Is reconciliation negotiable?

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15718069-12341266

International Negotiation 18 (2013) 471–493 brill.com/iner

Is Reconciliation Negotiable?

Valérie Rosoux1

Institut de Sciences Politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE), Collège Jacques Leclercq Place Montesquieu 1, Bte. L2.08.07, 1348 – Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

(E-mail: [email protected])

Received 25 October 2010; accepted 10 August 2013

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to question some basic assumptions regarding reconciliation after wars and mass atrocities. Indeed, how can numerous policy-makers, practitioners, and scholars contend that rec-onciliation is necessary while it is often distrusted and rejected by victims? Are there not cases where calls for reconciliation would prove to be fruitless and even detrimental for peace and/or democracy? To answer these questions, it is worth looking at the interactions between reconciliation and negotiation. Beyond a theoretical interest, this question has a direct impact for practitioners; a better understanding of the issue is actually a sine qua non condition for more efficient interventions. In terms of methodology, this study refers to various examples as illustrative cases (Afghanistan, Rwanda, South-Africa, and the Franco-German case). Its objective is not to capture the complexity of each case study but to determine to what extent reconciliation can be considered as negotiable.

KeywordsAfghanistan; Franco-German case; reconciliation; mass atrocities; memory; peace-building; Rwanda; South-Africa; peace accords

Since the end of the Cold War, more and more specialists in history, philosophy, psychology, and other social sciences pay attention to what is designated as “prob-ably the most important condition” for maintaining a stable peace: reconciliation between former enemies (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2000: 237). However, reconciliation appears as an “under-theorized phenomenon” (Long & Brecke 2003: 147), a “controversial and rather obscure” notion (Forsberg, 2003: 73) or even a “rather crude analytical tool” (Hermann 2004: 40–41). Therefore it seems crucial to question the scope and limits of reconciliation as a peace-building process.

The purpose of this article is neither to overcome all the shortcomings of this concept, nor to define it once and for all. It is rather to put into question some

1) Valérie Rosoux is a senior research fellow at the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS). She teaches international negotiation at the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL). In 2010–2011, she was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC). By training, she is a philosopher and a political scientist.

mailto:[email protected]

472 V. Rosoux / International Negotiation 18 (2013) 471–493

basic assumptions regarding reconciliation after wars and mass atrocities. Indeed, how can numerous policy-makers, practitioners, and scholars contend that rec-onciliation is necessary while it is often distrusted and rejected by victims? How can this concept be described as an obvious goal for some and as “indecent” by others (Rosoux 2005)? Is reconciliation, as such, always necessary and possible? Are there not cases where calls for reconciliation would prove to be fruitless and even detrimental for peace and/or democracy? In other words, in which condi-tions is reconciliation appropriate and effective – and in which cases is it not?

To answer this question, it is worth looking at the interactions between recon-ciliation and negotiation. At first glance, both notions refer to clearly distinctive processes. However, they are intimately connected. The main hypothesis of this article is that reconciliation is a continuation of the negotiation processes after an agreement is achieved. Case studies indicate that the so-called “reconciliation process” can actually be considered as a continuous negotiation after peace agree-ments are reached, sometimes through informal channels, but sometimes through more conventional negotiations. Reconciliation can thus be depicted as a contin-ued struggle to reach mutual accommodation. From that perspective, the litera-ture on negotiation can in fact illuminate the puzzle of reconciliation.

This study was written in the framework of a larger research project based on a case-oriented and inductive research design.2 It clearly shows that three main fac-tors contribute to the rapprochement between former enemies, all three of which are directly linked with the negotiation process that can take place at the end of the hostilities. The first element that turns out to be fundamental is the personal variable. Legitimate leadership is critical to favor a greater sense of mutual under-standing and a progressive trust between the parties. The second factor is con-nected with the robustness of institutions, at both the societal and governmental levels. Case studies demonstrate that without the support of the population, offi-cial reconciliatory events are sterile and vain. To foster domestic support and to gradually change perceptions of the enemy, leaders need to establish joint proj-ects and credible institutions where all parties must work together. The third factor that determines the scope of reconciliation efforts is timing. In this regard, one of the crucial issues to keep in mind is the question of ripeness (Zartman 2000): when is a protagonist ready for reconciliation efforts?

2) The project focuses on four configurations where official representatives commonly refer to the notion of reconciliation: the Franco-German case (post-international conflict), the South-African case (post-internal conflict), the Franco-Algerian case (post-colonial conflict), and the Rwandan case (post- genocide). Two main kinds of data were combined to dissect the relevant processes in each scenario. First, a systematic corpus of official speeches allows for a description of the evolution of the leaders since the end of the hostilities. Second, a comprehensive gathering of narratives depicts the reactions of indi-viduals directly affected by a violent past. Besides these data, the most important methods of data collec-tion were qualitative interviewing and participant observation within the context of four American and European NGOs. I wish to thank the United States Institute of Peace for supporting this project. I also thank the encouraging and meticulous editors and reviewers of this issue.

V. Rosoux / International Negotiation 18 (2013) 471–493 473

The analysis is divided into three parts. The first stresses the significance of the issue. The second examines the various conceptions of reconciliation as a political process and attempts to delineate to what extent it can be considered a negotiable issue. The final part stresses the limits of the concept of reconciliation when applied at a societal level. In terms of methodology, this study refers to various examples as illustrative cases. Its objective is not to capture the complexity of each case study but to emphasize the need for further research in this matter.

Significance of the Issue: Detour in Afghanistan

Reconciliation is depicted as the ultimate goal of various negotiation processes. In his book Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes, Zartman (2005) shows that reconciliation is more or less favored in political settlements intended to end conflict, be it an international or internal settlement. It thus follows that the chronological sequence between negotiation and reconciliation is unproblematic at first glance: reconciliation appears as a long-term purpose that may or may not occur – most often long after the nego-tiation processes.

