Civil society and reconciliation in Southern Africa

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Civil Society and Reconciliation in Southern AfricaAuthor(s): Christopher J. ColvinSource: Development in Practice, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jun., 2007), pp. 322-337Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Oxfam GBStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548219 .

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Development in Practice, Volume 17, Number 3, June 2007 \\ ^H^Lp

Civil society and reconciliation in Southern Africa

Christopher J. Colvin

This article presents some of the key findings of the Southern African Reconciliation Project (SARP). The SARP was a collaborative research project involving five Southern African

NGOs in Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. It examined how the

concept of reconciliation was understood in political and community contexts in Southern

Africa and investigated the ways in which national government policies and civil-society par ticipation in reconciliation initiatives have opened up and/or foreclosed on opportunities for reconciliation, transitional justice, and the promotion of a culture of human rights. The author summarises the historical context of reconciliation in Southern Africa, outlines the reconciliation initiatives in each country, and identifies emerging debates around and prin ciples of reconciliation that have surfaced in the work of civil-society organisations (CSOs) in the region.

Key Words: Conflict and Reconstruction; Governance and Public Policy; Civil Society; Rights; Sub Saharan Africa

Introduction

In the past two decades, several Southern African countries have embraced democratic gov ernance, albeit in different ways, and have put in place national 'reconciliation' processes to deal with human-rights abuses and address the deep ethnic, racial, political, and class-based divisions of the past. These reconciliation initiatives have all entailed a relationship between the state and civil society, a relationship that has been both co-operative and conflictual.1 The Southern African Reconciliation Project (SARP) was a collaborative research project involving five non-government organisations (NGOs) in Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe which investigated these reconciliation initiatives. It examined how the concept of reconciliation is understood in political and community contexts in these five countries, and studied the ways in which national government policies and civil-society participation in these initiatives have opened up and/or foreclosed on opportunities for

reconciliation, transitional justice, and the promotion of a human-rights culture. This article summarises the principal findings and conclusions of the SARP country and focus area reports.2

322 ISSN 0961-4524 Print/ISSN 1364-9213 Online 030322-16 ? 2007 Oxfam GB

DOI: 10.1080/09614520701336717 Routledge Publishing




In most Southern African countries, independence from colonial authority led to a combi nation of flourishing civil wars and low-level internal violent conflict, the establishment of

repressive one-party states, and the creation of structures of internal colonialism by white settler communities. As earlier colonial structures of power were transformed, fault lines

were reconfigured. Racial conflicts between settler and indigenous communities were overlain

with and intersected by ethnic conflicts between neighbouring communities; religious conflicts between traditional religions, Christianity, and Islam; economic conflicts between elites?both old and new?and non-elites; and wider geopolitical conflicts. Each of these countries has also been affected in the post-colonial period by intersecting regional conflicts, as well as destabili sation by the apartheid South African government.

It is in the context of this recent violent past that a variety of reconciliation initiatives were

developed. The SARP documented a large number of organisational processes, both local and

national, which engaged community members (especially victims, ex-combatants, and perpe trators) in dialogue, in improving mutual understanding, in trust building, in modifying enemy images, in building or realising common values, and in facilitating social reintegration. The next section profiles the five countries under review and outlines the state-sponsored recon ciliation initiatives that were undertaken. The third section examines the corresponding recon ciliation work of civil-society organisations (CSOs) in these countries, followed by a section

listing a number of factors that have enabled and/or constrained reconciliation work in the

region. The concluding section identifies principles of reconciliation and emerging debates that have surfaced in the work of CSOs in Southern Africa.3

Histories of conflict and state-sponsored efforts to promote reconciliation

Despite their very different trajectories of colonial and post-colonial violence, the histories of the five countries under review are also closely intertwined. During the past 30 years, the course of political change in one country has often been taken as an index of, or test case for, the pos sibilities for change in neighbouring countries. As each country emerged from its particular experiences of violence and social fracture, newly elected governments each developed their own series of reconciliation policies and programmes. These policies and programmes were

diverse but reflected, at the same time, regional developments in the discourse and practice of reconciliation. What follows is a brief summary of the political history of conflict in each of these countries, together with an overview of the kinds of state reconciliation initiative that have been undertaken in each.4

Malawi

Malawi was the first of the Southern Africa countries to find itself free of both its former colo nial masters and its small white-settler minority. Malawi's early independence, however, came

at a price: the 30-year totalitarian rule of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Banda was eventually ousted peacefully in an election in 1994, under pressure from internal forces. Reconciliation work in Malawi, therefore, relates more to the period of Banda's rule between 1964 and 1994 than to the anti-colonial conflicts of the early 1960s. It is focused on the victims of Banda's regime, including those who lived in exile, those who suffered physically at the hands of his security forces, and those who lost property and educational and employment opportunities.

Development in Practice, Volume 17, Number 3, June 2007 323




Although calls for a truth commission have been rejected, the new government did undertake a number of reforms to promote a more democratic form of governance and prevent the return

of autocracy and corruption. One of its first efforts was the brutal dismantling of the Malawi

Young Pioneers, a paramilitary force that was one of Banda's principal means of enforcement.

