New York University Center for Global Affairs
Armenian and Azerbaijani Youth Perspectives on Peaceand Reconciliation
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS
Concentration: PeacebuildingThesis Advisor: Thomas Hill
BYInna BabakulievaNew York, NYSpring, 2014
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Table of Contents
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………03
Chapter I: Research Methodology and Study Design …………………………………………06
Chapter II: Current State of Peace Process ……………………………………………………19
Chapter III: Youth as Agents of Change ………………………………………………………31
Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation ……..36
Chapter V: Key Findings ……………………………………………………………………….52
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….………………..69
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………….………………73
Appendix …………...…………………………………………………………….……………...87
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IntroductionA) Purpose and Rationale for the Study
The case of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth in the Nagorno-
Karabakh peace process is explored in this study with particular
attention to the concepts of exclusive historic representations,
collective memory, identity development and its impact on youth
roles and actions. The main objective of this study is to examine
the largely neglected psychological dimension to the conflict and
determine its impact on attitudes, beliefs and interests of young
adults in both nations. Theories of identity development,
reconciliation and conflict transformation form the conceptual
framework to guide this study. These theories were chosen for
their usefulness in examining how an appeal to the past,
historical narratives and collective memory may construct values
and beliefs in younger generations. These values and beliefs
inform a decision-making processes and determine attitudes
towards reconciliation and peace.
The mediation efforts of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group to bring adversaries to
an agreement on the framework for the negotiation of a
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comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict played a crucial role in solidifying and
institutionalizing a conflict resolution platform. It also has
been useful in reinforcing the priority of elites and their
influence over everything and everyone. A bilateral two decades-
long stalemate has resulted in the expansion of the conflict and
opened up space for the development of a living room war,
bringing the war to everyone’s house through state-controlled
media and government-censored reporting. Such government-
sponsored information campaigns have helped to shape the public’s
perception of what this conflict is about and the reasons behind
the stalemate,while deliberately dehumanizing the adversary.
The Minsk Group’s secrecy around its mediation efforts and a
lack of public diplomacy efforts by the co-chairs has resulted in
a lack of public awareness about the status of the negotiation
process. The population on both sides has had to rely on official
government statements to make sense of the deadlocked
negotiations. The undertone of these negotiations is that the
respective governments represent the interests and will of the
people and negotiate on their behalf. Such an attitude makes it
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impossible for low-status, or marginalized groups, such as youth,
to believe in and seize back their place in the process. The
people are not prepared to play a part in conflict resolution or
transformation activities. Furthermore, as the Minsk Group
celebrated the 20th year of deadlocked negotiations with few
results to display, both Armenia and Azerbaijan grow more
suspicious of the Minsk Group’s intentions and interests.
Prolonged political negotiations and excessive use of
derogatory remarks by the Armenian and Azerbaijani political
actors contribute to the obstacles faced by Track II diplomacy
efforts. Civil society organizations (CSOs) linked to foreign
agencies grow unpopular within the larger population. The NGO
community, developing and implementing reconciliation and
conflict transformation programs, is often subjected to
harassment by government authorities, especially as they diverge
from the hard-line political stance regarding the reconciliation
process between the two states. Draconian NGO legislation in both
states further hinders the space for implementation of programs
on empowerment and capacity building of youth, women and minority
groups.
6
Thus, two decades since the deadlocked negotiations began, a
new generation is coming of age with no direct experience of
living alongside the other. Two groups have limited people-to-
people interactions, in conjunction with endless hate speech and
derogatory public statements, leading to mutual isolation. This
isolation results in a mentality that dehumanizes and distrusts
the other side. Such a context makes it challenging to engage in
social cohesion or peacebuilding efforts. Transforming people’s
attitudes and perceptions, building their capacities, and
empowering them to commit to reconciliation activities is vital,
if the high-level official negotiations ever are to achieve long-
awaited results.
B) Approaching a Hypothesis
This study seeks to conduct a comparative analysis of the
prospective role of Armenian and Azeri youth in the peace
process. The goal of the study is to examine the interplay of
various narratives, attitudes and perceptions between Armenian
and Azeri youth, while attempting to determine which of the given
narratives would likely have a soothing effect and serve as a
useful tool for promoting productive interaction among youth. The
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study put forward the following hypothesis: Armenian and
Azerbaijani youth have hidden potential to serve a productive and
transformative role in the peace process to lead their countries
towards reconciliation. This hidden potential could, possibly, be
brought forth should:
a) Parties disengage and discontinue hate speech, derogatory
public statements, and dehumanization of the adversary;
b) Parties collaborate to transform employed negative
historical and collective narratives into more tolerant
ones;
c) The OSCE Minsk Group engages in public diplomacy efforts to
demystify the negotiation process;
d) The OSCE Minsk Group encourages and advocates for space for
civil society organizations to engage in Track II diplomacy
efforts (peacebuilding, social cohesion, and reconciliation
activities) without a fear of reprisal;
e) Parties encourage and empower marginalized groups to seize
back their places in the peace process to become full and
essential participants in it.
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This study employs a qualitative research approach and
explores the key concepts of collective narratives and identity
development. Relatively little research has been produced on the
youth’s role in building peace. This study makes an effort to
identify cases where youth has played an informal role in
transforming relations along ethnic lines. The nature of
political level negotiations that can play a vital role in the
resolution and impact Track II diplomacy efforts is also
discussed below.
Chapter I: Research Methodology and Study DesignA) Rationale for the Research Design
A review of the available academic literature and scholarly
articles reveals very few writings on the situation of low status
and marginalized groups of young adults in peace processes and
their role and potential for peacebuilding.1 Even less has been
written on youth’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.
Thus, I decided to employ a qualitative approach in this research
1 Sultanli, J. (2011). Youth in Sourh Caucasus: Agents of Peace or Future Soldiers?; Gurbanov, G. (2012). Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh: the Role of Youth and Democracy.
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and conduct primary research to try to generate some original
data and examine youth’s experiences and perceptions of peace,
reconciliation, and their role in the peace process through their
own words. The use of this approach has been useful in beginning
to generate data related to a subject about which there is a
limited body of knowledge. 2 Acknowledging that youth are
vulnerable to influence from outside elements, the central
component of this study is to explore the manipulation of
institutional and collective narratives, their influence on youth
identity development, and ways these narratives may have
potential for transforming beliefs into actions.3
This research rests on the foundation of a study conducted
by Garagozov (2011). He argues that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
is a conflict of mutually exclusive historical narratives,
collective memory, and nationalistic myths. These narratives and
rigidly fixed beliefs are well incorporated into the mainstream
sociocultural climate, poisoning the environment and undermining
prospective peacebuilding efforts. He suggests transforming 2 Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developinggrounded theory; Padgett, D. (2008). Qualitative methods in social work research. 3 Marutyan, H. (2007). Collective and historical memory in the dialogue of cultures.
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mutually exclusive nationalistic narratives into more tolerant
and cooperative ones by utilizing a “model of progressive
narrative transformation.”4
The main concept behind this model is to change and
transform original narratives into ones slightly closer to each
other. Once this step is achieved, Garagozov proposes to repeat
it a number of times until there is a comprehensive narrative
accepted by both sides that does not dehumanize or antagonize the
other. However, before manipulating any narratives it is
important to find the type of a narrative (or narratives) that
would be more conducive to reconciliation, and to determine to
what extent a specific narrative might reduce confrontational
attitudes. His three-phase study attempts to answer such
questions by engaging with Azerbaijani IDPs and non-IDPs. The
initial phase of his research includes a questionnaire on
individual attitudes and beliefs towards reconciliation; the
second phase tests three different narratives and assesses
participants’ moods when presented with a specific narrative.
When trying to identify a narrative that would be helpful in
4 Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes? Interplay of narratives, memory, emotions, and attitudes
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terms of diminishing confrontation attitudes, it is important to
examine if a specific narrative will have a similar effect on
both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Garagozov’s research does not
address this question.
This study incorporated survey instruments (with certain
edits) previously used by Garagozov, seeking to ensure that
narratives would be examined by both populations. My study
employed a perception survey to ascertain critical perspectives
of youth in relation to their social status, identity
development, and attitudes towards peaceful resolution of the
conflict.
Perception surveys, in general, allow researchers to measure
what respondents feel, think and believe.5 This approach helped
me to gain information about youth’s understanding of the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process, as well as their views
about reconciliation, peace and human rights, and their
attitudes, opinions about the peace process.
This study reached out to both the Armenian and Azerbaijani
populations to compare and draw conclusions about whether similar
5 Herbert, S. (2013). Perception surveys in fragile and conflict-affected states: Helpdesk Research Report.
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narratives would have similar attitudinal impacts on youth from
both communities. The recruitment process took place within a
popular and influential mode of communication in youth culture,
internet and social media. Acknowledging time and resource
constraints, and recognizing widespread internet access, the
benefits of conducting a perception survey online, through an e-
survey approach, seemed to supersede potential drawbacks.
The survey consisted of two sections and a total of 24
questions. The first section included both qualitative and
quantitative components. The quantitative component was
integrated to gather information that could be used to describe
and make comparisons between the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth.
The study was divided in a way so there would be one week to go
over the answers on a participant’s demographics before referring
him or her to the next section. This was done to identify and
prevent diaspora members from participating in the survey.
However, both parts were later combined into a single survey,
because another method emerged to identify the country location
of where participants accessed a survey.
B) Strengths and Limitations of online perception surveys
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There is limited research on the advantages and challenges
of perception and online surveys as a whole. Certain challenges
and strengths have been observed when conducting online
perception surveys, that also were reflected in the literature
review. In comparison to other data gathering means, and
depending on the procedural approach, perception surveys provide
a few advantages. The objective of this research was to collect
Armenian and Azerbaijani youth’s views and beliefs on what peace
and reconciliation means to them, whether reconciliation can be
achieved, steps and actions to ensure a successful reconciliation
process, and their attitudes toward given narratives. The
perception survey provided an opportunity to do just that, which
is to collect data “about issues which are intangible or
difficult to measure.”6 Such surveys allow rebalancing
information asymmetries and provide an important source of data
when available official data is incomplete or limited.7
Conducting a perception survey is useful in gathering data about
citizens’ views on various subjects rather than expert or 6 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development. (2013). http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/CCRVI/CCVRI-Practice-Product-Uses-of-Data.pdf7 Tariq, M.O., Haqbeen, F.R., & Kakar, P.L. (2012). Afghanistan in 2012: A survey of the Afghan people.
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official views. It additionally facilitates and assists in
articulating interests and positions of a marginalized group and
provides them with an opportunity to voice their concerns.
In recognition of the profound impact that the internet and
social media has had on youth culture, surveys were conducted
online. A literature review on the methodology of e-surveys
methodology features associated costs and benefits that could be
attributed to both perception and online surveys. The advantages
are cost effectiveness, time efficiency and convenience.8 Other
advantages of online surveys include: a potential for
international reach, incorporation of skip logic, direct database
connectivity and customized instrument delivery, which this study
confirms. Conducting perception surveys online, although, also
has its drawbacks, such as solicitation and delivery problems,
possible technological glitches, a risk of poor security, which
could potentially threaten confidentiality of respondents, and
limited access to prospective participants.9 This study has
confirmed these drawbacks.
8 Wiersma, W. (2012). The validity of surveys: online and offline. Oxford Internet Institute. 9 Wiersma, W. (2012). The validity of surveys: online and offline. Oxford Internet Institute.
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A review of official statistical data and independent NGO
data10 on internet access and usage in the South Caucasus region
presents the following picture: about 70 percent of Azerbaijani
households have internet access and over 40 percent11 of internet
users access it from home, with the majority of users being
within the younger age distribution. That is, 15 to 34 years old
individuals, constitute over 60 percent of internet users in the
country.
The picture in Armenia is a little different. Internet
penetration in Armenia remains the lowest in South Caucasus
region. About half of the Armenian population has access to the
internet, with approximately one-third of households reporting
having internet access.12 The internet connection speeds are the
lowest and costs are the highest of the three countries in the
South Caucasus region, partly because two of its four neighbors
10 Caucasus Barometer. (2013). Caucasus barometer 2013 regional dataset.; Kelly, S., Truong, M., Earp, M., Reed, L., Shahbaz, A., & Greco-Stoner, A. (2013). Freedom on the net 2013: A global assessment of internet and digital media. 11 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (2013). Internet Access of Households.12 Papyan, A. (2013, January 16). Home internet access in Armenia higher than global average [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://ditord.com/2013/01/16/home-internet-access-in-armenia-higher-than-global-average/
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blockaded Armenia.13 Data for exact penetration rates in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan is unavailable.
The original study methodology did not anticipate that
availability of internet and pace of IT sector development would
serve as a challenge in terms of achieving high response rates,
yet this was the case. The research does not provide a definite
conclusion and reasons for low response rates. Low response rates
could be linked either to low coverage or to connection quality
in those countries in comparison to internet access and use in
the West, particularly in the United States. It also could be
attributed to the sensitivity of the subject matter the study
aimed to examine.
The internet is an integral part of people’s lives, and
plays an important function in Armenian and Azerbaijani youth’s
identity development. Given its role in nation’s youth culture
while recalling time limitations, resource constraints and
possible security dilemmas posed by traveling to respective
countries to conduct in-person surveys, focus groups or
13 Krikorian, O. (2010). Internet in Armenia: slow, expensive, but increasingly important.
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interviews, at the time, benefits of an online perception survey
outweighed drawbacks.
C) Actual Research Design and Research Instruments
The study was conducted using a standardized semi-structured
questionnaire covering respondents’ demographics, and perceptions
and narratives on peace, reconciliation and human rights.
Questions and narratives were developed with the advantage of
available research instruments. Surveys developed by the Group on
International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace,
in addition to, Garagozov’s research instruments used in his
previous study were consulted and used with permission. An open-
ended field was available to most questions allowing respondents
to provide explanations or complete their thoughts.
The two-part survey, a consent document and recruitment
materials were first developed in English, and then translated
into Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani, primary languages spoken
by the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth population. Independent
back-translations helped to finalize and validate research
instruments.
D) Sample Selection and Recruitment
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This survey employed convenience sampling. A convenience
sampling is useful when it is difficult to determine whether each
and every unit is included in the sample. It is used in cases
when it is left up to each person to decide one’s own
participation, which was the case with this study where web link
to the survey was posted on social media platforms and was left
up to each individual to decide and take part in this research.
The initial recruitment process, an invitation to
participate in a web survey was posted as a message on various
social media platforms, online communities and organizational
sites, has not been effective or successful. As the initial
recruitment process attracted only few respondents, I decided to
utilize a professional survey support system, such as the Survey
Monkey Audience project, in which the company takes upon itself to
recruit a needed number of participants from each social group.
In this case, the company’s representatives indicated that
neither the company nor its partners have access to the Azeri
market, and do not have access to a requested pool of respondents
from Armenia.14
14 Z. Gholikely (personal communication, March 5,2014).
19
Nevertheless, I changed the solicitation process, and
decided to recruit participants through personal communication
and messaging. This was done in an attempt to increase response
rates. This approach displayed better results than the original
recruitment process. The personal invitation sent out to each
person noted that the researcher was available to answer any
questions or concerns one might have, which increased chances of
a dialogue, where prospective participants replied with questions
or comments.