This sequence has somehow been put into question by U.S. and Afghan official representatives who extensively used the term ‘reconciliation’ to refer to the nego-tiation process that took place between the Afghan government and certain Tali-ban leaders. When the Loya Jirga took place in Kabul in February 2010, president Hamid Karzai explained that its explicit ambition was to ‘negotiate’ and ‘recon-cile’ with the moderate Taliban (February 1, 2010). A couple of months later, practitioners and scholars were speaking of ‘reconciliation negotiations’ under-taken by the Afghan government (Biddle et al. 2010). Afterwards, U.S. official statements went a step further in highlighting above all the notion of reconcilia-tion. The following examples will illustrate this.

Interviewed on the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed on several occasions ‘reintegration’ and ‘reconciliation’ as the two main tracks to keep in mind.3 The distinction is sharp: reintegration is focused on the battlefield and on the individual fighter who is ready to go home under certain conditions, while “reconciliation is more along the lines of the clas-sic negotiation among leaders” (San Francisco, Oct. 15, 2010). Richard Hol-brooke confirmed this view: “Reconciliation is a reference to the possibility of discussions with the leadership of the Taliban about bringing a peaceful end to the war” (London, January 18, 2010). According to these definitions, reconcilia-tion looks like a perfect synonymous of negotiation. However, this meaning is

3) It is worth mentioning that the same distinction was underscored by Clinton in the context of Kosovo (Pristina, Oct. 14, 2010).


ambiguous for at least two reasons. The first one concerns the figure of the enemy. The second regards timing.

As far as the enemy is concerned, Holbrooke heavily warned against the risk of confusion: “People are talking about contacts with the Taliban, about negotia-tions with the Taliban . . . Let me be very clear . . . The United States is not in direct contact with the Taliban.” Since then, all official representatives remind that these ‘reconciliation’ meetings are Afghan-led and directly inspired by the “Afghan culture” – “this is frequently a way within Afghan society that various groups resolve conflict” (State Department Press briefing, Oct. 14, 2010). This insistence on the inexistence of negotiation between the U.S. and the Taliban raises the question of the identity of the enemy. If negotiations are undertaken with the Taliban, then who are we fighting? Richard Holbrooke made it clear: “Anyone involved in either reintegration or reconciliation has to renounce al-Qaida. That is the core objective, after all, of our presence in this region – to defeat al-Qaida” (London, January 18, 2010). By stressing an Afghan-led reconciliation process rather than a typical political negotiation, the coherence of U.S. foreign policy is preserved: reintegration and reconciliation concern foot soldiers and leaders who renounce violence, give up their weapons and bide by Afghanistan’s law and con-stitution, while al-Qaida remains the threat and the enemy.

The other ambiguity of the Reintegration – Reconciliation process emphasized by president Karzai regards timing. Two contradictory messages are indeed sent. On the one hand, some specialists, including a former adviser to the Afghan president, find that “time is ripe for a reconciliatory process”. In this view, recon-ciliation is “a key element of comprehensive stabilization in Afghanistan” (Mos-som Stanekzai 2008). That means, in other words, that reconciliation is a condition for security and stability in the region. Nonetheless, one could easily argue that security and stability are themselves minimal conditions for pursuing any attempt of reconciliation. Many official statements confirm this point. When reconciliation is defined as an effort to “reach an understanding on the future” of Afghanistan (State Department, Oct. 14, 2010), the emphasis is put on reconcili-ation as an ultimate purpose rather than a current potential situation. Similarly, Hillary Clinton underlined that reconciliation was “a long process”: “The reinte-gration process is accelerating. More and more of the fighters on the field are seeking a way out . . . But reconciliation is a much more complex effort that is just beginning” (quoted by Banusiewicz 2010). The emphasis on timing is even more explicit when Col. David Lamm explains that “in these sort of situations with these insurgencies, you are taking 10, 15, 20 years before you decide finally – one side finally wins, and then you get to real reconciliation” (PBS Newshour, Oct. 15, 2010).

The Afghan context shows how puzzled the picture can be when it comes to reconciliation. To what extent does the “reconciliation process” – underlined by President Karzai and supported by the former American commander in Afghani-


stan, Gen. David H. Petraeus actually differ from any political deal in the strictest sense of the term? Is reconciliation the “only way to end the war” (Marshall 2010) or an ambitious – too ambitious – goal to reach long after the end of the war? How can a practitioner design a coherent framework for pursuing peace if the same notion has competing and sometime contradictory meanings?

These questions do not only concern the Afghan situation. Other contexts could also be illustrative here. Hillary Clinton did not only mention “the power of reconciliation” in Afghanistan; she mentioned it in Lebanon, Northern Ire-land, Israel, Liberia, Angola, Kosovo, Burma, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Thailand. As First Lady, she already insisted on the need for reconciliation in Rwanda, El Salvador and Uganda. In most of her statements regarding “conflicts that have tormented generations,” Hillary Clinton maintains that “reconciliation has to be a part of the solution” (October 10, 2010). In the same line, the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, constantly reminds that there is no way to avoid violence without “a spirit of compromise and reconciliation.” Since 2007, he almost systematically combined the concept of reconciliation to the notions of peace, democracy, stability, justice, truth, and human rights. Beyond these gen-eral goals, Ban Ki-Moon seems to see reconciliation as a way to “bring a sense of closure” to harrowing chapters in history (Cambodia, October 27, 2010). For-mer French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, is even more explicit when he comments on the death of Col. Muammar Gaddafi in explaining that Libyans must now “reconcile” and “forgive each other” (October 11, 2011).

