECHO 2011). The sudden collapse of a repaired
embankment washed away any recovery activities completed by NGOs, and thus NGOs had
to undertake emergency work again (ECHO 2011). Aila damaged embankments just as the
monsoon season was approaching, exacerbating the impact as many local initiatives to fix the
breaches in embankments were unsuccessful due to high tides and rains (UNDP 2012; ECHO
2009). BWDB repaired all the broken sections of the embankment except for one (known as
Hareskhali, in Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra, Khulna) by February 2011 (ECHO 2011);
the Hareskhali broken section was finally repaired by BWDB in 2012 (BWDB 2015).
The response and recovery activities undertaken had limited success due to the regular
inundation of the affected areas (ECHO 2011). The affected households began full recovery
activities only when the villages were dewatered. International development partners and
NGOs were also unable to focus on recovery operations in the severely affected areas (except
8 ECHO (2011) presents the data relating to the number of households mentioned with reference to the upazila instead of the unions within the upazila. The report presents data for the eight unions of Dacope (Kamarkhola and Sutarkhali) and Koyra (Bagali, Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Sadar, Maharajpur, Maheswaripur, and Uttar Bedkashi) upazilas of Khulna District. The report also includes three unions of two other upazilas of Satkhira District.
10
some villages of Dakshin Bedkashi Union, Koyra) for almost two years after the event, even
though they were engaged in emergency response operations from the beginning of the crisis
(UNDP 2012). Many affected households were struggling to recover from the impacts of Aila
four or more years after the event (Stefanicki 2013).
1.2 Social Capital in the Cyclone Aila Response and Recovery
This study aims to explore the role of social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and
recovery process of the affected households. A number of scholars have researched the role of
social capital in post-disaster response and recovery in the contexts of both developed and
developing countries and various disasters such as cyclones, floods, and earthquakes (Aldrich
2012a; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004; James & Paton 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2009, 2011;
Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012; Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Marín et al. 2015; Shimada 2015;
Tse, Wei & Wang 2013; Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017;
Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018). Many disaster scholars suggest that social capital can
play an important role in post-disaster response and recovery although their studies varied in
terms of conceptualisation and measurement of social capital, levels of analysis (such as
household or community) and methods (Aldrich 2012a; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004; Dynes
2005; James & Paton 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2009, 2011; Storr & Haeffele-Balch
2012; Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Marín et al. 2015; Shimada 2015; Tse, Wei & Wang 2013;
Buckland & Rahman 1999; Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati
2017; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018). Disaster scholars also suggest that social capital
can simultaneously generate both benefits and negative externalities in post-disaster contexts
(Aldrich 2011a, 2012a) (see the literature review in Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion of
these sources and arguments).
The definition of social capital varies among scholars (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb
2008b; Castiglione 2008; Paxton 1999). In this study, I follow the definition of social capital
employed in Nan Lin’s network-based theory of social capital (2008). Lin (2008, p. 51)
defines social capital as ‘resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be
accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks’. Lin argues that although actors cannot
capture the embedded resources without networks, ‘equating networks with social capital is
incorrect’ (2008, p. 59) as social capital denotes embedded resources in social networks. In
this study, I define social capital as the resources available to households through social
networks. I consider not only material and monetary resources but also non-material and non-
11
monetary resources. Conceptualisation of social capital with reference to networks instead of
‘networks, norms and trust’ is productive for both the theoretical understanding and
application of the concept in empirical research (Cook 2005). When social capital is
conceptualised as ‘networks, norms and trust’ (Putnam 1993, p. 167), in the words of Karen
Schweers Cook as an ‘everything but the kitchen sink concept’ (Cook 2005, p. 8), it becomes
difficult to distinguish which feature of social capital is contributing when we claim the
importance of social capital for something such as the post-disaster economic recovery of
cyclone-affected households (Cook 2005).
In this study, I distinguish between bonding, bridging and linking types of social capital
instead of just bonding or bridging types (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter 2002; Szreter &
Woolcock 2004; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004; Pelling & High 2005; Aldrich 2012a, James &
Paton 2015). The addition of a category of linking type of social capital allows for an
understanding of the role of formal institutions beyond the community (i.e. the government
and external aid agencies such as NGOs) in the post-disaster response and recovery process
(Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter 2002; Szreter & Woolcock 2004). I define bonding networks
as households’ relations with relatives, bridging networks as households’ relations with
neighbours, friends and acquaintances, and linking networks as households’ relations with
formal organisations (i.e. the government and NGOs). Lin (2008, p. 62) suggests that social
capital does not ‘bind, bond or bridge’; ‘it is the nature of the social networks that bind, bond,
or bridge’. In other words, it is the nature of the social networks that bond, bridge or link.
Therefore, bonding social capital denotes resources available to the households through
bonding networks amongst relatives (i.e. people who are connected to the household head or
any member of the household by blood or marriage and are not members of the studied
household), bridging social capital denotes resources available to the households through
bridging networks, and linking social capital denotes resources available to the households
through linking networks.
In this study, I identify three dimensions of household recovery, namely, economic, housing
and psychological recovery, in order to understand recovery at the household level, as
scholars affirm that economic recovery, housing recovery and psychological recovery are
three key components of general household recovery (Lindell 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Bolin
1982). Thus, my study examines the role of social capital in the economic, housing and
psychological recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households. Inclusion of these
12
three dimensions of recovery provides the opportunity to understand the role of each of the
three types of social capital across each of the three dimensions of recovery. In addition to the
role of each of the three types of social capital in the economic, housing and psychological
recovery, the research also explores the role of each of the three types of social capital in the
evacuation, search and rescue operations and survival of the affected households.
This study is based on fieldwork carried out in two villages: the first is Channirchak, which is
located in Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila of Khulna District, and the second is
Dakshin Bedkashi, which is located in Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra Upazila of Khulna
District. Channirchak Village was subject to regular inundation for almost 21 months while
Dakshin Bedkashi Village was regularly inundated for almost 33 months following the event
(BWDB 2011, 2015).9 I have employed a mixed methods research design to address my
objectives as this research design provides a more in-depth understanding of the research
questions than either the quantitative or qualitative approach alone (Creswell 2014, p. 4;
Creswell & Clark 2007, p. 5). The mixed methods research design offers an opportunity to
bring together the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, which have both
strengths and limitations (Creswell 2014, p. 215; Creswell & Clark 2007, p. 18).
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions
The main objective of this study is to examine the role of social capital in the post–Cyclone
Aila response and recovery process of a selection of affected households in Bangladesh. The
three specific objectives of the study are to examine the role in this process of bonding,
bridging and linking social capital. Accordingly, the study aims to answer the central research
question through four sub-questions:
What were the contributions to the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and
psychological recovery process of the affected households of:
1. Bonding social capital?
2. Bridging social capital?
3. Linking social capital (government)?
4. Linking social capital (NGOs)?
9 Channirchak was subject to saltwater inundation for one period and sweet water inundation for another period of the year while Dakshin Bedkashi was subject to saltwater inundation throughout the year (source: key informants).
13
1.4 Significance of the Study
Despite many studies on cyclone hazards in Bangladesh, the question of long-term post-
disaster recovery of affected households and communities following cyclones in Bangladesh
remains highly under-researched. Similarly, the role of social capital in the post-disaster
response and recovery in general and in the post-cyclone response and recovery in particular
is also highly under-researched. Only a few studies so far have studied the relation between
social capital and disaster recovery or resilience to climate stress or adaptability to natural
hazards in the context of Bangladesh. Rotberg (2010) has studied the relationship between
social networks and rural adaptability to flood and river erosion based on a qualitative
approach in a village of Bangladesh. Jordan (2015) has studied the link between social capital
and resilience to climate stress based on a qualitative approach in two villages of Bangladesh.
Islam and Walkerden (2014, 2015) and Islam, Walkerden and Amati (2017) have addressed
social capital and disaster recovery based on the mixed method approach in two Cyclone
Sidr–affected villages of Pathorhgata Upazila of Barguna District of Bangladesh. Finally,
Masud-All-Kamal and Hassan (2018) have studied the relationship between social capital and
disaster recovery based on a qualitative approach in two Aila-affected villages of Shyamnagar
Upazila of Satkhira District in Bangladesh.
Although a few studies (Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017;
Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018) have focused on the role of social capital in post-cyclone
response and recovery in Bangladesh, no studies so far have specifically examined the role of
social capital in post-cyclone economic, housing and psychological recovery processes in
Bangladesh. A few studies in Bangladesh have investigated how households in affected
coastal villages of Bangladesh have utilised bonding, bridging, and linking social capital
during the post-cyclone survival and rebuilding, but they have not specifically considered the
three dimensions of recovery (economic, housing and psychological recovery) and, thus, have
not examined how social capital contributes to the economic, housing and psychological
recovery process. Likewise, the relationship between a specific form of social capital and the
three dimensions of the recovery (economic, housing and psychological) remains largely
unexplored. Moreover, no studies, to the author’s knowledge, have explored the role of social
capital in the post-disaster psychological recovery process of members of cyclone-affected
households in Bangladesh.
14
This study fills existing knowledge gaps by exploring the role of social capital in the
economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households following a
cyclone in Bangladesh. The study also explores the role of social capital in evacuation, search
and rescue operations and survival. The study addresses an existing knowledge gap by
exploring the role of each of the three types of social capital in economic, housing and
psychological recovery. In addition, the study contributes to new knowledge by showing how
the roles of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital differ from one another in terms of
their contribution to the post-cyclone response and recovery process. Moreover, the study fills
an existing lacuna by exploring the role of each of the three types of social capital in the
psychological recovery process of members of the affected households. The study also
contributes to existing knowledge by making a clear distinction between the bonding
(households’ relationships with relatives) and bridging (households’ relationships with
neighbours, friends and acquaintances) networks of the households in the context of coastal
Bangladesh.
The study provides evidence-based knowledge to policymakers and development practitioners
about the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process. The study
also explores the major weaknesses of the government’s and NGOs’ post-Aila response and
recovery operations. The findings will contribute to the strengthening of the capacity of the
different forms of network and to the design of effective post-disaster response and recovery
operations for future disasters in Bangladesh and other countries.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The thesis consists of seven further chapters. Chapter 2 reviews literature on key themes
pertinent to the study and contains three sections. The first section discusses the meaning of
disaster recovery, the relationship between household and community recovery and various
dimensions of, and issues related to, household and community recovery. The second section
reviews literature on the relationship between disaster recovery and resilience, while the third
section presents a review of literature on the relationship between social capital and disaster
recovery.
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used in this study. The chapter first presents information
related to the selection of the study areas, i.e. the two villages. The chapter then provides the
rationale for the use of a mixed methods approach and selection of the suitable mixed
15
methods design. The chapter next discusses qualitative and quantitative data collection
methods and the recruitment of participants and respondents for qualitative and quantitative
data collection. The chapter finally discusses the qualitative and quantitative data analysis
process.
Chapter 4 examines the role of bonding social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and
recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first discusses the kinship system in
Bangladesh. The chapter then discusses the types of aid or support and other non-aid items the
affected households received through bonding networks, i.e. from relatives. The chapter next
examines the role of bonding social capital in evacuation, search and rescue operations,
survival, and economic, housing and psychological recovery. The chapter finally explains
why bonding networks play a limited role in the survival, economic and housing recovery
process of the affected households.
Chapter 5 examines the role of bridging social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and
recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first provides the justification for
considering households’ relationships with neighbours and friends and acquaintances as
bridging instead of bonding networks. The chapter then discusses the types of aid or support
and other non-aid items the affected households received from neighbours and friends and
acquaintances. The chapter next examines the role of bridging social capital in evacuation,
search and rescue operations, survival, and economic, housing and psychological recovery.
The chapter later explains why bridging social capital plays a limited role in the survival and
economic and housing recovery process of the affected households. The chapter finally
presents a comparison between the role of bonding social capital and bridging social capital in
the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process.
Chapter 6 presents how the linking social capital (government) contributes to the post–
Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first
presents the aid items and other supports not in the form of aid items the affected households
received from the government. The chapter then examines the role of linking social capital in
evacuation, search and rescue operations, survival, and economic, housing and psychological
recovery. The chapter finally discusses the major weaknesses of the government’s post–
Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations.
16
Chapter 7 presents how the linking social capital (NGOs) contributes to the post–Cyclone
Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first introduces
those NGOs that participated in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations and
the aid items and non-aid items households received from NGOs. The chapter then examines
the role of NGOs in evacuation, search and rescue operations, survival, and economic,
housing and psychological recovery. The chapter finally discusses the major weaknesses of
NGOs’ post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations.
Chapter 8 first presents key findings of the study regarding the research questions. The
chapter next discusses how the findings of the study contribute to the advancement of
knowledge and policy in the research area. The chapter then discusses the limitations of the
study, the implications of climate change and sea level rise, and finally provides policy
recommendations and suggestions for potential future research.
17
Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the key concepts used in this research and tries to establish the link
among the concepts based on the existing relevant studies. This review of literature is further
divided into four sections. The first section briefly discusses the meaning of disaster recovery,
the relationship between household and community recovery and various dimensions of, and
issues related to, household and community recovery. The second section succinctly discusses
the relationship between disaster recovery and resilience while the third section briefly
discusses the relationship between social capital and disaster recovery. The second section is
divided into two subsections as follows: changing definitions of resilience; and recovery as an
opportunity for disaster risk-reduction and building resilience. The third section is divided
into three subsections as follows: social capital – understanding the concept; social capital –
levels of application, types, measurement and negative consequences; and application of
social capital to disaster recovery. The final section presents a conclusion.
2.2 Disaster Recovery, and Household and Community Recovery
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)10 (2009) defines
disaster as ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds
the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’ (p. 9). The
EM-DAT database records an event as a disaster which meets at least one of the following
criteria: ten or more people killed, 100 people or more affected, declaration of a state of
emergency and a call for international assistance (CRED 2015). Disaster life cycle has four
phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (IRP 2012; Mileti 1999; Arendt &
Alesch 2015). Mitigation and preparedness involve activities undertaken before disaster
strikes (UNISDR 2009; Mileti 1999; Arendt & Alesch 2015). Mitigation involves various
strategies and actions to lessen or limit the adverse impacts of hazards and associated disasters
in future (UNISDR 2009). Preparedness involves the development of knowledge and
capacities required to manage emergencies effectively and achieve an orderly transition from
response to sustained recovery (UNISDR 2009). The response phase involves actions that are
undertaken ‘directly before, during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives,
10 This is now known as the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR).
18
reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people
affected’ (UNDRR 2020). This phase mostly focuses on immediate and short-term needs and
is often known as ‘disaster relief’ (UNISDR 2009; UNDRR 2020). Recovery is the last phase
that denotes ‘the restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods
and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster
risk factors’ (UNISDR 2009, p. 23). According to the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCRCS) (2012), recovery following a disaster denotes ‘a
process that results in people’s lives returning to normal in such a way that they will be more
resilient to future disasters’ (p. 17). Broadly speaking, the recovery process includes post-
disaster reconstruction, restoration, rehabilitation, and redevelopment as parts of the process
(Chang 2010; Dynes & Quarantelli 2008).
Earlier disaster recovery was considered as ‘ordered, knowable, and predictable’ (Popkin
1977; Kates 1977; Kates & Pijawka 1977). Kates and Pijawka (1977) provided a sequential
model of disaster recovery activities that takes place across four overlapping periods:
emergency, restoration, replacement reconstruction (reconstruction I), and the
commemorative, betterment, and developmental reconstruction (reconstruction II). However,
later research found that the recovery process is not as ordered and predictable as suggested
by Popkin (1977), Kates (1977) and Kates and Pijawka (1977) (Chang 2010; Miles, Chang &
Eeri 2006; Berke, Kartez & Wenger 1993; Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985). Rather,
recovery is an uncertain, complex, nonlinear, multidimensional, and conflictual process
(Chang 2010). Therefore, recovery needs to be understood as a process, not as a product or
end state (Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985; Quarantelli 1999; Mileti 1999; Bolin 1982; Nigg
1995).
The recovery process following a disaster may be relatively quick or it may take several years
(IFRCRCS 2012). The time required for recovery also varies among people and communities
as some people or communities can recover more quickly than others (IFRCRCS 2012;
Lindell 2013a, 2013b; Finch, Emrich & Cutter 2010; Green, Bates & Smyth 2007). The
recovery process for greater Christchurch following the earthquakes is expected to take more
than ten years. The timeline for the immediate recovery phase was set at September 2010 to
December 2011 and the short-term recovery was anticipated to be 2012–2014, while the
medium and longer-term recovery is seen as 2015 to 2020 and beyond (CERA 2012). On the
other hand, the timeline for the short (rehabilitation) and medium term (reconstruction)
19
rehabilitation and reconstruction programs for Aceh following the tsunami on 26 December
2004 (also Nias that experienced an earthquake on 28 March 2005) was expected to be four
years (April 2005 to April 2009) (Mardhatillah 2010; Kenny et al. 2010).11 However, unlike
the recovery strategy for greater Christchurch, the master plan for rehabilitation and
reconstruction programs in Aceh and Nias did not cover long-term recovery programs. The
expected period of reconstruction of the physical environment and infrastructure following
the impact of Hurricane Katrina was eight to 11 years (Kates et al. 2006). An assessment
conducted one year after Cyclone Aila proposed early recovery interventions for two years
following the assessment (UN 2010). However, findings show that the affected households
and communities often do not recover within the period outlined in the plan. For instance,
many tsunami-affected people in Indonesia did not recover within the period set in the master
plan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction (Mardhatillah 2010; Samuels 2010).
Recovery takes place at different levels of the social unit such as individual, household and
community (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Quarantelli 1999; Chang 2010; Mileti
1999; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2011; Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012; Wickes et al. 2015). As
recovery occurs at different levels, assessment of recovery needs to state what level of social
unit is being evaluated. It is important as individuals or households may recover, while
communities may not, and vice versa, although the recovery of these social units is not fully
independent of each other (Quarantelli 1999; Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012).
In the context of Bangladesh, community level post-disaster recovery following Aila can be
understood in terms of post-disaster recovery at the village level. It is worth noting that the
term ‘community’ is one of the most elusive concepts in sociology as it lacks specific
meaning (Day 2006). A community generally means an ‘area of common life’ such as a
village (MacIver 1970). Parsons (1952, p. 91) defines community as a collectivity, ‘the
members of which share a common territorial area as their base of operations for daily
activities’. Two basic characteristics of community are locality and community sentiment
(MacIver & Page 1950). A community is not a homogenous entity, and relations among
members may not always be harmonious (Pelling 2007; Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012). An
individual or a group within a community can benefit at the expense of higher risk and greater
vulnerability for other individuals or groups (Wisner et al. 2004; Pelling 2007; Tierney &
11 The rehabilitation and reconstruction phase in Aceh followed an emergency period that lasted three months (ended at the end of March 2005) following the tsunami (Kenny et al. 2010).
20
Oliver-Smith 2012). In other words, usually a community is internally divided by various
factors such as unequal power and socio-economic conditions (Pelling 2007). Thus, assessing
post-disaster recovery at the community level (community as a unit of analysis) can often be
problematic as it may hide the fact that some groups may emerge as winners, while others
may be losers in the post-disaster recovery process (Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012). A
recovery process that may be considered successful at the community level may be
experienced very differently at the household level (Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012).
Although household recovery is different from community recovery, community recovery and
reconstruction activities carried out at the community level can influence household recovery
(Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Green, Bates & Smyth 2007; Bolin 1982, 1994; Hass
et al. 1977; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Trainer & Bolin 1976). Certain decisions at the
community level may help or impede household recovery (Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977). If
a community recovers (community functions are restored) quickly, then individual or
household recovery can proceed more smoothly, while the failure of a community to recover
can impair individual or household recovery (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Green,
Bates & Smyth 2007). At the same time, rapid recovery of individuals or households arising
from, for example, rapid recovery of mental health of community members can contribute to
the rapid recovery of the community functions (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012).
Studies show that people living in communities in which community members are more
spatially scattered during the early recovery period recover more slowly than do people living
in communities in which community members are less spatially scattered (Thorburn 2010).
Studies also show that individuals living in communities that experience higher destruction
exhibit higher post-traumatic stress reactivity (PTSR) than do individuals living in
communities with less destruction (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al.
2008). Mobility or displacement are also higher in communities with a high level of damage
than in communities with a low level of damage (Gray et al. 2009).
These findings suggest that community issues and community recovery influence the long-
term recovery of individuals and households within the community. However, the impact of
community recovery on household recovery is ‘by no means strictly causative’ as evidenced
by differences among households in the same community in terms of recovery (Bolin 1982).
Household recovery is linked not only to community characteristics and reconstruction
activities at the community level, but also linked to other elements such as characteristics of
21
the household, social support networks, aid received and the impact of the disaster on the
household (Bolin 1982; Frankenberg et al. 2013; Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012;
Frankenberg et al. 2008; Lindell 2013a, 2013b).
Both household recovery and community recovery involve several dimensions. Household
recovery is a complex process that involves various dimensions and various factors that are
both internal and external to a household (Bolin 1976, 1982; Ericson et al. 1976; Lindell
2013a, 2013b). Moreover, perception of household recovery can also vary across cultures. For
example, continuity of employment was the most important factor in the perception of
household recovery in Managua, Nicaragua, while it was not important in Rapid City, South
Dakota, USA (Bolin & Bolton 1983). Although dimensions of household recovery vary
across studies (Bolin & Bolton 1983, 1986; Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977),
this review suggests that household recovery has three basic dimensions: economic recovery,
housing recovery, and psychological recovery (Lindell 2011, 2013a, 2013b). One dimension
of recovery can also affect other dimensions of recovery (Bolin 1982; Peacock, Dash &
Zhang 2009). For instance, delays in the re-establishment of housing after a disaster may
cause delays in other dimensions of recovery as they limit the capacity of a household to
perform normal activities (Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009). The interrelationships among these
three dimensions can be understood from a recent study on psychological impact following a
disaster in Japan that suggests that damage to houses had the largest effect, home water
incursion had the second largest effect and income reduction after the event had the third
largest effect on the mental health of the people (Lebowitz 2016). This finding indirectly
suggests that people will be able to recover psychologically if they can fix damage to their
houses and recover from the reduction in income.
In the post-disaster context, re-establishment of permanent housing is one of the fundamental
dimensions of overall household recovery (Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009). It is worth noting
that disaster housing is different from disaster sheltering (Quarantelli 1982, 1991, 1995;
Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009). Quarantelli (1982, 1991, 1995) has distinguished between
sheltering and housing in four different terms for four different phenomena. These are:
emergency sheltering, temporary sheltering, temporary housing, and permanent housing. The
difference between sheltering and housing is that people do not re-establish household
routines in the case of sheltering, whereas people are required to re-establish household
routines in the case of housing. Temporary housing means re-establishment of household
22
routines in a location or structure which is not preferred, while permanent housing means re-
establishment of household routines in a preferred location and structure (Lindell 2013a,
2013b). At a point in time, some victims may belong to the emergency sheltering phase, while
other victims may move to permanent housing in a community (Quarantelli 1995; Lindell
2013b). Although the typology developed by Quarantelli (1982, 1991, 1995) is useful, it is not
always clear. The transitions from emergency sheltering to temporary sheltering and from
temporary housing to permanent housing are not always clear (Quarantelli 1995; Peacock,
Dash & Zhang 2009; Lindell 2013b).
Like household recovery, community recovery also involves several dimensions. Mileti
(1999) has mentioned five components of community recovery: residential, commercial,
industrial, social, and lifelines. The recovery strategy for greater Christchurch following the
Christchurch earthquakes contains six components of recovery: leadership and integration,
economic recovery, social recovery (health, education, and community support services),
cultural recovery, recovery of built environment (e.g. housing, infrastructure) and natural
environment (CERA 2012). Rubin, Saperstein and Barbee (1985) examined long-term
community recovery of 14 disaster affected communities in terms of recovery of activities in
five domains of community life: residential (e.g. repair or reconstruction of houses,
permanent resettlement of displaced people), business/economic (e.g. business recovery,
employment to pre-disaster level), public services and facilities (e.g. schools, hospitals),
general population (the return of certain social indicators to the pre-disaster level) and
mitigation (measures undertaken to reduce losses to future events) (Rubin, Saperstein &
Barbee 1985). The complexity of understanding community recovery can be understood by
considering that Rubin, Saperstein and Barbee’s (1985) study found 44 independent variables
in ten major categories which affected community recovery. It is worth noting that
community recovery and reconstruction issues are subject to the influence of government
policies and programs (Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985).
Reconstruction and recovery are not only technical processes, but also social, economic,
cultural, psychological, and political processes (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Samuels 2010; Kenny
et al. 2010; Oliver-Smith 1991). However, past post-disaster experiences show that the
reconstruction process mainly focuses on physical reconstruction or rebuilding of physical
infrastructures and ignores non-physical dimensions of reconstruction such as psychological
reconstruction (Suaedy 2010; Kenny & Clarke 2010; Kenny et al. 2010; Samuels 2010;
23
Fanany 2010a; Shaw & Guda 2004). Past post-disaster experiences also show that although
many affected people consider rebuilding of livelihoods as the most necessary issue of the
reconstruction, government and NGOs pay less attention to livelihood recovery programs
compared to the rebuilding of infrastructure (Kenny et al. 2010; Samuels 2010; Steinberg
2010). In the post-disaster situation, the issue of livelihood recovery becomes critical when
people move back to their homes and the food relief ends (Steinberg 2010; Saha 2017). Near
the end of the reconstruction activities in Aceh, government and NGOs paid increased
attention to livelihood recovery programs, but still with less priority compared to physical
reconstruction (Samuels 2010). However, these programs excluded many people and did not
provide adequate livelihood support to many recipients (Samuels 2010; Steinberg 2010). It is
believed that the physical reconstruction or rebuilding of physical infrastructures is more
popular than social and psychological reconstruction, because these are visible and
measurable (Samuels 2010; Kenny et al. 2010; Fanany 2010b). Rebuilding of physical
infrastructures helps agencies to prove easily to donors that they have done something (Kenny
et al. 2010; Samuels 2010). However, although rebuilding of infrastructure and housing is
certainly important, it should not be the only goal of the reconstruction (Kenny & Clarke
2010; Samuels 2010; Steinberg 2010). Other dimensions of reconstruction such as social and
psychological reconstruction also need to be addressed, perhaps with more emphasis (Kenny
& Clarke 2010; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016). In other words, to ensure a sustainable recovery
outcome, governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in reconstruction and
recovery efforts must keep in mind that ‘reconstruction is less a technical issue than it is a
social matter. Reconstruction only partly involves bricks and land use codes. It mostly
concerns social values and group interests’ (Dynes & Quarantelli 2008).
Disaster recovery goals of those who are assisted and those who are assisting can be different
(Kenny et al. 2010; Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010; Quarantelli 1999). Sometimes there may
be a clash between the goals of recovery of the affected people and the communities and
agencies involved in the recovery process (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010; Quarantelli 1999).
Sometimes sources of problems in the post-disaster period are not the affected people
themselves, but agencies that usually provide less assistance than they believe. They often
underestimate the informal assistance victims receive from relatives and friends (Quarantelli
1999). Previous post-disaster recovery efforts show that many aid agencies compete rather
than cooperate with one another (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010). Competition and the lack of
coordination among agencies involved in relief and recovery activities hinder recovery
24
processes (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010; Lu & Xu 2014; Quarantelli 1999). Little or lack of
coordination among agencies can cause duplication of recovery activities and, in worst cases,
can cause conflicts among agencies. The recovery needs of the affected people may not be
met as they may fall into the gap between two organisations (Quarantelli 1999). Substantial
differences among various agencies in terms of their interventions in a particular community,
such as the difference in the quality and size of the houses constructed by different NGOs, can
ignite tensions and conflicts among members of that community (Fanany 2010b; Thorburn
2010). Moreover, reconstruction and rebuilding activities, either due to inequality in aid
distribution or perceived differences, can also fuel tensions and conflicts between
communities as one community may consider itself less supported and discriminated against
compared to another community (Kenny 2010; Thorburn 2010; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016).
Likewise, problems within an agency such as inappropriate staffing, poor management
structure and poor leadership can also limit the effectiveness of interventions and thus impede
recovery (Clarke & Murray 2010; Quarantelli 1999). Furthermore, mutual hostility and lack
of coordination and trust between NGOs and the government agencies can also impede the
recovery process (Lu & Xu 2014; Mustafa 2003).
Most government and international agencies are reluctant to ensure local participation during
relief and reconstruction phases (Kenny 2010; Steinberg 2010) and many agencies do not
have the required skills to do so (Steinberg 2010). Aid recipients often feel excluded and
become passive observers when government and non-government aid agencies make
decisions without consulting them (Kenny et al. 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). Post-
tsunami interventions show that in most cases participation was mainly of the consultative
kind and sometimes manipulative and was used only as an instrument for obtaining consent to
implement interventions (Kenny 2010). Lack of consultation with the affected people and sole
control of the needs assessment process by external agencies produce outcomes that are not
appropriate to local needs (Kenny 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Shaw & Guda 2004).
For instance, many newly constructed houses in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami and in
Bangladesh following Cyclone Sidr were totally unsuitable for local needs due to the
inappropriate design of the houses (Kenny 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). In some cases,
recipients did not occupy houses built by external agencies as these houses were substandard
(Fanany 2010a; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). A top-down approach that failed to understand
the needs of the affected people made these interventions unsuccessful (Paton, Jang & Liu
2016; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). All forms of assistance during the relief and recovery
25
period can be more effective when recipients are consulted and involved in every stage of the
process (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Fanany 2010b; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Oliver-Smith
1991). In other words, instead of a top-down approach, a bottom-up participatory approach,
that views intervention as a partnership between affected people and communities, and
government and non-government agencies, is necessary for effective recovery outcomes
(Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton 2015; Kenny 2010; Fanany 2010b; Thorburn 2010;
Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Lawther 2016; Shaw & Guda 2004; Shaw & Sinha 2003; Shaw,
Pulhin & Pereira 2010). This approach allows the affected people to identify their actual
circumstances and needs, and views people as active agents who are capable of managing
their recovery, and thus they need to be supported instead of directed in their recovery process
(Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Kenny 2010). Moreover, if the government agencies, NGOs and
donors can be made responsible for their reconstruction works for a period after the work is
finished, then they might provide more successful interventions during the recovery period
(Fanany 2010b; Kenny & Clarke 2010).
2.3 Disaster Recovery and Resilience
2.3.1 Changing Definitions of Resilience
The rapid growth in popularity of the concept of resilience in the disaster risk management
literature is linked to the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (UN 2005; Pelling 2014).
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 also emphasises building
resilience to disasters (UNDRR 2015). Resilience generally denotes the capacity to ‘resile
from’ a shock (UNISDR 2009) and can be assessed for different levels such as individual,
household, community, organisation and even for a nation (Buckle 2006; Norris et al. 2008;
Manyena 2006; Cutter et al. 2008; Oliver-Smith 2013; Nguyen & James 2013; IFRCRCS
2004). Adger et al. (2002, p. 358) define social resilience at the community level as ‘the
ability of a community to withstand external shocks and stresses without significant
upheaval’. In their view, maintaining livelihood sustainability while absorbing external
shocks and stresses is the most important issue. Social resilience of communities must be
understood within the wider socio-political context (Adger et al. 2002). It is worth noting that
although the term resilience is often used as ‘a capability to return to a previous state’ based
on the notion of ‘bouncing back’, this understanding of the term is now considered
problematic as the post-disaster situation reflects a new and changed reality due to either the
26
consequences of the disaster or the recovery and reconstruction activities (Paton 2006a;
Matyas & Pelling 2014). Thus, people adapt to a new and changed reality instead of the pre-
disaster reality (Paton 2006a; Paton & Gow 2008). In addition, the understanding of resilience
based on the notion of ‘bouncing back’ fails to include the new possibilities offered by a
disaster (Paton 2006a). Thus, the notion of resilience as the capacity to return to a former state
has been replaced by the approach which defines resilience as an ongoing process rather than
an outcome (Norris et al. 2008). The Sendai Framework captures the notion of resilience as
being able to achieve a better situation than that experienced prior to the disaster in its key
phrase, ‘build back better’ (UNDRR 2015).
UNISDR (2009) defines resilience as ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed
to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a
timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential
basic structures and functions’ (p. 24). According to IFRCRCS (2016), resilience is ‘the
ability of individuals, communities, organizations or countries exposed to disasters and crises
and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from
the effects of shocks and stresses without compromising their long-term prospects’ (p. 19). It
is worth noting that although vulnerability and resilience are linked, they are not necessarily
opposite to one another as an individual or a community can be both vulnerable and resilient
at the same time (Buckle 2006; Cutter et al. 2008; Manyena 2006; Oliver-Smith 2013; Matyas
& Pelling 2014).
Paton (2006b, p. 315) defines resilience as ‘the capacity of people, communities and societal
institutions to adapt to and experience benefit from disaster’. At the community level, Norris
et al. (2008, p. 130) define resilience as a process instead of an outcome, ‘linking a set of
adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance’.
Norris et al. (2008) use the term ‘adaptive capacities’ to include the combination of resources
available to individuals, households and communities and their dynamic characteristics
(robustness – capacity to withstand stress or loss without degradation; redundancy – resource
diversity; and rapidity – how quickly the resources are accessed and used). The process links
adaptive capacities and access to resources to adaptation or outcomes (Norris et al. 2008, p.
130). However, some scholars consider resilience as both a process and an outcome and argue
that understanding resilience solely as a process can make policy agendas and goals abstract
in an unhelpful manner (Matyas & Pelling 2014).
27
Paton uses resilience as synonymous with adaptive capacity (Paton 2006a, 2006b, 2008;
Paton et al. 2007). Paton argues that resilience or adaptive capacity at the community level
can only be understood by identifying available resources at three interdependent levels:
personal, community and institutional/social levels and the processes that link resources
within and between levels to promote collective or societal action to adapt to the
consequences of a hazard or disaster (Paton 2006b, 2008). Paton (2006a) suggests that four
general components comprise resilience at the community level. To be a resilient community,
a community needs to have: 1) resources that are safe and capable of functioning in a context
created by hazard consequences, 2) the competencies for mobilising, organising and using
resources to overcome the problems posed by hazard consequences and adapt to the changed
reality, 3) the planning and development strategies for integrating the resources of all levels in
a coherent manner to capitalise opportunities for growth and development, and 4) strategies
that are designed to ensure the sustainability of resources so that resources can be used over
time and in a context created by hazard activity (Paton 2006a). Cutter et al.’s (2008) disaster
resilience of place (DROP) model at the community level suggests that community resilience
comprises six dimensions: ecological, social, economic, institutional, infrastructure and
community competence.
2.3.2 Recovery as an Opportunity for Disaster Risk Reduction and Building Resilience
An important aspect of the notion of recovery is that the recovery phase offers an opportunity
to move to a better or healthier state and become more disaster resilient instead of returning to
the pre-disaster level that will reproduce previous hazard exposure and vulnerability (UN
2005; UNISDR 2009; UNDRR 2015; IRP 2007, 2012; IFRCRCS 2012; James & Paton 2016;
Paton 2006a; Paton & Johnston 2001, 2006; Chang 2010; Christoplos 2006; Christoplos et al.
2010; Dynes & Quarantelli 2008; Kenny & Clarke 2010; Mileti 1999; Smith & Wenger 2009;
Lindell 2013a, 2013b; Horney et al. 2016; Bolin & Stanford 1998a, 1998b; Kates & Pijawka
1977; Shaw 2006, 2014a, 2014c; Shaw, Gupta & Sharma 2003). In other words, disaster is
considered as a catalyst for change as it offers opportunities for future growth and
development (UN 2005, UNISDR 2009, UNDRR 2015; IRP 2012; IFRCRCS 2012; James
2016; James & Paton 2016; Paton 2006a; Paton & Johnston 2001, 2006; Bolin & Stanford
1998b; Shaw 2006, 2014a, 2014c; Shaw, Gupta & Sharma 2003).
Both the Hyogo Framework for Action and its successor, the Sendai Framework, consider
disaster risk-reduction as a tool for building resilience of people, communities, and countries
28
to disasters (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015). These frameworks advocate disaster risk-reduction
measures to protect lives, livelihoods, health, socio-economic and cultural assets, and physical
and environmental assets of people, communities, and countries more effectively, and thus
strengthen the resilience of people, communities and countries to disasters. The United
Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience (2013) also shares the same
vision (UN 2013). Disaster risk-reduction measures to strengthen resilience can be taken in
two phases: pre-disaster phase (preparedness and mitigation) and post-disaster phase. In the
pre-disaster phase, disaster risk-reduction is integrated into various structural and non-
structural measures undertaken in various sectors such as health, education, livelihood and
infrastructure so that they remain safe and operational during and after disasters (UNDRR
2015). The integration of disaster risk-reduction into various activities in all sectors protects
lives, prevents and reduces losses, and facilitates effective recovery and rehabilitation
(UNDRR 2015). The reduction of exposure to disaster risks during the pre-disaster phase is
given priority as it is more cost-effective than primary reliance on post-disaster response and
recovery (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015; IFRCRCS 2016). In light of this expectation, the Sendai
Framework focuses on disaster risk management instead of disaster management (UNDRR
2015).
The post-disaster phase also offers an opportunity to reduce disaster risk by ‘building back
better’ (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015). In the post-disaster phase, disaster risk-reduction measures
are incorporated into recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction measures so that livelihoods
and socio-economic and physical structures are rebuilt and reconstructed in a way that reduces
vulnerability and increases resilience to future disaster risk (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015;
IFRCRCS 2001, 2012; Christoplos et al. 2010). According to the United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) (2015), the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction
phase is ‘a critical opportunity to “Build Back Better”, including through integrating disaster
risk reduction into development measures, making nations and communities resilient to
disasters’ (p. 21). Relying on the ‘building back better’ principle, the goal of the phase is to
restore basic services, infrastructure and livelihoods in a way that is better than what existed
before (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015; KTRC 2013).
It is often believed that despite encouragement from international development agencies,
disaster risk-reduction is not incorporated into current development policies and practices
(Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016; IFRCRCS 2002). As development policies and practices prioritise
29
economic growth over social and environmental issues, they ignore disaster risk-reduction in
the name of development and thus generate disaster risks (Oliver-Smith 1996, 2013, 2016;
IFRCRCS 2002; Hilhorst & Bankoff 2004; Frerks & Bender 2004). In the current disaster
risk management efforts, most resources are used for emergency management, preparedness,
and reconstruction rather than for addressing the root causes of disaster risk through
sustainable development (Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016). Thus, some scholars argue that disaster
risk management policies and strategies cannot address socially embedded causes of disaster
risk and vulnerability without challenging dominant values and current development practices
that produce disaster risks (Matyas & Pelling 2014; Pelling 2011; Pelling & Manuel-
Navarrete 2011; Pelling, O’Brien & Matyas 2015; Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016). In other words,
addressing the root causes of disaster risk and vulnerability requires reorientation of current
development pathways towards socially just and ecologically sustainable development, i.e.
transformation as an approach for building resilience (Pelling 2011, 2014; Pelling, O’Brien &
Matyas 2015; Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete 2011; Matyas & Pelling 2014; Oliver-Smith 2013,
2016; O’Brien 2012).
It is worth noting that sometimes there may be tension between the notions of ‘going back to
normal’ and ‘building back better’. The post-2004 tsunami experiences in Aceh suggest that
people affected by disaster often prefer to ‘go back to normal’ as early as possible and thus
want prompt assistance, while governments and international agencies/donors often prefer to
‘build back better’ which requires time (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Kenny 2010; Kenny et al.
2010; Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010). However, despite the necessity of a fast recovery, a too
fast recovery process that jeopardises quality should be avoided as this form of recovery may
fail to produce anticipated outcomes in the long term (CERA 2012; Kenny & Clarke 2010).
Although people need to achieve a new normal, this needs to be better than the previous
condition (Kenny & Clarke 2010). Thus, there needs to be a balance between two approaches
in a way that not only avoids ‘building back risk’ in the name of a fast recovery, but also
avoids unnecessary delay in the name of ‘building back better’. Optimum level of
consultation with, and participation by, the affected people in the recovery interventions of
the involved agencies can play a vital role in minimising the tension between the two
approaches (Kenny & Clarke 2010).
As this study explores the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery, it
provides an opportunity to understand how recovery measures undertaken at the household
30
and community levels contribute to strengthen their resilience to future disasters. By
understanding post-disaster rebuilding of livelihoods, houses and infrastructures through the
lens of disaster risk-reduction, the study can provide significant insights into how the
principle of ‘building back better’ is reflected in reconstruction and recovery measures
following Cyclone Aila.
2.4 Social Capital and Disaster Recovery
2.4.1 Social Capital: Understanding the Concept
Social capital is one of the most popular concepts in sociology that has been exported to other
social sciences and everyday language in recent years (Portes 1998, 2000). Few concepts like
social capital have become so widely disseminated within and beyond the social sciences
(Esser 2008). Although the concept has been originally applied to education and theorised
initially in sociology, its application to politics and economics brought it academic and
popular success (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008a, 2008b). It has been applied in
numerous empirical studies in recent years to examine a range of issues in various disciplines
of the social sciences (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008b; Portes 2000). The concept has
extended its influence on political and policy-making circles at local, national and
international levels (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008a).
Nevertheless, the exact meaning of the concept is hotly disputed (Castiglione, van Deth &
Wolleb 2008b; Castiglione 2008; Paxton 1999). Some scholars are even critical of the term
(Arrow 2000; Solow 2000). For example, Arrow (2000) advocates the abandonment of the
term ‘social capital’ as it does not possess the characteristics of capital, and Solow (2000)
argues that social capital research is characterised by ‘vague ideas’ and ‘causal empiricism’.
Despite criticism of the concept by some scholars, it is an established concept in social
science.
Some scholars believe that the success of the social capital concept is linked to its
applicability to a range of research and disciplinary fields, and its conceptual openness and
flexibility have benefitted empirical research (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008b). On the
other hand, other scholars believe that the application of the concept to various kinds of
problems is associated with confusion about its actual meaning, and controversy about its
alleged effects (Portes 2000). Although the concept of social capital has become popular in
recent decades, it does not include any idea which is really new to sociologists or sociological
31
theories. Group involvement and group participation can yield positive outcomes for both
individuals and communities is a major notion in sociology that can be dated to Durkheim’s
discussion on group life and Marx’s separation between a class-in-itself (an atomised class)
and a class-for-itself (a mobilised and effective class). Thus, the concept recaptures an insight
that has been present in sociology since its very beginning as an appropriate field of
philosophical examination (Portes 1998).
The conventional wisdom related to the concept is best reflected by ‘who we know’, not by
‘what we know’ (Woolcock 2001, p. 67). The basic idea that reflects the essence of the
concept is that family members, close or distant friends, neighbours and other people known
to an individual create an asset that can be used by an individual for achieving a material gain
or coping with a crisis period (Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b). This is
true not only for individuals, but also for groups (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Communities
that have a rich stock of social networks and civic associations are perceived to be able to
tackle poverty and vulnerability more effectively, resolve disputes and use new opportunities
advantageously. Like the presence of social ties, the absence of social ties has an equal
converse impact (Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b).
The first known use of the term, and also the first known use in the sense that it is used today,
can be traced back to the writing of L.J. Hanifan, then the state supervisor of rural schools in
West Virginia (Hanifan 1916; Putnam 2000; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Hanifan, in his
paper entitled ‘The Rural School Community Center’ in 1916, used the term to explain the
importance of community participation in the improvement of the community. Hanifan (1916)
described the concept of social capital as:
tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely,
goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of
individuals and families who make up a social unit... The individual is helpless
socially, if left entirely to himself… If he may come into contact with his neighbor,
and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which
may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality
sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community.
The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the
individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and
the fellowship of his neighbors. (Hanifan 1916, pp. 130–131)
32
Hanifan’s idea of social capital did not draw the attention of social scientists and disappeared
for several decades without a trace (Putnam 2000; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). The idea of
social capital was rediscovered by Canadian urban sociologists in the 1950s, by George
Homans, an exchange theorist, and Jane Jacobs, an urbanist, in the 1960s, and by an
economist, Glenn Loury (1977), in the 1970s (Putnam 2000; Loury 1977; Woolcock &
Narayan 2000). However, although a number of scholars from a variety of fields used the
concept earlier, the concept was not clear until Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman
analysed it (Paxton 1999). The French sociologist Bourdieu and American sociologist
Coleman initiated the contemporary analysis of the concept (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988,
1990; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Paxton 1999). The works of Loury (such as
Loury 1977, 1987), who used the concept in economics to understand the usefulness of social
resources in the development of human capital, helped Coleman to provide a refined analysis
of the role of social capital in the creation of human capital (Coleman 1990; Portes 1998). It is
worth noting that Coleman did not mention Loury and Bourdieu in his article published in
1988 (Coleman 1988), although he mentioned both scholars later in his 1990 book (Coleman
1990). Coleman (1988, 1990) also acknowledged the works of economist Ben-Porath and
sociologists Mark Granovetter and Nan Lin among others in his analysis of the concept. The
concept was developed more extensively by Robert D. Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000), Nan Lin
(1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2008), Ronald S. Burt (1992, 2001), Alejandro Portes (1998, 2000,
2014), Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and Portes and Landolt (2000).
According to Bourdieu (1986), capital has three fundamental forms: economic capital,
cultural capital and social capital. Like cultural capital, social capital, which is made up of
social obligations (‘connections’), can also be converted into economic capital on certain
conditions. Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a
group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned
capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 248–249). Bourdieu (1986) also argues that the volume of the
possessed social capital of a given agent is dependent on the size of the network of
connections that can be effectively mobilised by the agent, and on the volume of the capital
(economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed by each person to whom the agent is connected.
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Sociologist James S. Coleman (Coleman 1988, 1990) conceptualises social capital by its
function and defines social capital as ‘not a single entity, but a variety of different entities
having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure,
and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure’ (Coleman 1990,
p. 302). Social capital is a capital which has existence in ‘the relations among persons’
(Coleman 1988). Social capital is productive like physical capital and human capital and helps
to achieve certain ends that cannot be attained without its presence, or can only be attained at
high cost (Coleman 1988, 1990). It is valuable for both economic and non-economic
outcomes (Coleman 1988). It is a resource for an individual (Coleman 1988, 1990) and can
significantly affect an individual’s ability to act and perceived quality of life (Coleman 1990,
p. 317). However, a given form of social capital which is useful for certain actions can be
useless or harmful for others (Coleman 1988, 1990).
Although social capital is a resource, it is ‘not the private property of any of the persons who
benefit from it’ (Coleman 1990, p. 315). Unlike physical and human capital, most forms of
social capital are public goods, although some forms of social capital are private goods
(Coleman 1990). A greater amount of social capital is expected to be generated when people
need each other more extensively for aid, while a lesser amount of social capital is expected to
be generated when people require one another less due to some factors such as affluence and
government support (Coleman 1990, p. 321).
Coleman’s definition of social capital was amorphous and prepared the way for including
several different and even contradictory processes within the concept (Portes 1998). Coleman
himself did so by including mechanisms that generate social capital (such as reciprocity
expectation and enforcement of norms by a group), the consequences of possessing it (such as
advantaged access to information) and the social organisation that provides the setting for
both sources and effects to be materialised (Portes 1998). According to Portes, resources need
to be distinguished from the ability to gain resources through membership in different social
structures _ a distinction which is obscured in Coleman, but clear in Bourdieu (Portes 1998, p.
5). Thus, a systematic analysis of the concept requires the following three elements to be
separated from one another: (1) those who make claims (possessors); (2) those who agree to
demands (sources); and (3) the resources themselves (Portes 1998).
Social capital performs three basic functions: (1) source of social control; (2) source of
family-mediated benefits; and (3) source of benefits through networks beyond the immediate
34
family (Portes 1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000). The third function is the most common
function of social capital and closest to the definition of social capital provided by Bourdieu
(Portes 1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000) who views social capital as assets attained by
membership in networks. On the other hand, parental support for children’s development is
related to Bourdieu’s analysis of cultural capital (Portes 1998, 2000). Coleman has given
attention to the first function of social capital (Portes 1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000) and
his writing also has clearly influenced the second function (Portes 1998).
Robert Putnam’s 1993 book, Making Democracy Work, popularised the concept of social
capital. Putnam (1993) defines social capital as ‘features of social organization, such as trust,
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated
actions’ (p. 167). Putnam (2000) later defines social capital as ‘connections among
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from
them’ (p. 19). Putnam also argues that social capital has both individual and collective aspects
and it can be both private and public good at the same time (Putnam 2000, p. 20).
Putnam identifies three essential components of social capital: trust, the norm of generalised
reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement. A problematic aspect of Putnam’s (1993,
2000) definition of social capital is that it does not distinguish sources from consequences.
For example, Putnam (1993, p. 171) argues that social trust arises from norms of reciprocity
and networks of civic engagement. In this case, the norms of reciprocity and networks are
sources of trust. Similarly, his later definition (2000) of social capital also includes both
sources and consequences. However, the distinction between sources and consequences is
necessary to avoid tautological problems (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan
2000).
To avoid this problem, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) define social capital as ‘the norms and
networks that enable people to act collectively’ (p. 226). In a similar manner, Woolcock
(2001, p. 70; 2002b, p. 25) also defines social capital as ‘the norms and networks that
facilitate collective action’. Both definitions focus on sources of social capital and distinguish
between sources and consequences of social capital. The definition of social capital provided
by Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Woolcock (2001, 2002b) leaves out ‘trust’ – one
important element of Putnam’s definition of social capital. Woolcock (2001, 2002b)
eliminates trust as he views it as an outcome of social capital. He argues that trust per se is not
social capital; it can be a measure or an indicator of social capital like a test score as an
35
indicator of human capital (Woolcock 2001, p. 71). Dasgupta (2010) also views trust as a
consequence of social capital as he argues that social capital serves only as a means to create
trust, if directed properly, while it hinders economic development if misdirected. Likewise,
unlike Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000), Lin (2008) and Cook (2005) also believe that trust is
different from social capital. Lin (2008, p. 64) suggests that trust can be either antecedent or
effect, but not a component of social capital. Ahn and Ostrom (2008) also consider that trust
is not a form of social capital itself and serves as ‘the key link between forms of social capital
and outcomes’ (Ahn & Ostrom 2008, p. 80).
Another important point is that conceptualising social capital as ‘networks, norms and trust’
poses difficulties for the theoretical understanding as well as for the application of the concept
in empirical research, as we cannot identify what aspect of social capital is contributing when
we claim the importance of social capital for something (Cook 2005). In Cook’s (2005)
words, social capital when considered as ‘networks, norms and trust’ appears as an
‘everything but the kitchen sink concept’ (Cook 2005, p. 8). A similar argument can also be
put forward for definitions provided by Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Woolcock (2001,
2002b) who include norms in addition to networks, and Ahn and Ostrom (2008) who include
institutions/rules and trustworthiness in addition to networks as basic forms of social capital.
Although most scholars agree that social capital can benefit both the individuals and the
collectives, social capital as a relational asset needs to be distinguished from a collective asset
such as norms, trust and culture (Lin 2001, p. 26). In other words, a collective asset should not
be considered as an alternative form of social capital, although a causal proposition can be
formulated that a collective asset such as trust can promote relations and networks, and can
improve the utility of embedded resources, or vice versa (Lin 2001). Thus, social capital when
viewed as a relational concept needs to be conceptualised in terms of social networks (Lin
2001, p. 24).
Despite disagreement, the majority of scholars who have contributed to the discussion of
social capital acknowledge the general premise that social capital is network-based or
networks are one of the sources from which social capital emerges (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman
1988, 1990; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Lin 1982, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001, 2008; Portes
1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000; Burt 1992, 2001; Cook 2005; Ahn & Ostrom 2008; Esser
2008; Dasgupta 2010; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter &
Woolcock 2004).
36
Along these lines, Lin (2008) defines social capital as ‘resources embedded in one’s social
networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks’ (p. 51).
According to Lin (2008), an actor can borrow or capture the resources of other actors through
social relations or social networks. But social capital and social networks cannot be used as
interchangeable terms. An actor cannot capture the embedded resources without networks.
Similar to Lin, Portes (1998, p. 6) conceives social capital as ‘the ability of actors to secure
benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures’. Burt (1992)
also views social capital as the relationships which a player has with other players. According
to Burt (1992), social capital denotes an individual’s relations with friends, colleagues and
general contacts through whom/which an individual receives opportunities for using his/her
financial capital and physical capital. The parties involved in a relationship own social capital
jointly (Burt 1992). Cook (2005), like Lin, also views social capital as resources accessed
through network ties and argues that norms and trust are not the sources of social capital;
networks are the sources of social capital.
Despite differences, the minimum consensus among most scholars is that social capital is
network-based. This provides a foundation for a definition of social capital based on networks
only. This definition does not equate social capital with norms and trust. Defining social
capital by limiting it to a particular empirical referent, as Lin (2008) does, is productive for
the theoretical development of the concept (Cook 2005). If social capital is treated as Lin
(2008) treats it – that is, resources accessed through network ties – ‘then exchange networks
are precisely the kinds of networks Putnam had in mind’ (Cook 2005, p. 8).
2.4.2 Social Capital: Levels of Application, Types, Measurement and Negative Consequences
2.4.2.1 Social Capital: Various Levels of Application
The application of the concept is also controversial at different levels or units of analysis, i.e.
either it is an attribute of individuals or an attribute of collectivities (Portes 2000; Lin 2001).
Bourdieu and Coleman considered individuals or small groups as the unit of analysis in their
original theoretical formulations of the concept (Portes 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000). Despite
some important differences, the analyses of social capital by both scholars were centred on
the benefits that accrue to individuals or families because of their ties with others (Portes
2000, p. 2; Portes & Landolt 2000, p. 531). However, social capital became an attribute of the
community with the application of the concept at the community level by Putnam (Portes
37
1998, 2000, Portes & Landolt 2000). For instance, Putnam (1995) argues that life in a
community which has a considerable stock of social capital is more comfortable.
However, social capital as an attribute of communities, cities or nations is qualitatively
different from social capital as an attribute of individuals (Portes 2000, p. 3; Portes & Landolt
2000, p. 535). There are three differences between the application of the concept at the
individual level and that at the community/collective level (Portes 2000; Portes & Landolt
2000). Firstly, the use of the concept at the two levels of analysis (individual and community)
is not always compatible, as individual social capital can undermine collective social capital
in some instances (Portes 2000, pp. 3–4; Portes & Landolt 2000, p. 535). Even social capital
within a group can have negative consequences for others outside of the group or other groups
of the same community, community as a whole or larger society (Paxton 1999; Fukuyama
2001). Secondly, causes and effects of social capital when applied at the community level are
not separated from one another and therein lies the basic logical circularity (Portes 2000;
Portes & Landolt 2000). Thirdly, application of the concept at the community level allows
little space for considering other possible causes (such as educational level of the population
and geographical concentration of the population) that can affect both cause (civic behaviour
which reflects social capital) and effect (governmental responsiveness) and thus can make the
relationship between social capital (e.g. civic behaviour) and its effect (governmental
responsiveness) spurious (Portes 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000).
Despite controversy, most scholars including Portes agree that the concept can be applied at
various levels (Portes 1998; Lin 2008; Paxton 1999; Woolcock 1998; Esser 2008; Grootaert
1999; Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Krishna 2008). Portes (1998), who believes that the
highest theoretical potential of social capital lies at the individual level, argues that using
social capital as an attribute of communities requires more theoretical improvement.
2.4.2.2 Social Capital: Various Types
Esser (2008) suggests two categories of social capital: relational (individual form) and system
(collective form) social capital. Relational social capital means the valued number of
resources that can be employed and used by an actor through personal relations (direct or
indirect) with other actors who have control over those resources (Esser 2008). System social
capital refers to ‘an emergent characteristic of an entire network’ (Esser 2008, p. 25). System
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social capital is a by-product of relational social capital and cannot be produced by
individuals or single actors (Esser 2008).
Krishna and Uphoff (1999) and Uphoff (2000) mention two forms of social capital: structural
social capital and cognitive social capital. Structural social capital is associated with roles,
rules, procedures, precedents and networks while cognitive social capital is associated with
norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs (Uphoff 2000). Both forms of social capital are connected
to one another and mutually reinforcing, although one is distinguishable from the other.
Structural social capital is objective and external (can be observed and modified directly)
while cognitive social capital is subjective and internal (resides within the mind and cannot be
changed easily) (Krishna & Uphoff 1999). Krishna (2000) also proposes two forms of social
capital: institutional and relational social capital, which are connected to Uphoff’s (2000)
structural and cognitive social capital respectively.
Scholars also categorise social capital in three dimensions: bonding, bridging and linking. The
distinction between bonding and bridging is the most common and popular in social capital
literature and is founded on Cooley’s (1909) concept of primary group (and, by inference,
secondary group) and the work of Granovetter (1973) on weak ties and strong ties (Cooley
1909; Granovetter 1973; Woolcock 2001, 2002b). Generally, bonding and bridging social
capital denote connections to people who are alike and not alike respectively (Woolcock
2002b; Szreter 2002). Gittell and Vidal (1998, p. 15) suggest that bonding social capital
‘brings closer together people who already know each other’ while bridging social capital
‘brings together people or groups who previously did not know each other’. Putnam (2000)
suggests that bonding social capital (exclusive) is ‘inward looking’ and strengthens ‘exclusive
identities and homogenous groups’. On the other hand, bridging social capital is ‘outward
looking’ and connects people from diverse backgrounds. Bridging social capital links
individuals or groups to ‘external resources’ and better information, and generates ‘broader
identities’ (Putnam 2000, pp. 22–23). Woolcock (2001, p. 72) defines bonding social capital
as relations between ‘family members, close friends and neighbours’ and bridging social
capital as relations with ‘more distant friends, associates and colleagues’.
Briggs (1998) argues that social capital as an individual good has two forms: social support
and social leverage. The social support form of social capital helps an individual to ‘get by’ or
cope with life’s challenges, while the social leverage form of social capital helps an individual
to ‘get ahead’. Putnam (2000) like Briggs (1998) also argues that bonding social capital
39
(social support form of social capital) is associated with ‘getting by’ while bridging social
capital (social leverage form of social capital) is associated with ‘getting ahead’ (Putnam
2000, p. 23). Bridging social capital is associated with ‘getting ahead’ as access to bridging
social capital provides new information and resources to individuals and groups (Putnam
2000; Granovetter 1973, 1983). Other scholars also agree that bonding is related to survival or
getting by, while bridging is related to mobility or getting ahead (Woolcock 2001, 2002a,
2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Pelling & High 2005). Putnam (2000) has used the notion
of strong and weak ties in his conceptualisation of bonding and bridging. However, Woolcock
(2002a) argues that although the former is similar to strong ties and the latter is similar to
weak ties, they are not synonymous with strong and weak ties. Likewise, Pelling and High
(2005, p. 311) also argue that all bonding ties may not be necessarily strong and all bridging
ties may not be necessarily weak.
Woolcock (2001, 2002b) adds the concept of linking social capital to capture the vertical
dimension of social capital as he considers both bonding and bridging as horizontal
dimensions. In a similar manner, Aldrich (2012a) also argues that both bonding and bridging
primarily involve connections among individuals who have the same status. Linking social
capital denotes linkages with formal institutions beyond communities which provide
resources, information, and ideas (Woolcock 2001, 2002b). This is a special type of bridging
social capital which involves vertical power relations between parties or agents (Szreter 2002;
Pelling & High 2005). In other words, parties involved in linking social networks are not only
unalike as in the case of parties involved in the bridging social networks, but also unequal in
terms of power and access to resources (Szreter 2002). The concept of linking social capital
has great analytical value in understanding the context where external agencies work with
poor communities (Szreter 2002). This category allows the concept of social capital to be
used to evaluate relationships that form across political and social dichotomies such as state–
civil society, formal–informal and rich–poor, to consider the issues related to power, and the
role played by the state and government (Szreter 2002).
Different combinations of the three dimensions of social capital can produce a range of
outcomes, and combinations of these three dimensions can change over time (Woolcock
2001, 2002b). Understanding distinctions between the three dimensions as well as their
combinations has significant implications for understanding the plight of the poor (Woolcock
2001, 2002b). The poor may deploy a tight-knit and intensive stock of bonding social capital
40
to get by, while, unlike the non-poor, they may lack (or may have limited) access to bridging
social capital to get ahead (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). They
usually have almost no linking social capital (Woolcock 2001, 2002b). In other words, the
poor may have only bonding social capital (Szreter 2002; Aldrich 2012a) and may miss
individuals who act as ‘social relays’, i.e. people who can bridge or link a group to other
groups and authorities (Aldrich 2012a, p. 32). Typical rural agricultural or fishing
communities generally have high bonding, low bridging, and little or no linking social capital
while typical urban communities generally may have low bonding, high bridging and some
linking social capital. Likewise, women may be generally connected to bonding social capital,
while men may be generally connected to bridging/linking social capital (Woolcock 2002a).
However, this type of categorisation may not be always appropriate as the character of social
capital can vary based on history and social context (Pelling & High 2005, p. 313).
Although some scholars (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter & Woolcock 2004; Aldrich 2012a)
consider that bonding and bridging social capital involve horizontal relations, they may also
involve vertical relations. For example, the patron–client relationship is vertical and cannot be
considered as a linking relationship when defined with reference to formal
agencies/institutions only, although can certainly be considered as a linking relationship when
defined in terms of unequal power and access to resources without reference to formal
agencies/institutions. Another important aspect of the categorisation is that although linking
social capital can be easily distinguished from bonding and bridging with reference to formal
authorities such as government, sustaining the distinction between bonding networks and
bridging networks in empirical research can be very difficult, although the distinction is
analytically clear (Szreter 2002). Besides, the distinction is crucially dependent on context as
well (Szreter 2002). Although neighbours of a person share a physical community, they may
live in separate social worlds (Briggs 1998). For instance, members of a community, despite
sharing a place, can be internally divided by class and opposing political parties (Pelling
2007, p. 378; McCarthy 2014, p. 146).