The government also set up a Department of Relief and Rehabilitation and undertook a number

of institutional reforms, including the creation of the Ombudsman's Office, the Human Rights Commission, and the Anti-Corruption Bureau. Although there was no blanket amnesty for vio

lators of human rights in Malawi, neither was there a reckoning or acknowledgment of these

violations. Nor were there any prosecutions of those associated with Banda's violent reign. After complaints about this weak response, the government set up the National Compensation Tribunal (NCT), open to Malawians 'who, on political grounds between 6 July 1964 and 17

May 1994, were wrongfully imprisoned, forced into exile, personally injured, lost property or business, lost education opportunities, lost employment benefits and those who were born

in exile or detention'. Individuals were eligible for compensation in a variety of forms, includ

ing 'monetary, other material support, or symbolic acknowledgment of wrongdoing' (cited in

Buford and Merwe 2003: 23).

Mozambique

Mozambique was the next country to achieve independence, ejecting its Portuguese rulers in

1975 after a long anti-colonial struggle. FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), formed

in 1962, led the campaign and instituted a series of social and economic policies in line with

a Marxist ideology of nationalisation and collectivisation. A resistance soon emerged and even

tually crystallised in the shape of RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance). RENAMO,

however, was as much a product of the settler governments of South Africa and the then Rho

desia as it was a reflection of internal dissatisfaction with FRELIMO. The long civil war that

ensued was thus as much the product of the white, capitalist governments of South Africa

and Rhodesia?and the broader geopolitics of Cold War 'alignment'?as it was of conflicts

internal to Mozambique. Intensive intervention from international NGOs and foreign govern

ments forced RENAMO and FRELIMO to negotiate peace in 1992, and multi-party elections

were held in 1994. After almost two decades of civil war and economic malaise, most

Mozambicans had been victims of, or witnesses to, the looting and destruction of entire villages as well as public executions and torture.

The Mozambican government's response to the end of the civil war was, like Namibia's

(described below), to focus on the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants.

Unlike Namibia, however, their programmes for reintegration were well organised and well

funded, often by international organisations. A Commission for Reintegration (CORE) was

established, and many ex-combatants were offered skills training and other means of

support. Nevertheless, the government actively resisted calls for the memorialisation of those

who had fought against colonialism or in the civil war. While other countries in the area

were busy building monuments and establishing national holidays, the Mozambican govern ment avoided speaking publicly about the past. The government also provided no legal frame

work for the concepts of 'victim' or 'perpetrator', and support services for victims have been

few and far between. More often than not, the needs of victims of political violence have

been subsumed under basic welfare services or 'humanitarian assistance', and most efforts to

deal with the problems of ordinary citizens have been co-ordinated by the Catholic Church

(Buford and Merwe 2003:62). Similarly, the government has developed no official reparations

policy, and its general attitude seems to be that the claims of both ex-combatants and of victims

are best left unaddressed.5

324 Development in Practice, Volume 17, Number 3, June 2007




Namibia

Namibia's long battle for independence from South African rule began around the same time as

Mozambique's battle against the Portuguese. When the UN voted to end South Africa's mandate over the territory in 1966, South Africa refused, and SWAPO (South West Africa

People's Organisation) began its armed campaign. SWAPO's eventual victory against South Africa in 1989 came at the same time as the South African government was negotiating its own peace deal with the African National Congress (ANC). Elections were held in 1989, and independence was declared in 1990 by the new SWAPO government. The victims of

political violence in Namibia include those who suffered directly at the hands of South African and SWAPO forces, those who were victims of internal power struggles in SWAPO, and those who were victims of earlier colonial-era violations of human rights.6 With the end of South African rule, the new government adopted a policy of 'National

Reconciliation'. This policy, mostly unelaborated in legislation or regulation, has focused on the release of political prisoners, the granting of amnesty on all sides of the conflict, and the demobilisation and repatriation of ex-combatants. Programmes for ex-combatants, however, did little in terms of social reintegration. The government later set up the 'Socio-Economic

Integration Programme for Ex-Combatants' (SIPE) to offer skills training to ex-combatants and financial support for orphans. A number of national holidays and memorials have also been created. More recently, the government passed the 1999 War Veteran's Subvention Act to provide further financial compensation to veterans and orphaned children. There is no repara tions programme on the table. The government has consistently agued that 'unification'?a term that connotes a form of 'negative peace'?is more important than historical enquiry into and redress of past injustices. Many argue that this approach reflects a fear, also found in Mozambique, of a return to civil war. It may also reflect a fear among government officials that they could be found guilty of many of the unacknowledged human-rights violations during the past 30 years.

South Africa

After a decade of protests during the 1950s ended in the banning of anti-apartheid organisations, the ANC and other groups embarked on an armed campaign against the South Africa state. It was only 30 years later, with the end of the Cold War and movements towards peace in Namibia and Mozambique, that this struggle ended with multi-party elections in 1994. The end of apart heid left South Africa more dramatically divided along racial and economic lines than any ofthe other four countries. Five decades of repressive apartheid rule had left most of its citizens the victims of systematic abuse and discrimination. Victims of gross human-rights violations included intended and unintended victims of both state and anti-apartheid violence, as well as victims of intra-community and inter-ethnic violence in many of the black townships.