There is no need to multiply the examples to illustrate how recurrent the notion of reconciliation has become on the official stage. However, this increasing use does not necessarily favor a clearer picture of the phenomenon. A certain concep-tual vagueness forces us to raise a basic question to avoid any confusion: what are we talking about when we talk about reconciliation?

What Are We Talking About?

As the previous examples show, reconciliation appears to be a polysemic concept. So far, there is no consensus in the literature about the necessary conditions for it. For some, reconciliation requires above all the establishment of order based on a negotiated settlement or a cease-fire. In this view, reconciliation refers to any “mutually conciliatory accommodation between former protagonists” (Long & Brecke 2003: 1). Beside this pragmatic vision, others call attention to the “tran-scendent” nature of a far more demanding process requiring truth, mercy, justice and peace (Lederach 1997). Between these two conceptions, most of the scholars underline different and sometimes competing definitions of the concept (Abu-Nimer 2001; Henderson 2009).


Let us take a couple of examples to illustrate this variety of tones. For some, the core element of reconciliation is trust (Gover & Verwoerd 2002; Amstutz 2005; Nadler & Liviatan 2006). In this line, Marrow suggests that reconciliation “is reestablishment of friendship that can inspire sufficient trust across the tradi-tional split” (1999: 132). For another group of scholars, the key element is truth. In this view, reconciliation allows groups to face “unwelcome truths in order to harmonize incommensurable world views so that inevitable and continuing con-flicts and differences stand at least within a single universe of comprehensibility” (Asmal et al. 1997: 46). Yet, others voices claim that the essence of reconciliation is a psychological process of transformation leading ultimately to an identity change (Kelman 2004; Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004).

Walking among Definitions

Beyond this variety, three main approaches to political reconciliation can be dis-tinguished: structural, social-psychological, and spiritual ones. The first approach gives priority to security, economic interdependence, and political cooperation between parties (Kacowicz 2000); the second underlines the cognitive and emo-tional aspects of the process of rapprochement between former adversaries (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004), while the third accentuates a process of collective healing based on the rehabilitation of both victims and offenders (Tutu 1999).

Structures and Institutions After the cessation of violent acts, parties in conflict can establish mutually accepted structural and institutional mechanisms to reduce the general percep-tion of threat and to resolve any possible disagreement. The structural approach generally deals with the interests and the issues at stake, whereas the two others concentrate on the relationships between the parties. When adversaries live together in one single state, structural measures mainly concern institutional reforms with the purpose of integrating all the groups in a democratic system, restoring human and civil rights, and implementing a fair redistribution of wealth. When the former belligerents live in different states, these mechanisms can take the form of confidence-building measures like exchanging representatives in var-ious political, economic, and cultural spheres; maintaining formal and regular channels of communication and consultation between public officials; develop-ing joint institutions and organizations to stimulate economic and political inter-dependence; reducing tensions by disarmament, demobilization of military forces, demilitarization of territories.

RelationshipsAlthough some structural changes can be implemented relatively quickly after the end of a conflict, the transformation of relationships does not occur in the same


way. Studies dedicated to this slow and arduous process largely parallel each other, but their vision of the transformation process is diverging. Cognitive and social-psychological approaches analyze what they call a “deep change” in the public’s psychological repertoire. This evolution results from a reciprocal process of adjustments of beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions shared by the majority of society members (Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004: 17). The so-called spiri-tual approaches go a step further by asserting that reconciliation attempts to lead to forgiveness for the adversary’s misdeeds (Shriver 1995; Lederach 1998; Staub 2000; Philpott 2006). However, as we will see, there is no consensus about the appropriateness of forgiveness in international relations.

This classification could easily be challenged.4 The picture to describe is so rich that there are many ways to systematize it. Since the aim of this article is not to settle the issue from a theoretical point of view, we will not get involved in an academic debate about labels and categorizations. The main question to keep in mind at this stage is how to articulate the notion of negotiation and each concep-tion of political reconciliation (structural, socio-psychological, and spiritual). To what extent is reconciliation, according each of these conceptions, negotiable?

Three Scenarios to ‘Demobilize’ the Minds

Negotiating Interests There is no doubt that at the structural level, the so-called process of reconcilia-tion is fundamentally negotiated. At the international level, most of the post-conflict negotiations directly concern the structural aspect of the rapprochement between former belligerents (confidence-building measures, joint political or eco-nomic institutions, disarmament, demobilization . . .). The Franco-German case illustrates the effectiveness of such structural measures. Six years after the end of World War II, an economic union for coal and steel production was created; in 1963, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer signed the Elysee Treaty which institutionalized regular meetings between foreign, defense, and education min-isters; in 1988, the Franco-German Council was established and in 1995, joint military units were formed (Ackermann 1994).

This constant process of negotiation – before and after agreements are achieved – is probably the key to understand why the Franco-German case is widely consid-ered as a success story. This case does not constitute an archetype to be referred to

4) Gardner-Feldman (2002) distinguishes philosophical-emotional and practical-material components of reconciliation. In the same line, Long and Brecke (2003) analyse two main models of reconciliation: a signalling model and a forgiveness model. Hermann (2004) discerns cognitive, emotional-spiritual and procedural aspects of reconciliation. Nadler (2001) puts an emphasis on socio-emotional and instrumen-tal reconciliation. Schaap (2005) emphasizes restorative and political reconciliation approaches. Galtung (2001) refers to no less than twelve different conceptions of reconciliation.


in any circumstances and this success story could be questioned in many ways. However, on the international stage, the Franco-German example is frequently presented as a textbook case to be studied and replicated. Whether in Tokyo, Karachi, Islamabad or Warsaw, the Franco-German case is depicted as an inspir-ing model and even sometimes “the biggest product of reconciliation in history” (Kurbjuweit 2010). Consequently, it is worth paying attention to the Franco-German ability to evolve from a culture of war to a culture of negotiation – at all levels.