A review of relevant studies also suggests that bonding social capital may not be helpful for a
poor person to get ahead due to the homophily principle, i.e. an actor who is poor in resources
is likely to have ties with other actors who are also poor in resources (Woolcock & Narayan
2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Briggs 1998; Lin 2008). Although it is expected to be found
true in most real cases as poor people are likely to have bonding networks with poor people, it
41
should not be assumed as a rule (Lin 2008). Three issues – the richness of embedded
resources, the nature of relations and purposes of the action (expressive or instrumental) –
need to be considered together to understand the role of social capital (Lin 2008). Expressive
action involves maintaining and preserving existing resources and instrumental action
involves gaining new or additional resources. If a poor person has bonding relations with
embedded rich resources through kin, then bonding relations can be useful for achieving
instrumental action or getting ahead. In other words, a poor person having a bonding
relationship with rich kin may have access to the resources to get ahead. However, if a poor
person has bonding relations with embedded poor resources, then bonding capital may not be
useful for achieving instrumental action or getting ahead (Lin 2008). Thus, theoretically, the
bonding relationship is useful for expressive action, and depending on the context, may be or
may not be useful for instrumental action (Lin 2008).
2.4.2.3 Social Capital: Measurement
Scholars agree that social capital can be measured at both micro (such as individuals and
households) and macro (such as communities or villages) levels (Lin 2008; Paxton 1999;
Narayan 1997; Narayan & Pritchett 1999; Krishna & Uphoff 1999; Grootaert 1999). There is
no consensus on how to measure social capital (Fukuyama 2001, p. 12). This lack of
consensus on measurement has led to the use of questionable indicators to measure the
concept in some cases (Paxton 1999). Another important issue related to the measurement of
social capital is that the measure of the concept needs to be relevant to the cultural and
historical context as indicators appropriate for one culture can be inappropriate for another
culture (Krishna & Uphoff 1999; Krishna 2001, 2004). For example, measuring social capital
using density of membership in formal organisations, as Putnam did in Italian regions, is not
appropriate in Rajasthan villages, as villagers rarely set up formal organisations voluntarily
(Krishna & Uphoff 1999; Krishna 2001, 2004). Informal networks instead of formal networks
are relevant for measuring social capital in Rajasthan villages (Krishna & Uphoff 1999;
Krishna 2001, 2004) and this may be true for many developing countries (Krishna & Uphoff
1999, p. 25). Other scholars also argue that the dimensions of social capital vary from one
society to another and change over time, and thus instruments measuring social capital need
to incorporate various dimensions (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). However, dimensions of
social capital in different contexts can also be similar in some cases (Narayan & Cassidy
2001; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Studies in Ghana and Uganda – two different countries –
showed similarity in terms of the dimensions of social capital (Narayan & Cassidy 2001).
42
Lin (2008) argues that current research should measure both accessed social capital and
mobilised social capital. Accessed social capital measures the degree of access to resources
embedded in the social networks by an actor, or the extent to which an inventory of resources
that can generate returns is available in the social networks of an actor. The expectation is that
the greater the capacity of social capital, the better the return. On the other hand, mobilised
social capital is defined in terms of the actual use of social capital for a particular action and
the expectation is that the better the use of social capital, the better the return. In this
approach, an actor selects a specific social tie and its resources from the pool and uses
resources for a particular action.
2.4.2.4 Social Capital: Negative Consequences
Social capital can also have negative consequences (Portes 1998, 2014; Portes &
Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes & Landolt 2000; Putnam 2000; Paxton 1999; Fukuyama 2001;
Cook 2005; Ostrom 2000; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 1998, 2001, 2002b;
Narayan 1999; Narayan & Cassidy 2001; Pelling & High 2005; Ahn & Ostrom 2008;
Lowndes & Pratchett 2008; Aldrich 2011a, 2012a). It not only enables, but also constrains
(Cook 2005). Portes has identified four negative consequences of social capital: exclusion of
outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and
downward-levelling norms (Portes 1998; Portes & Landolt 2000).
2.4.3 Application of Social Capital to Disaster Recovery
Several disaster scholars have examined the role of social capital in post-disaster recovery
(Aldrich 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b; Aldrich & Meyer 2015; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004;
James & Paton 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2009, 2011, Dynes 2005; Minamoto 2010;
Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012; Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015;
Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018; Marín et al. 2015;
Shimada 2015; Tse, Wei & Wang 2013; Wickes et al. 2015; Elliott, Haney & Sams-Abiodun
2010; Murphy 2007; Pelling & High 2005; Buckland & Rahman 1999; Lu, Sato & Zhang
2008). Most of the studies examined the role of social capital either at the community level or
household level, while only a few studies examined the concept at both the community and
household levels. Some studies used only the qualitative method, or only the quantitative
method, or both qualitative and quantitative methods. However, it is often stated that most
studies on the relation between social capital and disaster recovery are qualitative rather than
quantitative (Shimada 2015, p. 388). Like variations in terms of levels of analysis and
43
methods employed among studies, conceptualisation and indicators used for measurement of
social capital and results are also varied. This is also true in the case of conceptualising and
measuring of post-disaster recovery. Even variations in terms of indicators used for measuring
both social capital and post-disaster recovery can be found within a single study. For instance,
Aldrich (2012a) used different indicators for measuring social capital (which is an
independent variable) and recovery (dependent variable) for different disasters and even
different indicators for measuring social capital and recovery in the context of the same
disaster such as the 2004 tsunami.
A review of studies shows that the positive relationship between social capital and post-
disaster recovery is well documented, although it has negative effects as well. Dynes (2005, p.
7) in examining the role of social capital in disaster response suggests that social capital is
‘less damaged and less affected’ among all forms of capital and it is ‘the form of capital that
serves as the primary base for a community response’ during the period of emergency.
Aldrich’s (2012a) research on the role of social capital in the post-disaster recovery process
following four mega-disasters (the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in 2005) in three countries shows that
communities and households/individuals with more social capital experienced more effective
recoveries. Aldrich’s (2012a) qualitative study in India in the case of the tsunami shows that
villages with higher levels of both bonding and linking social capital achieved better
recoveries than villages which had only bonding social capital or no bonding and linking
social capital. Likewise, Aldrich’s (2012a) quantitative study in the case of the same event
shows that both bonding and linking social capital were important in determining post-
disaster recovery at the household/individual level.12
Nakagawa and Shaw’s (2004) study on the Kobe and Gujarat earthquakes shows that
communities with higher social capital have had the speediest recovery. A study in Fiji shows
that households’ use of social capital for search and rescue, information dissemination, mutual
assistance and socio-commercial cooperation facilitated their post-flood response and
recovery process (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013). Likewise, Shimada’s (2015) quantitative study
after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 shows that social capital (measured by proxies
of bonding and bridging social capital) played a positive role in the post-disaster recovery
12 The study in the case of the tsunami in India considers only two types of social capital: bonding social capital and linking social capital.
44
(rate of population change) by encouraging people to stay or return to their homes in a
disaster-stricken area. Similarly, a study on the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 also shows that
social capital (networks–households’ interaction with other people) contributed positively to
post-disaster recovery (housing reconstruction) and affected households with small social
networks were vulnerable (Tse, Wei & Wang 2013).
James and Paton’s (2015) study shows that affected populations in collectivist societies such
as Myanmar and Taiwan often start the recovery initiatives by themselves based on strong
bonding social capital inherently present in their cultures. Likewise, Chamlee-Wright and
Storr (2009) show that the bonding social capital (networks surrounding a church) facilitated
a quick return of the Vietnamese-American community to the neighbourhood after Hurricane
Katrina. In a similar manner but with somewhat different conceptualisation of social capital,
Chamlee-Wright and Storr’s (2011) study in the context of Hurricane Katrina shows that
social capital in the form of collective narratives of a community can also facilitate or retard
post-disaster community recovery by shaping recovery strategies that individuals adopt.
However, social capital can also facilitate disaster recovery in loosely connected
communities. For instance, social capital (understood as the presence of a community-based
organisation that existed before Hurricane Katrina) facilitated relatively quick and robust
recovery of the heterogeneous loosely connected Broadmoor community in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina (Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012).
Although most studies show that social capital affects disaster recovery, some studies show
that social capital does not work in coping with natural disaster at the household level or has
limited effect on post-disaster community resilience at the community level (Lu, Sato &
Zhang 2008; Wickes et al. 2015). A study in rural China shows that social capital (measured
by mutual help, civic participation, and trust) does not help households in coping with natural
disaster. The study concludes that the role of social capital in risk sharing (or providing
informal insurance) has decreased due to the increased level of marketisation (Lu, Sato &
Zhang 2008). Likewise, a study on the role of the pre-flood neighbourhood structural
conditions and social capital on the post-flood community resilience (perceived community
problems) in Brisbane, Australia, shows that pre-flood/pre-disaster social capital has limited
effects for reducing post-flood/post-disaster community problems (Wickes et al. 2015).
A review of studies shows that social capital is a Janus-faced resource (Aldrich 2011a;
2012a). That is, social capital not only benefits, but also costs. For example, Aldrich’s
45
(2012a) study in six coastal villages in Tamil Nadu, India, shows that an institutionalised
body such as an uur panchayat that embodies strong bonding social capital and also linking
social capital (had little linking social capital before disaster and performed as bridges or links
to NGOs and government after disaster) provided benefits to its members that sped up their
recovery but excluded outsiders and marginalised members of communities such as women,
dalits (members of the lowest caste) and the elderly. The same study in the case of Hurricane
Katrina also shows that communities with stronger social capital avoided unwanted temporary
housing facilities (trailers and trailer parks) within their communities and pushed these
unwanted facilities into the areas of communities with less social capital. Therefore, some
communities improved quality of life at the expense of slowing down the overall provision of
temporary housing (Aldrich 2012a). Other studies also show that people who had good
relations with linking networks received more relief and recovery resources compared to
people who had weak relations (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Masud-All-Kamal &
Hassan 2018).
Another important point is that effective utilisation of social capital particularly at the
community level is dependent on the quality of leadership (Nakagawa & Shaw 2004).
Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) argue that social capital alone is not sufficient for successful
recovery; trusted leadership inside the community is also essential for facilitating collective
actions and disaster recovery processes. Krishna’s (2001) research in villages of Rajasthan,
India, also shows that a combination of high social capital and capable agency (capable agents
or capacity of leaders) is necessary for high development performance, but alone is not
sufficient. Other disaster scholars also suggest that leadership is a vital factor in facilitating
the disaster recovery process at the community level (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton
2016; Thorburn 2010; Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985; Rubin 1985). Thorburn (2010)
suggests that good leadership is associated with better recovery outcomes, and community
leaders who adopt consultative management styles are most trusted. Minamoto (2010), in the
context of post-tsunami Sri Lanka, suggests that a decisive leader (instead of a leader who
follows a bottom-up approach or works through consensus) can play a better role during the
time of reconstruction. However, unlike Minamoto (2010), the majority of scholars suggest
that a bottom-up participatory approach is more effective in facilitating effective recovery
processes (James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Kenny 2010; Fanany 2010b;
Thorburn 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Lawther 2016; Shaw & Guda 2004; Shaw &
Sinha 2003; Shaw, Pulhin & Pereira 2010). Although which form of community leadership is
46
better in the post-disaster recovery is a debateable issue, it is certain that the role of leadership
in utilising social capital is important (Nakagawa & Shaw 2004). Another important factor in
relation to leadership is that competing groups within the village leadership can hamper
recovery outcomes (Thorburn 2010; Steinberg 2010).
Another important factor is that although bonding social capital plays an important role in
post-disaster recovery, it may not be sufficient for effective recovery. James and Paton’s
(2015) study in the context of Cyclone Nargis (2008) and the Chi-Chi (921) earthquake
(1999) and Cyclone Morakot (2009) suggests that the presence of strong bonding social
capital at the community level in the studied areas of Myanmar and Taiwan was not sufficient
for effective recovery. Thus, an integration between bonding, bridging and linking social
capital is required for effective long-term disaster recovery (James & Paton 2015; Islam &
Walkerden 2014). For instance, Islam and Walkerden’s (2014) study on Cyclone Sidr–
affected households in Bangladesh suggests that affected households require support from
NGOs and government through linking networks for long-term recovery. Likewise, Marín et
al.’s (2015) study in Chile also shows that linking social capital is a critical factor in
determining post-disaster recovery trajectories (Marín et al. 2015).
However, sometimes linking social capital can also be inadequate. For example, local
government and NGOs supported households during the early recovery phase and the long-
term recovery phase and contributed to the reconstruction of community facilities/services
following Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh. However, livelihood and housing support during the
long-term recovery phase provided by local government and NGOs was relatively less
substantial compared to emergency relief support (Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam,
Walkerden & Amati 2017).
Post-disaster social capital can vary between the emergency period and the reconstruction
period. Minamoto’s (2010) study found that bonds with relatives and neighbours became
strengthened for a period following the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, while they became weaker
or destroyed during reconstruction due to the unfair distribution of external resources
(Minamoto 2010). Islam and Walkerden’s (2014) study in Bangladesh found that although
neighbours and friends supported households during the early phase of recovery, households’
networks with neighbours and friends became less active as the time following Cyclone Sidr
increased and sometimes broke down due to conflict over access to relief goods. However,
networks with relatives did not break down (Islam & Walkerden 2014). Drabek and Key’s
47
(1976) study conducted three years after the 1966 Topeka tornado also shows that disaster
impacts family (nuclear family) linkages with primary groups (immediate kin-parents,
married children, and siblings; friends; neighbours; and voluntary associations). Compared to
non-victim families, victim families’ linkages or bonds with immediate kin and friends
strengthened slightly, while linkages with neighbours and voluntary associations, except for
religious organisations, weakened. In addition, both high and low income victim families
preferred relatives over friends, if they faced money or family problems in an emergency.
Moreover, compared to non-victim families, victim families had less intense linkages with
neighbours and less participation in activities that involved different types of assistance the
victim families either received from or gave to neighbours, and fewer victim families
indicated positive feelings towards neighbours (Drabek & Key 1976).
The difference in terms of the strength of ties of a family with kin and other families,
particularly with neighbours and friends between the periods of immediate aftermath and
reconstruction, can be due to the emergence of a ‘therapeutic community’ or an ‘altruistic
community’ during the emergency phase (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969; Drabek & Key 1976,
1984; Ericson et al. 1976). However, as time increases, the altruistic attitudes disappear, and
hostilities develop (Quarantelli 1999; Islam & Walkerden 2014; Minamoto 2010). Thus,
although the recovery process is dependent on the existing social capital, the recovery process
itself can also influence bonding social capital (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013). Like bonding
social capital, the recovery process can also influence bridging and linking social capital. For
instance, the relationships between the members of Ho-Ping village in Taiwan and local
grassroots and government agencies became strong during the recovery phase following the
921 earthquake (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton 2015).
Although social capital plays an important role in post-disaster recovery outcomes, social
capital alone does not determine post-disaster recovery outcomes. Other characteristics apart
from social capital are also important in post-disaster recovery outcomes, both at the
community and the household levels (Blaikie et al. 1994; Wisner et al. 2004; Tierney &
Oliver-Smith 2012; Tierney 2006; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Frankenberg et al. 2013; Cutter et
al. 2008; Finch, Emrich & Cutter 2010; Norris et al. 2008; Sherrieb, Norris & Galea 2010;
Bolin 1976, 1982; IFRCRCS 2012). Scholars who have researched community resilience
suggest that pre-disaster social and structural characteristics influence post-disaster recovery
(Cutter 1996; Cutter et al. 2008; Cutter, Boruff & Shirley 2003; Cutter, Burton & Emrich
48
2010; Norris et al. 2008; Sherrieb, Norris & Galea 2010; Paton 2008). Cutter et al.’s (2008)
disaster resilience of place (DROP) model at the community level shows how various factors
can contribute to speed up or hinder recovery after a disaster. Likewise, Norris et al.’s (2008)
community resilience model also shows that the ability of a community to recover from
disasters is dependent not only on social capital, but also on other factors such as access to
economic resources, and distribution and diversity of economic resources.
Some empirical research on social capital in post-disaster recovery also shows the importance
of other factors. Aldrich’s (2012a) quantitative study at the village level in 62 villages in
Tamil Nadu, India, shows that factors like caste, wealth and family structure may affect the
period people stay in relief camps and aid access after a disaster. For example, in villages
which had a higher percent of scheduled caste (official name given to the lowest caste in
India) individuals, villagers stayed longer in relief camps.
Wickes et al.’s (2015) study in Brisbane, Australia, also shows that pre-flood social capital
had a limited effect on reducing post-flood community problems, while pre-flood socio-
structural or socio-demographic characteristics of a community had enduring and negative
effects on post-flood community problems. Marín et al. (2015) also suggest that social capital,
particularly linking social capital, cannot completely determine recovery outcomes as other
factors such as level of damage and geographical isolation also play critical roles in
determining post-disaster recovery outcomes (Marín et al. 2015). Various combinations
among linking social capital (both pre-and post-disaster linking social capital) and other
factors lead to various types of recovery outcomes (Marín et al. 2015).
Empirical research at the household level also reveals that other factors such as socio-
economic and demographic and disaster impact characteristics are important in understanding
recovery of households (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin & Bolton
1983, 1986; Drabek & Key 1984; Wang, Zou & Li 2015). Even Aldrich’s (2012a) study on
social capital shows that socio-demographic factors affect recovery outcomes. Similarly,
pioneering sociological disaster studies on household recovery show that household recovery
outcomes are subject to many factors that fall under three categories: pre-disaster socio-
economic and demographic characteristics, disaster impact, and response strategies or
recovery pathways (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin & Bolton 1983,
1986; Drabek & Key 1984). A household with lower socio-economic status such as lower
income and education is less likely to recover rapidly than a household with high socio-
49
economic status (Frankenberg et al. 2013; Wang, Chen & Li 2012; Elliott & Pais 2006; Paton,
Jang & Liu 2016; Msilimba 2010; Stringfield 2010; Green, Bates & Smyth 2007; Tierney
2006; Finch, Emrich & Cutter 2010; Zhang & Peacock 2009; Fothergill & Peek 2004; Dash,
Peacock & Morrow 1997; Bolin & Trainer 1978; Bolin & Stanford 1991; Bolin 1994).
Likewise, an elderly household is less likely to recover rapidly than a younger household
(Quarantelli 1999; Bolin 1976; Bolin & Klenow 1983) and a female-headed household is less
likely to recover rapidly than a male-headed household (Enarson & Morrow 1997; Childers
1999; Tierney 2006; Fothergill & Peek 2004). Similarly, households that move more times
into temporary shelters are expected to have delayed or prolonged recovery as they encounter
more difficulties in the recovery period (Lindell 2013a, 2013b; Quarantelli 1999). In addition,
socio-economic and demographic characteristics may be differentially linked to various
dimensions of household recovery (Bolin 1976).
Studies also show that disaster impact influences the recovery process. Finch, Emrich and
Cutter’s (2010) study at the community level shows that higher disaster impact causes slower
recovery. Likewise, studies on post-disaster psychological impacts show that loss of family
members, damage to assets such as house damage and water intrusion into the home, and loss
of business or income influence mental health significantly (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri
2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008; Lebowitz 2016; Isaranuwatchai et al. 2017). Additionally,
traumatic experiences and community destruction also affect mental health significantly
(Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008). Moreover, psychological
problems also vary due to socio-economic and demographic factors. Lower-income
households compared to higher income households may suffer more psychological impacts
(Fothergill & Peek 2004; Lebowitz 2016). Likewise, women compared to men and older
adults compared to younger adults are found to have higher post-traumatic stress reactivity
(PTSR) following a disaster (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al.
2008). Thus, female-headed households compared to male-headed households and elderly
households compared to younger households may experience slower psychological recovery.
An important finding in relation to psychological impact of disaster is that the impact of
disaster on mental health declines over time (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012;
Frankenberg et al. 2008; Frankenberg et al. 2013; Frankenberg, Laurito & Thomas 2014;
Pietrzak et al. 2012; Isaranuwatchai et al. 2017).
50
Another important point is that although the concept of social capital has been used recently
in studying disaster response (Dynes 2005), and thus has not been directly applied in earlier
sociological disaster research studies, the application of the concept in the form of social
networks as a source of formal and informal assistance is present in many previous
sociological disaster research studies (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin
& Bolton 1983, 1986; Drabek & Key 1984). All these earlier sociological studies on family
recovery along with other variables included kinship embeddedness and institutional
embeddedness that represent two dominant sources of aid – primary group aid and
organisational aid – used by families to recover from disaster (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer,
Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin & Bolton 1983, 1986; Drabek & Key 1984).13 A close review of
the studies shows that the general idea behind the inclusion of primary group aid and
organisational aid in understanding household recovery was based on the premise that some
households receive more assistance from many sources than other households due to having
more formal and informal networks (Quarantelli 1999).
Scholars have identified three recovery modes/pathways based on three corresponding
sources of assistance that households use to recover from a disaster: kinship mode (relying
primarily on resources from kin), institutional mode (relying primarily on resources from
agencies) and the autonomous mode (relying primarily on own resource) (Hass et al. 1977;
Bolin & Trainer 1978; Bolin 1982; Lindell 2013b). However, in reality a few households use
only one pathway to recover from a disaster (Lindell 2013b). Assistance from primary groups
(kin, friends and neighbours) plays an important role in household disaster recovery.
Households receive three broad types of help from their primary groups: monetary aid,
shelter, and labour power and other support services such as emotional support (Bolin 1982).
However, the major helping source for the clear majority of victims in the recovery period is
relatives and kin (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Quarantelli 1999). For example, Bolin’s (1982)
study in the USA found that very few victims received monetary aid or shelter from
neighbours. A study in Bangladesh found that relatives provide support longer than
13 For instance, Bolin’s (1982) model of household recovery includes primary group aid and organisational aid along with other variables such as variables related to demographic and socio-economic characteristics and disaster impacts. Drabek and Key’s (1984) conceptual model related to dimensions of disaster impact contains five conceptual categories of variables: demographic characteristics, household recovery capacity, disaster event qualities, recovery response and social impacts at four levels (individual, household, primary group, and community). This model included five categories of variable under the broad category of recovery process: 1. use of internal resources; 2. aid from kin; 3. aid from primary groups (neighbour and friends); 4. aid from government organisations; and 5. aid from voluntary associations or NGOs. While the first one is internal to the household, the latter four categories represent the role of bonding, bridging, and linking social networks in the post-disaster recovery process of the affected households.
51
neighbours and friends (Islam & Walkerden 2014). Nevertheless, support from kin may
decline over time as they may not have enough resources to continue to support the affected
households (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Mustafa 2003). Moreover, sometimes kin cannot
provide support as they are also affected by the disaster (Mustafa 2003; Lindell & Prater
2003; Islam & Walkerden 2014; Morrow 1997). Although recovery based on kin is generally
the most important recovery strategy, recovery of households may be also almost completely
dependent on institutional assistance or completely autonomous in some cases (Quarantelli
1999). The kin support mode of recovery may be the dominant mode in poor or developing
countries which lack adequate organisational capacity to support disaster affected households
(Islam & Walkerden 2014; Hass et al. 1977). However, households, particularly poor
households, which do not have kin or are isolated from kin, must use the autonomous mode in
the absence of assistance from external agencies. In the case of the autonomous mode,
generally poor households are in a more disadvantageous position compared to wealthier
households in achieving desired recovery outcomes as poor households usually have fewer
resources necessary for recovery (Hass et al. 1977; Lindell 2013a, 2013b).
Previous research shows that other factors such as socio-demographic and disaster impact
characteristics also have impact on these three recovery modes which are also differentially
related to various dimensions of household recovery. Assistance received by victims may
vary due to socio-economic status such as income, age, race and caste (Aldrich 2012a; Finch,
Emrich & Cutter 2010; Fothergill & Peek 2004; Tierney 2006; Bolin & Stanford 1998b; Bolin
1986; Erickson et al. 1976; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). Generally, lower income families,
elderly families and ethnic minority families receive less assistance from formal organisations
(Drabek & Key 1984; Bolin & Stanford 1998b; Tierney 2006; Fothergill & Peek 2004; Bolin
1986; Oliver-Smith 1990) as well as from kin and primary groups such as friends (Drabek &
Key 1984). Households with higher socio-economic status typically have higher affiliation
with people and offices in power and thus may have more access to governmental and non-
governmental disaster assistance programs than lower socio-economic status households
(Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Tierney 2006). In addition, higher socio-economic households
typically have skills to navigate bureaucratic requirements such as procedures of application
and filling out forms to access various recovery programs, while lower-socio-economic
households may not (Fothergill & Peek 2004; Tierney 2006). Sometimes, eligibility
requirements for receiving assistance from agencies such as legitimate ownership of land, or
home ownership, or a minimum level of income as a requirement for receiving housing
52
support also disadvantage lower income households (Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Fothergill
& Peek 2004; Bolin & Stanford 1998b; Oliver-Smith 1990). A household is more likely to
achieve housing recovery if a household utilises more institutional aid sources and is less
likely to achieve housing recovery if a household is solely dependent on kin for aid (Bolin
1976; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977). On the other hand, a household is more likely to
recover in a perceptual and emotional sense if a household uses more aid from kin (Bolin &
Bolton 1986; Bolin 1976, 1982). It suggests that, although kin may not be able to provide the
needed aid for housing recovery as organisations do, they can provide useful support for
psychological recovery (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Bolin & Bolton 1986; Bolin 1976, 1982;
Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977).
A review of studies shows that religious and cultural beliefs play a key role in the post-
disaster recovery outcomes (James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Jang &
LaMendola 2006; Gillard & Paton 1999; Paton & Tang 2008; Samuels 2010; Schmuck 2000;
Kenny & Clarke 2010; Fanany 2010a). Religious beliefs contribute to the acceptance of the
circumstances and serve as mechanisms of coping with, adapting to, recovering and growing
from the disaster. For instance, the Hakka spirit in Taiwan or the viewing of natural hazards
as an act of Allah in Bangladesh and Indonesia helped affected people to recover from
disaster (Schmuck 2000; Samuels 2010; James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Jang
& LaMendola 2006; Paton & Tang 2008). Schmuck (2000) suggests that religious beliefs help
people in Bangladesh to overcome post-disaster crisis as people believe that Allah not only
sends the floods, but also gives the strength to survive the floods. Despite accepting fate
passively, they actively employ all necessary means to overcome the crisis. The passive
acceptance of fate is particularly effective for psychological recovery as it helps people not to
feel lost and desperate (Schmuck 2000). However, religious beliefs sometimes can also have
negative effects. For example, many people in Bangladesh do not take safe refuge after
receiving cyclone warnings as they believe that the cyclone is ‘Allah’s will’ (Saha & James
2017; Paul et al. 2010; Paul & Routray 2013; Paul 2014; Haque & Blair 1992; Haque 1995;
Ikeda 1995). It suggests that although the passive acceptance of fate plays a positive role in
the post-disaster context, it plays negative roles during an emergency. Nevertheless, religious
beliefs sometimes can also impede recovery, if the people affected by disaster consider it as a
punishment as did many people in Aceh (Fanany 2010a; Samuels 2010) and other areas such
as in the Philippines (Bankoff 2004). However, it is worth noting that different religious
beliefs may affect psychological responses to disasters differently (Fanany 2010a; Gillard &
53
Paton 1999) and thus the influence of religion in a post-disaster context can vary among
believers of different religions such as Muslims and Hindus in the context of Bangladesh.
A review of studies also shows that governmental response, capacity and policies, and
governance practices, play a vital role in determining the quality of the recovery process
(Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton 2015; Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012; Kenny 2010;
Silva & Yamao 2007; Sundet & Mermelstein 1997; Dash, Peacock & Morrow 1997; Rubin,
Saperstein & Barbee 1985; Rubin 1985). Lack of effective governmental response,
particularly local governmental response, lack of relationships among governmental agencies
at the same level and various other levels, and inappropriate government policies can slow the
recovery process (Silva & Yamao 2007; Dash, Peacock & Morrow 1997; Rubin, Saperstein &
Barbee 1985; Rubin 1985; Sundet & Mermelstein 1997). In addition, governance practices of
the government and non-government agencies influence the quality of the recovery process.
Widespread corruption in the recovery period in both developing and developed countries
undermines the efficiency and equity of recovery operations (Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013;
Kenny 2010; Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Quarantelli 1999;
Mustafa 2003; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018). Likewise, political considerations may
also seriously undermine the efficiency and equity of recovery operations as recovery
assistance sometimes is only provided to the followers of the political party or political
leaders in power (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Mustafa 2003; Quarantelli 1999). The
influence of political power in recovery activities can be more complicated in settings where
the political party in power at the local level is different from the political party in power at
the national level (Quarantelli 1999). Moreover, sometimes political pressure for a fast
recovery can jeopardise the application of a participatory approach and the idea of ‘building
back better’ in the post-disaster situation (Steinberg 2010). Studies in the context of Cyclone
Sidr in Bangladesh show that corruption and favouring of political supporters by local
government, and corruption and favouring of their own microcredit borrowers by NGOs
among others during relief and recovery operations negatively affected the efficiency and
equity of the post-disaster operations (Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati
2017).
2.5 Conclusion
Despite disagreement, most social capital scholars acknowledge that social capital is network-
based, or networks are one of the sources from which social capital emerges. This provides a
54
foundation for defining social capital based on networks only. This definition does not include
norms and trust. Defining the concept with reference to an empirical referent is also useful for
the theoretical development of the concept. Thus, this study defines social capital in line with
Nan Lin’s (2008) network-based theory of social capital, i.e. resources households received
through networks.
Despite controversy, most scholars also agree that the concept can be applied at various
levels. Moreover, although scholars categorise social capital in various ways, categorisation
of social capital in bonding, bridging and linking types is a popular one. Addition of linking
type to the bonding and bridging types provides a unique opportunity to understand the role of
formal institutions beyond the community (i.e. the government and external aid agencies such
as NGOs) in the post-disaster response and recovery process. Moreover, although linking
networks from bonding and bridging networks can be easily differentiated with reference to
formal authorities, it is very difficult to sustain the distinction between bonding networks and
bridging networks in empirical research. Furthermore, the distinction is also crucially
dependent on context.
Social capital can be measured at various levels. However, there is no consensus among
scholars on how to measure social capital. Moreover, the measurement of the concept needs
to be relevant to the cultural and historical context. Indicators suitable for measuring the
concept for one culture may not be suitable for measuring the concept for another culture. The
review also demonstrates that social capital not only benefits but also costs. The literature
review shows that social capital significantly affects the post-disaster recovery process of
affected households and communities. In addition to social capital, socio-economic, cultural
and political contexts as well as disaster impact characteristics significantly impact on the
post-disaster recovery process of affected households and communities.
55
Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In this study, I have used a mixed methods approach to understand the role of social capital in
the post-disaster response and recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households in
Bangladesh. I have carried out fieldwork in two Aila–affected villages in two upazilas
(Dacope and Koyra) of Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter is further divided into five
sections. Section 3.2 presents information related to the selection of the study areas, i.e. the
two villages. Section 3.3 provides the rationale for the use of mixed methods approach and
selection of the suitable mixed methods design. Section 3.4 discusses qualitative and
quantitative data collection methods and the recruitment of participants and survey
respondents for qualitative and quantitative data collection. Section 3.5 discusses the
qualitative and quantitative data analysis process while section 3.6 offers conclusions.
3.2 Selection of Research Areas
The two research sites of the study are Channirchak Village of Kamarkhola Union of Dacope
Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra Upazila, Khulna
District, Bangladesh (See Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3).14 In Bangladesh, an upazila
(sub-district) comprises several unions and a union comprises nine wards. A union has several
villages and a village is the lowest rural geographic unit. A ward generally includes one
village or more than one village. Channirchak village is a part of Ward 3 of Kamarkhola
Union and Ward 3 consists of three villages (Channirchak, Jaliakhali, Choto Jaliakhali).15
Dakshin Bedkashi Village represents Ward 7 of Dakshin Bedkashi Union as Ward 7 includes
only Dakshin Bedkashi Village. The selection of two unions from two upazilas and two
villages from two unions is based on the severity of the impact of Aila. Kamarkhola Union
was one of the worst affected unions of Dacope, and Dakshin Bedkashi Union was one of the
worst affected unions of Koyra (see Table 3.1) (ECHO 2011; UN 2010). Channirchak was
14 The total area of Dacope is 991.56 square kilometres and Koyra is 1775.40 square kilometres. The total land area of Dacope is 286.01 square kilometres while Koyra is 260.56 square kilometres. The total population of Dacope Upazila is 152,000 and that of Koyra Upazila is 194,000. The average household size of Dacope is 4.13 and that of Koyra is 4.24. The density of population per square kilometre in Dacope is 154 and in Koyra it is 109 (BBS 2013). 15 Although local people always consider Jaliakhali and Choto Jaliakhali as two different villages, Choto (small) Jaliakhali is sometimes considered as a part of Jaliakhali instead of a separate village. Most of the area of Choto Jaliakhali (except a little cultivable land located outside the embankment now and suitable for shrimp farming only) was lost to the river both before and after Aila due to river erosion. The river devoured all houses of the village and all the households of this village are living in other places including embankments.
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one of the worst affected villages within Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi was one
of the worst affected villages within Dakshin Bedkashi Union (see Table 3.2).
Figure 3.1 Study areas: Channirchak, Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Upazila, Khulna District
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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Table 3.1 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila to Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi Uniona
Items Kamarkhola Union, Dacope
Dakshin Bedkashi Union, Koyra
Affected population (nos) 16,000 23,000 Affected households (nos) 3,200 5,800 Reported deaths (nos) 4 33 Houses fully damaged (nos) 4,600 3,520 Houses partially damaged (nos) 200 1,800 Crops fully damaged (acres) 280 29.68 Crops partially damaged (acres) 190 -- Loss of poultry (nos) 4,000 25,000 Loss of livestock (nos) 100 -- Shrimp ghers/ponds damaged (acres) -- 3,500 Damaged educational and religious institutions (nos) b
36 educational and religious institutions partially damaged
4 educational institutions completely and 15 educational institutions partially damaged; 40 mosques/temples damaged (not mentioned either fully or partially)
Note: a -- in the table means not available. b Schools and mosques/temples that were partially damaged by Aila later were fully damaged due to flooding of the villages in both Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi Union over a long period.
Source: PIOD (2009); PIOK (2009)
Both unions were subject to continuous inundation for a long time following Aila as major
breaches in embankments caused by Aila were not repaired or they were not possible to be
repaired (UNDP 2012; UN 2010; ECHO 2011). Most of the areas of Kamarkhola Union were
subject to continuous inundation for almost 21 months while most of the areas of Dakshin
Bedkashi Union were subject to continuous inundation for almost 33 months. Aila also caused
massive displacement in both unions. Channirchak Village was subject to regular inundation
for almost 21 months following the event, as the flow of water to the village through the
Jaliakhali broken section of the embankment stopped on 9 February 2011 (BWDB 2011).
Dakshin Bedkashi Village was subject to regular inundation for almost 33 months following
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the event, as the flow of water to the village through the Hareskhali broken section of the
embankment stopped on 3 March 2012 (BWDB 2015).16
Table 3.2 Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi at a glance
Items Channirchak Dakshin Bedkashi Polder number 32 14/1 Total households (nos)
152 380
Deaths due to Aila (nos)
0 1
Houses damaged due to Aila (%)
100% (fully damaged: 78.6% houses; partial but major damage:15.7% houses; partial but minor damage: 5.7% houses)
100% (fully damaged: 92.2% houses; partial but major damage: 2.2% houses; partial but minor damage: 5.6% houses)
Flooding period after Aila
Water flow though the broken section of the embankment stopped on 9 February 2011.
Water flow though the broken section of the embankment stopped on 3 March 2012.
Major occupational groups
Agriculture in own land, day labourer, agriculture on rented land.
Day labourer, fishermen (shrimp fry collectors, crab catchers and fishermen and most of them are shrimp fry collectors), shrimp farming in own land, own business, shrimp farming on rented land.
Use of cultivable land
Agriculture (mainly rice cultivation for one season of the year).
Mainly shrimp farming (year-round).
Single room dwelling house
80% households have single room house.
65.6% households have single room house.
Perceived socio-
Ultra-poor: 8.6%; poor: 18.6%; lower middle class: 68.6%; upper
Ultra-poor: 2.2%; poor: 26.7%; lower middle class: 61.1%; upper
16 Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra is located within Polder No. 14/1. Many villages of Dakshin Bedkashi Union including Dakshin Bedkashi Village were subject to flooding by saltwater until the Hareskhali broken section of the embankment in Polder No. 14/1 was repaired. BWDB started to construct Hareskhali Closure (officially known as Patakhali Closure) through the contractor named Bangladesh Diesel Plant Limited on 29 January 2012 after previous failures, and finished the construction of the closure on 27 May 2012 (BWDB 2015; BDPL 2017). The flow of water into the inundated villages (including the studied village) under Dakshin Bedkashi Union through the broken section of Hareskhali stopped on 3 March 2012 (BWDB 2015). Kamarkhola Union and Sutarkhali Union of Dacope are located within Polder No. 32. BWDB started to construct both Jaliakhali Closure and Golbunia Closure through two contractors on 14 December 2010 and finished the construction of both the closures on 31 March 2011 after previous failures. The flow of water into the inundated villages through the broken section of Jaliakhali stopped on 9 February 2011 and through the broken section of Golbunia stopped on 13 February 2011 (BWDB 2011). The flow of water into Channirchak Village stopped on 9 February 2011 due to the success with the stopping of water flow through the broken section of Jaliakhali. Flow of water into the whole polder stopped on 13 February 2011 with the stopping of the flow of water through the broken section of Golbunia (key informant interview with the BWDB officer on 22 October 2017 and key informants from the village).
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Items Channirchak Dakshin Bedkashi economic condition of the household
middle class: 4.3% middle class: 10%
Electricity
No electricity. There was electricity before Aila. However, there was no electricity for many years after Aila. Electricity connection resumed during the second half of 2017.
Roads One major road within the village is still broken. Villagers used to use this road as the main road to go to the Union Parishad Headquarters and local bazaar before Aila. The area of the roads having brick pavement is less within the village compared to pre-Aila period.
One major road within the village is still broken. The area of the roads under brick pavement is now less within the village compared to pre-Aila period. Road network connecting the village to the upazila headquarters is still poor compared to pre-Aila period.
Major infrastructures
One government primary school-cum-cyclone-shelter and one community health clinic.
Two government primary schools, one high school, one cyclone shelter (located within the high school boundary), one madrasa, Union Parishad building and Union Parishad health complex.
Major natural hazards
Riverbank erosion, salinity, cyclones and storm surges and associated flooding due to breach in the embankment.
Riverbank erosion, salinity, cyclones and storm surges and associated flooding due to breach in the embankment.
Source: Author’s fieldwork (interviews, key informant interviews, observation, survey,
BWDB 2011, 2015)
The selection of the two worst Aila affected villages of the two worst Aila affected unions as
study areas provides a unique opportunity for understanding how three forms of social capital
contribute to the response and recovery process of the affected households when households
are under very high level of stress. Moreover, the two objectives of the study are related to the
role that linking networks (i.e. the government and NGOs) play in the response and recovery
processes of the affected households. As the government and NGOs usually provided more
and longer–term interventions to the worst affected villages compared to the other less
affected villages, the two worst affected study villages provided suitable real settings for
examining the role linking social networks play in the response and recovery process of the
affected households. However, Aila did not affect many areas severely. For instance, although
Aila severely impacted Dacope Upazila of Khulna, Kamarkhola and Sutarkhali unions of
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Dacope Upazila were severely impacted while other affected areas in Dacope Upazila were
substantially less impacted. Even within the worst affected unions, for instance, within both
the studied Kamarkhola and Dakshin Bedkashi unions, a small part of each union became
dewatered much earlier than most of the part of the union including the two study villages.
Thus, the role social capital plays in the response and recovery process in the extremely
impacted villages might differ from the role played by social capital in the less impacted
villages. For instance, bonding and bridging networks might play a more important role in the
response and recovery process of the affected households in the less impacted villages such as
the affected unflooded villages or the flooded villages that became dewatered within a very
short period after Aila compared to the study villages that were subject to long–term flooding
after Aila. Households’ bonding and bridging networks in the less affected villages might be
able to play a relatively better role in the response and recovery process as the affected
relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances with whom households had bonding and
bridging relations are expected to be less severely affected and encounter less severe
challenges for their own survival and recovery compared to the bonding and bridging
networks of the households in the extremely affected villages. Likewise, households’
dependency on linking networks for survival and recovery might not be so high in the less
impacted villages as the households in those villages might restore their livelihoods and start
the recovery process on their own much earlier. Thus, when the findings from these severely
impacted case study areas are generalised, it is important to keep in mind that the role social
capital plays in disaster response and recovery might vary depending on the severity of the
impacts in the affected areas.
3.3 Research Approach
3.3.1 Mixed Methods Research Approach
To achieve the objective, the study has adopted a mixed methods research approach. Mixed
methods research approach is ‘an approach to inquiry involving collecting both quantitative
and qualitative data, integrating the two forms of data and using distinct designs that may
involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks’ (Creswell 2014, p. 4). A
mixed methods research approach provides an opportunity to combine both quantitative and
qualitative methods that have both strengths and limitations (Creswell 2014; Creswell &
Clark 2007). This approach affords an opportunity to gain a thorough and insightful
understanding of the research problems or questions (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011; Creswell
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2014) and research context or setting in which the participants talk (Creswell & Clark 2007,
2011). Scholars present various reasons to use the mixed methods approach to conduct a
research (see Table 3.3).
The study uses the mixed methods approach as it provides a more in-depth understanding of
the research questions than either the quantitative or qualitative approach alone (Creswell &
Clark 2007, 2011; Creswell 2014) and research context (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011) and
provides an opportunity to answer exploratory and confirmatory research questions in the
same study (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003). The use of the mixed methods approach also
provides an opportunity to check the validity of the findings as the findings of one database
help to check the findings of another (Creswell 2014). The use of the mixed methods
approach helps to unpack the two main concepts of this thesis, social capital and post-disaster
recovery, and their relationship. Application of the mixed methods approach produces a more
robust understanding of the operations of these concepts than using either the qualitative or
quantitative approach alone (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011).
Table 3.3 Strategic reasons for using the mixed methods approach
Aspects Description Sources Triangulation Provides opportunity to triangulate
quantitative and qualitative methods as well as findings from both methods, and thus one database helps to check the validity of the findings of the other database
Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011
Offset Offsets weakness of both quantitative and qualitative approaches
Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011
Completeness Provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone
Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011
Explanation One database can be used to explain the findings of the other database
Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011
Research questions
Answers questions that cannot be answered by either quantitative or qualitative approach alone
Creswell & Clark 2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003; Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2009
Different research questions
One database can be used for different questions than the other database
Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011
Data collection tools
Researchers can use all the available tools of data collection
Creswell & Clark 2007
Process Qualitative research captures the sense of process in social life and quantitative research captures the structures in social life
Creswell & Clark 2011
Comparison Provides an opportunity to compare different Creswell 2014
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Aspects Description Sources perspectives drawn from different databases
Theory generation and verification
Can generate and verify theory in the same study
Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003
Better inferences Provides better inferences Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003
Context Provides better understanding of the research context
Creswell & Clark 2011
Credibility Enriches the integrity of findings Creswell & Clark 2011 Diversity of views
Provides the opportunity to present a greater diversity of divergent views
Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003
3.3.2 Selection of the Suitable Mixed Methods Design
Selection of an appropriate mixed methods design requires four key issues to be addressed:
priority of the qualitative and quantitative strands (qualitative dominant, quantitative
dominant, or equal), the timing of the strands (concurrent, sequential, and multiphase),
interaction or integration between the strands (independent or interactive), and the ways of
mixing the two strands (Creswell & Clark 2011).
This study uses the exploratory sequential mixed methods design. An exploratory sequential
design is a two-phase sequential mixed methods design in which the researcher collects and
analyses qualitative data in the first phase and then uses the qualitative exploratory findings in
the second quantitative phase to test or generalise the initial qualitative exploratory findings
(Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011). It is a design that provides greater emphasis on the
qualitative strand of the study (Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011). The
primary purpose of this design is to explore a phenomenon and generalise the initial
qualitative findings from a few individuals to a larger sample of population in the quantitative
phase (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011). This design is suitable when the
researcher wants to explore a phenomenon in depth, to identify unknown variables, to develop
an instrument that is not available, to test aspects of an emergent theory and to generalise
qualitative findings to different groups (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011).
This study uses the exploratory sequential design as it is a qualitative dominant study with an
inductive theoretical lens (Creswell 2014; Morse 2003). The timing of the strands is
sequential as the study collects qualitative data in the first phase and quantitative data in the
second phase. Although the study employs quantitative analysis (a deductive phase) in the
second phase, the overall theoretical drive of the research is inductive as the qualitative
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method conducted first has guided the study theoretically (Morse 1991, 2003). The
quantitative component in the second phase plays a secondary role (Creswell & Clark 2011),
assists in the interpretation of qualitative findings (Creswell et al. 2003) and provides an
opportunity for expanding and logical extension of the qualitative exploratory findings
(Creswell & Clark 2011; Morse 2003).
In this study, quantitative and qualitative strands are interactive as the implementation of the
quantitative strand is dependent on the findings of the qualitative strand (Creswell & Clark
2011). This study mixes qualitative and quantitative strands during data collection, data
analysis and interpretation (Creswell & Clark 2011). The study mixes two strands during data
collection as the qualitative findings in the first phase guides the quantitative component
(Creswell & Clark 2011). The study analyses data from both strands separately at the initial
level and mixes two datasets during data analysis and interpretation by relating results of one
dataset to the other dataset in a way that compares and synthesises the findings of both
(Creswell & Clark 2011) and shows how the qualitative findings can be generalised or not to
the larger sample (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011).
Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 87) argue that an exploratory design uses two paradigms:
constructivism in the first qualitative phase and post-positivism in the second quantitative
phase. Morse (2003) argues that although the quantitative component is used following the
qualitative component as in the case of exploratory design, the theoretical drive remains
inductive as the first qualitative phase is the core phase of the study. Likewise, Johnson,
Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p. 124) argue that ‘qualitative dominant mixed methods
research is the type of mixed research in which one relies on a qualitative, constructivist-
poststructuralist-critical view of the research process, while concurrently recognizing that the
addition of quantitative data and approaches are likely to benefit most research projects’. In a
similar manner, Guba and Lincoln (2005, p. 200) state that ‘within each paradigm, mixed
methodologies (strategies) may make perfectly good sense’. This study investigates research
problems principally from a pragmatist worldview or paradigm that considers the nature of
reality as both multiple realities (as in the case of constructivist paradigm) and singular reality
(as in the case of post-positivist paradigm) and allows collection, mixing and analysis of both
qualitative and quantitative data (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011). Thus, the study
includes both the biased perspectives (as in the case of constructivist paradigm) and unbiased
perspectives (as in the case of post-positivist paradigm) (Creswell & Clark 2011, p. 42). The
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study uses the theory-development variant (places the emphasis on the qualitative phase)
instead of the instrument development variant (places the emphasis on the quantitative phase)
of the exploratory sequential design (Creswell & Clark 2011, p. 90). As the study has
conducted the qualitative strand first, I have used the constructivist paradigm in the first phase
(Creswell & Clark 2011, p. 87) and this has allowed me to understand the historical and
cultural settings of the participants and varied and multiple meanings of the experiences of the
participants constructed through their subjective views (Creswell 2013, 2014; Creswell &
Clark 2011). Thus, the use of the constructivist paradigm in the first phase has provided the
opportunity to understand the complexity of views among the participants and interpret the
meanings the participants have about the situation and develop a pattern of meaning
inductively (Creswell 2013, 2014).
3.4 Data Collection and Recruitment of Participants and Respondents
This research is based on nine months fieldwork conducted in two periods in the two Aila-
affected villages: 8 months from 20 May 2017 to 19 January 2018 and one month (29 days)
from 25 March 2019 to 22 April 2019. The fieldwork during the first eight months was
divided into two phases. I collected qualitative data in the first phase which took almost six
months. I also developed a household survey questionnaire based on the primary
understanding of the qualitative data and collected quantitative data through household
surveys in the second phase which took almost two months. In addition to primary data, I
collected various documents and maps such as damage and loss reports, reports related to
various recovery interventions, community disaster risk reports, reports related to UP budgets,
maps of the two polders from local government authorities, various government agencies and
an autonomous agency (BWDB), and national and international NGOs during the first
fieldwork period (May 2017 to January 2018). During the second fieldwork period (March–
April 2019), I collected some additional documents and interviewed some of the previous
interviewees for clarification of some of the issues they shared during the interviews in the
first fieldwork period (May 2017 to January 2018). In addition, I conducted two key
informant interviews over the phone from Australia during October 2019. The documents I
collected allowed me to understand the interventions that government and NGOs
implemented in the studied villages after Aila. These documents also greatly helped me to
verify the findings of the study from primary data. Documents and maps of two polders from
BWDB officials enabled me to know the dates related to the repair of the embankment and to
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understand the location of two polders such as areas located within the polder, the places of
breaches in the polder and areas and rivers outside the polder.
3.4.1 Qualitative Data Collection
3.4.1.1 Qualitative Procedure of Inquiry
Given the nature of the research and the research questions, the study has employed the case
study procedure of inquiry within the qualitative approach. The case study is one of the five
major qualitative research designs or procedures of inquiry (narrative research,
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study) to conduct a qualitative
inquiry (Creswell 2013, 2014). A case study research is a qualitative procedure of inquiry in
which the researcher studies ‘a case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting’
(Creswell 2013, p. 97). This is suitable for all three types of investigation: exploratory,
descriptive, and explanatory (Yin 2003, 2009). It provides an in-depth understanding of a case
or cases (Creswell 2013; Flyvbjerg 2011) and a case can be an event, an activity, a process, a
program, an individual, a small group, a community, a relationship, or an organisation
(Creswell 2013, 2014).
Case study is suitable when the researcher asks a how or why question (Yin 2003, 2009).
Moreover, this is also suitable, as Flyvbjerg (2011) suggests, when the purpose of the study is
to understand what causes a phenomenon, and thus a case study approach has strength in
linking causes and outcomes. It is also suitable when the study deals with both a phenomenon
and its context and when the goal of the study is analytical generalisation (expanding and
generalising theories) instead of statistical generalisation (enumerating frequencies) (Yin
2003, 2009). An important advantage of this procedure of inquiry is that it allows the use of
both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods (Yin 2003, 2009; Punch 2005). This
procedure of inquiry allows in-depth data collection from multiple sources such as
observations, interviews including open-ended qualitative interviews and surveys, documents
and archival records (Yin 2003, 2009; Creswell 2013).
This study focuses on the post-disaster response and recovery process of households
following Aila (2009) in two affected villages. The study has employed a case study
procedure of inquiry as this is suitable to cover contextual factors that are highly relevant to
the post-disaster recovery process of the affected households and communities. Although the
study has focused on household level, the study has also gathered data to understand
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community-level issues. The same case study can have several units of analysis and a
researcher can use different data collection techniques for each level of analysis (Yin 2003,
2009). By using the case study design, the study has been able to explore differences and
similarities between two villages in terms of the issues or themes identified (Creswell 2013, p.
99).
3.4.1.2 Qualitative Data Collection Methods
In this study, I have collected qualitative data using three data collection methods: in-depth
interview, focus group discussion (FGD) and observation. The following sections elaborate
on these three data collection methods.
3.4.1.2.1 In-depth Interview
The interview is an important data collection tool in qualitative research (Punch 2005). A
qualitative interview is a form of conversation in which the interviewer discusses a set of
topics, instead of standardised questions, with the interviewee to obtain in-depth
understanding of the topics being discussed (Babbie 2013). An in-depth interview is an
efficient way to learn about the perspectives of the participants regarding the research topic
(Mack et al. 2005). In an in-depth interview, the interviewer can understand the meaning of
the participant fully by using follow-up questions and probes (Legard, Keegan & Ward 2003).
An in-depth interview allows the researcher to ‘explore fully all the factors that underpin
participants’ answers: reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs’ (Legard, Keegan & Ward 2003,
p. 141). During in-depth interview, the interviewer considers the participant as an expert and
conducts the interview with a desire to learn about the research questions from the participant
(Mack et al. 2005).
An interview can be classified as a structured, semi-structured/half-structured or unstructured
interview (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006; Punch 2005; Boeije 2010). Structured
interviews are conducted based on questions that are planned and standardised; unstructured
interviews are conducted based on questions that are not pre-planned and standardised and
semi-structured interviews lie in between the standardised structured interviews and non-
standardised unstructured interviews (Punch 2005). Both unstructured interviews and semi-
structured interviews are qualitative interviews (Boeije 2010). In this study, I have used semi-
structured in-depth interviews. These are conducted around ‘a set of predetermined open-
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ended questions, with other questions emerging from the dialogue’ between the participant
and me as an interviewer (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006, p. 315).
3.4.1.2.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)
The focus group discussion (FGD) is an important qualitative data collection tool in which a
small number of people are interviewed in an informal group discussion setting around a topic
or a set of issues (Wilkinson 2004). However, FGD can also take place in a formal setting
(Fontana & Frey 2003, 2005). In an FGD, the interviewer acts as a moderator for the group
and facilitates group discussion based on the FGD schedule. The moderator poses the
questions, keeps the discussion flowing, and enables full participation of the group members
by encouraging interaction among group members (Wilkinson 2004).
A focus group usually includes 6 to 12 members (Baker 1994; Neuman 2006). However, it
can also include 6 to 8 members (Finch & Lewis 2003) or 5 to 15 members (Babbie 2013).
FGD as a data-gathering tool can be used alone or in conjunction with other qualitative or
quantitative tools (Punch 2005). FGDs are inexpensive, flexible in format, data rich,
stimulating for participants and recall aiding (Fontana & Frey 2003, 2005). A researcher
generally records the FGD, transcribes the data, and then analyses data using thematic or
content analysis (Wilkinson 2004).
3.4.1.2.3 Observation
Observation is one of the important tools for collecting data in qualitative research.
Observation is ‘the act of noting a phenomenon in the field setting through the five senses of
the observer’ (Creswell 2013, p. 166). Observation can be four types: complete participant,
participant as observer, observer as participant (nonparticipant) and complete observer
(Creswell 2013, 2014; Kawulich 2005; Punch 2005). The group being studied knows about
the research activity in the case of both participant as observer and observer as participant
(Kawulich 2005). In this study, I assumed the role of a participant as observer in observing
behaviour and activities of the villagers in their daily lives and leadership and politics in the
village that have implications for the post-disaster recovery process of the affected households
and communities (Kawulich 2005). I assumed the role of an observer as participant at the
initial period as the villagers were fully aware of my research activity and I was an outsider to
them (Creswell 2013, 2014). However, I assumed the role of a participant as observer over
time (Creswell 2013, p. 167). As I conducted an extended period of fieldwork in two villages,
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I established rapport with local people over time and became an insider over time, engaging in
interaction with the participants fully (Kawulich 2005). Thus, I have gained ‘insider views
and subjective data’ that have given me better insight into how households in two villages
have experienced the impact of, and recovery from, Aila (Creswell 2013, p. 167).
3.4.1.3 Recruitment of Participants for Collecting Qualitative Data
The study recruited participants for in-depth interviews, key informant interviews and FGDs
based on purposeful sampling strategy during the qualitative phase as the intent of the study is
to select participants who are suitable for exploring research questions (Creswell & Clark
2007). The study used maximum variation sampling for the selection of participants as this
purposeful sampling procedure is suitable for choosing participants with diverse viewpoints
or experiences in relation to the research problems being explored (Creswell 2013). For
instance, in selecting the participants for in-depth interviews with the household-level
interviewees, the study used occupation of the household head, socio-economic status, degree
of the disaster impact, level of education, aged households, and female-headed households as
some criteria to differentiate among households (Creswell 2013).
The study recruited household heads (including female-headed households) or the wives of
household heads as the participants for in-depth interviews at the household level and for
FGDs. In addition to the participants for the household-level interviews, the study also
conducted in-depth interviews with the key informants. I conducted 83 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with household heads (including female-headed households) and wives
of the male household heads in the absence of household heads in two villages. I conducted
51 in-depth semi-structured interviews in Dakshin Bedkashi Village and 32 in-depth semi-
structured interviews in Channirchak Village. I continued to conduct in-depth interviews with
the household-level participants until data saturation was reached (Creswell 2014; Mason
2010; Fusch & Ness 2015; Morse 1991). Although I conducted the main interview in the first
setting, I often interviewed the interviewees later if I needed to know anything from them. As
I lived in the villages, I had the opportunity to meet them and listen to them if I required any
additional information or further clarification. I have given only the date of my first interview
throughout the thesis when I mention interview dates.
In addition, I conducted total eight FGDs in two villages and four FGDs in each village. I
conducted two FGDs with male household heads or any adult male members of the
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households in the absence of the male household heads and two FGDs with wives of male-
headed households and heads of female-headed households in each village. The number of
participants across eight FGDs varied from six participants to 12 participants (Baker 1994).
One male FGD in Channirchak has six participants and the other male FGD in Channirchak
has seven participants. One male FGD in Dakshin Bedkashi has six participants and the other
male FGD in Dakshin Bedkashi has seven participants. One female FGD in Channirchak has
six participants and the other female FGD in Channirchak has 11 participants. One female
FGD in Dakshin Bedkashi has nine participants and the other female FGD in Dakshin
Bedkashi has 12 participants. FGDs have not included participants from households whose
heads or wives of the heads were the participants for in-depth interviews.
I also conducted 49 in-depth interviews with elected representatives and secretary of the local
government (UP), government officials of the concerned departments at various levels
including BWDB officials, national and international NGO personnel and key informants
from two villages and surrounding areas including political leaders, community leaders and
others such as local school teachers. To gather necessary in-depth data and divergent views to
explore the research problems, I selected key informants purposively so that they hold
different positions and different perspectives. I conducted 23 key informant interviews for
Channirchak and 26 key informant interviews for Dakshin Bedkashi. I conducted some of the
key informant interviews in Dacope Upazila Parishad Headquarters, Koyra Upazila Parishad
Headquarters, Khulna City and other districts such as Gopalgonj District and Gazipur District
as the BWDB and NGO staff who participated in Aila response and recovery were not
employed in the study location due to transfer within the organisation or moving to another
organisation. I conducted all key informant interviews in person except two. I conducted two
key informant interviews with two NGO officials over the phone from Australia in October
2019 and I recorded both the interviews with their permission.
I used three separate in-depth interview guides: one in-depth interview guide for conducting
interviews with the participants of the households, the other one for conducting key informant
interviews with elected representatives, government officials and NGO personnel, and the
other one for conducting interviews with key informants from the two villages and
surrounding areas (see Appendix 1, 2 and 3). In addition, I used an FGD guide to conduct
FGDs (see Appendix 4).
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FGDs and key informant interviews mainly focused on the issues at the village or community
level. For instance, FGDs focused on issues such as factors (socio-economic, cultural and
political) that affected the economic, housing and psychological recovery in the village; the
contribution of relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances, the government and NGOs in
survival and recovery of the villagers, evaluation of the emergency and long-term support
provided by the government and NGOs. Key informant interviews focused on issues like the
contribution of the government and NGOs to the survival and recovery of the households in
the village and the strengths and weaknesses of their operations, coordination between
government agencies and NGOs as well as among government agencies or among NGOs;
significant changes in the village compared to the pre-Aila situation, and contribution of the
post-Aila measures undertaken by government and NGOs to the reduction of disaster risks.
However, the study also inquired into personal household-level issues in addition to the
queries for key informants in the case of key informants who were the residents of the studied
villages.
I recorded all the in-depth interviews with household heads or wives of the household heads,
key informant interviews and FGDs. I also took necessary notes. It is worth noting that as I
lived in the villages for a long period, I met in-depth household-level interviewees and key
informants from the local area (village and surrounding areas) many times in many places
including bazaars, mosques, temples, and various common places within and outside the
village. Thus, I often discussed with them various issues related to my research outside the
interview arrangement. I took various notes based on the discussion although I did not usually
record these discussions. However, I use no qualitative data in the study that was not recorded
(unless stated otherwise).
3.4.2 Quantitative Data Collection
3.4.2.1 Household Survey
I conducted a household survey to collect quantitative data. The survey was conducted in the
second phase and the survey questionnaire was developed based on the qualitative findings.
The survey was quite comprehensive. The questionnaire used was in Bangla language and
included ten sections (nine sections excluding the first section related to survey information).
The survey gathered information on all household members (gender, age, relation with
household head, marital status, education, religion, working status and primary and secondary
occupation); various household-level information; impacts and coping strategies; contribution
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of relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances, the government and NGOs and their role
in survival and recovery; self-perceived recovery (economic, housing and psychological)
status; evaluation of houses received from the government and NGOs; disaster resilience;
warnings and taking refuge; and village-level information (see Appendix 5).
The questionnaire included mainly closed-ended questions, although it also included some
open-ended questions. After the development of the questionnaire, the questionnaire was pilot
tested to improve it further before the final administration (De Vaus 2014). Pilot testing
helped to evaluate the validity (indicators measuring the concept they need to measure) and
reliability (obtaining a similar result on repeated occasions) of the indicators developed for
measuring the concepts (De Vaus 2002, 2014).