South Africa's official reconciliation policies and programmes have been noteworthy for their embrace of truth telling, (limited) accountability, and victim support. Despite the many justified criticisms of these programmes and policies, South Africa's approach does stand out in the Southern African region as an exception to the rule of blanket amnesty and national for

getting in the name of a 'quiet' unification. The most prominent component ofthe reconciliation effort was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).7 Besides the work of the TRC committees who were responsible for amnesty and victims' testimony, the recommendations of the Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation (CRR) are perhaps the most important, and most controversial, aspects ofthe Commission's work. The CRR recommended that a com

prehensive reparations programme should be implemented by the government, to include direct





financial compensation to victims, as well as symbolic, community-based, and institutional

forms of reparation. It would easily have been the most ambitious reparations programme in the Southern African region. After a long and acrimonious political and legal battle with civil society, however, the government decided to implement only a very reduced version of the original recommendations (Colvin 2005).

Zimbabwe

In 1965, after 90 years of colonial rule, and a year after Malawi gained its independence, Zimbabwe found itself under the rule of Ian Smith and a white-settler government. Internal resistance against settler rule led to a brief period of negotiation and power sharing, and the eventual election in 1980 of Robert Mugabe as Zimbabwe's first democratically elected presi dent. Although the 'War of Liberation' of the 1960s and 1970s produced many victims of

political violence, Mugabe's increasingly repressive regime has been another important engine of political violence. The Matabeleland and Midlands Uprisings in the mid-1980s ended with Mugabe's vicious suppression of the political opposition. Food riots in 1998 and

election protests in 2000 were also brutally repressed. Despite its proclamation of an official 'policy of reconciliation' in 1980, Zimbabwe

pursued policies similar to those of Mozambique and Namibia. After independence, this

policy consisted of the 1980 War Victim's Compensation Act, the Amnesty (General Pardon) Act, and a deal with white residents that included a guaranteed proportion (20 per cent) of seats in the first Parliament and the protection of property rights. A Demobilisation Directorate was set up for ex-combatants and operated for a brief time. There were com

plaints that these few programmes for compensation and support were too narrow and

vague, too prone to corruption, and too poorly funded. Critics also argued that they were

essentially the same as social-welfare programmes and thus did not constitute adequate

reconciliatory measures for victims. Another Act of Parliament ten years later provided limited skills training and support for war orphans, but still failed adequately to address

the needs of victims of human-rights violations.

Civil-society strategies and interventions

Southern African governments have been, on the whole, less than enthusiastic in driving these reconciliation initiatives. Government programmes have by far the biggest political,

legal, social, and economic impacts, but these programmes have often been criticised for

being significantly under-funded and badly managed. Consequently, many CSOs have

argued that civil society has a vital dual role to play in reconciliation. CSOs, frustrated

with the failure of states to implement sustained, integrated, widely accepted, and effective

reconciliation programmes, have spent a great deal of energy pressuring the state to

engage more fully with the work of reconciliation. They have also argued that only their

active participation in reconciliation will bridge the gap, often wide, between national

elite-level political discourses of reconciliation and local understandings of reconciliation.

They function, thus, as both 'pressure groups' and 'service providers' for reconciliation

work. The next section considers the practice of reconciliation 'on the ground' in Southern

Africa by these CSOs. It describes the interventions of the organisations, individuals, and

communities in terms of SARP's five focus areas: trauma counselling, victim-support ser

vices, demobilisation, memorialisation, and reparations.





Trauma counselling

Trauma counselling has been a feature of many post-conflict reconciliation initiatives. This

particular brand of mental-health care is often offered not only as an individual medical inter

vention, but also as an important component of broader processes of social reconciliation.

Despite the many models available for trauma counselling, 'they all have the same objec tives: to change the way people think of, and experience, their problematic situation, and to act upon their new understanding' (Muinjangue 2003: 6). Most Southern African states, however, have failed to support this component of reconciliation. South Africa is probably the one exception to this rule. But despite its general support at the state level for trauma

therapy (in particular through the TRC), trauma counselling in South Africa has been the near-exclusive province of NGOs. These organisations face a range of difficulties. Most

clients, for example, come to trauma clinics not for counselling but for other types of aid: medical attention, employment, food, and shelter. Victims' desperate material circumstances make it very difficult to develop sustained and productive therapeutic relationships. There have also been complaints that counselling is an inappropriately 'Western' form of

healing. Some have criticised counselling for its apolitical approach to social suffering, which offers 'coping strategies' instead of progressive political frameworks for removing the sources of suffering. Finally, counselling programmes in all of these countries are almost all funded by overseas aid organisations, human-rights organisations, trauma-counselling NGOs,

foreign governments, and church groups. These programmes are thus vulnerable both to shifts in funding priorities and to non-local agendas and perspectives. Although many of those interviewed by the SARP agreed that work on emotions alone is unable to create a

lasting reconciliation, there was also consensus that without sufficient attention to the emotional dimensions of suffering, reconciliation will be undermined.