The official decision to put an end to the calls for mutual destruction was not a matter of altruism; it directly corresponded to French and German national interests. France and Germany each needed the other, as Adenauer and de Gaulle readily recognized. In September 1962, Chancellor Adenauer said, “Thank God, the interest of France coincides with the interest of Germany.” President de Gaulle explained later that “it is clear that our interests meet and will meet more and more. Germany needs us as much as we need it” (Peyrefitte 1994). The con-figuration of the broader international system was also decisive for stimulating reconciliation. Among the political, economic, and security considerations that promoted this process, four were particularly significant: the complete and radi-cal character of Germany’s defeat (and therefore its need for political rehabilita-tion and return of sovereignty), the process of building the European community, the existence of a common enemy (the USSR), and the external – mostly American – support for a rapprochement.

Several other examples could illustrate this negotiation process, from the German-Polish case to the Sino-Japanese case (to name only two of them). Germany’s rapprochement with Poland after WWII was also heavily guided by national interest, managing to bridge a long history of animosity despite being on opposites sides of the Cold War. The strong bipartisan desire for the reunifica-tion of West and East Germany forced elites to take a number of conciliatory measures towards the Eastern bloc countries who otherwise perhaps would not allow increasingly close relations between the two Germanys. Meanwhile, Sino-Japanese reconciliation consistently faltered over the course of the twentieth cen-tury because of a strong conservative party refusing to accept Japanese guilt for war crimes, and national survival ensured by a close relationship with the United States. Limited bilateral trade and the mutual suspicion over military buildup – despite a common enemy in the USSR for much of the Cold War period – never provided the structural conditions necessary for “deep reconciliation” (He 2009).

At the national level, structural measures to be negotiated mainly concern institutional reforms. The South African case is often qualified as “exemplary” in that regard. In this case, internal reconciliation process entirely results from a negotiation between the main parties in presence, and not a military victory for one of them (as was the case after World War II). The intense negotiations that made possible the transition from apartheid started in the 1980s. An important


issue for all sides in the negotiation process (National Party government, African National Congress, and other parties from the resistance movement) was how to achieve a constitution to govern the post-apartheid, democratic South African state. This process led to President F. W. De Klerk’s speech in February 1990 at the annual opening of parliament that ultimately led to the first multiracial elec-tions in April 1994 (Lloyd 2005).

Beside the constitution itself, the negotiations that made possible the transi-tion from apartheid were based on the need to acknowledge “gray zones” that occurred in the past. To do so, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up by the South African parliament. To turn the page of apartheid, a deliberate link was made between the proceedings of the TRC and the granting of amnesty. In order to obtain amnesty, an offender had to apply to the TRC, participate in its hearings, and meet its requirements, including the requirement of full disclosure. Aside from its frequently described shortcomings, the TRC had at least one merit: it opened the floor to victims of each side and gave them a chance to tell their story. The hope was that the process of talking would some-how alleviate the sufferings endured in silence for so long.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to be too optimistic regarding these objectives. The TRC was above all shaped by political constraints and more particularly by the balance of power between the parties. The issue of amnesty for human rights offenders was decided by a political deal between the outgoing political elite (the National Party) and the African National Congress. In other words, the TRC was a compromise solution forced on the country by the fact that those who had power were not going to surrender it without guarantees that they would not be prosecuted after stepping down. This particular arrangement is typical of similar regime transitions. As Wilson has shown, the area of justice in transition is the one in which leaders are most likely to reach a deal over the heads of ordinary people, and ipso facto the one in which civil groups are usually the least effective in shaping the course of the talks (2001: 198–200).

Negotiating Identities Negotiating structural measures is critical to establish a basic level of trust. However, they are likely not sufficient to resolve protracted conflicts (Wilmer 1998: 93). Sustainable peace obviously implies the transformation of relation-ships between former opponents. Here is probably the core of the issue. Is there any room for negotiation regarding the adjustment of beliefs, attitudes and emotions shared by the majority of society members?

The Franco-German case is once again telling because it demonstrates that “yesterday’s hereditary enemies” may become “determined friends” (de Gaulle 1970: 428–9) if they get involved in a multilayered negotiation process. Beside the official negotiations about economic, political, and military issues, a whole range of negotiations were needed – and are still needed – between associations and


individuals from both sides of the Rhine. Decades of mutual adjustments between official representatives, historians or artists made a certain work of memory pos-sible. And even though there is no formal negotiation (in the strictest sense of the term) to reassess the conflictual past, one can consider that the mutual narratives of the past have been progressively negotiated (in the metaphorical sense). For more than a century and a half, the incessant reminder of past confrontations created entrenched positions on either side of the Rhine. However, in the imme-diate post-war years, a group of pioneers deliberately sought to influence the public opinion to normalize relations between the two people. Among these pio-neers were historians from both countries that quickly engaged in the arduous task of revising textbooks and national histories. Their objective was to critically scrutinize the myths of a “hereditary enmity” between France and Germany. Between 1958 and 1962, de Gaulle and Adenauer undertook considerable efforts to persuade the public of the necessity of a Franco-German rapprochement. They carried out frequent trips on both sides of the Rhine to help their populations overcome preconceived ideas and fears rooted in past events.