The unit of analysis for the survey is the household. Respondents of the survey are household
heads (either male or female headed households). In the absence of household heads during
the survey, wives of the household heads were interviewed. As all households of the two
villages under investigation were affected by Aila, the population for the survey is the total
number of households of the two villages. The total number of households in Channirchak is
152 while the total number of households in Dakshin Bedkashi is 380. Thus, the total number
of households in both villages is 532. The sample size was determined using the following
population proportion sample size (n) formula (Cochran 1963):
n = N*X / (X + N – 1),
where,
X = Zα/22 *p*(1-p) / MOE2,
and Zα/2 denotes the critical value of the Normal distribution at α/2 (e.g. for a confidence
level of 95%, α is 0.05 and the critical value is 1.96), MOE denotes the margin of error, p
denotes the sample proportion, and N denotes the population size. A Finite Population
Correction has been applied to the sample size formula.
The recommended survey sample size for the population size of 532 households is 224
households with 5% margin of error, 95% confidence level, and sample proportion 50%.
The recommended sample size 224 has been proportionally divided for two villages based
on the number of households. The required sample size for Channirchak is 64 households
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and for Dakshin Bedkashi it is 160 households. However, the study collected data from 250
households instead of 224 households and collected data from 70 households in
Channirchak and 180 households in Dakshin Bedkashi.
3.4.2.2 Recruitment of Survey Respondents and Administration of Survey
I prepared a list of all households of the two villages. As I had the sampling frame (a list of all
households of the two villages) for the population, I selected sample households using simple
random sampling procedure (De Vaus 2014). I selected sample households within each
village using simple random sampling technique without replacement (each household has
only one chance to be selected). The households that were interviewed for in-depth
interviews and households of the key informants who are residents in the studied village
were excluded from the sample for the survey to avoid confounding factors (Creswell
2014). Key informants living in the village were excluded from the survey as I usually knew
their own story in addition to their views on the questions asked for the key informant
interviews. The study used simple random sampling procedure to select a representative
sample of the population so that the findings could be generalised to a population (Creswell &
Clark 2007).
Participation in the survey was voluntary and based on the informed consent of the
participants. The informed consent was obtained orally because participants could refuse to
participate in the survey if they were asked to sign a written form (De Vaus 2014). Moreover,
many of the participants were not able to read and sign the informed consent form as they did
not know how to read or write. Participants were assured that the confidentiality of their
responses would be honoured (De Vaus 2014).
I recruited six research assistants from a university to assist me during survey data collection.
One research assistant helped me in administering the pilot survey and finalising the survey
questionnaire while five research assistants collected survey data. In addition, I employed four
field assistants from the local area who helped the research assistants to reach the households
and introduced them to the households and provided other logistical support. All the research
assistants stayed in the villages during the survey period. I also stayed in the two villages
during the survey and supervised the data collection process. I gave feedback to the data
collectors each day at the beginning of the survey and at night after checking all the surveyed
questionnaires. Prior to administering the survey, the research assistants were provided
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appropriate training to familiarise them with the research objectives, the questionnaire, and
the ethics protocol they needed to follow. The questionnaire was administered using face-to-
face paper and pencil interview technique. The interviewer recorded answers on a paper
questionnaire and answered respondent’s questions and clarified questions if the respondent
asked (De Vaus 2002) (see Appendix 6 for the socio-demographic characteristics of the
survey respondents).
3.5 Qualitative and Quantitative Data Analysis
Qualitative data analysis consists of three broad steps: preparation and organisation of the
data, reduction of the data into themes through coding, and condensing the codes and
presentation of the data (Creswell 2013). Thus, generating themes for the study through the
process of coding is one of the core elements of the qualitative data analysis process. Themes
in qualitative research are defined as ‘broad units of information that consist of several codes
aggregated to form a common idea’ (Creswell 2013, p. 186). Thematic analysis is a
foundational method for qualitative data analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006; Grbich 2007) and
can be defined as ‘a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within
data’ (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 79).
Qualitative data analysis involves six interconnected steps: organising and preparing the data,
reading through all data, coding the data, generating themes and a detailed description of the
setting or participants for analysis, interrelating themes/descriptions and interpreting the
meaning of themes/descriptions (making an interpretation of the findings) (Creswell 2014, p.
197). In line with these steps, I have transcribed interviews and sorted and arranged data
based on sources. Then I have identified themes or patterns for the study. Although I have had
theoretical interests and research questions in my mind when I have been reading and re-
reading data, I have identified themes through a ‘bottom up’ or inductive way, i.e. through a
data-driven approach (Braun & Clarke 2006). To develop themes for the study, I have first
developed many categories and then I have collapsed these categories into fewer themes
(Creswell 2013). Then I have looked for each theme including similarities and differences
between participants in terms of a theme and interconnectedness among themes. Finally, I
have compared the study findings based on the themes with the findings of the relevant
existing studies or theories (Creswell 2013, 2014).
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The study has used univariate analysis and suitable graphs to present data. The study presents
some of the survey findings with a 5-point Likert Scale. The study has not carried out higher-
level statistical analyses and has focused on qualitative understanding instead, although the
initial plan was to carry out some higher-level statistical analyses to examine the relation
between social capital and post-disaster recovery. The study has used Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (SPSS) to analyse the survey data and prepare the necessary graphs.
3.6 Conclusion
The study has employed an exploratory sequential design that included both qualitative and
quantitative approaches during data collection and data analysis and interpretation. The study
has gathered qualitative data in the first phase and quantitative data in the second phase. It has
gathered qualitative data through in-depth interviews (household-level participants and key
informant interviews), FGDs and observation and quantitative data through household
surveys. The study has selected sample households through simple random sampling
procedure. The collection and analysis of the qualitative data has guided the design and
conduct of the quantitative component. The quantitative component has played a secondary
role and assisted in the interpretation of qualitative findings. Application of the mixed
methods approach has provided a more in-depth understanding of the research questions than
either the quantitative or qualitative approach alone. It has also ensured the validity of the
findings as the findings of one database have provided an opportunity to check the validity of
the findings of the other database. The next chapter examines the role of bonding social
capital in post-Aila response and recovery processes of the Aila-affected households.
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Chapter 4: Role of Bonding Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how bonding social capital contributes to the post-disaster response
and recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households in Channirchak Village of
Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Dakshin Bedkashi
Union of Koyra Upazila, Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter conceptualises bonding
social capital as the resources that affected households received through their bonding
networks, which are the networks that extend between the affected households and their
relatives. The chapter focuses on the role of the resources received as aid or support from
relatives, where aid or support is defined as those resources received free of charge or without
the requirement to return anything in exchange.17 Although the chapter focuses on the role of
aid or support (hereafter aid) received from relatives, it also briefly discusses the role of non-
aid items received from relatives where necessary.
This chapter contains six sections, including section 4.1. Section 4.2 briefly discusses the
kinship system in Bangladesh. Section 4.3 presents the types of aid the affected households
received through their bonding networks, i.e. from relatives. Section 4.4 examines the role of
bonding social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process of the affected
households. Section 4.5 examines why bonding social capital plays a limited role in the
survival and the economic and housing recovery process and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Kinship in Bangladesh
Kinship relations are at the centre of the rural social structure of Bangladesh (Aziz 1979;
Mashreque & Amin 1993). A person’s behaviour with relatives is usually different from
behaviour with non-relatives. A person gives priority to relatives first and then to fellow
villagers in matters of consideration and fellowship. Relatives maintain economic connections
with one another and provide economic assistance to one another. Providing economic
assistance to relatives is sometimes viewed as a religious virtue. Relatives are generally
preferred compared to non-related people for certain economic activities and transactions such
17 The survey questionnaire used ‘aid or support’, i.e. support as a synonym for aid items received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances. The term ‘support’ was used as a synonym for aid in denoting particular aid types such as psychological support and shelter support.
78
as providing the opportunity for work, gaining a job, personal loans, business partners or
assistants, and sale of property. Relatives also provide free labour service to a relative in an
hour of need. A wealthy relative may provide economic assistance to a needy relative, either
to maintain his prestige or to gain respect from other members of society, or simply in
consideration of the necessity of providing economic assistance to a needy relative as a
religious virtue (Aziz 1979).
The patrilineal and patrilocal is the usual family structure in Bangladesh. Although patrilineal
ties dominate, matrilineal ties are almost as important as patrilineal ties in practice (Aziz
1979). Genetic or consanguineal relatives and marriage or affinal relatives are the two most
important forms of kin relationship in Bangladesh (Aziz 1979; Mashreque & Amin 1993).
The marital relationships of sons and daughters are most frequently established outside the
village and these marital relationships in other villages offer opportunities for economic
cooperation (Aziz 1979). In addition, fictive relatives, unrelated through consanguineal or
affinal relationships, are also an important form of kin relationship in Bangladesh (Aziz 1979;
Mashreque & Amin 1993). The patrilineal and patrilocal family is the normal type of family
within the two studied villages, although matrilineal ties are also important. The matrilocal
family is rare in the two studied villages. Moreover, although marital relationships of son and
daughter are most frequently established outside the village in both villages, a few marital
relationships of son and daughter within the village are found in both villages.
Relatives can also be categorised as close relatives, distant relatives and most distant relatives
based on the degree of closeness of the relationships (Aziz 1979). A close relationship or
ghanistha samparka involves ‘a wide set of rights and obligations and endure[s] for life’
while the distant relationship or dur samparka and most distant relationship or anek dur
smaparka do not have such ‘lifetime obligations’ (Aziz 1979, p. 108). The close or ghanistha
relatives by blood or affinal connection play the most influential role in various matters.18
People usually turn to and rely on their close relatives at times of taking any important
decisions on social and economic affairs. People normally give thoughtful consideration to
something that is considered favourably by close relatives. More credibility is given to
18 Examples of closely related blood or affinal households from the standpoint of the male head of a household (ego) include the households of sons when sons live in a separate household, the households of daughters if daughters are married, household of the parents when parents live in a separate household, households of the siblings (brothers and sisters), households of the household head’s brother’s son and daughter and sister’s son and daughter, households of household head’s father’s brother and sister, households of household head’s mother’s brother and sister, household of wife’s parents, and households of wife’s siblings.
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information on various social, economic and political matters when received from close
relatives. If a person requires any loan or assistance, he/she usually asks close blood or affinal
relatives within or outside the village first. If a person cannot obtain the necessary assistance
from close relatives, then he/she may approach a distant relative (Aziz 1979).
To understand the contribution of relatives in the post-disaster response and recovery process
of the Aila-affected households, it is necessary to separate relatives of the households into the
following groups: close relatives, distant relatives, and most distant relatives. It is worth
noting that the survey did not distinguish between close and distant or most distant relatives.
However, it has been observed during the qualitative phase of the research that households
that received material and monetary aid from relatives usually received from their close
relatives.
A household is an eating unit (khana) or a hearth group (chula) and usually consists of
consanguineal kin members and their married partners. According to the Bangladesh Bureau
of Statistics (2013), related or unrelated individuals who live together and take food from the
same kitchen form a household. It is the primary production and consumption unit. Each
household has a functional head. Household members have very close ties among them. In
addition, the head or any other member of a household is also related to the head or any
member of other households either by blood or affinal connection. As household members
have very close ties among them, a person’s responsibilities are first to the members of his
own household or the immediate family and then to the blood or affinal relatives with the
responsibilities first to the close blood or affinal relatives (Aziz 1979). In other words, as
kinship is intrinsically ‘a set of mutual expectations and obligations’ (Aziz 1979, p. xiii),
these expectations and obligations in Bangladeshi society in general and rural Bangladeshi
villages in particular are first to the members of their own household and then to the other
blood or affinal relatives with diminishing intensity based on the degree of closeness of the
relationships.
This research considers patrilineally related and affinally related people as relatives and does
not consider fictive relatives as relatives. This research examines the role of bonding
networks, i.e. relatives at the household level, and conceptualises the household as the unit of
analysis. Thus, the research defines relatives of a household as people who are connected by
blood or marriage to the household head or any member of the studied household and who are
not members of the studied household or the eating unit.
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4.3 Aid Received Through Bonding Networks
Relatives are important sources of aid in a disaster. They play a distinct role in helping the
disaster-affected people confront the post-disaster crisis by providing aid (Bolin 1982; Bolin
& Bolton 1986; Bolin 1994). The affected people expect their relatives to provide them with
what is needed in the aftermath of a disaster (Bolin & Bolton 1986).
The survey data presented in Table 4.1 show the 16 types of aid the surveyed households
received from their relatives after Aila (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for aid by village). In the
survey, respondents were asked to choose from the list of 16 types of aid which kinds of aid
they received from relatives after Aila. These 16 types of aid were: food, water, clothes,
utensils and other necessary household items, shelter support at the time of Aila, shelter
support for at least a week or more, caring for livestock, informational support such as
information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities, assistance to get work,
monetary aid only for surviving after Aila, monetary aid for economic recovery such as for
starting economic activities, monetary aid for repairing or constructing the house, housing
materials for repairing or constructing the house, free labour for repairing or constructing the
house, psychological support and other. The types of aid included in the quantitative survey
were based on the findings of the qualitative phase. Moreover, households also received some
other types of aid or support immediately before, during and immediately after the event from
their relatives, although these types of aid or support were not directly included in the survey
list. For instance, the qualitative findings show that, whenever required, they received
assistance related to evacuation and search and rescue activities and assistance related to the
relocation of the household to another place such as to the embankment. However, if any
household specifically mentioned any type of aid or support, then the response was included
in the category of other.
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Table 4.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250)19
Types of aid Percentage (%) Food 70.8 Water 32.4 Clothes 19.6 Utensils and other necessary household items 14.4 Shelter support at the time of Aila 10.0 Shelter support for at least a week or more 4.0 Provided caring for livestock in their house 5.2 Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities
64.4
Assistance to get work 33.2 Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila 31.6 Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities
5.2
Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house 3.2 Housing materials for repairing or constructing house 4.4 Free labour for repairing or constructing house 32.4 Psychological support 100.0 Other 6.8
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
An analysis of the survey data presented in Table 4.1 shows that 100 percent of the surveyed
households (n=250) received at least one type of aid among the 16 types of aid from relatives.
The reason for this is that all the surveyed households received psychological or emotional
support from their relatives. However, there are households that did not receive anything
except psychological support from their relatives. For instance, 6.4 percent of the surveyed
households did not receive any aid among the 16 types except psychological support from
relatives. Likewise, if only material aid and monetary aid are considered, then the percentage
of households that received material and monetary aid becomes lower. Thus, aid which the
19 This was created by combining four variables: particular aid the affected households received from: a. relatives within the village, b. relatives outside the village but living within the union, c. relatives living outside the union but were affected by Aila, and d. relatives living outside the union but were not affected by Aila, i.e. from the unaffected relatives. It is worth noting that the two studied villages and the two unions within which the two studied villages are located were fully affected by Aila. A household that received a listed type of aid from relatives located in any place has been considered as a recipient of that type of aid. Thus, if a household received a listed type of aid from relatives of at least one place from amongst relatives in any of the four places, then the household was considered as a recipient of that aid. A household that did not receive a listed type of aid from relatives located in any place has been considered as a non-recipient of that aid. For instance, if a household received food from relatives of one place, or from relatives of two places, or from relatives of three places or from relatives of all the four places, then it was considered that the household received food from their relatives. If the household did not receive food from the relatives of any place, then it was considered that the household did not receive any food from relatives. Thus, it is possible that one household that received food from relatives may have received food from relatives located in more than one place and from more than one relative located in one place. In addition, a household may have received more than one type of aid. The data presented in Table 4.1 for the 15 types of aid other than food have also been presented based on the same logic.
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affected households received from their relatives after Aila and the role the received aid
played in the recovery process of the affected households can be better understood if all 16
types of aid received from relatives (presented in Table 4.1) are categorised under six
categories: material aid, monetary aid, information and assistance to get work, labour,
psychological support, and other (presented in Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid
Six categories 16 types of aid Material aid (includes seven types) Food
Water Clothes Utensils and other necessary household items Shelter support for at least a week or more Provided caring for livestock in their house Housing materials for repairing or constructing house
Monetary aid (includes three types) Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house
Information and assistance to get work (includes two types)
Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work
Labour Free labour for repairing or constructing house Psychological support Psychological support Other (includes two types) Shelter support at the time of Aila
Other
The categorisation of the aid received by the survey respondents from relatives into six
categories is important for analysing qualitative data properly. The analysis of the in-depth
interviews conducted with the head of the household or wife of the household head reveals
that the interviewees consider certain aid from relatives as a natural and part of their everyday
life and expect it to be provided by their relatives. Thus, they usually do not consider the
certain aid they received from relatives as aid, unless they are asked specifically. For instance,
psychological support, free labour, shelter support at the time of Aila, receipt of information
related to something and receipt of help to get work from relatives are some types of aid that
the interviewees usually expect their relatives to provide and thus usually they do not consider
these as part of the aid. They may consider these types of aid from relatives as usual and
natural as they do not usually require any material and monetary resources. Thus, when they
were asked to reflect on the aid they received from their relatives or other people, they usually
reflected on material and monetary aid. However, they reflected on aid such as psychological
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support, free labour, receipt of information and assistance to get work when they were asked
specifically about these types of aid.
Figure 4.1 Aid received from relatives, Channirchak (n=70) (multiple response)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
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Figure 4.2 Aid received from relatives, Dakshin Bedkashi (n=180) (multiple response)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
The analysis of the survey data shows that 76 percent of the surveyed households received
material aid from their relatives.20 The survey data also show that 32.4 percent of the
surveyed households received some sort of monetary aid from their relatives (see Table 4.1
and Table 4.3).21 In total, 78.4 percent of the surveyed households received material and
monetary aid when both material aid and monetary aid are considered.22
20 A household received at least one type of seven types of material aid and may have received more than one type of material aid. 21 A household received at least one of three types of monetary aid and may have received more than one type of monetary aid. 22 A household received at least one of ten types of material and monetary aid and may have received more than one type of material and monetary aid.
85
Table 4.3 Total amount of money households received from their relatives (n=81)
Amount Frequency Up to 500 23 501–1,000 10 1001–3,000 19 3001–5,000 8 5001–10,000 14 10001–20,000 4 More than 20,000 3 Total 81 Note: a household may have received money from more than one relative.
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
In addition to material and monetary aid, households received information about aid sources
and work or employment opportunities and assistance to get work from relatives. The survey
data show that 64.4 percent of the surveyed households received informational support such
as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities while 33.2 percent of
the surveyed households received assistance from relatives to get work following Aila. The
national government or local government and NGOs often distributed relief items in the
places that were far away from the studied villages. They usually distributed relief items in
the Union Parishad Headquarters or local bazaars or in other places such as river ghats (where
people and goods are taken on and off the boat), embankments and a locally known place in
the village or adjacent village or in the union.23 People came to know about the date and the
place of distribution of the relief items from their relatives and often went together to that
place to receive aid. Similarly, they received important information from their relatives
related to work or employment opportunities within the affected areas such as cash for work
and food for work programs operated by NGOs, the local government and contractors. They
also received important information from their relatives related to work or employment
opportunities in the unaffected areas or distant places so that they could undertake temporary
migration to those places to overcome their livelihood crisis. Thus, relatives served as
important sources of information after the disaster (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Islam &
Walkerden 2014).
Assistance from relatives to get work played an important role in tackling the post-Aila crisis
as the affected households in the two studied villages were not able to restore their normal
23 People of Channirchak collected relief items distributed by one NGO in the first phase from the Dacope Upazila Parishad Headquarters.
86
livelihood activities within the village for a long period following Aila due to the flooding.
Channirchak was subject to continuous inundation for almost two years (around 21 months)
and Dakshin Bedkashi was subject to continuous inundation for almost three years (around 33
months) following Aila (BWDB 2011, 2015). The qualitative data demonstrate that the
affected households usually received two types of assistance from relatives, mainly from their
relatives within the village, to get work both before and after the embankment was repaired:
a) to get temporary wage labour opportunities in their villages and surrounds, and b) to
undertake temporary migration to other places as many of the affected people were not able to
secure their income in their villages and surrounds as before Aila. Affected households were
not able to restore their normal livelihood activities even immediately after the embankment
was repaired.
Relatives helped each other to find work in their villages and surrounds. Sometimes people
formed groups to repair the embankment under private contractors for wages in the village or
affected adjacent and distant villages. Relatives helped to include each other as members of a
group. People also worked as a group in agriculture for wages or crops in the village and
surrounding villages when agriculture started after the repair of the embankment. Relatives
also helped each other by including them as members of a group. Moreover, some households
that had a considerable amount of agricultural land permitted relatives or others to cultivate
their unsuitable agricultural land for a specific period on condition that they would make this
land suitable for agriculture within the specific period by levelling the agricultural land by
cutting mud. The households that permitted relatives or others to cultivate their unsuitable
agricultural land as sharecroppers received smaller than usual amounts of crops as rent.
Likewise, relatives who used to undertake temporary migration before Aila helped the male
member/s of the non-migrant related households to undertake temporary migration after Aila.
In addition, relatives also helped one another to migrate to new places on a temporary basis
after Aila.
Another important aid that the affected households received from relatives was free labour.
The survey data show that 32.4 percent received free labour from their relatives for the repair
or construction of their houses. Although many households received free labour for various
purposes following Aila, the survey considered only the free labour for the repair or
construction of houses. The qualitative findings suggested that it was the main form of the
received free labour that households identified spontaneously. Moreover, people in the
87
studied villages consider providing free labour to their relatives when needed as a normal part
of their life. Thus, if the affected households required or asked relatives to provide free
labour, they usually received it. They received it mostly from relatives living within the
village. Another vital aid that all the surveyed households received from their relatives after
Aila was psychological support.
The category ‘other’ includes two categories: shelter support at the time of Aila and other.
Ten percent of the surveyed households took shelter at the time of Aila in their relative’s
houses and 6.8 percent of the surveyed households received other aid. All the households that
received shelter support at the time of Aila received that support from their relatives located
within the same village. Moreover, the types of aid the surveyed households mentioned in the
category ‘other’ do not include any material or monetary aid. One important type that the
affected households mentioned in the category ‘other’ included keeping rice or household
items in the house of the unaffected relatives for a period. In addition to aid items, households
mainly had access to two non-aid items, i.e. borrowing (without any interest) of food and
other necessary household items and money, from their relatives. They borrowed food and
other necessary household items and money from their relatives for a short period for meeting
survival needs. In a few cases, they also borrowed money from their relatives for starting
economic activity or repairing or constructing a house.
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Table 4.4 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250)
Types of aid Affected Relatives % (n) Relatives outside the union but not Aila affected % (n)
Relatives within the village
Relatives outside the village but within the union
Relatives outside the union but Aila affected
Food 40.8 (102) 3.6 (9) 6.4 (16) 30.4 (76) Water 12.4 (31) 1.2 (3) 2.0 (5) 20.0 (50) Clothes 4.0 (10) 1.2 (3) 1.6 (4) 13.6 (34) Utensils and other necessary household items
3.6 (9) 1.2 (3) 0.8 (2) 8.8 (22)
Shelter support at the time of Aila
10.0 (25) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Shelter support for at least a week or more
0.8 (2) 0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 2.8 (7)
Provided caring for livestock in their house
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 5.2 (13)
Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities
64.0 (160) 9.6 (24) 2.0 (5) 2.4 (6)
Assistance to get work 31.2 (78) 6.4 (16) 0.4 (1) 2.4 (6) Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila
8.4 (21) 2.0 (5) 3.6 (9) 20.4 (51)
Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities
0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.8 (2) 4.4 (11)
Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house
0.4 (1) 0.4 (1) 0.4 (1) 2.0 (5)
Housing materials for repairing or constructing house
2.4 (6) 0.4 (1) 0.8 (2) 0.8 (2)
Free labour for repairing or constructing house
27.2 (68) 2.4 (6) 1.6 (4) 4.4 (11)
Psychological support 98.4 (246) 45.6 (114) 28.0 (70) 42.0 (105) Other 3.6 (9) 0.0 (0) 0.8 (2) 3.6 (9) Note: Household may have received a particular aid from more than one relative located in one place. Household may have received more than one type of aid.
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
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4.4 Bonding Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery24
4.4.1 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue
Relatives played vital roles in evacuation and in search and rescue activities. They acted as
the first responders and the first rescuers. Relatives within the village helped one another to
evacuate to safer places during the event (and, in a few cases, immediately before the event).
They also helped one another to save lives during the event and search for and rescue
members of their households immediately after the event (Alam & Collins 2010; Shaw &
Sinha 2003). Although many people moved out of the homestead to reach safer places during
the event, others became trapped in their flooded houses or within and around their
submerged homestead.25 Among people who left their homestead to reach safer places during
the event, with a few exceptions, everyone in the two villages left their homestead only after
the villages became flooded due to the breaking of the embankments caused by the storm
surge associated with Aila. Thus, the majority experienced difficulties in reaching safer places
in the rising waters; they waded through the flooded roads, or swam against the flow of the
water. Relatives, if required and whenever possible, came forward to save their lives and
helped them to reach a safe place.
A significant number of people in the two villages became trapped in their flooded houses or
within and around their submerged homestead as the whole village became inundated within a
short period of time. The flood waters increased continuously for some hours following the
breaking of the embankments. People saved their lives by tying themselves to the trees around
their homestead, staying on the roof of their damaged houses, clinging to the remnants of their
houses, or staying in a boat which was usually tied to a tree. The comment of an interviewee
makes it clear: ‘We clung to the branches of a tree… We went to the Union Parishad
[building] by boat when the tide began to ebb [in the evening]’ (DB, 23 September 2017).
24 Kates et al. (2006) in the case of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans considered the end of the emergency period to be at six weeks, based on the point when New Orleans became dewatered due to the draining of the flood waters from the city. In the case of Aila, social and economic activities in the two studied villages did not return to a normal state before the embankment was repaired. If dewatering is considered as the end of the emergency period, then the emergency period for Channirchak would be almost 21 months while the emergency period for Dakshin Bedkashi would be almost 33 months following the event as Channirchak became dewatered in February 2011 and Dakshin Bedkashi became dewatered in March 2012 (BWDB 2011, 2015). This research defines the response period as up to one month following the event. The period after one month to the time when the embankment was repaired was a mix of response and recovery, predominantly response in nature. A mix of response and recovery was considered as there were some recovery works carried out by the NGOs and the government. The recovery activity started mainly after the embankment was repaired. 25A homestead refers to the area of land on which one or more houses belonging to a single household stand, together with the surrounding land area. A house refers solely to the dwelling structures.
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Some people who were trapped in their houses had to move to another adjacent house of
relatives or neighbours to save their lives during the flooding as their house collapsed, or the
house was about to collapse, or they felt that they could not survive in that location due to the
flood water level. Some of them moved again to another adjacent house of relatives or
neighbours to survive during the flooding. Relatives within the village also played a vital role,
when needed, in searching for relatives and rescuing them from the places where they had
become trapped immediately after the event. The following excerpt of an interviewee depicts
how relatives provided mutual assistance to one another during the event:
My younger brother brought a boat from the embankment. I put the children [mine
and those of my younger brother] and my parents on the roof of the veranda of the
house before my brother came with the boat. When my brother came with the boat, I
put everyone on the boat. By tying the boat to a tree, all members of the two families
stayed in the boat from 12 pm to 5 pm, i.e. for 5 hours. We went to the cyclone shelter
by boat around 5 pm and stayed one night at the cyclone shelter. (DB, 10 July 2017)
Although close relatives living in the village played main roles in evacuating relatives to a
safe place and saving lives of the relatives and in searching for relatives and rescuing trapped
relatives, close relatives from the adjacent villages also came forward to search and rescue
their trapped relatives. This can be clearly understood from the following excerpt:
I climbed the tamarind tree at 12 pm… My daughter was on the adjacent tree. My
husband was also on that tree with my daughter… My husband tied my daughter to
himself… My father came [from the neighbouring affected village] here after the
evening by boat, then we got down from the trees to the boat and then my father took
us to the embankment by boat. (DB, 9 July 2017)
If close relatives had not come forward to assist during the first few hours of the flooding,
many children, aged people and women would have lost their lives, particularly when male
members of the immediate household were not present at home. Relatives also helped one
another to rescue valuable items from the inundated houses and to relocate their houses to the
embankment whenever possible. They also assisted one another to prepare a muchan26 within
the homestead, in case the household did not move to the embankment, or if the household
26 A platform, made out of wood and bamboo, used to live with household items during flooding. It can be elevated when floodwaters rise.
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that moved to the embankment returned from the embankment to the homestead within a few
days of the event. In a few cases, relatives from the unaffected areas also helped their affected
relatives to relocate to the embankment or to prepare a muchan within the homestead.
4.4.2 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Survival
Both the qualitative and survey data show that many households did not receive any material
and monetary aid from relatives at any stage after Aila. For instance, 21.6 percent of the
surveyed households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives after Aila.
Nevertheless, the majority of the interviewed as well as surveyed households received either
material aid or both material and monetary aid from their relatives. The qualitative data show
that among households that received only material aid, many households did not receive any
material aid except food and/or water from relatives.27 The following excerpts of the
interviewees show that their households did not receive any material and monetary aid except
food from their relatives after Aila:
My daughter’s husband brought some rice, some vegetables and some pulse. The
father-in-law of my youngest son also brought some food. No relatives gave money…
No relatives except two gave any aid [son and his wife are the member of the same
household]. (CC, 14 July 2017)
My father-in-law gave rice one time. No relatives except father-in-law gave any aid.
(DB, 6 August 2017)
Moreover, some households that received only food from relatives did not receive any food
except dry food. However, many households received food and other material aid, although
did not receive any monetary aid, while many households received food and other material
aid as well as monetary aid. Some affected households left the affected area after the event as
they had no place to live and stayed at their relative’s house outside the affected area for a
27 The survey data also confirm this finding. For instance, 70.8 percent of households received food and 32.4 percent of households received water from relatives. In total, 70.8 percent of households received either food or both food and water from relatives as all households that received water also received food from relatives. On the other hand, 19.6 percent and 14.4 percent of the households received clothes, and utensils and other necessary household items from relatives respectively while only 4 percent, 5.2 percent and 4.4 percent of the households received shelter for a week, caring for livestock and housing materials from relatives respectively. If all seven types of material aid are considered, then the survey data show that 76 percent of the surveyed households received material aid from relatives. However, if five types of material aid except food and water are considered, then the survey data show that 34 percent of the surveyed households received material aid from relatives.
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period and then returned to the village. They generally returned to the village with some
necessary food, utensils and other household items given by relatives to start a new domestic
life in the displaced location. However, in a few cases, although the affected households left
their homestead as they had no place to live, they had to stay for a period with their close
relatives located within the village or the affected area. They received this form of shelter
support from very close unaffected relatives and affected relatives, usually from the parents’
house of the wife of the household head. Likewise, some households sent their livestock to
their relatives living outside the affected areas. The following excerpts of the three female
interviewees depict how relatives helped their households after Aila (households of the two
interviewees of Channirchak received material and monetary aid only from the unaffected
relatives, while the household of the interviewee of Dakshin Bedkashi received material aid
only from the Aila-affected parents living in the adjacent village):
We [she along with husband and two daughters] went to my father’s house on the day
following Aila. We lived there one month and then came to the village and started
living on the embankment by constructing a temporary shelter… We came to the
village with all sorts of necessary household items [that my parents and sister and
sister’s husband gave]… My parents gave me money, clothes, rice and pulse, plates
and cooking stuff, kantha [a light quilt] and pillow, they gave me everything required
to start a new sangsar [domestic life]… My sister and sister-in-law also helped me a
lot. They gave me money, rice and saree to wear. They [parents and sister and sister-
in-law] were always in touch with us… They helped me first 1 to 2 months after the
event… We require many things in our sangsar [domestic life], how many things
would they give me? (CC, 10 June 2017)
My brother gave me some flattened rice and puffed rice and 500 Taka.28 I had 16 cows
and one died due to Aila. I kept 15 cows in my brother’s daughter house located
outside the affected area. I had 22 goats and 5 died. I kept the remaining 17 goats in
my brother’s daughter house. (CC, 10 June 2017)
My mother had sarees, my father had lungis and shirts; they gave those clothes to my
father-in-law and mother-in-law and to all of us. We all members [9 members] of the
28 One hundred Taka is equivalent to 1.72 Australian Dollars or 1.18 US Dollars (as on 30 June 2020, Bangladesh Bank).
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family ate in my father’s house for 15 to 20 days and then started to eat separately [by
our own means]. (DB, 9 July 2017)
The qualitative data suggest that, except in rare cases, households did not receive any material
aid or monetary aid from their distant or most distant relatives. Almost all households
received material aid or monetary aid or both from their close blood or affinal relatives. Close
blood and affinal relatives of other households such as parents, son and daughter, brother and
sister (sibling) and their children, father’s brother and sister (sibling) and their children,
mother’s brother and sister (sibling) and their children, wife’s parents, wife’s brother and
sister (sibling) and their children from the standpoint of the male household head provided
material aid or monetary aid or both to the affected households. Out-marrying daughter and
sister of the male household head and close relatives through in-marrying wife of the male
household head (in few cases, close relatives through in-marrying son’s wife or brother’s wife
of the male household head if the family of the married son or married brother belongs to the
same household) played important roles. However, although households did not receive
material aid or monetary aid or both from their distant or most distant relatives, they received
non-material resources such as psychological support from their distant or most distant
relatives, mainly from the blood connected distant relatives living in the village. The
following excerpts show the role of distant or most distant relatives:
Relatives other than close relatives had made inquiries about our well-being.
However, they did not give food or money. (CC, 9 June 2017)
Nobody except close relatives helped us… Distant relatives did not help us. (DB, 18
June 2017)
The qualitative data also show that relatives outside the affected areas played more significant
roles compared to the affected relatives in providing material and monetary aid to the affected
households after Aila. Many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from
their affected relatives. Households that did receive material aid or monetary aid or both from
their affected relatives usually received a small amount. Other studies also show that affected
relatives cannot support others as they also experience the same situation (Mustafa 2003;
Lindell & Prater 2003; Islam & Walkerden 2014; Morrow 1997). The following excerpt
shows the inability of the affected relatives to provide material and monetary aid:
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My brothers [living in the village] had a similar situation… How could they give?
They had nothing to do without observing by their eyes and hearing by ears as they
also had the same situation. (CC, 8 June 2017)
Most households in the two villages had most of their close relatives from whom they could
receive material and monetary aid within the affected areas. For instance, the survey data
show that 80.8 and 85.2 percent of the surveyed households had most of their close relatives
within the same affected village and within the same affected union respectively. As most of
their close relatives were affected, most of them were usually not able to provide material and
monetary aid to one another. Moreover, many households did not have any relatives outside
the affected areas.29 The following excerpts of the interviewees clearly demonstrate that all
relatives of the household were also affected:
I did not receive any aid from relatives. I even did not receive meals for one time or
two times or 100 or 500 Taka… All relatives were affected. (DB, 10 July 2017)
I did not receive any [material and monetary] aid from my relatives because they were
also affected by Aila. (CC, 13 July 2017)
Furthermore, many households that had relatives outside the affected areas did not have close
relatives outside the affected areas and thus they did not generally receive any material or
monetary aid from them. Many households that did not receive any material or monetary aid
from relatives at any stage after Aila were usually the households that had all relatives in the
affected areas, or did not have any close relative outside the affected areas, or close relatives
outside the affected areas were very poor. However, households that had close relatives
outside the affected areas usually received material and monetary aid after Aila. The key
informants describe the contribution of the unaffected and affected relatives in the following
way:
After hearing that we were living on the embankment and we did not have a house,
relatives living outside came [to see us] and brought some rice, pulse and vegetables
for us. They gave us emergency support in this way. Relatives living in this area
29 An indirect survey finding also confirms this qualitative finding as the data show that 19.6 percent of the surveyed households mentioned not having any relatives outside the affected areas as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving less amount of monetary aid from the unaffected relatives after Aila.
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[village and other affected villages] had to see only, one could not support another.
Even a brother could not support his brother. (DB, 31 July 2017)
Close relatives from the outside areas helped. Close relatives of this area [affected
area] could not help as they were affected themselves. (CC, 9 June 2017)
The survey data also show that a higher percentage of the surveyed households received most
of the types of material and monetary aid from their unaffected relatives. The survey data
show that among seven types considered under material aid, a higher percentage of the
surveyed households received food and housing materials from the affected relatives
compared to the unaffected relatives while a higher percentage of the surveyed households
received water, clothes, utensils and other necessary household items, shelter support for a
week or more and caring for livestock from the unaffected relatives compared to the affected
relatives (see Table 4.4). All the surveyed households that received caring for their livestock
in their relative’s house received this support from the unaffected relatives. Moreover, the
higher percentage of the surveyed households received all three types of monetary aid from
the unaffected relatives.
The survey data by village show that 41.4 percent and 52.9 percent of the surveyed
households (n=70) in Channirchak received food from the affected relatives and unaffected
relatives respectively while 46.7 percent and 21.7 percent of the surveyed households (n=180)
in Dakshin Bedkashi received food from the affected relatives and unaffected relatives
respectively. Thus, unlike Dakshin Bedkashi, the higher percentage of the households in
Channirchak received food from the unaffected relatives compared to the affected relatives.
Although an overall higher percentage of the total surveyed households (n=250) received food
from relatives within the village or from the affected relatives compared to the unaffected
relatives, some important issues need to be kept in mind in explaining this quantitative finding
in addition to the fact that many of the affected households did not have any relatives outside
the affected areas, i.e. did not have unaffected relatives. The figure might be higher as the
survey did not distinguish between food received from relatives within the first few days of
Aila and food received from relatives later. Qualitative data show that if a relative within the
village had some rice that was saved from being washed away during Aila, then the rice was
shared with other affected relatives as well as other villagers during the first few days,
particularly during the night of Aila and the following day. It was usually a meal for one or at
best two times and mainly cooked rice without any other items or khichuri (a preparation of
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rice and lentils together). Moreover, the affected relatives in some cases also gave food to
their affected relatives from the emergency relief they received from the unaffected relatives,
outside people and organisations and the government and NGOs. Another important factor is
that although unaffected relatives provided a small amount of food in absolute terms in most
cases, the amount they provided was usually greater compared to the food affected relatives
gave to the affected households. They usually provided food for a longer period. In the case of
housing materials for repairing or constructing a house, it was found that in some cases, if
affected relatives had some extra housing materials either from their damaged houses or from
the housing materials such as polythene, tarpaulin and bamboo they received as aid from the
external agencies, then they usually gave those materials to their close relatives; for example,
to the households of siblings. In a few cases, the affected relatives bought housing materials
and provided them to their affected relatives to construct houses.
Relatives played noteworthy roles in meeting the basic survival needs of the majority of
households, until the arrival of aid from the external agencies. The nearest affected relatives
shared food with one another during the night of Aila and the following few days, if they had
some that had been saved from being washed away. This is evident in the following comment
by an interviewee: ‘I ate food first on the Tuesday night [day after Aila]… My brother was
able to save his rice… He cooked khichuri [hotchpotch] with that rice and gave it to me’ (DB,
17 June 2017). However, the sharing of food among the affected relatives happened only in
some cases as only a few households in both villages were able to save their rice or other food
items from being washed away. Thus, many people ate first after receiving food either from
their relatives living outside the affected areas, or from the people and organisations such as
rich people, businessmen, schools, colleges from the adjacent or distant unaffected areas and
the government and NGOs. Villagers started to receive emergency relief items, mostly food
and water, from the outside mainly two days after Aila. Many people did not eat any food,
particularly rice, before that. Moreover, food relief from the government and NGOs during
the first week was little or nothing. Relatives, particularly those from unaffected areas, as well
as the people and organisations from the adjacent or distant unaffected locations, played vital
roles in that period by providing food, water and other emergency relief items. The relatives
outside the affected areas also provided cooked food such as cooked rice, curry and lentils to
their affected relatives instead of uncooked food, particularly in the first week of the event. It
was not convenient to cook food in the affected villages as there was no space or wood to
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cook. The people and organisations from the unaffected areas also provided cooked food such
as khichuri in the first few days.
The qualitative data show that relatives contributed to the survival of a majority of the
affected households in the response period (up to one month), mainly during the first two
weeks. Relatives contributed to the survival of only some households after the response
period. Most of the households that received material or monetary aid or both from their
relatives received it during the first month of the event. Moreover, most of the households that
received material or monetary aid or both from their relatives received it only for survival.
The following excerpts clearly show this:
Close relatives outside the affected areas helped up to the first two weeks… They
helped up to 15 days in 95 percent of cases… Most households that received aid from
close relatives received it within the first month. They received food and some
monetary aid. (CC, 8 June 2017)
Most households received aid [food and money] from close relatives up to one to two
weeks… Some households received after that time… In most cases, households
received food and, in some cases, received both food and money. (CC, 23 August
2017)
Close relatives of the outside gave food [first] one to two weeks. In some cases, they
gave money. (DB, 11 July 2017)
Some households received either material or monetary aid or both for survival after the first
month of the event. An interviewee depicts the situation in the following way:
Relatives [two sisters and mother’s sister from outside the affected areas] helped me
up to 2 or 3 months after Aila… They [three relatives] gave me money and food… I
received 2000 to 3000 Taka from them in total and about one maund30 rice from them
in total. (CC, 23 August 2017)
Only in rare cases did households receive either material or monetary aid or both for survival
during response, mixed and recovery stages. Other studies also show that support from
relatives declines over time as they do not have enough resources to continue to support the
30 One maund is equal to 37.32 kilograms.
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affected households (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Mustafa 2003). The qualitative data reveals
that many households did not require assistance for survival after a period, particularly when
they started to receive 20 kg rice per month from the government in September 2009. They
were able to meet the basic subsistence needs with that rice along with relief from NGOs,
cash or food due to participation in cash or food for work programs (operated by the
government, NGOs and contractors) and money earned from catching fish or other work in
the affected areas, or working outside the affected areas as a temporary migrant. Moreover,
mutual borrowing and lending of food and money among related households, particularly
among related households within the village, for a short period to meet daily needs played an
important role in meeting the survival needs of the affected households. However, a few
households that received monetary aid for economic recovery and housing recovery from
relatives received it mainly after the village became dewatered due to the repair of the
embankment. Moreover, households received housing materials and free labour during the
repair or construction of the temporary shelter at the initial period and permanent housing
after the embankment was repaired.
Although relatives contributed to the survival of a majority of the affected households in the
response period, most of the affected households were not able to survive after Aila if they
were not supported by the government and NGOs. Many households did not receive any
material and monetary aid from relatives for any purpose including survival. Although the
majority received material and monetary aid from their relatives, the aid was only enough for
survival for some days in most cases. However, Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi were
subject to flooding for almost 21 months and 33 months after the event respectively. Most of
the households in both the villages struggled to meet survival needs for a long period as they
were not able to restart recovery activities and were predominantly dependent on the
government and NGOs for their survival. Thus, most of the affected households were not able
to survive after Aila if they did not receive aid from the government and NGOs and did not
have the opportunity to participate in the cash or food for work programs operated by the
government and NGOs, mainly by NGOs. Nevertheless, households were usually grateful to
their relatives for the aid they provided as it played a vital role in their survival, particularly
when there was no food from the government or NGOs. The survey data demonstrate that
70.8 percent (n=177) of the surveyed households received either both food and water or one
of these from relatives after Aila. Among the surveyed households that received both food
and water or one of these from relatives (177 out of 250), 80.2 percent of respondents
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considered that the aid was extremely important for the survival of their households during
the post-Aila period while 12.4 percent, 5.1 percent, 1.7 percent and 0.6 percent considered
that the aid was very important, moderately important, slightly important and not at all
important respectively for the survival of their households during the post-Aila period (see
Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from relatives in their survival (n=177)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
The analysis of the qualitative data shows that households received psychological support
from relatives and, if required, they usually received free labour, informational support,
assistance to get work and other aid that did not require material and monetary resources to be
invested throughout the recovery process. The qualitative data also suggest that more
households received these types of aid from the affected relatives. The survey data also
confirm this finding as the data show that the higher percentage of the surveyed households
received six categories of aid (shelter support at the time of Aila, informational support,
assistance to get work, free labour for repairing or constructing house, psychological support
and others) not considered as material and monetary aid from the affected relatives compared
to the unaffected relatives (see Table 4.4). Careful examination of the six types of aid shows
that providing these types of aid does not require material and monetary resources. Thus, the
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affected and poor relatives can also provide these types of aid to the affected relatives.
Moreover, a higher percentage of the households might have received these six categories of
aid from affected relatives as many households did not have any relatives outside the affected
areas and most of the households had most of their close relatives in the affected areas.
The above discussion clearly demonstrates that relatives greatly helped their affected relatives
to meet the basic subsistence needs, until the arrival of aid from the external agencies. They
played significant roles for the survival of the majority of the affected households in the
response phase (up to one month) and played important roles in meeting the survival needs of
some of the affected households even after the response period. Thus, the findings confirm
that bonding social capital contributes to the survival or ‘getting by’ of the affected
households after a disaster (Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock &
Narayan 2000; Pelling & High 2005). Nevertheless, most of the affected households were not
able to survive after Aila if they did not receive support from the government and NGOs.
Relatives did not contribute to the survival of many households and contributed to the
survival of the majority of the households only for a short period, although most households
had survival needs for a long period due to the nature of the event that was accompanied by
prolonged flooding.
4.4.3 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery
Although relatives contributed greatly to the survival of the affected households during the
response period and in some cases beyond the response period by providing various types of
aid, they did not play any role in the economic recovery or housing recovery of most of the
affected households. Moreover, if relatives played any sort of role in the economic recovery
or housing recovery of the affected households, they played very limited roles in most cases.
The analysis of qualitative data reveals that few households received money from relatives for
starting economic activity. Likewise, few households received money or housing materials
from relatives for repair or construction of their houses, although a significant number of the
households received free labour from relatives during the repair and construction of their
houses. The survey data reveal that 5.2 percent of the surveyed households (n=250) received
money from relatives for economic recovery. Moreover, among three types of aid directly
related to housing recovery, only 3.2 percent of the surveyed households received monetary
aid for repairing or constructing houses from relatives, while 4.4 percent of households
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received housing materials and 32.4 percent of households received free labour from relatives
respectively for repairing or constructing houses. The data show two characteristics. Firstly,
compared to the percentage of the surveyed households that received monetary aid from
relatives only for survival after the event (31.6%), a significantly lower percentage of the
households received monetary aid from relatives for either economic recovery or repairing or
constructing the house. Secondly, compared to the percentage of the surveyed households that
received either monetary aid or housing materials from relatives for repairing or constructing
houses, a significantly higher percentage of the households received free labour from relatives
for this purpose. This is expected, as providing labour does not require additional resources to
be invested.
The qualitative data demonstrate that relatives did not play any role in the economic and
housing recovery of most of the interviewed households. Relatives played direct roles in the
economic recovery process of only a few households as only a few households received any
aid from relatives for the economic recovery purpose. The few households that received
monetary aid from their relatives for economic recovery usually received only a part of the
total amount needed to start an economic activity such as agriculture or shrimp farming.
However, some households that did not receive any aid for economic recovery but received
aid for survival from relatives considered that relatives played a slight role in the economic
recovery. Likewise, although only a few households received monetary aid or housing
materials from relatives for repair or construction of their houses, many households
considered that relatives had a slight role in the housing recovery only due to the free labour
they received from their relatives. The few households that received monetary aid from their
relatives for repairing or constructing the house received a part of the cost needed. Similarly,
the few households that received housing materials received some of these as aid from
relatives. No households were found during the qualitative interviews that received either the
total or most of the required cost or all or most of the required housing materials from
relatives to repair or construct the house. Moreover, not a single interviewed household
considered that they could achieve economic and housing recovery based on the aid they
received only from relatives. This can be understood from the following excerpts of the two
interviewees (the first interviewee from Channirchak Village represents one of the few
interviewed households in the two studied villages that received substantial material aid and
monetary aid from relatives):
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My parents gave to me when I required something. When we did not receive rice from
the Union Parishad after Aila, they constructed a temporary house [on the
embankment that cost 7,000 Taka and they gave the whole amount], gave rice,
shopped for necessary food and other household items required for daily consumption,
gave water and money… They gave me money 8 to 10 times during Aila [when the
village was subject to inundation]… They gave me almost 20,000 Taka [when the
village was subject to inundation]… The monetary value of food and other household
items they provided various times [when the village was subject to inundation] was
also equivalent to almost 20,000 Taka. They also helped me to fix my kitchen and
house for cattle [cattle shelter] after the embankment was repaired.31 We managed
some money and they gave some money [to fix kitchen and cattle shelter]. They gave
2,000 to 3,000 Taka to fix the kitchen and cattle shelter. I did not receive any aid from
anyone except my parents. In addition to my parents, I received aid from NGOs and
the government… It was not possible to recover only with the aid I received from my
parents, we had to endure more hardship [if there was no support from NGOs and the
government]. (CC, 23 October 2017)
It was not possible to achieve economic and housing recovery with what we received
from relatives… Aid from relatives did not play a main role, it contributed slightly.
Relatives gave aid to us when we were starving and had no clothes to wear. They gave
to us in the initial stage. (DB, 17 June 2017)
The survey data also show that the aid from relatives did not play any role in the economic
and housing recovery for the overwhelming majority of the households (see Figure 4.4). The
survey data show that among households that received any aid from relatives (n=250),
respondents of the 78.8 percent of households considered that the aid received from relatives
did not play any role in the economic recovery of their households while 14.4 percent, 3.2
percent, 2 percent and 1.6 percent of respondents considered that the aid received from
relatives played a slightly important, moderately important, very important and extremely
important role in the economic recovery of their households respectively. Among households
that received any aid from relatives (n=250), 79.6 percent of respondents considered that the
aid from relatives was not at all important for housing recovery, while 16.4 percent, 2.8
percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.8 percent of respondents considered that the aid from relatives was
31 She received her dwelling house from a non-government organisation.
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slightly important, moderately important, very important and extremely important for housing
recovery respectively. Thus, aid from relatives had some sort of role in the economic recovery
of 21.2 percent of households and in the housing recovery of 20.4 percent of households.
Although aid from relatives had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 21.2 percent of
households, the qualitative data suggest that most respondents might have considered that
relatives had some sort of role in the economic recovery mainly due to the material and
monetary aid they received from relatives for survival. Likewise, although aid from relatives
had some sort of role in the housing recovery of 20.4 percent of households, most respondents
might have considered that relatives had some sort of role in the housing recovery mainly due
to the free labour they received from relatives for the repair or construction of the houses. In a
few cases, households borrowed money without interest from their close relatives to start an
economic activity or to construct a new house or repair the damaged house. Thus, borrowing
of money from close relatives for a period also played a very important role in the economic
and housing recovery of the affected households.
Figure 4.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=250)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
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4.4.4 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Psychological Recovery
Relatives played a noteworthy role in the psychological recovery process of the members of
the affected households. Both qualitative and survey data show that all households received
psychological support from their relatives after the disaster. The affected households received
sympathy and consolation and positive hope for the future from their relatives. The affected
households provided psychological support to one another, although they were usually not
able to provide material and monetary aid to one another and received psychological support
from their unaffected relatives. Islam and Walkerden (2014) also found that 100 percent and
94 percent of the respondents in the two coastal villages of Bangladesh received emotional
support following Cyclone Sidr from family members and in-laws respectively. The following
excerpts are from two interviewees. One interviewee did not receive any material or monetary
aid from relatives as all of his relatives were Aila affected. The other interviewee did not
receive any material or monetary aid from his unaffected married daughter. Although their
relatives did not provide material or monetary aid as they did not have the capacity to do so,
they did provide psychological support:
If brothers [living in the same village] wanted to help me [by providing material and
monetary aid], it was not possible for them to help me. It was not also possible for me
to help my brothers… Brothers provided free labour … Brothers and other relatives
gave psychological support. (CC, 13 July 2017)
My eldest daughter could not give me any aid as her economic condition was not
good. She did what she could do by keeping in touch with us and providing mental
support. (DB, 18 June 2017)
Thus, although relatives of the affected households did not have the capacity to provide
required material and monetary aid to their affected relatives, either for survival or for
economic and housing recovery, they had the capacity to provide non-material resources like
psychological support. The psychological support relatives provided greatly helped the
affected households to recover psychologically from the shock created by Aila. The survey
data also confirm it and show that, among households that received any aid from relatives
(n=250), respondents of 44 percent of households considered that aid from relatives played an
extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the members of the affected
households, while 34.4 percent, 15.2 percent and 6.4 percent of respondents considered that
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aid from relatives played very important, moderately important and slightly important roles in
the psychological recovery of the members of the affected households. None of the
respondents mentioned that aid from relatives was not at all important for psychological
recovery. Another noticeable fact is that while 78.4 percent of respondents considered that aid
from relatives had a very important and extremely important role in the psychological
recovery of the members of the affected household, only 3.6 percent and 1.2 percent of
respondents considered that aid from relatives had very important and extremely important
roles in the economic and housing recovery process of the affected households respectively.
Thus, although relatives of the affected households played very or extremely important roles
in the economic and housing recovery of a few households, they played very or extremely
important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of most households (see
Figure 4.4). This finding is consistent with the finding of Bolin and Bolton’s (1986) study,
conducted in another cultural context, that show that the aid from primary groups is more
important for psychological recovery compared to economic recovery.
The survey respondents were also asked to assess the importance of the psychological support
they received from relatives in the psychological recovery process. The results show that 44
percent of respondents consider that psychological support received from relatives played an
extremely important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected
households, while 37.2 percent, 13.6 percent and 5.2 percent considered that the
psychological support received from relatives played a very important, moderately important
and slightly important role respectively. No respondents mentioned that it was not at all
important. The survey data show that there is a slight difference between the importance of
aid in the psychological recovery process and the importance of psychological support in the
psychological recovery process. The percentage of the respondents who considered that
psychological support played an extremely important role was the same as the percentage of
the respondents who considered that aid played an extremely important role. However, the
percentage of the respondents who considered that psychological support played a very
important role was higher than the percentage of the respondents who considered aid played a
very important role. Yet, the percentage of the respondents who considered psychological
support played a moderately important or slightly important role was lower than the
percentage of the respondents who considered that aid played a moderately important or
slightly important role. While 78.4 percent of respondents considered that aid from relatives
had a very important or extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the
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members of the respondent household, 81.2 percent considered that psychological support
from relatives had a very important or extremely important role in the psychological recovery
of the members of the respondent household. This slight difference may be because when
they were asked about the importance of only psychological support, they did not relate it to
the material and monetary aid that many households did not receive or did not receive a
substantial amount if received.
The qualitative findings suggest that the psychological support the affected households
received from relatives was very intense and they received psychological support from their
relatives throughout the recovery process. It is worth noting that a ‘therapeutic community’
emerged in both villages after Aila, although it did not last long (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969;
Drabek & Key 1976, 1984; Ericson et al. 1976). Conflict emerged in both villages after Aila
due to competition for access to relief items. In a few cases, conflict also emerged due to
competition for securing a place on the embankment for temporary shelter as the space on the
embankment was limited compared to the number of affected people. However, these forms
of conflict did not usually emerge among the related households within the village,
particularly among closely related households such as households of siblings. The conflict
was mainly with neighbours and in some cases with friends (particularly distant friends) and
acquaintances within the village and was mainly due to competition for access to relief items.
The qualitative findings also demonstrate that a household that did not receive a relief item
was silent and did not have a sense of deprivation and tense, suspicious and conflictual
relations with a closely related household that did receive a relief item. However, in many
cases, the household that did not receive a relief item was not silent or had a sense of
deprivation, and sometimes the relationship became tense, suspicious and conflictual with an
unrelated household (such as neighbour or friend and acquaintance within the village) when
the unrelated household received a relief item. Moreover, on many occasions people opposed
listing a household as a possible recipient of an intervention from an NGO or the government
and urged the respective personnel of the providing agency and the elected leaders and village
leaders to remove the selected household from the list. This was argued on the grounds that
there were other vulnerable households in the village that should receive the selected
intervention instead of the household being listed. A selected household usually faced this
form of opposition from unrelated neighbours and villagers and usually did not face it from
related households due to the strong in-group solidarity.
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The qualitative findings also reveal that although bonding networks performed less well in
terms of providing material and monetary aid as the time after the disaster increased, the
affected households received continuous support, mainly psychological support along with
other aid such as free labour, information and help to get work, from their bonding networks
throughout the recovery process. Thus, their networks with relatives did not become weak or
less active or did not break down. Islam and Walkerden (2014) also found that the affected
households’ networks with relatives after Cyclone Sidr did not break down. However, the
disaster itself imposed some problems on the operation of the bonding network in two ways:
firstly, in some cases, related households that used to live in one homestead or in the adjacent
homesteads up to the event became scattered after the event. It happened because they were
not able to manage a place on the embankment to live side by side during the inundation of
the villages for a long period due to the shortage of space on the embankment. Thus, in some
cases and particularly in Channirchak, one household lived on one side of the embankment
while the other closely related household lived on the other part of the embankment, until the
village became dewatered. In a few cases, households of siblings also had the same
experience. This restricted their usual interactions and mutual borrowing and lending of goods
and money for a short time as it was very difficult to move from one side of the embankment
to the other side due to poor road networks. Similarly, households that stayed in the
homestead also experienced this problem as many of their closely related households lived on
the embankment. Moreover, permanent migration of the closely related households from both
the villages following Aila also weakened the bonding network. As the closest relatives of
some households left the village permanently, bonding networks of some households became
weak compared to the pre-disaster period. For instance, one of the interviewed households in
Dakshin Bedkashi does not have any relatives in the village as his sibling household who used
to live in the village migrated permanently to another place three days after Aila. Many
households in both the villages experienced this problem as their relatives not only from the
village but also from other affected villages left their village permanently after the event.
They did not return and many of them will never return.
4.5 Why Bonding Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery
Both qualitative and survey data reveal that although relatives played a significant role in the
survival of the majority of the households, they did not contribute to the survival of many
households as many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives
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even for survival. Moreover, although relatives contributed to the survival of the majority of
the households, they contributed only for some days in most cases. However, most of the
households in both the villages required assistance for survival for a much longer period.
Thus, although bonding networks played a significant role in the survival period, bonding
networks lacked the capacity to provide necessary material and monetary aid for survival for a
few days in many cases and for survival for a long period (as demanded by the post-Aila
situation) in most cases. Both qualitative and survey data reveal that bonding networks did not
play a much more significant role in the survival and did not play a significant role in the
economic and housing recovery mainly because of two important factors: firstly, poverty of
the relatives, and secondly, many relatives were affected. An interviewee who did not receive
any material and monetary aid depicts the situation in the following way:
I did not get anything from my relatives. I did not get food and monetary assistance.
Everyone is poor. Everyone is within the affected area. We all had the same situation.
(DB, 3rd August 2017)
The survey findings related to the monetary aid show that 98 percent of the respondents
mentioned relatives were affected, while 49.2 percent of respondents mentioned relatives
were poor and 0.8 percent of respondents mentioned other as one of the reasons for not
receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from the affected
relatives. Likewise, 60.8 percent of the respondents mentioned relatives outside the affected
areas were poor, 30.4 percent of respondents mentioned that relatives outside the affected
areas had capacity to help but did not help, 19.6 percent of respondents mentioned not having
any relative outside the affected areas and 4.4 percent of respondents mentioned other reasons
for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from the
unaffected relatives. The survey did not distinguish between close relatives and distant or
most distant relatives and thus it might be possible that a substantial percentage among 30.4
percent of unaffected relatives who did not help despite being capable were not close
relatives. It was found in the cases of almost all the qualitative interviews that they received
aid only from their close relatives.
Both poverty and their own experience of the disaster (if relatives were affected) limited the
capacity of the relatives to contribute to the survival and the economic and housing recovery.
However, a critical analysis shows that relatives were not able to contribute to the survival for
a long period or the economic and housing recovery due to poverty even if they were not
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affected. If the relatives of the affected households were not affected themselves, they could
have provided more material and monetary aid and thus could have contributed a little more
to the survival and the economic and housing recovery of the affected relatives. Moreover, if
the relatives were not affected, households that did not receive any material or monetary aid
or both could have received some. However, as relatives were usually poor, they were not
able to provide the aid needed for survival for the long period required in the post-Aila
situation, or for the economic and housing recovery of affected relatives, even if they were not
affected. This can be understood from the following excerpt from an interviewee who
received only dry food from relatives after Aila:
All my relatives are poor, all are [poor] like me… All relatives are in the Aila affected
area… If they were not affected by Aila, they would not be able to give substantial
amount of aid, they would be able to give food for two to five days or one week as all
of them live on daily physical labour. If my relatives were not affected by Aila, they
did not have capacity to construct a dochala house [double roofed house] for me like
an NGO gave to me. If my relatives were not affected by Aila, they did not have
capacity to give me 20 kg rice per month in the way the government gave 20 kg rice
per month. (DB, 9 July 2017)
Some indirect survey findings also show that most of the households do not have relatives
who are capable to contribute to the survival for a long period and the economic and housing
recovery. For instance, 77.6 percent of the respondents mentioned that if the household faces
any crisis, then they do not have anyone from whom they can receive the money required to
meet the household expenditure for at least one month as aid. Moreover, only 3.6 percent of
the respondents mentioned that it was possible to receive 20,000 Taka from their
relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances as aid to cope with the post-Aila situation
while 16 percent and 23.2 percent mentioned that it was possible to borrow (without any
interest) and receive as a loan (with interest) respectively. On the other hand, 7.6 percent of
the respondents mentioned that they have relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who
are capable of providing them 20,000 Taka as aid at present while 32.8 percent and 56 percent
mentioned that they have relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of
lending them 20,000 Taka without interest and lending them 20,000 Taka with interest
respectively at present. Thus, more than 92 percent of the households do not have anyone in
their social circles who is capable independently of providing 20,000 Taka as aid to the
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households at present. These survey findings clearly denote that most of the households have
bonding relations with poor relatives who are unable to contribute to the survival for a longer
period and the economic and housing recovery of the affected relatives, even if they are not
affected by Aila.