There was a pattern within questions or concerns raised
during those personal communications. Some participants had
concerns and questions about whether the survey was actually spam
or a hacking attack on their profiles.15 There were also few,
Armenian and Azerbaijani youth, who mentioned reviewing the
survey, but dropped out as they thought these types of research
or activities were unimportant and could not affect the
situation. Some youth mentioned mistrust and vivid negative
attitudes towards the other side as their reason not to
participate in this research. A few responses communicated very
15 as there has been a pattern of Armenian hackers attacking Azerbaijani online communities and vice versa
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strong and negative connotations and explicitly stated a personal
hatred and aggression towards individuals of the other country’s
ethnicity, while reflecting on one’s own role in protecting and
defending the historical territory of the nation with arms. A
considerable amount of Armenian and Azeri youth expressed support
for the project, while disclosing a personal view and interest in
seeing the conflict resolved through peaceful means as opposed to
employing military capabilities.
A review of available literature on e-survey methodology
suggests that response rates for internet surveys often fall
below 30 percent, which has been observed throughout the study.
There were individuals who displayed a distinct non-response
typology, where individuals accessed the survey, reviewed some
parts of the survey and then decided not to participate in it.
Over 500 personal communications were issued. Less than 10
percent replied, noting that they either participated in the
survey, planned to or did not plan to complete it. The final
sample size was 102 individuals, out of whom just 32 completed
both parts of the survey. Sixty-seven completed the first part,
and the rest partially completed the first part. As for the
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characteristics of the population surveyed, 75 were male and 27
were female. A general limitation in any perception survey is
gender inequality and underrepresentation.16 This has been the
case in this research as it was difficult capture women’s voices
and opinions. It was challenging to reach out to the female
population through personal communications and messaging systems
because of profile privacy settings. At the same time, many
females who received invitations seemed uninterested in
participating in the survey, which resulted in a wide gap in
gender representation.
Graph 1. Surveyed Participants by Gender
Male Female
Regarding the ethnic background of research participants,
there were 60 Azerbaijanis and 42 Armenians. More than two-thirds
of respondents (75 percent) reported having a tertiary
education, with 31 percent of respondents noted having or
16 Herbert, S. (2013). Perception surveys in fragile and conflict-affected states: Helpdesk ResearchReport.
22
pursuing master’s degree or Ph.D., and 45 percent of respondents
having earned or were pursuing a bachelors’ degree. The rest
either reported enrollment in high school or noted non-
enrollment. Regarding the individual knowledge of conflict
resolution field, 24 percent participated at least once in a
conflict resolution or peace education program; out of this
group, 50 percent had been involved in some sort of protest
against war and in favor of peace by signing a petition or
participating in an event. Twenty-six percent of the survey
participants reported having been involved in some sort of
protest.
Qualitative Methods
E) Data and Criteria of Sources
The strengths and drawbacks of the study link to the
methodological approach of the survey. To ensure a rigorous and
high quality approach to the survey, the study incorporated
methodological and theory triangulation, which utilized different
sources of information, other non-survey and non-perceptions
data. The study combined the use of primary sources, personal
interviews, and collection of fresh data, such as statistical
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data, political statements when possible. In spite of few hurdles
impeding the access to first hand data, bearing in mind the
sensitivity of materials pertaining to political level
negotiations, there is still a significant primary data materials
available for this research. Among the sources utilized in this
report are:
i. Political Statements: Explicitly, speeches and declarations made
by 1) governmental officials 2) individuals representing
foreign agencies and institutions associated with the
mediation and negotiation process
ii. Statistical Data: A review and examination of the 2008-2013
data on attitudes regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution17 collected by the Caucasus Resource Research
Centers (CRRC);18 2010 poll conducted by Populus, a UK-based
opinion polling company, in partnership with the Armenian
Institute for Political and Sociological Consulting
(AIPSC);19 and also consulted available data on internet
usage of youth in both nations.17 Caucasus Barometer. (2013). Caucasus barometer 2013 regional dataset.18 Krikorian, O. (2012). New data on attitudes to Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution 19 Cooper, A., & Morris, K. (2013). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in light of polls in Armenia and NK
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iii. Documents: Select number of documents produced by the
OSCE
In over two decades of the conflict’s life (since the dissolution
of the Soviet Union), a large body of literature has been
produced about the history and evolution of the conflict, and the
ongoing negotiation process. Most of the literature concentrates
on: the immediate background to the conflict; the conflict, and
the conflict resolutions efforts after signing of the Bishkek
Protocol in 1994, and; the Russian brokered cease-fire agreement.
Most of the literature has been produced in the Armenian and
Azerbaijani languages, followed by English and Russian. The
sources used for the study have been selected based on their
relevance and nature of the information they contain. Following
are the types of secondary sources consulted for this research:
i. Periodicals, Journals and Reports: A growing body of academic
journals addresses individual and collective identity of
communities engaged in conflict and/or reconciliation
efforts; literature on social representations of history and
its role in identity politics, in conjunction with
periodicals on post-Soviet environment and the rapid
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escalation of ethnic armed conflicts, boomed in the past two
decades. In addition, an English and Russian version of
numerous Armenian and Azerbaijani academic journals became
available making original materials from the region
accessible.
ii. Papers and Studies: Source materials and research papers
presented at symposia and conferences addressing various
aspects of a larger topic of this study have been of great
significance. Numerous publications produced and presented
by the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental
Aggression and Peace have been useful in baring new and
innovative concepts and ideas for this research.20
iii. Daily Press and Electronic Data: Considering an expansion and
availability of such data in conjunction with the pace of
new and unfolding developments in the region made the use of
such reports obligatory. Throughout this research, there has
been a systematic follow up of media and electronic sources
to stay in the information loop of dynamic events. Among the
many available sources, the ones utilized in this reports
20 Boston University Psychology. (2014). Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression
26
have been considered for their accuracy, reliability and
validity.
F) Data collection and analysis
Data collection took place over a two months period from
February to March 2014. I, on my own, designed and implemented
the study. I do not have a prior experience conducting surveys,
yet completed a thorough review of survey and interview
techniques, the use of online technology to collect and analyze
data to minimize risks and challenges. After data collection, the
Survey Monkey Analysis program provided basic quantitative data
analysis of demographic information. The qualitative responses to
items were categorized according to the Strauss and Corbin’s21
grounded theory approach. The process allowed concepts and themes
to emerge from the responses to provide the foundation for coding
categories. The qualitative part and commentaries were imported
to Market Sight for analysis.
G) Validity and Reliability
The study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods;
therefore, traditional definitions of reliability and validity
21 Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory.
27
concepts so useful in quantitative studies have not been fully
applicable to this research. Lincoln and Guba propose utilizing
the concept of trustworthiness as a criterion to determine
reliability and validity.22 The term trustworthiness implies that
survey represents what it proposes to represent, while findings
reflect meanings as closely as possible to those expressed by the
respondents.
There are two types of validity: internal and external.
These imply that questions and concepts that are set out to be
measured are actually measured (internal validity), while
findings and results are valid beyond the study and are
applicable to the larger social group and across contexts
(external validity). The most obvious threat to validity was that
although there was widespread internet access in both countries,
there were as many subgroups of the population that did not have
an access to the internet. Another underlying challenge with the
internet was the sampling selection. To avoid biases in the
survey it would be best to employ random sampling. To conduct
random sampling online, a full list of the population would have
22 Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
28
been needed. Yet an online list of 18-27 year old Azerbaijani and
Armenian youth does not exist, as opposed to a list of students
at a university.23 This situation posed a major limitation in
terms of applying key findings to a larger youth demographic
across borders. However, two of the six strategies described by
Padgett to determine thoroughness and accuracy in a qualitative
study were employed, which were triangulation and auditing.24
Triangulation implies using different sources of information,
other non-survey and non-perceptions data, while auditing
suggests the researcher keeps notes about choices made during the
progression of the course as a method to minimize bias and
incorporate comprehensive analysis of lessons gathered and
learned. It is important to emphasize that results of this
research should be interpreted carefully and cannot be applied or
generalized to a larger social group.
H) Structure of the Study
To set the stage for this research, immediately below,
Chapter II: Current State of Peace Process provides an analysis of the 23 Wright, K.B. (2006). Research internet-based populations: advantages and disadvantages of online survey research, online questionnaire authoring software packages and web survey services.24 Padgett, D. (2008). Qualitative methods in social work research. Los Angeles, Calif: Sage Publications.
29
mediation efforts made for the resolution of the conflict. It
discusses ongoing efforts within Track I Diplomacy to resolve the
conflict, and highlights the issue of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs’
serving more as representatives of their respective countries
rather than as committed and objective mediators. This chapter
examines Track II, so called citizens’, diplomacy efforts while
arguing that lack of coordination between two tracks limits the
effectiveness and efficiency of all and each individual efforts.
Chapter III: Youth as Agents of Change will provide a review of
available literature on the subject of youth and conflict
pointing out to a biased skew in research branding youth as a
destabilizing force while neglecting to emphasize and highlight
their hidden and unrecognized potential. It will also provide
several cases recognizing practical experiences in ethnic
conflicts where youth, through self-empowerment, found a way to
transform relations positively across divided ethnic communities
within that social group.25
Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
transformation highlights that an emerging line of research on
25 Social group = youth
30
youth and identity development in conflict environments
implicitly or explicitly undertakes a narrative approach to the
study. It also argues that there is a relationship between
historical narratives built on a negative image and
interpretation of the other and ethnically motivated violence.
However, a thorough research of the subject provides that just as
historical narratives and collective memories might escalate
tensions on the line of contact (LOC);26 these can also plant
seeds for positive social change, counter a culture of violence,
and encourage a culture of peace.
Chapter V: Key finding of the Survey and Summary concludes by reviewing
key findings and providing a comparative review of Armenian and
Azerbaijani youth perspectives on peace, reconciliation and human
rights, analyses individual comments on given narratives, while
identifying narratives that could possibly diminish
confrontational attitudes or serve a foundation to begin a
dialogue. A references page of consulted resources for this study
follows the chapter.
26 Between Nagorno-Karabakh and the rest of Azerbaijan
31
Chapter II: Current State of Peace ProcessA) Track I Diplomacy
Davidson and Montville coined the term “Two Track
Diplomacy”27 to raise the attention around the relationship of
official and unofficial activities, as there was little
recognition within governments about the civil society
contribution to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. They
explain Track I diplomacy as one comprising “traditional policy
statements by the president and secretary of state […], or
official visits and meetings.” Track II they describe as
unofficial and non-structured, but as one that might help to
resolve or ease “actual or potential conflict by appealing to
common human capabilities to respond to good will and
reasonableness.”28 McDonald and Diamond further developed the
concept of multi-track diplomacy by introducing a unified system
of interlinked and related tracks: government, professional
conflict resolution, business, private citizen, research,
27 Davidson, W.D., & Montville, J.V. (1981). Foreign policy according to Freud. Foreign Policy, 45,145-157.28 Davidson, W.D., & Montville, J.D. (1981). Foreign policy according to Freud. Foreign Policy, 45, 145-157.
32
training and education, activism, religion, funding and media or
public opinion29. Today, Track II diplomacy encompasses
previously mentioned sub-tracks of citizens’ diplomacy.
The OSCE Minsk Group has been the main and only platform for
Track I diplomacy or political level negotiations on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. The OSCE30 began to work on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict soon after the newly independent Armenia and
Azerbaijan joined the organization.31 “With its regional remit”
the OSCE appeared better situated than the United Nations (UN) to
address the conflict, as key state actors thought the conflict
reached its ripe moment and a breakthrough was forthcoming, which
led the OSCE to assume responsibility for mediation.32
The OSCE had “a two-fold task: first, to facilitate and
support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
29 Diamond, L., & McDonald, J. (1993). Multi-track diplomacy: A systems approach to peace.30 In the period prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the involvement of the international bodies, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has experienced a variety of mediation efforts toward its resolution. At the time,Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic, with the backing of Armenian SSR, and Azerbaijani SSR brought their concerns to the Council of the Soviet Union, however the Soviet leadership was passive in addressing needs and positions ofeach party, while lacking to commit to dispute resolution efforts.31 At the Helsinki meeting in March 1992, the OSCE Council requested to “convene a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh to provide a forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis http://www.osce.org/mg/6687232 Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts.
33
and second, to negotiate relations among its participating states
and determine the role of the OSCE and the Minsk Process within
the context.”33 Internal conflicts between key OSCE players
stemming from mutually exclusive national interests complicated
both agendas during initial phases. As a result, there was a
move to limit the circle of participants taking part in peace
talks. By 1997, a permanent “troika” of co-chairs,34 consisting
of Russia, the United States, and France, was formed35 with a
mandate to “realize a full-coordination in all mediating and
negotiating activities harmonizing them into a single coordinated
effort within the framework of the OSCE.”36 The followed active
period of shuttle diplomacy to find a resolution was hampered by
the fact that the Minsk Group co-chairs often served more as
representatives of their respective countries rather than as
individual mediators.37
33 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage34 The only OSCE body in place on the ground was and continues to be the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador Andrzei Kasprczyk of Poland, whose mandate does not include negotiations35 Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts. 36 Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE (“Minsk Conference’)37 Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts.
34
Once the working relationship had been established within
the Minsk Group, the discussion turned to the development of the
framework for the negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful
settlement of the conflict.38 The Minsk Group put forward two
proposals. One of the proposals incorporated the package
solution, which consisted of two separate agendas: Agreement I
and Agreement II. The conflicting parties had freedom to
implement each agreement at their own pace “but with an
understanding that at the end of the day all outstanding issues
will have to be resolved.”39 The second proposal, a “step-by-step
solution,” focused on sealing Agreement I before proceeding with
Agreement II.40
Both proposals entailed a withdrawal of the Armenian forces
from seven Azeri provinces followed by a discussion on the final
status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan accepted the plan.
Armenia, although with reservations, also accepted it. Karabakh
Armenians rejected both proposals as unacceptable. Thus, the 38 Since 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group continues to be the only medium for official level diplomatic negotiations over the conflict and are supported by the United Nations and the international community.39 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage40 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage
35
Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian, who accepted the plan,
was forced to resign, allowing Robert Kocharian, then de-facto
president of Nagorno-Karabakh to come to power, who effectively
sidelined participation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians from
the negotiation table.41
In the spring of 2004,42 a series of meetings began between
the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. This allowed the
development of the first draft of basic principles outlining the
structure of a comprehensive settlement, which was presented to
presidents the following year. The basic principles, which were
kept in secret until June 2006,43 were revealed to the larger
public to pressure the parties to launch a public debate about
them and, at last, come to an agreement.
In November 2007, the Minsk Group formally presented the
“Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict” to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It later was
41 The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities continuously stated that any agreement would be impossible without them sitting at the negotiating table, yet Robert Kocharian and the current Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, both Karabakh Armenians, themselves effectively sidelined NK’s participation at the negotiating table. 42 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage43 OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs (2006). We have run out of ideas: Statement of mediators of Nagorno Karabakh
36
deposited with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to serve as a basis
for future negotiations. The Madrid principles,44 as they became
known, had an obvious advantage over the previous proposals as it
avoided having to choose between the step-by-step solution or
package solution. Parties agreed that the final status would be
determined once all confidence-building measures (CBM) are put in
place (an element of a stage-by-stage process). Then again, these
CBM measures would be implemented after an agreement on the
mechanism for the determination of the status has been reached
(an element of a package process). Concurrently, basic
principles revolve around the following points: 1) security
guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) a return of occupied
territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) the Lachin corridor;
3) final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh; 4) internally
displaced persons and refugees, and a possible peacekeeping
operation.45
Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on a majority of these points.