As a result, this process progressively affected all levels of society. The Elysee Treaty of 1963 made the Franco-German rapprochement durable thanks to a double linkage: the requirements for regular consultation and the promotion of interaction on a “people-to-people” level. The institutional mechanisms provided for by the Elysee Treaty and supplemented in 1988 have created a structure of constant negotiation through semestrial meetings of Head of State, foreign and technical ministers’ consultations, as well as joint councils in all fields. On the people-to-people level, the Franco-German relationship has reached an unmatched level of intensity. The Franco-German Youth Office created by the Treaty was conducive to revitalizing youth exchanges, conferences, and reciprocal language teaching. In 1964 alone it contributed to the meeting of 180,000 youths from both countries at 6,500 gatherings, seminars, and study trips. Each country is now the other’s most important trade partner. Over 2,500 towns are paired by twin-cities programs and partnerships. Almost 75% of the French and German populations live in twinned cities, while more than seven million youth were involved in student exchange programs (Gardner Feldman 2002).

This impressive evolution implies a drastic change of narrative regarding the Franco-German past. On the interpersonal level, most individuals involved in the rapprochement favored an indirect approach to reconciliation. They preferred focusing on subjects of mutual concern rather than discussing the wars. However, at the official level, a totally new narrative of the Franco-German past was quite rapidly established. The authorities of the two states systematically tried to avoid being locked into memories that were strictly national. They recognized that national perceptions overlap and must be considered as mutually dependent. Their objective was not to discover the truth about the past but to develop – that


is to say, to negotiate – a common language capable of encompassing the two nations’ conflict-ridden history.

The official meaning given to the battle of Verdun is an outstanding example of this kind of implicit negotiation. The number of victims – a quarter of a mil-lion of young soldiers – added to the ruthless nature of the battles and created fearful remembrances in the consciences in both territories. As early as 1916, patriotic representations of the combat were being elaborated, separately in France and in Germany. On the French side, Verdun witnessed the glory, the heroism and the victorious spirit of the French combatants. On the other side of the Rhine, it was quickly recovered by the national-socialist ideology that strongly called for revenge. Four decades later, the Franco-German rapprochement paved the way for a new interpretation to be given to this event. Verdun became a sym-bol with a similar meaning to all combatants, French and Germans. The memo-ries were not presented any longer as national and separate. They were rather unified as a result of the reconciliation that had occurred: the soldiers who fought in the opposite camps were then gathered in a common tribute.

Yet such an evolution does not develop directly and spontaneously, but only emerges gradually and painstakingly. The work of memory that has been under-taken by French and German authorities takes root in deep divergences. “Identi-fying and softening these divergences is a more realistic goal” than eliminating them (Gardner Feldman 2002: 337). Even in the Franco-German case, which is often qualified as remarkable, reconciliation appears as an open-ended process. Although the first Franco-German commission of historians already met in 1950, the first totally common textbook written by French and German historians has only been published in 2006 (Geiss & Le Quintrec 2006). According to former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, a constant negotiation process remains necessary because of the persistence of “memory misunderstandings” between the two nations (1999). One could add that, despite this historical rapprochement, Franco-German relations have been subject to a series of crises and strains, which can easily re-open profound scars. The frequency and the intensity of the conflicts of interest between both states (especially during the current financial crisis in Europe) show that there is no point of no return in terms of reconciliation. Negotiating is an attitude to maintain in the long run, far after major agreements are achieved.

Can we observe a similar evolution in South Africa? Like in the Franco- German case, the purpose of South African authorities is to think through the conditions of coexistence between diverging experiences. However, beyond this common aim, both contexts largely differ. In South-Africa, restorative justice aimed at achieving the ‘healing’ and ‘restoration’ of all concerned – of victims in the first place, but also of offenders, their families and the larger community (van Ness 1993: 259). The ultimate purpose of this initiative was not to punish offend-ers, but to reintegrate them into the community and to repair damaged social


bonds (Tutu 2000: 59–60). To do so, the authorities rapidly highlighted a new strategic narrative. Their objective was to grasp challenging diversities of color and race, and to set a unique example for the world. As Nelson Mandela asserted: “Our once divided people are steadily merging into a truly rainbow nation” (November 15, 1995). The “rainbow nation” metaphor is sometimes described as a myth pretending that everything is perfect since 1994. Nonetheless, it can also be understood as an inspiring symbol if we consider that a rainbow can only be formed “with unstable and contradictory conditions.”5 From that perspective, the “rainbow nation” metaphor reminds all South African of the need for a con-stant negotiation between national components.

To illustrate this need, it is worth considering how the South African authori-ties dealt with the ambivalent meaning of the so-called “national day of recon-ciliation”. The 16th of December is an emblematic day in South Africa since two historical events took place on that date. The first refers to the Battle of Blood River between the Zulu’s and the Voortrekkers Boers in 1838. The second occurred in 1961 when Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), was formed. For decades, this memory remained divi-sive. As President Jacob Zuma explained, “until 1948, this day was observed as ‘Dingaan’s day’, marking the annihilation of the Boers by Zulu King Dingane” (Pretoria, December 16, 2010). However, in 1949, Afrikaners decided to cele-brate 16 December as the “Day of the Covenant” – and in 1980 as “the Day of the Vow” – to remember that a group of Voortrekkers defeated a Zulu army at the Battle of Blood River. To counterbalance this commemoration, ANC activists strictly emphasized the memory of Dec. 16, 1961 when the ANC started to arm its soldiers to overthrow Apartheid. This example demonstrates the extent to which both memories – and therefore, both identities – were not only divergent, but also contradictory.

To transcend this incompatibility, Nelson Mandela did not choose to purely and simply erase the embarrassing commemoration date. Knowing that the population could neither forget nor bury the pain of conflict, he celebrated the 16th of December as a public holiday for the first time in order to acknowl-edge the significance of this date in both the Afrikaner and liberation struggle traditions. In renaming this day as the “Day of Reconciliation,” Nelson Mandela considered the plurality of representations of the past. According to him, this new attitude meant that the people of South Africa were turning the variety of their interpretations of the past, once used to divide them, into “a source of strength and richness”:

5) As the prominent South African writer Antjie Krog presented it in Cape Town on October 13, 2010.