Thus, bonding social capital is useful for social support for a short period in most cases but
not for social leverage (Briggs 1998). Although it played an important role for survival or
‘getting by’ in the case of the majority of the affected households, for a very short period in
most cases, it did not play an important role for ‘getting ahead’ (Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000;
Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Pelling & High 2005). It contributed to
the survival for a very short period in most cases or did not contribute to the survival in many
cases and did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery of the overwhelming
majority of the households. This was because an overwhelming majority of the households
had bonding relations with poor relatives and thus embedded resources among relatives were
poor. Although bonding social capital does not play a useful role in the case of the
instrumental actions such as economic and housing recovery, it plays a useful role in the case
of expressive actions as evidenced from its important role in the psychological recovery.32 In
other words, although bonding networks do not have capacity to provide material and
monetary resources required for instrumental actions, they have the capacity to provide non-
material resources. Bonding social capital played some role in the economic and housing
recovery for only those few households that had bonding relations with relatives with
relatively rich embedded resources. Thus, the research confirms that although the bonding
relation may not be valuable for instrumental action based on the context, the bonding relation
is valuable for expressive action (Lin 2008).
The findings suggest that bonding social capital does not contribute to survival for a long
period (or to survival for a short period in many cases) and economic and household recovery
due to the homophily principle.33 People with poor resources are likely to have ties with
people who have poor resources due to the homophily principle (Lin 2001, 2008). As most of
the households were poor and lower-middle-class households, they usually had bonding
networks with poor relatives and thus did not have access to the necessary resources through
32 Instrumental actions require ‘additional or new or better resources’ while expressive actions do not require ‘additional or new resources’ (Lin 2008, p. 60–61). 33 The homophily principle denotes that ‘a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people’ (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001, p. 416).
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bonding networks.34 This was found to be the case for all but two of the qualitative
interviewees. Two poor interviewees who had bonding relationships with a middle class or
upper-middle-class relative received resources that played a significant role in the housing
recovery of those two affected households. One interviewee received 48 percent of the total
cost (25,000 Taka) required to construct a new small house from a relative while the other
interviewee received 20 percent of the total cost (55,000 Taka) required to construct a new
small house from a relative. Thus, bonding social capital in a few cases can be useful for a
poor person who has bonding relations with a relatively wealthy relative (Lin 2008).
4.6 Conclusion
Relatives played important roles in evacuation and saving lives during the event and in search
and rescue activities immediately after the event. They were the first responders and the first
people who provided rescue assistance as well as relief to their affected relatives. Affected
households received various types of aid from their relatives. They received material and
monetary aid from their close blood or affinal relatives. They usually received more material
and monetary aid from close relatives living outside the affected areas compared to the
affected relatives.
Although many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives, the
relatives of the affected households played significant roles in meeting the basic subsistence
needs of the majority of the affected households until the arrival of aid from the external
agencies. Most of the households that received material aid and monetary aid from relatives
usually received it in the first month of the event and most of them received only enough for
survival for some days. Relatives contributed significantly to the survival of a majority of the
affected households in the response phase (up to one month) and, in some cases, to the
survival of the affected households even after the response period. However, relatives did not
play any role in the economic and housing recovery for most of the households. Only some
households received monetary aid for economic recovery and material and monetary aid for
repairing or constructing houses, although a significant number of the affected households
received free labour for repairing or constructing the house.
34 The survey data show that 4 percent and 24.4 percent of the respondents assessed their household’s present socio-economic condition as ultra-poor and poor respectively while 63.2 percent and 8.4 percent of the respondents assessed their household’s present socio-economic condition as lower-middle-class and upper-middle-class. However, none of the respondents assessed their household’s present socio-economic condition as rich.
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However, relatives played a significant role in the psychological recovery process of the
members of the affected households. All the households received psychological support from
their relatives throughout the recovery process, and, if required, they usually received other
non-material and non-monetary aid such as free labour, information and help to get work
throughout the recovery process. The psychological support relatives provided greatly helped
the members of the affected households to recover psychologically following Aila. Although
bonding networks did not have the capacity to provide material and monetary resources for
economic and housing recovery to their affected relatives in most cases and for survival in
many cases, they had the capacity to provide non-material and non-monetary aid or support
such as psychological support. As the affected households received non-material and non-
monetary aid from their relatives throughout the recovery process, households’ networks with
relatives did not become weak or less active, and did not break down.
The findings demonstrate that bonding social capital plays a significant role in the survival of
the majority of the households in the response period. Moreover, although relatives
contributed to the survival of the majority, they contributed only for some days in most cases.
However, most of the households in both the villages were in need of assistance for meeting
basic survival needs for a long period due to the flooding. Thus, most households were not
able to meet survival needs after Aila if they did not receive support from the government and
NGOs. Moreover, bonding social capital did not play a significant role in ‘getting ahead’ as
evidenced from the fact that bonding networks did not play any role in the economic and
housing recovery of the overwhelming majority of the households. Bonding social capital did
not contribute to the survival of many households at all, to the survival of the majority of
households for the required longer period, or to the economic and housing recovery of most of
the affected households, as their relatives were poor and the affected relatives had their own
experience of disaster and recovery challenges. Although both poverty and their own
experience of the disaster and recovery challenges (if relatives were affected) were important,
the poverty of the relatives was the key factor that limited their capacity to contribute to the
survival and to the economic and housing recovery. As most of the affected households had
bonding relations with poor relatives, bonding networks did not contribute to their survival for
the required long period or to the economic and housing recovery. However, bonding
networks contributed to the psychological recovery as they had the capacity to provide non-
material resources despite being poor and affected.
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Thus, although bonding social capital plays an important role in post-disaster response and
recovery, it is insufficient to meet basic long-term survival needs in a post-disaster situation
like the post-Aila situation, or to achieve economic and housing recovery. Ensuring access to
basic survival needs and achieving economic and housing recovery of most of the households
requires external assistance through linking social networks such as government agencies and
national and international NGOs (Islam & Walkerden 2014; James & Paton 2015).
The next chapter will investigate how bridging social capital (i.e. the aid or support the
affected households received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances) contributed to
the disaster response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process. The chapter
will also examine how the role of bonding social capital varied from the role of bridging
social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process of the Aila-affected
households.
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Chapter 5: Role of Bridging Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery
5.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how bridging social capital contributed to the post-disaster response
and recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households in the two villages of the two
upazilas of Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter conceptualises bridging social capital as
the resources that affected households received from their bridging networks, which are the
networks of the affected households with their neighbours and friends and acquaintances. The
chapter focuses on the role of the resources that affected households received as aid or support
from neighbours and friends and acquaintances, where aid or support (hereafter aid) means
resources received free of charge or without the requirement to return anything in exchange.
However, the chapter also briefly discusses the role of non-aid items the affected households
received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances where necessary.
This chapter is divided into six further sections. Section 5.2 briefly discusses why neighbours
and friends and acquaintances have been considered as bridging instead of bonding networks.
Section 5.3 discusses the types of aid the affected households received through their bridging
networks, i.e. from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Section 5.4 examines the role
of bridging social capital in the disaster response and recovery process of the affected
households. Section 5.5 examines why bridging networks played a limited role in the survival,
economic and housing recovery process of the affected households. Section 5.6 compares the
role of bonding social capital and bridging social capital in the post-disaster response and
recovery process while section 5.7 presents the conclusion.
5.2 Understanding Bridging Networks in the Research Context
The study defines bonding networks as the relationships of the studied household with
relatives who are not the members of the studied household, and bridging networks as the
relationships of the studied household with neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Some
scholars consider relations between ’family members, close friends and neighbours’ as
bonding social capital while relations with ‘more distant friends, associates and colleagues’ as
bridging social capital (Woolcock 2001, p. 72). The term ‘family members’ has a broader
meaning as the notion of family members includes immediate members of a particular
household as well as related people or relatives who are members of other households. As a
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household in Bangladeshi villages acts as a unit and the unit of analysis in this study is the
household, the study only considers the contribution of relatives who live in other households.
The study considers neighbours, friends and acquaintances as bridging social networks
instead of bonding social networks that represent relatives only. The study considers
neighbours, friends and acquaintances as bridging social networks based on the nature of aid
households in the two villages received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances
after Aila as well as the households’ experiences and the nature of households’ networks with
relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances. The category ‘friends and acquaintances’
under bridging social capital includes not only close friends but also ‘more distant friends,
associates and colleagues’. It is worth noting that Islam and Walkerden (2014) also
considered neighbours and friends as bridging networks in understanding the role of social
networks in the post-Sidr (2007) recovery in Bangladesh.
This study considers the household’s relationships with neighbours, friends and acquaintances
as bridging because the aid the affected households received from relatives differed
significantly in both qualitative and quantitative ways from the aid the affected households
received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances.35 Szreter and Woolcock (2004, p. 654)
argue that a bonding network needs to have ‘trusting and co-operative relations between
members’. This study, based on the households’ perspectives and nature of their networks,
found that households’ relations with neighbours, friends and acquaintances were not as
‘trusting and co-operative’ as were households’ relations with relatives. Moreover,
households usually have expectations to receive material and monetary aid from relatives for
their survival as well as for the economic and housing recovery process, if the relatives have
35 The survey did not distinguish between friends and acquaintances although friends, particularly close friends, are expected at least theoretically to contribute more than acquaintances to the response and recovery process of the affected households. However, based on the results of the qualitative phase, the survey did not distinguish between friends and acquaintances as there was no significant distinction between friends and acquaintances in terms of the importance of the role they played in the response and recovery process of the affected households, particularly in terms of providing material and monetary aid after Aila. As every household in the two villages was under water for a long time after Aila and was struggling to survive and recover, the material and monetary contribution from friends did not differ significantly from that of acquaintances. Thus, the role friends played was not significantly different from the role acquaintances played in the survival and economic and housing recovery process. However, there were differences between friends and acquaintances in some areas such as in terms of intensity of psychological support they provided and free labour for the repair or construction of the houses. For instance, members of the affected households received more intense psychological support from close friends than acquaintances. Likewise, if households received free labour from friends and acquaintances, households usually received it from close friends, not from acquaintances. Moreover, if households exchanged food and money for survival with friends and acquaintances, they mainly exchanged with close friends. The survey also did not distinguish between friends and close friends as the role friends played was not significantly different from the role close friends played in the survival and economic and housing recovery process of the affected households. However, close friends usually provided intense psychological support and free labour. Moreover, households usually had exchange of food and money for a period with close friends.
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the capacity to do so. Households generally consider that close relatives have some sort of
obligations to give material and monetary aid if they are capable. Most households have
expectations to receive material and monetary aid from neighbours, friends and
acquaintances, particularly from close neighbours and close friends, for their survival for a
short period such as a day or a few days if they are capable. However, only a few households
expect that neighbours, friends and acquaintances, particularly close neighbours and close
friends, may provide them material and monetary aid for survival for a relatively long period
and the economic and housing recovery process if they are capable. Moreover, unlike
relatives, households generally do not consider that neighbours, friends and acquaintances
have some sort of obligations to provide them material or monetary aid either for survival or
the economic and housing recovery process if they are capable to do so.
In addition, Putnam (2000, p. 22) suggests that a bonding (or exclusive) network is ‘inward
looking’ and strengthens ‘exclusive identities and homogenous groups’ while a bridging (or
inclusive) network is ‘outward looking’ and connects people from diverse backgrounds. He
also argues that bonding social capital creates ‘strong in-group loyalty’ which in turn may
produce ‘strong out-group antagonism’ (p. 23). Putnam (2000, pp. 22–23) further claims that
bonding social capital supports ‘specific reciprocity’ and mobilises ‘solidarity’ among
members of homogenous groups and strengthens ‘narrower selves’, while bridging social
capital generates ‘broader identities and reciprocity’. The nature of networks of the
households in the two coastal villages shows that their networks with relatives were inward
looking while their networks with neighbours, friends and acquaintances were outward
looking. In addition, there was ‘strong in-group’ sentiment among related households,
particularly among related households in the village. With some exceptions, neighbours,
friends and acquaintances, particularly friends and acquaintances within the village, were not
part of the ‘in-group’. Thus, solidarity among related households was usually very strong,
while solidarity with neighbours and other villagers was usually weak and less intense
compared to that with relatives. In addition, households usually prioritised relatives for
mutual borrowing and lending of food and money, and in many cases they did not have any
mutual borrowing and lending with neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Aila.
Moreover, all neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the villages were not from the
same background and not members of a homogenous group. This is also true for friends and
acquaintances the affected households had outside the village and the affected areas. Thus,
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households had neighbours, friends and acquaintances who had diverse backgrounds. In other
words, as neighbours, friends and acquaintances include ‘people across diverse social
cleavages’, they represent bridging networks (Putnam 2000, p. 22). Another important fact
was that although villagers shared the same place, both villages were internally divided by
class and opposing political parties (Pelling 2007, p. 378; McCarthy 2014, p. 146). The
villages also became more divided internally due to conflicts among villagers concerning
relief items after Aila.
Lin (2008) argues that ‘social capital does not bind, or bridge. It is the nature of the social
networks that bind, bond, or bridge’ (p. 62). Thus, bonding and bridging are ‘network features
rather than social roles… some roles (e.g., neighbours, friends, relatives, etc.) can be either
bridges, bonding, both or neither’ (email communication with Professor Nan Lin, 23 July
2018). He argues that binding and bonding relations are ‘the inner layer of relations’ and
bridging relations are the outer layer of relations. The outer layer which is the community
provides ‘a sense of belongingness and general social identity’. The two villages that
represent the outer layer provided all villagers with a sense of belongingness and social
identity mediated by the membership in the village (Lin 2008).
The study also found that households usually had strong ties with close relatives and weak
ties with neighbours, friends and acquaintances. However, in a few cases where households
had strained relationships with close relatives, the tie with close relatives was weak. In
addition, their ties with distant or most distant relatives were also weak. In a few cases, it was
also observed that households had strong ties with neighbours and close friends. So, all
bonding ties are not essentially strong, and all bridging ties are not essentially weak (Pelling
& High 2005). However, it is also worth noting that the weak tie component of the bonding
network did not contribute, while the strong tie component of the bonding network
contributed to the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households. This
weak tie component of the bonding network had no obligations. In most cases, this included
distant and most distant relatives, and in a few cases close relatives with whom the household
had a strained relationship arising from an issue such as ownership of land. Thus, they did not
provide any aid to one another and did not participate in mutual borrowing and lending of
food and money, even for a short period.
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5.3 Aid Received Through Bridging Networks
Neighbours, friends and acquaintances act as important sources of aid or support in a disaster.
Aid or support from them play a vital role in the disaster response and recovery process of the
affected households (Bolin 1982; Bolin & Bolton 1986; Bolin 1994).
Table 5.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances36 (n=250)
Types of aid Neighbours (%)
Friends and acquaintances (%)
Food 14.8 17.6 Water 6.8 10.8 Clothes 1.6 6.0 Utensils and other necessary household items 0.8 1.6 Shelter support at the time of Aila 5.2 0.8 Shelter support for at least a week or more 0.8 0.0 Provided caring for livestock in their house 0.0 0.0 Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities
52.4 25.6
Assistance to get work 26.4 14.8 Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila 0.4 2.0 Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities
0.0 0.8
Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house 0.0 0.0 Housing materials for repairing or constructing house 0.4 0.4 Free labour for repairing or constructing house 10.0 4.0 Psychological support 92.0 60.4 Other 2.4 2.0
36 Data for friends and acquaintances was created by combining four variables: particular aid the affected households received from: 1. friends and acquaintances within the village, 2. friends and acquaintances outside the village but living within the union, 3. friends and acquaintances living outside the union but were affected by Aila, 4. friends and acquaintances living outside the union but were not affected by Aila, i.e. from the unaffected friends and acquaintances. It is worth noting that the two studied villages and the two unions within which the two studied villages are located were fully affected by Aila. A household that received a listed type of aid from friends and acquaintances located in any place has been considered as a recipient of that type of aid. Thus, if a household received a listed type of aid from friends and acquaintances of at least one place out of friends and acquaintances of the four places, then the household was considered as a recipient of that aid. A household that did not receive a listed type of aid from friends and acquaintances located in any place has been considered as a non-recipient of that aid. For instance, if a household received food from friends and acquaintances of one place, or from friends and acquaintances of two places, or from friends and acquaintances of three places or from friends and acquaintances of all the four places, then it was considered that the household received food from their friends and acquaintances. If the household did not receive food from the friends and acquaintances of any place, then it was considered that the household did not receive any food from friends and acquaintances. Thus, it is possible that one household that received food from friends and acquaintances may have received food from friends and acquaintances located in more than one place and from more than one friend and acquaintance located in one place. In addition, households may have received more than one type of aid. The data presented in Table 5.1 for the 15 types of aid other than food from friends and acquaintances have also been presented based on the same logic. Data for neighbours: households may have received a particular aid from more than one neighbour, and households may have received more than one type of aid.
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Table 5.1 shows the 16 types of aid the surveyed households received from their neighbours,
friends and acquaintances after Aila. Respondents were asked in the survey from a list
containing 16 types of aid (including ‘other’ as a category in the list) to indicate which aid
they received from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances after Aila. The types of aid
included in the survey were based on the findings of the qualitative phase.
An analysis of the survey data show that 92 percent of the surveyed households (n=250)
received at least one type of aid listed in Table 5.1 from neighbours. Likewise, 64.4 percent of
the surveyed households (n=250) received at least one type of aid listed in Table 5.1 from
friends and acquaintances. In other words, 8 percent and 35.6 percent of the surveyed
households did not receive any aid listed in Table 5.1 from their neighbours, and friends and
acquaintances respectively. However, among households that received aid from neighbours,
friends and acquaintances, many households did not receive any aid except psychological
support. If psychological support is not considered, then 65.2 percent of the surveyed
households received at least one type of aid from neighbours. Likewise, if psychological
support is not considered, then 39.2 percent of the surveyed households received at least one
type of aid from friends and acquaintances. Similarly, among households that received aid
from neighbours and friends and acquaintances, the overwhelming majority of the households
did not receive any material or monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances.
Thus, aid the affected households received from their neighbours and friends and
acquaintances after Aila and the role the received aid played in the response and recovery
process of the affected households can be better understood if all 16 types of aid presented in
Table 5.1 are listed under six categories (see Table 5.2).
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Table 5.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid
Six categories 16 types of aid Material Aid (includes seven types)
Food Water Clothes Utensils and other necessary household items Shelter support for at least a week or more Provided caring for livestock in their house Housing materials for repairing or constructing house
Monetary Aid (includes three types)
Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house
Information and assistance to get work (includes two types)
Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work
Labour Free labour for repairing or constructing house Psychological support Psychological support Other (includes two types) Shelter support at the time of Aila
Other
The analysis of the survey data show that 16.80 percent of the surveyed households received
material aid37 from neighbours and 0.4 percent of the surveyed households received any sort
of monetary aid38 from neighbours. In total, 17.2 percent of the surveyed households received
material and monetary aid39 from neighbours. The analysis of the survey data show that 18.40
percent of the surveyed households received material aid from friends and acquaintances and
2.4 percent of the surveyed households received any sort of monetary aid from friends and
acquaintances. In total, 18.40 percent of the surveyed households received material and
monetary aid from friends and acquaintances.40
In addition to the material and monetary aid, households received informational support such
as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities and assistance to get
work from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. The survey data show that 52.4 percent
of the surveyed households received informational support and 26.4 percent of the surveyed
households received assistance from neighbours to get work following Aila. Likewise, 25.6
37 A household received at least one type of seven types of material aid and may have received more than one type of material aid. 38 A household received at least one type of three types of monetary aid and may have received more than one type of monetary aid. 39 A household received at least one type of ten types of material and monetary aid and may have received more than one type of material and monetary aid. 40 See footnotes 37, 38 and 39 for material aid, monetary aid, and material and monetary aid.
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percent of the surveyed households received informational support and 14.8 percent of the
surveyed households received assistance from friends and acquaintances to get work
following Aila. As discussed in Chapter 4, like relatives, neighbours, friends and
acquaintances served as important sources of information (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013). The
affected households received information from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances
about various aid sources and the date and place of the distribution of relief items by the
national government or local government and various NGOs. They also obtained important
information from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances related to work or employment
opportunities in the affected areas as well as in the unaffected areas or distant places so that
they could employ temporary migration to those places to succeed in dealing with their
livelihood crisis.
The qualitative data demonstrate that neighbours, friends and acquaintances helped the
affected households to get work as wage labourers in their villages or nearby and to undertake
temporary migration to other places both before and after the embankment was repaired.
Neighbours, friends and acquaintances helped the affected households to get work by
including male members of the affected households in a group that worked to repair the
embankment under private contractors for wages in the village and other affected adjacent or
distant villages. Moreover, they also helped the affected households to get work by including
the male member(s) of a household in a group that worked in agriculture for wages or crops in
the village and surrounding villages when agriculture recommenced after repairing the
embankment. Furthermore, neighbours and close friends who had a considerable amount of
agricultural land permitted some of the affected households to cultivate their unsuitable
agricultural land for a specific period in return for a smaller amount of crops than the usual
conditions of sharecropping, so that they level the land surface by cutting mud and thus render
it suitable for cultivation in future years.41 Likewise, neighbours, friends and acquaintances
assisted those affected households from which member(s) did not undertake temporary
migration before Aila to employ temporary migration after Aila. In addition, they also helped
each other to undertake temporary migration to new places after Aila.
41 This happened in Channirchak where people use land for rice production. In Dakshin Bedkashi, people usually do not produce rice and thus use land for shrimp farming. Agricultural land became unsuitable for cultivation as it was subject to continuous inundation by saline water (part of the year) for a long period of time. The land became very high due to the sediment the tidal water brought or became very low due to erosion caused by the tidal flood water. It took many years to bring the land under agricultural production. There is still agricultural land in Channirchak which was not under cultivation as the sediment has not been removed yet.
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Another important aid that the affected households received from neighbours, friends and
acquaintances was free labour for the repair or construction of the house. Ten percent of
households received free labour from neighbours, while 4 percent of households received free
labour from friends and acquaintances during the repair or construction of the house. It is
worth noting that many households did not consider that they were able to receive free labour
from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances.
The most important aid the affected households received from neighbours and friends and
acquaintances was psychological support. Ninety-two percent of the surveyed households
received psychological support from their neighbours while 60.4 percent of the surveyed
households received psychological support from their friends and acquaintances.
The category ‘other’ includes two types: shelter support at the time of Aila and other. Almost
5 percent and 0.8 percent of the surveyed households took shelter in their neighbours’ houses
and friends and acquaintances’ houses at the time of Aila respectively. Two households that
received shelter in their friends and acquaintances’ houses at the time of Aila received it from
friends and acquaintances within the village. Moreover, 2.4 percent and 2 percent of the
surveyed households received other aid from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances
respectively. In addition to aid items, households borrowed food and other necessary
household items and money from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. The survey data
show that 27.6 percent (n=69) of the surveyed households borrowed money from neighbours
and friends and acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila crisis. The qualitative data suggest
that households usually borrowed these items for a very short period in order to meet their
survival needs. Moreover, 7.6 percent (n=19) of the surveyed households took a loan (with
interest) from neighbours, friends and acquaintances for various purposes including survival
and starting recovery activity.
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Table 5.3 Percentage of the households that received aid from friends and acquaintances (n=250)
Types of aid Affected friends and acquaintances % (n)
Friends and acquaintances outside the union but not Aila affected % (n)
Within the village
Outside the village but within the union
Outside the union but Aila affected
Food 7.6 (19) 1.6 (4) 2.8 (7) 6.8 (17) Water 5.2 (13) 0.8 (2) 1.6 (4) 3.2 (8) Clothes 3.2 (8) 0.8 (2) 0.4 (1) 2.8 (7) Utensils and other necessary household items
1.2 (3) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.4 (1)
Shelter support at the time of Aila
0.8 (2) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Shelter support for at least a week or more
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Provided caring for livestock in their house
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities
22.4 (56) 3.2 (8) 1.6 (4) 1.2 (3)
Assistance to get work 10.0 (25) 4.0 (10) 1.2 (3) 1.2 (3) Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 2.0 (5)
Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities
0.0 (0) 0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.4 (1)
Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Housing materials for repairing or constructing house
0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Free labour for repairing or constructing house
2.8 (7) 0.4 (1) 0.4 (1) 0.4 (1)
Psychological support 54.4 (136)
14.8 (37) 9.2 (23) 8.8 (22)
Other 2.0 (5) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) Note: Household may have received a particular aid from more than one friend and acquaintance located in one place. Household may have received more than one type of aid.
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
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5.4 Bridging Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery
5.4.1 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue
Neighbours, and in some cases friends and acquaintances within the village, played a vital
role in helping the affected households in evacuation to the safer places during the event (in a
few cases, immediately before the event), saving lives during the event and in search and
rescue activities immediately after the event (Shaw & Goda 2004; Shaw & Sinha 2003; Shaw
2014b; Islam & Walkerden 2014). Many people left their homestead to reach a safe place,
while many people became trapped in their flooded houses or within and around their
submerged homestead. Among people who left their homestead to go to safer places in the
two villages, most people42 left their homestead after the villages became flooded due to the
breaking of embankments caused by the storm surge associated with Aila. Thus, the majority
encountered difficulties in reaching safer places as they had to wade through the flooded
roads or swim against the flow in the rising waters. Neighbours, friends and acquaintances
within the village, when needed, saved their lives and assisted them to reach a safe place. The
following excerpt from an interviewee, who along with her adult son was trying to go to the
adjacent cyclone shelter from her house by swimming, depicts how people came forward to
save lives and assist in reaching a safe place:
We could not reach the cyclone shelter by swimming. I went down below the surface
of the water; my son also went down below the surface of the water. People who were
in the cyclone shelter during that time [saved us and] took us to the cyclone shelter.
(DB, 17 June 2017)
Among people who left their homestead, many people stayed in their own houses or within
and around their homestead at the initial stage of the flooding and left their homestead later.
They had to move to their neighbour’s house (or relative’s house) during the later stage of the
flooding as their house had collapsed or was about to collapse, or they felt that they could not
survive in their house, or within and around their homestead, as the flood water level
42 The survey data show that household members (who were present at home on the day of Aila) of 99.2 percent of the total surveyed households moved from their homestead to other places on the day of Aila (before, during and after the flooding). The data show that 89.6 percent of the total surveyed households left their homestead after both their homestead and house were inundated, 6.8 percent left their homestead after only their homestead inundated, and 0.8 percent left their homestead before their homestead inundated. Also, in the case of 2 percent of households, some members of the household moved before the homestead inundated and some members moved both after the homestead and house were inundated.
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increased continuously for some hours. This can be understood from the following excerpt of
an interviewee who left her homestead after her house had collapsed:
When the whole house collapsed, I was standing in the courtyard and the level of
water was equal to the height of my chest… I left my homestead after that with my
child held to my breast [to go to the nearby building of a neighbour]. I lived in that
building that night. (CC, 25 October 2017)
Many of them had to move again to another adjacent house of a neighbour (or a relative) to
survive during the flooding as the neighbour’s house (or relative’s house) where they moved
first also collapsed. The survey data show that 5.2 percent and 0.8 percent of the surveyed
households took shelter at their neighbour’s house and friends and acquaintances’ houses at
the time of Aila respectively. The qualitative data suggests that people who took shelter in the
adjacent house of neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village (and relatives
within the village) in most cases were not able to go to other safer places such as an
embankment, cyclone shelter or school building in the rising waters.
In both the villages, a sizable number of people became trapped in their flooded houses or
within and around their submerged homestead. Neighbours, friends and acquaintances within
the village helped the affected households, when needed, in searching for members of these
households. They also played an active role, when needed, in rescuing members of the
affected households from their flooded houses or submerged homesteads or other places
where they were trapped immediately after the event. The following excerpt shows how a
neighbour came forward to rescue members of the household of a male interviewee who was
not at home during the event:
We were all at Bazaar… They [family members] survived by clinging to the branches
of a tree… All of them clung to the same tree… When the tide became stable, [a
neighbour] Masud [pseudonym] bhai [brother] rescued them and took them to the
union parshad. (DB, 18 June 2017)
Among neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village, neighbours played a more
important role as neighbours’ households were generally close to the affected households
compared to the houses of friends and acquaintances within the village. Young people in the
neighbourhood and village played vital roles in evacuation and search and rescue activities. In
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some cases, children, aged people and women would have lost their lives if they had not been
assisted by their neighbours, friends and acquaintances during the first few hours of the
flooding. They also helped to rescue valuable items from inundated houses whenever
possible. Moreover, they helped one another to relocate their houses to the embankment or to
prepare a muchan within the homestead. Neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the
village played more important roles in evacuation and saving lives during the event compared
to their role in the search and rescue activities. Members of the related households within the
village mainly helped one another to search for and rescue members from the trapped places
immediately after the event.
5.4.2 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Survival
Although bridging social capital played an important role in evacuation and search and rescue
activities, bridging social capital did not contribute to the survival of most of the affected
households. An analysis of the qualitative interviews shows that most of the interviewed
households did not receive any material or monetary aid from their neighbours at any stage
after Aila. Some households that received material aid from neighbours usually received food
and water. Except in rare cases, households did not receive clothes, utensils and other
necessary household items from neighbours. Moreover, none of the interviewed households
received shelter support for a week or more, or caring for livestock, or housing materials as
assistance from neighbours. The qualitative data also show that no household received any
sort of monetary aid from neighbours. The survey data show that 82.8 percent of the surveyed
households did not receive any material or monetary aid from neighbours. The data also show
that 14.8 percent, 6.8 percent, 1.6 percent and 0.8 percent of the surveyed households received
food, water, clothes, utensils and other necessary household items from neighbours
respectively. Moreover, 0.8 percent of households received shelter support for at least a week
or more and only 0.4 percent of households received housing materials for repairing or
constructing the house, while none of the surveyed households received assistance in caring
for livestock from their neighbours. Furthermore, only one surveyed household received
monetary aid (only 100 Taka) only for surviving the disaster from neighbours.
An analysis of the qualitative interviews shows that most of the interviewed households did
not receive any material or monetary aid from their friends and acquaintances at any stage
after Aila. Some households that received material aid from friends and acquaintances
received food and water. In a few cases, households received clothes from their friends and
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acquaintances. For instance, among all the qualitative in-depth interviews with the
interviewees from the studied households, only two households received clothes from their
friends and acquaintances. Both households received this from friends and acquaintances
(from friends) of the unaffected areas and both households were from Dakshin Bedkashi.
Except in rare cases, they did not receive utensils and other necessary household items from
friends and acquaintances. None of the interviewed households received shelter support for a
week or more, caring for livestock and housing materials from friends and acquaintances. The
qualitative data also show that only two households among all the interviewed households
received money from friends and acquaintances. Both households received it from friends and
acquaintances of the unaffected areas and both households were from Dakshin Bedkashi.
Both households received money only for surviving the disaster. One household received
money (along with money to buy clothes for family members) from a friend who lives in
Dhaka and another female-headed household43 received money (along with food such as
flattened rice, rice and clothes) from her brother’s friends who live in Khulna City. The
following statements of the interviewee who received money from his friend who lives in
Dhaka depict the event clearly:
I received 10,000 Taka from a friend. He was my partner in a shrimp firm before Aila
[during 1998–1999 and business was closed due to loss; the person was from Khulna
and had been living in Dhaka from before Aila]. However, I had friendship with him; I
also have communication with him up to now. He phoned me after hearing about Aila
and gave me 10,000 Taka… Later I went to Dhaka, I worked there after Aila and met
him in Dhaka. He gave me 3,000 Taka again and told me to buy clothes for children
with that money. (DB, 17 June 2017)
The survey data show that 81.6 percent of the surveyed households did not receive any
material or monetary aid from friends and acquaintances. The data show that 17.6 percent,
10.8 percent, 6 percent and 1.6 percent of the surveyed households received food, water,
clothes, and utensils and other necessary household items from friends and acquaintances
respectively. Moreover, only 0.4 percent of households received housing materials for
repairing or constructing the house, while none of the surveyed households received shelter
support for at least a week or more or caring for livestock from their friends and
43 All her brothers also live in the same village. Her brothers’ households also received money along with food such as flattened rice, rice and clothes from her brother’s friends.
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acquaintances. The data also show that only 2 percent of households (n=5) received monetary
aid for surviving the disaster from friends and acquaintances.44 The survey data also show that
more households received material aid from the affected friends and acquaintances while
more households received monetary aid from the unaffected friends and acquaintances (see
Table 5.3).
An analysis of the qualitative data shows that households that received food and water from
neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village received this mainly during the
night or next day of Aila.45 If a neighbour or friend and acquaintance within the village had
saved some rice from being washed away during Aila, then the household shared the rice with
other affected people during the night of Aila and the following day. It was typically a meal
for one or at best two times and mainly cooked rice without any other items or khichuri. This
was really a very small amount of food that contributed greatly to the survival. If any
household had some rice among all the households that gathered in one place, such as a
school building, Union Parishad building or cyclone shelter, then people cooked it and
distributed it among all those present. This can be understood from the following excerpt of
an interview:
We had a drum of rice. The drum was being washed away by the flooded water; I
saved the drum by swimming. Rice in the drum became wet as water entered the
drum. We went to the Union Parishad along with that drum of rice. People who came
to the Union Parishad did not have any rice. We cooked that rice and ate it with salt
that night. We gave that rice to everyone present there. All families [20 to 25 families]
at the Union Parishad ate cooked rice from that rice. (DB, 17 June 2017)
The qualitative data also show that after the night or following day after Aila, households
generally received material aid or monetary aid or both (mainly material aid) from
neighbours, friends and acquaintances in four ways. Firstly, some households received mainly
44 The survey data show that six households received monetary aid from friends and acquaintances. Three households received from friends and three households from acquaintances. While one friend was from the affected areas (outside the village but within the union) and two friends were from outside the Aila affected areas, all three acquaintances were from outside the Aila affected areas. One household received 6,000 Taka from the affected friend for economic recovery only, one household received 1,100 Taka from a friend from the unaffected areas for survival only and another household received 12,000 Taka from a friend from the unaffected areas for both survival and economic recovery. Three households that received money from acquaintances received money only for survival (one household received 1,500 Taka and two households received 500 each). 45 The survey did not distinguish between food received from neighbours or friends and acquaintances within the first few days of Aila and food received from neighbours or friends and acquaintances later.
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food and water from their neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances as
neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances gave from what they received as aid
from other sources such as relatives outside the affected areas. Households usually received
emergency food and water for survival and, except in a few cases, households received this
form of aid during the first few days of the event. This can be understood from the following
excerpts:
My neighbours were affected, I was also affected. Thus, I had nothing to do. Relatives
from the outside gave me something and I gave something to neighbours from that.
Many people did like that. (CC, 8 June 2017, Key informant)
I did not receive anything from neighbours. I received aid sometimes from an
acquaintance whom I met after Aila when I was doing BRAC’s work [cash for work
program operated by BRAC, an NGO] with her. She received more vegetables and
water from her relatives compared to us and she used to give me some from that aid.
(CC, 25 August 2017)
Secondly, only a few households received material aid and monetary aid for survival from
friends (not acquaintances) outside the affected areas due to the previous friendship. They
received this within the first few weeks of the event. Thirdly, some households received
material aid as one-off relief from a few neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the
village and affected areas.46 Fourthly, some households received material aid as one-off relief
from acquaintances of the unaffected adjacent and distant places. In the case of the third and
fourth ways, households generally received a one-off relief packet from neighbours or friends
and acquaintances of the affected areas or the acquaintances of the unaffected areas as part of
the group distribution process, not as an individually targeted household, due to being
neighbours and friends and acquaintances of the person who donated the relief. Households
received mainly food, water and clothes as one-off relief. However, these types of one-off
relief distributions usually covered only a section of the households of a village, not all the
46 For instance, one Aila-affected household in Channirchak distributed emergency relief items among related households within the village and households of neighbours and friends and acquaintances of a section of the village. The household that distributed relief items was also severely affected by Aila and lost income from agriculture in the village. However, the household did not experience complete loss in its usual income as two sons of the household head used to derive income from an area not affected by Aila even from the pre-Aila period. Likewise, an out-marrying woman of Dakshin Bedkashi, who was married to an area not affected by Aila, distributed almost 70 to 75 relief packets (each packet contains 2–3 kg rice and 1 kg flattened rice) via her father who lives in Dakshin Bedkashi. Moreover, two outside persons who were the owners of a shrimp farm in Dakshin Bedkashi distributed relief items among households of a section of the village.
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households. Moreover, one person usually distributed once, and the majority distributed
during the first two weeks of the event.
Neighbours and friends and acquaintances did not contribute to the survival of most of the
households. They contributed to the survival of only some households. Although the aid some
households received was only enough for survival for a day in most cases, they were usually
grateful to their neighbours and friends and acquaintances for the aid they provided as it
played vital roles for survival, particularly during the night and following day of Aila. The
survey data show that 14.8 (n=37) and 17.6 (n=44) percent of the surveyed households
received either both food and water or one of these two items from neighbours, and friends
and acquaintances respectively after Aila.47 Among the households that received both food
and water or one of these two items as aid from neighbours, 21.6 percent of respondents
considered that the aid was extremely important for survival while 27 percent, 29.7 percent,
18.9 percent, and 2.7 percent of respondents considered that the aid was very important,
moderately important, slightly important, and not at all important respectively for the survival
of their households during the post-Aila period (see Figure 5.1). Among the households that
received both food and water or one of these two items as aid from friends and acquaintances,
45.5 percent of respondents considered that the aid was extremely important for the survival
of their households while 13.6 percent, 25 percent, 13.6 percent, and 2.3 percent of
respondents considered that the aid was very important, moderately important, slightly
important, and not at all important respectively for the survival of their households during the
post-Aila period (see Figure 5.2).
47 Food and water received at any period following Aila.
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Figure 5.1 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from neighbours in their survival (n=37)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
Figure 5.2 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from friends and acquaintances in their survival (n=44)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
The analysis of the qualitative data shows that although only some households received
material aid and monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances at any stage after
Aila, most households received psychological support from these sources. In addition, a
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significant number of households received informational support and assistance to get work.
Moreover, although many households mentioned that they did not receive labour from
neighbours and friends and acquaintances without money, many households received free
labour for the repair or construction of houses from neighbours, and friends and
acquaintances, mainly from close friends. In sum, although bridging networks did not perform
well in providing material and monetary aid after the first few days of the event, the affected
households received resources that did not require material resources to be invested such as
psychological support, informational support and help to get work for a longer period.
However, many households did not even receive non-material resources from the bridging
networks after a period, as their relationships with neighbours and friends and acquaintances
became conflictual after a period, mainly due to the competition for relief items. For instance,
neighbours and villagers on many occasions concealed information from non-related
households if the information was related to any livelihood or housing intervention, as some
had a belief that the amount of interventions was limited compared to the demand. In addition
to the aid or support, mutual borrowing and lending of food and money among neighbours
and close friends within the village and adjacent villages for a short period to meet daily
needs played an important role in meeting the survival needs of the affected households,
although many households did not have any mutual exchange with people other than relatives.
5.4.3 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery
Bridging social capital did not play an important role in the economic and housing recovery
of the affected households. The qualitative data show that none of the interviewed households
received monetary aid from neighbours for any purpose, while only two households received
monetary aid from friends and acquaintances (received from a friend/friends) and both the
households received that money for survival, not for economic and housing recovery.
Moreover, none of the interviewed households received housing materials from neighbours or
from friends and acquaintances. However, many households received free labour from
neighbours for the repair or construction of their houses after Aila, while some households
received free labour from friends and acquaintances, mainly from close friends, for the repair
or construction of the houses after Aila.
The survey data show that no household received monetary aid from neighbours for economic
recovery while 0.8 percent of households received monetary aid from friends and
acquaintances for economic recovery. The survey data on three types of aid directly related to
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housing recovery show that none of the surveyed households received monetary aid from
neighbours for the repair or construction of their houses, while 0.4 percent of households
received housing materials and 10 percent of households received free labour from
neighbours for the repair or construction of their houses. Likewise, the survey data show that
no household received monetary aid from friends and acquaintances for the repair or
construction of their houses, while 0.4 percent of households received housing materials and 4
percent of households received free labour from friends and acquaintances for the repair or
construction of their houses. Thus, both the qualitative and survey data show that no
household received monetary aid for economic and housing recovery from neighbours.
Moreover, the qualitative data show that no household received monetary aid for economic
and housing recovery from friends and acquaintances, while the survey data show that 0.8
percent of households received monetary aid for economic recovery and no household
received monetary aid for housing recovery from friends and acquaintances. Likewise, both
the qualitative and survey data confirm that, except in rare cases, they did not receive housing
materials for repairing or constructing their houses from neighbours and friends and
acquaintances.
Analysis of the qualitative interviews shows that none of the interviewed households
considered that the aid they received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances had any
significant role in the economic recovery. Likewise, none of the interviewed households
considered that the aid they received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances had any
significant role in the housing recovery, although some households acknowledged that the
free labour they received during the repair or construction of the houses was useful and thus
had a slight role in the housing recovery. In sum, bridging social capital in general did not
play any role in the economic recovery of the affected households. Likewise, except in a few
cases, it did not play any role in the housing recovery of the affected households. It played
some sort of role in the housing recovery of a few households by providing free labour during
the repair or construction of the houses.
The findings of the survey also confirm these qualitative findings. Among households that
received any aid from neighbours (n=230), respondents of 97.8 percent of households (225
out of 230 households) considered that the aid from neighbours was not at all important for
economic recovery, while respondents of 2.2 percent of households (5 out of 230) considered
that the aid was slightly important for economic recovery. No household considered that aid
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from neighbours had either a moderately important or very important or extremely important
role in the economic recovery (see Figure 5.3). Likewise, among households that received any
aid from friends and acquaintances (n=161), respondents of 96.9 percent of households (156
out of 161 households) considered that the aid was not at all important for economic recovery
while respondents of 1.9 percent (n=3), 0.6 percent (n=1) and 0.6 percent (n=1) of households
considered that the aid was slightly important, moderately important and very important
respectively. No household considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances had an
extremely important role in economic recovery (see Figure 5.4).
Among households that received any aid from neighbours (n=230), respondents of 94.8
percent (218 out of 230 households) considered that the aid from neighbours was not at all
important for housing recovery while 4.8 percent (11 out of 230 households) and 0.4 percent
(one household) considered that the aid from neighbours was slightly important and
moderately important for housing recovery respectively. No household considered that the aid
from neighbours had either a very important or extremely important role in the housing
recovery (see Figure 5.3). Based on the qualitative data, it can be argued that 4.8 percent out
of 230 households considered that neighbours had a slight role in the housing recovery
process only due to the free labour the households received from their neighbours during the
repair or construction of the houses after Aila. Likewise, for households that received any aid
from friends and acquaintances (n=161), 99.4 percent (160 out of 161 households) considered
that the aid from friends and acquaintances was not at all important for housing recovery,
while 0.6 percent (n=1) considered that the aid was very important for housing recovery (see
Figure 5.4).
Thus, aid from neighbours had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 2 percent (n=5)
of the total surveyed households and in the housing recovery of 4.8 percent (n=12) of the total
surveyed households. Likewise, aid from friends and acquaintances had some sort of role in
the economic recovery of 2 percent (n=5) of the total surveyed households and in the housing
recovery of 0.4 percent (n=1) of the total surveyed households. In addition to aid, a few
households took a loan with interest from neighbours and friends and acquaintances for
starting economic activity such as agriculture, shrimp farming and business and repairing or
constructing houses. The survey data show that among households that took a loan from
neighbours, friends and acquaintances (n=19), seven households took a loan for starting
economic activity while one household took a loan for repairing or constructing a house.
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Figure 5.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from neighbours in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=230)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
Figure 5.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from friends and acquaintances in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=161)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
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5.4.4 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Psychological Recovery
Neighbours, friends and acquaintances played an important role in the psychological recovery
process of the members of the affected households. The qualitative data reveal that although
most households did not receive material or monetary aid from their neighbours, friends and
acquaintances, most households received psychological support. The survey data also reveal
that among all types of aid that the affected households received from neighbours and friends
and acquaintances, the highest percentage of the households received psychological support
from neighbours as well as from friends and acquaintances (see Table 5.1). Thus, although
neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected households did not have the capacity to
provide the required material and monetary aid for survival or for economic and housing
recovery, they had the capacity to provide non-material and non-monetary resources like
psychological support. Neighbours and friends and acquaintances provided sympathy and
consolation and positive hope for the future to the affected households. The affected
households provided psychological support to one another and received psychological support
from their unaffected friends and acquaintances, mainly from friends. The psychological
support neighbours, friends and acquaintances provided greatly helped the affected
households to recover psychologically from the shock created by Aila.
The survey data also confirm this and show that among households that received any aid from
neighbours (230 of 250) after Aila, respondents of 10.9 percent (n=25) and 36.5 percent
(n=84) of households considered that the aid from neighbours played an extremely important
role and very important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the
affected households respectively. The data show that respondents of 27.8 percent (n=64) and
19.6 percent (n=45) of households considered that the aid from neighbours played a
moderately important role and slightly important role respectively, while respondents of 5.2
percent (n=12) of households considered that the aid from neighbours did not play any role in
the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households (see Figure
5.3). Among households that received any aid from friends and acquaintances (161 of 250)
after Aila, respondents of 8.1 percent (n=13) and 34.8 percent (n=56) of households
considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances played an extremely important role and
very important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected
households respectively. The data show that respondents of 37.9 percent (n=61) and 16.8
percent (n=27) of households considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances played a
moderately important role and slightly important role respectively, while respondents of 2.5
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percent (n=4) of households considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances did not
play any role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households
(see Figure 5.4).
Another noticeable fact is that while 43.6 percent (n=109) of the total respondents (n=250)
considered that aid from neighbours had a very important and extremely important role in the
psychological recovery of the members of the affected household, no respondents considered
that aid from neighbours had a very important and extremely important role in the economic
and housing recovery process of the affected households respectively. Likewise, while 27.6
percent (n=69) of the total respondents (n=250) considered that aid from friends and
acquaintances had a very important and extremely important role in the psychological
recovery of the members of the affected household, 0.4 percent and 0.4 percent considered
that aid from friends and acquaintances had a very important and extremely important role in
the economic and housing recovery process of the affected households respectively. Thus,
although neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected households did not play any
role in the economic and housing recovery in most cases, they played a significant role in the
psychological recovery process of members of the affected households (Bolin & Bolton
1986).
The survey also asked the respondents to assess the importance of the psychological support
received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances in the psychological recovery process of
the members of the household. Among households that received psychological support from
neighbours (230 of 250) after Aila, respondents of 11.3 percent (n=26) and 37.4 percent
(n=86) of households considered that psychological support from neighbours played an
extremely important role and very important role respectively in the psychological recovery
process of the members of the affected households. The data show that respondents of 29.6
percent (n=68) and 18.3 percent (n=42) of households considered that psychological support
from neighbours played a moderately important role, and slightly important role respectively
while respondents of 3.5 percent (n=8) of households considered that psychological support
from neighbours did not play any role in the psychological recovery process of the members
of the affected households. Among households that received psychological support from
friends and acquaintances (151 of 250) after Aila, respondents of 9.3 percent (n=14), 37.1
percent (n=56), 40.4 percent (n=61) and 13.2 percent (n=20) of households considered that
the psychological support they received form their friends and acquaintances had an
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extremely important role, very important role, moderately important role and slightly
important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected
households respectively while nobody mentioned that it had no role.
The qualitative findings suggest that the psychological support the interviewed households
received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances was not so intense in many cases.
Moreover, in many cases, the interviewed households did not receive psychological support
from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village throughout the recovery
process as households’ relationships with neighbours and friends and acquaintances within
the village became tense, suspicious and conflictual after a period following Aila due to the
competition for access to relief items. Islam and Walkerden (2014) also found that conflict
with neighbours and friends emerged due to the competition for access to relief items in the
context of the post-Sidr (2007) situation in Bangladesh. In a few cases, conflict also emerged
from competition for securing a place on the embankment to build a temporary shelter as the
space on the embankment was limited relative to the number of people who needed to live
there. However, conflict over securing a place on the embankment emerged only in a few
cases and mainly during the first few days following Aila and was not as problematic as the
conflict due to the competition for relief items. Thus, although a ‘therapeutic community’
emerged in both villages after Aila (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969; Drabek & Key 1976, 1984;
Ericson et al. 1976), it did not last long, mainly due to the conflict from the competition for
relief items. This can be understood from the following excerpts of the interviews:
Rich and poor, all were equal after Aila. There was envy and hostility before Aila.
However, envy and hostility decreased after Aila. There was harmony among people
after Aila… People were closer to one another after Aila compared to pre-Aila…
Conflict started when the relief operation started. (DB, 18 June 2017)
As everyone was in a precarious situation due to Aila, there was solidarity among all
after Aila. However, the solidarity among people started to decline when the relief
assistance [from the government and NGOs] came. People became envious of one
another; I would get more, my family would get more… As people became envious of
one another, there was a decline in the interpersonal trust. (CC, 9 June 2017, Key
informant)
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The above-mentioned excerpts show that conflict emerged after Aila due to the competition
for relief items in both villages. However, although the conflict started at the early phase of
the relief operation such as when there was only emergency relief distribution, it was not so
intense during this phase of the relief operation. The conflict became intense at the later phase
of the relief operation when the government and NGOs started interventions related to
livelihood and housing recovery. Two important interventions from the government following
Aila in both the villages were: a) 20 kg rice per vulnerable group feeding (VGF) card; and b)
20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of the houses. When the government distributed 20
kg rice per VGF card from September 2009 to October 2010, the conflict was less intense as
the intervention included almost all the affected households. Thus, as almost every household
received it, there was a sense of equal treatment, so there was less of a problem. However,
compared to the number of affected households, the number of beneficiary households for the
20,000 Taka given by the government for the repair or construction of the houses was fewer.
Likewise, the number of beneficiary households for various NGO-operated programs such as
livelihood and housing programs was fewer compared to the number of affected households.
As the number of beneficiaries was fewer compared to the number of affected households
who had actual need, the conflict started. This can be understood from the following excerpt:
People became envious of one another because if others knew [about these relief
items] then I would not get it, my name would be deleted from the list… It was in my
mind that if others knew, then I would not get it as the amount of the relief was
limited. (CC, 7 June 2017)
Although conflict emerged after Aila due to the competition for relief items (in a few cases,
for securing a place on the embankment), these forms of conflict usually emerged with
neighbours or in some cases with friends and acquaintances within the village. The analysis of
the qualitative data shows that if a household did not receive a relief item from an outside
organisation but neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village received this item,
then, in many cases, the household that did not receive that item usually had a sense of
deprivation and sometimes the relationships with neighbours, friends (particularly distant
friends) and acquaintances within the village became tense, suspicious and conflictual.
However, a household did not usually have a sense of deprivation or a tense, suspicious and
conflictual relationship with a related household when the related household, particularly a
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closely related household, received an item from the outside organisation while the household
did not receive that item.
Analysis of the qualitative interviews reveals that on many occasions people in the villages
urged the elected leaders of the local government, village leaders, and the respective
personnel of the government agencies and NGOs to remove from the list some households
who were listed by an NGO or the government for receiving a particular benefit/intervention
(e.g. a house from an NGO). They felt that there were other more vulnerable households that
should receive this benefit instead of the listed household. Households usually experienced
this form of opposition from neighbours and villagers, not from relatives, particularly not
from close relatives, living within the village.
Thus, a household was silent when one of the closely related households received a relief item
which the household did not receive. However, in many cases, the household was not silent
and had a tense, suspicious and conflictual relationship with unrelated neighbours or friends
and acquaintances within the village when they received the item that the household did not
receive. This tendency was observed in both villages although was more apparent in the
Dakshin Bedkashi Village as, unlike Channirchak Village, there were many houses that the
NGOs constructed in this village during the recovery period.
Aila itself limited the operation of the bridging networks. As the space on the embankment
was insufficient for the number of displaced people, villagers became scattered after Aila.
Thus, among households that used to live close together, some households lived on one side
of the embankment while others lived on the other side until the waters subsided. This was a
major problem for Channirchak. Although related households usually lived close to one
another on the embankment, in some cases they became dispersed as they failed to secure a
place to live side by side on the embankment. In some cases, households of siblings also
became scattered. This happened to an even higher degree with neighbours, friends and
acquaintances within the village. Thus, those who were usually neighbours were no longer so.
Acquaintances from the village or acquaintances and previously unknown people from
adjacent villages became neighbours when households lived on the embankment for a long
period following Aila. Likewise, households of friends and acquaintances within the village
also became scattered. Consequently, households living on one side of the embankment
became scattered from households that lived on the other side. Moreover, households that
lived on the embankment became scattered from households that stayed in the usual
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homestead. Likewise, households that did not live on the embankment but stayed in their
usual own homesteads also became scattered from one another. It was difficult to move from
one side of the embankment to another or from the embankment to a household that stayed in
the usual homestead or from a household that stayed in the usual homestead to another
household that also stayed in the usual homestead due to regular tidal flooding of the villages
for a long period. This persisted for a long period until the embankment was repaired. Thus
dispersal of households restricted the usual social interactions as well as the customary
borrowing and lending of essential household goods and money for a short period among
neighbours, friends and acquaintances.
5.5 Why Bridging Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery
Bridging social capital did not play an important role in the survival and the economic and
housing recovery process of the affected households for three main reasons: neighbours,
friends and acquaintances with whom households had bridging relations were poor;
neighbours and most of their friends and acquaintances were themselves affected; and most
households did not have friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas who could give
them material or monetary aid.
An analysis of the qualitative data shows that neighbours and the affected as well as the
unaffected friends and acquaintances did not play important roles in the survival, economic
and housing recovery process of the affected households as they did not have the capacity to
provide the required material or monetary aid due to poverty. Moreover, neighbours and the
affected friends and acquaintances were not able to play important roles in the survival,
economic and housing recovery of the affected households since most households had lost
their material possessions. They were not able to restore their usual livelihood activities for a
long period as the villages were subject to tidal flooding (one village for almost 21 months
and the other for almost 33 months). Thus, neighbours and the affected friends and
acquaintances also had their own struggles for survival and their own recovery challenges.
The following excerpts clearly denote this situation:
Neighbours, friends and acquaintances in the village were not able to help. Everyone
had a problem; everyone had the same condition… Everyone was equal… How could
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I ask others [for help]? Who would give? What would they give? Thus, I did not ask
others for anything. (CC, 9 June 2017)
I did not receive any aid [material or money] from neighbours, friends and
acquaintances. All of them were affected by Aila. All of them had problems. (DB, 10
July 2017)
Qualitative findings also suggest that friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas did
not play important roles in the survival and economic and housing recovery of the affected
households as a few households had any friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas
from whom they could receive material or monetary aid after Aila. Households generally had
their close friends and acquaintances from whom they could expect to receive material or
monetary aid for survival, if not for economic and housing recovery, only within the village,
the adjacent villages and the union. However, they were also affected as both the studied
unions were affected. Moreover, a significant number of households did not have any friends
and acquaintances outside the village or the adjacent villages or the union, i.e. outside the
affected areas. The following excerpts support this:
I do not have any close person outside the village. My network is within the village, I
do not have any person outside the village from whom I can get 500 to 1,000 Taka if I
am in a crisis. All [friends and acquaintances] are in the village, I do not have any in
other villages. (CC, 23 August 2017)
I do not have any acquaintances outside the area. All acquaintances are within the
village and the adjacent villages. (CC, 9 June 2017)
I do not have friends and acquaintances outside the union… When we go outside for
work, we meet some people, but this is for a short period of time. (DB, 9 July 2017)
Furthermore, except for a few households, the friends that households had outside the affected
areas were not close friends. Thus, households usually did not have any expectation to receive
any material or monetary aid spontaneously from those friends. They also did not expect to
receive any material or monetary aid from the acquaintances outside the affected areas.
Some survey findings related to the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a
smaller amount of monetary aid from the affected neighbours, friends and acquaintances
144
show that 98 percent of the respondents mentioned neighbours were affected while 51.6
percent of the respondents mentioned neighbours were poor as one of the reasons for not
receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from neighbours.
Likewise, 98.8 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances were
affected while 52.8 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances were
poor as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of
monetary aid from the affected friends and acquaintances. Moreover, 42 percent of the
respondents mentioned not having any friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas,
38.8 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances outside the affected
areas were poor, 26.4 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances
outside the affected areas had capacity to help but did not help, and 5.6 percent of the
respondents mentioned other as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or
receiving a small amount of monetary aid from the unaffected friends and acquaintances. The
survey did not distinguish between close friends and friends, or between acquaintances from
whom they did expect to receive some aid and acquaintances from whom they did not expect
to receive any aid. Thus, it might be possible that most of the unaffected friends and
acquaintances who did not provide monetary aid or provided only little despite being capable
were not close friends or acquaintances from whom they had any expectation to receive
monetary aid. The above survey findings point out four important reasons – own experience
of disaster, poverty, not having any friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas, and
friends and acquaintances outside did not help despite being capable – for not receiving
monetary aid or receiving little monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances.
A critical analysis of the findings show that neighbours, friends and acquaintances were not
able to contribute to the survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery
process due to poverty, even if neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances of the
households were not affected themselves. The qualitative data suggest that although most
households expect that neighbours, friends and acquaintances will help them in the survival
for a short period such as a day or a few days, only a few households expect that they will
help them in the survival for a relatively long period such as a week or some weeks and the
economic and housing recovery process even if they are capable. In other words, most
households do not have any expectations that neighbours, friends and acquaintances will help
them in their survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery even if they
are capable. If neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances of the households were
145
not affected themselves, then neighbours and friends and acquaintances could have played a
little better role in their survival for a short period. Likewise, they could have played a little
better role in the economic and housing recovery process of the few affected households.
Nevertheless, neighbours, friends and acquaintances did not have the capacity to provide the
required material and monetary aid for survival for a long period as required in the post-Aila
period and the economic and housing recovery of the affected households due to poverty,
even if neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances were not affected. This can be
clearly understood from some of the relevant survey findings. The survey data reveal that 96.4
percent of households did not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances from
whom the household was able to receive 20,000 Taka as aid to cope with the post-Aila crisis.
Likewise, 84 percent of households did not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and
acquaintances from whom they were able to borrow (without interest) 20,000 Taka while 76.8
percent of households did not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances from
whom they were able to receive 20,000 Taka as a loan (with interest) to cope with the post-
Aila crisis. Thus, most households were unable to receive 20,000 Taka as aid from people in
their social circle to cope with the post-Aila crisis. In other words, most households did not
have neighbours and friends and acquaintances who could give them 20,000 Taka as aid to
cope with the post-Aila crisis.
The findings also show that neighbours, friends and acquaintances cannot contribute to the
survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery process at present due to
poverty if the households face any crisis like Aila. The relevant survey findings confirm this.
The survey findings reveal that 92.4 percent of households do not have any
relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of giving them 20,000 Taka
as aid at present. Similarly, 67.2 percent of households at present do not have any
relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of lending them 20,000 Taka
without interest and 44 percent of households at present do not have any
relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of lending them 20,000 Taka
with interest Most households do not have anyone in their social circles who is capable of
providing 20,000 Taka as aid at present. Like bonding relations with poor relatives,
households have bridging relations with similarly poor neighbours and friends and
acquaintances.
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Some other relevant survey findings also show that the bridging networks of the studied
households are not able to contribute to survival for a long period and the economic and
housing recovery following a future disastrous event like Aila. The survey data show that 77.6
percent of the total surveyed households do not have anyone from whom they can receive the
money needed for the household expenditure for at least one month as aid if the household
faces any crisis. The data also show that 22.4 (n=56) percent of the total surveyed households
have one person, 18.4 (n=46) percent of households have two persons and 13.2 (n=33)
percent of households have three persons who may give the household the money required to
meet the household expenditure for at least one month as aid if the household faces any crisis.
The findings show that only a few households (10 out of 250 households) may receive the
money needed for meeting their household expenditure of at least one month as aid from their
neighbours, friends and acquaintances if the household faces any crisis.
5.6 Bonding Social Capital Versus Bridging Social Capital
Although all households received aid from bonding networks, many households did not
receive any aid from bridging networks. Moreover, although most of the households received
material and monetary aid from bonding networks, only some households received material
and monetary aid from bridging networks. The survey data show that while 100 percent of the
total surveyed households (n=250) received at least one type of aid (listed in Table 5.1) from
relatives, 8 percent and 35.6 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250) did not receive
any of the aid from neighbours and friends and acquaintances respectively. Moreover, 76
percent (n=190) of the total surveyed households received material aid from their relatives
while 16.80 percent (n=42) and 18.40 percent (n=46) of the total surveyed households
received material aid from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances respectively.