Yet, there are two points of contention that have not been
44 The Madrid principles and basic principles will be used interchangeable within the entire paper. The version presented in Kazan45 OSCE. (2009). Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries.
37
resolved and for which the parties still need to find a common
ground.46There is an agreement on the principle covering
peacekeeping forces, the security situation, and refugees. All
parties agree that a referendum will take place to determine the
final legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh, however, there are
disagreements on where and when will the referendum take place,
and who will participate.47 Another major point of discord is the
final status of the Lachin corridor, currently linking Armenia to
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh would like to
retain a permanent maintenance of the entire corridor to allow
unrestricted communication with between two locations. Therefore,
the Minsk Group continues to seek for options48 that would please
all sides.
The peace process went through a difficult year during
Armenian and Azerbaijani pre-election campaigns, as both
presidents had to resort and step up their nationalist rhetoric
in order to appease constituencies and ensure a win in
presidential elections. For Sargsyan losing territory meant loss 46 J. Warlick (personal communication, March 6, 2014).47 J. Warlick (personal communication, March 6, 2014).48 That is will there be a complex leasing arrangement for Lachin which is unlikely to satisfy the Armenians, or will it belong to Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia, which is unlikely to satisfy the Azerbaijanis.
38
in elections. The precedent two terms, Aliyev was in the shadow
of his father’s legacy, now he is in a stage of creating his own.
The following four years, prior to the 2018 Azeri and Armenian
presidential elections, could possibly provide space and a window
of opportunity to tackle last few disagreements between
conflicting parties.
Nevertheless, numerous issues underlie Track I political
negotiations of the OSCE Minsk Group starting with the dynamics
between key actors and their interests. Some state that the co-
chairs accord low priority to Karabakh while also advancing geo-
political and national interests of their representative
countries in the region. De Waal asserts that Russia is a main
obstacle to the resolution, as it proved itself incapable or
unwilling to mediate successfully a peace agreement. He
elaborated that Russia’s role and interests in prolonging the
tensions stem from the threat of its decreased influence in the
region and increased influence of the USA, EU, and NATO.49 Yet he
neglects to note that each co-chair acts in a capacity as a
representative of his country, and he overlooks that Ambassador
49 De, W. T. (2003). Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war. New York: New York University Press.
39
Igor Popov has served much longer as a Co-Chair and has a greater
depth of knowledge and expertise on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process than his counterparts.
Former president Medvedev50spent a lot of time and political
capital pushing for the peace process. There was much
expectation, by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the international
community that the meeting in Kazan, which was the ninth that
Medvedev hosted for the two presidents,51 would result in an
agreement on the basic principles. During the meeting, Aliyev,
however, raised new issues that Co-chairs were not aware or
informed about, resulting in an all-time low point for the
political negotiations until the end of 2013.52 Nonetheless, as
of early 2014, the Russian government remained committed to
working with the parties.
France is home to a large and influential Armenian diaspora.
The country also owns 5% of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
These broad interests result in France lacking a valuable
50 President of the Russian Federation – 2008-201251 Sammut, D. (2011). After Kazan, a defining moment for the OSCE Minsk Process.52 Sammut, D. (2011). After Kazan, a defining moment for the OSCE Minsk Process
40
contribution to the peace negotiations.53 The USA also has a
large and highly influential Armenian diaspora. The Armenian
diaspora has been successful in lobbying the U.S. Congress in
passing numerous legislations including the Section 907 of the
Freedom Support Act (P.L. 102-511), which prohibits the U.S.
assistance to Azerbaijan.54 Within the USA, there is a separate
conflict battleground with individual states supporting
Azerbaijan or Armenia by either recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as
an independent state55 or by “supporting the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”56 The U.S.
State Department under the leadership of John Kerry, a long-time
peacebuilding enthusiast, and Ambassador James Warlick, current
Minsk Group Co-Chair, launched a new strategy in pressing for a
resolution of a protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Ambassador
Warlick stepped-up the game and has been increasingly engaged in
public diplomacy efforts trying to demystify and raise awareness
53 Gamaghelyan, P. (2009). Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Identity,Politics, Scholarship.54 “prohibits all US government assistance to Azerbaijan, except for non-proliferation and disarmament activities, until the President determines that Azerbaijan has taken demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” Giragosian, R. (2001). Nagorno-Karabakh: International Political Dimension55 Maine – April 10-30, 2013 Recognizes NK56 Arkansas – U.S. State recognizes Khojaly Genocide
41
around the negotiation process. As of the early 2014, the United
States remained committed to working with the parties, as a Co-
Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, to achieve a lasting and peaceful
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based upon three core
principles of the Helsinki Final Act.57
B) Track II initiatives and Confidence Building Measures
Numerous factors have limited the effectiveness and
efficiency of Track II initiatives in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and significantly curbed confidence-building measures.
The political environment for peacebuilding and confidence
building measures is unfavorable and less promising than it was
in 2008-2009, and much less so than during the period 1998-2001,
the “high point for Armenian-Azerbaijani CBM.”58
In the early and mid-1990s, most of peacebuilding NGOs in
the region launched activities with a built-in CBM element. CSOs
in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh participated
effectively and fruitfully in a number of projects, especially
those related to the exchange of prisoners of war (POW), mutual
57 http://armenpress.am/eng/news/751966/usa-remains-committed-to-peaceful-settlement-of-karabakh-conflict.html58 Broers, L. (2014). Confidence building in the Karabakh: what next? Caucasus Edition, Journal of Conflict Transformation.
42
visits of students, young adults and students, or aid
disbursement to refugees.59 Large groups of journalists traveled
back and forth between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh
in late-1990s in a program that provided an opportunity to
generate good journalism and were a good reality check for both
sides.
In the early 2000s, peacebuilding NGOs’ activities
concentrated more on capacity building and citizen security
enhancement, 60 including awareness of land mines, clearance of
mines and cluster munitions,61repairing schools and monitoring
human rights. Most of these initiatives were introduced by
foreign organizations, such as the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, or
Conciliation Resources, which expected governments of the
respective countries to further these processes and engage the
general population. However, the lack of political will and CSOs
resource and capacities’ constraints undermined challenge the
implementation and effectiveness of these initiatives.
59 Ghaplanyan, I. (2009). Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution60 Ghaplanyan, I. (2009). Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution61 The Halo Trust. (2014). Nagorno Karabakh.
43
Social media and blogging on Azeri-Armenian relations and
the Karabakh conflict have taken off in recent years and have had
an immense impact, both positive and negative, on the overall
debate around the conflict.62 A number of social networks serve
as a platform that spreads more propaganda. Much of it is a
repetition of the same hardline political stance broadcasted on
TV and distributed on print media platforms.
Nonetheless, there is also positive movement. A group of
Armenian and Azerbaijani individuals is using this platform to
convey a more tolerant narrative to circumvent government
propaganda. The Caucasus Edition, Journal for Conflict
Transformation63 is an online policy journal that brings together
authors and bloggers to share their research and analysis on
South Caucasus affairs and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Imagine
Center for Conflict Transformation organization brings together
Armenian and Azerbaijani youth for conflict resolution seminars
and confidence building exercises. Online platforms, such as
recently created an Armenian-Azerbaijani joint initiative,
62 Geybullayeva, A. (2012). Nagorno Karabakh 2.063 Caucasusedition.net
44
Imagine Neutral Zone,64 provide space for the dialogue to
continue long after face-to-face sessions. Then again this
movement is constrained by few factors, as this is a self-
selecting group of courageous individuals, many of whom are
labeled as traitors, looked at with suspicion, have difficulties
challenging mainstream nationalistic rhetoric, and lack resources
and organization.
Traditional ways of meeting and dialogue between the
Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society representatives still
exist and are the most widespread activities on the Track II
front. Few of these opportunities are available through pan-
regional Caucasus-wide formats that bring together Armenians and
Azerbaijanis within a wider community of actors.65 The number of
civil society representatives, though, is small and most have
been involved in the process for over two decades. This
continuously leads to skepticism on whether those CSO veterans
have anything new to contribute. In addition, while participants
share a commitment to non-violence and a peaceful settlement of
64 http://imagineneutralzone.com/65 Broers, L. (2014). Confidence-building in the Karabakh: what next?
45
the conflict, each adheres to incompatible and competing visions
of the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.66
Various factors resulted in the decline of CSOs
peacebuilding activity on the ground. As international
organizations dictate type and design of projects they plan to
sponsor, NGOs have to draw up projects, which suit the needs of
organizations and governments and not necessarily realities and
necessities of their respective societies. Such ill-suited
proposals and projects appear to lack context and conflict
sensitivity leading to populations’ outrage. In early 2012, the
Caucasus Center of Peace-Making Initiative with the support of
the U.S. Embassy organized an Azerbaijani film festival in
Yerevan and Gyumri. The public reaction to the event was more
than negative. Armenians expressed outrage online by posting
negative comments on various social networks and by staging
protests on the streets, which, eventually, led to the event’s
cancellation. While the initiative aimed to promote
reconciliation efforts and raise awareness on the Nagorno-
66 M. Tadevosyan ( personal communication March 5, 2014).
46
Karabakh situation from Azeri perspective, the design of the
program did not incorporate a conflict-sensitive approach.67
Similar initiatives and projects also lead the respective
government and societies to doubt the intentions and stakes of
peacebuilding activists in the conflict transformation process.
The foreign funding of NGO activities began to be seen as direct
intrusions into the process, leading to these NGOs and civil
society representatives growing increasingly unpopular and being
labeled as traitors. The politicization of NGOs in the context of
government opposition is significant, which leads to authorities
in Armenia and Azerbaijan to regard their own civil societies
with suspicion as “covert vehicles of opposition.”68 NGOs
exercise little to no independence,69 have limited resources, are
not influential and not in position to offer expertise to
67 M. Tadevosyan ( personal communication March 5, 2014). - Instead of creating an individual event, organizers could have screened some of their films through annual Golden Apricot Yerevan International Film Festival68 Hasanov, A., & Ishkanian, A. (2005). Bridging divides: Civil society initiatives69 The newly NGO legislation in Azerbaijan adopted to suffocate political dissent, which allows suspension or banning of national and foreign NGOs in the country is detrimental to organizations seeking to engage in peacebuildingor conflict transformation activities, which go against hardline political position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict - http://www.civicsolidarity.org/article/892/council-europe-should-condemn-repressive-ngo-legislation-azerbaijan
47
government bodies. These factors present that Track II efforts
are very constrained.
National NGOs are weak, and despite various efforts of
foreign donors, it will continue to be so unless both governments
demonstrate true commitment to empowering a civil society while
undertaking democratic reforms. A political environment gives no
room for dehumanization of the enemy, despite the “Moscow
Declaration” of 2009,70 in which both presidents explicitly
endorsed confidence-building measures as a pillar to reinvigorate
the peace process.
C) Coordinating Track I and Track II
Two decades have passed since the cease-fire agreement was
reached in 1994 and the Minsk Group began engaging in a shuttle
diplomacy between conflicting parties. The Track I negotiations
that have repeatedly taken place behind closed doors in strict
confidentiality seem to be moving in a positive direction, yet
has not been successful in bringing parties to a full agreement
on the framework for the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of
70 Broers, L. (2010). Opening borders, preserving walls: opportunities to support the Karabakh peace process. Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation, 3(1), 5-8.
48
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Track I has been too focused on
the political negotiations and too poorly staffed to devote much
attention to Track II activities. National and international
actors have undertaken various non-official peacebuilding and
conflict transformation diplomacy efforts, though, with little
information on Track I negotiations, have not been able to
contribute more or time their activities to support phases of the
official process.
Joint efforts of national and international actors to
implement, coordinate and complement “track two diplomacy”
efforts are vital for lasting and sustainable peace between two
nations. “Signed peace agreement does not create peace, without
the corresponding societal infrastructure to support it, the
peace will never hold.”71 As in the case of the Levon Ter-
Petrosian resignation, any concession on the political level that
does not sit well with public opinion will essentially cost his
or her political position, not to mention, that implementation of
a peace agreement reached without widespread support would be
nearly impossible.
71 Notter, J., & Diamond, L. (1996). Building peace and transforming conflict:Multi-track diplomacy in practice.
49
In November 2008, a coalition of British NGOs, which formed
the Consortium Initiative, wrote to the co-chairs, calling for
the “establishment of a mechanism for dialogue and exchange of
views between the [NK] peace process led by the OSCE Minsk Group
co-Chair and non-state actors working in support of the peace
process”, while asking for more transparency in the process.72 In
March 2009, all three co-chairs attended an Armenian-Azerbaijani
meeting in Vienna organized by International Alert.73
While his predecessors and Russian and French counterparts
serve their traditional roles of mediators in quiet diplomacy.
Ambassador James Warlick stepped-up the game and has been
increasingly engaged in public diplomacy efforts. This engagement
is seen in a number of activities, such as interviews and press
conferences, while speaking with the largely detached public and
civil society representatives on the current state of the
negotiation process and future steps to be taken by the
mediators.
It is not, necessarily, the job of international mediators
to orchestrate civil society dialogue or to strengthen the type
72 Consortium Initiative. (2008, November 26). 73 De Waal, T. (2003). Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war
50
of debate, inside the respective states, that is essential to
ease polarization of public opinion on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Yet, mediators should demonstrate a greater willingness
to interact with and support civil society initiatives.
Similarly, civil society must be more engaged with formal Track I
negotiations for both sides to tackle discordant issues and
create a common vision for conflict resolution at the grassroots
level.74 Yet, Track II dialogue should not imitate the stalled
Track I negotiations, which often lead to belligerent debates
over terminology and political status. As De Waal notes, for
immediate pragmatic reasons, there should be more interaction and
coordination between Track I and II efforts for both sides to
counter the belief that the negotiations are “some kind of
international plot to impose a settlement on unsuspecting
Armenians or Azerbaijanis.”75
Chapter III: Youth as Agents of ChangeTo explore the role of youth in peacebuilding, conflict
transformation or post-conflict reconstruction, it is important
74 Huseynov, T. (2011, October). A Developing dialogue: entrenched positions. 75 De Waal, T. (2010, August 1). Op-Ed; Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process.
51
to define the role and status of “youth.” There are legal and
operational definitions to this term. The international legal
system created a legal distinction between a child and an adult,
yet made it particularly problematic to pinpoint “youth” along
this range. Chronological definitions and age-defined boundaries
do not capture social and cultural interpretations of the term,
with age being “a common characteristic, but not the defining
criteria.”76 This is where the differences between the legal and
operation definitions of youth arise.