The Government of National Unity chose this day precisely because the past had made December 16 a living symbol of bitter division. Valour was measured by the number of enemies killed and the quantity of blood that swelled the rivers and flowed in the streets. Today we no longer vow our mutual destruction but solemnly acknowledge our interdependence as free and equal citizens of our common Motherland (December 16, 1995).

The emphasis on interdependence implicitly meant the passage from a country based on domination to a country based on respect and negotiation. In terms of narrative and official memory, this evolution was the symbol of a decisive “break with the past”.

In the same line, the TRC constituted an ambitious attempt to consider the divergent representations of the past. The release of its report, in October 1998, showed that the TRC clearly tried to be even-handed in its judgments (Cherry 2000). On the one hand, the report stated that the policy of apartheid was a “crime against humanity” and that both the ANC and the Pan African Congress (PAC) were “internationally recognized liberation movements conducting legiti-mate struggles” against the policy of apartheid. On the other hand, the commis-sion drew a distinction between a “just war” and “just means” and found that in terms of international conventions, both the ANC and the PAC committed “gross violations of human rights” for which they were “morally and politically accountable” (TRC 1998, vol. 2, chap 4: 235). In confronting victims and per-petrators, the TRC dealt with all the contradictions of the past. The establish-ment of a common narrative about the past does not mean that individuals share the same memories. It would be naïve to consider that an institution like the TRC could create a consensus about history. The effort in order to integrate national memories does not imply that events will be given in the future a uni-form representation on both sides. Integration does not bring about plurality to be set aside. In fact, it supposes that a form of disagreement may be accepted to a certain extent. One may speak, in that regard, of a reasonable disagreement, which appears to be admitted by the parties (Dwyer 1999; Schapp 2005). In that sense, what is often called a “work of memory” remains a process of negotiation concerning memories – that concept being then used in a plural form.

More than 15 years later, do the South Africans consider that their identity has evolved thanks to this process? The TRC undoubtedly led to controversies and disputes, the fundamental objection being that it sacrificed the rights of victims and survivors and their legitimate need for justice. The pretended healing effect of the TRC indeed varied considerably from one set of victims to another. More-over, the TRC final report, issued in 2003, recommended that $348 million in reparations be paid to more than 21,000 victims of apartheid, urging businesses to contribute along with the government. Nevertheless, thousands of people are still waiting for reparations. Continuing disparities in wealth, housing, educa-tion, and health between blacks and whites indicate that the process of reconcili-ation still involves a hard work. In the long run, the challenge is immense since


the goal of the project is to create a society within which the chances of the recur-rence of the kinds of gross violations of human rights that occurred in the past are reduced to a minimum.

The Non-negotiable?

The spiritual approaches to reconciliation emphasize a demanding process requir-ing truth, justice, and forgiveness. At that level, the articulation between negotia-tion and reconciliation processes raises a series of delicate questions. Is truth negotiable? Is the need for justice negotiable? Is forgiveness negotiable? In the field, many cases show the existence of inescapable tensions between the prag-matic compromises that characterize any negotiation process and the maximalist requirements underlined by the most zealous advocates of reconciliation.

(1) The assertion that truth per se leads to reconciliation is highly questionable. Nobody can deny the fact that amnesia refuses victims the public acknowledge-ment of their pain and, therefore, can surely not contribute to reconciliation in the long-run. Yet, in certain circumstances, the search for truth can be seen as undermining the fragile cooperation by holding on to the past instead of looking to the future. This is particularly the case at the very end of international or inter-community conflicts. As many negotiators explain, it does not seem appropriate to deal with such explosive issue in the aftermath of a violent war. On the con-trary, most practitioners consider that it is often crucial to put the question of truth aside in order to move ahead.

In the Middle East, for example, the contrasting Israeli and Palestinian narra-tives concerning the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 both rely on the negation of the existence of the other to bolster the justice of their own cause. In the frame-work of the Oslo process, parties initially repeated their version of the historical truth and their demands for reparations and punishment as the basis of their posi-tion. But as Abu Ala’a said after the initial exchanges of grievances between the two sides, “let us not compete on who was right and who was wrong in the past. Let us see what we can do in the future.” In response, Uri Savir recalls telling Ala’a,

‘I’m sure we can debate the past for years and never agree. Let’s see if we can agree about the future’ . . . We had arrived at our first understanding. Never again would we argue about the past. This was an important step, for it moved us beyond an endless wrangle over right and wrong. Dis-cussing the future would mean reconciling two rights, not re-addressing ancient wrongs (quoted in Zartman 2005: 291).

Robert Malley, who participated in the Camp David negotiations, shares this future-oriented perspective. As he said, the objective of any political agreement is not to assess the historical truth. Malley states, “In the Middle East, each side develops a narrative of its own history. But negotiators cannot deal with represen-tations that have been shaping the identities of the parties for decades” (Malley


2001). His conclusion is sharp: firstly the political conditions for peace and after-wards the question of truth.

This example shows that the parties involved in a process of reconciliation need to feel sufficiently secure before they can accept to remember what shames them as well as what justifies them. The achievement of such security may require a decade, a generation or even more, of silence. Even though seeking accuracy about the past and allowing victims to tell their stories are vital steps in the rec-onciliation process, truth in itself rarely favors effective negotiation, at least immediately upon the cessation of hostilities.