Furthermore, 32.4 percent (n=81) of the total surveyed households received any sort of
monetary aid from their relatives while 0.4 percent (n=1) and 2.4 percent (n=6) of the total
surveyed households received any sort of monetary aid from their neighbours, and friends and
acquaintances respectively. In total, 78.4 percent (n=196) of the total surveyed households
received material and monetary aid from relatives while 17.2 percent (n=43) and 18.40
percent (n=46) of the total surveyed households received material and monetary aid from
neighbours, friends and acquaintances respectively. The higher percentage of households
received each of the other six types of aid (shelter support at the time of Aila, information,
assistance to get work, free labour, psychological support and other) from relatives compared
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to neighbours. Likewise, the higher percentage of households received each of the other six
types of aid from relatives compared to friends and acquaintances. Thus, households heavily
drew on their bonding networks compared to the bridging networks.
Both bonding and bridging social capital played important roles in evacuation and search and
rescue. However, although neighbours and in some cases friends and acquaintances within the
village helped the affected households in evacuation and in search and rescue activities, it was
mainly the relatives within the village who came forward first and who played the vital role.
This was done mainly by close relatives living in the adjacent households within the village
such as households of siblings or cousins of the head of the interviewed household. Moreover,
neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village had more important roles in
evacuation and saving lives during the event compared to the role they played in the search
and rescue activities immediately after the event. Members of the immediate studied
households and members of the related households within the village played major roles in
searching and rescuing the members of the studied households from where they were trapped
immediately after the event.
Although bonding social capital contributed to the survival of the majority of the affected
households in the response phase (up to one month) and the survival of some of the affected
households even after the response period, bridging social capital contributed to the survival
of some households and mainly during the night and the following day of Aila. Compared to
bonding networks, a significantly lower number of households received food, water and
money only for survival from bridging networks. For instance, 70.8 percent of the total
surveyed households received food from relatives while 14.8 percent and 17.6 percent of the
total surveyed households received food from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances
respectively. Likewise, 32.4 percent of the total surveyed households received water from
relatives while 6.8 percent and 10.8 percent of the total surveyed households received water
from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. Similarly, 31.6 percent of the
total surveyed households received money only for survival from relatives while 0.4 percent
and 2 percent of the total surveyed households received money only for survival from
neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. The survey data show that food and
water or either item they received from relatives played very important and extremely
important roles in the survival of 65.6 percent of the total surveyed households. However,
food and water or either item they received from neighbours played very important and
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extremely important roles in the survival of 7.2 percent of the total surveyed households.
Likewise, food and water or either item they received from friends and acquaintances played
very important and extremely important roles in the survival of 10.4 percent of the total
surveyed households.
Although bonding social capital played a more important role than bridging social capital in
the survival, most households would not have been able to survive after Aila based on the
resources they received from either bonding or bridging networks, if households did not
receive aid from the government and NGOs and either food or cash from participation in the
food for work or cash for work programs operated by the government and NGOs. Most of the
households that received material and monetary aid for survival from bonding networks
received for the survival of some days. Likewise, most of the households that received
material aid for survival from bridging networks received for the survival of a day. However,
most households had critical survival needs for a long period as Channirchak and Dakshin
Bedkashi were subject to inundation for almost two years and three years respectively. As
they were not able to commence their usual livelihood activities before the embankment was
repaired, most households were not able to survive without the aid given and employment
generated by the government and NGOs. Thus, government and NGOs played vital roles and
acted as the main players in helping the villagers to overcome the post-disaster crisis.
Both bonding social capital and bridging social capital did not play any role in the economic
and housing recovery of most of the affected households. Nevertheless, bonding social capital
played a more important role than bridging social capital (see Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6). For
instance, the survey data show that aid from relatives had some sort of role in the economic
recovery of 21.2 percent of the total surveyed households while aid from neighbours had
some sort of role in the economic recovery of 2 percent of the total surveyed households, and
aid from friends and acquaintances had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 2
percent of the total surveyed households. Moreover, aid from relatives had some sort of role
in the housing recovery of 20.4 percent of the total surveyed households while aid from
neighbours had some sort of role in the housing recovery of 4.8 percent of the total surveyed
households, and aid from friends and acquaintances had some sort of role in the housing
recovery of 0.4 percent of the total surveyed households.
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Figure 5.5 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in economic recovery
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
Figure 5.6 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in housing recovery
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
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Figure 5.7 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in psychological recovery
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
Although both bonding social capital and bridging social capital had a significant contribution
in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households, bonding
social capital played a more important role compared to bridging social capital (See Figure
5.7). Although all the surveyed households (n=250) received psychological support from
relatives, 8 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250) did not receive psychological
support from neighbours and 39.6 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250) did not
receive psychological support from their friends and acquaintances. Moreover, respondents’
assessment of the importance of aid in the psychological recovery process of the members of
the households varies significantly among these three categories. The survey data show that
although aid from relatives played some sort of important role in the psychological recovery
process of the members of 100 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250), aid from
neighbours played some sort of important role in the psychological recovery process of the
members of 87.2 percent (n=218) of the total surveyed households (n=250) and aid from
friends and acquaintances played some sort of important role in the psychological recovery
process of the members of 62.8 percent (n=157) of the total surveyed households (n=250).
Some 4.8 percent (n=12) of the total surveyed households that received aid from neighbours
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considered that this did not play any role in the psychological recovery process. Likewise, 1.6
percent (n=4) of the total surveyed households that received aid from friends and
acquaintances considered that this did not play any role in the psychological recovery process.
Aid from relatives had very important and extremely important roles in the psychological
recovery process of the members of 78.4 percent (n=196) of the total surveyed households
(n=250). On the other hand, aid from neighbours had very important and extremely important
roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of 43.6 percent (n=109) of the
total surveyed households (n=250) while aid from friends and acquaintances had very
important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery of the members of 27.6
percent (n=69) of the total surveyed households (n=250).
Likewise, respondents’ assessment of the importance of psychological support in the
psychological recovery process of the members of the households varies significantly among
these three categories. Psychological support received from relatives played very important
and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of 81.2
percent (n=203) of the total surveyed households. On the other hand, psychological support
received from neighbours played very important and extremely important roles in the
psychological recovery process of the members of 44.8 percent (n=112) of the total surveyed
households and psychological support received from friends and acquaintances played very
important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the
members of 28 percent (n=70) of the total surveyed households. None of the households that
received psychological support from relatives (n=250) reported that psychological support
from them was not at all important. Among households that received psychological support
from neighbours (230 households out of 250 households), eight households or 3.2 percent of
the total surveyed households reported that psychological support from neighbours was not at
all important while none of the households that received psychological support from friends
and acquaintances (n=151) reported that psychological support from friends and
acquaintances was not at all important.
The psychological support the households received from relatives was very intense while the
psychological support the households received from neighbours and friends and
acquaintances was not so intense in many cases. Moreover, households received
psychological support from their relatives throughout the recovery process. However, many
households did not receive psychological support from neighbours and friends and
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acquaintances throughout the recovery process due to the conflict from the competition for
access to relief items (and in few cases, due to the competition for securing a place on the
embankment for temporary shelter). The conflict due to the competition for relief items did
not usually emerge among the related households within the village; it usually emerged with
neighbours and in some cases with friends and acquaintances within the village. The
following excerpt of an interviewee who believed that neighbours and villagers informed
outside organisations not to support him by claiming that he was well off depicts the intense
relationships with relatives and the hostility toward him by neighbours and friends and
acquaintances:
Relatives have relations with our soul [atma’s atmiya]. As they are our soul mates,
they have that affection for us. Nobody except siblings and close relatives made
inquiries about our well-being during that time [crisis following Aila]… Relatives felt
the pain [we had]… Neighbours and villagers were hostile to me. (CC, 8 June 2017)
As the time after the disaster increased, households’ networks with relatives did not become
less active and break down, while households’ networks with neighbours and friends and
acquaintances became less active and, in many cases, broke down. Bridging networks became
less active due to poverty of neighbours, friends and acquaintances, and the own recovery
challenges of the affected neighbours, friends and acquaintances. Bridging networks broke
down due to the conflict from the competition for relief items. Although bonding networks
performed less well in providing material and monetary aid as the time after the disaster
increased, bonding networks provided aid that did not require additional material resources to
be invested throughout the recovery process. However, bridging networks not only performed
less well in providing material and monetary aid as the time after the disaster increased, in
many cases they did not provide aid that did not require material resources to be invested.
An analysis of the qualitative interviews reveals that the expectation households have from
their bonding networks is fundamentally different than the expectation they have from their
bridging networks. Households usually expect that they would receive aid in crisis from their
relatives if the relatives are capable of doing so. They usually expect and believe that their
close relatives have some sort of obligations to give them material and monetary aid for
survival and economic and housing recovery if their close relatives have the capacity to do so.
However, they are aware that the material and monetary aid will not be so substantial and not
be effective for survival for a long period as well as for economic and housing recovery as
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their close relatives are not capable enough. Nevertheless, they believe that they will receive
material and monetary aid, although small amounts, from close relatives if close relatives are
capable and they will always receive aid from their close relatives that does not usually
require any material resources to be invested. They consider that receipt of aid that does not
usually require any material resources to be invested, such as information, psychological
support, free labour from relatives, is normal and natural. Finally, they do not have
expectations to receive material and monetary aid in crisis from relatives who are not capable
to do so, and they consider it understandable as it is usually believed that the responsibility of
a person is first toward the members of the immediate household and then toward other close
relatives and so on. Due to this understanding, households did not have any expectations to
receive material and monetary aid from the affected relatives after Aila as they themselves
were not capable, although they received other aid except material and monetary aid.
However, except in a few cases from close neighbours and close friends, households do not
usually have any expectations to receive material and monetary aid from their neighbours and
friends and acquaintances for survival for a long period and the economic and housing
recovery process after a crisis like Aila, even if neighbours, and friends and acquaintances are
capable. Moreover, while some households do not have expectations to receive any material
and monetary aid for survival, most households have expectations that, if capable, then
neighbours, and friends and acquaintances, particularly close neighbours and close friends,
will give them material and monetary aid needed for survival for a very short period such as
of a day or a few days. However, they generally do not consider that neighbours, friends and
acquaintances have obligations to help if they have capacity. The following excerpts show the
expectations people have from their neighbours:
Neighbours will come forward if there is a problem. However, none of them will help
me if I require monetary assistance. They will help me if I require other types of
assistance… They will not give me [money] even if they are capable to give…
Relatives will help me by providing money if they are capable to give. (DB, 6 August
2017)
Do not have confidence in neighbours. They will come to see if there is a problem;
however, will do nothing. (CC, 23 August 2017)
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Neighbours will not give more [aid] even if they are capable. However, relatives will
give more [aid] if they are capable. Neighbours will give scant amount [of aid] even if
they are capable. If we borrow anything from neighbours, then it needs to be returned.
If we borrow anything from relatives, it might be okay if we cannot return it to the
relatives. (DB, 9 July 2017)
Neighbours do not have the mentality to assist… If I want to borrow 5,000 to 10,000
Taka from neighbours when I am in a crisis, then they will give it to me with a
condition such as mortgaging of my land to them or payment of interest for the
money. Otherwise they will not give it to me… Relatives will help in crisis. They will
give [money] if they have it. (CC, 9 June 2017)
The affected households usually received, if they required it, free labour from relatives.
However, although many affected households received free labour from neighbours as well as
from friends and acquaintances, mainly from close friends, many households did not receive
free labour from neighbours and friends and acquaintances.48 They received labour from
neighbours and friends and acquaintances in exchange for money. The interviewees depict the
situation in the following way:
Nobody except relatives gave free labour… All except relatives gave labour in
exchange for money. (CC, 13 July 2017)
Brothers gave free labour; neighbours did not give free labour. If neighbours give
labour, then they need to be paid. Nobody gives free labour. Only brothers give free
labour. (DB, 9 July 2017)
Another interesting fact is that while households usually received information related to an
upcoming benefit from the government agency or an NGO from relatives, households
sometimes did not receive information related to an upcoming benefit from neighbours and
friends and acquaintances as the information involved conflicts of interest. For example, in
some cases, neighbours and villagers hid information related to any livelihood or housing
intervention from non-related households. They hid that sort of information as they had a
48 The survey shows that 32.4 percent of the total surveyed households received free labour for the repair or construction of the houses from relatives while 10 percent and 4 percent of the total surveyed households received it from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively.
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belief that the amount of interventions was limited compared to the demand and thus they
would not receive it if others knew about the intervention.
Many households did not have any mutual borrowing and lending of small amounts of food
and money for a short period with people other than relatives. Nevertheless, many households
had mutual borrowing and lending with not only relatives, but also with neighbours and
friends and acquaintances. They usually prioritised related households in the process of
mutual exchange. They first approached relatives and if they were not able to borrow from
relatives, then they approached neighbours and others. The following excerpts show that
households did not have mutual borrowing and lending with people other than relatives and
households that had mutual exchange with relatives as well as with other prioritised relatives.
What I borrowed, I borrowed from relatives, I did not borrow from others… If I
needed to borrow 1–2 kg rice, I borrowed from brothers [siblings and first cousins, i.e.
father’s brother’s sons] and brothers also borrowed from me. (CC, 13 July 2017)
We borrowed and lent rice… We borrowed and lent money… However, this act of
borrowing and lending always took place among brothers [siblings] only… This did
not take place with neighbours… this did not take place with anyone except brothers
[siblings]. (DB, 11 July 2017)
We borrowed from [and lent to] brothers and neighbours. Never borrowed from others
or lent to others [except brothers and neighbours]. We borrowed mainly from brothers
and lent also mainly to brothers. We firstly approached our own brothers (siblings),
then other brothers and then neighbours. If it was not possible to borrow from
relatives, then we went to neighbours. (DB, 9 July 2017)
The above discussion clearly shows that the aid the affected households received from
bonding networks is qualitatively and quantitatively different than the aid the affected
households received from bridging networks. Thus, bonding social capital helped households
more in evacuation, search and rescue activities compared to bridging social capital, and
bonding social capital played a more important role than bridging social capital not only in
the survival but also in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the
affected households. Moreover, the expectations households have from bonding networks are
essentially different than the expectations households have from bridging networks.
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Households usually expect to receive more aid in crisis from bonding networks compared to
bridging networks, if both networks have the capacity to help.
5.7 Conclusion
Neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village played significant roles in
evacuation and search and rescue activities. They acted as the first responders and helped the
affected households in evacuation and search and rescue activities and provided emergency
food to the affected neighbours and other households in the village, if they had something that
was saved from being washed away by the flooded water.
However, bridging social capital did not contribute to the survival of most of the affected
households. Most households did not receive any material and monetary aid from their
bridging networks at any stage after Aila. It contributed to the survival of some of the affected
households and the contribution was mainly during the first few days, particularly during the
night and the following day of Aila. Households did not usually receive material aid and
monetary aid after that from their neighbours and affected friends and acquaintances.
However, some households later received one-off relief packets for survival from their
bridging networks. The relief packets usually included food, water and clothes. Likewise,
except in a few cases, bridging social capital did not play any role in the economic or housing
recovery processes of the affected households. Bridging networks, mainly neighbours and
friends within the village, contributed to the housing recovery of a few of the affected
households by providing free labour during the repair or construction of the houses.
Although bridging social capital did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery
process except for a few households, it played a significant role in the case of psychological
recovery of the members of the affected households. Bridging networks were able to
contribute to the psychological recovery as neighbours and friends and acquaintances had the
capacity to provide non-material resources, although they were poor and affected (if friends
and acquaintances were affected). The psychological support neighbours and friends and
acquaintances provided greatly helped the members of the affected households to recover
psychologically following Aila. Nevertheless, many households did not receive psychological
support at any stage after Aila from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Moreover,
many households that received psychological support after Aila from neighbours and friends
and acquaintances within the village did not receive that support from them after a period as
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households’ relationships with them became conflictual after a period due to the competition
for access to relief items.
The findings demonstrate that bridging social capital does not play any role in the survival or
‘getting by’ of most of the households. Likewise, it does not play any role in ‘getting ahead’
as evidenced from the fact that, except in a few cases, bridging networks did not play any role
in the economic and housing recovery of the affected households.Thus, the findings contradict
the argument that bridging social capital is helpful for getting ahead (Putnam 2000;
Granovetter 1973, 1983; Briggs 1998; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000;
Lin 2008). Bridging social capital did not contribute to the survival and economic and
housing recovery as neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village and other
affected areas were poor and Aila-affected themselves and thus had their own recovery
challenges. They lost most of their material possessions and failed to derive a secure income
and start their own recovery activities as the two villages were under water for a long period.
Thus, neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances had no resources to support other
affected households in crisis. They were also in need of assistance for their survival and their
own economic or housing recovery. Likewise, friends and acquaintances outside the affected
areas did not play an important role in the survival and economic and housing recovery
process as a few households in these two studied villages had friends and acquaintances
outside the Aila-affected areas from whom they could receive material and monetary aid.
Nevertheless, the findings show that neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected
households are unable to contribute to the survival over longer periods and economic and
housing recovery of the affected households due to poverty, even if their neighbours and most
of their friends and acquaintances are not affected themselves. In other words, households do
not have access to rich resources through bridging networks with neighbours and friends and
acquaintances.
The findings show that, compared to bridging social capital, bonding social capital played a
more important role in evacuation, search and rescue, and survival, as well as in the
economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. Both
bonding and bridging social capital played important roles in evacuation and search and
rescue, although bridging networks played a more important role in evacuation compared to
search and rescue activities. However, although bonding social capital played an important
role in the survival of the majority of the households, bridging social capital played an
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important role in the survival of some of the households. Moreover, although both bonding
and bridging social capital did not play important roles in the economic and housing recovery
of the affected households, the role bonding social capital played in the economic and housing
recovery was much more important than the role played by bridging social capital. Likewise,
although both bonding and bridging social capital played important roles in the psychological
recovery, the role bonding social capital played was much more important.
The findings suggest that bridging social capital plays only a small role in the survival and
does not play an important role in the economic and housing recovery (Islam & Walkerden
2014). Thus, linking social networks such as government agencies and national and
international NGOs must provide external assistance to the affected households to enable
them to survive, if the post-disaster situation is like the post-Aila situation, and to assist
survivors to achieve economic and housing recovery after a disaster (Islam & Walkerden
2014; James & Paton 2015).
The next two chapters will investigate how linking social capital, i.e. the resources the
affected households receive from the government and NGOs, contributes to the disaster
response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected
households. The next chapter will examine the role the government plays while the following
chapter will examine the role NGOs play in the disaster response and recovery process of the
affected households.
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Chapter 6: Linking Social Capital and Post-Cyclone Response and Recovery: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the
Government’s Response and Recovery Operations
6.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the role of linking social capital (i.e. resources households received
from the government) in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected
households, and the weaknesses of the government’s post–Cyclone Aila response and
recovery operations. Both of these objectives are addressed through the government’s post–
Cyclone Aila operations in two Aila-affected villages of Khulna District, Bangladesh. One
village is Channirchak, which is located under Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila, and
another village is Dakshin Bedkashi, which is located under Dakshin Bedkashi Union of
Koyra Upazila. This chapter also addresses the role of Union Parishad as part of the role of
the government. This chapter defines linking social capital as the resources affected
households received from the linking network, which is households’ links with the
government including Union Parishad in this case. Affected households were linked to the
government mainly through Union Parishad.
Union Parishad, hereafter UP, is the lowest level of the local government.49 UP is also the
smallest rural administrative unit in Bangladesh. UP consists of 13 elected members: an
elected chairman, nine elected members from nine wards and three elected women members
from three reserved seats for them (Pandey 2019). Although UP is a local government unit, it
has developed as ‘an extension of the central government’ (Panday 2019, p. 87). In addition to
the grant that UP receives from the central government, UP collects fund from taxes, rates,
tolls, fees and other sources allowed by the Local Government (Union Parishad)
(Amendment) Act, 2010 (GoB 2010). However, the total funds UP collects (excluding the
funds from the central government) are very low (Pandey 2019). UP is mainly dependent on
the government funds for undertaking various activities including development activities
undertaken within the union (Pandey 2019).50 Even elected representatives of UP and UP
staff receive a portion of their salary from the government. The government gives resources to
the UP through various ways including gratuitous relief (GR), vulnerable group feeding
49 Rural local government in Bangladesh has three hierarchical tiers: Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad, and Zila Parishad (Pandey 2019, p. 87). 50 For instance, the total annual budget of Kamarkhola Union Parishad in 2016–2017 was 12,740,647 Taka. However, the total funds Kamarkhola Union Parishad contributed to the annual budget of 2016–2017 from its own source was only 6, 68, 030 Taka (KU 2016).
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(VGF), test relief (TR), vulnerable group development (VGD), annual development program
(ADP) grant, food for work, cash for work, and employment generation program for the
poorest (EGPP) (KU 2016; DBU 2017).
This chapter defines a government aid item as any aid item households received from the
central government, Zila Parishad, Upazila Parishad and UP through UP or field-level
government agencies/offices.51 Most of the aid items the affected households received from
the government received them through UP. UP usually selected the beneficiaries of the aid
items that UP received from the government through field-level government offices for
distribution to the affected households. However, some government aid items were not
received by households directly through the UP. For instance, the Bangladesh Army prepared
the list of the beneficiaries of 20,000 Taka and the beneficiaries received the money to their
own bank accounts. Likewise, although UP played an important role in the selection of the
beneficiaries for agricultural support, the selected households received seeds and fertiliser
directly from the upazila-level office of the Department of Agricultural Extension, and not
from the UP. In addition to aid, affected households participated in government employment
programs; in this instance, UP selected the beneficiaries of these programs and implemented
these programs.52
The chapter is further divided into five sections. The second section presents the aid items and
other support not in the form of aid items that the affected households received from the
government after Aila. The third section examines the role government played in the post-
Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The fourth section presents
major weaknesses of the government’s post-Aila response and recovery operations, while the
fifth section presents a conclusion.
6.2 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from the Government
The affected households in both villages received various aid items from the government after
Aila (see Table 6.1). The survey data show that 88.8 percent of the surveyed households
51 Like UP, Zila Parishad and Upazila Parishad each collects funds from their own sources and receive part of their funds from the central government. 52 Government departments implemented some projects through contractors. For instance, the Local Government and Engineering Department (LGED) constructed government school-cum-cyclone-shelters using contractors. Participation of local people as workers in the projects implemented by the contractors was not considered as participation in the government employment programs.
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received emergency food and 18.4 percent of the surveyed households received emergency
water from the government.53 Moreover, 11.2 percent of the surveyed households received
clothes and 39.2 percent of the surveyed households received utensils and other necessary
household items from the government.54 Likewise, 15.6 percent and 3.2 percent of the
surveyed households received medical assistance and water-storing support respectively.
Similarly, 24.4 percent and 91.6 percent of the surveyed households received money as
gratuitous relief (GR) and rice under vulnerable group feeding (VGF) respectively.55 The data
also show that only 1.2 percent of the surveyed households received houses while 8.4 percent
of the surveyed households received small amounts of money for the repair or construction of
the house respectively (see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). Moreover, 71.2 percent of the
surveyed households received 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of the house while
only 1.2 percent of the surveyed households received tin for houses. Furthermore, only 6.8
percent of the surveyed households received agricultural support such as paddy and vegetable
seeds and fertilisers.
Table 6.1 Types of aid the affected households received from the government (n=250)56
Types of Aid Frequency (n=250)
Percentage (%)
Food 222 88.8 Water 46 18.4 Clothes 28 11.2 Utensils and other necessary household items 98 39.2 Medical assistance 39 15.6 Support for storing water 8 3.2 Gratuitous relief (GR) money 61 24.4 Rice under vulnerable group feeding (VGF) 229 91.6 House 3 1.2 Small amount of money for repair or construction of the house 21 8.4 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of the house 178 71.2 Tin for house 3 1.2 Agricultural support such as seeds and fertilisers 17 6.8 Other 0 0.0
53 Any types of food including rice households received from the government except rice received under the VGF program and vulnerable group development (VGD) program. Water households received any time from the government after Aila. 54 The survey included aid items like tents and tarpaulin under utensils and other necessary household items. 55 This only includes 20 kg rice under vulnerable group feeding (VGF) program, does not include other amount of rice given under the VGF program. A household got 20 kg rice under VGF when a household received one card. A household got 40 kg rice under VGF when a household received two cards. In some cases, households with many members received two cards and thus received 40 kg rice per month per household. 56 Two households did not receive any type of aid from the government.
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In addition to aid, people also received the opportunity to participate in the government
employment programs such as food for work (FFW) program or kabikha and employment
generation program for the poorest (EGPP) (see Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4). These
employment programs also greatly contributed to the survival and economic, housing and
psychological recovery. Moreover, some households also took loans from the government
sources after Aila. In addition to the distribution of various types of aid and operations of
employment programs, the government also contributed to the repair and construction of
community-level infrastructure. For instance, the government repaired damaged and broken
parts of the embankment, repaired and constructed roads and constructed new school-cum-
cyclone-shelters (see Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8).57
Figure 6.1 A house constructed after Aila in Channirchak Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna)
Source: Author (2017–2018)
57 The Bangladesh Government is implementing Coastal Embankment Improvement Project, Phase I (CEIP-I). Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) is the implementing agency (MoWR 2013a). Channirchak village is located within the Polder 32. The rehabilitation and improvement of Polder 32 under CEIP-1 is underway (source: observation; key informant interviews). Dakshin Bedkashi village is located within the Polder 14/1. CEIP-1 also includes Polder 14/1 for the rehabilitation and improvement (MoWR 2013b). However, physical work for the rehabilitation and improvement of Polder 14/1 has not started up to the fieldwork period (source: observation; key informant interviews; Sadik et al. 2018).
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Figure 6.2 A house constructed after Aila in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna)
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 6.3 People working in a government employment program in Channirchak Village
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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Figure 6.4 Women working in a government employment program in Dakshin Bedkashi Village
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 6.5 A road constructed by a government agency in Channirchak (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO)
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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Figure 6.6 A road constructed by a government agency in Dakshin Bedkashi (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO)
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 6.7 A new government primary school-cum-cyclone-shelter constructed in Channirchak Village after Aila (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department)
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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Figure 6.8 A new government primary school building in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department)
Source: Author (2019)
6.3 Role of the Government in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery
6.3.1 Role of the Government in Evacuation, Search and Rescue
The Union Parishads (UPs) did not properly disseminate the early warnings before the event.
Most households did not receive early warnings from their UPs or any other sources before
the event. For instance, the survey data show that 78.8 percent (n=197) of the surveyed
households (n=250) did not receive early warnings before the event. The survey data also
show that only one-third of the respondents (18 out of 53) who received early warnings before
the event mentioned UP as one of the sources of the early warnings. The qualitative data
reveal that none of the UPs disseminated early warnings in either of the studied villages
through what is locally known as ‘miking’ (i.e. broadcast by loudspeaker). Thus, although
some of the surveyed households received early warnings from the UP, they would have
received the early warnings from the elected representatives and staff of the UPs orally.
People in both villages did not hear any announcement related to early warnings from
mosques and temples though miking. Some interviewees of one of the studied villages
mentioned that they received the news of the breaking of the embankment through miking
from other villages, mainly from mosques; that the storm surge had damaged the embankment
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and thus water was entering the villages. Neither UP took necessary measures to evacuate
people and livestock to the safe places before or during the event. The UPs did not even take
measures to help the most vulnerable such as children, pregnant women, disabled and aged
people to evacuate to the safe places.
The UPs played a very limited role, if any, in searching for and rescuing the members of the
affected households from the trapped places immediately after the event or on the night of
Aila (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).58 Immediate members and relatives (within the
village and the adjacent villages) of a household played the most important role in searching
and rescuing member/s of that household. The affected households that moved to the places
such as embankments, cyclone shelters and other buildings immediately after the event or on
the night usually did not receive any assistance from their UP to move to those places.
Moreover, the households that moved to other places, mainly during the next few days after
Aila, did not receive any logistic support services such as boats from the UP to move with
their remaining household goods to the relocation places. The very limited role that UPs
played in search and rescue operations is not surprising as the elected representatives of the
UPs and most of the UP employees, if not all, were from the local areas and were also victims
of Aila. Moreover, neither UP had the necessary logistics to conduct search and rescue
operations.
Nevertheless, the UP carried out the immediate assessment of the damage and losses and
reported to the higher authority, mainly to the Upazila Nirbahi [executive] Officer (UNO),
hereafter UNO, who is the chief executive officer of the Upazila Parishad.59 The UP also
informed the higher authority about the need for necessary aid materials and other assistance
required to handle the emergency. The UP first distributed relief in both the villages a few
days after the event, once the UP had received relief from the government. For instance,
Dakshin Bedkashi UP first distributed relief, in the form of rice received from the
government, to the studied village and other villages of Dakshin Bedkashi UP on Thursday
afternoon (28 May 2009) although Aila struck during daytime on Monday (source: key
informant interview with the then chairman of the union). Likewise, key informants from
58 The UP office of Dakshin Bedkashi Union, which is a building, was located within the studied Dakshin Bedkashi Village. Many people evacuated to that place during the event (in a few cases, immediately before the event). People living in the surrounding areas went to that place after the event to stay on the night of the event. Many households lived in that building for a long period after Aila. 59 UNO is a member of Bangladesh Civil Service (administration) cadre and holds the rank of Senior Assistant Secretary of the government of Bangladesh (Hassan & Mannan 2016).
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Channirchak also confirmed that the villagers received some rice as the first relief from the
government through UP on Thursday.60 However, only some households in both the villages
received that rice, as the amount of rice the government allocated as the first relief for both
the unions was extremely small compared to the needs of the populations.
Neither UP played an effective role because they were not well prepared, given that the
Khulna District was under danger signal number seven for the cyclone (DMIC 2009).61
Moreover, neither UP was prepared for a flooding situation due to broken embankments
caused by the storm surge associated with Aila.
6.3.2 Role of the Government in Survival
Channirchak was mainly agriculture-based and thus most of the households in Channirchak
were dependent on agriculture for their livelihood before Aila.62 In addition to agriculture,
member/s (mainly the male head of the household) of a considerable percentage of the
households used to participate in rural–urban migration to increase the income of the
household, as the income from agriculture was not sufficient for many households to meet the
required expenditure for the whole year. The survey data show that 57.1 percent of the
surveyed households in Channirchak used to employ seasonal migration before Aila.
On the other hand, agriculture was not the usual economic activity in Dakshin Bedkashi
before Aila. Households that had cultivable land in Dakshin Bedkashi usually used the land
mainly for shrimp farming. A maximum of one to two percent of the total cultivable land in
Dakshin Bedkashi was under agricultural production before Aila. This is also true for the
post-Aila period. Households of Dakshin Bedkashi were dependent mainly on wage labour,
shrimp farming, small business (a significant portion of the people engaged in business was
engaged in buying and selling of bagda shrimp, shrimp fry and crabs) and fishing (most of
them were engaged in shrimp fry collection and some were engaged in fishing and crab
catching from the rivers). The survey data show that 45.6 percent of the surveyed households
in Dakshin Bedkashi used to participate in seasonal migration before Aila. It is worth noting
60 A government document from Dacope Upazila Parishad office shows that the deputy commissioner of Khulna allocated gratuitous rice relief for distribution among the Aila-affected people in Dacope Upazila on 25 May 2009. Dacope Upazila Parishad office prepared the allocation letter of 3 metric tons of rice (one metric ton and two metric tons separately) for Kamarkhola Union on 26 May 2009. 61 Great danger signal numbers are eight, nine and ten and higher signal numbers denote greater danger (BMD 2014). 62 Households of Channirchak were dependent on both agriculture and saline water shrimp farming up to 2008. However, three was no shrimp farming in the village from the second half of 2008 as there was a consensus among the villagers to stop saline water shrimp farming due to its negative effect.
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that the households that had cultivable land in Dakshin Bedkashi either farmed shrimps
themselves in their own land or leased their land to other shrimp farmers of the village or
outside businessmen who had shrimp enclosures in the village in exchange of a specific
amount for a year, a process locally known as hari. They usually received 5,000 Taka per
year for each bigha63 of cultivable land. Households that had more cultivable land generally
farmed shrimps on their own land while households that had a very small amount of land
generally leased the land to the shrimp farmers for a year in exchange for the money.
Moreover, households that did not have land or only a little land were dependent on wage
labour in the village or surrounding areas and in other distant places as seasonal migrants.
They were mainly dependent on wage labour in the distant places as seasonal migrants due to
the lack of work for wage labourers in the village or surrounding areas. Shrimp farming
instead of agriculture or paddy cultivation in the locally available cultivable land was the
main reason for the lack of work for wage labourers in the village or surrounding areas.
Almost all households lost all or part of their usual income after Aila. Most of the households
in both the villages were not able to start their usual economic activities in the affected areas
at least until the embankment was repaired as both the villages were subject to flooding until
the embankment was repaired. Only some households had access to their usual income
opportunities in the affected areas when the villages were subject to flooding. A few
households in both the villages, mostly households of teachers at local primary schools,
secondary schools and madrasas (Islamic educational institutions), had their regular salary
although they also lost their usual income from agriculture or shrimp cultivation in the
affected areas if they were engaged in agriculture or shrimp cultivation. Moreover, some
households, mainly in Dakshin Bedkashi, that were engaged in fishing (catching fish,
catching crabs and collecting shrimp fry) before Aila for their livelihood had access to their
usual income opportunity in the affected areas if they had a net and boat or net only to do so.
Likewise, a few households, mainly in Dakshin Bedkashi, that were engaged in small
business before Aila had access to their usual income opportunities if Aila had not destroyed
their shops. It is worth noting that although some households had access to a salary or were
able to start economic activities in the affected areas before the embankment was repaired,
they usually lost their houses and most of their material possessions, became displaced and
lost income from agriculture or shrimp farming if they had cultivable land. In addition,
63 One bigha is equivalent to 33 decimals.
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households that employed seasonal migration when the village was subject to flooding had
some income from the unaffected areas if they employed migration.
It is worth noting that the affected households were not able to start economic activities in full
phase immediately after the embankment was repaired. For instance, most of the households
of Channirchak were dependent on agricultural production. They were not able to start
agriculture in full phase immediately after the embankment was repaired as their agricultural
land became unsuitable for agriculture due to the periodic flooding of the land by saline water
for a long time. Some of the agricultural land was not suitable for agriculture even during the
time of fieldwork. The affected households were also not able to start the process of the
housing recovery until the embankment was repaired as the villages were subject to flooding.
They mainly lived on the embankments or in their flooded houses within the homestead in a
temporary arrangement until the embankment was repaired. Many households living on
embankments or other places did not return to their homestead immediately after the
embankment was repaired as they did not have houses to live in on their homestead or
property. They moved to their homestead after constructing a house or after receiving houses
from NGOs. A few households, particularly in Channirchak, had to move to new places
previously owned by them as they lost the previous homestead to the rising rivers or canals.
Many people still did not build their desired houses in both the villages.
Other than the opportunity to participate in various income-generating programs operated by
the government, NGOs and the contractors, most households in both the villages mainly had
two income opportunities until the embankment was repaired. These were catching fish in the
affected areas and undertaking seasonal migration to the unaffected areas if member/s of any
household wanted to employ seasonal migration. Most of the households in both the villages,
whether previously engaged in fishing or not, started to catch fish after Aila for household
consumption and income. This new income opportunity emerged as the villages were subject
to flooding and persisted until the embankment was repaired. The survey data show that 90.8
percent (n=227) of the surveyed households caught fish for household consumption and 70
percent (n=175) of the surveyed households caught fish for selling in the market after Aila
although household heads of only 11.6 percent (n=29) of the surveyed households were
engaged in fishing (including fishermen, crab catchers and shrimp fry collectors) as a primary
occupation before Aila struck. Households that used to employ seasonal migration when the
villages were subject to flooding had some income though migration. The survey data show
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that 48.8 percent of the surveyed households employed seasonal migration before Aila while
52.8 percent and 64.8 percent of the surveyed households employed seasonal migration before
and after the embankment was repaired following Aila respectively.
As most households in both villages did not have their usual income from the affected areas
and were not able to start economic activities until the embankment was repaired, they were
not able to meet their basic survival needs for the required long period based on their own
capacity. Thus, most households needed assistance from their bonding networks (relatives),
bridging networks (neighbours, friends and acquaintances) and linking networks (government
agencies and NGOs) to meet their basic survival needs for the required long period. However,
many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bonding networks
for any purpose after Aila, and most of the households that received material and monetary
aid from their bonding networks received it only for the survival for some days, and received
it during the response period (up to one month). Likewise, most of the households did not
receive any material and monetary aid from their bridging networks for any purpose after
Aila. Some households that received material and monetary aid from their bridging networks
primarily received material aid, and they received it mainly in the first few days. Thus, most
of the households in both the villages were unable to meet the survival needs for the required
long period based on their own capacity and the material and monetary aid they received from
their bonding and bridging networks. They required assistance from their linking networks,
i.e. from the government and NGOs, for survival and recovery (Islam & Walkerden 2014,
2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; James & Paton 2015). Aid from the government and
NGOs as well as the opportunity to participate in various income-generating programs
operated by the government and NGOs contributed to their survival until the embankment
was repaired. The government and NGOs, but mainly NGOs, also played an important role in
survival for a period after the embankment was repaired, and in economic and housing
recovery. The dependency of the affected households on the assistance from the government
and NGOs for survival and recovery can be understood from the following excerpts:
It was not possible to survive [without support from government and NGOs]… It was
not possible to recover. People of this area would have left the area… They would
have become refugees. (an elected representative, DB, 20 September 2017)
They had to leave the area. They lived [on the embankment] for one month, two
months, three months with a hope that they would return to their homestead when the
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village would become dewatered. However, they could not return to their homestead
even after the 18 months of the event. If there was no relief from the government and
NGOs, then they could not survive [here]. (An NGO key informant who participated
in the post-Aila response and recovery operations in Channirchak, 17 August 2017)
Many people would have left the place if they did not receive support from the
government or NGOs. (a focus-group participant, DB, 22 September 2017)
It is worth mentioning that the Government of Bangladesh has a constitutional duty to assist
the disaster affected people (GoB 2016; MoDMR 2015). The Disaster Management Act 2012
and National Disaster Management Policy 2015 of Bangladesh also affirm the necessity of
providing humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to the disaster affected people by the
government (GoB 2012; MoDMR 2015). For instance, providing emergency humanitarian aid
and conducting post-disaster rescue and rehabilitation operations more efficiently are two of
the main objectives for which the Disaster Management Act 2012 has been enacted (GoB
2012). Likewise, the act states that one of the main functions of the Department of Disaster
Management in Bangladesh is to conduct emergency humanitarian aid and post-disaster
rescue and rehabilitation operations more efficiently. Thus, the normative expectation is that
the government should be able to meet the needs of the disaster affected people. Nevertheless,
the government might not be able to meet the needs of the affected people in disaster
situations as the government might not have sufficient resources to undertake necessary post-
disaster response and recovery operations for meeting the needs of the affected people.
The government played a vital role in the survival of the affected households in both villages.
Most of the aid items the government gave to the affected households were for their survival.
The aid items the affected households initially received from the government mainly included
rice, flattened rice, gur (molasses), water, clothes (saree and lungi), tents, tarpaulin, water
storing containers and small amounts of money as gratuitous relief (GR). The government
continued to distribute some of these aid items even after the response period (up to one
month following the event) as the affected villages were subject to flooding for a long period.
In addition, households received medical assistance if required. The government gave rice to
the affected households under two programs: rice as gratuitous relief (GR) and 20 kg rice per
household under vulnerable group feeding (hereafter VGF) program. The government initially
distributed rice as GR and started to give 20 kg rice under the VGF program from September
2009. The amount of aid from the government was much less before the introduction of 20 kg
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rice under the VGF program. Except food and necessary aid items for survival, the
government also gave aid items for recovery, particularly housing recovery.
Emergency food and water played a very important role in survival (see Figure 6.9). The
survey data show that among the households that received either emergency food and water or
one of these two items from the government (n=222), 75.2 percent (n=167) of households
considered that the emergency food and water or one of these items played an extremely
important role in the survival of their households while 19.4 percent (n=43), 3.6 percent
(n=8), 0.9 percent (n=2) and 0.9 percent (n=2) of households considered that the emergency
food and emergency water or one of these items played a very important, moderately
important, slightly important and not at all important role in the survival of their households
respectively.
Figure 6.9 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from the government in their survival (n=222)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
The government aid item that contributed most significantly to the survival of the affected
households was the 20 kg rice per card per month under the VGF program. Households
usually received one card per household and thus received 20 kg rice per month. A few large
households received two cards and thus received 40 kg rice per month per household. The
government gave 20 kg rice under the VGF program in the two studied villages and unions
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from September 2009 to October 2010 (14 months).64 As the affected households in both the
villages were not able to commence recovery activities due to the regular flooding of the
village, they were unable to manage the necessary food for survival. In both villages,
households that were receiving 30 kg rice under the Vulnerable Group Development
(hereafter VGD) program during that time did not receive rice under the VGF program
(source: key informants).65
Rice under the VGF program played a substantial role in meeting the survival needs of the
affected households (see Figure 6.10). Most households would have faced food scarcity or
starvation if they did not receive VGF rice as they did not have income or enough income to
buy the necessary food. Many households left the villages immediately or sometime after the
event as they had lost everything and were not able to survive in the area in the absence of
any income. In addition to the major contribution to survival, rice under the VGF program
was one of the most important aid items that played an extremely important role in reducing
the migration of entire households from the studied villages to other places. The importance
of rice under the VGF program in meeting the survival needs and in reducing the migration of
entire households with all the members or otherwise retaining people in their villages can be
understood from the following excerpts:
It was not possible to buy rice. How could we buy rice to eat as there was no
income?... I had to go to another place if I did not receive 20 kg rice. Otherwise, I had
to die here due to starving as there was no income. (DB, 17 June 2017)
20 kg rice was half of the food we required… The cost of other half of the food and
other expenses of the family were met by the earning from catching fish and working
in the embankment [for cash or food for work program]… If we did not receive 20 kg
rice, we had to take a loan with interest or we had to go to another place for forever.
Many families left this place. We also had to leave this place. (CC, 25 October 2017)
The survey data also show that VGF rice played a significant role in the survival of the
affected households. The survey data show that among households that received VGF rice
64 In Dakshin Bedkashi Union, the number of VGF cards was 5,200 from September 2009 to June 2010 and 3,011 from July 2010 to October 2010 (source: Project Implementation Office, Koyra). In Kamarkhola Union, the number of VGF cards was 3,500 from September 2009 to October 2010 (source: Project Implementation Office, Dacope). 65 Rice support under the VGD program is a regular safety net program of the government.
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(n=229), respondents of 93.9 percent (n=215), 5.2 percent (n=12) and 0.9 percent (n=2) of
households mentioned that VGF rice played an extremely important, very important and
moderately important role respectively in meeting the daily food necessity of the households
while the respondents of none of the households mentioned that it played a slightly important
role or no role.
Figure 6.10 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of VGF rice in meeting the daily food necessity of the households (n=229)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
Households that did not receive VGF rice experienced food scarcity if they did not have the
necessary income or savings to buy food.66 With a few exceptions, these households had an
acute food crisis. An interviewee of a household that did not receive rice under either the
VGF or VGD programs clearly describes the situation:
66 The survey data show that out of 8.4 percent (n=21) of the surveyed households (n=250) that did not receive 20 kg rice under the VGF program, only three households received rice under the VGD program after Aila. The survey only inquired if either a household received rice under the VGD program any time after Aila or not and did not inquire about the time of receiving rice under the VGD program. Rice under the VGD program is a regular safety net support of the government and thus a household can receive it any time after Aila. Thus, three households that received rice under the VGD program might not have received VGF rice as they were receiving rice under VGD. It is also possible that they might have received VGD rice during the period when the government was not operating the VGF program for the Aila-affected people. However, if the three households even received rice under the VGD program when the government operated the VGF program, 7.2 percent (n=18) of the surveyed households (n=250) did not receive rice under either the VGF or VGD program.
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If we had received 20 kg, it would have been helpful for us. We suffered due to lack of
access to food. We had scarcity of food. We were not able to buy necessary food that
time with the income we had that time. (DB, 10 July 2017)
In addition to 20 kg rice, many households that received money such as a small amount of
money as gratuitous relief or for house construction or repair used the money for meeting
their survival needs. Likewise, many households that received 20,000 Taka for repair or
constructing their houses used the money for meeting their survival needs instead of using it
for the repair or construction of the house. In addition to aid, income from the government
employment programs greatly contributed to the survival of the affected households. These
employment opportunities helped participant households to meet survival needs both before
and after the embankment was repaired.
6.3.3 Role of the Government in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery
The government played a substantial role in the economic and housing recovery process of
the affected households (see Figure 6.11). The government did not give any aid item directly
related to the economic recovery purpose. Although some households received aid items such
as paddy and vegetable seeds and fertilisers as agricultural support from the government, they
received these aid items as part of the regular activities undertaken for the development of
agriculture by the government in Bangladesh, not due to being affected by Aila. The
government gave a small amount of money for the repair or construction of the house.
However, the main aid item the affected households received from the government for the
repair or construction of the house was 20,000 Taka. The survey data by village show that
95.7 percent (n=67) of the surveyed households (n=70) in Channirchak and 61.6 percent
(n=111) of the surveyed households (n=180) in Dakshin Bedkashi received 20,000 Taka for
the repair or construction of the house.67 The money was distributed in two phases: 12,000
Taka in the first phase and 8,000 Taka in the second phase. In addition, although the
government did not implement any housing project targeting Aila-affected households, a total
of eight households, six households in Dakshin Bedkashi and two households in Channirchak,
received houses after Aila from the government. Out of eight houses, four houses were from
67 A total of 3,011 households in Dakshin Bedkashi Union and 3,472 households in Kamarkhola Union received 20,000 Taka. A total of 140 households in Channirchak Village and 244 households in Dakshin Bedkashi Village received 20,000 Taka. It is worth noting that 365 households under Ward 3 of the Kamarkhola Union received 20,000 Taka. Out of 365, 140 households in Channirchak, which is a village under Ward 3, received 20,000 Taka (source: Project Implementation Office, Dacope & Project Implementation Office, Koyra).
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the Zila Parishad, Khulna, and two households in each village received houses from the Zila
Parishad, Khulna.
The qualitative data show that many households would have required much more time to
construct or repair houses if they did not receive 20,000 Taka. Moreover, many households
that were living outside their homestead due to the displacement would have required much
more time to return to their homestead after the village became dewatered if they did not
receive 20,000 Taka. An interviewee depicts the situation in the following way:
I constructed a [small] house with 20,000 Taka. I could not construct the house if I did
not receive 20,000 Taka… As I could not construct the house, I could not come to my
homestead. (DB, 17 June 2017)
Moreover, households that did not receive 20,000 Taka encountered difficulties in
constructing or repairing houses and in a few cases could not still repair the damaged
surviving house. An interviewee elucidates in the following way:
I could not repair the house up to now after Aila… If I would receive 20,000 Taka,
then I could have repaired the house. If it rains, then water falls from above. The
windows are also broken. (Aila damaged the house of the interviewee partially, DB 10
July 2017)
Among the households that received any aid from the government (n=248), the respondents of
8.1 percent (n=20), 23.8 percent (n=59), 28.6 percent (n=71) and 26.6 percent (n=66) of
households considered that aid from the government played an extremely important, very
important, moderately important and slightly important role in the economic recovery of their
households respectively. On the other hand, the respondents of 12.9 percent (n=32) of
households considered that aid from the government did not play any role in the economic
recovery of their households. Among the households that received any aid from the
government (n=248), the respondents of 30.6 percent (n=76), 17.3 percent (n=43), 8.9 percent
(n=22) and 11.7 percent (n=29) of households considered that aid from the government
played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important
role in the housing recovery of their households respectively. On the other hand, the
respondents of 31.5 percent (n=78) of households considered that aid from the government
did not play any role in their housing recovery.
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Figure 6.11 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from the government in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=248)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
Although households received direct aid for housing recovery and did not receive direct aid
for economic recovery, aid from the government played a role in the economic recovery and
housing recovery of 86.4 percent (n=216) and 68 percent (n=170) of the surveyed households
respectively. Aid that households received for other purposes have indirectly contributed to
the economic recovery. Moreover, many households that received 20,000 Taka for the
housing recovery purpose did not use the money for that purpose.
The survey data show that among the households that received 20,000 Taka (n=178), 60.7
percent (n=108) used the money for repairing or constructing the house while 39.3 percent
(n=70) did not use the money for repairing or constructing the house. Among the households
that received 20,000 Taka from the government (n=178), respondents of 52.2 percent (n=93),
7.3 percent (n=13), 5.1 percent (n=9) and 14.6 percent (n=26) considered that it played an
extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role while
20.8 percent (n=37) considered that it did not play any role in the housing recovery of their
households. The survey data also show that all the recipient households that mentioned that
20,000 Taka did not play any role in the housing recovery (n=37) did not use the money for
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the repair or construction of the houses. Moreover, among the recipient households that
mentioned that 20,000 Taka played a slight role in the housing recovery (n=26), 25
households did not use the money for the repair or construction of the house.
The qualitative data suggest that households spent 20,000 Taka for various purposes instead
of spending for the repair or construction of the house. For example, they spent the money for
meeting survival needs, repaying the previous loan, meeting health costs, meeting educational
costs, meeting the cost of marriage of the daughter, buying utensils and other necessary
household items, buying homestead land and taking agricultural land in mortgage. They spent
the money for one or more of these purposes. Households also used part of the money for the
house and part of the money for other purposes such as for economic purposes or meeting
health costs. The use of 20,000 Taka for various purposes can be understood from the
following excerpts:
[People] could not use the money for [the construction or repair of] the house. People
had no food at that time. They had to manage food with that, they shopped with that.
They bought rice with that. (a focus group participant, DB, 10 August 2017)
I could not spend the money for the house… There was financial hardship at that
time… The money had been spent for buying rice and for shopping necessary items
needed to manage domestic life. (CC, 10 June 2017)
From 20,000 Taka, I repaid a previous [pre-Aila] loan of 10,000 Taka. I bought
clothes, cooking pots, plates, bowls and other necessary household items with the
remaining 10,000 Taka. (DB, 10 July 2017)
I spent first 12,000 Taka for the treatment of my child. With the money received later
[8,000 Taka], I bought bamboo, pillars and constructed a [small] house [on the
displaced location, not at the current homestead]. (CC, 25 October 2017)
Like aid, participation in various employment programs operated by the government also
played a significant role in the economic and housing recovery (see Figure 6.12). These
employment programs ensured access to food and income in a period when they had no
income. The survey data show that among the households that participated in cash for work
and food for work or any of these programs (n=135), respondents of 6.7 percent (n=9), 28.9
percent (n=39), 34.1 percent (n=46), and 23 percent (n=31) of households considered that
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participation played extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly
important roles in the economic recovery of their households respectively, while respondents
of 7.4 percent (n=10) of households considered that it played a not at all important role in the
economic recovery of their households. Among the households that participated in cash for
work and food for work or any of these programs (n=135), respondents of 5.9 percent (n=8),
22.2 percent (n=30), 20.0 percent (n=27), and 19.3 percent (n=26) of households considered
that participation played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and
slightly important role in the housing recovery of their households respectively, while
respondents of 32.6 percent (n=44) of households considered that it played a not at all
important role in the housing recovery of their households.
Figure 6.12 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in cash for work program and food for work program or any of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=135)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
Among the households that participated in the employment program (n=135), participation
played a role in the economic recovery and housing recovery of 92.6 (n=125) and 67.4 (n=91)
percent of households respectively. The qualitative data suggest that households wanted to
start economic activities and construct or repair the house. However, they usually preferred to
start economic activities instead of constructing or repairing the house if they did not have
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enough money for both. Thus, more households might have used the money earned from
these programs for starting economic activities instead of constructing or repairing their
houses. Households that mentioned that participation in the employment programs did not
play any role in the economic recovery might have used all the amount for other purposes
such as for meeting survival needs instead of using the money for starting the economic
activity. Likewise, households that mentioned that participation in the employment programs
did not play any role in the housing recovery might have used all the amount for other
purposes instead of using the money for constructing or repairing their houses. Similarly,
some households might have used the money for other purposes such as for meeting survival
needs instead of using the money for both economic recovery and housing recovery.
The aid from the government played a significant role in the psychological recovery process
of members of the affected households although the government did not provide
psychological support as an intervention (see Figure 6.11). Among the households that
received any aid from the government (n=248), the respondents of 50.4 percent (n=125), 33.1
percent (n=82), 10.5 percent (n=26), 5.2 percent (n=13) and 0.8 percent (n=2) of households
considered that aid from the government played an extremely important, very important,
moderately important, slightly important and not at all important role in the psychological
recovery process of the members of their households respectively.
Like aid, participation in various government employment programs also played a significant
role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households (see
Figure 6.12). Among the households that participated in cash for work and food for work or
any of these programs (n=135), respondents of 24.4 percent (n=33), 48.9 percent (n=66), 19.3
percent (n=26), and 6.7 percent (n=9) of households considered that participation played an
extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role in the
psychological recovery process of the members of their households respectively while the
respondent of only one household considered that it did not play an important role at all in the
psychological recovery process of the members of the household.
An interesting finding is that both aid from the government and participation in the
government employment programs contributed to the psychological recovery of a higher
percentage of the households compared to the economic and housing recovery. Aid from the
government played a role in the psychological recovery of the members of 98.4 percent
(n=246) of the surveyed households (n=250) while aid from the government played a role in
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the economic and housing recovery of 86.4 percent (n=216) and 68 percent (n=170) of the
surveyed households (n=250) respectively. Moreover, aid from the government played an
extremely important and very important role in the psychological recovery of the members of
82.8 percent (n=207) of the surveyed households while aid from the government played an
extremely important and very important role in the economic and housing recovery of 31.6
percent (n=79) and 47.6 percent (n=119) of the surveyed households respectively. Likewise,
participation in cash and food for work or any of these programs played a role in the
psychological recovery of 53.6 percent (n=134) of the surveyed households (n=250), and it
played a role in the economic recovery of 50 percent (n=125) and housing recovery of 36.4
(n=91) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively. Moreover, participation in cash and
food for work or any of these programs played an extremely important and very important
role in the psychological recovery of 39.6 percent (n=99) of the surveyed households (n=250),
while it played an extremely important and very important role in the economic recovery of
19.2 percent (n=48) and 15.2 percent (n=38) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively.
The significant contribution of aid and the government employment programs to
psychological recovery in the absence of psychological support as an intervention is highly
consistent with the findings of qualitative data. The qualitative data suggest that as the
affected people were not able to begin recovery activities due to the villages being subject to
the regular flooding, they became perplexed. They became worried about survival. They were
not sure either they would be able to live in the affected village or not. There was also a belief
in the initial period among the villagers in both the studied villages that the villages would not
continue to exist, and they would lose everything to the rising river due to the breaches of the
embankments not being repaired. Thus, they were more concerned about survival and the
possibility of living in the villages in the initial period rather than commencing recovery
activities although commencing recovery activities was not possible.
However, aid and work opportunities from the government as well as from NGOs in the
absence of any regular income for most of the households created a sense of optimism among
the affected people and helped them feel psychologically better. They got mental strength
from believing that the villages would become dewatered in future and they would be able to
stay in the affected villages when the government and NGOs started relief operations in full
phase and created temporary employment opportunities. They got the confidence that the
government and NGOs were with them and would support them not only to survive but also
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to achieve recovery. Thus, although they did not receive direct psychological support, aid for
survival, economic and housing recovery and work opportunities from the government, as
well as from NGOs, greatly contributed to the psychological recovery. The following
statements of an interviewee show how the aid given for other purposes contributed to
psychological recovery:
The government and NGOs played the main role in the case of housing and economic
recovery… As they gave support for housing and economic recovery, we became
psychologically well. If housing and economic conditions would remain bad, then we
would remain psychologically unwell. (DB, 17 June 2017)
In addition to aid and employment programs, some households took loans (with interest) from
the government sources such as Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB) and the Ektee Bari Ektee
Khamar (One House One Farm) project for various purposes including starting economic
activities after Aila. They took loans mainly after the embankment was repaired. The survey
data show only one household took a loan from the government source before the
embankment was repaired and took the loan only one time in order to meet survival needs.
However, 9.6 percent (n=24) of the surveyed households took a loan from the government
sources after the embankment was repaired. All but one household took a loan one time while
one household took a loan two times from the government sources after the embankment was
repaired. Among the purposes of taking a loan after the embankment was repaired, starting
economic activity was the most important purpose and meeting survival needs was the second
most important purpose.
6.4 Major Weaknesses of the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations
6.4.1 Lack of Aid During the Initial Period
The aid from the government was less than the needs of the people in both the villages, until
the government started providing 20 kg rice under the VGF program. The affected households
in both the villages did not receive any aid from the government during the first few days
after the event. The government gave its first aid, in the form of rice, in both the villages on
the third day following the day of the event. However, only some households received that aid
as the amount of aid was extremely limited compared to the needs of the households in both
villages. The amount of aid was lower than the needs of the households in both the villages
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during the first week. However, the flow of the government aid, mainly emergency aid items
such as rice, dry food and water, gradually increased from the second week.
6.4.2 Inadequacy of Major Aid Items Compared to Need: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka
The government stopped providing 20 kg rice under the VGF program in both villages before
the embankment was repaired. The government started distributing 20 kg rice under the VGF
program from September 2009. The last month for which the government provided rice under
the VGF program in both the villages was October 2010. However, Channirchak became
dewatered in February 2011 while Dakshin Bedkashi became dewatered in March 2012 due
to the repair of the embankment. As most households did not have access to their usual
income, they had survival needs before the embankment was repaired. Most households also
had survival needs for a period after the embankment was repaired as they required time to
revive economic activities after the embankment. For instance, households that were mainly
dependent on agriculture or shrimp farming had no income until they harvested crops or
shrimps, if they had no income from other sources. Thus, it was necessary to continue the
provision of giving 20 kg rice under the VGF program to the affected households not only
until the embankment was repaired but also up to a period after the embankment was repaired.
It is worth noting that although people in both villages used to eat atap rice (rice milled from
sun-dried paddy, they received shiddhya rice (rice milled from parboiled paddy) under the
VGF program. Thus, many households experienced difficulty in eating unfamiliar shiddhya
rice.
The number of households that received 20,000 Taka was lower than the number of
households that really needed the money. The government also provided an extremely smaller
number of houses in both the villages. Only eight households received houses from the
government in the two villages. All of them also received 20,000 Taka (source: interviews
and household survey). All the households received houses much later than they received
20,000 Taka. However, many households, including some extremely poor and poor
households, particularly in Dakshin Bedkashi Village, did not receive either a house or the
20,000 Taka from the government. It would have been fair if the houses were distributed to
those households that did not receive 20,000 Taka from the government.
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6.4.3 Problems Related to the Criteria of Aid Distribution: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka
A household received 20 kg rice under the VGF program for one VGF card. The elected
representatives of UP gave two VGF cards per household if the household had many
members. Nevertheless, some of the households that had more members received only one
VGF card. Thus, the households with more members faced problems as the amount of rice
was insufficient compared to the needs of the households. This sort of distribution (including
the same sort of distribution by NGOs) caused the separation of the extended or joint family
into more than one family in a few cases. Thus, it is necessary to consider the number of
household members in distributing aid items like rice.
The government gave 20,000 Taka per household. Although large households (a household
consisting of more than one nuclear unit) received two cards for 20,000 Taka (40,000 Taka)
in a few cases, large households usually received one card for 20,000 Taka although the
household required more than one card. Thus, extended or joint households were in a
disadvantageous position due to the consideration of these households as a single household.
Moreover, if a household or two households among separate households of siblings received
20,000 Taka, then the household of the other sibling or siblings often did not receive 20,000
Taka although they were poor and needy. Thus, in both villages, some poor households did
not receive 20,000 Taka as a sibling or siblings of the household heads living in the separate
household/s received 20,000 Taka while some rich households received 20,000 Taka.
Two issues related to the 20,000 Taka donations contributed to the non-use of money for the
repair or construction of the house. Firstly, households in both the villages received the
money when the villages were subject to flooding. Thus, needy households spent the money
for meeting survival needs instead of saving the money to repair or construct house in the
future when the village would become dewatered. Secondly, the households received the
money in two instalments. The needy households spent the money or some of the money
received in the first instalment for survival before they received the second instalment. Thus,
they could not save the whole amount for repairing or constructing the house. The survey data
also show that 76.8 percent (n=192) of the total surveyed households opined that the
disbursement of the money in two instalments was a problem for the repair or construction of
the house.
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6.4.4 Lack of Livelihood Support
The affected households in both the villages badly required livelihood support. Some
households received agricultural support in the form of free paddy and vegetable seeds and
fertilisers. However, they received these items under regular activities of the Department of
Agricultural Extension, not under any livelihood support project that was particularly
designed for the Aila-affected households. The lack of livelihood support from the
government was one of the major weaknesses of the post-Aila recovery operations. Islam,
Walkerden and Amati (2017) also found that most households did not receive livelihood
support after Cyclone Sidr from UP.
6.4.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention
Some of the more severe impacts of disaster such as loss of family members, destruction of
house, water incursion into the home and loss of income influence mental health significantly
(Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008; Lebowitz 2016;
Isaranuwatchai et al. 2017). Thus, psychological support after an event like Aila is extremely
necessary for the affected people. However, the government did not provide psychological
support to the Aila-affected people as an intervention. The absence of psychological support
to assist people to recover from the shock created by Aila was one of the major weaknesses.