An abundance of literature draws attention to the status of
young people within a larger social scheme, whether “immigrants,”
or outsiders,77 “alienated,”78 “not children but not certain to
become adults,”79or “lacking a guide to adulthood.”80 Across
cultures, an understanding of the idea of a child, youth, and
adult is developed through social dynamic. Thus, a person might
76 Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change. 77 Magnuson, D. (2009). The need for the study of everyday life about youth work practice in divided societies. 78 Bronfenbrenner, U. (1974). The origins of alienation. Scientific America, 23(1), 53-61.79 Keniston, K. (1975). Prologue: Youth as a stage of life. In R.J. Havighurst& P.H. Dreyer (Eds.), Youth: The seventy-fourt yearbook of the national society for the study of education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press80 Coleman, J.S. (n.d.). Innovations in the structure of education. Baltimore:John Hopkins University
52
be regarded as a “youth” well past the legal age-definition until
the occurrence of a certain life event, whether it is a marriage,
land ownership, or an assessment of personal capacity.81
A social construct of youth also has an under-studied gender
dimension, as women tend to disappear when it comes to literature
and theories on youth and violence. While the term “young adult”
is understood in a variety of different ways, this study focuses
on individuals ages 18-27, incorporating both the legal and
operational definitions. These individuals are of legal age with
control over personal actions and decisions, yet, might not have
transitioned into a fully pledged adult within the social scheme
and public opinion.82
Youth compose a significant portion of the population in the
Caucasus, accounting for approximately 30 percent of the
Armenian83 and 35.6 percent of the Azerbaijani84 population.
Having such a significant population of youth constituencies
81 Kemper, Y. (2005). Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions. Approaches by International Organizations. 82 Arnett, J.J. (2001). Conceptions of the transition to adulthood: perspectives from adolescence through midlife. 83 YerevanReporter. (2010, November 10). In Armenia, home to around 900 thousand young people.84 Zulgugarov,S., Nagiyeva,T., Efendiyev,T., Abbasali,F., & Sadigzade, O. (2007). The state of youth in Azerbaijan: Summary of analytical report.
53
presents an opportunity and a potential in relation to redressing
violence and addressing existing conflicts. Engaging and
empowering youth, an under-represented and marginalized group, is
vital, as they are the next generation to lead their nations.
Their experiences will influence their interpretations and
perceptions of peace and conflict with a potential to alter the
national trajectory towards reconciliation, a peaceful settlement
of the conflict, or reincitation of the armed conflict.
The abundance of literature on the role of youth in conflict
examines possible correlations between youth and stability. Yet,
it mostly concentrates on the role of young males as rebels
and/or perpetrators in armed conflict, and the main protagonists
of violence and destabilization. 85 Huntington suggests that
countries and regions with youthful age structures, or “youth
bulges”, more likely to experience political violence.86Some used
the “youth bulges” theory to explain recent political crisis and
destabilization in the Arab world, as well as youth recruitment 85 Boyden,J., & DeBerry, J. (2004). Children and Youth on the Front Line; Collier, P.,& Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563-595.; Singer, P.W. (2005). Children at War. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.; Zakaria, F. (2001). The roots of rage. Newsweek, 138(16), 14-33.86 Huntington, S.P. (2001, October). So, are civilizations at war? The Guardian.
54
within international terrorist networks.87 In essence, the
literature brands youth bulges as a group with opportunities and
motives for conflict.
The opportunities perspective has its roots in the Collier’s
greed argument, which maintains that when the potential gain from
joining a rebel group is high and the expected costs are low,
conditions that provide the rebel group with the financial means
to fight provide opportunities for a rebel group to wage war
against a government.88 Lancaster further elaborated on the
youth’s role through the economic model of supply and demand.
Youth participate in a marketplace of ideas, arms, and power in
service to the market’s demands. In exchange, war and conflict
provides them an entrée, an equal and immediate access to the
world: elevation to higher social class, attention, power,
economic advancement and vast other opportunities.89
The motive-oriented perspective has its roots in the
grievance argument, which views the eruption of violence or
rebellion a result of economic or political grievances,
87 Zakaria, F. (2001). The roots of rage88 Collier,P. (2000). Doing well out of war: An economic perspective.; Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004).89 Lancaster, P. (2007). Categories and illusions: Child soldiers in Burundi.
55
inequality, unemployment, or poverty. However, the distinction
between the greed and grievance perspective overlap and
overstated. The mere existence of a sizeable pool of youth is a
factor that could lead to greed and grievance as the opportunity
cost for a young adult belonging to larger group cohorts is lower
compared to members of smaller size cohorts.90 That is if a labor
market cannot absorb a sudden overflow of jobseekers, it will
result in a large pool of unemployed (greed-model) youth with
strong sentiments and frustrations (grievance-model).
While the “youth bulge” and “greed-grievance” model
demonstrate how youth population might cause instability and
conflict; these models do not provide a structure to consider
youth’s role during and after conflict; or how they might
influence the conflict itself. The Stedman’s “spoilers theory”
focuses on the role of parties and individuals, mainly leaders
and elites, seeking to hinder negotiation process or block
implementation stages of peace agreements as it threatens their
power and interests.91 Greenhil and Major redefine and reframe
this theory into the “capabilities model”, examining parties’
90 Urdal, H. (2011, July). A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. 91 Stedman, S.J. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.
56
structural and situational capacities, with an additional
classification of potential or “latent spoilers”, who are “weak
actors [and] would oppose the implementation of a peace accord,
if only they had the material […] to do so.”92 Schwartz93 further
elaborated that the model is applicable to the low-status group
like youth. If young adults are threatened with low opportunity
cost, such as unemployment in peacetime, with an opportunity to
benefit during wartime by holding a secured position, the
expected utility to continue fighting may be greater.94 This
model presents that parties’ behavior is not predetermined, but
rather has the “potential to change if proper conditions are in
place.”95
Blindly classifying and branding “young adults,” men and
women, as a dangerous demographic and a destabilizing force
overlooks and discounts number of individuals and forces behind
peace movements, and their significant contributions towards
peacebuilding, relationship transformation and dispute resolution
92 Greenhill, K.M., & Major, S. (2007). The perils of profiling: Civil war spoilers 93 Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change. 94 Grattan, A. & Morgan, S. (2007). Youthwork in conflict societies: From divergence to convergence.95 Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change.
57
efforts. In Serbia, youth organized into clubs to shelter from
ongoing ethnic conflicts while developed projects to transform
their daily lives.96 In Bosnia, “youth reconstructed a fountain
to restore a historic meeting place for youth from divided
communities.”97 In Angola, orphaned and runaway youth built homes
for themselves and developed a system of values to sustain a
stable and cooperative family98.
Youth possess an enormous potential and resilience to become
the driving force behind a peaceful resolution to the conflict. A
central feature of peacebuilding is in its conflict and context
sensitive approach. To avoid potential causes of instability, it
is important to fully understand various youth roles in conflict,
as perpetrator or combatant, as a victim of violence, and as a
leader in peace efforts. This would allow a better understanding
on how to approach structural challenges young adults face that
96 Ognjenovic, V., Skorc, B. &Ivackovic,S. (2007). Introduction to Programs and Organizations Developmental Youth Groups with War-Affected Children and Youth97 Helsing, J., Kirlic, N., McMaster, N., & Sonnenschein, N. (2005). YoungPeople's Activism and the Transition to Peace: Bosnia, Northern Ireland, andIsrael98 Nordstrom, C. (1997). A different kind of war story. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press
58
lead towards destabilizing behavior, in order to transform these
challenges to empower an under-represented group.
Young people are urged to be peacemakers, yet they are
marginalized, excluded and are not perceived as a group with the
right to voice their position in the negotiation process.99They
are not recognized as having a role of active citizens, political
constituencies, and are seldom invited as full and essential
participants during the negotiation and post-conflict processes.
Investing in young people from early on, engaging them in
peace processes, and introducing them to a perspective on
conflict and peace will allow youth to gain knowledge, will
provide them with space for network development and initiate
experience towards social and political inclusion. Broadening
opportunities for youth should include a holistic approach, that
is, policies’ implementation in the areas of education, labor,
and capacity building for civic and political participation to,
eventually, enable them to grow, fulfill their potentials, and
turn them into active and productive citizens. A sound and
99 Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP.(2005). Youth and violent conflict: society and development in crisis? A strategic review with a specialfocus on West Africa.
59
efficient policy implementation that positively alters the
incentive structure allowing youth to benefit more from the
peaceful settlement to the conflict, might prevent them from
resorting to violence and contribute positively to the stability
and peace. The Armenian and Azerbaijani nations need to be
dedicated to empowering young leaders to advance reconciliation
and conflict transformation efforts. Yet, systemic change
requires a shift in thinking from merely advocating for youth and
consulting with them to putting them at the center of policy
development and peacebuilding process.
Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformationA) Nagorno-Karabakh as a conflict of historical representations and identities
The negotiation and mediation process of the OSCE Minsk
Group100 emerged in recognition that parties to the dispute cannot
eliminate the other side and, therefore, must work with each
other to achieve their goals. The role of international mediators
is to facilitate the articulation of needs, positions and
100 building on the awareness of the conflict,
60
interests of the concerned parties into practical and mutually
acceptable solutions to promote relationship restructuring. Yet,
so far, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have been
institutionalizing a conflict resolution platform focused on the
fundamentals of settlement, while reinforcing the priority of
elites and their influence over everything and everyone. The
conflict resolution and management efforts of international
mediators failed to acknowledge the need for holistic conflict
transformation.
The literature on peace and reconciliation studies101 refers
to two related phenomena when describing the concept of
peacemaking. First, it describes a stage of institutionalized
conflict resolution and conflict management. In the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh, it means - maintaining a cease-fire agreement
and getting the adversaries to agree on the framework for the
negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful settlement. The OSCE
Minsk Group and the conflicting parties derive and evolve their
plan from the notion that the conflict must be managed, by 101 Galtung, J. (1964).An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4; Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization.; Goodhand, J. (2006). Aiding peace? The role of NGOs in armed conflict.; Lederach, J.P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington,DC: USIP
61
dealing with destructive consequences and components of the
conflict, while promoting the impression that a conflict is
undesirable and must end (or be eliminated). Lederach argues that
concepts of resolution and management do not adequately describe
the nature of the conflict “in the relational ebb and flow over
time,” while questioning “its usefulness in the construction of
peace.”102Further, he inquires whether it is possible to manage
human interaction the way we manage material things, which
possibly explains sporadic escalations and violations of the
cease-fire on the line of contact.
Second, the concept of peacemaking presupposes that negative
peace (the end of direct violence and sustaining cease-fire) at
the formal political level is closely linked with positive
peace103 building (the lasting progress through improved human
communication, understanding, and education). This stage refers
to a greater project of reconciliation and conflict
transformation. Lederach suggests that transformation does not
imply that there is need to eliminate or manage conflict (like
102 Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. 103 Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1),1-4.
62
resolution and management), but highlights its inherent dialectic
nature.104 He further expands that conflict is a phenomenon of
human creation that alters relationships, affects direct and
indirect communication channels, and transforms broader social
context. Volkan and Kelman add that conflict has a psychological
dimension to it, as it effects perceptions and understanding of
the other and of self, which is precisely the case of protracted
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in which symbols and a notion of the
enemy are institutionalized and dominate public discourse.
In other words, developing a sustainable and lasting peace
through conflict transformation suggests: 1)addressing cultural
violence, beliefs and values that explain, justify, and reproduce
violence; by 2)transforming mutually destructive and harmful
patterns of expression towards constructive and mutually
beneficial ones; while also 3) attending to structural violence
(inequality and discrimination);105 and 4) seeking systemic
change by “building on the energy and impact of conflict
itself.”106
104 Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace P. 17105 Schirch, L. (2013). Conflict assessment and peacebuilding planning: 106 Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace pg. 19
63
Thus, while the Minsk Group Co-Chairs are working tirelessly
to advance discussions and negotiations on the formal level, they
failed to acknowledge and push conflicting parties to address a
neglected aspect of a psychological dimension to the
conflict.107Tensions and mistrust between Armenian and
Azerbaijanis are linked to socio-cultural and historical
dimensions, that of memory, exclusive historic interpretations,
nationalistic myths and a collective identity.108 An application
of research concepts developed in studies on nationalism,
ethnicity and group identification allows selecting a few very
important features of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to
understand a mechanism that contributes to the emergence and
reigniting of armed conflict. The basis of analysis of the
Armenian and Azerbaijani perception of conflict will demonstrate
a correlation between Karabakh events and processes of nation-
building, and arising difficulties in this process that are
detrimental to the peaceful settlement of the conflict.
107 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. 108 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project.
64
The stalemate in the negotiation process109 led to criticism
and skepticism from both nations on a possibility of achieving a
peaceful settlement to the conflict. Prolonged negotiations led
to a belief in a single win-lose approach deepening the
polarization of public opinion. Polarization of public opinion,
assimilation of collective symbols and memory of war, continuous
propaganda, and negative attitudes towards the other, exclusive
hard-lined political stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh future legal
status only intensify feelings of mutual mistrust and hatred.110
In intractable conflicts, negative transformations also take
place through reinterpretations and rewriting of historical
accounts. Cases of shaping and transforming selective narratives
within the domestic public domain are not rare. It is a
reflection of a development of a group identity as it111 imitates
a sense of solidarity in times of turbulence and confusion, 112
and possesses a powerful ethnic mass mobilization potential.113
109 within the ongoing “no peace, no war” scenario,110 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. 111 These shared perceptions and collective identity112 Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes?113 Zolyan, M. (2005). Historical narratives and the representation of a conflict
65
An appeal to history and the past is a common and a very
powerful mechanism of a psychological impact on masses.114 Ilham
Aliyev, during his speech at the opening of the Guba genocide
memorial, emphasized the need of all, especially younger
generations, to know all aspects of history, including disasters
the [Azerbaijani] nation faced in the past. He went on to state
that it was necessary to produce research reflecting the
historical truth and communicate that history to Azerbaijani
population.115 Similar calls have been made by the Armenian
counterparts urging to support a comprehensive and meaningful
research around historical lands of the Armenian population.116
A clash between disputed national historical accounts does
not necessarily result in the emergence of a political conflict.
There are numerous cases, when utterly opposing accounts of
history do not interfere with the peaceful and positive
development of bilateral relations, or relations between various
ethnic groups within a single state. Yet, it is difficult to deny
114 Framing and constructing the past and political realities in the domestic public domain are widespread phenomenon and not constrained to a specific country or era. 115 Aliyev, I. (2013, September). The opening of the Guba Genocide Memorial complex.116 MassisPost. (2011, July 31). Critical moment in Armenian history: An appeal
66
the existence of a direct relationship between narratives of a
national history, built on a negative image and interpretation of
the “other” and ethnically motivated violence.
A narrative written on a combination of various elements and
characteristics, such as, a common vision of the world grounded
on experience, historic events, and adopted interpretation of
selected narratives, has a decisive influence on the development
of group identity.117 History provides a narrative that constructs
the spirit and core of a group’s identity, its values,
obligations and norms, relationship with other groups, determines
routes for present challenges and a trajectory for the future.118
Groups’ representations of their history are in its
“charter”, an account of its origin and historical mission”. 119
The charter, as Malinowsky describes, defines the timeless and
fundamental nature of a group that explains why nations and
ethnic groups react differently when presented with a similar
challenge. The charter continuously reconstructed and
renegotiated to reflect a fluctuating environment legitimizes
117 Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory118 Liu, J.H. & Hilton, D.J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: 119 Malinowki, B. (1926). Myth in primate psychology. Longon: Norton.
67
present political policies. Major institutions that promote this
talent of historical myth- and memory-making are the ones that
facilitate the absorption of these historical accounts and
written records across generations, which are educational
facilities, the media, and religious institutions. These
narratives are part of “institutional history,”120 the type that
supported by those institutions dominated in the community and
dominates in a given community.