(2) The tensions between reconciliation and negotiation do not only regard truth. They also concern the issue of justice. After a violent conflict, the expecta-tions of victims in terms of justice are very high. Especially in horrendous situa-tions like Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Cambodia and others, many consider that there cannot be reconciliation without justice. In this respect, justice appears as one fundamental component of reconciliation (Kriesberg 2004: 83). However, mutual relationship between justice and conflict transformation can be disputed. Although frustrating for victims, incomplete justice sometimes appears as a nec-essary condition for reaching a deal between former enemies. In South Africa, as mentioned before, the possibility of amnesty for apartheid killers directly resulted from the peace negotiation leading to the democratic transition. Incomplete jus-tice can also be a practical necessity. In Rwanda, to take another example, the prosecution of all the genocidaires was simply impossible. From April to July 1994, more than 800,000 people (the majority Tutsis) were killed. One year later, the lack of staff and financial support was so striking that Rwandan authorities admit-ted that national courts would take more than a century to try all the suspects. This case illustrates a general question raised by Hannah Arendt: how to exercise justice after crimes “that one can neither punish, nor forgive” (1961: 307)?

(3) The linkage between forgiveness and reconciliation is even more controver-sial. The political use of forgiveness raises the sensitive question of a double del-egation. Who can ask for it and who can grant it? On the one hand, people ask for forgiveness in the name of their late fathers. As descendants, they are not per-petrators themselves. On the other hand, survivors forgive in the name of the dead victims, which is not evident as such. Many cases show the concrete limits of such an exercise. Let us stress the reaction of a South African towards those who had applied to the TRC for amnesty for their killing of her son: “They are not asking forgiveness from us, the people who have lost their loved ones. They are asking forgiveness from the government. They did not do anything to the government. What they did, they did to us” (quoted by Biggar 2003: 316). These arguments do not deny the potential impact of public acknowledgements and diplomatic apologies. But they highlight the useful clarification between the interpersonal frame (appropriate for forgiveness) and the political or collective frame (pertinent for public acknowledgements and diplomatic apologies).


Reconciliation might be at stake in both frames, while negotiation primarily con-cerns the second one. In the aftermath of mass atrocities, forgiveness is not negotiable (Brudholm & Rosoux 2009).

Limitations of the Concept

These remarks show how problematic the normative and maximalist views of reconciliation are. The analysis undertaken so far indicates that reconciliation fails to promote negotiation and conflict transformation in two particular cir-cumstances: when it is revealed to be merely a politically expedient program or a miraculous formula.

Reconciliation as a Political Slogan

Just after the war, victims or relatives of dead victims usually distrust the notion of reconciliation especially if it is proclaimed as official policy. The gap between individual and political processes is obvious in the case of the mothers of the disappeared group in Argentina, Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), who still refuse compensation. At the official level, the need to reconcile is presented as a way to look forward. However, for victims, this “poli-tics of reconciliation” is often perceived as a rhetorical argument that despises the sufferings endured in the past.

The resentment of a population deeply affected by a conflict seems inevitable. From a psychotherapeutic approach, resentment is seen as legitimate and even necessary to express self-respect (Murphy 1988; Hampton 1988; Montville 1993: 120). One Rwandan survivor eager to let bygones be bygones and involved in reconciliation processes explained: “I took the time to hate everybody. It took me ten years. I needed this time for hatred. Now I can think about reconciliation” (Kigali, April 7, 2010). Such an evolution, thought, does not constitute a rule in that matter. In other cases, those who suffered in themselves or who lost family members keep the stigmata of the past tragedy during their whole life (Edkins 2003: 230–232). The record of another Rwandan survivor proclaims: “This is not the end of the genocide that really stops a genocide, because inwardly genocide never stops” (Mujawayo & Belhaddad 2004: 197). Same echo is found in the words of Speciosa Mukayiranga: “The survivor remains inconsolable. He resigns himself but he remains in revolt and powerless. He does not know what to do, the social environment does not understand him, and he does not understand him-self neither” (Mukayiranga 2004: 777).

Thus it does not come as a surprise that victims or relatives of dead victims denounce what they call as the “ideology of reconciliation.” Among them, Immaculée Mukarwego argues:


Reconciliation. This word became unbearable to me, and to most of the survivors who I know. To me, it is even perfectly indecent after a genocide . . . ‘To reconcile,’ as it is written in the dictionary, consists in making people at odds agree again . . . Do I have to consider that what happened in Rwanda between April and July 1994 is the product of a dispute, a quarrel, a disagreement and therefore, that it would not be understandable not to reconcile? Do the people who use this word all the time realize that its meaning is fundamentally simplistic? (Le Soir, 7 April 2004).

These words resonate with those of Jean Améry (who was subject to torture dur-ing World War II). To him, “what happened really happened” and “the fact that this happened cannot be taken thoughtlessly”; “nothing is cauterized, and the wound that was almost healed constantly reopens and suppurates” (1995: 17–20). These sentences indicate a tension that cannot be avoided when speaking about reconciliation: the legitimate need to look forward always risks to deny people damaged to life (Brudholm 2008). The understanding of this tension might help the authorities responsible for the reconstruction of the social fabric to negotiate a pragmatic rapprochement between parties.

Reconciliation as a Miraculous Formula

Social resistances do not only limit the ambitions of official authorities. They also put into question the moralistic and somehow euphoric view adopted by some scholars and practitioners. As it has been underlined, reconciliation involves pro-longed, deep, and multi-faceted negotiation processes. To be fruitful, these processes require the management of expectations in at least two different ways. First, it is doubtful to call for the restoration of a supposed “harmony” between former adversaries. Reconciliation tends to create an environment in which dif-ferences, misunderstandings and conflicts can be negotiated and not purely elim-inated (Schaap 2005: 21; Gardner-Feldman 2006). In the same sense, references to “healing” are understandable in a metaphorical sense, but the passage from an individual to a social group still remains questionable. How can wounds be healed at a societal level? Such idealized and therapeutic conception obviously fails to be a realistic model of reconciliation (Hazan 2006).