Victim-support services

Victim-support services include the work of victim-support and advocacy groups, legal-advice centres, skills training and economic empowerment, social-work services, providers of mental

and physical health care, and conflict-resolution organisations. Government support for these

services has been far less than adequate and, in most cases, CSOs have been active in filling some of the many gaps. These organisations, however, have limited resources, and are

unable to fully respond to the many?and the many kinds of?victims in this region. In Namibia, there is no official state support for victims. Many of the CSOs that have offered

some of these missing services are victim-founded support groups like Breaking the Wall of Silence and the National Society for Human Rights. In Mozambique, there has been a similar lack of state support, and international NGOs and church groups have taken on some of the responsibility, as have many communities themselves. The situation in Zimbabwe resembles that in Namibia and Mozambique. Again, local NGOs and church groups have led the effort to fill some of the gaps left by the state.

Victim support in Malawi and South Africa has been slightly better. In Malawi, victims had access to a very limited form of support through the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation and the National Compensation Tribunal. South Africa has developed the most comprehensive set of victim-support services. The TRC, in particular, collaborated with a wide range of South

African NGOs and government departments to provide services to victims. In addition to these NGO service providers, victim-support groups have been a prominent part of South African civil society's response to victims' needs.





Demobilisation and reintegration programmes

In contrast to the scant attention paid to trauma counselling and other forms of victim support, ex-combatants have received much more attention. In all five countries, ex-combatants were

seen, to varying degrees, to be threats to the fragile new peace. Many were having a hard time reintegrating into their home communities, because of difficulty in adjusting to peacetime life and hostility from family and community members. Governments?as well as civil

society?in these five countries have worked, with mixed success, to demobilise ex-combatants and reintegrate them into their communities. Namibia, with the help of the UN, repatriated and demobilised many soldiers from groups opposing SWAPO, although they initially had offered no meaningful social-reintegration programmes for soldiers. South Africa also implemented a demobilisation programme without providing adequately for the social reintegration of these soldiers. It did, however, incorporate some ex-combatants into its new armed forces. Zimbabwe

established a demobilisation directorate in 1981. This directorate, which operated for only two

years, offered a small pension and skills-training package to former combatants.

Mozambique developed the most comprehensive and sustained demobilisation and reinte

gration programmes in the region. Much of its focus is on income-generating and skill-training programmes. It has also developed family- and community-level interventions that facilitate the

acceptance and reintegration of individual soldiers. Traditional healers, unions, and church

organisations have also contributed their own particular perspectives and programmes. Former combatants themselves have set up their own organisations to pursue income gener

ation, skill training, or psychological healing. All of these groups face a number of challenges. Ex-combatants are by no means

homogeneous, and the needs of different subgroups?women, child soldiers, members of differ ent ethnic or political groups?often differ radically. Many of the organisations representing demobilised soldiers have also developed a 'culture of protest as a strategy to gain access to more resources from government as well as from non-governmental organisations' (Igreja

2003: 33). Veiled (or sometimes not-so-veiled) threats of violence become negotiating tactics, making the relationship between these ex-combatants and the state, as well as civil

society, all the more strained.

Memorialisation

After demobilisation, memorialisation has probably been the second most common form of

state-sponsored reconciliation work in Southern Africa. Unfortunately, however, most memor

ialisation efforts have been elite-driven, national programmes that have honoured a narrow

range of politically connected individuals (Werbner 1995). The Heroes' Acres in Zimbabwe

and Namibia?national memorial complexes for individuals aligned to the ruling party in

each instance?are good case studies of the centralisation and hierarchisation of memory in

post-conflict Southern Africa.

South Africa is, again, a partial exception to this rule. The degree to which South Africa

promoted a variety of memorial strategies (including smaller memorials, exhumations and

reburials, and national holidays) puts it in a different league. The TRC solicited memories of

apartheid from both its victims and its perpetrators. The (often grudging) willingness of the

ANC to submit its own past violations to review is similarly unique. Mozambique, however,

provides the counter-example to South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia in its careful avoidance

of any memorialisation efforts that might be seen to exacerbate tensions in the country. Families and communities in all of these countries have also undertaken their own memor

ialisation at the local level. In many cases, memorialisation is incorporated into long-standing





traditional rituals of communication with ancestors. Many felt that the state memorials like Heroes' Acre?with its vast graveyards of unrelated individuals in distant cities?made these

important traditional forms of veneration impossible. Besides, without a sense of real partici pation and ownership in the construction of these larger memorials, communities have fre

quently dismissed them as cynical political manipulations of tragedy. Memorialisation continues to be an active and controversial area of the reconciliation process.