Historical memories, communicated by way of mass education,
allow influencing beliefs and attitudes of people who could turn
those filtered experiences into action.121 This explains the
reason behind inflated in importance historical chronicles in
societies tangled in ethnic disputes. Events and narratives of
the past transformed into important political issues at present.
Debates around historical truth have little to do with the
objective historiography, as the aim is not to clarify historical
facts, but to provide an ideological explanation to a specific
political campaign.
120 Ferro, M. (1994). Kak rasskazyvaiyut istoriyu detiam v raznyh stranaah mira. Moscow: Vysshaia Shkola121 Gahramanova, A. (2010). Paradigms of political mythologies and perspectivesof reconciliation
68
A correlation between conflict and historical narratives are
twofold: 1) the effect of national representation of history on
events in the region, and 2) how various events in the zone of
conflict influence transformation of historical narratives. The
angle on national memory and historiography attracted a lot of
attention. Researchers noteworthy of mentioning, Garagozov,
Furman, Marutyan, Astourian, developed and produced a
considerable amount of research on this subject.122 Yet, they
emphasize the need to differentiate between “historical
narratives” and “collective memory”.
Shared memories have a complex relationship, as they are
based on historical narratives but might clash with collective
memories, which as Ferro points out preserved in the form of oral
accounts and transmitted in an informal environment (home, a
neighborhood) through community storytelling.123 In this context,
instrumentalization of the “Soviet people” narrative, founded on
explicit antinationalistic Soviet ideology, to educate Homo
122 Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes? ; Marutyan, H. (2007). Collectiveand historical memory in the dialogue of cultures.; Astourian, S. (1994). In search of their forefathers: National identity and the historiography and politics of Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnogeneses.; Furman, D. (2001). Azerbaijan i Rossiya.123 Ferro,M. (1994). Kak rasskazyvayut istoriu detiam v raznyh stranakh mira
69
Sovieticus,124 by suppressing negative experiences and
recollections of traumatic events was unable to wipe out
collective memories of the people in the Caucasus. Ironically,
this flawed system provided vast opportunities for the nation
building process, which strengthened ethno-nationalist myths in
the former Soviet space.125
Since the mid-1980s, the policy of “glasnost” promoted freedom
of the press, and led to a rapid rise of nationalism in a
society, which was deprived of a forum for public debates and
exchange of opinions. From the very start of this public debate,
the Armenians and Azeris connected their national identity to the
ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. A preceded re-surfacing and wide
circulation of nationalistic rhetoric and political mythology
activated a corresponding pattern of collective memory. However,
for the specific narrative to provide a foundation for the
outbreak of ethno-political conflict, it had to be powerful
enough to transform beliefs into actions.126
124 The term coined by A. Zinovyev, and implies the average soviet man125 Wertsch, J.V. (2002). Voice of Collective Remembering.; Slezkine, Y. (1994). The USSR as a communal apartment or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism. 126 Marutyan, H. (2007). Collective and historical memory in the dialogue of cultures
70
The influence a narrative has on a group is conditioned by
the manifestation of the following elements: 1) the group “has
definite patterns of collective memory” and 2)the distribution of
narratives’ contents that “interpret the present and/or
historical events of the past […] capable of exerting influence
on these patterns” in excessive quantities.127Analysis of various
research128 present that the theme of Armenian Genocide, and a
pattern of collective memory linked to numerous Armenian-Turkish
clashes, combined with an anarchical and weak state led to the
transformation of the image of the victim and gave way to the
image of a fighter, seeking justice and compassion to be achieved
through struggle. Such oversimplification does not explain the
reason behind the scale and dynamic of 1988 mass mobilization of
the Armenians in a matter of two weeks129, yet, in conjunction
with other elements, the narratives serve to be powerful
catalysts for a group’s social and political mobilization and a
127 Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory, 128 Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory; Rothchild, J. (1982). Ethnopolitics: A conceptual Framework.; Gahramanova, A. (2010). Paradigms of political mythologies and perspectives of reconciliation in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 129 From several hundred on February 13, 1988 to 700,000 February 25, 1998
71
“high level of in-group solidarity”.130 Research provides analyses
of developments that took place in the years leading up to the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the escalation of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, as well as, general practices in the Armenian
and Azerbaijani historiography.
Just as collective memories are capable of mobilizing
masses, inciting ethnic conflicts, they also can nurture
reconciliation. The reconciliation process, though, must stem
from the shift in participants’ collective identities and social
attitudes.131 Studies point out various ways to promote
reconciliation efforts and deal with troubled memories. One way
to cultivate trust and confidence for groups’ reconciliation and
cohesiveness is to seek, acknowledge and address grievances,
wrongdoings and injustice through mechanisms132 that provide
opportunities to explore the narrative of the past, develop new
patterns of a collective memory, and create a framework for new
historical narratives.
130 Cornell, S.E. (1997). Conflict Theory and the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: Guidelines for a Political Solution? 131 Kelman, H.C. (2008). Reconciliation from a social-psychological perspective. 132 such as Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as in the case of Kenya or South Africa
72
Another strategy that could possibly be conducive to
reconciliation is to let the past be forgotten, as in the case of
Catalonia and Spain. The strategy of erasing and forgetting the
past was effective in bringing reconciliation to the country at
that moment. Yet, this strategy of simply forgetting and erasing
the past from historical accounts seems to resolve the dispute
temporarily, but cannot escape collective memories of the
troubled past preserved and passed through generations in the
form of storytelling.
Intergroup dialogue and contact is also seen as a type of
peacebuilding initiative that is believed to result in mutually
beneficial cooperation. The underlying idea is that creating
collaborating interethnic relations could possibly break
political myths, transform hostile stereotypes and change
negative attitudes.133Garagozov, however, is skeptical with regard
to intergroup dialogue as a strategy for reconciliation and
attitudinal change. Plasticity, openness and readiness for
collaboration, a transformation and shared commitment to a
peaceful settlement to the conflict is difficult to overcome by
133 Kriesberg, L. (2000). Coexistence and the reconciliation of communal conflicts
73
opposing positions and visions on the future of the Nagorno-
Karabakh. He, instead, suggests changing collective memories
through the process of a progressive narrative transformation.
The objective of which is to construct a common narrative that
would allow conflicting parties to come to terms with their
troubled past. In the context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
recasting ethno-nationalist myths into more cooperative and
tolerant ones, alongside with writing and teaching of fair-minded
historical chronicles instead of nationalistic ones could be more
effective and efficient.
The need for this type of change is obvious in this case, as
mutual mistrust is the main obstacle to conflict resolution and
point to the importance of building trust between the disputed
parties. Peace negotiations and conflict transformation efforts
undertaken by national, international organizations and political
leaders have failed to bring about positive peace. This failure
highlights the limitation of negotiations and conflict resolution
initiatives and advocates the launching of a process of
reconciliation through a narrative transformation as a foundation
for peace.
74
B) Youth, Historical Narratives and Identity Formation
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is at a pivotal moment for
conflict transformation. The priorities must shift from merely
resolving the conflict and managing the risk of unintended
escalation to investing in a gradual attitudinal change in
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies to rule out military force as
a legitimate means to secure goals and interests in this
conflict.134 While parties are having difficulties to come to
an agreement on various subjects, a new generation is coming of
age with important implications for the feasibility of the peace
process. Given the current negotiation context and the tendency
of peace agreements and settlement implementation to be
elongated, currently disenfranchised adolescents and those in
their early adulthood will determine success or failure of a
peace process as they attain their political and institutional
reigns.135 In light of their roles, youth have significant
transformative powers and their prospective contributions to
134 L. Broers (personal communication March 31, 2014). 135 McEvoy-Levy, S. (2001). Youth, Violence and Conflict Transformation, Peace Review, 13, 89-96
75
politics and civil society are determined by their experiences,
collective memories and learned symbols of conflict and peace.
As was elaborated in the “Youth as Agents of Change”
chapter, youth is not a biological stage of human development,
but a social process that reproduces and/or renounces cultural
practices or historical narratives in the public discourse. Youth
depicts a process of personal human and socio-cultural
development, and they can and often have come to dissent and
dispute received social order.136 The role of youth in escalating
or otherwise transforming conflict presupposes the need to
explore the relationship between identity formations, narrative,
collective memory and conflict.
The emerging line of research on youth and identity
formation in conflict environments implicitly or explicitly
undertakes a narrative approach to the study. Identity is set at
both personal (individual) level and the social (collective)
level of circulating narratives on shared experiences and group
placement. In the field of psychology, there is an emphasis on
narrative identity at the level of individual development. In the
136Keniston, K. (1971). Youth and dissent. The rise of a new opposition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
76
field of political science, an emphasis is placed on the larger
collective level with narratives reproduced and communicated
through political ideological rhetoric and institutionalized
written accounts.
Identity development of younger generations probed in a
process of individual meaning making and memory telling helps to
internalize shared experiences, collective memory and historical
accounts. An analytical point of study involves the way youth
engage with historical narratives, as they create and develop
their personal and collective identities. McLean’s study on
memory telling function in identity construction137 defined
identity development as a process of narrative engagement closely
“mediated by social experiences,” in which individuals encounter
and utilize various discursive options to seek a meaning of their
experiences. Porat furthered the line of scholarship by studying
how individuals and youth engage with given narratives. He
discovered that written accounts are important, however, the
interpretation is linked to youths’ community and environment.
That is, the narrative engagement does not happen in a cultural
137 McLean, K.C. (2005). Late Adolescent Identity Development: Narrative Meaning Making and Memory Telling.
77
vacuum, but closely mediated by social experiences and requires
“sustained communities of shared […] interpretation to maintain
salience.”138
Furthermore, youth are not merely passive objects upon which
narratives project. Youth are producers and products of139
collective memory, socio-cultural and group identity. They are
part of a larger systemic structure, and, although, not drivers
of systemic change, they are active contributors to social,
political, and economic processes in peacetimes and conflict.140 A
narrative approach to identity development revealed the way a
dialectic nature of narratives’ meaning making reflects
individual placemaking in a conflict setting and the ability of
circulating master narratives reify the narrative basis of
conflict.
On a socio-structural and collective level two underlying
concepts of identity emerged in the literature on youth and
political conflict categorizing identity as either a burden or
138 Porat, D. (2004). Its not written here, but this is what happened: 139 Shwemer. Collective psychology140 See Abeyratne 2004 and Daiute 2006 for in-depth analysis of youth roles andsocial integration (Hammack)
78
benefit.141 The notion of identity as a burden is linked to its
function in influencing individuals to join and support
collective behavior and social activities that recreate or
maintain the status quo of conflict. Collective behavior and
social activities involve active contribution to political
violence and social processes of “memory making”, such us use of
a negative image and interpretation of the “other” and inflating
intergroup differences that complement libeling in conflict
environments. The concept of identity, through this lens, becomes
a tool hindering individual judgment, rationality and morals.142
The concept of identity built on a discourse of power,
subordination and social categorization and order framed as
“natural.”143 Parties struggling with representation and
identification are likely to be the subject to the established
system of social order and are likely to utilize arrangements
within that system to enhance their position in the social
hierarchy. An identity as a burden for youth is rooted on the
141 Hammack, P.L. (2010). Identity as burden or benefit? Youth, historical narrative, and the legacy of political conflict. 142 Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. American behavioral scientist, 50, 1430-1453143 Reicher, S. (2001). Self and nation categorization, contestation and mobilization London : SAGE.
79
belief that if polarized narrative of a collective identity
accepted incontestably and internalized by individuals, then
these individuals are likely to overlook and miss identity as a
tool for liberation, separation to have an agency over narrative
meaning making.
The bulk of the literature highlights the negative effects
that political violence has on the psychological well-being of
young adults. In order to cope with the stress of violence, young
adults are likely to turn to narratives and collective memories
that rationalize and make a meaning of ongoing senseless
conflict. Such strategies allow youth to build their resiliency
capacities and maintain their ability to function under extreme
stress.
Punamaki discovered that “Israeli children with much
experience of political violence, did not manifest increased
psychological problems, when they had a strong ideological
commitment” to the group’s participation in armed conflict.144
Muldoon and Wilson, however, suggested that mental health,
internalization of the group’s identity, and ideological
144 Punamaki, R.L. (1996). Can ideological commitment protect children’s psychosocial well-being
80
commitment have a bit more of a complex relationship. Greater
ideological commitment might lead to young adults taking part in
violence, increasing their risk of mental health problems
afterwards.145 At the same time, ideological commitment and a high
level of identification appear to develop a negative image of the
other, stereotypes, negative attitudes, and support for violence
against “outsiders.”146 Yet, their study established that youth in
Northern Ireland with high levels of ideological commitment
reported high levels of self-esteem. Ultimately, it might provide
a reason and an explanation on the youth’s decision to
internalize narratives of collective memories to build resiliency
and cope with possible psychological problems that might arise.
Education is a source of social reproduction,
instrumentalization of collective memory, and a site for
rewriting historical accounts. An absolute state control over
historical narratives, with capacities and abilities to alter and
implant master narratives, provides an advantage over maintaining
hegemony and supremacy over minds. Educational materials could 145 Muldoon, O.T. & Wilson,K.(2001). Ideological Commitment, 146 Bar-Tal, D. (1996). Development of social categories and stereotypes in each childhood: The case of ‘the Arab’ concept formation, stereotype and attitudes by Jewish children in Israel. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20, 341-371
81
delegitimize the stance of the other side, could sustain and
promote the status quo, and promote tension escalation. Numerous
cases, as in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the role of
geography and history education effectively delegitimizes the
narrative of the other side, while delivering blanket of themes
of collective victimization, security, and positive self-image.147
History is an essential component in sustaining the group’s
identity and historical memory. History is a tool for emotional
resonance that purposefully commemorates conflicts between groups
by identifying friends, foes, and the group’s calling. Written
accounts of factual events in conjunction with widely recognized
figures, which are woven into temporary versions of a narrative,
communicate emotional messages of collective memory and shared
experiences, intelligence and wisdom of the group. Present day
interpreters are the ones who evoke needed emotions and
attitudes. Factual accounts of events and people are
undisputed148, however their meaning, interpretation, the larger
narratives woven into and relevance to the present time can be
147 Bar-Gal, Y. (1994). The image of the Palestinian in geography textbooks in Israel. 148 Similar to the saying of “history written by the victors”,
82
easily disputed. If these historical accounts and social
representation of events are widely accepted in public discourse,
it assures legitimization of current social order and political
arrangements. In a way, formal education and state-controlled
institutions, that enables communicating a specific narrative,
provide fertile ground for identity polarization and conflict
reproduction.