As Aila not only impacted the physical infrastructure but also impacted the psyche of the
affected people, psychological recovery was as necessary as the recovery of infrastructure
(Kenny & Clarke 2010). Thus, provision of psychological support to the disaster victims
should be considered as one of the most important areas of the post-disaster response and
recovery programs, as a disaster always causes psychological damage as well as physical
damage (Haque at al. 2012).
6.4.6 Lack of Coordination
Coordination between the government and NGOs occurred at the various levels including
coordination at Upazila Parishad level and UP level. NGOs that worked within the upazila
informed the UNO officially. UNO is the chief executive officer of the Upazila Parishad and
representative of the central government at the upazila level (Hassan & Mannan 2016). The
UNO is also vice-chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Management Committee (UzDMC) and
chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Response Coordination Group (UDRCG) (MoDMR
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2019).68 NGOs submitted the necessary documents to the UNO to implement projects within
the upazila. After the approval from UNO, NGOs usually organised a project inception
meeting at the upazila level and started the project activities. The elected representatives of
the project area, mainly the chairman of the UP or Ups, usually attended the inception
meeting at the upazila level.
In addition, NGOs informed and worked in coordination with the UP as NGOs implemented
projects within the areas of a union or more unions of an upazila. The elected chairman of the
UP is the head of the UP. The chairman is also the chairman of the Union Disaster
Management Committee (UDMC) which is the main body for undertaking necessary actions
during the warning period, disaster period and post-disaster period at the union level. The
UDMC plays vital roles in coordinating the government and NGO relief activities and
distributing relief items at the union level. The chairman is also the member of UzDMC
(MoFDM 2010b). The chairman plays the most important role at the union level during the
warning stage, disaster stage and rehabilitation stage. The chairman operates the union-level
control room and has contact with the upazila-level control room operated by the UNO. The
chairman coordinates and supervises relief works carried out by the government and NGOs at
the union level. UP members who are also the members of UDMC also play an important
role. They assist the UP chairman at every stage, playing an important role in announcing
warnings and keeping the emergency volunteer team ready for various tasks including
evacuation. They also participate in rescue, relief and rehabilitation operations (MoFDM
2010b).
The UNO coordinated all the NGOs that participated in the post-Aila response and recovery
operations within the upazila through the monthly NGO coordination meetings. Coordination
between UNO and NGOs helped to avoid overlapping of the interventions in the same area by
different NGOs. The UNO sometimes invited the chairman of the respective UPs to attend the
monthly NGO coordination meeting. The coordination between UNO and NGOs at the
upazila level was usually better. However, the coordination between elected representatives
and NGOs at the union level was sometimes problematic. The lack of coordination at the
68 The UNO earlier acted as the chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Management Committee (UzDMC) (MoFDM 2010b). Currently, the upazila chairman is the chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Management Committee (UzDMC) (MoDMR 2019).
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union level undermined the success of the response and recovery operations (Islam,
Walkerden & Amati 2017, p. 374).
The coordination between UP and NGOs varied from one studied UP to another studied UP
and within the same UP during the periods of the different chairmen. NGOs that worked in
the union usually informed the chairman and members of the UP and other people living
within the UP about the project through the arrangement of the inception meeting at the union
level. NGOs are always required to work in coordination with the UP. The chairman of the
UP did not arrange regular monthly coordination meetings with NGOs like UNO did.
However, the chairman usually met NGO representatives working within the union when
necessary. The chairman sometimes also invited the representatives of the NGOs working
within the union to attend the monthly regular meeting of the UP to know about the progress
of activities undertaken under various projects by NGOs or to discuss project-related issues
such as the selection of the beneficiaries for a particular project.
The main problem between the UP and NGOs emerged concerning the selection of the
beneficiaries for an aid item from an NGO. The problem arose mainly during the distribution
of important aid items such as house and livelihood support. Different NGOs selected the list
of beneficiaries in different ways. Nevertheless, NGOs usually finalised the list of the
beneficiaries after consultation with the UP representatives. They often had to adjust the list
of the beneficiaries by including or excluding some beneficiaries recommended by the UP
representatives. However, UP representatives and NGOs sometimes were not able to reach
consensus. The main reason for the disagreement was the recommendation and pressure by
the UP representatives for the inclusion of the ineligible beneficiaries in the list at the cost of
the exclusion of the eligible beneficiaries from the list prepared by the NGOs in consultation
with the community people. UP representatives often recommended people such as relatives,
friends and political supporters and the people from whom they took bribes as the
beneficiaries for an aid item from NGOs. Like UP representatives, powerful village leaders
including the village-level leaders of the ruling party at the national level also wanted and
pressured NGO employees to include their own people and the people from whom they took
bribes as the beneficiaries for an aid item. Thus, inappropriate recommendation and pressure
by the UP chairman or elected representatives on NGO employees for giving an aid item to
the ineligible beneficiaries based on social and political connections and the receipt of bribes
from a potential beneficiary was the major source of conflict between the UP and NGOs. An
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NGO employee who participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations depicts
the situation in the following way:
They give priority to their close people. Say, I will give sheep to 50 people. When the
chairman listens, he will keep [just] 20 to 30 of the beneficiaries included in the list
[created based on the community consultation]. He wants to distribute the remaining
to his party people and close people… They put pressure. Many created pressure
during that time… Many NGOs were compelled to give to the people they wanted. (17
August 2017)
Key informants also confirmed that the then chairman of one of the UPs physically assaulted
NGO employees when they did not agree to include his preferred people in the list of
beneficiaries. Moreover, NGO employees often felt scared when they worked, particularly in
one of the studied villages, as the political leaders often intimidated them for not including
their people in the list.
However, both the parties often resolved these sorts of disputes through discussion, with the
help of other people from both the parties. An elected representative of one of the unions
elucidates this in the following way:
The then chairman had turbulent relations with many NGOs during that period…
Many NGOs became dissatisfied and thus decided not to work in the area. We
comforted them and convinced them to start the work again. (DB, 11 August 2017)
However, if the dispute was not resolved through discussion at the UP level, then NGOs
usually raised the issue in the monthly NGO coordination meeting with the UNO. The
chairman of the affected unions sometimes participated in the monthly NGO coordination
meeting at the invitation of UNO. The chairman also raised issues related to the problematic
aspects of NGO operations such as exclusion of eligible beneficiaries by NGOs in the
monthly NGO coordination meeting with the UNO. The UNO played a vital role in solving
the disputes between the chairman or other elected representatives and NGOs.
6.4.7 Exclusion of Poor Households
Many poor and extremely poor households did not receive major aid items while many better-
off households did. For instance, among the 51 interviewed households in Dakshin Bedkashi,
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13 households did not receive 20,000 Taka and many of them were poor or extremely poor
households. On the other hand, many better-off households received 20,000 Taka. Although
the better-off households that received 20,000 Taka needed the money to construct or repair
their houses as Aila destroyed their houses too, the exclusion of poor and extremely poor
households was unfair. A female interviewee from an extremely poor household, who lost her
nine-year-old boy due to Aila (the only person killed in that village) and her husband (who
had been suffering from a disease before Aila) a week after Aila, clearly depicts the situation:
I lost my son; I lost my husband… Many people living adjacent to me received
money. Was it not the right thing for money to be given to me? People living adjacent
to me earn better, their [economic] condition is good. They received the money, but I
did not receive the money. Thus, I felt emotionally hurt. (DB, 23 September 2017)
Some of the households that did not receive 20 kg rice under the VGF program were poor
households and yet they also did not receive rice under the VGD program. Thus, they had an
acute food crisis. Moreover, some of the households that received houses from the
government were relatively better-off households, although many poor and extremely poor
households did not receive houses. It is worth noting that all the better-off households that
received houses from the government also received 20,000 Taka from the government.
However, many poor and extremely poor households, particularly in Dakshin Bedkashi
Village, did not receive either a house or 20,000 Taka from the government.
6.4.8 Favouritism
UP representatives favoured relatives and people who were socially close to them such as
friends, and supporters of their own political party or own group during the distribution of
various aid items (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). In addition to the chairman and elected
members of the UP, unelected village leaders, mainly the village-level leaders of the national-
level ruling political party and some powerful village leaders, also played important roles in
the distribution of the aid items. They also favoured their own people during the distribution
of various aid items. Leaders of the national-level ruling political party at other broader levels
such as union level also played an important role in the distribution of the aid items. They also
favoured their own people during the distribution of various aid items. The qualitative data
show that many households were deprived of various aid items due to the favouritism of the
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UP representatives. The following excerpts of the interviews illustrate the favouritism being
shown by the UP representatives:
The chairman-member gives more [aid] to the people whom they know and their
[political] supporters. They even give to the people who do not deserve it. (CC, 16
August 2017)
I do not believe member-chairman because they gave to the people whom they liked;
they did not give to the people whom they did not like. (DB, 9 July 2017)
Party politics is very important here. One needs to get in touch with the chairman or
member. They recommend people to whom they want to give. (CC, 9 June 2017)
Political favouritism in the distribution of the aid items seriously undermined the equity and
efficiency of aid operations (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Mustafa 2003; Quarantelli
1999). UP representatives favoured supporters of their own political party or own group,
reflecting their own political interests. As the supporters played important roles in electing
them, they always tried to a give an aid item to the households of their supporters. They also
could not ignore the demands of their supporters for aid items. They wanted to give aid to
their supporters to secure their position as a leader and a win in the next election. A key
informant describes this in the following way:
They need to increase their vote bank. That is why they play an active role to provide
a support [aid item] to the people whom they like. (1 October 2017)
Among the supporters of the political party, people who had more connection with the UP
representatives received more aid. The UP representatives sometimes excluded supporters of
the opposite political party from various types of aid items due to political favouritism.
Likewise, they sometimes excluded supporters of the opposite group within the same political
party. Similarly, they sometimes also favoured some people who were supporters of the
opposite political party but supporters of their own group in local-level politics. An
interviewee describes the exclusion of the supporters of the opposite political party from
various types of aid items given by the government through UP:
As we are the supporters of F and G [two national-level political parties not in power],
they do not give [to] us. If there is something left after distributing among the
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supporters of E [the national-level ruling political party and the party of the UP
chairman], then they give [to] us. Otherwise, they do not. (DB, 17 June 2017)
The UP representatives also favoured their relatives, close people and political supporters
when they selected the households that could work in the various employment programs
operated by the government. This can be understood from the following excerpt:
The chairman-member gives work opportunities to their relatives and some of their
own party members. They give work opportunities to the people who are close to
them. (CC, 23 August 2017)
The UP chairman favoured his areas for the distribution of some important aid items such as
houses and tried to ensure more infrastructure development such as new roads in his areas.
Favouritism in distributing aid items strengthened the bond between the UP representatives
and those households that received benefits while it weakened the bond between the UP
representatives and the other households deprived of aid items. The favouritism in distributing
aid items not only excluded people belonging to the opposite political party or opposite group
within the party but also created tensions within the village and thus weakened community
resilience.
The receipt of unfair benefits by some households from their relationships with linking
networks such as UP representatives should not be considered as an actual instance of the
effective functioning of linking social networks. This represents not the anticipated
functioning of social capital, but rather its dark side (Putnam 2000; Aldrich 2011a, 2012a).
Favouring socially or politically close households and exclusion of many households
therefore not only undermined the equity and efficiency of response and recovery operations
but also undermined the welfare of the community by weakening the relationships between
the UP representatives and the households deprived of aid items and creating conflicts among
villagers. Other empirical studies have also observed this Janus-faced nature of social capital
in post-disaster contexts (Aldrich 2011a, 2012a; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).
6.4.9 Less Amount of VGF Rice and Bribery
Distribution of less rice than a household was entitled to receive, and distribution of the aid
items in exchange for bribes, seriously undermined the equity and efficiency of aid operations
(Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017;
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Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018; Kenny 2010; Mustafa 2003). As discussed earlier,
practices like these represent the negative consequences or dark sides of social capital
(Aldrich 2011a, 2012a; Putnam 2000; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). A household that
received a VGF card was entitled to receive 20 kg rice per card. However, many interviewees
confirmed that the weight of the rice they received under the VGF program was less than 20
kg. Mahmud and Prowse (2012) also found that most of the households that received 20 kg
rice under the VGF program after Aila received less rice than 20 kg. The interviewees depict
the situation in the following ways:
The rice was less than 20 kg. If the UP gave 20 kg, then it used to be 18 kg. I weighed
to see. The rice was not more than 18 kg. (CC, 25 August 2017)
The amount of rice was less. They gave 20 kg rice. However, the weight of the rice
used to be 17 kg or 18 kg. (DB, 6 August 2017)
Distribution of the aid items in exchange for bribes was a major problem. The qualitative data
reveal that elected representatives of the UP took bribes when they distributed various
government aid items (Mahmud & Prowse 2012; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). They also
took bribes from the people whom they selected for the various employment programs created
by the government (Mahmud & Prowse 2012). Unelected village leaders, mainly the village-
level leaders of the central-level ruling political party and some powerful village leaders close
to the UP representatives, also took bribes (Mahmud & Prowse 2012; Nadiruzzaman & Paul
2013; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).69 They often took bribes in collusion with the
elected representatives as they usually worked as the middlemen. This can be understood
from the following excerpt:
Other representatives [elected members of UP] and [politically close persons] of the
chairman are also involved with him. For example, a person close to the chairman
took 10,000 Taka from you. He gave 8,000 Taka to the chairman and he received
2,000 Taka as he asked for the bribe or worked for it. (DB, 4 August 2017)
The government distributed 20,000 Taka to the recipients through their own bank accounts.
The Bangladesh Army prepared the list of beneficiaries for 20,000 Taka. The personnel of the
69 Mahmud and Prowse (2012) found that among the households that gave bribes to receive a small amount of money distributed by the government, more households gave bribes to the middlemen than the chairman and members of UP.
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Bangladesh Army visited the villages and conducted a door-to-door survey and prepared the
list in consultation with the UP representatives. Nevertheless, some household-level
interviewees and key informants confirmed that UP representatives and unelected village
leaders, mainly the village leaders of the ruling political party and some powerful village
leaders close to the UP representatives, often took bribes from the recipients of 20,000 Taka.
This can be understood from the following excerpts of the interviews:
We were told that 20,000 Taka could be given if half of the money was given [as
bribes]. We gave half of the money [10,000 Taka] to the person through whom we got
the card and we took half of the money. (a focus group participant, DB, 7 August
2017)
One had to give 500 Taka or 1,000 Taka to receive 20,000. Otherwise, it was not
possible to receive. I also had to give money. I was not the only person who gave
[1,500 Taka as bribes], everyone had to give 1,000 or 2,000. Everyone who received
the money had to give 1,000 Taka, 1,500 Taka or 2,000 Taka. (He gave 1,500 Taka in
two instalments to the elected member of the UP.) (DB, 6 August 2017)
[Middlemen] wanted 5,000 Taka for 20,000 Taka. If I would give 5,000 Taka, then I
would receive 20,000 Taka. However, I did not give the money. I did not take part in
the illegal activity. Middlemen who worked for the chairman-member asked for the
money. (DB, 5 August 2017)
Elected representatives of UP and other unelected leaders also took bribes during the
distribution of houses received from the government. For instance, two households in one of
the studied villages received houses from Zila Parishad and both households gave bribes to
the UP representatives to receive houses. One household gave 10,000 Taka and another
household gave 25,000 Taka. An interviewee who gave 10,000 Taka to the UP representatives
to receive a house given from Zila Parishad stated that she got the house due to her relative
who was a politician and had a strong link with the chairman of Zila Parishad and a national-
level political leader of the ruling political party. She mentioned that due to her connection to
the higher level, she got the house by providing only 10,000 Taka to the elected
representatives of the UP. Otherwise, the amount of bribe to receive the house would have
been much higher. She explains her situation in the following way:
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It was never possible to receive the house [if we had to give 50,000–60,000 Taka]. I
received it by giving 10,000 Taka. We were never able to give 50,000–60,000 Taka.
(CC, 25 August 2017)
Six households in another village received two types of houses from the government: four
houses of the same design and two houses of the same design. The four houses of the same
design were distributed based on political considerations and given to the supporters of a
political party (source: interviews with the two recipients). The other two houses of the same
design, given by Khulna Zila Parishad and locally known as the government building house,
were distributed to the relatively better-off households. One of the recipients of these houses,
who was a household-level interviewee of the study, informed that he did not give a bribe to
anyone to receive the house. However, it is an open secret and there is a widely accepted
belief in the village that two households received the government building house due to large
bribes given to the UP representatives. An interviewee explains:
Two government building houses were given to [X and Y]. They are not poor. They
have 10 to 15 bighas agricultural land. We do not have any land except the homestead.
However, we did not get [the government building house]. We could not give money
[like the recipients]. (DB, 4 August 2017)
A few households also mentioned that they had to give bribes to the elected leaders or
unelected village leaders to get the opportunity to work in the employment programs operated
by the government. An interviewee who gave a 300 Taka bribe to a local leader (he did not
mention the identity of the leader) to get 40 days’ work depicts the necessity of providing a
bribe to participate in the government-operated employment programs in the following way:
I do not believe [the member-chairman]. If they distribute work, then poor people do
not get that work. If someone gives money [to them], then they get work. If someone
does not give money [to them], then they do not get work… The other leaders
[unelected village leaders] aside from the member-chairman are also the same. (DB, 3
August 2017)
UP representatives also took bribes from the people who received aid items from NGOs. UP
representatives often pressured NGO personnel to provide aid items to their relatives, friends
and political supporters, or to people from whom they took bribes. Moreover, unelected
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leaders of the village were also involved in the corrupt practices either in collusion with the
elected leaders or alone. Three interviewees confirmed that they gave bribes to the elected UP
representatives and unelected leaders to get the houses from NGOs. Although only three
interviewees acknowledged it, there is a belief among the local people and NGO key
informants that elected and unelected leaders often took bribes from the potential recipients of
aid items from NGOs by assuring them that they would receive an aid item if they gave a
bribe. Key informants from the NGO sector stated that elected and unelected leaders often
took bribes in the name of NGO staff although NGO staff were not aware of this. This can be
understood from the following excerpts of an interview with an NGO employee who worked
in one of the studied villages:
Alam [pseudonym] bhai [brother] cannot tell you directly. His rate is 10,000 Taka.
However, I talked to him and [confirmed] it for you. You give me 8,000 Taka.
Otherwise, your name would be deleted from the list. Local people, particularly the
elected member [of the Union Parishad] and some other people [locally powerful
people, mainly political leaders] took money secretly from people by using our name.
They were poor people. They thought that we did not have a house, we might lose the
house [if we did not give money]. Some gave them 5,000 Taka, some gave 7,000
Taka, some gave 3,000 Taka, and some gave 2,000 Taka. In fact, the people who were
needy and eligible to receive the house received the house. Nevertheless, they had to
give the money. (1 October 2017)
In a few cases, NGO staff also became involved with the elected chairman and members of
UP and unelected village leaders and participated in the corrupt practices. A key informant
from the NGO sector depicts it in the following way:
Our field staff sometimes became biased. Everyone did not have the same mentality…
When the staff formed a collusion with the representative of the local government –
for example, a member of the Union Parishad when they discharge their job duties –
they became involved in corruption. The staff were sacked later, and new staff were
appointed. (11 September 2017)
However, NGOs usually cautioned the villagers that they did not need to give bribes to
anyone to receive an aid item. Nevertheless, the villagers gave bribes to UP representatives
and other local leaders for receiving vital aid items such as houses from NGOs. They gave
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bribes to be included or not to be excluded from the list of beneficiaries. The following
statements of an NGO employee clearly illustrate this:
Do not give bribes to anyone. A [the name of an NGO] does not take any money [for
the aid provided]. If you give bribes to anyone, then we will not give you a house, we
will not give you a latrine [if we know about it]. Despite this warning, people gave
bribes. Elected leaders such as chairman-members and local leaders took the bribes. (1
October 2017)
The survey did not inquire about corrupt practices of the elected representatives of the UP and
unelected village leaders. However, it inquired about how much the respondents trust elected
representatives of the UP as well as unelected village leaders in a five-point scale. The survey
also inquired about respondents’ opinions regarding the honesty of the elected representatives
of the UP as well as unelected village leaders in a five-point scale. The survey data show that
most of the respondents trust elected representatives of the UP and unelected village leaders
only to a small or very small extent, and most respondents think that they are dishonest.
The negative image of the UP representatives and unelected village leaders can also be
understood from some other survey findings. Only 10.8 percent (n=27) of the survey
respondents (n=250) agreed while 86.8 percent (n=217) of the survey respondents disagreed
and 2.4 percent (n=6) were undecided in response to the statement that the elected leaders
give priority to the welfare of the village over that of their own family, relatives and people
close to them. Likewise, 16.4 percent (n=41) of the survey respondents agreed while 80.4
percent (n=201) disagreed, and 3.2 percent (n=8) were undecided in response to the statement
that unelected village leaders give priority to the welfare of the village over that of their own
family, relatives and people close to them.
6.5 Conclusion
Neither of the UPs disseminated the warnings effectively or took essential measures to
evacuate people and livestock to the safe places. Both the UPs played a very limited role in
searching for and rescuing people immediately after the event or on the night of the event.
The UPs were not well prepared despite the cyclone warning signal of seven, and were not at
all prepared for the flooding of the whole union due to the breaking of the embankments
caused by the storm surge associated with Aila.
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The government started relief operations within a few days of the event. Although the aid that
the government provided was very limited for a period following the event, the government
played an extremely important role in the survival of the affected households. As the villages
were subject to flooding for a long period, the affected households could not start recovery
activities. Most of the affected households were not able to survive without external
assistance from the government and NGOs, as households did not have income to meet their
survival needs for a long period. They would have left the area as they were unable to meet
their survival needs. Various government aid items such as rice, flattened rice, gur, water and
clothes greatly contributed to people’s survival. Rice under the VGF played a vital role in
meeting the survival needs of the people. It also played an extremely important role in
reducing permanent migration of households from the studied villages. In addition to aid,
participation in the government employment programs helped households greatly to meet
their survival needs. The case of the post-Aila situation shows that survival of the households
was not possible without aid and non-aid employment assistance from linking networks, i.e.
government and NGOs.
The government also played a significant role in the economic, housing and psychological
recovery. However, the livelihood support was much less than the needs in both the villages.
The distribution of 20,000 Taka for repair or construction was a great support for housing
recovery. However, many households did not use the money for the repair or construction of
the house. Nevertheless, households used the money for other necessary purposes including
meeting survival needs and many other purposes. Although the government did not provide
psychological support as an intervention, aid and work opportunities from the government
(along with the aid and work opportunities from NGOs) created a sense of optimism among
the affected people and gave them mental strength and confidence and thus contributed to the
psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. In addition to aid,
participation in the government employment programs also greatly contributed to the
economic, housing and psychological recovery. Moreover, loans from the government
sources after the embankment was repaired also aided some households in undertaking
recovery initiatives.
The government’s post-Aila response and recovery operations had some serious weaknesses.
It did not start the relief operation immediately after the event. The amount of relief was
extremely low compared to needs during the first week and was very limited up to the point
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when the government started the VGF program. The government gave VGF rice for a lesser
period than was needed and gave locally unsuitable rice. Moreover, the government gave
20,000 Taka to a smaller number of households than required. Lack of livelihood support and
an absence of psychological support as an intervention were two major weaknesses of the
government response and recovery operations. Lack of coordination between UP and NGOs,
exclusion of poor households, and favouritism and bribery of the UP representatives in
discharging aid items seriously undermined the fairness and effectiveness of the distributed
aid items.
Finally, the post-Aila situation shows that the affected households are not usually able to
survive and recover without aid and non-aid support from the government. The government
acted as a source of resilience. The government should address these weaknesses in order to
play a better role in future response and recovery operations. The government should ensure
the supply of necessary survival aid items during the initial period. The government should
provide necessary livelihood support as economic recovery is one of the most important
components of the post-disaster recovery process. Moreover, the government should provide
psychosocial support as one of the core areas of the future disaster response and recovery
operations. The next chapter will investigate how linking social capital, i.e. the resources the
affected households received from NGOs, contributes to the disaster response and the
economic, housing and psychological recovery process.
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Chapter 7: The Role of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and Their Weaknesses in the Post-Cyclone Aila Response and
Recovery Operations
7.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the role of non-government organisations (NGOs) in the post–
Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households, and the weaknesses
of NGOs’ post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations. This chapter investigates both
objectives based on NGOs’ post-Aila operations in Channirchak Village of Kamarkhola
Union of Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union of
Koyra Upazila, Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter has six sections including the
introduction in section 7.1. Section 7.2 briefly outlines the NGOs that participated in the post-
Aila response and recovery operations in the two studied villages. Section 7.3 presents the
types of aid and non-aid items the affected households received from NGOs, i.e. through their
linking networks. Section 7.4 examines the role of NGOs in the post-Aila response and
recovery process of the affected households. Section 7.5 examines weaknesses of NGOs’
post-Aila response and recovery operations. Section 7.6 presents the conclusion.
7.2. NGOs that Participated in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations
Various national and international NGOs participated in the post-Aila response and recovery
operations (see Table 7.1). However, most of the NGOs that implemented projects in the two
studied villages were national NGOs. International NGOs such as ActionAid, Cristian Aid,
DanChurchAid, Oxfam, Save the Children and WaterAid either supported or funded the
projects implemented by national NGOs. Moreover, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, UK Aid
(the Department for International Development, United Kingdom), the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), the European Commission (EC) and United Nation
agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme
(WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) either supported or funded the projects implemented by national NGOs. It is worth
noting that Islamic Relief Bangladesh, an international NGO, directly implemented some
projects in Dakshin Bedkashi Union including the studied Dakshin Bedkashi Village.
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Table 7.1 Major NGOs that participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations70
Channirchak Dakshin Bedkashi Banchte Shekha BRAC BRAC Caritas Bangladesh Dushtha Shasthya Kendra Islamic Relief Bangladesh Heed Bangladesh Nowabenki Gonomukhi Foundation Jagrata Juba Shangha Rupantar Rupantar Sheba Manab Kallyan Kendra Sheba Manab Kallyan Kendra Shushilan Shushilan Uttaran Ulashi Sreejony Sangha Uttaran
Source: Household-level interviews, Key informants, FGDs
7.3 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from NGOs
The affected households received various types of aid from NGOs.71 The survey data show
that 99.6 percent (n=249) of the surveyed households (n=250) received aid from NGOs.72
One surveyed household that did not receive any aid from NGOs was from Dakshin Bedkashi
and the household participated in two cash-for-work programs and one food-for-work
program operated by NGOs. The survey data also show that 21.2 percent (n=53) of the
surveyed households received aid from three or fewer NGOs while 43.6 percent (n=109) and
34.8 (n=87) percent of the surveyed households received aid from four to six NGOs and more
70 Key informants and interviewees confirmed that Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, World Vision, Nabolok, and Prodipan distributed emergency relief items in Channirchak. Key informants and interviewees confirmed that Bangladesh Red Crescent Society distributed emergency relief items and Shishu Sasthya Foundation provided three houses and some water filters in Dakshin Bedkashi. It is worth noting that Shishu Sasthya Foundation did not implement the project in Dakshin Bedkashi. It implemented the project in Shyamnagar Upazila of Satkhira District. However, an employee of the project who hailed from Dakshin Bedkashi provided some project support, with permission from the higher authority, to Dakshin Bedkashi (personal communication with the employee who hailed from Dakshin Bedkashi). 71 The UNDP Early Recovery Facility through three vendors provided 265 disaster-resilient core family shelters in four villages of Dakshin Bedkashi Union. Each shelter was equipped with a pit latrine and rooftop rainwater harvesting facility. Thirty-five households in Dakshin Bedkashi Village received a disaster-resilient core family shelter, locally know as a ‘UNDP house’. These shelters were constructed with financial assistance from UK Aid and support from UNDP. Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor constructed 35 core family shelters in Dakshin Bedkashi Village. It also constructed core family shelters in another village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union. It did not have any involvement in the beneficiary selection of the project. It worked only as a vendor, not as a typical partner. Nevertheless, the research has included 35 houses and 35 latrines constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor as interventions of Islamic Relief Bangladesh instead of UNDP. 72 During qualitative interviews with the heads or representatives of the households in both villages, it was found that only one household did not receive any aid from NGOs. The household was the richest household or one of the richest households in Channirchak. Although the household did not receive any aid from NGOs, the household participated in a cash for work program operated by an NGO named BRAC.
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than six NGOs respectively. It is worth noting that a few NGOs implemented more than one
project in the same village. For example, Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) and Shushilan
implemented more than one project in Channirchak whereas Islamic relief Bangladesh and
Shushilan implemented more than one project in Dakshin Bedkashi. Thus, households
received aid from various projects of the same NGO.
The survey data show that 94.8 percent of the surveyed households (n=250) received
emergency food from NGOs, while 53.2 percent and 40.4 percent of the surveyed households
received emergency water and clothes from NGOs respectively (see Table 7.2).73 The survey
data also show that 84.4 percent of the surveyed households received utensils and other
necessary household items while 29.6 percent and 52.4 percent of the surveyed households
received medical assistance and support for storing water respectively (see Figure 7.1 and
7.2). It is worth noting that the survey included the recipients of emergency shelter items such
as plastic sheets, tarpaulins, ropes and bamboo as the recipients of utensils and other
necessary household items. The survey data also reveal that 35.2 percent of the surveyed
households received long-term food aid from NGOs. Almost 12 percent of the surveyed
households received a boat and net and 22 percent of the surveyed households received cash
for income-generating activities (IGA) such as for agricultural production, fish farming, crab
farming, chicken rearing, duck rearing, homestead vegetable gardening, starting small
businesses and buying a sewing machine. Moreover, 17.6 of the surveyed households
received poultry such as chickens or ducks and/or livestock such as goats, sheep, calves and
cows for income-generating activities and 6 percent of the surveyed households received
goods for business.74 The data also demonstrate that 29.2 percent of the surveyed households
received houses from NGOs while 10.8 percent and 4.8 percent of the surveyed households
received raised plinths for houses and raised homesteads, respectively (see Figures 7.3 to
73 Emergency food and emergency water are not related to any time period. Emergency food means food excluding long-term food aid households received from NGOs any time after Aila. Emergency water means water households received from NGOs any time after Aila. Emergency food aid is different from long-term food aid. If a household received food per month for several months from the same NGO, then the household was considered as the recipient of the long-term food aid. If a household received food from any NGO (one NGO or more NGOs) any time after Aila but did not receive food from the same NGO per month for several months, then the household was considered as the recipient of the emergency food aid. A household can be the recipient of both emergency food aid and long-term food aid. Emergency food and water were distributed even after the response period (up to one month of the event) and thus the term ‘emergency’ is not interchangeable with response period. 74 The survey included households that received sewing machines or a professional tool set such as masonry tools as recipients of goods for business.
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7.7).75 It is worth noting that most of the households that received houses from NGOs also
received latrines with the house. A few households received houses without latrines while a
few households received only latrines (see Figure 7.8, Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10). The data
further show that 67.6 percent of the surveyed households received agricultural support such
as seeds and fertilisers.76 Moreover, 3.2 percent of the surveyed households received other
types of aid from NGOs.
Table 7.2 Types of aid the affected households received from NGOs (n=250)
Types of Aid Frequency (n=250)
Percentage (%)
Food 237 94.8 Water 133 53.2 Clothes 101 40.4 Utensils and other necessary household items 211 84.4 Medical assistance 74 29.6 Support for storing water 131 52.4 Long-term food aid (received several times from the same NGO) 88 35.2 Fishing net and boat 29 11.6 Cash for income-generating activities 55 22.0 Poultry/livestock for income-generating activities 44 17.6 Goods for business 15 6.0 House 73 29.2 Raising plinth of the house 27 10.8 Homestead raising 12 4.8 Agricultural support such as seeds and fertilisers 169 67.6 Other 8 3.2
75 Out of 29.2 percent (n=73), 25.6 percent (n=64) of the surveyed households that received houses from NGOs are from Dakshin Bedkashi and 3.6 percent (n=9) of the surveyed households that received houses from NGOs are from Channirchak. Out of 64 households in Dakshin Bedkashi, 16 households received houses from UNDP. 76 The survey included households that received inputs such as vegetable seeds and fertilisers for homestead gardening and fruit saplings and wood saplings from NGOs as the recipients of the agricultural support while the survey included households that received cash grants for agriculture from NGOs as the recipients of cash for income-generating activities. Moreover, the survey included households that received fish species and fish food for fish cultivation from NGOs as the recipients of the agricultural support while the survey included households that received cash grants for fish farming from NGOs as the recipients of cash for income-generating activities.
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Figure 7.1 A water storing earthen pot or matka given by an NGO in Channirchak
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.2 A water storing container given by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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Figure 7.3 A dochala (two roofed) house with a veranda constructed by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in Channirchak
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.4 A modified version of a dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi (an extra layer of fence was given outside the original bamboo fence by the recipient so that rainwater cannot enter inside)
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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Figure 7.5 A chouchala (four roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.6 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi (without the originally included rooftop rainwater harvesting facility)
Source: Author (2017–2018)
208
Figure 7.7 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.8 A latrine given by an NGO in Channirchak
Source: Author (2017–2018)
209
Figure 7.9 A latrine given with the dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.10 A latrine given with the UNDP house in Dakshin Bedkashi
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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In addition to providing various types of aid, NGOs also operated various temporary
employment-creation programs such as cash-for-work (CFW) program, food-for-work (FFW)
program, or cash and food-for-work (CFFW) program.77 For instance, various NGOs such as
BRAC, Shushilan and Ulashi Sreejony Sangha in Channirchak and BRAC, Islamic Relief
Bangladesh and Shushilan in Dakshin Bedkashi operated CFW/FFW/CFFW programs. In
addition to aid and various temporary employment-creation programs, NGOs also operated
the cash-for-training (CFT) program. NGOs such as Ulashi Sreejony Sangha in Channirchak
and Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi operated the CFT program. NGOs
through CFT created awareness on water, sanitation and hygiene practices, and personal
health practices. CFT also increased knowledge and skills about various income-generating
activities and awareness and knowledge on disaster risk-reduction and climate change. The
cash received from the participation in CFT also helped the households in meeting survival
and recovery needs. Moreover, NGOs, mainly micro-credit operating NGOs, also gave loans
to the affected households in both the studied villages to cope with and to commence recovery
processes such as starting economic activities like agricultural production and constructing a
house.
It is worth noting that the study has not considered the cash or food or both cash and food the
households received due to participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW programs and CFT program as
aid, as the recipient households did not receive the cash or food or both cash and food as aid.
Likewise, the study has not considered the loan households took for any purpose after Aila
from NGOs as aid. However, the study has investigated the contribution of CFW/FFW/CFFW
programs and CFT program in the survival and recovery process of the affected households,
particularly in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process to understand the
contribution of NGOs fully. Likewise, the study has collected relevant data related to the
loans from NGOs and other sources both before and after the embankment was repaired to
understand the role of loans in the response and recovery processes of the Aila-affected
households.
In addition to the distribution of various types of aid, creation of employment programs,
operations of training programs and operations of micro-credit programs, NGOs greatly
77 Among three types of employment-creation programs, NGOs mainly operated cash-for-work (CFW) programs in both the studied villages. Only one NGO operated food-for-work (FFW) programs in one of the studied villages and it operated the food-for-work (FFW) program before the embankment was repaired while only one NGO operated both cash and food-for-work (CFFW) programs in both the studied villages after the embankment was repaired.
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contributed to the repair and construction of the community-level infrastructure. NGOs
repaired the embankment, constructed ring embankments, and repaired or constructed (mainly
constructed) earthen roads, link roads and approach roads (see Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12).
NGOs also raised school grounds, repaired old cyclone shelters and constructed new cyclone
shelters. For instance, a local NGO named DSK built a school-cum-cyclone shelter in a
village adjacent to Channirchak while Islamic Relief Bangladesh repaired a cyclone shelter in
Dakshin Bedkashi (see Figure 7.13 and Figure 7.14).
Figure 7.11 A road constructed by an NGO in Channirchak
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.12 A road constructed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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Figure 7.13 A school-cum-cyclone shelter constructed in 2012 by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in the adjacent village of Channirchak
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.14 A previous cyclone shelter and multipurpose community centre (constructed by Caritas in 1992) in Dakshin Bedkashi repaired by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as school-cum-cyclone shelter
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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NGOs also greatly contributed to the improvement of water supply systems in the studied
villages. For instance, they excavated and re-excavated ponds, repaired tube wells, raised the
platform of tube wells, installed tube wells, installed pond sand filters (PSF) and supported
rooftop rainwater harvesting systems (see Figure 7.15 and Figure 7.16). They also played a
noteworthy role in ensuring the affected children’s access to education when the villages were
subject to flooding. They constructed temporary schools for children in suitable places such as
on the embankment before the embankment was repaired. They also constructed temporary
schools again after the embankment was repaired in the previous school area or new area if
the previous school boundary was lost to the rising rivers. NGOs through the setting up of the
Child Friendly Space (CFS) provided the affected children the opportunity to participate in
recreational activities such as playing, singing, dancing, drama and psychosocial care. They
also provided children two meals a day (morning snacks and lunch) through the Child
Friendly Space. Likewise, NGOs also provided nutritious food as relief, particularly for
children.
NGOs also greatly contributed to disaster awareness, preparedness and governance. They
contributed to the formation of Ward Disaster Management Committees (WDMCs) and
community-based organisations (CBOs). They also contributed to the formulation of hazard
maps, conduct of community risk assessment and preparation of a disaster risk-reduction
action plan. NGOs’ household-level training on disaster risk-reduction and climate change
adaptation increased household and community-level awareness and knowledge on disaster
risk-reduction, climate change and climate change adaptation strategies. These trainings
particularly increased household and community-level awareness and knowledge on cyclone
warning signals and various precautionary measures households need to undertake before the
event. NGOs trained the members of CBOs and volunteer groups on disseminating warnings
and provided necessary equipment for disseminating warnings. CBOs created by NGOs
disseminate warnings through hoisting flags so that people can easily understand cyclone
warning signals. NGOs also provided trainings to their CBO members and volunteer groups
on first aid, search and rescue, and fire safety, and provided necessary equipment for first aid
and search and rescue. They provided training to the members of the Union Disaster
Management Committee (UDMC) on disaster risk-reduction, standing orders on disaster,
shelter management and climate change to build their capacity in dealing with disastrous
situations and climate change related problems. NGOs also created mass awareness on
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disasters and emergency response through billboards/signs/banners. They also undertook tree
planting at the community level.
Figure 7.15 A pond sand filter (PSF) installed by an NGO in Channirchak
Source: Author (2017–2018)
Figure 7.16 A tubewell installed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedakshi
Source: Author (2017–2018)
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7.4 Role of NGOs in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery
7.4.1 Role of NGOs in Evacuation, Search and Rescue
NGOs did not play any role in evacuation and search and rescue operations. People within the
village played main roles in evacuation and search and rescue operations. They helped one
another to evacuate to the safe places during the event and in a few cases immediately before
the event. Likewise, they helped one another to save lives during the event and to search for
and rescue members of their households from the trapped places immediately after the event.
The search and rescue phase lasted up to the next day evening after the event. Affected
households’ relatives within the village, neighbours and in some cases friends and
acquaintances within the village played important roles in helping the affected households in
evacuation, saving lives of the members of the households and in search and rescue
operations. However, affected households’ relatives within the village, particularly close
relatives, played main roles in evacuation, saving lives and searching for and rescuing the
members of the affected households from the trapped places immediately after the event.
Moreover, close relatives from the adjacent villages also played important roles in searching
for and rescuing their relatives from the trapped places immediately after the event. It is worth
mentioning that neighbours compared to friends and acquaintances generally played a more
important role in evacuation and search and rescue operations as neighbours’ households were
households that were adjacent to the affected households. Moreover, neighbours, friends and
acquaintances within the village played relatively less important roles in the search and rescue
operations immediately after the event compared to the role they played in evacuation and
saving lives during the event. Members of the immediate studied households, members of the
related households within the village and close relatives from the adjacent villages played
major roles in searching for and rescuing the members of the affected households from the
trapped places immediately after the event.
Untrained and non-professional people within the village, particularly young males,
spontaneously and successfully participated in evacuation and search and rescue operations.
They played vital roles in safeguarding lives of many people, particularly children, aged
people and women. However, although NGOs did not participate in evacuation and search
and rescue operations, they helped local people in cleaning debris, ponds and roads and in
ensuring access to water and sanitation facilities. They provided this sort of service mainly
from the third week of the event.
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7.4.2 Role of NGOs in Survival
The affected households in both the villages needed relief immediately after the event for
survival. They needed food, drinking water, clothes and shelter. Moreover, members of the
households with severe injury needed emergency medical treatment. However, the affected
households in both the villages did not receive relief from NGOs immediately after the event.
Nevertheless, they received food, water and other non-food items mainly from their close
relatives from the unaffected areas and from people and organisations such as rich people,
businessmen, schools and colleges from the adjacent or distant unaffected areas. They
received relief items such as food and water from the outside mainly after two days following
Aila. Many people were not able to eat any food, particularly rice, before they received food
from relatives in the unaffected areas and people and organisations of nearby or distant
unaffected areas. It is worth noting that the affected households in both the villages shared
food with one another in some cases if they saved some food from being washed away.
However, a few households were able to save some food and shared that food with other
affected households mainly during the night or next day of Aila. Thus, relatives from the
unaffected areas and spontaneous distribution of relief by the people and organisations of the
nearby and distant unaffected areas played remarkable roles in meeting the basic survival
needs of the affected households, until the arrival of aid from NGOs and government
agencies.
Relief from NGOs was absent or very little if any during the first week and very little during
the second week. The then chairman of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union noted that the first NGO
that provided relief in Dakshin Bedkashi provided relief after one week following Aila.78 Roy
et al. (2009) also reached the same finding during initial assessment of Aila (p. 22). Likewise,
many key informants in Channirchak noted that NGOs did not provide relief during the first
week. A key informant from Channirchak depicted the situation in the following way:
NGO came after one week… Wealthy people and relatives from the nearby unaffected
areas mainly helped us by giving food and water during the first week. (CC, 23
August 2017)
78 The then member of Dakshin Bedkashi Village informed me that the first NGO that provided relief in Dakshin Bedkashi provided relief 4–5 days after the event.
217
Only one or two NGOs provided relief within the first two weeks of the event. As the relief
was insufficient compared to the needs, many households did not receive relief from NGOs
during the first two weeks. NGOs started relief operations mainly from the third week of the
event. Nevertheless, the qualitative data show that many households received relief first from
NGOs after 15 to 20 days. However, NGOs started relief operations in full phase one and a
half or two months after the event. Key informants from both the villages confirmed that
NGOs assessed the needs of the community first and then prepared a list of the affected
households and then started the relief operations in full phase. The key informants depicted
the situation in the following ways:
NGOs gave slight dry food after 15 days… They gave nothing in the first 15 days…
They started relief operations in full phase after one and half months of the event.
(CC, 9 June 2017)
Although the remaining NGOs79 started to serve people after two months following
Aila, they came here some days ago to assess the situation first. However, they did not
provide anything to people. They visited the area and then prepared a list. They started
to serve people after two months of the event. (the then chairman and current
chairman of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union, 1 August 2017)
Although NGOs did not start relief operations immediately after the event, NGOs played a
vital role in the survival and recovery process. The affected households in both the villages
started recovery activities mainly after the embankment was repaired as both the villages and
their adjacent villages were subject to regular flooding before the embankment was repaired.
Almost all households lost all or part of their previous regular income after Aila. Except
employment opportunities created by the government, NGOs and the contractors, catching
fish in the affected areas and employing seasonal migration to the unaffected areas were the
two main income opportunities that were available to most of the households in both the
villages until the embankment was repaired.
As most households could not start their usual economic activities in the affected areas until
the embankment was repaired, they did not have the capacity to survive for the required long
period based on their own capacity. They were also not able to survive for the required long
79 Except two or three NGOs that came in the area within a month of the event and distributed some emergency relief and/or contributed to cleaning debris and improving access to water and sanitation facilities.
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period with the help of the resources they received from their bonding and bridging networks.
Many of them did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bonding networks
while most of them did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bridging
networks. Most of the households that received any material and monetary aid from their
bonding networks received it only for survival for some days and received it during the first
month of the event. Likewise, most of the households that received material or monetary aid,
mainly material aid, from their bridging networks received it only for survival for a few days
and received it during the first week of the event. As most households did not have their own
capacity to survive for the required long period and as they did not receive the necessary
material and monetary aid for survival for the required long period from their bonding and
bridging networks, they were mainly dependent on the government and NGOs for their
survival until the embankment was repaired. They also required assistance from the
government and NGOs for survival for a period after the embankment was repaired and
economic and housing recovery. The following statements are from an interviewee who
considered that his household received equivalent to 225,000 to 230,000 Taka from NGOs if
all aid items including a house and benefits from four employment programs and one cash for
training program his household participated in were converted into money. This illustrates
limitations of people’s own capacity, bonding and bridging networks, and the dependency on
NGOs:
I received minimum 225,000 to 230,000 Taka from NGOs… If NGOs did not give to
us, we were never able to manage that amount… How could we get so much money?
From whom could we get so much money? We were poor. We lived hand to mouth. It
was not possible to manage such amount. We could have received total 2,000 Taka
from all relatives after Aila if relatives were not affected themselves [his household
did not receive anything from relatives]… If I face a problem now, then I will get
maximum total of 2,000 Taka from all my relatives, will not get more. I will get the
money from close relatives only. (10 July 2017)
NGOs provided various types of aid such as food, water, clothes, utensils, livelihood support
and houses that played vital roles in the survival as well as in the economic, housing and
psychological recovery processes of the affected households. NGOs provided some
emergency aid items such as food and water for a long period, i.e. after the response period
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(up to one month).80 The survey data show that 94.8 percent (n=237) of the affected
households received both emergency food and emergency water or either of these two items
from NGOs after Aila. Among the recipients, respondents of 88.6 percent of households
(n=210) considered that both emergency food and water or either they received played an
extremely important role in the survival of their household while 9.7 percent (n=23), 1.3
percent (n=3) and 0.4 percent (n=1) considered that both emergency food and water or either
they received played very important, moderately important and slightly important roles in the
survival of their household. None of the respondents of the recipient households suggested
that it played no role (see Figure 7.17).
Figure 7.17 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from NGOs in their survival (n=237)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
NGOs distributed food aid in both the villages, even in the second year following the event.
For instance, an NGO gave long-term food aid in both Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi in
the second year following the event. It gave 30 kg rice, 5 kg pulse and 3 kg oil per month six
times to each of the selected beneficiary households of Channirchak during the period
between 3/9/2010 and 20/03/2011 and Dakshin Bedkashi during the period between
21/9/2010 to 3/4/2011 respectively. The distribution of long-term food aid by NGOs greatly
80 Response period and relief period are different and not interchangeable as the affected households received relief after the response period (up to one month). The research defines response period up to one month following the event to analyse qualitative data in a better way.
220
helped households to avoid food scarcity. It can be understood from the following excerpt of
an interview:
They gave us rice, pulse and oil. We did not have food scarcity due to that… If we did
not receive it, then we were not able to have the required food with the income we
had. (CC, 25 October 2017)
In addition to various types of aid, employment-creation programs greatly contributed to the
survival. NGOs operated CFW/FFW/CFFW programs both before and after the embankment
was repaired. These programs played vital roles in ensuring access of the affected households
to food and income to meet basic survival needs before the embankment was repaired as most
households did not have access to employment opportunities before the embankment was
repaired. These programs also played vital roles in the survival of many households for a
period after the embankment was repaired as households required time to start their usual
economic activities such as agriculture even after the embankment was repaired. The
importance of the NGO operated employment-creation programs in survival can be
understood from the following excerpts:
If NGOs did not provide opportunities to work [in cash or food for work programs],
then our food intake and survival would have been difficult. We would have eaten one
time in a day while had to starve for two times a day. (a focus group participant, DB,
22 September 2017)
Catching fish was not possible, agriculture was also not possible [after the
embankment was repaired]. We survived on NGOs’ work. If NGOs did not give work,
then it was not possible to get by. (CC, 25 August 2017)
In addition to employment-creation programs, the CFT program also contributed to the
survival of many households as many households used the money received from training for
meeting the survival needs in the absence of regular income. The following excerpt of a key
informant from Dakshin Bedkashi depicts the contribution of NGOs in survival and the
monetary value of NGO contribution (aid including house and money from the employment
and cash for training programs) in the case of households that received a house from NGOs:
If NGOs did not come, nobody in our area could survive… There was no item that
NGOs did not give us… A household that received a UNDP house received a total
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minimum amount equivalent to 225,000–250,000 Taka from NGOs including aid and
the money from the participation in employment [cash/food/cash and food for work]
and training [cash for training] programs. A household that received a Chouchala
[four roofed] house from Islamic Relief received a total minimum amount equivalent
to 175,000–200,000 Taka from NGOs including aid and the money from the
participation in employment and training programs. A household that received a
Dochala [double roofed] house from Islamic Relief received a total minimum amount
equivalent to 150,000–175,000 Taka from NGOs including aid and the money from
the participation in employment and training programs. (DB, 17 September 2017)
Moreover, loans from NGOs also greatly contributed to the survival of the affected
households. The qualitative data suggest that more households took loans from NGOs and
other sources for survival after the embankment was repaired compared to the number of
households that took loans from NGOs and other sources for survival before the embankment
was repaired. The survey data also confirm the qualitative findings. The survey data show that
25.6 percent (n=64) of the surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other sources for
survival after the embankment was repaired while 10.8 percent (n=27) of the surveyed
households took loans from NGOs and other sources for survival before the embankment was
repaired.81 The lower percentage of households took loans from NGOs and other sources for
survival before the embankment was repaired because households were mainly dependent on
relief and employment-creation programs for meeting their survival needs before the
embankment was repaired. However, they struggled to meet their survival needs after the
embankment was repaired as NGOs stopped providing relief and NGO operated employment-
creation programs were ended within a year or two after the embankment was repaired, even
though many households did not restore usual economic activities to maintain the required
cost of their households. Thus, they had to meet their survival needs from the loans taken
from NGOs and other sources. Although they took loans from NGOs and other sources,
NGOs were the most important sources of loans taken for survival.
NGOs acted as one of the major sources of resilience. Most households were dependent on
NGOs for survival. If households did not receive aid along with the opportunity to participate
in employment-creation programs and paid training programs and take loans from NGOs,
81 The survey included the post-Aila loan history (purpose, source, amount taken, amount needing to be paid now) of a household up to three times before the embankment was repaired and up to three times after the embankment was repaired.
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then the households were not able to survive, and most households would have left the area.
The following excerpts of the interviews and an FGD show the importance of the NGO aid
and support (nobody considered the role of loans when they depicted the role of NGOs):
People in that area survived based on the support they received from NGOs [local and
international NGOs]… If they did not receive aid and other support [opportunity to
participate in employment-creation programs and cash for training programs] from
NGOs, they would have been involved in stealing, robbery and would have left the
area. For instance, they would have left the area like the Rohingya refugees left their
country… Women could have been on the wrong track. As male members were not
able to manage food for themselves, how could they feed wife and children… They
could have become prostitutes. We noticed these sorts of incidences in few cases… [If
NGOs did not contribute], they could not recover [either economic, housing or
psychological recovery]. How would they recover? There were no income sources
there. (a key informant who worked for an international NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi
Village, 1 October 2017)
If there was no support from NGOs after Aila, then our area would have been at least
30 years back from the present time despite the support we received from the
government. (DB, 11 August 2017)
If NGOs did not support us, then it was not possible for us to live here. For instance, I
was the only earning member [in the family]. I had to provide food for 4 to 5 persons.
If we lived here, how could we manage food for living [as there was no income]?
NGOs helped a lot. (a focus group participant of an FGD with male, CC, 24 August
2017)
It was not possible to survive without the help of NGOs. NGOs kept us alive during
Aila [flooded period]. They kept all alive… They helped everyone. (CC, 24 October
2017)
People were not able to live [remain alive] if various NGOs did not provide support.
People had to abandon this area. (CC, 9 June 2017)
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7.4.3 Role of NGOs in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery
NGOs played a significant role in the economic and housing recovery process (see Figure
7.18). Various types of livelihood support from NGOs contributed directly to the economic
recovery while houses from NGOs contributed directly to the housing recovery. In addition,
various aid items excluding livelihood support might have contributed indirectly to the
economic recovery. Likewise, various aid items excluding houses might have contributed
indirectly to the housing recovery. The survey data show that 99.6 percent (n=249) of the
surveyed households received at least one of the types of aid mentioned in Table 7.2. Among
the households that received aid from NGOs (n=249), 24.1 percent (n=60) of households
considered that the aid from NGOs played an extremely important role in the economic
recovery process of their households, while 20.1 percent (n=50), 19.3 percent (n=48), 17.3
percent (n=43) and 19.3 percent (n=48) of households considered that aid from NGOs played
a very important role, moderately important role, slightly important role and not at all
important role in the economic recovery of their households respectively. In other words, aid
from NGOs played a role in the economic recovery of 80.4 percent (n=201) of the surveyed
households and it played an extremely important and very important role in the economic
recovery of 44 percent (n=110) of the surveyed households. The data show that among the
households that received aid from NGOs (n=249), respondents of 31.7 percent (n=79) of
households considered that the aid from NGOs played extremely important role in the
housing recovery process of their households, while 8.4 percent (n=21), 11.6 percent (n=29),
18.9 percent (n=47) and 29.3 percent (n=73) considered that the aid from NGOs played a very
important role, moderately important role, slightly important role and not at all important role
in the housing recovery of their households respectively. In other words, aid from NGOs
played a role in the housing recovery of 70.4 percent (n=176) of the surveyed households and
it played extremely important and very important roles in the housing recovery of 40 percent
(n=100) of the surveyed households.
224
Figure 7.18 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from NGOs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=249)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
NGOs also played a significant role in the psychological recovery process (see Figure 7.18).
NGOs did not provide psychological support to the affected people other than children as part
of their project interventions. NGOs provided psychosocial support to the children through
the operation of the Child Friendly Space (CFS). Nevertheless, aid provided by NGOs during
the post-Aila response and recovery period greatly contributed to the psychological recovery
of the affected people. People were grateful to NGOs because they not only helped them to
survive but also to stay in their ancestral place after the event. Many households migrated
immediately after the event, most of the households were not able to survive and there was a
common belief that they would not be able to reside in those villages if the embankment was
not repaired. In general, they were worried not only about commencing recovery, which was a
distant goal, but also about short-term survival and the practicality of living in the villages.
However, when NGOs came to the villages and started interventions, villagers gradually
gained confidence. The presence of NGOs gave them mental strength and hope to live.
The survey data show that among the households that received aid from NGOs (n=249),
respondents of 61.4 percent (n=153) of households considered that aid from NGOs played an
extremely important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of their
households while 22.9 percent (n=57), 9.6 percent (n=24), 5.2 (n=13) and 0.8 percent (n=2)
225
considered that aid from NGOs played a very important role, moderately important role,
slightly important role and not at all important role in the psychological recovery process of
the members of their households. An interesting as well as surprising aspect of the data is that
while aid from NGOs played role in the economic recovery and housing recovery of 80.4
percent (n=201) and 70.4 percent (n=176) of the surveyed households (n=250), aid from
NGOs played a role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 98.8 percent
(n=247) of the surveyed households. Moreover, while aid from NGOs played an extremely
important role in the economic recovery and housing recovery of 24 percent (n=60) and 31.6
percent (n=79) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively, aid from NGOs played an
extremely important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 61.2
percent (n=153) of the total surveyed households.
Like aid, employment-creation programs also greatly contributed to the economic, housing
and psychological recovery process of the affected households (see Figure 7.19). The
qualitative data reveal that participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW programs not only helped the
households to survive but also helped many households to save money to start economic
activities and to construct or repair houses. A few households also used the money for other
purposes such as for repaying loans taken before Aila or for meeting the cost of a daughter’s
marriage. The CFW/FFW/CFFW programs, by ensuring access to food and income, created a
sense of optimism among the people and helped them to feel psychologically better.
Likewise, CFT program also contributed to the economic, housing and psychological
recovery (see Figure 7.19). The money participant households received for training not only
contributed to the survival but also contributed to the economic, housing and psychological
recovery of many participant households. Moreover, these training programs contributed
greatly to the psychological recovery as the trainers usually provided consolation and mental
support and encouragement to the participants during the training sessions.
The survey data show that 97.6 percent (n=244) of the surveyed households participated in
CFW/FFW/CFFW programs and CFT programs (at least one of these programs and at least
one time in one of these programs). Among the households that participated in at least one or
more of these programs (n=244), 55.3 percent of households (n=135), 23.4 percent of
households (n=57), 13.5 percent of households (n=33) and 5.7 percent of households (n=14)
considered that participation played extremely important, very important, moderately
important and slightly important roles in the economic recovery process of their households
226
respectively. Respondents of 2 percent of households (n=5) considered that participation did
not play an important role in the economic recovery process of their households. The data also
show that among the households that participated in at least one or more of these programs
(n=244), respondents of 34 percent of households (n=83), 13.1 percent of households (n=32),
10.7 percent of households (n=26) and 22.5 (n=55) percent of households considered that
participation played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and
slightly important role in the housing recovery process of their households respectively.
Respondents of 19.7 percent of households (n=48) considered that participation played a not
at all important role in the housing recovery process of their households.
The data further show that among the households that participated in at least one or more of
these programs (n=244), respondents of 75 percent of households (n=183), 17.2 percent of
households (n=42), 5.7 percent of households (n=14) and 2 percent of households (n=5)
considered that participation played an extremely important, very important, moderately
important and slightly important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of
the affected households. None of the respondents considered that the role participation played
was not important.
Figure 7.19 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs or any one of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=244)
Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
227
While participation in at least one or more of these programs played an extremely important
role in the economic and housing recovery process of 54 percent (n=135) and 33.2 (n=83)
percent of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively, it played an extremely important
role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 73.2 percent (n=183) of the total
surveyed households. Participation in these programs played a role in the economic and
housing recovery process of 95.6 percent (n=239) and 78.4 percent (n=196) of the surveyed
households (n=250) respectively. Participation in these programs contributed to the economic
recovery of a higher percentage of households compared to the housing recovery of the
households. The qualitative data suggest that although people wanted both the revival of
economic activity and construction or repair of houses after Aila, revival of economic activity
was the most important need for their survival. Thus, if they had any money, they generally
used it first for starting economic activity such as for starting agriculture or shrimp farming or
other small businesses to secure income for their survival. Many households that did not
receive houses from NGOs initially constructed a normal temporary-type house in their
homestead after the village became dewatered. They constructed their desired houses later
when they managed the required amount. Many households still did not construct their
desired houses although many of them were saving or trying to save money from their regular
income to construct their desired house later. Respondents who mentioned that participation
played no role in the economic recovery of their households might have spent all the amount
for survival and/or other purposes such as for constructing the house or meeting education or
health costs or the cost of marrying daughter, providing a dowry and repaying the previous
loan. Likewise, respondents who mentioned that participation played no role in the housing
recovery of their households might have used all the amount for survival and/or other
purposes.
In addition to aid and employment and training programs, NGOs provided loans (with
interest) during the response and recovery period. Households took loans (with interest) from
NGOs and other sources for survival and starting the recovery process. The survey data show
that 72.8 percent (n=182) of the surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other
sources after Aila. Moreover, 24.8 percent (n=62) of the surveyed households took loans from
NGOs and other sources before the embankment was repaired and 66.4 percent (n=166) of the
surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other sources after the embankment was
repaired. Many households took loans several times from NGOs and other sources after Aila.
The survey data show that 17.6 percent (n=44), 4.8 percent (n=12) and 2.4 percent (n=6) of
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the surveyed households (n=250) took loans one time, two times and three times respectively
from NGOs and other sources for various purposes before the embankment was repaired.
However, 28.8 percent (n=72), 21.2 percent (n=53) and 16.4 percent (n=41) of the surveyed
households (n=250) took loans one time, two times and three times from NGOs and other
sources for various purposes after the embankment was repaired. Although households took
loans from NGOs and other sources, NGOs were the main sources of loans.
Households took loans for various purposes including meeting survival needs, starting
economic activities, constructing houses and meeting the cost of education of the children and
healthcare. Among households that took a first time loan from NGOs and other sources before
the embankment was repaired (n=62), 37.1 percent (n=23) took it for survival, 33.9 percent
(n=21) took it for starting economic activities, 11.3 percent (n=7) took it for house
construction or repair, 9.7 percent (n=6) took it for meeting the educational cost of the
children and 8.1 percent (n=5) took it for meeting the health cost. Likewise, among
households that took a first time loan after the embankment was repaired (n=166), 25.3
percent (n=42) took it for survival, 42.8 percent (n=71) took it for starting economic
activities, 12 percent (n=20) took it for house construction or repair, 6 percent (n=10) took it
for meeting educational costs of the children, 7.8 percent (n=13) took it for meeting health
costs and 6 percent (n=10) took it for other purposes.
7.5 Weaknesses of NGOs’ Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations
7.5.1 Failure to Start Relief Operations Immediately After the Event
NGOs did not start relief operations immediately after the event. The affected households in
both the villages encountered a severe situation during the first two weeks after the event.