Reparations

The argument that reparations are a key part of reconciliation has been made on a number of fronts. The SARP identified five main justifications:

1. Reparations are a firmly established right in international law. 2. They are a moral necessity for victims suffering from physical and psychological injury. 3. They give victims a role and a stake in the transition process. 4. They contribute to the political transition's projects of crafting a new political identity and

culture of human rights and the rule of law. 5. They are needed to counterbalance the amnesty that is often granted to perpetrators of

human-rights violations in post-conflict contexts. (Buford and Merwe 2003: 13-14)

Reparations, however, require both the commitment and funding of the state. Only three of the five Southern African countries have developed reparations policies, and none has proved broadly satisfactory to victims. Malawi's National Compensation Tribunal (NCT) was sup posed to serve as a form of reparation, but under-funding, inefficiency, corruption, and lack of public awareness have hampered the success of this programme. Zimbabwe's War Victims Compensation Act, a similar attempt to provide reparative measures, has suffered from the same range of criticism aimed at the NCT. In South Africa, despite the TRC's com

prehensive, multi-faceted recommendations, the government decided to implement only a limited reparations programme, consisting of one-off direct financial payments and a yet-to be determined community reparations programme. Mozambique and Namibia have no repara tions policies at all, and no plans to develop any.

The role of civil society in reparations has largely been to lobby for and provide input in the

development of government reparation policies and to offer skills, infrastructure, and resources

for the implementation of certain kinds of reparation. A number of difficulties have been encountered. Governments have complained of insufficient resources for proper reparations. Both governments and CSOs have struggled with how to define eligible victims. Victims

rarely comprise an easily definable class of persons, especially in these Southern African cases. There are also complaints that reparations, especially in the form of direct financial pay ments, constitute a form of 'blood money' that governments might use to absolve themselves of full culpability for the past.

Enabling and constraining factors The SARP also worked to identify internal and external factors that both constrained and enabled reconciliation work. This section outlines a number of these factors. It provides a poten

tially useful list of variables that any organisation involved?or thinking about becoming involved?in reconciliation work should be aware of.





Socio-economic status of victims

Civilians living in rural and urban poverty have been the most severely affected by the violence of social conflict during the past 30 years. With the end of hostilities, these victims have very little power in post-conflict decision making. The relatively weak political position of victims has less impact, however, on whether or not reconciliation programmes are created than on who

gets to be recognised as a victim (Buford and Merwe 2003). Indeed, with the exception of

Malawi, whose NCT was empowered to address a wide range of victims, the category of 'victim' has been strictly circumscribed in all of these countries. Even the TRC, whose

definition of victim included many rural and urban poor, instituted fairly narrow legal criteria that focused on victims of 'gross human rights violations'. Other victims?of harassment, dis

crimination, detention, physical and sexual assault?are typically not included in the legislative and memorial complex of victimhood.

The active engagement of victim groups and other CSOs with the state can be an important part of developing and promoting reconciliation among those with the least socio-economic

power. Strong and active alliances between victims and other parts of civil society have been

important in pushing for programmes that have only weak government support. In theory, the greater the involvement of civil society, the more victim-centred and holistic reconciliation

policies should be, although this is probably true only at the policy level. Victims have been less successful in maintaining political pressure at the level of implementation. South Africa has

probably had the strongest and most effectively engaged civil society, but even there, the

relationship with the state has often been frustrating and ineffective.

Political and legal contexts during and after transition

Political and legal contexts during and after transition also affect the ability of a state or civil

society to develop and implement effective reconciliation policies and programmes. Political

transitions in Southern Africa have been characterised by negotiated settlements between two or more conflicting parties, often facilitated by foreign governments, international govern

ment organisations (IGOs), and church groups, and they have inevitably involved a host of

uncomfortable social and legal compromises, especially in relation to reconciliation. If these

compromises contribute to a fuller, more participatory, democratic culture, some of the pain

of deal-making might, in the long run, be assuaged. If, however, these compromises enable

the consolidation of a dominant one-party state, then the prospects for long-term reconciliation

are even more damaged. The SARP consistently found that the dominance of one political

party, even within the context of multi-party elections, generally had a damaging effect on

reconciliation process.

Most political transitions in Southern Africa have also involved the substitution of one set of

political and economic elites by another. In these cases, the new political masters largely repro duce the class and political power structures already at work in the country. Such transitions do

not make it any easier for those at the other end of the socio-economic and political spectrum to

participate meaningfully in reconciliation initiatives. These new elites' interests in protecting their newfound privileges also militate against the kinds of broad-scale reform called for by

grassroots reconciliation initiatives.

Legal decisions about transitional justice form another important context for reconciliation.

When political compromises are encoded in law, they become less mutable. Amnesty laws, the

most prominent and controversial legal instruments of transitions, tend to alienate victims of

political violence. The challenge of reconciliation in the context of amnesty is to ensure that

other measures are put in place to attend to the needs of victims. In most cases, amnesty





laws cannot easily be reversed, but there are often alternative legal routes for addressing the

victims' needs. There are hopes in South Africa, for example, that international lawsuits for

reparations being brought against international corporations will force the government to

reconsider its own reparation policies.