However, education can also plant seeds for positive social
change. Education can actively counter a culture of violence
through a series of inter-communal encounters, lecture series on
peace education and conflict resolution, while facilitating
broader interaction between divided and contested societies. In
their research on social representation of history149 Liu,
Lawrence, Ward and Abraham also argue that when the dominant
representation of history offers an acceptable and fair position
for each subgroup within a nation it facilitates a “positive
networking”, a term that defines a positive relationship between
national and subgroup identity.150 At the same time, a 149 Liu, J.H., Wilson, M.W., Ward, C., & Abraham,S. (2002). Social representations of history in Malaysia and Singapore: On the relationship between national and ethnic identity. 150 Liu, J.H., Wilson, M.W., Ward, C., & Abraham,S. (2002). Social representations of history
83
representation of history should contain narratives that allow
for subgroup reconciliation, reflect the group’s identity to
participate in the national agenda, and be part of the socially
constructed definition of nationality;151 thus, to allow self-
identification at a higher level (regional and national) to
complement lower-level self-identification (ethnicity, subgroup,
individual).152 Should the minority representations of history
contradict with the dominant narrative, it is likely to create
tensions between majority and minority (ethnic) identities, the
results of which we have seen in the eruption of secession
movements after the collapse of the Soviet Union.153
Built on the framework of oppression and liberation
theology, an alternative perspective on identity highlights a
transformative nature of identity. This idea challenges the
notion of conflict as essentially negative and undesirable, and
situates it as a need to transform the status quo, which
undermines interests and needs of marginalized and low-status
151 Reicher, S. (2001). Self and nation categorization, contestation and mobilization London : SAGE.152 Hawke, D. (2005). Reconstructing the past and attributing the responsibility for the Holocaust.153 Papazian, L. (2001). A People’s Will: Armenian Irredentism over Nagorno-Karabakh,
84
groups for recognition and representation. Similarly, to that of
“identity as burden”, the starting point and basis of this
concept of “identity as a benefit” lays on the axis of power,
subordination and social order.
A comprehensive scholarship on education and identity
formation presents the notion of narrative engagement that
demonstrates how youth can confront internalization of
conflicting narrative, at the same time having young adults
engage in multicultural education and coexistence programs to
expose them to the narrative of the other. Conflict can be a
positive force challenging discrimination and inequality and
initiating steps towards social change, justice and human rights.
Battles have been waged and the global rise of political activism
laid a foundation to counter oppression, social order,
subordination, authoritative regimes while contributing to social
justice for marginalized groups. Youth are seen as subordinated
to adults and elites with a hegemonic agency for decision-making
in the political, financial, conflict resolution or humanitarian
fields. More than often, political voices of youth are silenced
with little to no representation. Nonetheless, youth have the
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agency to develop personal identities, to construct make a
meaning of narratives, communicate memories through storytelling,
to gain and share knowledge with their group and wider
audience.154
The view of conflict as transformation and narrative
identity as a tool for systemic change can be tied to the
identity politics movement.155 As Taylor argues the identity
politics movement is about recognition and redistribution of
power within political, social and economic spheres.156There are
numerous cases in modern history of the “use of identity as a
tool for liberation from subordination,”157 such as struggles and
movements for recognition and equality of ethnic minorities,
LGBTQ rights, or civil rights. The use of identity represents the
framework of “strategic essentialism”158 in its acknowledgement
that just as social categories serve the foundation for
154 McEvoy-Levy, S. (2000). Silenced Voices? Youth and peer relationships in armed conflict and its aftermath. 155 Bernstein, M., & Taylor, V. (2013). Identity politics. 156 Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition.157 Hammack, P.L. (2006). Identity, Conflict, and Coexistence: Life stories of Israeli and Palestinian Adolescents. 158 Term first coined by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; Hangen, S. (2005). Race and the politics of identity in Nepal.; and Garza, C.M. (1995). Chicana lesbian identity and strategic essentialism
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oppression and subordination, they can confer political power and
state control.
The intention of this chapter has been to examine the
interplay of hegemonic narratives, collective memory and its
effect on youth identity, development and status in conflict and
post-conflict settings. Historical narratives are a powerful tool
that promotes collective remembering, develops a group identity,
and evokes emotions and attitude. Acknowledging that in a fragile
and unstable environment, there is widespread dissemination of
exclusive and glorifying representations of history and
identities; youth internalizes a given narrative to make sense of
context and cope with stress. However, branding youth as a source
of instability and perpetrators of violence, fails to recognize
the complex role and status youth holds in such settings.
Programs that cater to the needs of youth and realize youth’s
positive and transformative potential can facilitate the young
people’s role in conflict transformation. Sequencing these
programs with efforts to lessen confrontational attitudes through
narrative transformation could possibly mediate attitude changes
and facilitate rapprochement between parties.
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Chapter V: Key FindingsA) Youth Attitudes and Beliefs on Peace and Human Rights
A review of national and regional context demonstrate that
Armenia and Azerbaijan have been involved in a number of armed
conflicts going back centuries and are currently involved in a
mutually destructive conflict. The existence of a conflict with
sporadic violent escalations has claimed lives and has been
detrimental to fostering a peaceful environment for people to
enjoy their freedoms and rights. A continuous support and ongoing
efforts of international mediators and civil society
organizations allowed both nations to reach and enjoy negative
peace within their borders. Yet, constant escalations on the line
of contact, militaristic and hateful official statements,
personal and historical memories of conflict and aggression,
affected the way youth defines, perceives peace and conflict.
Thus, the survey attempted to answer the following questions:
when asked to define peace, do respondents provide negative or
positive definitions159 of peace? Do they view peace as achievable
or idealistic? Do they believe a right to peace is a human right?
159 Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4
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Do they believe reconciliation between Armenian and Azerbaijani
nations is realistic and achievable? What steps and factors are
necessary to achieve inter-group reconciliation, regional
security and stability? What actors should be involved to bring
about peace? and, Do they believe youth is an important social
actor that could influence the peace process?
The sample for the first section was composed of 69
respondents: 31 Armenians and 38 Azerbaijanis. Respondents’
demographic information allowed me to analyze individual
conceptualization and understanding of terms based on certain
demographic characteristics (other than ethnicity) such as:
gender; participation in peace education programs; involvement in
some sort of protest activity, and; having a family member who
was affected by or who participated in armed combat. The majority
of participants provided basic demographic information; however
not all replied to all items throughout they survey, as
respondents had an option to skip or decline to answer questions.
This chapter provides key findings of the survey.
First, participants were asked to define what peace meant to
them. Respondents’ answers to this question varied from a single
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word to lengthy sentences. To analyze the data, each answer was
placed and sorted by thematic categories. Definitions of peace
were categorized by the following themes: negative peace,
positive peace, and idealism. Responses sorted into ‘negative
peace’ column described peace in terms of the absence, removal or
an end of a threatening situation or aggressive act. The
‘positive peace’ column included responses that described both
prerequisites and outcomes of peace and incorporated components
such as equality, tolerance, human rights, freedoms, that must be
in place to achieve peace. The ‘idealism’ category incorporated
responses that questioned attainability of peace, and rather
described peace as an ideal scenario.
More than two thirds (70 percent) of the Azerbaijani youth
responses included definitions within a “negative peace category”
as opposed to 40 percent of the Armenian youth and defined peace
as “an absence of armed and military combat.” Positive peace -
included in 10 percent of Azerbaijani youth definitions, and 39
percent of Armenian youth responses, was defined as “mutual
understanding,” “positivity” and “harmony.” Five percent of the
Azerbaijani and 19 percent of the Armenian youth defined peace as
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an ideal state. Demographic characteristics, such as gender,
involvement and participation in protests or peace education, did
not reveal any statistical significance when defining the term.
One can argue that this displays that youth in way is
conditioned to see the world peace through a lens of arms and
power struggle, where a single state or international system has
a right to utilize any available means to bring about peace.
Galtung argues this concept of peace, which dominates political
environment, serves the interests of the powerful to maintain
status quo in the society.160
Once youth reflected on what peace meant to them, subsequent
questions explored their attitudes on the right to peace. There
is a deep linkage between peace and human rights. Just as peace
promotes and protects human rights, a respect for human rights
and dignity serves the foundation of freedoms and peace.161 Thus,
while the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth displayed their beliefs
towards peace, this question examined whether they believe in the
right to peace.
160 Galtung, J. (1981). Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace. Journal of PeaceResearch, 17(2), 189-199.161 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the HC on the outcome of the workshop onthe right of peoples to peace
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The majority of respondents (94 percent) conveyed their
strong belief that “all human beings have a right to peace,”
including 91 percent of Armenian and 97 percent of Azerbaijani
youth. Responses to this question varied, with many responses
perceiving this right as an individual (personal) right, while a
few mentioned it as a collective right. Similar to definitions of
peace, responses on the human right to peace argued the
responsibility to protect and promote the right to peace lies
with states, and are the one to blame for concurrent violation of
this inherent right. For example, one respondent reasoned, “From
my point of view, there should be no obstacles to a happy and
peaceful life in this world. Egotistical (selfish) start wars,
who during the planning or implementation process do not think
about the lives of others, and cannot put oneself in a place of
ordinary people who suffer in the course of actions.” This
statement possibly implies that youth places the blame for lack
of peace on elitist groups, those with power (governments),
rather than “ordinary people”, since an “average citizen” has no
influence on policy development. Few other examples included “the
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right to peace is as inherent as the right to life”, and “every
person – is an individual, why would (s)he seek war?”
The question regarding childrens’ rights to grow up in a
world of peace received similar positive feedback with 96 percent
of respondents agreeing with the statement: 92 percent of
Armenians and 100 percent Azerbaijanis. Respondents’ explanation
to this question can be categorized into a culture of peace
theme. A culture of peace means that peace cannot be imposed;
rather it can come about through a change of mindset and change
of culture.162 A respondent wrote, “Children developing into
adulthood should not see war as to avoid [possible] negative
consequences. A child needs to see a peaceful environment to
think in peaceful terms; a future might not be easy for them
because of various obstacles, but the war is not something kids
should experience growing up.” Justifications and explanations
for violence, invasion or attack, are incompatible with a culture
of peace. While, the majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth
respondents defined peace as an absence of war, they do, however
162 United Network of Young Peacebuilders (2013, February). http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RightPeace/Pages/WGDraftUNDeclarationontheRighttoPeaceStatements.aspx
93
believe, that the next generation should instead think in terms
of positive peace and restoration of relationship. They also
argue that there should policies and structures in place to
develop a culture of peace for the benefit of children, future
and world peace.
Regarding the right to protest against war and in favor of
peace, there was conformity about this right. An analysis of
responses revealed that 15 percent of Azerbaijani and 11 percent
of Armenian youth argued against such a right, as opposed to 86
percent of Armenians and 70 percent of Azerbaijanis, who argued
in favor. The majority of proprotest respondents noted that
people are entitled to this right (to peacefully voice their
concerns), and that “The desire to leave in peaceful times – is an inherent
right”. There were those respondents who neither agreed nor
disagreed with this statement, as one respondent expressed “I
would not participate in this type of events, as I believe any
protest or rally lead to those same wars, however, on a smaller
scale. Peace cannot be achieved until there is harmony and
understanding. People need to be heard to be understood, however
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cry always perceived negatively, which can be said about the
protest.”
Literature on the right to peaceful assembly and association
maintains that antiwar, non-violent peace activism plays a
significant role toward the decline of armed conflict and
attainment/sustainability of peace.163 Overall, Armenian and
Azerbaijani respondents demonstrated a widespread support for the
right to protest in favor of peace, while reaffirming it as an
inherent and basic human right, and an outlet to voice one’s
concerns and needs. However, none of the participants linked the
right to protest to an engagement in advocating political parties
for peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Perspectives on the right to protest did not seem to vary in
relation to one’s gender, neither in relation to previous
involvement in protests, nor participation in peace education
programs.
B) Youth Attitudes and Beliefs on Reconciliation
Intractable ethnic conflicts and long-running disputes
deeply set and influence ecological and socio-political
163 Cohrs, C.J., & Boehnke, K. (2008). Social psychology and peace. Social Psychology, 39(1), 4-11 – Pierhke
95
environment with aggression, hostility, distrust and anger. For
high-level political negotiations to be accepted by the general
population, processes of inter-group contact and reconciliation
must accompany a top-down process of conflict resolution.
Reconciliation is a complex term, as it implies both, a process
and a state. Prior to delving deep into the subject, it is
important to explore how Armenian and Azerbaijani youth define
reconciliation and if they believe reconciliation is possible.
An overwhelming majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth
indicated that they believe reconciliation is achievable and only
eight percent of Azerbaijani and five percent of Armenian youth
argued the opposite. Based on collected responses, definitions of
reconciliation ranged and were categorized into following major
themes: 1) process, 2) an achieved state, 3) and perceived
reality.
A “perceived reality” category incorporated responses that
referred to or reflected some sort of a real event or situation,
such as “1994”, rather than a definition of the term. An
“achieved state” or stage, referred to definitions such as the
end of the conflict, or hostilities, or a positive emotional
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state, like “when everything is good.” A “process” theme
incorporated responses that referred to an act of finding a way
to live alongside with former adversaries, placing or setting
aside the memory of the contested past, to rebuilding
relationships with the enemy in “an attempt to get along and
improve relations.” A majority of responses (43 percent), defined
reconciliation as an achieved state, followed by “reconciliation
as a process” (32 percent) and a “perceived reality” (25
percent), with the latter mainly including Armenian responses.
Demographics characteristics revealed a significance of
association. Proportionally more Azerbaijani and Armenian women,
rather than men, provided a definition that was categorized to
the ‘process’ theme. On the other hand, respondents with a family
member who was affected by or who participated in armed combat
were more likely to provide a definition that was categorized
into an ‘achieved state’ or stage theme.
These responses display how definitions vary in complexity
and substance. Differences in demographics demonstrate that youth
across ethnic lines define terms in similar or divergent ways
depending on a specific characteristic and current regional
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context. Historical and collective memories of the nation’s past,
lengthy history of conflicts and invasions, remembrance of
marginalization from the hands of invaders, in addition to
ongoing direct or indirect exposure to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict reflect the way Armenian and Azeri youth define
reconciliation.
Young adults do not necessarily see reconciliation as a
process that involves forgiveness, or healing, rebuilding
relationships or trust, as Lederach defines it. They see it a
state, such as “a temporary cease of armed conflict,” or a
“specific stage between conflict and peace.” However, lacking a
vision of process, lacking a vision of future orientation and
mutual collaboration for a common cause should raise concerns.
These findings of a small group of respondents reconfirm that
those seeking to bring parties to an agreement must raise
awareness on what reconciliation will be should parties come to
an agreement on the implementation of confidence building
measures; and of utmost importance should reflect ordinary
people’s priorities and interests within the holistic
reconciliation process.
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C) Steps and conditions for inter-group reconciliation
An intractable and prolonged conflict such as the conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh raises notes of distrust. Both nations are
suspicious of each other, and suspicious of proposed solutions to
the conflict by the adversary.164 An important element in a
reconciliation process is rebuilding a certain level of trust
between conflicting parties. When the trust is damaged, a trust-
building process should consider the following factors: 1) who
should take the initiative to stimulate reconciliation, and who
actually desires to rebuild trust; and 2) if those, whose trust
was broken are willing to reconcile and restore trust?165
Respondents rated their level of agreement with the following
statement “rebuilding trust is essential for reconciliation, and
it is the offender who should take the initiative in stimulating
reconciliation.”
The majority of responses, 82 percent, agreed that trust-
building is essential for reconciliation and the offender should
the initiative, accounting to 79 percent of Armenian and 85
164 Trust-Building. (n.d.). In International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict.165 Lewicki, R.J., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2003). Trust and Trust Building. Beyond Intractability.
99
percent of Azerbaijani youth. Some respondents concentrated their
responses to the first part of the statement, noting, “trust
building might help resolving the conflict”, while others pointed
out the importance of the second part: “it is well established
that the first step to make a truce originates from perpetrators
of the conflict.” Fisher’s exact test assessed the extent to
which there was a significance of association between the
statement and respondents’ demographics. Proportionally more
respondents, who previously participated in peace protests or
peace education, than respondents who did not, agreed with the
statement.