Relief from NGOs was absent or extremely little compared to the needs during the first week
and very little compared to the needs during the second week. Many households received
relief for the first time from NGOs 15 to 20 days after the event. One of the reasons for the
failure to start relief operations immediately after the event was that NGOs did not have their
own funds to start relief operations. As they were dependent on donors for the funds to start
the relief operations, they required more time. A key informant who participated in the Aila
response and recovery operations of an NGO depicts the situation in the following way:
They [affected people] encountered a severe situation up to the first 10 to 15 days as
all NGOs required some time to organise and start the relief operations. They suffered
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a lot during that period. They had serious problems during the first one to two weeks,
mainly due to the lack of drinking water, sanitation facilities and food… We would
have felt happy if we could have provided the relief a little earlier, within a week…
We did not have the ability to start the relief operation… We received funds [from
donors] within 15 days and started the relief operation within 15 to 20 days. (17
August 2017)
7.5.2 Quantity and Quality of the Relief Items
Relief packets given by NGOs varied from one NGO to another in terms of quantity. While
one NGO gave a relief packet that included a large amount of rice that was enough for a
typical household to meet food needs for the whole month, another NGO gave a relief packet
that was only enough for a typical household to meet food needs for some days as the relief
packet included a small amount of rice. The households that received small size relief packets
searched for relief packets from other NGOs for survival. Relief packets given by NGOs also
varied from one NGO to another in terms of the items included and the standard of the items
included.
An important problem of NGO operations was that NGOs did not consider the number of the
household members in distributing relief items, particularly food. When an NGO distributed
food relief, the NGO provided each household of a village the same amount of food although
the number of the household members varied from one household to another. As a result,
often a relief item was insufficient for a household with a higher number of members. Thus,
NGOs must avoid the notion that ‘one size fits’ all and must consider the number of the
household members in providing relief items such as food. Another important problem was
that NGOs distributed rice that was unsuitable for the affected people in both the studied
villages. People in the studied villages generally used to eat atap rice (rice milled from sun-
dried paddy) traditionally. However, NGOs gave them shiddhya rice (rice milled from
parboiled paddy). As they were not used to eating shiddhya rice, many people found it
difficult to consume the donated rice.
NGOs should harmonise the content of relief packets in terms of quantity, the items included,
and the standard of the items included to ensure fair and equal distribution of the relief items.
They must consider the number of household members when they distribute relief items like
food and should distribute locally suitable food. Introduction of a standard relief packet will
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be helpful for ensuring fair and equal distribution of the relief items. The packet should be
different in terms of the quantity of the items based on the number of the household members.
Moreover, a household-level relief card should be introduced to ensure relief distribution in a
fairer and coordinated way. This card will help the government agencies and NGOs to know
which household received what and which household needs to be provided further support.
7.5.3 Coordination Among NGOs and Coordination Between the NGOs and the Government/Local Government
Coordination among NGOs is a key factor for the successful delivery of aid and avoiding
overlapping or duplication of the work. Key informants confirmed that coordination among
NGOs was not good during the initial period. There was a lack of coordination among NGOs
in the first 2–3 months following the event. Many organisations distributed relief items in a
random and uncoordinated manner (UNDP 2012; Cook, Shrestha & Htet 2018). This resulted
in unequal distribution of relief items. Many households did not get any emergency relief
while others got emergency relief several times from several NGOs. Moreover, many
households received some items several times while they did not receive some necessary
items at all. However, coordination among various NGOs gradually improved in the course of
time. Although coordination among NGOs certainly improved in the later stage, there were
also cases that a household received aid such as livelihood support from more than one NGO,
while others did not receive that aid from anyone. Nevertheless, improved coordination
among NGOs in the later stage played a vital role to avoid overlapping or duplication of the
activities and implementation of the similar projects in the same geographical location
(UNDP 2012). A key informant who participated in the post-Aila response and recovery
operations as an NGO employee in Channirchak depicts the situation in the following way:
There was a lack of coordination among NGOs during the distribution of the
emergency relief… Many NGOs distributed relief items haphazardly. It continued up
to 2–3 months… Long-term support [the support given after the embankment was
repaired] was provided in a bit more coordinated manner. There was less overlapping
during providing long-term support. (17 August 2017)
Coordination between the NGOs and the government/local government is a key factor for the
successful delivery of aid items and other interventions such as employment programs during
the response and recovery stage. Coordination between the NGOs and the government/local
government has two important aspects. The coordination between the NGOs and the UNO
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Office was generally better than the coordination between the NGOs and the local
government which is Union Parishad. NGOs faced more challenges coordinating with the
local government representatives (elected chairman and members) during the implementation
of the projects. The issues related to the coordination between the NGOs and the
government/local government have been discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
7.5.4 Less Livelihood Support and Houses Compared to the Needs
Livelihood and housing support were the aid items that the affected households in both the
villages most required after Aila. However, NGOs provided much less livelihood support and
houses compared to the needs of the studied villages. Many households did not receive any
livelihood support although they required the support badly. Likewise, many households did
not receive a house although Aila destroyed their houses. Islam and Walkerden (2015) in the
post-Sidr recovery context in Bangladesh also found that NGOs provided less livelihood
support and houses compared to the needs. A key informant from the NGO sector describes
the post-Aila livelihood support by NGOs in the following way:
They required the livelihood support most. However, the livelihood support we
provided was very weak [much less than required]. The livelihood support we
provided was too little. (1 October 2017)
Households that received livelihood support received less than they required. Thus, they were
not able to utilise that support for deriving any economic benefit. For instance, many
households received some ducks or chickens or a cow, but these were not enough to restore
livelihood. Two key informants from the NGO sector depict the inadequacy of livelihood
support in the following ways:
It would have been good if a family could have been given livelihood support under a
complete package. However, the livelihood support was given in a scattered way. I
gave ducks, others gave cows, another gave sheep. As a result, none of the
interventions were productive/sustainable. Someone ate it, someone sold it because it
was very insufficient compared to the need… Livelihood intervention would sustain if
the livelihood intervention is given to the family as a package. (17 August 2017)
It would have been better if the amount provided for the IGA support was more than
the given amount. The given amount was not enough. If the amount would have been
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20,000 Taka or 25,000 Taka or 30,000 Taka instead of 12,000 Taka, then people could
have earned more [from that investment/money]… When the amount is provided for
IGA support, a poor amount is provided for that support. (11 September 2017)
In a few cases, people received livelihood support that did not match with the previous
occupational background of the recipient and thus the support was not productive. It was also
observed that some households received livelihood support from more than one NGO, while
many households did not receive any livelihood support.
In addition to providing a smaller number of houses compared to the needs, NGOs in some
cases distributed low-quality houses to the most vulnerable households and better-quality
houses to the less vulnerable households. For instance, Islamic Relief Bangladesh provided
two types of houses to the affected households in Dakshin Bedkashi under two different
projects. ISR Bangladesh firstly provided dochala or double roofed houses to the affected
households under one project and later provided chouchala or four roofed houses under
another project. The quality of the chouchala houses was much better than dochala houses.
The cost of the chouchala houses was also more than dochala houses. However, most
vulnerable households received dochala houses while relatively less vulnerable households
(compared to the recipients of dochala houses) received chouchala houses. As the provision
of providing dochala houses was the first housing intervention by an NGO in the village, the
recipients of the dochala were the most vulnerable households. As houses provided by the
same NGO differed in terms of quality and cost, households that received dochala houses felt
deprived as they received low-quality houses while relatively less vulnerable households
received better quality houses. The significant differences in terms of quality and cost of the
houses provided by the same NGO under two projects also created tension among the
recipients (Fanany 2010b).
7.5.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention
NGOs did not provide psychological support to the disaster victims other than children. As
people generally became traumatised by Aila, they required the psychological support to
recover from the psychological trauma. A key informant who worked for an international
NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi depicts the necessity of providing psychological support to the
Aila-affected people by NGOs:
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They lost everything or most of their possessions… Many suffered from psychological
disorder, many became perplexed as they lost many things. They were at a loss. They
necessitated to be provided psychological support. There was no provision of
psychological support in our project. (11 September 2017)
Although it is not clear why NGOs did not provide psychological support to the affected
people, one of the possible reasons for this might be that psychological support as an
intervention is not able to be easily evaluated (Fanany 2010b). Thus, psychological support
does not allow NGOs to prepare rigorous report for donors (Kenny & Clarke 2010). It is
worth noting that many NGO staff personally or as part of their own initiatives provided
consolation and mental support to the affected people when they interacted with the affected
people during the project implementation period. For instance, they personally gave
consolation and mental support during training sessions. This helped the affected adult people
to recover from the psychological trauma. The following excerpts of the two key informants
depict the situation:
Affected people need psychological support… if someone becomes psychologically
normal, then he/she can take initiatives to start work. Thus, he/she needs to be fit
mentally first… However, I personally gave psychological support. I discussed with
them some psychological issues, particularly during Friday Prayer [Jumu’ah] in the
mosque… I gave psychological support as part of my personal initiative; I did not give
it as an intervention of the project of the Islamic Relief. (A key informant from the
NGO sector, 1 October 2017)
We are with you… You do not need to be scared. We could not be able to return you
what you lost. However, we would try our best to compensate your loss… They gave
us mental strength. They gave mental encouragement by saying that you would get
more than what you lost. (CC, 9 June 2017)
Local people appreciated the psychosocial support NGOs provided to the children through the
setting up of the Child Friendly Space (CFS). This psychosocial support helped the children
to recover from the psychological trauma. Although providing psychosocial support to the
children was an important and expected intervention, NGOs should also provide psycho-
social support to the affected adults. NGOs must need to understand that psychological
reconstruction is also necessary as the disaster impacts not only the physical infrastructure but
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also on the psyche of the affected people (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Haque et al. 2012). Thus,
recovery of the psyche is as important as, if not more, than the recovery of the physical
infrastructure (Kenny & Clarke 2010).
7.5.6 Preference to Implement Activities that Have Visible Outcomes
NGOs focused on and implemented activities that had visible outcomes. They emphasised the
construction of physical infrastructures such as roads, houses, and latrines. They appeared to
consider the recovery process mainly as a technical process of building physical
infrastructures (Samuels 2010). They might have emphasised construction of physical
infrastructures as these were easily visible, measurable and results of these activities were
achievable within a short time (Samuels 2010). NGOs can easily include visible outcomes in
the evaluation report and can prepare rigorous reports for the donors (Samuels 2010; Kenny et
al. 2010). Key informants from the sector confirmed that NGOs had preferences for spending
in areas that are visible because it provides an easy way to prove to donors that they have
done something (Kenny et al. 2010; Kenny 2010). On the other hand, activities that do not
have visible outcomes such as psychological rehabilitation are not subject to evaluation in a
straightforward way (Fanany 2010b, p. 119). They also informed that donors also had
preferences for the activities that have visible outcomes as they were able to see and measure
these outcomes easily. The following excerpts of the interviews with two key informants from
the NGO sector clearly show the preferences of NGOs and donors for the implementation of
activities that have visible outcomes:
There was a preference for the hardware support or the support that was visible.
Software support cannot be seen… But hardware support, for instance a house
constructed by 100,000 Taka, can be seen. It is visible that people have really received
that sort of support from NGOs. (11 September 2017)
Structural measures are given priority… Visible works are given priority. Donors also
want that… It is not possible to have photos of the mind [non-structural things]. The
donor [private donor of his project] wants to understand the project outcomes or
changes that happened due to the project by seeing the photos. (22 August 2017)
Local people also value visible projects. When they were asked about NGO interventions
after Aila in the village, usually they first shared visible outcomes such as houses and latrines
provided by NGOs. When they do mention about training provided by various NGOs, they
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consider those activities as a subsidiary contribution to the construction of the physical
infrastructures such as roads, houses, and latrines. Thus, NGOs prefer to implement activities
that have visible outcomes as the public regard these as successful.
7.5.7 Lack of Consultation and Participation
NGOs generally implemented their projects in the studied villages following a top-down
approach instead of a bottom-up approach (UNDP 2012). The qualitative data show that
NGOs implemented projects without any form of consultation with the aid recipients in many
cases. When they consulted with the recipients, the consultation was usually tokenistic as the
objective of the consultation was only to inform the recipients about the potential
interventions of the externally designed projects (Kenny 2010). In a few cases, they involved
the recipients or members of the community in the implementation of the intervention/s of the
externally designed project. For instance, they created project implementation committees
consisting of the members of community to implement the intervention/s of the externally
designed project effectively. Nevertheless, they generally did not consult with the aid
recipients to include their feedback to design or modify their interventions. Although
information-sharing or consultation is a must for participation, it does not equate with
participation as participation involves the recipients’ influence and control over the project
decisions and resources (World Bank 1996; ADB 2001). As NGOs did not consult with the
recipients to include their suggestions in their operations, the recipients felt a lack of
participation and became passive recipients.
The evidence suggests that NGOs delivered inappropriate aid items or less successful
interventions due to the lack of consultation with the recipients (Kenny 2010). Many
problems associated with the post-Aila NGO interventions could have been avoided if NGOs
consulted with the affected people and included their advice in planning and implementing
activities. For example, one NGO that gave two types of houses under two projects in
Dakshin Bedkashi did not consult with local people. The NGO constructed both types of
houses based on its own design. These houses had lots of problems that could have been
avoided if NGOs developed the design based on consultation with local people. The affected
people also wanted to participate in the process. They had choices for materials and design of
the houses. They informed the NGO that the houses would have certain problems if the NGO
constructed the houses based on the design and with the materials the NGO selected.
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However, the NGO ignored their suggestions and constructed houses following their own
design and materials. As a result, the houses constructed had lots of problems.
Effective NGO–recipient interaction, that requires the participation of the recipients in the aid
delivery process, is a key element to distribute aid successfully. The involvement of the
recipients in every stage of the aid provision will make the aid more effective as the
involvement will allow NGOs to know the preferences and requirements of the recipients
(Fanany 2010b; Kenny & Clarke 2010). NGOs should interact with the recipients in a way so
that the recipients feel that their ideas and comments are important to NGOs (Fanany 2010b).
They should appreciate the strengths of the affected recipients and should take inputs from
recipients and, if inputs are valid, then they should take or modify decisions based on these
inputs. They should empower the recipients through ensuring their participation.
A bottom-up participatory approach instead of a top-down approach is needed to ensure the
participation of the affected people in the planning and implementation of the response and
recovery activities. Participation of the affected people would bring more success to NGO
activities as participation will help NGOs to find out pre-existing vulnerabilities, address key
needs and minimise loopholes of the implemented projects. It will also empower people and
make them more resilient to future disasters (UNDP 2012). Lastly, if possible, NGOs should
be made more inclined to participation by ensuring that they take a continuing responsibility
for their work including houses for a period after the completion of the project (Fanany
2010b; Kenny & Clarke 2010).
7.5.8 NGOs Addressed Remote Areas Least
NGOs worked in the remote affected areas least during the initial period. More NGOs worked
in areas that were easy to access (UNDP 2012). For instance, the studied Dakshin Bedkashi
Village under Dakshin Bedkashi Union and the Dakshin Bedkashi Union itself are in the very
remote areas of Koyra Upazila. Interviews with the key informants from the area show that as
Dakshin Bedkashi Union was in the remote areas, many NGOs did not work in Dakshin
Bedkashi Union, at least during the first months, due to the lack of communication facilities.
In some cases, if they came to the union or a village of the union, then they only came to the
places that were easily reachable. This can be understood from the following statements of a
key informant:
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Many NGOs did not come as the area [Dakshin Bedkashi Union] was remote… Many
NGOs worked in Uttar Bedkashi Union [adjacent union]. However, many of them did
not enter our Dakshin Bedkashi Union. They did not enter due to the lack of
communication facilities… If they came, then they came to Jorsing and then
returned.82 They did not enter inside to understand the situation of this area. (elected
member and panel chairman of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union Parishad, DB, 11 August
2017)
One of the important lessons from the post-Aila response and recovery experience is NGOs
that work in the disaster response and recovery operations in Bangladesh must have staff who
can work in the remote areas and logistic support to reach remote areas very quickly.
7.5.9 Places of Distribution and Exclusion of Households from Relief Items
NGOs distributed relief items during the period when the villages were subject to flooding in
the places where they were able to reach easily. They preferred to distribute relief items in the
easy to go areas of a village or a Union Parishad (UNDP 2012). They usually distributed
relief items in the Union Parishad Headquarters, bazaars, river ghats, places on the
embankment, and other locally known places within the union. However, sometimes people
were not able to reach the places of distribution due to the lack of communication facilities.
For instance, people living within the village often had difficulty to reach Union Parishad
headquarters, bazaars, river ghats and places on the embankment. As a result, many
households received less relief during the period when the villages were subject to flooding.
NGOs did not often enter villages due to very poor communication facilities when the villages
were subject to inundation. They distributed most emergency aid items such as once-off relief
packets, emergency shelter materials, utensils, temporary shelters and bathrooms to the people
living on the embankments located on the outer side of a village or many villages (UNDP
2012). Thus, the households that did not move to the embankment after Aila and lived on
their flooded houses often received less relief compared to the households that lived on the
embankments during the period when the villages were subject to flooding. This can be
understood from the following excerpt of an interview:
82 Jorsing is a village of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union that is on the bank of a river and easily accessible by the river road. One of the two bazaars or marketplaces within the union is in Jorsing.
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I received much less relief [from NGOs]. People who lived on the embankments
received more relief from NGOs. As we lived inside the village, the village became
full of water during high tide. Thus, NGOs had to face problems to come inside;
communication was very bad. As a result, many households living inside the village
were deprived of relief items. (CC, 13 July 2017)
Further, a key informant from the NGO sector reported that they had to distribute the
equivalent of a single day’s relief over two or even three days, as there were no places to store
relief items at the union level during the initial period. NGOs also distributed relief items in
the initial period from the upazila headquarters due to the lack of suitable places at the union
level to store relief. For instance, one NGO in Dacope distributed relief packets to the affected
households of Channirchak and other villages from the Dacope Upazila Parishad
Headquarters that was far away from Channirchak. Many households struggled to reach the
upazila headquarters as the transportation system from Channirchak to the upazila
headquarters was very bad and they spent a lot on travel which was an additional burden for
them. Households suffered when they did not have young male or physically capable
members who could carry the relief packets from the upazila headquarters to the village. They
were often dependent on other people for carrying these items.
The two studied unions were in the remote areas and communication facilities were extremely
poor. It was difficult for the NGO staff to move even inside each of the studied villages. The
difficulty of working in the studied villages can be understood from the following statement
of a key informant who worked for an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi Union and lived in the
Dakshin Bedkashi Village:
It was difficult to work in those areas [due to remoteness]. I think people [NGO staff]
who are mentally and physically weak are not suitable for working in those areas. (1
October 2017)
Although it was difficult to reach the remote studied villages and places inside the studied
villages, NGO staff could have better served in many cases if they were professionally trained
to work in the remote areas and had the mentality to serve people in need in the remote areas.
A key informant from the NGO sector depicts the situation in the following way:
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NGOs usually distributed relief in areas where there were gatherings of more people.
It was necessary to go to the remote areas… They [NGO staff] did not go to the
remote areas as it was difficult to go there. They also had lack of mentality [to go to
the remote areas]. There was enough allocation for the local transport [to go to the
remote areas]. (22 August 2017)
7.5.10 More of the Project Interventions to the Less Affected Project Areas
The qualitative data show that, in a few cases, NGOs spent more of the allocated funds in the
less affected areas compared to the severely affected areas in order to spend the allocated
money within the project time period. For instance, key informants from Channirchak and a
key informant from an NGO that worked in Channirchak confirmed that the funds allocated
for constructing houses in Channirchak were used to construct houses in other adjacent less
affected villages, as Channirchak was still subject to inundation. A key informant from the
village described it in the following way:
When they [NGOs] gave houses, our village was subject to flooding. There was no
suitable place to construct houses in our village. They transferred all those houses to
Kamarkhola [an adjacent affected village that became dewatered much earlier]. (CC, 9
June 2017)
The specific NGO that transferred houses to the other less affected villages did not later
implement any project in Channirchak that provided houses. Thus, despite being severely
affected, the affected households of Channirchak were deprived of housing assistance due to
the pressure NGOs felt to spend money within the project time period.
7.5.11 Favouring Own Members/Borrowers and Pressuring Microcredit Borrowers for Repayment
Microcredit operating NGOs generally favoured their own microcredit borrowers. For
instance, one local NGO that operated a microcredit program before Aila in Dakshin
Bedkashi organised a cash for work program after Aila. The NGO selected all the participants
of the cash for work program from among the members of the NGO. Likewise, one
microcredit-operating NGO distributed some water storage tanks without taking money in
Channirchak but only among members of the organisation. Like microcredit-operating NGOs,
NGOs that formed a CBO after Aila, particularly in the recovery period, gave houses,
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livelihood support and free house plinth raising and homestead raising services only to their
CBO members.
NGOs that operated microcredit programs had a poor reputation for putting pressure on
borrowers to repay loans taken before Aila. Moreover, a national NGO that operated a
microcredit program took the instalment of the loan taken before Aila from the wage
borrowers earned as a participant in the cash for work program operated by that NGO. The
NGO paid a small part of the wage and kept most of the wage from the participants who took
loans from that NGO before Aila as instalments for the previous loan. An interviewee who
took 15,000 Taka as a loan from a prominent national NGO portrays the situation in the
following way:
I had loan from N [pseudonym]… It did not take instalment for the loan until it
operated a cash for work program. When it operated the cash for work program, it
took money from the wage I received from the cash for work program. It cut from
everyone who took loans from it… It gave only a small part of the daily income and
kept most part of the earning from the cash for work program. (DB, 10 July 2017)
In some cases, NGOs did not again give loans to the borrowers who did not repay a loan
taken before Aila as they became incapable due to the loss of income and material
possessions.
7.5.12 Avoidance of a Beneficiary of One NGO by Other NGOs
If one NGO supported one household, then other NGOs did not support that household in
many cases. Some NGOs created CBOs. Members of a CBO of an NGO often did not receive
support from other NGOs. Other NGOs excluded them from support even though they did not
receive that support from the CBO to which they were members. The following statements of
a key informant from the NGO sector depict it clearly:
A person received a house from DSK [as the person was the member of a CBO of
DSK]. He became known as the beneficiary of DSK. As a result, other NGOs did not
give him anything. He needed various things. DSK did not give him everything… The
important issue of consideration [before excluding him from another support by
another NGO] was to consider what he received from DSK. (17 August 2017)
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7.5.13 Exclusion of Upper-Middle-Class and Some Lower-Middle-Class Households
NGOs selected beneficiaries based on their own criteria. They prioritised the poor, ultra-poor,
woman-headed households and households with disabled and elderly members in the
beneficiary selection process. Although NGOs sometimes excluded marginalised households
that deserved to be included as beneficiaries and included less vulnerable households as
beneficiaries, overall NGOs tried hard to include the marginalised households. However,
NGOs usually provided less aid and work opportunity to those households belonging to the
middle-class categories, particularly upper-middle-class households and those lower-middle-
class households that had a little more agricultural land compared to the majority. Although
this might have been good practice in a typical post-disaster setting, it was an extremely bad
practice in the post-Aila setting.
Most of the middle-class households in both villages were dependent on land for income.83
Most of them in Channirchak were dependent on agriculture (one crop in a year) while most
of them in Dakshin Bedkashi were dependent on shrimp farming. Almost all of them had no
income before the embankment was repaired and even for some time after the embankment
was repaired, as starting economic activities such as agriculture and shrimp farming in full
phase required time after the village became dewatered. Moreover, most of them generally did
not have enough savings to survive for a long period following Aila. Thus, they badly
required aid and non-aid support such as work opportunities from external agencies. The
following excerpt from a key informant interview describes the necessity of external support
for all:
There was no division between rich and poor after Aila… One who was the owner of
20 bighas was not capable and one who was the owner of five decimals was also not
capable. We lived here for a long time with the help of the relief items [and other
support, given by the government and NGOs]. (current elected member, Dakshin
Bedkashi Union Parishad, DB, 20 September 2017)
However, upper-middle-class households and some lower-middle-class households had
severe hardship and food scarcity as they received less aid and work opportunity from NGOs.
83 At present, most households that belong to the middle-class category in both the villages belong to the lower-middle-class category and some households belong to the upper-middle-class category. Only two to three households in total in both the villages have a distinct better position within the upper-middle-class category, if they do not belong to the rich category considering the village context. The situation was almost same before the Aila also.
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Some upper-middle-class households received very little aid and at best one paid work
opportunity. Some of the upper-middle-class and lower-middle-class households had more
hardship and food scarcity compared to many of the affected poor households as they had no
income or little income along with less aid and work opportunity.
This teaches the need to consider the uniqueness of each disaster as well as the socio-
economic setting of the affected areas. If the villages were not subject to the regular flooding
for a long time, then providing less relief to the upper-middle and some lower-middle
households might not be so disastrous as they might have been able to meet their needs.
Likewise, if the upper-middle-class or lower-middle-class households would not be dependent
on land for income or would have income from the non-agricultural sectors such as from jobs,
then they might have been able to meet their needs based on their own capacity. It is worth
noting that some middle-class households, particularly upper-middle-households, felt
ashamed to seek relief from the aid agencies, especially in the beginning, due to their existing
social status within the village.
Although upper-middle-class households and some lower-middle-class households usually
received less aid and work opportunity from NGOs, some upper-middle-class and lower-
middle-class households received more aid and work opportunities. They appropriated more
aid and work opportunities because of their close political links to the chairman and member
of the Union Parishad. On the other hand, the poor received less aid and work opportunities in
some cases due to their lack of political links.
7.5.14 Corruption
None of the interviewees from the interviewed households during the qualitative phase
mentioned that they bribed NGO personnel to receive any aid including houses or to
participate in employment or training programs. However, three interviewees who received
UNDP houses in Dakshin Bedkashi mentioned that they had to bribe the elected leaders or
local leaders to receive their houses. One of these three households bribed the then elected
chairman of the Union Parishad to retain the name of the household in the recipient list. The
household was told that the household would be deleted from the recipient list if the
household did not bribe the chairman.
Key informants including NGO informants confirmed that local people took bribes in the
name of NGO staff who were not aware of this deception. However, NGO staff undertook
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corrupt practices in a few cases, either alone or in collusion with the chairman and members
of the local government and other powerful people of the locality. For instance, two key
informants from the NGO sector confirmed that a few employees lost their job due to corrupt
practices in one of the studied villages. They lost jobs because they became involved in the
corrupt practices in collusion with the elected and unelected leaders in the beneficiary
selection process. It was possible to take bribes during the process of beneficiary selection as
the resources available were limited while the number of the affected households that really
needed support was very high (UNDP 2012). Finally, both the qualitative and survey data
show that most people trust NGO staff and consider that they are honest. For instance, the
survey data show that 71.6 percent (n=179) of the survey respondents trust NGO staff to a
very great or great extent, while 16 percent trust NGO staff to a very small extent or small
extent and 12.6 percent trust NGO staff neither to a great nor to a small extent. Similarly, 68.4
percent (n=171) of the survey respondents considered that NGO staff are very honest or
honest, while 14.8 percent considered that NGO staff are very dishonest or dishonest and 16.8
percent considered that NGO staff are neither honest nor dishonest.
7.5.15 Aid Dependency
Disaster affected people become aid dependent and stop working when they receive massive
aid or aid over a long period (Samuels 2010; Islam & Walkerden 2015). The survey data show
that 92.8 percent of the respondents think that villagers have become very much dependent on
outside relief following Aila. The qualitative data also show that many households still expect
certain types of aid such as houses or livelihood support from NGOs. The desire of the
affected households to receive something from NGOs can be understood from the following
statements of a key informant:
If an NGO representative enters the area, then everyone runs behind him… Everyone
tries the best to go to him first, to talk to him to include the name into the list. (elected
member and panel chairman of Dakshin Bedkashi Union, DB, 11 August 2017)
Nevertheless, not everyone runs after aid. Some people focus on their own activity. This is
evident from the following statements of a key informant from the NGO sector:
There are two types of people. There are some people who think what they would
receive when they meet a person from an NGO. There are some people who want to
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be self-dependent. They do not run after relief. They want to live on their own labour.
(11 September 2017)
Households do not want to get more aid from NGOs to avoid work. They do hard work, and
additional to their hard work they want to receive some aid from NGOs to achieve better
economic and housing conditions. One of the reasons for their desire for the additional aid
was the less livelihood and housing support NGOs provided compared to their needs. Many
households did not receive any livelihood and housing support. If they would receive
livelihood and housing support, they might not have expected more aid. It was also found
during the qualitative phase that a few households expected to receive more aid from NGOs
although they had received both livelihood support and houses. Although they tried to extract
as much as they could from NGOs, they did not avoid work. They wanted to achieve a better
position motived by selfishness. However, attitudes of these few households do not represent
most people in the villages. Moreover, the majority of the households in both the studied
villages do not have access to the income opportunities throughout the year. The lack of
income opportunities might have acted as a factor for their desire for more aid. Households
want employment opportunities, not aid. The eagerness of the people to do hard work if they
get work opportunities also does not support the idea that they want aid because they do not
want to work (Samuels 2010). A key informant describes this in the following way:
People do not want relief now. They want employment opportunities now; they want
to live on what they earn from their own labour… They want to work. (CC, 9 June
2017)
7.6 Conclusion
NGOs did not play any role in evacuation and search and rescue operations. Villagers helped
one another during evacuation and search and rescue operations. NGOs also failed to start the
relief operations immediately after the event although the affected households in both the
villages badly needed relief immediately after the event. As the relief was absent or extremely
little during the first week and very little during the second week, people experienced severe
suffering.
Despite the failure to start relief operations immediately after the event, NGOs played a vital
role in the survival and recovery process. Most of the households were dependent on external
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assistance from the government and NGOs for their survival and recovery. Most of the
households were not able to survive if they did not receive aid and non-aid support such as the
opportunity to participate in employment programs as households did not have income
required to survive for a long period. NGOs also greatly contributed to the economic, housing
and psychological recovery of the households by providing various livelihood supports and
houses. However, livelihood support and housing support were much less compared to the
needs of the community. Likewise, CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs greatly contributed
to the economic, housing and psychological recovery of the households. Microcredit from
NGOs also helped households to take recovery initiatives, mainly after the embankment was
repaired. Although NGOs did not provide direct psychological interventions, various aid and
employment and training programs operated by NGOs gave them mental strength and
contributed to the psychological recovery of the members of the affected households.
NGOs had some serious weaknesses that undermined the effectiveness of their post-Aila
response and recovery operations. They failed to start relief operations immediately after the
event. They distributed relief packets that varied from one NGO to another NGO in terms of
quantity as well as the items included, and the standard of the items included. They also did
not consider the number of the household members in providing relief. They also distributed
locally unsuitable rice. The lack of proper coordination among them caused overlapping of
the interventions and resulted in unequal distribution of relief items.
They did not provide enough livelihood and housing support. Moreover, the livelihood
support they provided was not sustainable as it was very small compared to the needs of a
household. They also provided low quality houses to the most vulnerable households while
provided high quality houses to the relatively less vulnerable households. They did not
provide psychosocial support to the affected people. They mainly focused on the activities
that have visible outcomes and ignored activities related to the non-physical needs.
NGOs implemented projects following the top-down approach. They did not consult with the
recipients in many cases and did tokenistic consultation in the form of information sharing
about the interventions of the externally designed projects in most cases when they consulted
with the recipients. Thus, they did not ensure recipients’ participation. Lack of consultation in
designing or modifying their interventions made the recipients passive observers and caused
the delivery of inappropriate items.
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They served least in the remote areas in the initial period. They distributed relief items in
places where they could go easily and thus many households living in the remote areas or
inside the flooded villages did not receive many relief items during the period when the
villages were subject to flooding. In a few cases, they provided more interventions to the
relatively less affected areas to spend the project money within the project time period.
They favoured their own CBO members and own microcredit recipients. However,
microcredit-providing NGOs put pressure for paying the instalments although people were
not capable to meet basic survival needs. NGOs sometimes excluded the households that
received support from other NGOs. They also excluded upper-middle-class households and
some lower-middle-class households from relief and other support although they badly
required those as they did not have income. In a few cases, NGO staff were also involved in
corrupt practices.
Finally, NGOs should avoid these weaknesses in the future response and recovery operations.
They should reach the affected area immediately after the event. In addition to survival, they
need to ensure necessary livelihood and housing interventions as these two are the critical
sectors in the recovery process. They should consider the psychosocial support program as
one of the core areas of their post-disaster response and recovery programs. They should
focus on consultation instead of tokenistic consultation and participation of the recipients.
Consultation with and participation of the recipients will help NGOs to overcome many
problems.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research
8.1 Introduction
The general objective of this study has been to examine the role of social capital in the post–
Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households in Bangladesh. This
study has examined three specific research objectives and addressed them by framing four
related research questions (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Research Objectives and Questions
Research Objectives Research Questions
Understanding the role of bonding
social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila
response and recovery process of the
affected households.
How did bonding social capital contribute to the
post–Cyclone Aila response and economic,
housing and psychological recovery process of the
affected households?
Understanding the role of bridging
social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila
response and recovery process of the
affected households.
How did bridging social capital contribute to the
post–Cyclone Aila response and economic,
housing and psychological recovery process of the
affected households?
Understanding the role of linking
social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila
response and recovery process of the
affected households.
How did linking social capital (government)
contribute to the post–Cyclone Aila response and
economic, housing and psychological recovery
process of the affected households?
How did linking social capital (NGOs) contribute
to the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic,
housing and psychological recovery process of the
affected households?
The key findings of the study, in answer to the four research questions listed above, are
presented first (section 8.2). I then consider how these findings might contribute to knowledge
and policy (section 8.3), before reviewing some of limitations of the study (section 8.4). The
implications of climate change and sea level rise for coastal Bangladesh are addressed
(section 8.5) as necessary background to the framing of policy recommendations (section
8.6). Finally, I present some possible directions for future research (section 8.7).
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8.2 Key Findings of the Study
8.2.1 The Role of Bonding Social Capital
The first research question concerns how bonding social capital contributed to the post–
Cyclone Aila response and the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the
affected households. This study has conceptualised bonding social networks as the network of
the affected households with their relatives and bonding social capital as the resources
affected households received through their bonding networks, i.e. from their relatives.
Bonding social capital played a significant role in evacuation and search and rescue during
and after Cyclone Aila. Relatives were the first responders and the first rescuers. Relatives
within the village helped the members of the related households to evacuate to safer places
during the event. They played a vital role in saving the lives of members of related
households during the event and in searching for and rescuing the members of related
households from the trapped places immediately after the event. Likewise, close relatives
living in the adjacent affected villages played vital roles in searching for and rescuing
members of related households from trapped places. Relatives within the village assisted one
another to rescue valuable items from being washed away and to move to relocated sites or to
prepare muchan within the homestead if the household did not move to other places or the
household returned from the other places to the homestead within a few days after the event.
Relatives from the unaffected areas also assisted affected households in a few cases to
relocate to the embankment and other places or to prepare muchan within the homestead.
The study shows that although the majority of households received either material aid or both
material and monetary aid from their relatives, many households did not receive any material
and monetary aid from relatives at any stage after Aila. Households usually received material
or monetary aid or both from their close blood or affinal relatives. Except in rare cases,
households did not receive any material or monetary aid from their distant relatives.
Moreover, relatives outside the affected areas played more important roles compared to the
affected relatives in giving material and monetary aid to the affected households.
Bonding social capital played the most important role in the survival of the majority of the
affected households until the arrival of aid from the external agencies. It contributed
significantly to the survival of the majority of the affected households during the response
period (up to one month) and to the survival of some of the affected households beyond the
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response period. Most of the households that received material and monetary aid from
relatives usually did so in the first month after the event. Although some households received
material and monetary aid from their relatives after the response period, only in rare instances
did households receive either material or monetary aid or both for survival during the
response, mixed and recovery stages. Moreover, bonding social capital did not even
contribute to the survival of many households as they did not receive any material and
monetary aid from relatives at any stage after Aila.
Most of the households that received material or monetary aid or both from their relatives
received only enough for survival and in most cases only sufficient for several days.
However, most of the households in both the villages required assistance for survival for a
long period as both the villages were subject to flooding for a long period. Thus, most of the
households were not able to meet survival needs after Aila if they did not receive support
from the government and NGOs.
Bonding social capital also played no role in the economic and housing recovery process of
most households. Very few households received monetary aid for economic recovery, and
material or monetary aid for repairing or constructing houses, although a considerable number
of the affected households received free labour from their relatives when repairing or
constructing their houses.
However, bonding social capital did play an immensely important role in the psychological
recovery processes of the members of the affected households. All households received
psychological support from their relatives throughout the recovery process. Households also
generally received, if needed, other non-material and non-monetary aid items such as free
labour, information and help to get work from their relatives throughout the recovery process.
Thus, bonding networks have the capacity to give non-material and non-monetary aid items
although they do not have the capacity to give material and monetary resources for economic
and housing recovery. As relatives provided non-material and non-monetary aid to the
affected households throughout the recovery process, household networks with relatives did
not become weak or less active and did not break down.
Bonding social capital did not contribute to the survival of many households at all or to the
survival of the majority of households over the required longer period and the economic and
housing recovery of most of the affected households, mainly because most of the affected
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households had bonding networks with poor relatives. The recovery challenges confronting
the affected relatives also limited the capacity of bonding social capital to contribute to the
survival and the economic and housing recovery of the affected households. However, the
poverty of relatives is the main factor that limits the capacity of the bonding networks. Due to
their own poverty, relatives cannot provide the necessary aid for survival and economic and
housing recovery even if they are not themselves affected by an event like Aila.
8.2.2 The Role of Bridging Social Capital
The second research question concerns how bridging social capital contributed to the post–
Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the
affected households. The study has conceptualised bridging social networks as the network of
the affected households with their neighbours and friends and acquaintances, and bridging
social capital as the resources affected households received through their bridging networks,
i.e. from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances.
Bridging social capital played an important role in evacuation and search and rescue
activities. Neighbours, and friends and acquaintances within the village, played more
important roles in evacuation and saving lives during the event compared to the role they
played in the search and rescue activities immediately after the even. Most households
received no material or monetary aid for any purpose after Aila from bridging networks. Only
some households received material and monetary aid, mainly material aid, from bridging
networks. Thus, bridging social capital did play a role in the survival of some households.
Households that received aid from the bridging networks mainly received it in the first few
days of the event, particularly during the night and the following day of the cyclone. In most
cases, the aid some households received from the bridging networks was only enough for
survival for one day. However, the affected households needed aid for survival for a longer
period as the villages were subject to extended flooding.
Bridging social capital played no role in the economic or housing recovery processes of the
affected households, except in a few cases. Bridging networks, particularly neighbours and
friends within the village, contributed to the housing recovery process mainly by providing
free labour during the repair or construction of the houses.
The psychological support from neighbours, friends and acquaintances greatly helped
members of the affected households to recover psychologically following Aila. Thus,
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although neighbours, friends and acquaintances do not have the capacity to provide the
required material and monetary aid for survival and economic and housing recovery, they
have the capacity to provide nonmaterial and non-monetary resources such as psychological
support. Nevertheless, many households have not received psychological support or other
non-material and non-monetary resources such as labour. Moreover, households’
relationships with neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village became tense,
suspicious and conflictual and, in many cases, broke down after a period due to the
competition for access to relief items.
Bridging social capital played no role in the survival and the economic and housing recovery
process of most of the affected households, due mainly to the poverty of neighbours, friends
and acquaintances. In addition to poverty, bridging social capital did not play an important
role for two important reasons: neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances were
themselves affected and thus had their own recovery challenges; and most households had no
friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas from whom they could seek material or
monetary aid. However, neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected households
could not contribute to the survival for a long period, or the economic and housing recovery
processes, due to poverty, even if they were not affected themselves.
Bonding social capital played a more important role than bridging social capital in the
evacuation, search and rescue, and survival phases, as well as in the economic, housing and
psychological recovery process of the affected households. The study also shows that over
time after the disaster, household networks with neighbours and friends and acquaintances
became less active and, in many cases, broke down. However, households’ networks with
relatives did not become less active or break down. Both bonding and bridging networks
performed poorly in providing material and monetary aid as time increased after the disaster.
Nevertheless, throughout the recovery process, households received non-material and non-
monetary aid from their bonding networks, though many received none from their bridging
networks. The study also shows that the expectation households have of their bonding
networks is fundamentally different than the expectation they have of their bridging networks.
Households usually expect and believe that, if close relatives are capable, close relatives have
some sort of obligation to provide material and monetary aid for survival and recovery
purposes after a disaster. However, they generally do not consider that neighbours, friends
and acquaintances have any such obligation, even if they are capable.
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This study suggests that the affected households usually have bonding relations with poor
relatives and bridging relations with poor neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Thus, the
affected households require external assistance through linking social networks such as
government agencies and national and international NGOs for survival as well as for
economic and housing recovery in a post-disaster situation.
8.2.3 Linking Social Capital: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the Government’s Response and Recovery Operations
The third research question is related to the contribution of linking social capital
(government) to the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological
recovery process of the affected households. This study has shown that neither of the Union
Parishads (UPs) disseminated warnings successfully, or took the necessary measures for
evacuating people and livestock to safe places, because the early cyclone warning was not
high enough. Both UPs also played an extremely limited role, if any, in search and rescue
operations as most elected representatives of UP and most UP employees were also affected
by Aila as they were from the same affected unions, and the UPs did not have the necessary
logistics support for carrying out search and rescue operations. Moreover, neither of the UPs
made the necessary preparations for a flood of the whole union, which resulted in a poor level
of response, including search and rescue operations, in the initial period.
The government played a significant role in the survival of the affected households. Most
households in the two villages did not have access to their usual income from the affected
areas as they were unable to start economic activities until the embankment was repaired.
They were unable to meet their own survival needs relying either on their own capacity or on
the material and monetary aid they received through their bonding and bridging networks.
Instead they required additional assistance from their linking networks, i.e. from the
government and NGOs, for both survival and recovery. Government aid and employment
programs, along with aid and non-aid support from NGOs, greatly contributed to the survival
of the affected households over the long term.
Although various government aid items greatly contributed to survival, rice under the VGF
program played a vital role in meeting the survival needs of the affected households. If the
government did not provide VGF rice, most households would have experienced food scarcity
or starved as they did not have enough income to buy the necessary food. VGF rice also
played an extremely important role in reducing permanent migration of households from the
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studied villages. In addition to aid, income from the government employment programs
helped participant households to meet survival needs both before and after the embankment
was repaired.
The government also played a substantial role in the processes of economic, housing and
psychological recovery. However, the government provided livelihood support to a relatively
small number of households and did not provide psychological support to the affected people
as an intervention. The government mainly provided aid items for survival and for the repair
or construction of houses. Nonetheless, aid items from the government contributed overall to
economic and psychological recovery. Various aid items and employment opportunities from
the government (and from NGOs) gave the affected people a degree of mental strength and
confidence by creating a sense of optimism among them; this played a significant role in their
psychological recovery process. In addition to the various aid items, participation in the
government employment programs also played a significant role in economic, housing and
psychological recovery. Moreover, loans from government sources also assisted some
households to undertake recovery initiatives, once the village was dewatered. Overall, the
post-Aila situation shows that most households require both aid and non-aid forms of support
from the government for survival and recovery. In this way, the government acts as a source
of resilience.
The post-Aila response and recovery operations had some serious weaknesses. The
government was unable to launch the relief operation immediately after the event. Households
in both villages received their first relief items from the government only after a few days.
The government provided much less relief than was needed in both villages during the first
week and before the introduction of the VGF program from September 2009. The VGF rice
was provided for a shorter period than needed and the rice distributed was locally unsuitable.
Moreover, although the government gave 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of
houses, the number of households that received 20,000 Taka was lower than the number of
households that needed the money to repair or construct their houses. Furthermore, the
government did not provide much-needed livelihood support. Although some households
received seeds and fertilisers, they did so as part of regular government programs for
agricultural development. Lack of livelihood support and absence of psychological support as
an intervention were the two key weaknesses of the government response and recovery
operations. Lack of coordination between UP and NGOs, exclusion of poor households, and
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favouritism and bribery of the UP representatives in discharging aid items seriously
undermined the fairness and effectiveness of the aid operations.
8.2.4 Linking Social Capital: The Role of NGOs and the Weaknesses of the NGOs’ Response and Recovery Operations
The fourth research question is related to the contribution of linking social capital (NGOs) to
the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of
the affected households. The study showed that NGOs played no role in evacuation and
search and rescue operations. However, NGOs did play a significant role in the survival and
recovery processes of the affected households. Most households did not have the necessary
income for survival for a long period as they were unable to start their usual economic
activities due to the ongoing flooding. Thus, most households were dependent on external
assistance from the government and NGOs for survival and recovery as they were unable to
survive for long periods based just on their own means or the material and monetary aid they
received through their bonding and bridging social networks. Aid as well as employment
programs from NGOs thus greatly contributed to the survival of households.
In addition to playing significant roles in survival, NGOs also played a substantial role in the
economic, housing and psychological recovery processes of the affected households. Various
aid items including livelihood support and houses from NGOs proved important. The
CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs operated by NGOs have greatly contributed to the
recovery process, and NGOs have also assisted recovery initiatives though microcredit
operations. Although NGOs have not provided psychological support to the affected
households as an intervention, their distribution of various aid items and the operation of
employment and training programs have significantly contributed to the psychological
recovery process. The post-Aila experience shows that aid and non-aid support from NGOs
are crucial not only for survival but also for recovery. Most of the households in both the
villages might have left the area if they had not received aid and non-aid support from NGOs
as well as from the government. Thus, NGOs acted as one of the major sources of resilience
in the post-Aila situation.
NGOs’ post-Aila response and recovery operations had some serious weaknesses that
undermined the effectiveness of their response and recovery operations. NGOs failed to start
aid operations immediately after the event. Relief packages from different NGOs varied in
terms of quantity, the items included, and the standard of the items included. NGOs gave
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locally unsuitable rice. The lack of coordination among different NGOs led to the overlapping
of the interventions and caused unequal distribution of relief items.
NGOs provided limited livelihood support and housing support relative to needs. The
livelihood support that NGOs provided was not sustainable as it was too limited relative to the
needs of each recipient household. They also distributed low-quality houses among the most
vulnerable households and high-quality houses among the relatively less vulnerable
households. The absence of psychosocial support to the affected people from NGOs as an
intervention and the preference of NGOs to implement activities that have visible outcomes
were also major weaknesses.
NGOs implemented projects through a top-down approach. They did not consult with the
recipients in many cases. Moreover, when NGOs consulted with the recipients, they carried
out tokenistic consultation in most cases in the form of information sharing about the
interventions of the externally designed project. Thus, they did not ensure participation of the
recipients. The inability of the aid recipients to design and modify NGO interventions made
the recipients passive observers and resulted in the delivery of inappropriate aid items or the
implementation of the interventions in a less successful manner.
NGOs worked least in the remote affected areas in the initial period. They gave relief items in
accessible places when the villages were subject to flooding and thus many households did
not receive relief items. In a few cases, NGOs intervened more frequently and substantially to
the relatively less affected areas in order to use up project funding within the duration of the
project. They also favoured their own CBO members and microcredit borrowers. NGOs that
operated microcredit programs before the event put pressure on the borrowers to pay back an
instalment of loans taken before Aila, but at a time when the borrowers did not have the
capacity to meet their survival needs. Likewise, the exclusion of households that received aid
from other NGOs, and of upper-middle-class and some lower-middle-class households from
aid and non-aid support, and the involvement of NGO employees in a few cases in corrupt
practices, were major weaknesses of the NGOs’ post-Aila response and recovery operations.
8.3 Contribution to Knowledge and Policies
The study contributes to the theoretical development and application of the concept of social
capital in empirical research by defining the concept in terms of social networks. The study
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deliberately excludes questions of trust and norms from the definition of the concept, as the
study adopts Nan Lin’s network-based theory of social capital, which does not include trust
and norms as components of social capital (Lin 2008). Karen Schweers Cook (2005) argues
that social capital as ‘networks, norms and trust’ appears as an ‘everything but the kitchen
sink concept’ (Cook 2005, p. 8). Using concepts such as trust and norms in addition to social
networks risks detracting from my focus here, which is on the contribution of different
network types of social capital (Cook 2005).
The study contributes to knowledge by focusing on the role of social capital in the post-
disaster response and recovery process, exploring in particular how social capital contributes
to the economic, housing and psychological recovery processes of the affected households.
The study contributes to a significant gap in knowledge by showing how bonding, bridging
and linking types of social capital contribute to evacuation, search and rescue, survival and
economic, housing and psychological processes of recovery and how the roles of each type of
social capital differ from one another in each of these processes. The study also fills a gap
related to the link between social capital and psychological recovery following a cyclone in
Bangladesh by exploring the role of each of the three types of social capital in the
psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. Finally, the study
contributes to knowledge by defining and distinguishing bonding and bridging networks
clearly in the context of coastal Bangladesh.
The findings of the study confirm the claims that bonding social capital is helpful for survival
or getting by (Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan
2000; Pelling & High 2005). However, the study adds to existing knowledge by
demonstrating that although bonding social capital helps people to get by, it helps for a
limited period, and not over a longer timeframe. The study also contributes to new knowledge
by showing that the purpose of action is vital in understanding the role of bonding social
capital. Lin (2008) suggests two purposes of action: expressive (does not require additional or
new resources) and instrumental (requires additional or new or better resources). My study
suggests that bonding social capital is usually useful when households require few material
and monetary resources from their bonding networks, such as for survival for a limited period,
or require non-material and non-monetary resources from their bonding networks such as
assistance with evacuation, search and rescue and psychological support. However, bonding
social capital is usually not useful when households do require substantial material and
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monetary resources from their bonding networks, such as for survival for a long period,
economic recovery or housing recovery. The study also contributes to theoretical knowledge
by showing that bonding social capital usually does not play an important role in survival for
a long period (or even for survival over a short period in many cases) and economic and
household recovery due to the homophily principle, i.e. people close to someone are likely to
have similar resources (Lin 2001, 2008). Most of the households in my study area were poor
or lower-middle-class and had bonding networks with similarly poor relatives. However, in
the case of a few households that had access to relatively rich resources through bonding
networks, bonding social capital may have played an important role in terms of instrumental
action (Lin 2008, p. 60). For instance, bonding social capital played a significant role in the
housing recovery of two households out of 83 interviewed households in the qualitative
phase, as these two households were linked to relatively rich resources through their bonding
networks, i.e. relatives.
My findings contradict the argument that bridging social capital is useful in getting ahead as
people gain access to varied or rich resources through bridging networks (Putnam 2000;
Granovetter 1973, 1983; Briggs 1998; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000;
Lin 2008). The general idea is that when people reach beyond their immediate circles, as in
the case of bridging networks, they gain access to more diverse and better resources due to the
heterophily principle (Lin 2008). Contrary to this theoretical expectation, this study shows
that households do not have access to rich resources through bridging networks with
neighbours, friends and acquaintances. Bridging networks played a limited role in all aspects
including survival, economic, housing and psychological recovery by comparison with
bonding networks. The study contributes to knowledge by showing that the richness of
resources embedded in the networks is an important factor in understanding the role of a
network (Lin 2008, p. 60). Neither bonding nor bridging networks were able to provide the
necessary resources following Cyclone Aila. Instead, in the absence of livelihood restoration
for a long period, affected households were dependent mainly on resources through linking
networks for their survival and economic and housing recovery. Thus, the study confirms that
the access to the resources through households’ linking networks with the government and
NGOs is a critical factor in the disaster response and recovery process of the affected
households (Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). Moreover,
the study also contributes to knowledge by showing that although households do not receive
psychological support as an intervention from the linking networks, aid and non-aid support
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other than psychological support from the linking networks can also significantly contribute
to the psychological recovery process.
Finally, the study provides evidence-based knowledge to policymakers and development
practitioners on the relationship between social capital and post-disaster response and
recovery. The findings should be helpful for policy-makers and development practitioners in
devising effective policies and programs to strengthen the capacity of the bonding and
bridging networks and to modify the operations of linking networks by recognising the
dependency of households on linking networks for survival and assistance during recovery.
The findings relating to the weaknesses of the government’s and NGOs’ post-Aila response
and recovery operations will be helpful for policymakers and development practitioners in
Bangladesh and elsewhere in designing more effective post-disaster response and recovery
operations that ensure a bottom-up participatory approach and that focus on recovery support
measures such as livelihood and housing assistance, and the introduction of psychological
support, in the context of future disasters.
8.4 Limitations of the Study
Limitations in the study are evident in the following four main areas. First, the fieldwork for
this study began eight years after Cyclone Aila. As the study was conducted a long time after
the event, the interviewees during the qualitative phase and the survey respondents had to
recall Aila-related emotions, experiences and information. The memories of interviewees and
survey respondents may have diminished over the course of time. However, this study
collected data from various sources through different data collection methods (observation,
interviews with the household-level interviewee, FGD, key informant interview, and
household-level survey) and crosschecked the data collected from various sources to
overcome the problem of recall bias. Moreover, the study also drew on the available relevant
documents from the government agencies and local government and national and
international NGOs to crosscheck data collected through qualitative and quantitative data
collection methods. It is worth noting that many important documents from the government
agencies and local government and national and international NGOs were not available
because the government agencies and NGOs do not store documents over longer periods.
Second, as the study fieldwork was conducted eight years after Aila, it was not possible to
conduct interviews with many of the government officials and employees of national and
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international NGOs who had participated in the Aila response and recovery operations. Most
of these individuals had left the study areas or the upazila or district in which the study
villages are located due to transfers and promotions or had moved on to new jobs in other
organisations.
Third, as the study was carried out in the two villages most impacted by Aila, it is important
to keep in mind when generalising the study findings that the contribution of social capital to
the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households may vary in less
impacted villages.
Fourth, the study has considered the relationships of the affected households with relatives
(bonding networks), neighbours, friends and acquaintances (bridging networks) and
organisations, i.e. government including local government and NGOs (linking networks).
However, the study did not explore the relationship between local government and central
government, the relationship between different agencies of the central government involved in
the response and recovery operations, or the relationship between national NGOs and
international NGOs in detail. Again, the difficulties involved in tracking down individuals
within central or local government or in NGOs who were present during the Aila response
made this task impractical.
8.5 Implications of Climate Change and Sea Level Rise
The coastal zone will be the area worst affected by climate change in Bangladesh due to sea
level rise (MoEF 2009). It is predicted that sea level rise will exacerbate many of the existing
hazards within this zone (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid 2017). Sea level rise will increase both
salinity and the intensity of the tropical cyclones, with higher storm surges and higher wind
speed (MoEF 2005, 2009). The IPCC (2019, p. 20) forecasts that the global mean sea level
rise by 2100 may be 0.43 m (likely range: 0.29 m to 0.59 m) with a low greenhouse gas
emissions and high mitigation future, and 0.84 m (likely range: 0.61 m to 1.10 m) with the
highest greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of measures for combating climate change.
Bangladesh’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (2009), quoting the IPCC, mentions
that the rise in sea level will be up to 79 cm along the Bangladesh coast by the next 100 years
(MoEF 2009, p. 56). This action plan also suggests that sea level rise could displace 6 to 8
million people in Bangladesh by 2050. The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (2007, p. 485)
states that sea level rise in 2050 may directly affect more than one million people in the
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Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta in Bangladesh. A World Bank (2010) study suggests that
a one metre rise in sea level rise would inundate 18 percent of the total land of the country.
Houghton (2009, p. 182) predicts that Bangladesh will lose 10 percent and 20 percent of the
habitable land due to a sea level rise of half a metre and one metre respectively.
Projected sea level rise along the Bangladesh coast varies from one study to another. Some
earlier studies suggested that sea level rise along the Bangladesh coast could be 1 metre by
2050 and 2 metres by 2100 (Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul 2014). A World Bank (2011)
study assumes 27 cm rise in sea level by 2050 in Bangladesh. Another World Bank (2013)
study assumes 50 cm rise in sea level by 2070 under 2o C warming and 50 cm rise in sea level
by 2060 under 4o C warming in the South Asian coastlines. The same study also projects that
sea level rise in the South Asian coastlines could be 70 cm (60–80 cm) by 2080–2100 under
2o C warming and 105 cm (85–125 cm) by 2080–2100 under 4o C warming.
Future rise in sea level is thus certain and the inundation of the coastal area of Bangladesh
appears inevitable, with people of the coastal area being forced to move and resettle in other
places at some point in the future (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul 2014).
However, there is great uncertainty regarding the rate of sea level rise along the Bangladesh
coast, though there is some agreement that the rate of rise will be relatively small by 2050, but
accelerate thereafter to about one metre in rise by 2100 (Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul
2014; World Bank 2011). If the rate of increase in sea level remains low up to 2050, it may be
possible for people in the coastal areas of Bangladesh to live with rising sea levels for the next
three to four decades or for at least another generation by undertaking various adaptation
measures (Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul 2014). Nevertheless, in broad terms, the
outlook for future inundation along the Bangladesh coastline is grim.
8.6 Policy Recommendations
The Government of Bangladesh considers that disaster risk-reduction measures promote
adaption to climate change (MoFDM 2010a; MoEF 2009). Although not all disaster risk-
reduction measures are linked to climate-related hazards and not all climate change impacts
are hazards, there is substantial overlap between disaster risk-reduction measures and climate
change adaptation measures (Rashid & Paul 2014). Both disaster risk-reduction measures and
climate change adaptation measures focus on reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience
(MoFDM 2010a). Recognising the potential of disaster risk-reduction in promoting adaptation
261
to climate change, the Government of Bangladesh has also included comprehensive disaster
management as one of the six pillars of its Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009
(MoEF 2009). Likewise, national disaster management plans have also highlighted the
importance of integration between disaster risk-reduction measures and climate change
adaptation measures (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017). Here, I make a series of
recommendations directed at policies that seek to enhance the resilience of coastal households
to cyclone hazards in the short-term and medium-term (Paul & Rashid 2017). Implementation
of these policies will also help coastal households to adapt to the adverse impacts of sea level
rise, at least in the short-term and medium-term (they may need to relocate to other places in
the long-term). Recommendations are presented in the following areas: infrastructure,
livelihood and employment, cyclone-resilient houses, disaster preparedness and post-disaster
response and recovery, and social networks.
Infrastructure
This study shows that the key future threat confronting affected households is further
destruction of the embankment. As the households in both the studied villages live on land
protected by the embankment, its destruction inundates the villages. They must live on the
embankment or other places or in flooded homesteads and cannot restore livelihoods or build
durable houses until the embankment is repaired and the waters have receded (UN-Habitat &
IFRCRCS 2010). As the embankment protects the villages from flooding, the fate of the
embankment determines the fate of the households living in these villages. Thus, the proper
maintenance of the existing embankment so that it does not fail, and the repair of breaches in
the embankment in the quickest possible time, are the two most important actions that the
government should take to save the villages within the polder from future disaster. One of the
most important steps the government can take to ensure the proper maintenance of the
embankment is to implement stringent measures to stop the illegal breaching of the
embankment by shrimp farmers trying to bring saline water from the rivers into shrimp farms
located within the polder. The Aila experience shows that many of the breaches along the
embankments were precisely the points that had been cut by shrimp farmers to bring saline
water inside the polder.
The government could set up a special task force involving community people trained by the
Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) with the goal of repairing breaches in the
embankment in the quickest possible time after any event like Aila (UNDP 2012). The repair
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of the breaches in the embankment in the quickest possible time will not only lessen the
suffering of the affected people but also reduce the cost of repairing the breaches later as they
become bigger over time and thus require more money to repair. Swift repair will also save
the resources of the government and NGOs as they will need to commit fewer resources for
the post-disaster response and recovery operations. Moreover, it will be necessary to upgrade
the embankment to protect the area from storm surge and sea level rise (MoEF 2009). It is
worth noting that protection from storm surge is an issue that was not given proper attention
when the polders were originally designed (MoWR 2013a). Likewise, roads, bridges, culverts
and existing rural market centres need to be raised above the highest local tide or flood level,
including any projected rise in sea level, so that tidal waters cannot inundate these
infrastructures (Paul & Rashid 2017).
There is also an urgent need to construct additional cyclone shelters, which are fewer in
number than required, to save coastal people from high magnitude cyclones and storm surges
in the future (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017; Paul & Rashid 2017; Paul et al. 2010; Paul
2009; Parvin, Takahashi & Shaw 2008). Cyclone shelters must have water and toilet facilities
and, if possible, power facilities such as solar power (Paul & Rashid 2017; Paul et al. 2010;
Paul 2012). Moreover, they should have separate spaces and toilets for women and should
also be disabled friendly (Paul 2012; Paul & Rashid 2017; Paul et al. 2010; Ahsan et al.
2016). They should be connected to the roads so that people can easily reach them, and should
have storage facilities so that people can store valuable items including documents when they
take refuge (Paul et al. 2010). There is also an urgent need to construct killas (raised earthen
platforms) adjacent to the cyclone shelters for livestock, as the lack of safe places for
livestock is one of the principal factors that discourages people from moving to save their
own lives (Ikeda 1995; Paul 2012; Paul et al. 2010; Ahsan et al. 2016; MoDMR 2017).
Livelihoods and Employment
Enhancing livelihood resilience is one of the key components required to make coastal
households more resilient to future disasters. There is a serious need for external support for
agricultural livelihoods in coastal areas. Farmers cultivating rice and other crops have already
been experiencing serious problems due to salinity in agricultural fields (Mainuddin et al.
2011). For instance, in both the studied villages, households that cultivate rice can usually
cultivate only one time per year due to salinity. In Dakshin Bedkashi Village, cultivable land
is used mainly for shrimp farming instead of rice cultivation. The effect of sea level rise is
263
already evident from the increase in salinity over time and continued sea level rise would
further exacerbate this situation and badly affect agriculture (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid
2017). Sea level rise has added new challenges for the coastal farmers as they have very
limited options to adjust to the salinity problem in their agricultural fields though their
traditional agricultural adaptation practices (Paul & Rashid 2017). The government and NGOs
need to support households through providing saline-tolerant rice varieties, fertilisers, cash
and technical support for rice production. Rice varieties that can grow in highly saline soils
need to be developed to support farmers of the coastal area living in areas with such soils and
to sustain coastal agriculture in the future as soil salinity increases (Paul & Rashid 2017).