International dynamics

International dynamics?political, legal, and economic?can also enable or constrain reconci

liation initiatives. Most efforts to promote reparations, for example, are grounded in inter

national legal principles and commitments that many Southern Africa governments are

obliged, in principle, to uphold (Rwelamira and Werle 1996). Similarly, the ability of victims to pursue claims against states or individuals in domestic or international judicial forums like the International Criminal Court (ICC) could affect the political decision making

within states.

Some foreign governments have applied political and economic pressure to influence the direction of political transitions. International NGOs and church groups also command con siderable influence through the substantial amount of aid that they provide. The involvement of these actors, however, can make reconciliation work vulnerable to external priorities and

approaches, political in-fighting, and sudden shifts in funding streams. Nor do foreign gov ernments and international NGOs have the best track record in facilitating strong local par ticipation in decision making and planning. Their involvement can thus both help and hinder the work of reconciliation, sometimes simultaneously (White 2000).

Victims, communities, NGOs

Any process as broad and multi-faceted as reconciliation will be engaged in for a variety of often conflicting reasons. National governments want to consolidate their popular legitimacy. Victim groups want recognition of their experiences and reparation for their suffering. Labour unions want economic changes that will benefit their members, while large corpor ations?and small businesses?want the same. International organisations and foreign govern

ments engage with post-conflict reconstruction for an equally wide variety of reasons. The

possible points of divergence among these various actors are many: race, ethnicity, gender,

class, institutional priorities, and political or religious ideology. One important and insufficiently recognised area of potential divergence can be found in the

relationships between victims, communities, and NGOs. These three groups are often united in

pressuring reluctant post-conflict governments for more rights, recognition, and resources.

Often, these three groups appear interchangeable and even claim to speak for one another. However, their voices?and their interests?are anything but unified. Among NGOs, a

strong dynamic of self-preservation often guides their work, making them less than fully accountable to or representative of the communities with whom they work. Similarly, those

community members who claim to 'speak for' the community do not always fully represent the range of perspectives in a community. Finally, victims do not share a single perspective on reconciliation, and the many differences in their experiences and in their social, political, and economic positions are seldom recognised. These differences of opinion, approach, per spective, and goals are part and parcel of the broader social conflicts that need to be negotiated

within the reconciliation process.





Cultural models of reconciliation

SARP research has also highlighted the importance of integrating national and NGO-driven reconciliation processes with local cultural contexts and traditions. Concepts like ubuntu, for

example, a presumably 'African' form of community-focused humanism, have been used to

describe common local understandings in Africa?and elsewhere?of the importance of com

munity and the need to restore and maintain social order in ways that are not simply punitive.8 Other examples of cultural models of reconciliation included 'condolence' and kupupesa, in Zimbabwe and Malawi respectively. In Mozambique, much of the reintegration of former sol diers has been facilitated by traditional healers who have made use of local cleansing rituals to

'purify' these 'polluted' ex-combatants, enabling them to rejoin their communities (Honwana 2005).

In many cases, these cultural models reflect an approach to criminality and violence that observers have termed 'restorative justice', as opposed to the logic of 'retributive justice' embedded in Western legal culture (Maepa 2005). The case can, however, be overstated. African communities?like communities everywhere?also employ punitive and retributive forms of justice. Respect for cultural practices and contexts should not ignore these equally important traditions.

Conclusion

Despite the many challenges posed by reconciliation endeavours, civil society throughout Southern Africa has nonetheless been busy pursuing this elusive goal. A number of principles of reconciliation in Southern Africa have emerged from this work and are discussed below.

Reconciliation as a victim-centred, victim-friendly (and victim-driven?) process

Most of the individuals, organisations, and communities involved in reconciliation work agree that it should be victim-centred and victim-friendly. There is agreement, even from most gov

ernment officials, that top-down, bureaucratic processes of reconciliation are not likely to

prove meaningful or sustainable. Reconciliation programmes must also take into account the

poverty, lack of education, and ill health that affect many victims of political violence. Mean

ingful and appropriate symbolism is another important dimension of reconciliation. Too many memorialisation programmes fail to use symbolism that speaks directly and powerfully to local traditions and experiences. Finally, there is a general consensus that reconciliation processes

should be 'driven' by victims as well. On the ground, however, this rarely happens. Although victims have been effective in pushing governments for particular programmes and policies,

especially reparations, once these initiatives are underway, victims are typically unable to

guide the process meaningfully. This is largely a reflection of the disempowered position that most victims hold in relation to government. Old political divisions and persisting class div isions are two of the major sources of this disempowerment.

A holistic and integrated approach to reconciliation

Another broad area of agreement is that reconciliation initiatives should integrate a range of

reparative and restorative measures in different domains (legal, financial, material, medical,

educational, institutional, and legislative reforms) and on different levels (individual, commu

nity, national). The ideal approach to reconciliation is, thus, holistic and integrated. It not only comprises multiple dimensions, but connects them to one another as well. Integration also





means the co-ordination of the overall reconciliation programme both with other transitional

justice processes and with other state programmes more generally. Many government

ministries?especially social welfare, health, education, and justice?contribute to both recon

ciliation and broader socio-economic justice, and the relationship between transitional justice programmes and the rest of government is an important, but under-examined, dimension of

reconciliation initiatives.