Zartman, on the other hand, argues that timing for
negotiations is a key to the peaceful settlement of disputes. He
further describes this concept as a “ripe moment.”166 The concept
centers on the conflicting “parties’ perception of a mutually
hurting stalemate”167 – thus, a situation in which parties realize
that status quo – is lose-lose situation, as opposed to a zero-
sum game. A stalemate and continuation of the status quo is
harmful to both parties. Hence, to avoid the mutual loss, parties
166 Zartman, W.I. (2013). Ripeness. Beyond Intractability167 Zartman, W.I. (2013). Ripeness. Beyond Intractability
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seek a “way out” or an alternative policy to settle the conflict
as it might negative affect both. So, respondents were asked to
rate their agreement to the following statement “a situation, in
which neither side can win, continuing the stalemate negative
affects attitudes and sharply increases sufferings; seeking an
alternative policy might alter attitudes and serve as a tool for
reconciliation.” Over half of respondents (53 percent),
accounting for 44 percent of Armenian and 65 percent of
Azerbaijani respondents, reported their agreement with the
statement. Perspectives on the concept of “ripe moment” did not
seem to vary in relation to one’s gender, neither in relation to
previous involvement in protests, nor participation in peace
education programs.
A further review of the literature on steps and factors to
achieve reconciliation suggests that a sincere apology has
potential to facilitate forgiveness and healing, as apology and
recognition of past wrongdoings are essential parts to the larger
process. Yet, simply apologizing is not enough: recognition of
wrongdoings, the circumstance of the apology and further action
following public apology are very relevant. Thus, respondents had
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to answer whether they believe “an apology by the invading
country could improve the chances for reconciliation”, and “what
steps are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving
reconciliation?” An analysis of responses displayed a statistical
significance. The majority of Azerbaijani youth, 71 percent, as
opposed to 46 percent of Armenian youth believed an apology was a
necessary component for reconciliation.
There were major differences on their views regarding steps
and factor that should accompany an apology in achieving
reconciliation. The Fisher’s exact test revealed that Armenian
youth focused and provided an answer that was included within
‘repairing relations’ category. These responses accounted for 55
percent of Armenian respondents, as opposed to 8% of Azerbaijani
respondents. Examples of such are “parties should think about the
future”, or “end the politics of hatred, Armenophobia and
Azerophobia”, “stop antagonizing youth towards aggression and
hatred.”
The Azerbaijani youth concentrated on the type of apology
that is furthered by actions, as simply apologizing is not
enough. These responses accounted for 50 percent of Azerbaijani,
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and only 14 percent of Armenian respondents. However, Armenian
and Azerbaijani responses that were categorized within the
tangible needs category varied in meanings. The following are the
answers by Azerbaijani respondent coded to tangible needs
category: “return all currently-occupied Azerbaijani territory.
[…] And reimburse all financial costs and effects to refugees in
Azerbaijan”; “An apology and compensation, reparations to
families of victims, forcibly resettled persons, and refugees;
full payment of economic damage.” While Armenian responses within
the same category were, “open the border” and “independence and
recognition of our territories.” These responses could imply
that both groups associate their sense of identity with the same
territory. As each side provides explanations such as ‘we must
possess or live on our historic lands as they represent our
nation’s meaning, past and current sufferings and collective
identity.’ Thus, a threat of losing the land implies losing their
identity in a sense.
Other responses included: recognition of wrongdoing,
implying that the country that is apologizing must admit and
recognize one’s own mistake, and readiness for diplomatic
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negotiations. Gender, one’s involvement in antiwar protests or
peace education programs did not display a significance of
association within this category of question.
Armenian and Azerbaijani youth have a strong belief that
reconciliation can be achieved. They also view apology as an
important aspect that can promote and further support
reconciliation efforts. However, views on how to make an apology
effective differed as conflict, narratives is present and
reinforced through historical narratives, collective memory,
personal experiences and national values. Yet, again, they all
agreed that apology has a potential and could be a step forward
towards the end goal.
D) The dynamic of identity and reconciliation
There are identity-related processes at various levels
(individual, social, structural) that play significant roles in
maintaining, escalating a conflict, contributing to
intractability, creating a negative image or dehumanizing the
adversary. In an intractable and prolonged conflict, in which
parties perceive a threat to their individual and collective
identities, they are not likely to be ready or willing to move
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toward resolution or reconciliation. Thus, the change in the
dynamics and nature of the relationship must take place to allow
changes to occur on a larger level. Changes to the nature of a
relationship would not directly, or immediately, alter individual
or collective identities, but the experience of relating in some
significant different way, over time, can create change in
identity. Northrop notes several elements that could facilitate a
redefinition of the nature of the relationship.168 First, the
introduction of a new threat, that endangers all conflicting
groups and requires adversaries to cooperate to defend themselves
against the new threat, can serve as a useful reconciliation
tool. Forty-one percent of respondents agreed with the statement,
while over 26 percent disagreed to the statement arguing, “a
threat is a provocation to new conflict that can only worsen
conditions.” Gender, involvement in antiwar protests or peace
education programs did not display a significance of association
within this category of question.
Northrop further explored that changes in the nature of
relationship also might occur if a subgroup within one of the
168 Northrup, T.A. (1989). The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict.
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parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of
cooperative relationship with the adversary, change and path
forward to reconciliation may be possible. Responses to this
statement display that more than half agreed with the statement,
while about 25 percent of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth could
neither agree nor disagree with it. Gender, one’s involvement in
antiwar protests or peace education programs did not display a
significance of association within this category of question.
The literature review presents that grass-roots dialogue and
inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a
relationship from one that is adversarial to one that is
conciliatory. The survey questioned if respondents agreed with
the prompt. Proportionally more women than men agreed with the
statement. Seventy-one percent of Azerbaijani respondents agreed
with the statement, as opposed to 54 percent of Armenian
respondents who agreed. Respondents noted, “a dialogue provides a
good a chance to be heard.” The second most popular answer to
this statement displayed neither agreement nor disagreement with
the statement; and few strongly disagreed noting that the
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adversary “does not want peace; and the conflict can only be
resolved with war.”
Certain implications for strategies for change exist.
Responses of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth display that although
shifting and transforming the nature of relationship might sound
like a good alternative, as it does not necessarily seek to
change individual and collective identities, achieving that
change through Northrop’s above suggested methods would be highly
unsuccessful. The introduction of a new threat is perceived as
detrimental to rebuilding relationships, and, thus, such strategy
would be faced with obstacles and resistance from both nations.
Encouraging a subgroup to initiate intergroup contact is believed
to be effective, however, did not receive a widespread support
from either group. The use of grass-root dialogues can be
considered a feasible strategy, as these dialogues would not
occur outside the usual public channels and would provide a
mechanism through which disputants and adversaries may more
safely derigidify their relationship.
The question that explored whether youth, as a social group,
would be an important actor to participate and influence the
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peace process revealed that only 65 percent believe it to be so,
while approximately 30 percent did not see youth as an important
actor. Armenian youth was more likely to view their social group
an important actor in the peace process (71 percent), as opposed
to Azerbaijani youth (61 percent). Similarly, those who reported
being involved in conflict resolution or peace education programs
were more likely to agree with the statement (65 percent), as
opposed to those who did not (35 percent). The most commonly
cited (38 percent) role that youth could play was categorized as
a positive and productive role. Categories with youth defining
their roles as negative and passive accounted for 13 percent
each. Responses to this question ranged considerably. One
respondent noted, “young people, students and activist can play a
prosperous role in the peace process.” Another respondent argued,
“I do not think my group could lead the peace process between the
parties, but I believe, that we can ensure and avoid displaying
negativity towards the people of the country, with whom there is
a conflict.” While one confidently stated “I could participate in
armed combat.”
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A sustainable and lasting solution to a conflict is feasible
only with the involvement of all groups, including youth. It is
encouraging to see that more than half of Armenian and
Azerbaijani population recognize the importance of their role in
the peace process, yet, it is discouraging do see that many see
their participation in a passive or negative manner, while 27
percent did not believe in the importance of youth participation
in the peace process at all. The current negotiation format and
mediation process are evidence that political elites are far from
promoting and empowering active participation of various groups,
be that civil society activists or youth groups. Yet, again, an
imposed political resolution that does not sit well with public
opinion will essentially cost a politician his or her position.
Voices and concerns of ordinary people should be taken into
consideration.
E) Part II: Narratives Section
Once respondents completed a questionnaire, they were
directed to the next phase. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of four narratives about current situational context and
various impacts of the unresolved Karabakh conflict. These
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narratives were: “common suffering,” “blame the OSCE,” “blame the
Russians,” “youth’s role in the peace process.” Narratives’
descriptions and instructions are provided in the Appendix. A
social distance question measured Azerbaijani’s and Armenian’s
attitude towards the adversary. The average of responses to the
social distance question presented high scores meaning greater
distance between the two nations (Azerbaijani’s mean = 3.48;
Armenian’s mean = 3.0). Thus Azerbaijani youth showed greater
social distance than the Armenian youth.
A grounded theory approach was used to create a coding
system to assess participants’ general negative or tolerant
association or mood towards a narrative. An analysis of the
general attitudes to the narrative did not display positive
correlation. Moreover, the narrative on the role of youth in the
peace process presented statistically significant higher levels
of negativity attitudes and social distance in the Azerbaijani
youth. While the ‘common suffering’ and presented similar
findings in the Armenian youth. Narratives that blamed the
Russians or the OSCE seemed to bring both parties to agreement,
with attitudes ranking similarly. In order to develop an
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understanding of this subject, I analyzed comments and individual
responses.
Responses discussing the “common suffering” narrative
appeared to follow several themes: “they are the enemy,” “the
current situation hinders livelihoods,” and “comparative
victimhood.” Respondents, who provided explanations within the
“enemy” theme displayed high social distance and negativity
attitudes. One respondent wrote the situation must end “homes in
Shusha and Karabakh remain empty from the war.” While another
further explored “the conflict is not only detrimental for the
ordinary people, but for the state and power structure. First,
there are numerous human losses, involuntary displacement and
exile from native territories. The conflict plays a detrimental
role, as hatred towards Armenians only leads to increased
aggression and violence. Those who have Armenian roots are forced
to hide them, or turn into enemies. For the state – the conflict
is detrimental as it prevents countries from creating a free
trade zone on the Caucasus territory that could strengthen
economies. Yet, instead both conflicting parties are highly
dependent on “outsiders”, and the help that is provided is not
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gratuitous.” Few comments manifested what might be called a
“competitive victimhood”, which is subjective claim that one’s
group has suffered more than the other.169 Yet, these types of
perceptions and claims could develop into obstacles during the
reconciliation process.
“Blame the OSCE” and “blame the Russians” narratives
resonated deeply with the Armenian (67 percent) and Azerbaijani
side (75 percent), and displayed high negativity attitudes.
Armenian and Azerbaijani responses discussing the OSCE and Russia
appeared to follow several common themes: The OSCE Minsk Group
lacks influence and pressure, Russia is interested in weak
Caucasus region, outside powers influence the peace process and
status quo. An Azerbaijani respondent wrote, “The OSCE does not
have a leverage or pressure on the conflicting parties. The
Madrid principles are interpreted differently by different
countries. The approach “not to offend anyone” eventually will be
rejected. Then we can talk about the progress.” An Armenian
replied to the ‘Blame the Russians’ narrative, “Well, it is
beneficial for the RF (Russian Federation) to have instability in
169 Nadler, A. (2002). Postresolution processes: Instrumental and socioemotional routes to reconciliation.
112
the region, that way it can enforce its control and influence
countries (in the South Caucasus region).” While another
respondent further elaborated “This is not only the case with
Russia; there are other countries interested in conflict as a way
to easily manipulate conflicting parties.”
Another theme emerged from the comments to both narratives,
such as “blame the other side for the lack of progress,” with
comments set at two extremes. An Azerbaijani respondent wrote,
“The OSCE Minsk Group, unfortunately is ineffective. For all the
talks – over 20 years – nothing has been achieved. They fail
mainly because Armenia shows no respect for international law,
the OSCE and the UN resolutions requiring a return of occupied
Azerbaijani territory.” At the other end, an Armenian respondent
wrote, “To this date, an alternative to the OSCE Minsk Group does
not exist. This is the only platform for mediators and
conflicting parties to exploit. As for the failure of the Minsk
Group, it is largely due to the absence of a constructive
approach to negotiations from Azerbaijan.” It is encouraging to
see that there are certain themes within a narrative that seem to
resonate similarly with both groups. Those involved in
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peacebuilding and reconciliation process should aim and seek to
explore these themes within the larger narrative to begin a
discussion and dialogue on common beliefs in an attempt to
restructure the nature of the relationship in a longer-term.
Similarly, type of perceptions and claims that could develop into
obstacles during the reconciliation process should be addressed
in a conflict-sensitive manner.
The narrative on the role of youth in the peace process
displayed negative attitudes from the Azerbaijani side, and
tolerant attitudes from the Armenian side. Responses discussing
the theme appeared to follow several common themes. A theme on
youth agency, included responses such as “we are the future for
this country if we do not take up this problem, it will continue;
our children and grandchildren will suffer.” A theme on the power
of elites, incorporated comments like, “In my opinion, young
people cannot have an impact on a peace process in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, this issue is very complex and probably is a
question of political relations between two countries.” The
literature review suggests that the line between agency and
manipulation of the elitist structures is not clear-cut. The
114
conflict is a creation of elites struggling for power, and the
role that youth will get to play depends on the existing
structures. As evidence suggests not only is the general
population in Armenia and Azerbaijan detached from the
negotiation process, but their management rights have been
seized, while elitist structures in both nations far from
empowering or facilitating active participation of all groups. A
sustainable and lasting peace is only feasible with the
involvement and collaboration of all type of actors: top, middle-
range and grassroots leadership.
F) General Discussion
This research contributes to a bank of knowledge of a
complex dynamic between narratives, collective memory and
attitudes by providing insights into the feasible mechanisms that
could stimulate narrative-based attitudinal change in a conflict
situation. To gain a better understanding of this subject,
conducting a study on the ground would be the best choice.
Conducting online perception surveys with groups originating from
115
contested and divided societies presents challenges and obstacles
in terms of the recruitment process, data collection and
analysis. Therefore, a similar comparative study in person would
be highly advisable.
This research provides evidence that although the new
generation does not have a first-hand account of living alongside
with the adversary, collective and historical memories
communicated via state-sponsored or community-based channels have
led to a mentality that dehumanizes and distrusts the adversary
and is reflected in individual responses. Besides, both groups
displayed rather high level of social distance towards the other.
It is likely that narratives similar to “blame the OSCE or the
Russians” makes it possible to divert one’s attention towards
blaming a third party. It also has potential of finding a common
base to begin a dialogue between two groups that could possibly
result in positive and productive interaction between the two.
One of the most interesting findings is that the majority of
Armenian and Azerbaijani respondents did not believe in their
right to fully participate in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.