Moreover, the government and NGOs need to support the households to cultivate alternative
crops when the land cannot be used for rice cultivation, and to have access to fresh water for
the cultivation of these alternative crops. Likewise, the government and NGOs should also
support households that want to stop saline-water shrimp farming and resume rice cultivation
due to the negative impacts of the saline-water shrimp farming on local employment,
livestock and the environment. In many parts of the coastal areas, conversion of agricultural
land into shrimp farming land has further exacerbated the salinity problem (Paul & Rashid
2017; Habiba et al. 2013). Furthermore, a significant proportion of the households in these
villages undertake seasonal migration to other places. Income through migration is helpful for
households in general and will also assist them if the coastal villages become flooded for a
long period. Thus, policies and programs that support and facilitate seasonal migration to
other areas as a livelihood strategy and adaptation strategy are necessary (Siddiqui & Billah
2014).
The government and NGOs also need to support coastal households through the creation of
more local employment opportunities as the lack of local employment opportunities is a
serious problem for most of the households (MoWR 2005). The lack of local employment
opportunities creates more problems for women and households that do not have male
members who can migrate to other places to bolster their livelihood. As women do not usually
undertake seasonal migration like men, they cannot earn even if they badly require money due
to the lack of local employment opportunities. Thus, it is necessary to provide more support to
the women so that women can engage in income-generating activities such as tailoring, duck
rearing, chicken rearing, goat raising, sheep raising, cattle raising, homestead gardening, and
handicrafts in the local areas (MoWR 2005). The government and NGOs can support coastal
households through donations, interest-free loans or loans with minimum interest, skills
264
development training for income-generating activities, and through linking their products to
the market. While creation of both on-farm and off-farm opportunities for income generation
in the local areas is important, creation of off-farm income-generating activities will make
coastal households more resilient to disasters that impact on-farm activities (agriculture and
livestock).
Cyclone-Resilient Houses
The construction of cyclone-resilient houses is one of the most important requirements for
coastal households to become resilient to future cyclone events. Poor quality of housing is one
of the critical factors that has contributed to the huge number of deaths due to cyclones in
Bangladesh. Although construction of cyclone-resilient houses is a necessity, most coastal
households are not able to afford cyclone-resilient houses (Paul & Rashid 2017). The
government, NGOs and donors need to assist coastal households by providing cyclone-
resilient houses as aid and supporting the construction of cyclone-resilient houses though
various measures such as special long-term loans with little or no interest. Capable people
should be encouraged to construct two-storey buildings as these can serve as mini cyclone
shelters and can save people from storm surge (Bern et al. 1993). In addition to cyclone-
resilient houses, raising the level of homesteads and house plinths is also necessary for
protection from storm surge and adaptation to sea level rise (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid
2017; Alam & Collins 2010).
Disaster Preparedness and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery
This study shows that there is considerable scope to enhance disaster preparedness at the
community level. The involvement of the community for preparedness programs should be a
central focus (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017; Shaw 2012). Moreover, it is also essential to
strengthen the capacity of UP to undertake effective preparedness measures. Crucially, the
Government of Bangladesh has placed importance on disaster risk-reduction through pre-
disaster prevention or mitigation and preparedness measures instead of the previous style of
responding after the disaster takes place (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017). The study
demonstrates that the local government or UP does not have the necessary resources to
conduct search and rescue operations and relief operations immediately after the event.
Equipping UP with necessary equipment supports and the creation of trained volunteer groups
for search and rescue operations at the UP level would enhance the capacity of UP (MoFDM
265
2010a). Moreover, one of the important measures that should be taken is to ensure a sufficient
UP disaster fund to provide emergency relief materials to the affected people until aid arrives
from outside, including from central government and NGOs. Likewise, NGOs did not start aid
operations immediately after the event and one of the main reasons for this was the
dependency on donors to start aid operations. Although NGOs need funds from donors to
undertake full aid operations, they must develop their own capacity to start and continue
emergency aid operations independently for at least the initial two to four weeks after a
disaster.
The study affirms that the livelihood and housing support were limited compared to need
although these two are the most critical sectors in the recovery process. The post-Aila
recovery phase was an opportunity for the government and NGOs to ‘build back better’,
including livelihoods and houses, to reduce the vulnerability of the households and make
them more resilient to future disasters (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015). Thus, there is a need for
more focus on the improvement of livelihoods and houses (Islam & Walkerden 2015).
The government and NGOs did not provide psychological support to the affected people, and
must consider psychosocial support programs as one of the core areas of the post-disaster
response and recovery operations, and as significant as economic or housing recovery
(MoFDM 2010a; UN 2005; UNDRR 2015; Haque at al. 2012; Kenny & Clarke 2010).
The study argues that aid recipients became passive recipients as they had no role in
designing and modifying the externally designed projects. Thus, there is a need for a bottom-
up participatory approach instead of a top-down approach for the successful implementation
of the response and recovery interventions (James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016;
Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Kenny 2010; Fanany 2010b; Shaw & Guda 2004; Shaw & Sinha
2003; Shaw, Pulhin & Pereira 2010).
Social Networks
The study demonstrates that most of the affected households are primarily dependent on
linking networks for survival and recovery after Aila as the post-Aila situation has been
characterised by long-term flooding that has prevented the initiation of recovery activities,
including the restoration of livelihoods. This flooding situation also limits the capacity of the
bonding and bridging networks as the affected relatives, neighbours, friends and
266
acquaintances of the affected households are also primarily dependent on linking networks for
their survival and recovery. Nevertheless, resources through bonding and bridging networks
cannot contribute to survival for a long period or substantial economic and housing recovery
in the case of most of the households because most of the households have bonding
relationships with poor relatives and bridging relationships with poor neighbours, friends and
acquaintances. Thus, the government and NGOs need to assist coastal households in
Bangladesh for both survival and recovery after a disaster like Aila.
The study affirms that bonding and bridging networks play a significant role in evacuation
and search and rescue operations. Therefore, it is necessary to devise effective policies and
programs to strengthen the capacity of bonding and bridging networks so that they can
successfully act as the first responders.
The study also shows that household relationships with neighbours and friends and
acquaintances within the village become tense, suspicious and conflictual and, in many cases,
break down after a period due to the competition for access to relief items. Conflict often
emerges due to the unfair distribution of aid items by the government and NGOs. The
government and NGOs can play an effective role in minimising such conflict through
ensuring maximum transparency about the available aid items, the beneficiary selection
process and the participation of recipients in the aid distribution process (Islam & Walkerden
2014). These measures would also greatly contribute to curbing corruption (favouritism and
bribery) in the post-disaster response and recovery operations.
Finally, poverty is a key factor that makes households and communities in the coastal area of
Bangladesh more vulnerable to cyclone hazards (Kristof 1991; Paul & Rashid 2017). Thus,
efforts to reduce poverty of the poor households and communities need to be reinforced to
reduce their vulnerability to disaster risks and make them resilient to future disasters (MoWR
2005; MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017; UNDRR 2015; UN 2013). Moreover, as sea level rise
will permanently displace a large number of coastal households through the permanent
inundation of coastal areas in Bangladesh in the long-term, the Government of Bangladesh
should develop a resettlement plan for the displaced population to be resettled in other areas
in future. The plan should include options for resettling the displaced population both inside
and outside of Bangladesh, particularly in industrial countries (MoEF 2009; Rashid & Paul
2014).
267
8.7 Suggestions for Future Research
The study recommends further research that compares the role of social capital in post-
disaster response and recovery between those areas that were not subject to flooding for a
long period or became dewatered within a very short period after Aila and the areas that were
subject to flooding for a long period, such as the two studied villages. The role of bonding,
bridging and linking networks might vary based on these different post-Aila contexts. For
instance, bonding social capital and bridging social capital might contribute slightly more
while the dependency of households on linking social capital for survival and recovery might
be relatively less in the areas that were not subject to flooding for a long period or became
dewatered within a very short period after Aila.
The long period of flooding post-Aila in the studied villages was exceptional by comparison
with the usual post-cyclone situation in Bangladesh. The quick repair of the breaches of the
embankment could have enabled a quicker recovery and could have saved some of the
resources the government and NGOs spent. Thus, another important research area is to
explore the reasons for the delayed repair of the embankment by the responsible government
agency (BWDB).
Other key areas for further research include exploring: how the post-Aila flooding situation
impacted on children’s education in the affected areas; the impact of the loss of household
members due to Aila on the psychological recovery process of the remaining members of the
households; and how those households that migrated permanently to other places as a unit
(with all the members of the household) have adjusted to their new environments.
There is also a need to explore ways to minimise corruption in government, particularly in
local government and NGOs, during the distribution of emergency aid and recovery aid items,
and extending to the role of public participation at the community level in fighting corruption
in post-disaster contexts. There is also a need for further research to explore the factors that
limit the capacity of the local government and that might enable them to undertake
preparedness measures and immediate response and recovery measures.
Finally, I hope that this study will contribute practically to the households and communities
whose lives, livelihoods and houses are frequently impacted by cyclones in Bangladesh and
other countries. I believe that the findings of this study reflect the voices of the cyclone-
268
affected households and communities. Thus, improvement of policies and programs to ensure
effective post-disaster response and recovery operations in future, based on these findings,
will reflect the contribution of these affected households and communities and will ensure
better success of the post-disaster response and recovery operations in future in Bangladesh
and other countries.
269
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Zhang, Y & Peacock, WG 2009, ‘Planning for housing recovery? Lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew, Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 5–24.
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Appendix 1
In-depth Interview Guide for In-depth Interviews with Household Head (Including Female Headed Household) or Wife of the Household Head of the Selected Households in the Two Studied Villages.
1. Please describe the socio-economic and demographic characteristics related to you and
your household (sex, age and education of the interviewee and household head if the
interviewee is not household head, present and previous information on the number of
household members, number of earning members, occupation of earning members,
household income, size of the homestead and agricultural land [if any] and house type).
2. Please describe how Cyclone Aila impacted on your household (personal injuries or
injuries to household members; loss and damage; economic impact; displacement and
period of displacement [if any] and the location/s your household stayed during the
displacement period).
3. How did your household cope with the post-Cyclone Aila situation?
4. How do you evaluate the level of economic recovery of your household after Cyclone
Aila and the present economic condition of your household compared to the pre-Cyclone
Aila economic condition?
5. How do you evaluate the level of housing recovery of your household after Cyclone Aila
and the present condition of your house compared to your pre-Cyclone Aila house?
6. How do you evaluate the level of psychological recovery of you and members of your
household after Cyclone Aila?
7. What are the factors (such as socio-economic, cultural, and political) that affected the
economic, housing and psychological recovery process of your household following
Cyclone Aila?
8. What aid and non-aid assistance did your household receive from relatives, neighbours,
friends and acquaintances following Cyclone Aila?
9. How did aid and non-aid assistance your household received from relatives, neighbours,
friends and acquaintances contribute to the survival and economic, housing and
psychological recovery process of your household?
298
10. What emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance did your household receive
from both the government and NGOs/only government/only NGOs after Cyclone Aila?
11. How did aid and non-aid assistance received from the government and NGOs/only
government/only NGOs contribute to the survival and economic, housing and
psychological recovery process of your household?
12. In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the post-Cyclone Aila
emergency and long-term operations undertaken by the government agencies and NGOs?
13. If you received a house from the government or an NGO after Cyclone Aila, then how do
you assess the processes involved when the house was given (such as consultation and
beneficiary selection criteria)?
14. How do you assess the house you received from the government or NGO in terms of the
following issues: number of rooms, quality of fence/wall, number of doors, number of
windows and their placement, movement of air through the house, quality of materials,
quality of construction, flexibility in the design so that structures can be adapted, any
disaster risk reduction measures that were taken, space, privacy, comfort, suitability for
health condition, suitability for long-term use, the capacity to withstand a severe cyclone
and overall satisfaction with the assistance and other related issues you consider
important? Did you repair the house or make any modifications to the house you
received? If yes, why?
15. (If you have not received a house from the government or an NGO but want to comment)
How do you evaluate the processes and outcomes of the Post-Cyclone-Aila housing
project implemented by the government agencies or NGOs or both in your village?
16. How did your religious beliefs help you to view Cyclone Aila and cope with the post-
Cyclone Aila situation?
17. Do you take safe refuge when you receive early cyclone warnings? If not, then why?
18. In your opinion, what would have happened differently if Cyclone Aila had struck at
night?
19. Do you prefer agriculture or shrimp farming in your village? Why?
20. Do you have trust in relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances/community or village
leaders/elected leaders of the local government (Union Parishad)/other concerned
government agencies/ NGOs/ NGO staff?
299
21. How do you evaluate your household’s present and previous socio-economic condition in
relation to other households in the village?
22. Do you think that your household is more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone
Aila period? Why?
23. What are the factors that affected (either facilitated or impeded) the recovery trajectory of
your village after Cyclone Aila?
24. How do you evaluate the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone
Aila period?
Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep appreciation
for your time and contribution to this interview.
301
Appendix 2
In-depth Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews with Elected Representatives, Government Officials and NGO (Local and International) Officials Across Various Levels.
1. How do you evaluate the post-Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the
affected households and villages in general and the affected households and village under
investigation in particular?
2. In your opinion, what are the factors that facilitated or impeded the recovery trajectory of
the affected households and villages in general and the affected households and village
under investigation in particular?
3. What emergency aid did government agencies/NGOs provide to the affected households?
4. What economic or livelihood related interventions did government agencies/NGOs
provide to the affected households?
5. What housing related interventions did government agencies/NGOs provide to the
affected households?
6. What psychological support interventions did government agencies/NGOs provide to the
affected households? If not, why?
7. How would you evaluate the importance of cash for work/food for work/both cash and
food for work programs operated by the government and NGOs to the survival and
recovery process of the affected households? How would you evaluate the importance of
cash for training programs operated by NGOs?
8. In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the post-Cyclone Aila
emergency and long-term interventions?
9. If your agency or NGO provided livelihood support to the affected studied village, then
what type of livelihood support did your agency or NGO provide? How do you evaluate
the effectiveness of the given livelihood support intervention? Please comment in detail.
10. If your agency or NGO provided housing to the affected studied village, then how did
your agency or NGO implement the intervention? Please comment in detail.
11. Can you please comment on the given houses in terms of the following issues: number of
rooms, quality of fence/wall, number of doors, number of windows and their placement,
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movement of air through the house, quality of materials, quality of construction,
flexibility in the design so that structures can be adapted, any disaster risk reduction
measures that were taken, space, privacy, comfort, suitability for health condition,
suitability for long-term use, the capacity to withstand a severe cyclone and satisfaction
of the recipients with the assistance and other related issues you consider important?
12. Do you think that there are some households in the studied village which have not yet
fully recovered? If so, do you have any plan to undertake any measures to support these
households? What measures are you planning to undertake to support these households?
13. Can you please comment on the coordination between government agencies and NGOs as
well as among government agencies or among NGOs?
14. Can you please mention any significant changes, if any, in Cyclone Aila-affected
villages/areas compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period in terms of employment patterns,
migration patterns, housing structure, infrastructure and other changes that you consider
important?
15. Do you think that post-Cyclone Aila structural and non-structural measures undertaken
by the government/NGOs including your agency or NGO in various sectors such as
economic or livelihood, housing, health, education and infrastructure have contributed to
the reduction of disaster risk of the affected households and villages to future disasters?
16. Do you think that the Cyclone Aila-affected villages in general/the village under
investigation are/is more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period?
Why?
17. If you are aware of the present overall situation of the village, then how do you evaluate
the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period or the time
when you started working in the village after Cyclone Aila or came to know the village
after Cyclone Aila (for the government and NGO officials)?
18. Do you recommend any specific measures required to make households and the village
more disaster resilient?
Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep
appreciation for your time and contribution to this interview.
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Appendix 3
In-depth Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviewees from the Two Studied Villages and Surrounding Areas (key informants from the surrounding villages were asked to comment with reference to the studied village as they were aware of the situation of the studied village).
1. How did Cyclone Aila impact on this village and its households?
2. How did households in your village cope with the post- Cyclone Aila situation?
3. How do you evaluate the recovery trajectory of your village after Cyclone Aila (1.
economic recovery; 2. social recovery such as health, education and community support
services; 3. cultural recovery; 4. housing recovery [repair or construction of houses] and
recovery of infrastructure [schools, health complexes, mosques and temples, roads and
embankments]; and 5. recovery of the natural environment)?
4. What factors affected the recovery trajectory of your village after Cyclone Aila?
5. How do you evaluate the levels of economic, housing, and psychological recovery of the
households in your village?
6. Do you think that there are some households in your village which have not yet fully
recovered? Can you please provide more details about these households? In your opinion,
what are the reasons for their failure to recover following Cyclone Aila?
7. What emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance did households in your village
receive from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances for survival and economic,
housing and psychological recovery following Cyclone Aila?
8. How did aid and non-aid assistance received from relatives, neighbours, friends and
acquaintances following Cyclone Aila contribute to the survival, economic, housing and
psychological recovery process of households in your village?
9. What emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance did the government and NGOs
provide to the affected households in your village?
10. How did post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance from the
government and NGOs contribute to the survival and economic, housing and
psychological recovery process of households in your village?
304
11. How do you evaluate the post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term operations
undertaken by the government and NGOs (strengths and weaknesses)?
12. How do you evaluate the processes and outcomes of the post-Cyclone Aila housing
project implemented by the government agencies or NGOs or by both in your village?
13. Can you please comment on the coordination between government agencies and NGOs as
well as among government agencies or among NGOs?
14. Can you please compare between the government agencies and NGOs in terms of
emergency and long-term support interventions including the processes and outcomes of
the post-Cyclone Aila housing project?
15. Can you please mention any significant changes, if any, in your village compared to the
pre-Cyclone Aila situation in terms of employment patterns, migration patterns, housing
structure, infrastructure, sanitation and any other changes that you may consider
important?
16. Do you think that post-Cyclone Aila structural and non-structural measures undertaken
by the government/NGOs in various sectors (such as economic or livelihood, housing,
health, education and infrastructure) have contributed to the reduction of disaster risk of
the affected households and village to future disasters?
17. Do you think that your village is more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila
period? Why?
18. How do you evaluate the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone
Aila period?
19. Do you recommend any specific measures that will be useful for government agencies
and NGOs to undertake post-cyclone interventions effectively in the future in
Bangladesh?
20. Do you recommend any specific measures to make households in your village as well as
the village itself more disaster resilient?
Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep
appreciation for your time and contribution to this interview.
305
Appendix 4
FGD Guide for FGDs with Male and Female of the Selected Households in the Two Studied Villages.
1. How did Cyclone Aila impact on your household and village?
2. How did households of your village cope with the post-Cyclone Aila situation?
3. Can you please mention problems women in your village faced during and in the post-
Cyclone Aila period? (Only for FGDs with female participants).
4. How do you evaluate the levels of economic, housing and psychological recovery of the
households in your village after Aila?
5. How do you evaluate the recovery trajectory of your village after Aila (economic
recovery; social recovery such as health, education and community support services;
cultural recovery; recovery of the built environment such as a) repair or construction of
houses and permanent settlement of displaced people and b) infrastructure: schools,
health complexes, mosques and temples, roads and embankments; and recovery of the
natural environment)?
6. What are the factors that affected the economic, housing and psychological recovery of
households in your village?
7. What type of households in your village suffered most after Cyclone Aila? Are there
households in your village which have not yet fully recovered after Cyclone Aila? Why?
8. What aid and non-aid support did households in your village receive from relatives,
neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Cyclone Aila?
9. How did aid and non-aid support households received from relatives, neighbours, friends
and acquaintances following Cyclone Aila contribute to the survival and economic,
housing and psychological recovery process of the households in your village?
10. What aid and non-aid support did the government agencies and NGOs provide after
Cyclone Aila?
11. How did post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term support (both aid and non-aid
support) from the government and NGO sources contribute to the survival and economic,
housing and psychological recovery process of the households in your village?
12. How do you evaluate post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term operations undertaken
306
by the government agencies and NGOs (strengths and weaknesses)?
13. How do you evaluate the processes and outcomes of the post-Cyclone Aila housing
project implemented by the government agencies or NGOs or by both in your village?
14. Which one do you prefer in your village: agriculture or shrimp farming? Why?
15. Do you think that your village is now more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone
Aila period? Why?
16. How do you evaluate the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone
Aila period?
17. Do you recommend any specific measures that will be useful for government agencies
and NGOs to undertake post-cyclone interventions effectively in the future in
Bangladesh?
18. Do you recommend any specific measures to make households in your village as well as
the village itself more disaster resilient?
Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep appreciation
for your time and contribution to this interview.
307
Appendix 5
Household Survey Questionnaire Social Capital, Post-disaster Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction for Building Resilience: The Case of Cyclone Aila (2009) in Bangladesh This research attempts to examine the recovery process of affected households and communities
after Cyclone Aila (2009) in Dacope and Koyra Upazilas, Khulna District, Bangladesh. The results of the research will be useful for formulating appropriate policies and approaches to ensure effective post-disaster recovery in Bangladesh. To accomplish this research, I need to conduct a household survey in two villages: Channirchak Village of Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Koyra Upazila, Khulna District. I cordially invite you to participate in completing a household survey questionnaire. Your survey responses will be recorded on a paper questionnaire. The expected duration for the survey is an hour and a half. Your participation is completely voluntary. You can refuse to participate and refusing to participate will not affect you in anyway. You can also refuse to answer any questions during the interview and withdraw from the interview at any time. I would hereby like to express my appreciation of your attention and hope that you will be able to participate in this research. Ethics Committee Clearance: The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee (Protocol 2017/115). If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, please contact: Ethics Manager, The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee The Australian National University, Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 Email: [email protected] Yours sincerely, Sebak Kumar Saha, PhD Candidate School of Culture, History and Language, CAP The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Phone: 01791-141409 Email: [email protected]
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Section 1: 1.1: Information about Interviewer 1.1 Name of Interviewer
Date of Interview
1.2 Name of Supervisor
Date of Review
Date of Re-interview
1.2: Information about Study Area
Area
Name Remarks Code
2.1 District Khulna
2.2 Upazila
2.3 Village
2.4 Household Number
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Section 2: Household Member Schedule Serial No. (Give a tick in the serial no. to indicate the respondent)
Name Sex 1. Male 2. Female
Age Relationship to Head of Household 1. Household head 2. Husband/Wife 3. Father/Mother 4. Son/Daughter 5. Daughter-in-law/Son-in-law 6. Brother/Sister 7. Other (specify)
Marital Status (for 15 years or above) 1. Single 2. Married 3. Widow/Widower 4. Divorced 5. Other (specify)
Educational Level (for 5 years or above)
Religion 1. Hindu 2. Muslim 3. Other
Working Status (for 12 years or above)? 0. Not working 1. Working
Primary Occupation*
Secondary Occupation*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 *1. Agriculture in own land, 2. Agriculture in rented land (sharecropper), 3. Shrimp farming in own land, 4. Shrimp farming in rented land, 5. Renting out land to others for shrimp farming, 6. Day labourer, 7. Fisherman, 8. Shrimp fry collector, 9. Crab catcher, 10. Own business, 11. Motorcycle driver, 12. Government/NGO service holder, 13. Housewife, 14. Other
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Section 3: Household Information 01 How many members does your household have? No. Now At the time Aila struck 02 What is the type of your household? (1. Nuclear, 2. Extended/Joint) No. Now At the time Aila struck 03 How many earning members are in your household? No. Now At the time Aila struck 04 What was the occupation of the household head before Aila? Primary occupation (in case of more than one occupation, write number for the primary occupation): 1. Agriculture in own land 5. Renting out land to
others for shrimp farming
9. Crab catcher 13. Housewife
2. Agriculture in rented land (sharecropper)
6. Day labourer 10. Own business 14. Other
3. Shrimp farming in own land
7. Fisherman 11. Motorcycle driver
4. Shrimp farming in rented land
8. Shrimp fry collector 12. Government/NGO service holder
05 Give details about the dwelling house (in case of more than one dwelling
house, give details about the main dwelling house) Now At the time
Aila struck Base (1. Earthen, 2. Semi-pucca, 3. Pucca) Pillar (1. Bamboo, 2. Wood, 3. Concrete, 4. Pillar (building), 5. Mud, 6. Other) Fence (1. Earthen, 2. Chhitter fence [Goran semi-stem usually coated with a
mixture of mud and cow dung], 3. Straw, 4. Golpata, 5. Bamboo, 6. Bamboo and tin, 7. Tin, 8. Wood, 9. Brick wall, 10. Other)
Roof (1. Tin, 2. Asbestos, 3. Golpata, 4. roof (building), 5. Other) Number of rooms in the dwelling house 06 What type of toilet do your household members use? (1. Septic toilet, 2. Ring-slab toilet with
water seal, 3. Ring-slab toilet without water seal, 4 Pit toilet (open), 5. Open defecation, 6. Other) No.
Now Before Aila 07 What are the sources of water of your household for the following purposes? Tube
well Rainwater Pond
sand filter Pond River Other
Drinking Now Before Aila Food preparation &
cooking Now
Before Aila Bathing Now Before Aila Toileting Now Before Aila Other household works
(for example: washing Now
Before Aila
311
utensils and clothes) 08 Does the household have electricity or a solar electricity system? Now 1. Yes 2. No Before Aila 1. Yes 2. No 09 Have you or any member of your household: During the last six
months During the six months
before Aila
taken any loan to meet food expenditure? 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No borrowed food from your
relative/neighbour/friend/acquaintance? 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
sold or mortgaged any asset to meet food expenditure?
1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
reduced expenditure on other heads of the household to meet food expenditure?
1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
10 What is the overall food adequacy situation of your household? (1. More than enough, 2.
Enough, 3. Sometimes not enough, 4. Never enough) No.
Now (last six months) Before Aila (the six months before Aila) 11 How many domestic animals does your household have? Types of animals Now (number) At the time Aila struck
(number)
Died due to Aila (number)
1. Chickens/ducks 2. Goats/sheep 3. Cows 5. Other 12 Land information before and after Aila Now At the time Aila struck Yes No Amount Yes No Amount What is the total amount of homestead land (in
decimal) of the household?
What is the total amount of farming land (in bigha) of the household?
13 At present, are all your farming lands suitable for agriculture or shrimp farming?
1. Yes 2. No
14 Total monthly expenditure and income of your household Now Before Aila What is the amount of total monthly expenditure of your household
(including the economic value of the rice consumed)?
What is the amount of total monthly income of your household (including the economic value of the rice consumed)?
15 If your household had any savings prior to Aila, then how much (Tk.)? 16 In your opinion, what is the current health status of your household members?
(1. Excellent, 2. Very good, 3. Good, 4. Fair, 5. Poor) No.
17 Have you or any member of your household suffered a major illness after Aila
(major illness means the spending of 10,000 taka or more for that illness)? 1. Yes 2. No
18 If yes, how much was spent on treating the illness?
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19 How many members of your household are studying in the city? No. Now Before Aila 20 Are you or is anyone in your household a member of any groups, organisations, or associations?
(multiple responses possible) 1. Farmers’
group/cooperative 3. Trade or business association
5. Political party 7. Other (specify)
2. Fishermen’s group/cooperative
4. Any village committee 6. NGO or CBO
21 In your opinion, what is your household’s present socioeconomic condition? No. (1. Ultra-poor, 2. Poor, 3. Lower middle class, 4. Upper middle class, 5. Rich) Section 4: Impacts and Coping Strategies 4.1: Impacts 01 What were the impacts to your household because of Aila? (Multiple responses possible) 1. No income/reduced income 14. Scarcity of drinking water 2. Damage of shrimp farms 15. Problem relating to cooking 3. Damage or loss of business 16. Problem relating to the bathroom 4. Loss of work or employment opportunities 17. Cash money lost in the flood 5. Damage of house 18. Ornaments lost in the flood 6. Displacement from the homestead 19. Important documents lost in the flood 7. Damage of household materials (furniture, utensils)
/household materials washed away in the water 20. Farming land was submerged
8. Loss of livestock 21. Farming land lost to river or canal 9. Loss of poultry (chicken and duck) 22. Homestead land lost to river or canal 10. Food shortage (first two weeks) 23. Health problem 11. Food shortage (after two weeks to the end of first
month) 24. Physical injury
12. Food shortage (after first month) 25. Other 13. Damage or loss of stored paddy or rice or stored
paddy or rice washed away
02 If your house was damaged by Aila, then how badly was it damaged? 1. Completely 2. Partial but major damage 3. Partial but minor damage 03 Was any member of your household injured by Aila? 1. Yes 2. No 04 Did the injury cause any loss to the household income? 1. Temporary loss 2. Permanent loss 3. No loss 05 In your opinion, how affected was your household by Aila? (1. Extremely, 2. Very, 3.
Moderately, 4. Slightly, 5. Not at all) No.
06 In your opinion, how disrupted was your household due to Aila? (1. Extremely, 2.
Very, 3. Moderately, 4. Slightly, 5. Not at all) No.
07 Where did your household members stay on the night Aila struck? 1. Homestead 3. Cyclone
shelter 5. Union Parishad building
7. Relative’s house (outside the village but within the union)
9. Boat
2. Embankment 4. School 6. Relative’s house (within the village)
8. Neighbour’s house 10. Other (specify)
08 Was the whole of your household absent in the village on the day of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No
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09 Was any member of your household absent in the village on the day of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No 10 If members of your household who were present in the home on the day of Aila moved to other
places on the day of Aila, when did they leave the homestead? 1. After both homestead and house were inundated 2. After only the homestead was inundated 3. Before the homestead was inundated 4. Some members before the homestead was inundated and some members after both homestead and house
were inundated 5. Some members before the homestead was inundated and some members after only the homestead was
inundated 11 Did your household have to move outside of the homestead on the day of Aila
or in the days or any time following Aila due to Aila? 1. Yes 2. No
12 If yes, then when did your household return to the current homestead for living? 1. Before the embankment was
repaired 2. After the embankment was repaired
3. Still living in another place
13 If your household returned to the current homestead before the embankment was repaired, then when?
1. Next day 4. Within two weeks 7. Within six months 2. Within three days 5. Within a month 8. Within a year 3. Within one week 6. Within three months 9. Later
14 If your household became displaced due to Aila, in which place(s) did your household stay during the period of displacement? (include all places the household stayed since the day of Aila)
If stayed only in one place If stayed in more than one place (multiple responses possible)
First place=1, Second place=2, Third place = 3 and so on
Place where your household stayed most of the time? (Tick here)
Time for places where the household stayed for a short period of time
1. Embankment 1. Embankment 2. Cyclone shelter 2. Cyclone shelter 3. School building 3. School building 4. Union Parishad
building 4. Union Parishad building
5. Relative’s house (within village)
5. Relative’s house (within village)
6. Neighbour’s house 6. Relative’s house (outside the village but within the union)
7. Other (specify) 7. Relative’s house (outside the union but affected)
8 Relative’s house (outside the union and unaffected)
9. Neighbour’s house
10. Other (specify)
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4.2: Coping Strategies 01 What coping strategies did your household employ to cope with the post-Aila situation (multiple
responses possible) 1. Reducing the number of meals per day 15. Migration to other places for work 2. Reducing the amount of food intake per meal 16. Borrowing money from relatives 3. Relying on inexpensive foods 17. Borrowing money from neighbours, friends and
acquaintances 4. Consuming rice stored before Aila 18. Taking loan(s) from relatives with interest 5. Using savings 19. Taking loan(s) from neighbours, friends and
acquaintances with interest 6. Receipt of food, vegetables, clothes, and water
from relatives 20. Taking loan(s) from NGOs/CBOs/microcredit organisations/cooperatives
7. Monetary aid from relatives 21. Taking loan(s) from government owned banks or sources
8. Receipt of food, vegetables, clothes, and water from neighbours, friends and acquaintances
22. Arranging cooking with other families for several days
9. Monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances
23. Selling of livestock such as cows and goats
10. Relying on emergency aid and long-term aid from the government and NGOs
24. Selling of farming land
11. Catching fish for household consumption 25. Mortgaging of farming land 12. Catching fish for selling in the market 26. Selling of homestead land or part of it 13. Participation in cash or food or cash and food for
work program 27. Collecting drinking water from distant places
14. Participation in cash for training program 28. Other 02 Has your household lost any homestead/farming land due to Aila? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, please give details: Land type Tick here Quantity Homestead land (decimal) Farming land (bigha) 03 Because of Aila, did your household sell any land or other assets? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, please give details: Land or other assets Tick here Unit/Quantity Homestead land Farming land Cow Goat/sheep Other (specify) 04 Did your household have any outstanding loans at the time of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, give details: Total amount outstanding (up to the day of Aila) = Amount outstanding of that loan now =
315
05 As a consequence of the cyclone, did your household take any loans? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, give details Serial
Number Before the embankment was repaired After the embankment was repaired
Purpose* Source Amount taken
Amount outstanding today
Purpose* Source Amount taken
Amount outstanding today
1 2 3 *1. Only for surviving after Aila, such as for meeting expenditures of the household, 2. Starting a
business/agriculture/shrimp farming/income generating activity, 3. House repair or construction, 4. Education cost of the children, 5. Healthcare cost, 6. Other
06 Did or does any member of your household migrate to other places for work? 1 Yes 2. No After Aila Before Aila If yes, give details: Time How
many members? (number)
Who? (multiple responses possible) 1. Household head 2. Other
Where? 1.Within Bangladesh 2.India 3.Both within Bangladesh and India 4. Other
How many times in a year? (number)
How much time of the year in total? (month)
After Aila
Before the embankment was repaired
After the embankment was repaired
Before Aila 07 Did your household migrate as a unit (with all members) to another place for a
period following Aila? 1. Yes 2. No
If yes, please give details: When Where? (multiple responses possible)
1. Within upazila 2. Outside upazila but within district 3. Outside district but within Bangladesh 4. India
How many places? (number)?
How much time did your household stay (month/year)?
Before the embankment was repaired
After the embankment was repaired
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Section 5: Section 5.1: Aid or support from relatives, neighbours, friends, and acquaintances 01 Most of your close relatives live: 1. Within the village 3. Outside your union but within
your upazila 5. Outside your district but within Bangladesh
2. Outside the village but within your union
4. Outside your upazila but within your district
6.Other
02 Are any of your neighbours also your relatives? 1. Yes 2. No 03 Are most of your neighbours your relatives? 1. Yes 2. No 04 Did your household borrow food and other necessary household items from
relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation?
1. Yes 2. No
05 Did your household borrow money from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation?
1. Yes 2. No
06 Did your household lend food and other necessary household items to the Aila affected relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances to help them to cope with the post-Aila situation?
1. Yes 2. No
07 Did your household lend money to any Aila-affected relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances to help them cope with the post-Aila situation?
1. Yes 2. No
08 From whom did your household first receive emergency aid? 1. Relative (affected) 4. Friend 7. NGO 2. Relative (unaffected) 5. Acquaintance 8. Stranger 3. Neighbour 6. Government 9. Other
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09 Did your household receive any aid/support from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances? 1.Yes 2. No If yes, what kind of aid/support did your household receive from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances? Relatives Neighbours Friends and acquaintances Within
village Out of village but affected Out of
union but unaffected
Within village
Out of village but affected Out of union but unaffected
Within union Out of union Within union Out of union Food Water Clothes Utensils and other necessary household
items
Shelter support at the time of Aila Shelter support for at least a week or more Provided caring for livestock in their house Informational support such as information
about aid sources and work or employment opportunities
Assistance to get work Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila Monetary aid for economic recovery such as
for starting economic activities
Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house
Housing materials for repairing or constructing house
Free labour for repairing or constructing house
Providing psychological support Other (specify)
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10 Did anyone help your household or lobby for your household to be enlisted in
NGO and government support (aid and not-aid) programs available in your village? (multiple responses possible)
1. Yes 2. No
If yes, then who? 1. Elected members of Union
Parishad 3. Relatives 5. Friends and acquaintances
2. Village leaders (unelected) 4. Neighbours 6. Other 11 If your household received monetary aid from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances
following Aila, then how much in total did your household receive? From whom? How much in total 1. Relatives 2. Neighbours 3. Friends 4. Acquaintances
17 Generally, how did you get the aid from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances?
1. They offered spontaneously 2. You asked for aid 3. Both 18 If your household had not received monetary aid or in your opinion, had received a small amount
of monetary aid from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances, then what were the reasons?
Affected relatives (multiple responses possible)
1. Affected 2. Poor 3. Other
Unaffected relatives (outside the village and union) (multiple responses possible)
1. No relatives outside the Aila affected areas 2. Poor 3. Had capacity to help but did not 4. Other
Neighbours (multiple responses possible) 1. Affected 2. Poor 3. Other Affected friends and acquaintances
(multiple responses possible) 1. Affected 2. Poor 3. Other
Unaffected friends and acquaintances (multiple responses possible)
1. No friends and acquaintances outside the Aila-affected areas 2. Poor, 3. Had capacity to help but did not 4. Other
Please rank the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances for the following questions between 1 and 5 [Extremely important=5, Very important=4, Moderately important=3, Slightly important=2, Not at all important=1]
12 If your household received any emergency aid (food and water or either) from the following people, how would you assess the importance of emergency aid in the survival of your household?
Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1
13 If your household received any aid/support from the following people, how would you assess the importance of aid/support in the economic recovery process of your household?
Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1
14 If your household received any aid/support from the following people, how would you assess the importance of aid/support in the housing recovery process of your household?
Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1
15 If your household received any aid/support from the following people, how would you assess the importance of aid/support in the psychological recovery process of your household members?
Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1
16 If your household received any psychological support from the following people, how would you assess the importance of the psychological support in the psychological recovery process of your household members?
Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1
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19 Did your household give any aid/support to relatives, neighbours, friends
and acquaintances who were affected by Aila? 1. Yes 2. No
If yes, what kind of aid/support did your household give to relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances who were affected by Aila?
Relatives within the village
Relatives outside the village but Aila-affected
Neighbours Friends and acquaintances within the village
Friends and acquaintances outside the village but Aila-affected
Within union
Out of union
Within union
Out of union
Food Water Clothes Shelter support at the
time of Aila
Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities
Assistance to get work Monetary aid only for
surviving after Aila
Free labour for repairing or constructing house
Providing psychological support
Other (specify) 20 If your household needed the following after Aila, whom did you prefer to ask first?
(1. Relatives within the village, 2. Neighbours, 3. Friends and acquaintances within the village 4. Other)
No.
Borrowing food such as rice for one or two days Borrowing small amount of money (say up to 500 Taka) Free labour assistance 21 How often does your household borrow things from or lend things to relatives within the village,
neighbours, and friends and acquaintances within the village? Borrow Lend 1. At least
once a week 3. At least once in a month
5. At least once in six months
1. At least once a week
3. At least once in a month
5. At least once in six months
2. At least once in two weeks
4. At least once in three months
6. Never 2. At least once in two weeks
4. At least once in three months
6. Never
22 If your household faces any crisis and needs aid, who are the three people (other than members of
your household) from whom you can receive the following aid? Who? (multiple responses
possible) His or her economic condition (1. Ultra-poor, 2. Poor, 3. Lower middle class, 4. Upper middle class, 5. Rich, 6. Do not know)
Whom you would ask first (If multiple responses)?
Your household needs 1. Relative 1.Relative
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money to meet the household expenditure for at least one month
2. Neighbour 2.Neighbour 3. Friend 3. Friend 4. Acquaintance 4. Acquaintance 5. Other 5. Other 6. Nobody Section 5.2: Government and NGOs 01 The number of Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) aid sources? 1. 3 or fewer 2. 4 to 6 3. More 02 What kind of aid did your household get from Government and NGOs? Government (give tick mark) NGO (give tick mark) Emergency food aid Emergency food aid Emergency water supply Emergency water supply Clothes Clothes
Utensils and other necessary household items
Utensils and other necessary household items
Medical assistance Medical assistance Support for water storage such as
tank, motka and big container for storing water
Support for water storage such as tank, motka and big container for storing water
Gratuitous relief (GR) rice or money
Long-term food aid (received several times from the same NGO)
Rice under VGF Net and boat House Cash for income generating activities Small amount of money for house
repair/construction Poultry/livestock for income generating
activities
20,000/- Taka for house repair/construction
Goods for business
Tin for house House Agricultural support (such as seeds
and fertilisers) Plinth raising
Other (specify) Homestead raising Agricultural support (such as seeds and
fertilisers)
Other (specify) 03 Did you or any member of your household participate in any of the following programs operated
by the government or NGO after Aila? Government NGO
1.Yes 2. No
How many times
1.Yes 2.No
How many times
Name of NGOs that operated the programs
Food or cash for work Cash for work Employment generation
program for the poorest (40 days employment program)
Food for work
Cash and food for work
VGD support Cash for training Other (specify) Other (specify) Participation in cash or
food for work program under contractors for constructing or repairing embankments
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Please rank, from 5 to 1, the importance of aid received from the government or NGO(s) for the
questions 4–10 and the importance of employment and training programs from the government or NGO(s) or contractor(s) for the questions 11–13. [Extremely important=5, Very important=4, Moderately important=3, Slightly important=2, Not at all important=1]
04 If your household received any emergency aid (food and water or either) from the government or NGO(s) after Aila, how would you assess the importance of emergency aid in the survival of your household?
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1
05 If your household received any aid from the government or NGO(s) after Aila, how would you assess the importance of aid in the economic recovery process of your household?
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1
06 If your household received any aid from the government or NGO(s) after Aila, how would you assess the importance of aid in the housing recovery process of your household?
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1
07 If your household received any aid from the government or NGO(s) after Aila, how would you assess the importance of aid in the psychological recovery process of your household members?
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1
08 If your household received a house from the government or any NGO(s), how would you assess the importance of this aid in the housing recovery process of your household?
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1
09 If your household received 20,000 Taka from the government, how would you assess the importance of this aid in the housing recovery process of your household?
Gov 5 4 3 2 1
10 If your household received rice under VGF support from the government, how would you assess the importance of VGF rice in meeting the daily food necessity of your household?
Gov 5 4 3 2 1
11 If any member of your household participated in cash/food/cash-and-food for work and cash-for-training or any of them, how would you assess the importance of participation in the economic recovery process of your household? (cash-for-work or food-for-work for the government and contractor)
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1 Contractor 5 4 3 2 1
12 If any member of your household participated in cash/food/cash-and-food for work and cash-for-training or any of them, how would you assess the importance of participation in the housing recovery process of your household? (cash-for-work or food-for-work for the government and contractor)
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1 Contractor 5 4 3 2 1
13 If any member of your household participated in cash/food/cash-and-food for work and cash-for-training or any of them, how would you assess the importance of participation in the psychological recovery process of your household members? (cash-for-work or food-for-work for the government and contractor)
Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO 5 4 3 2 1 Contractor 5 4 3 2 1
14 If your household received 20,000 Taka from the government for house repair or
construction, did your household spend the money for house repair or construction?
1. Yes 2. No
15 In your opinion, was 20,000 Taka sufficient for house repair or construction? 1. Yes 2. No 16 Was the distribution of 20,000 Taka in two instalments a problem for house repair
or construction? 1. Yes 2. No
17 Was it possible for your household to receive 20,000 Taka as aid from relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation?
1. Yes 2. No
18 Was it possible for your household to borrow (without interest) 20,000 Taka or to receive 20,000 Taka as a loan (with interest) from relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation?
Borrow 1. Yes 2. No
Loan 1. Yes 2. No
19 At present, do you think that your household has any relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances who are capable of providing 20,000 Taka to your household as aid?
1. Yes 2. No
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20 At present, do you think that your household has any relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances who are capable of lending (without interest) 20,000 Taka or providing 20,000 Taka as a loan (with interest) to your household?
Lend 1. Yes 2. No
Loan 1. Yes 2. No
Section 6: Recovery 6.1: Economic Recovery 01 How do you evaluate the present economic condition of your household compared to the pre-Aila
economic condition? a. Much better b. Somewhat
better c. About the same
d. Somewhat worse
Much worse
02 How do you evaluate the present quality of life of your household members compared to the pre-Aila quality of life of your household members (consider standard of living, health, safety and security, achievement in life, personal relationships and connectedness to the villagers)?
a. Much better b. Somewhat better
c. About the same d. Somewhat worse
e. Much worse
03 How much economic hardship did your household experience because of Aila? a. Extreme
hardship b. Major hardship
c. Moderate hardship
d. Minor hardship e. No hardship at all
04 How was the quality of your household’s meals in the previous six months compared to the quality of your household’s meals in the six months before Aila?
a. Better b. About the same c. Worse 05 How much time did the earning member/members of the household require to
participate in income generating activities since Aila? (except participation in cash/food/cash-and-food for work programs operated by the government and NGOs)
06 Has any adult female member of your household who never worked before Aila to earn money started working at any time after Aila to earn money?
1. Yes 2. No
6.2: Housing Recovery 01 How do you evaluate the condition of your present house compared to your pre-Aila house? a. Much better b. Somewhat
better c. About the same d. Somewhat
worse e. Much worse
02 How disaster resilient is your present house compared to your pre-Aila house? a. Much more
resilient b. Little more resilient
c. About the same d. Little less resilient
e. Much less resilient
03 Is your present house in the same place as it was before Aila? 1. Yes 2. No If no, in which place is the present house? 1. Another place but within the previous homestead 3. New homestead on land owned by others 2. New homestead on previously owned land 4. Other 04 The height of the floor level of your present house Higher than the house at the time Aila struck? 1. Yes 2. No Above the highest flood level observed on the day of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No Above the flood level observed during regular tidal flow following Aila (before
the embankment was repaired)? 1. Yes 2. No
6.3: Psychological Recovery 01 How do you evaluate the psychological recovery of you and members of your household following
Aila? a. No recovery at all, b. Minor recovery, c. Moderate recovery, d. Major recovery, e. Complete recovery
02 How much happier is your life and the lives of members of your household now compared to the pre-Aila period? a. Much happier, b. Somewhat happier, c. About the same, d. Somewhat unhappier, e. Much unhappier
03 Did you see anyone die in the water during Aila or any dead body during the 1. Yes 2. No
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day of Aila or in the days following Aila? 04 Statements about Psychological Recovery Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following
statements. [Strongly agree=5, Agree=4, Undecided=3, Disagree=2, Strongly disagree=1]
Level of agreement
Cyclone Aila was very traumatic for me and my household members. 5 4 3 2 1 Members of my household relied heavily on religious beliefs to overcome the
crisis caused by Cyclone Aila. 5 4 3 2 1
My household members often recall unpleasant memories, worries, bad dreams, or bad experiences from Cyclone Aila.
5 4 3 2 1
When we get a cyclone warning signal or see bad weather or a lot of rain during a cyclone warning signal, we fear for our lives and safety.
5 4 3 2 1
When I get a cyclone warning signal or see bad weather or a lot of rain during a cyclone warning signal, my memories of Cyclone Aila are revived.
5 4 3 2 1
I avoid thinking about the damage caused by Cyclone Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 I feel very sad when I recall the memories of Cyclone Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 I have bad dreams about Cyclone Aila from time to time. 5 4 3 2 1 I cannot sleep when I remember Cyclone Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 As time passes, I have bad dreams about Cyclone Aila less frequently. 5 4 3 2 1 As time passes, I remember Cyclone Aila less frequently. 5 4 3 2 1 I believe Cyclone Aila is Allah’s/God’s will. 5 4 3 2 1 I believe Cyclone Aila is Allah’s/God’s wrath or the consequences of human sin. 5 4 3 2 1 I believed that I was able to deal with the post-Cyclone Aila situation. 5 4 3 2 1 Section 7: Government or NGO House (Only for respondents who received a house) 01 If your household has received a house from an NGO, then what is the name of the NGO?
…………………………………________________ 02 If your household has received a house from Islamic Relief
Bangladesh, then what type of house did your household receive? 1 Dochala 2 Chouchala
03 Would you have been able to build the same quality house with your own capacity if you had not received the house from either the government or NGO?
1. Yes 2. No
04 Please indicate your satisfaction in relation to the following aspects of the house (please tick)
Satisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Number of room/s Quality of fences/walls Number of doors Number of windows Placement of windows Movement of air through the house Quality of materials Quality of construction Flexibility in the design of the house so that new
structures can be added
Disaster risk reduction steps that have been taken 05 To what degree were you or members of your household consulted during the provision of the house? 1. Completely 2. Considerably 3. Moderately 4. Slightly 5. Not at all 06 If you or anyone from your household asked for any
modification of the house, was it considered? 1. Yes 2. No 3. Did not request
for modification 07 Is the size of the received house sufficient for the number of
people in your household? 1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know
08 Is the house adequate for maintaining the privacy of the members of your household?
1.Yes 2. No 3. Do not know
09 How comfortable is the house for living? (5. Extremely comfortable, 4. Very comfortable, 3. Moderately comfortable, 2. Slightly comfortable, 1. Not comfortable at all)
5 4 3 2 1
10 How comfortable is this house compared to your house at the time Aila struck? (5. Much more comfortable, 4. More comfortable, 3. About the same,
5 4 3 2 1
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2. Less comfortable, 1. Much less comfortable) 11 How suitable is the house you received for your overall health condition? (5.
Extremely suitable, 4. Very suitable, 3. Moderately suitable, 2. Slightly suitable, 1. Not suitable at all)
5 4 3 2 1
12 How suitable is the house for long-term use? (5. Extremely suitable, 4. Very suitable, 3. Moderately suitable, 2. Slightly suitable, 1. Not suitable at all)
5 4 3 2 1
13 Overall, how satisfied are you with the house you have received from government or NGO? (5. Very satisfied, 4. Satisfied, 3. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 2. Dissatisfied, 1. Very dissatisfied)
5 4 3 2 1
14 Do you think that the house you received can withstand a severe cyclone?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know
15 Did you make any modifications to the house you received from government or NGO?
1. Yes 2. No
If yes, give details: Modification 1. Yes 2. No Was the feature present in your house at
the time Aila struck) (1. Yes 2. No)
Veranda constructed Extra room is constructed in the veranda Additional room is constructed NA Providing bars to the windows Windows repositioned NA Additional windows constructed NA Other (specify) 16 Did you undertake any repair work on the house due to poor quality of
construction? 1. Yes 2. No
17 If you had a choice to take a cash payment of equivalent value instead of a physical house, would you have preferred to take the cash instead of the house?
1. Yes 2. No
18 Do you know the economic value of the house you received? 1. Yes 2. No 19 If you had received the equivalent money for the house provided, would you have been able to a. construct a better-quality house c. construct a lower quality house b. construct the same quality house d. do not know Section 8: Disaster Resilience Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements
[Strongly agree=5, Agree=4, Undecided=3, Disagree=4, Strongly disagree=1] Level of agreement
01 My household has greater awareness and knowledge of disaster risk reduction compared to the pre-Aila period
5 4 3 2 1
02 My household’s disaster preparedness for the next cyclone is better than it was in the pre-Aila period
5 4 3 2 1
03 My household has diversified income sources through various livelihood strategies 5 4 3 2 1 04 My household has diversified income sources through non-agricultural livelihood
strategies 5 4 3 2 1
05 My household has the knowledge and skills to take the necessary disaster risk reduction measures to deal with a cyclone with greater efficiency
5 4 3 2 1
06 My household has the resources to take the necessary disaster risk reduction measures to deal with a cyclone with greater efficiency
5 4 3 2 1
07 My household has the knowledge and skills to employ climate change adaptation strategies
5 4 3 2 1
08 My household has the resources to employ climate change adaptation strategies 5 4 3 2 1 09 My household is now more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Aila period 5 4 3 2 1 10 My household now has a better understanding of cyclone warning signals compared to
the pre-Aila period 5 4 3 2 1
11 The Union Parishad has the required capacity to deal with disasters 5 4 3 2 1 12 Construction of coastal embankments under CEIP will enhance the resilience of the
villagers to cyclone hazards 5 4 3 2 1
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13 Government investment for disaster risk reduction is sufficient for enhancing resilience to cyclone hazards
5 4 3 2 1
14 Participation in training sessions arranged by NGOs has increased awareness and knowledge of my household members on disaster risk reduction
5 4 3 2 1
15 Participation in training sessions arranged by NGOs has increased awareness and knowledge of my household members on climate change and climate change adaptation strategies
5 4 3 2 1
16 Training provided by NGOs on income generating activities (IGA) has contributed to the diversification of income sources
5 4 3 2 1
Section 9: Cyclone Warnings and Taking Refuge 01 Did you receive cyclone warnings prior to the landfall of Sidr, Aila and Mora? Sidr 1. Yes 2. No Aila 1. Yes 2. No Mora 1. Yes 2. No 02 What were the sources of cyclone early warnings for Aila and Mora? (multiple responses
possible) Aila Mora 1. Radio 1. Radio 2. Television 2. Television 3. Newspaper 3. Newspaper 4. CPP volunteers 4. CPP volunteers 5. Local government (Union Parishad) 5. Local government (Union Parishad) 6. NGOs/NGO volunteers 6. NGOs/NGO volunteers 7. Mosque/temple 7. Mosque/temple 8. Village leaders (unelected) 8. Village leaders (unelected) 9. Relatives, neighbours, friends and
acquaintances 9. Relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances
10.Other source 10.Other source 03 Did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere other than
your own house during Sidr? 1. Yes 2. No
04 Did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere other than your own house during Aila?
1. Yes 2. No
05 Did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere other than your own house during any cyclone after Aila?
1. Yes 2. No
06 If yes, did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere other than your own house during Cyclone Mora?
1. Yes 2. No
If yes, then give details: Taking refuge at safe place
If some members took refuge at a safe place, then who took refuge? (multiple responses possible)
Where? (multiple responses possible)
1. All members 2. Some members
1. Women, 2. Children, 3. Old-aged people, 4. Men
1. Cyclone shelter, 2. School building, 3. Union Parishad building, 4. Relatives’ house, 5. Neighbours’ house, 6. Embankment, 7. Other place
07 What precautionary measures did your household take during Cyclone Mora? (multiple responses possible)
1. No measures were taken 7. Household goods were packed 2. All household members took shelter in safe
place(s) 8. Household goods were moved to another place
3. Some household members took shelter in safe place(s)
9. Villagers were consulted
4. Livestock was moved to safer places 10. Prayed to Allah/God 5. Money, ornaments and necessary documents 11. Other
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were packed 6. Money, ornaments and necessary documents
were moved to another place
08 If any member of your household did not take refuge in any place other than your own house during Cyclone Mora, what were the reasons for not taking refuge? (multiple responses possible)
1. There was no cyclone shelter 11. There was no place for keeping livestock in the cyclone shelter
2. Distance to the nearest cyclone shelter was too far
12. Living in a pucca house
3. Road network to go to the cyclone shelter was poor
13. Considered own house as a safe place
4. There were too many people in the cyclone shelter
14. Cyclone shelter was filled mainly with males
5. Lack of drinking water, light and toilet facilities in the cyclone shelter
15. Male members were not at home
6. Did not believe the warnings 16. Lack of separate space and toilet for women in the cyclone shelter
7. Took refuge in the cyclone shelter or other place after receiving warnings on previous cyclone/s but nothing happened at that time/those times
17. Thought that cyclone would not occur here
8. Received warnings on previous occasions but nothing happened
18. Cyclone is Allah's/God's will; so, He will save us
9. Weather was good despite warnings 19. Other 10. Fear of burglary 09 If members of your household took refuge in any place other than a cyclone shelter during
Cyclone Mora, what were the reasons for not taking refuge in a cyclone shelter? (multiple responses possible)
1. There was no cyclone shelter 6. Cyclone shelter was filled mainly with males 2. The distance to the nearest cyclone shelter was
too far 7. Lack of separate space and toilet for women in the cyclone shelter
3. Road network to go to the cyclone shelter was poor
8. Prefer taking shelter on the embankment
4. There were too many people in the cyclone shelter
9. Other
5. Lack of drinking water, light and toilet facilities in the cyclone shelter
Section 10: Village 01 What is your village’s overall situation at present compared to the pre-Aila period? Improved Stayed the
same Worsened Do not
know Economic condition of the households in the
village
The quality of housing The quality of health care Sanitation and hygiene related practices Educational opportunities Quality of religious and cultural festivals Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements
[Strongly agree=5, Agree=4, Undecided=3, Disagree=2, Strongly disagree=1] Level of agreement
02 Most people in the village will help you if you need it. 5 4 3 2 1 03 The people of this village usually trust one another. 5 4 3 2 1 04 The level of trust among the people of this village has decreased compared to the
pre-Aila period. 5 4 3 2 1
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05 The people of this village think only about the welfare of their household, not the welfare of the village.
5 4 3 2 1
06 Elected leaders give priority to the welfare of the village over their own family, relatives and close ones.
5 4 3 2 1
07 Village leaders (unelected leaders) give priority to the welfare of the village over their own family, relatives and close ones.
5 4 3 2 1
08 There is strong unity among villagers. 5 4 3 2 1 09 Unity among villagers has declined compared to the Pre-Aila period. 5 4 3 2 1 10 If there is a problem with the embankment in the village, the villagers will try to
solve the problem through mutual cooperation. 5 4 3 2 1
11 The local government (Union Parishad) is committed to consulting with villagers. 5 4 3 2 1 12 NGOs (that have worked or are currently working in this village) are committed to
consulting with villagers. 5 4 3 2 1
13 The people of the village have become more dependent on aid since Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 14 Shrimp farming in saline water is/was not good for the village. 5 4 3 2 1 15 The decision to stop shrimp farming in saline water was/will be a positive
decision. 5 4 3 2 1
Please answer the following questions (16-18) by choosing an option between 1 and 5. 16 How much do you trust the following people? [To a very great extent=5, To a great extent=4,
Neither great nor small extent=3, To a small extent=2, To a very small extent=1] Elected representatives of local government (Union Parishad) 5 4 3 2 1 Village leaders (unelected) 5 4 3 2 1 NGO staff 5 4 3 2 1 Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 Friends and acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1 17 In your opinion, how honest are the following people? [Very honest=5, Honest=4, Neither honest nor
dishonest=3, Dishonest=2, Very dishonest=1] Elected representatives of local government (Union Parishad) 5 4 3 2 1 Village leaders (unelected) 5 4 3 2 1 NGO staff 5 4 3 2 1 18 To what extent do the following differences divide people in your village? [To a very great extent=5,
To a great extent=4, Neither great nor small extent=3, To a small extent=2, To a very small extent=1]
Difference in wealth 5 4 3 2 1 Difference in land ownership 5 4 3 2 1 Difference in political ideology 5 4 3 2 1 Difference between supporters and opponents of shrimp farming 5 4 3 2 1 Difference in religious beliefs 5 4 3 2 1 19 Does any of the above differences cause problems? 1. Yes 2. No Which two differences most often cause problems?
(1. Difference in wealth, 2. Difference in land ownership, 3. Difference in political ideology, 4. Difference between supporters and opponents of shrimp farming, 5. Difference in religious beliefs)
Rank Responses First: Second:
Do such problems ever lead to violence? First 1.Yes 2. No Second 1. Yes 2. No 20 What are your three main sources of
information about what the government, local government (Union Parishad) and NGOs are doing in your village and union?
Tick here (multiple responses possible) 1. Relatives 6. Village leaders
(unelected) 2. Neighbours 7. Government
employees 3. Friends and
acquaintances 8. NGO staff
4. Radio 9. Other 5. Elected leaders of
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Union Parishad 21 What are the two main problems in your village that you think must be solved? 1. 2. 22 In your opinion, what additional measures should be undertaken by the government to reduce the
negative impacts of cyclones in the future? (multiple responses possible) 1. Proper maintenance of the coastal
embankment 4. Raising the height of roads within the village
2. Construction of more cyclone shelters 5. Stopping the unplanned breaching of embankments for water needed for shrimp farming
3. Plantation of trees 6. Other 23 What is your expectation for the future? 1. Better 2. About the same 3. Worse
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Appendix 6
Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents (n=250) Sex n (%) Male 160 (64.0) Female 90 (36.0) Age (years) n (%) 20-30 48 (19.2) 31-40 73 (29.2) 41-50 65 (26.0) 51-60 44 (17.6) 61-70 20 (8.0) Marital status n (%) Single 8 (3.2) Married 228 (91.2) Widow/widower 11 (4.4) Divorced 3 (1.2) Years of schooling n (%) 0 56 (22.4) 1-5 98 (39.2) 6-10 87 (34.8) 10+ 9 (3.6) Religion n (%) Hindu 99 (39.6) Muslim 151 (60.4) Primary occupation n (%) Agriculture in own land 48 (19.2) Agriculture in rented land (sharecropper) 6 (2.4) Shrimp farming in own land 18 (7.2) Shrimp farming in rented land 10 (4.0) Renting out land to others for shrimp farming 2 (0.8) Day labourer 45 (18.0) Fisherman 2 (0.8) Shrimp fry collector 13 (5.2) Crab catcher 1 (0.4) Own business 17 (6.8) Motorcycle driver 2 (0.8) Government/NGO service holder 2 (0.8) Housewife 76 (30.4) Other 8 (3.2) Respondents’ household monthly income now in Taka Mean income 8990 Median income 7500 Standard deviation 5481 Respondents’ household monthly expenditure now in Taka Mean expenditure 7976 Median expenditure 7000 Standard deviation 4735 Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)
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