'Critical' relationships between civil society and government

The importance of 'critical' relationships between civil society and governments engages two senses of the word 'critical'. On one hand, there is an emerging consensus that civil society should always be able to criticise state programmes and policies constructively and vigorously. On the other hand, there is also a sense that it is 'critical' to engage and work with government on reconciliation initiatives. Partnerships between the state and civil society are increasingly seen as vital to the success of reconciliation. In all of the countries under review here, the

relationship between the state and civil society has often been tense, ambivalent, and uncertain.

Nonetheless, many CSOs do, and indeed have to, work with government. Given that civil

society in Southern Africa is still relatively weak, unco-ordinated, and significantly under

funded, most victims, communities, and NGOs in fact seem to want more?and better?govern ment involvement, not less. In most cases, this relationship will probably continue to be one of

struggle rather than of co-operation, but it is not a relationship that either side can avoid.

Reconciliation and respect for local culture

Another emerging principle of reconciliation in Southern Africa is the importance of under

standing, respecting, and integrating local culture into reconciliation initiatives. This is

especially true in the areas of traditional healing, religion, and local forms of political and

legal dispute-resolution. Being attentive to local culture may also mean paying attention to the informal and inventive ways that people find to cope with their daily lives. In practice, however, few reconciliation initiatives are meaningfully integrated with local contexts, con

cerns, and cultural practices (Shaw 2005). In addition, the reified notions of 'culture' at work in many NGOs and government offices

simplify what is in fact a very complex cultural and political terrain. Christianity, for

example, is widespread in Southern Africa, and is just as deeply 'cultural' as any other part of Southern Africa life. Many Christians in Southern Africa, however, reject the widespread practice of 'superstitious' rituals at the graves of ancestors, preferring instead to pray for the fate of departed souls in the Christian afterlife (Bischoff 2003: 51). Culture is not a homo

geneous set of concepts and actions within a particular place and time; more often than not, it is composed of competing, complementary, conflicting, and/or contradictory notions and

imperatives.

Prioritising women and children

In most Southern Africa countries, women and children have suffered disproportionately as

victims, both direct and indirect, of gross human-rights violations. The forced recruitment of child soldiers has also meant that many children have perpetrated similar forms of violation themselves (Honwana 2005). The needs of women and children often go unrecognised, and their general marginalisation means that their resources for coping are also severely limited.

Women bear the burden for most aspects of social reproduction: childbirth and rearing,





maintaining households, agricultural labour, etc. Attending to their needs is, therefore, import ant for re-establishing normal and stable social structures after violence. Finally, since women

are often the most active and productive members of CSOs, their energy and skills, and those of their children, can be invaluable in promoting reconciliation. Prioritising women and children in the aftermath of conflict has, therefore, become an important principle of reconciliation work.

Reconciliation as process and practice

Although the rhetoric of reconciliation often paints it as an end state to be achieved in the future?rather than a process to be pursued in the present?much of the actual work of recon

ciliation revolves around process-oriented interventions. Both state and civil-society actors

inevitably describe their work as part of a larger, long-term process that necessarily involves

many others and will take a very long time to come to fruition. A related perspective sees reconciliation as a practice as much as a process. Here, reconcilia

tion develops through changes in action as much as through changes in thoughts or attitudes. A

Mozambican newspaper editor argued, for example, as follows:

/ think there are two ways to heal the wounds. One is.. .whereby people.. .talk openly

[about] what individually they did, people they killed. ... This is the way that was very

useful in [South Africa]. But here in Mozambique this was avoided, nobody wanted to

talk about the past. ... Thus, the better way to ensure the forgiveness of wrongdoings of

the past... is ... to include all people in the economic, political and social participation

in the society. I think this is a unique way of healing the wounds of the past.. .1 think this

way, more or less, we can heal the wounds of the past.. .To participate means to feel

owners of the country, ... in [the] economic sphere,

... in [the] social sphere, ... in all

spheres of the country. (Bischoff 2003: 8)

Undine Kayser (2005) has argued similarly that the opportunity to practise new forms of inter

action?the chance to touch people from another group, to spend time with them, to work on

projects together, and live and eat in the same small space?enables people to understand, in

a small way, what reconciliation might feel like. She argues that this is just as important a com

ponent of reconciliation as is the ability to change one's ideas and perspectives.

Law and reconciliation

While it is generally accepted that legal solutions to reconciliation are always inadequate in and

of themselves, law has been increasingly recognised as an important means of forcing the state,

perpetrators, and beneficiaries to participate in reconciliation measures. There is a sense, at least

in civil society, that law and reconciliation have a close, if always ambivalent, relationship.

Legal approaches, especially if actively supported by the government, can be an important index of a state's commitment both to reconciliation and to principles of accountability and

the rule of law. This is not to suggest that law can serve as an adequate substitute for other

forms and modes of reconciliation. Law can, however, sometimes achieve in quicker

measure what politics and pressure from civil society cannot.