Moreover, they believed this should be left to states and
116
multinational organizations. This finding suggests that youth are
alienated, disengaged, and misinformed about the actual process
of conflict resolution or the peace process. The need to
demystify the negotiation process, to advocate for youth
empowerment, engagement and participation in a process is greater
than ever. Armenian and Azerbaijani youth has as much potential
for peacebuilding as for violence, and in a unified voice survey
respondents noted that they believed reconciliation is possible.
As these young adults become the next generation to lead their
countries, their experiences and memories may alter the nation’s
trajectory towards reconciliation, a peaceful settlement of the
conflict, or reincitation of the armed conflict. Only by
empowering and engaging youth, and other low status and
marginalized groups, will the elitist structures involved in a
mediation process be forced to act responsibly by listening to
and understanding the needs and positions of a larger society.
ConclusionThe Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a conflict of mutually
exclusive historical interpretations, shared perceptions, and
117
collective identity. The evidence suggests that both communities
have connected their national identity to the ownership of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, a threat of losing the land implies
losing their identity. The OSCE Minsk Group, working tirelessly
to resolve the conflict on a political level, failed to
acknowledge an important aspect of a psychological dimension to
the conflict. Failure to recognize and address psychological,
social and collective aspects to the conflict hinders the
possibility and a potential to transform inter-group relations
and the conflict.
Track II diplomacy efforts around the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict are weak, but not necessarily for lack of trying. The
main issue is that the governments would prefer to monopolize the
negotiation process to prevent its development into a more
comprehensive and inclusive process they are not able to control.
The civil society space is very limited and the NGO community is
barely tolerated. NGOs are punished and actively condemned for
promoting and implementing social cohesion or reconciliation
types of activities and initiatives.
118
Yet, “societal reconciliation, rather than political
negotiations, is a key to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
transformation.”170 The overwhelming majority of Armenian and
Azerbaijani youth, who participated in this research, indicated
that they believe reconciliation can be achieved and that there
is a desire for it. However, differences in views exist about
what reconciliation is and how to achieve it. These differences
in perceptions and attitudes are a direct result of mutually
exclusive and hostile narratives employed by the governments.
Government-controlled media and educational sector provide
an opportunity to reproduce and communicate historical narratives
to a larger population, including youth. As young adults
internalize these narratives and inherit these identities, they
come to believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation and peace
process should be left to states, governments, and multinational
organizations. The majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth
respondents did not believe in their right to fully participate
in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, which is reflected in the
limited involvement of the grassroots, marginalized, and low-
170 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project.
119
status social groups, such as youth, within the ongoing
negotiation and peace process.
At the same time, the lack of progress within the mediation
efforts led to criticism and skepticism about the probability of
resolving the conflict peacefully, while embedding the belief in
a single win-lose approach. Derogatory public remarks, hate
speech and widespread propaganda around the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict led to polarization of public opinion and only
intensified mutual mistrust and hatred. The “no peace, no war”
status is volatile as government-sponsored information campaigns,
in conjunction with historical and collective narratives widely
communicated within societies, have ensured that any concession
on the political level will produce public outrage.
The need to promote a comprehensive and inclusive peace
process, while, consequently, transforming historical narratives
in order to influence collective memories, attitudes and
perceptions is greater than ever. The conflict is a creation of
elites struggling for power: the role that youth will get to play
depends on the existing structures. As the survey findings
suggest not only are young adults in Armenia and Azerbaijan
120
detached from the negotiation process, but their management
rights have been seized. Elitist structures in both states do
little to empower them or to facilitate their active
participation.
A sustainable and lasting peace is only feasible with the
involvement and collaboration of all groups and actors,
especially youth, a large and a significant portion of the
population in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Having such a
significant population of youth presents an opportunity and a
potential to redress violence and address existing conflicts.
Engaging and empowering youth, an under-represented and
marginalized group, is vital, as they will be the next generation
of leaders. Their experiences, collective identities and
historical memories will influence their interpretations and
perceptions of peace and conflict with the potential to alter the
national trajectory away from re-inciting of the armed conflict
and toward reconciliation and a peaceful settlement of the
conflict.
121
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144
Armenian Azerbaijani Turkish0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
29% 24%
0%
71% 76%
100%
GenderFemale Male
Colu
mn %
No Yes0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
78%
22%
73%
27%
100%
0%
Participation in conflict resolution or peace education programArmenian Azerbaijani
Colu
mn %
No Yes0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
82%
18%
65%
35%
100%
0%
Involvement in protest against war and in favor of peace
Armenian Azerbaijani Turkish
Colu
mn %
145
Perspectives on Reconciliation
Armenian Azerbaijani Turkish0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
40%
18%0%
11% 9%0%3%
15%0%
46% 52%
100%
0% 3% 0%
Individuals have the right to protests against war and in favor of peaceAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree Series6
perceived reality
process
state
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
9%
27%
64%
Definitions of Reconciliation
perceived reality process state0%
10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
25%
50%
25%
0%
14%
86%
Definitions of Reconciliation by Gender
Female Male
Armenian Azerbaijani0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
29%
52%50%
32%
9% 10%6%
0%0%3%
Rebuilding trust is essential for reconciliation Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree
147
Armenian Azerbaijani0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
32%
42%
9%6%
38%
19%
12%
23%
6%0%
Ripe momentAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree
Armenian Azerbaijani0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
29%32%
14%
6%
37%
16%17%
39%
3%6%
Apology and ReconciliationAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree
Armenian Azerbaijani0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
48%
30%
12% 10%
18%
33%
15%20%
6%3%
If a subgroup within one of the parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of cooperative relationship with the adversary,
change and path forward to reconciliation may be possible
Agree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree
Armenian Azerbaijani
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45% 42% 42%
9%6%
27%
10%12%
29%
3%
10%
A grass-root dialogue and inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a relationship
from one that is adversarial to one that is conciliatoryAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree
148
Youth as an important social group in the peace process
Armenian Azerbaijani0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
4%0%
8%4%
17%
39%
71%
57%
Do you see yourself and your social group, as an important actor, who could participate and influence in the peace process by EthnicityDon't know Maybe No
Lack of
empower...Negative ..
.Passive ... Positive ..
.The future of thi...
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
19%
12% 12%
38%
12%
Youth's rolesColumn %
149
Narratives Section
Negative Tolerant0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
67%
33%
50% 50%
"Common Suffering" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani
Negative Tolerant0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
67%
33%
75%
25%
"Blame the OSCE Minsk Group" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani
Negative Positive0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
50% 50%
83%
17%
"The role of youth in the peace process" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani
Negative Tolerant0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0%
100%
50% 50%
"Blame the Russians" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani
Research Instruments
Part 1. Questionnaire
Demographics
DIRECTIONS: Please answer each question by highlighting the correct answer or filling in the space provided.
1. What is your age?2. What is your gender? – Female Male3. What is your ethnic background/nationality?4. Where do you live now? ---------------------------------------- How
long have you lived there for?-------5. What is your native tongue?6. What is the highest level of education you have completed?7. Are you currently a student? ____ If yes, grad or undergrad?
___________ Major:8. Describe your employment status9. Has any member of your family been affected by the violent conflict or
participated in combat? If so, please indicate time, location, the effect, and the relationship of the family member
Opinions
1. Please provide your personal definition and understanding of each of the following terms:Peace: __________________________Reconciliation:________________________
2. Have you ever participated in any conflict resolution or peace education programs?If yes, please indicate when and where, and describe the program____________________
3. Have you ever been involved in any sort of protest against war and in favor of peace, by signing a petition, participating in the event? If yes, please explain _________________
DIRECTIONS: Answer the questions to the best of your ability. Please click the appropriate number to indicate the extent to which you agreeor disagree with that statement. There are no right or wrong answers.
151
StronglyDisagree
1
Disagree
2
Neitheragree nordisagree
3
Agree
4
StronglyAgree
5
4. Children have the right to grow up in a world of peace? – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
5. All human being have a basic right to peace – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation ofrating:
6. Regional stability and inter-group reconciliation can be achieved – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
7. Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace? –1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
8. The introduction of a new threat, that endangers all conflicting groups and requires adversaries to cooperate to defend themselves against the new threat, can serve as a useful reconciliation tool. – 12 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
9. A grass-roots dialogue and inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a relationship from one that is adversarial to one that is conciliatory – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
10. A situation, in which neither side can win, continuing the stalemate negatively affects attitudes, sharply increases a suffering,and might lead to an outbreak of violence; seeking an alternative policy might alter attitudes and serve as a tool for reconciliation – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
11. If a subgroup within one of the parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of cooperative relationship with the adversary, change and path forward to reconciliation may be possible – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
12. If a country has in the past invaded, colonized, exercised control over the government affairs of another country, an apology by the invader can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:
152
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the question by filling in the space provided.
13. Do you see yourself and your social group, as an important actor,who could participate and influence in the peace process:_______________
Part 2. Narratives
Narratives
DIRECTIONS: PLEASE READ THE NARRATIVE. TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITIES, ANSWER FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN THE COMMENT BOX BELOW
1st narrative: Armeno-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created enormous hardships for both people. Tens of thousands of people lost their lives, or became disabled. Hundreds of thousands became refugees, displaced persons, lost all their property. Intermarried families had to beseparated or became refugees overseas in order to keep their families together. To the best of your abilities answer the following question in the comment box below.
QUESTION: Based on your personal experience, heard, or learned knowledge, how harmful and devastating was and continues to be the Nagorno-Karabakh war and conflict to both nations?
2nd narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution is in deadlock because the OSCE-Minsk Group has not been wholeheartedly committed to the process while prolonging negotiations indefinitely. Moreover, they work effortful shifting geopolitical balance towards individual Co-Chairman Representative countries’ interests and positions. The OSCE-Minsk Group neglects to address and focus on interests and positions of conflicting parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh’s status and security, which point to the ineffectiveness of the negotiation and mediation mechanism. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below.
QUESTION: Reflect on the role of the OSCE-Minsk Group in mediating the peace process, what have been the Group’s successes? In what ways are they failing to achieve their mandate? What are possible solutions in improving the OSCE Minsk Group effectiveness in mediating the process?
153
3rd narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still not resolved because Russia had interests in seeing conflict in the Caucasus. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below.
QUESTION: What is the role of Russia in provoking conflict and preventing peace in the Caucasus?
4th narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not be resolved and the negotiation process will not be successful while youth and the general population of both nations are excluded and detached from the peace process, without getting a chance to be heard and to provide alternative ideas. Reflect on the role youth plays and has in the educational, employment sector, or household level. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below.
QUESTION: Are there youth initiatives aimed at introducing persons to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What role can and should youth play in resolvingthe conflict? Will youth likely be more successful in resolving the conflict? What are the current impediments in youth’s involvement and participation in the peace process?
Attitude assessment: Armenians’ attitudes towards Azeri:
If an agreement was reached between two sides, in which the solution confirms positively with your interests and positions, how would you feel if:
1) Azerbaijani travel freely to the neighboring country2) Having Azeri as neighbors3) Having Azeris as co-workers4) Having their children or close relatives marry an Azeri
Attitude assessment: Azerbaijanis’ attitudes towards Armenians:
If an agreement was reached between two sides, in which the solution confirms positively with your interests and positions, how would you feel if:
1) Armenians travel freely to the neighboring country2) Having Armenians as neighbors
154
3) Having Armenians as co-workers4) Having their children or close relatives marry an Armenian
StronglyAgainst
1
Against
2
Neitheragainst norin favor
3
In favor
4
Strongly inFavor
5
Consent to Participate in a Research StudyYou have been invited to take part in a research study to gain
understanding of Armenian and Azeri youths’ perceptions on the group dynamics and tensions surrounding both nations. This study will be conducted by Inna Babakulieva, a graduate student at the Center for Global Affairs of School of Continuing and Professional Studies, New York University. The research study on perceptions about peace, conflict, reconciliation, and narratives of events is part of her master’s thesis work. Her faculty sponsor is Prof. Thomas Hill, Center for Global Affairs –New York University.
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to do the following:1. Complete a demographic and perceptions on reconciliation survey: age,
gender, occupation, other identities, perceptions on peace, conflict, and reconciliation?
2. Answer two questions posed on a given narrative about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the best of your abilities.Your answers and responses will be recorded. You may review these
records and request that all or any portion of the information be destroyed.
Participation in this study will involve about two hours of your time:30 minutes to complete the questionnaire and approximately 30 minutes for the narrative portion.
155
There are no known risks associated with your participation in this research beyond those of everyday life. Although you will receive no directtangible benefits, this research may help the investigator to understand the narratives employed to form youth’s national identity better. Moreover,the researcher will share findings and the master’s thesis once completed.
Confidentiality of your research records will be strictly maintained by attaching a unique identifying number for you, which will be used to track your progress through the three components of the study. From that point forward, your name will never be requested, only your unique identifying number. The number will have no association with your identity.Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty. For questionnaire and survey, you have the right to skip or not answer any questions you prefer not to answer.
If there is anything about the study of your participation that is unclear, or that you do not understand, if you have questions or wish to report a research-related problem, you may contact Inna Babakulieva at vk.com/innayb or [email protected] , .
For questions about your rights as a research participant, you many contact the University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects, New York University, 665 Broadway, Suite 804, New York, NY 10012 at 212-998-4808 or [email protected] to ParticipateSubject’s Initials: Date:
Recruitment Letter #1Dear friends,
156
My name is Inna Babakulieva and I am graduate student at New York University completing my studies in Global Affairs. I am currently working on my thesis to gain an understanding of Armenian and Azeri youth perception on the group dynamics, relations, and history. The goal of the survey is to document views and perceptions of individuals, like you, as you are the population of young adults, who will be the next generation to lead your countries. Your answers will support efforts helping to improve knowledge and understanding on youth identities, needs, and interests, I would greatly appreciate if you could participate in this survey. It will take you approximately one hour to complete both sections (30 minutes for each part)IF YOU ARE:
1. Ages 18-272. Citizen and/or permanent resident of Armenia or Azerbaijan, who are
de-facto, de-jure, permanently residing in Armenia or Azerbaijan You qualify to participate in this survey.
If you are a student, studying abroad, that is, outside of Armenia and Azerbaijan, yet remain residency in Armenia and Azerbaijan, you qualify to participate in this survey.
As a token of my appreciation, I will make results and a final report available to you by publishing it online and you can request the results tobe sent to you by email. The information gathered will be processed and shared in an aggregate manner, that is, your identity will remain confidential unless previously agreed. To sign up as a participant in this study, or to receive additional information, please email [email protected] you choose to participate or not, please, forward this message to any individual you know, whose opinions you feel should be included. Pleasefree to contact me with any questions at [email protected] or at vk.com/innaybThank you for your time and participation
Inna Y BabakulievaM.S. Candidate Global AffairsCenter for Global Affairs - New York UniversityNew York, NY, [email protected]
Recruitment Letter #2I am currently working on my thesis to gain an understanding of
Armenian and Azeri youth perception on the group dynamics, relations, and history. For that, I am conducting a survey.
IF YOU ARE:
157
1. Ages 18-272. Reside in Armenia
Please participate in this survey, which you can access at - https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/37SWQMB
I would greatly appreciate if you could participate in this survey.Feel free to contact me with any questions you might have.
To receive additional information, please email [email protected] Whether you choose to participate or not, please, forward this message to any individual you know, whose opinions you feel should be included. Pleasefree to contact me with any questions at [email protected] or at vk.com/innaybThank you for your time and participation
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