Second, practitioners involved in conflict transformation risk facing major dif-ficulties if they present reconciliation as a “kit for stabilizing peace.” Reconcilia-tion as such does not constitute a normative model or a magical solution that can be applied to any conflict. Third parties play critical roles in encouraging and sup-porting each step of the process, but reconciliation cannot occur without the active efforts of each side’s leaders and the support of the entire society – or at least the majority of it. In Kosovo for instance, reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians was a key objective for the United Nations peace-consolidation mis-sion that based its approach on the promotion of multi-ethnicity. However, the extreme difficulty to reach and to implement a negotiated agreement about the status of Kosovo shows that reconciliation process could only be an endogenous


one (Duclos 2003). In Rwanda, to take another example, the notion of recon-ciliation seems to be unacceptable when it sounds like easy advice given by the former colonial authorities: “Coming from Europeans [i.e. Belgians], this word [reconciliation] has incontestably a paternalist and contemptuous connotation since ‘the Blacks’ are perceived as children who are invited to make peace after a struggle” (Mugarwego, Le Soir, 7 April 2004). Beyond these two examples, all case studies remind that reconciliation process is substantially “home grown” rather than imposed from outside or under the tutelage of a more powerful third-party or organization.

Conclusion: Lessons for Practice

The purpose of this article was to emphasize the need for further research on the interactions between the fields of reconciliation and negotiation. There is much at stake, since without a fundamental clarification in this regard, the notion of reconciliation may turn out to be counterproductive. Beyond a theoretical inter-est, this question has a direct impact for practitioners; a better understanding of the issue is actually a sine qua non condition for more efficient interventions.

It would certainly be vain and possibly detrimental to formulate general con-siderations without taking into account the potential perils of context-insensitive reconciliation attempts (Hermann 2004: 49). More research needs to be done to specify the relationship of reconciliation to peace-building and to determine which aspects of peace-building are negotiable and under what circumstances. However, the analysis of numerous cases studies allows us to draw at least three lessons to keep in mind regarding the situation in Afghanistan or in any other post-conflict situation.

First, leadership is critical to favor a better understanding of the others’ inter-ests and to initiate a sense of trust between former adversaries. In this regard, a fundamental factor lies in the personal past of the respective leaders. Case studies show that things will go more smoothly if the rapprochement is advocated by a person who has accomplished heroic actions against the enemy with whom rec-onciliation is being sought. This person then asks the population to undergo a transformation that he has undergone himself – i.e., overcoming resentment towards the former enemy. For instance, the historical legitimacy of Charles de Gaulle probably helped the French people to change their views about the Ger-mans. A similar point can be made with respect to Nelson Mandela in South Africa. This element raises a delicate question regarding the Afghan scene: is there any credible and legitimate leader to launch the process?

Second, the only reason why former enemies can favor a rapprochement based on a constant negotiation process is that all of them perceive the effort as useful and profitable. Former belligerents will only try to commit themselves in such a


move if it serves their national interest. The best way to make sure that it is the case is to establish joint projects and to set up activities where all parties have to work together. Robust and credible institutions allow the negotiation process to progressively affect all levels of society. In Afghanistan, the emphasis seems to be exclusively put on the national political leadership. Their role is undoubtedly critical to give clear signals to the other party. However, without the support of the population, official discourses and public ceremonies are ineffective. This point is fundamental since the outcome of the process depends above all on pop-ular support. Even if a rapprochement seems necessary to the representatives of each party, it cannot be imposed by decree. The authorities can create a climate that encourages private steps towards reconciliation but they cannot force indi-vidual initiatives. At the most basic level, reconciliation is all about individuals.

Third, case studies indicate how essential timing is where the objective is to change an adversarial relationship. Some events, particularly traumatic violations of human rights, can remain unexpressed for a period of time – a period that psychoanalysts often call “latent” (Weinrich 1999: 189). There does not appear to be any standard in this matter. However, one can reasonably think that the transformation of the representations that parties have of their conflictual past is an ongoing process that generally lasts for several generations. Such a process may not be imposed on a population that is still deeply hurt by stigmata of the past. As individual wounds often hinder any immediate rapprochement, one can prob-ably postulate the following proposition: the shorter the delay between the conflict and the reconciliation process, the sharper the resistance within the pop-ulation. This lesson of timing does not suggest that the United States cannot support the current Afghan-led process, but it is wise to have a clear idea of the scope – and also the limits – of its action.

The most obvious policy recommendation to come from this research is that the term “reconciliation” can no longer go on undefined and unquestioned in government and NGO programs. The mechanisms of reconciliation are fre-quently assumed to be self-evident or based loosely on the precepts of the contact hypothesis (i.e. regular meetings between enemies softens their hatred for one another). However, reconciliation is decidedly not something that occurs after a handful of dialogue workshops between local leaders, nor through meetings solely at the elite level.

This contribution definitely favors a “modest” picture of reconciliation (Dwyer 1999). Although reconciliation process does not have any formal beginning and ending, it seems appropriate to conceive of it as at least a two-stage negotiation process: first, a peaceful coexistence for pragmatic reasons (common involvement into institutional and economic frame), afterwards a potential transformation of beliefs and identities. Rather than expecting a process that entails truth, justice, and forgiveness, it is critical to adopt a reasonable opinion in terms of aims and timing.


Consequently, before reconciliation programs are even considered, mediators, donors, and/or implementers must ask themselves how committed they truly are to seeing this process happen and whether reconciling the parties in the specific case is even feasible. One could indeed wonder whether reconciliation is always possible (at least in the short-term), and even whether it is always necessary. Unless if we consider that, ultimately, the purpose may not be to reconcile with the other, but to reconcile with the world as it actually is.

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Is reconciliation negotiable?

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