Formal versus informal interventions

Building on the idea that reconciliation should be seen as a holistic and integrated process that

respects local culture, proponents of reconciliation have also argued that reconciliation pro

cesses need to happen both formally?in larger-scale, institution-oriented and/or state-driven





contexts?and informally, in less planned, more local, and non-state contexts. Formal processes

usually employ an explicit framework with a set of operating procedures and ways of measuring outcomes. Informal processes are more open-ended and more open to negotiation and are often

difficult to assess in terms of outcome. State programmes are sometimes criticised for their formalism and are accused of being elitist or of ostracising those on the margins. While often true, it is also the case that informal CSO programmes can just as easily be accused of

running slipshod and inefficient programmes that are neither accountable nor representative. Whatever their respective weaknesses, however, it is clear from the experiences in Southern Africa that sustainable, meaningful, and effective reconciliation initiatives require the strengths of both formal and informal processes.

All organisations involved in reconciliation work in Southern Africa?governments, aid

agencies, CSOs, religious organisations, and international NGOs?soon come to appreciate the enormous challenges confronting them as they seek to address the impact of centuries of violent conflict in the region. One clear lesson of the Southern African Reconciliation

Project (SARP) is that a durable reconciliation requires the support and active input of civil

society. This does not mean, however, that civil society can or should go it alone. Appropriate government policies and interventions are also vital for the promotion of national reconcilia tion, transitional justice, and a culture of human rights. But the active participation of civil

society, broadly conceived, in reconciliation work is the best hope for achieving a lasting peace in the region. The SARP has documented a number of civil-society processes that

engaged community members in dialogue, in improving mutual understanding, in trust build

ing, in modifying enemy images, in building or realising common values, and in facilitating social reintegration. In the process, a number of enabling and constraining factors for successful reconciliation were identified, and a number of emerging debates and principles of reconcilia tion were described. As the Southern African region becomes increasingly integrated, economi

cally and politically, the SARP hopes that civil-society organisations in these countries will also be able more effectively and sustainably to co-ordinate with and learn lessons from each other. The challenges for reconciliation in the region are substantial, but so are the possibilities. Understanding the lessons of past experience will make future efforts at reconciliation more

lasting and effective.

Acknowledgements The article is based on the research conducted by the five NGOs involved in the South African Reconcilia

tion Project (SARP). It has also benefited from editorial advice from Hugo van der Merwe.

Notes 1. See the papers from a Symposium 'Building Bridges in Southern Africa: Conflict, Reconstruction, and

Reconciliation in Times of Change', published in Development in Practice, Volume 7, Number 4

(1997) for an overview of many of these issues.

2. NGOs in each of the five Southern Africa countries were approached, and one from each country was

selected to participate in the research. Each NGO was then responsible for collecting data in its particu lar country for a 'country report'. In addition, each NGO was responsible for writing a report on one of the five 'focus areas'?trauma counselling, victim-support services, demobilisation and reintegration,

memorialisation, and reparations?by integrating the findings from the other four countries. These focus area and country reports and other reports are available through the Centre for the Study of Vio lence and Reconciliation (CSVR). The findings of these reports comprise the bulk of the material for this article.





3. The terms 'CSO' and 'NGO' will both be used here. 'CSO' refers to the broad range of possible civil

society organisations, while 'NGO' will be used to refer to a narrower range of more formal institutions

that often have their own staff, funding, and infrastructure.

4. For more on recent events in these five countries, see Saul 1999; Melber 2002; Crais 2003.

5. Mozambique is often mentioned as an example of a post-conflict society that has chosen the path of

'silence'?or, at the very least, other, less verbal forms of social reconstruction?rather than the

more public and confessional forms of addressing the past that have been adopted in countries such

as South Africa. The government's 'silence' on these issues may therefore reflect not only political cal

culation, but a certain underlying resonance with local cultural precepts. Many NGOs, however, chal

lenge the idea that the government's silence on the past reflects cultural rather than purely political motivations.

6. The Herero and Nama, for example, are pursuing lawsuits for damages for atrocities committed

between 1907 and 1915 by German colonial forces.

7. The Land Commission was another major effort on the part of the South African government to address

one of the key issues likely to undermine long-term reconciliation in the country: the violent and inequi table (re-)distribution of residential and agricultural land during apartheid.

8. There have been debates about exactly how 'African' this concept is, with some arguing that the term is

simply a way to 'Africanise' political compromises and make things like amnesty and victim testimony look more 'cultural' than political.

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The author

Christopher Colvin is an anthropologist working in South Africa on several aspects of socio-political reconstruction in post-conflict societies. He also conducts research on HIV/AIDS, masculinity, and the

global politics of public-health science. He works with the Transition and Reconciliation Programme of

the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and in the School of Public Health and Family Medicine at the University of Cape Town. Contact details: 21 Duke St., Observatory 7925, Cape Town,

South Africa. <[email protected]>




Civil society and reconciliation in Southern Africa

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