New York University Center for Global Affairs

Armenian and Azerbaijani Youth Perspectives on Peaceand Reconciliation

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Concentration: PeacebuildingThesis Advisor: Thomas Hill

BYInna BabakulievaNew York, NYSpring, 2014

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Table of Contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………03

Chapter I: Research Methodology and Study Design …………………………………………06

Chapter II: Current State of Peace Process ……………………………………………………19

Chapter III: Youth as Agents of Change ………………………………………………………31

Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation ……..36

Chapter V: Key Findings ……………………………………………………………………….52

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….………………..69

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………….………………73

Appendix …………...…………………………………………………………….……………...87

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IntroductionA) Purpose and Rationale for the Study

The case of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth in the Nagorno-

Karabakh peace process is explored in this study with particular

attention to the concepts of exclusive historic representations,

collective memory, identity development and its impact on youth

roles and actions. The main objective of this study is to examine

the largely neglected psychological dimension to the conflict and

determine its impact on attitudes, beliefs and interests of young

adults in both nations. Theories of identity development,

reconciliation and conflict transformation form the conceptual

framework to guide this study. These theories were chosen for

their usefulness in examining how an appeal to the past,

historical narratives and collective memory may construct values

and beliefs in younger generations. These values and beliefs

inform a decision-making processes and determine attitudes

towards reconciliation and peace.

The mediation efforts of the Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group to bring adversaries to

an agreement on the framework for the negotiation of a

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comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict played a crucial role in solidifying and

institutionalizing a conflict resolution platform. It also has

been useful in reinforcing the priority of elites and their

influence over everything and everyone. A bilateral two decades-

long stalemate has resulted in the expansion of the conflict and

opened up space for the development of a living room war,

bringing the war to everyone’s house through state-controlled

media and government-censored reporting. Such government-

sponsored information campaigns have helped to shape the public’s

perception of what this conflict is about and the reasons behind

the stalemate,while deliberately dehumanizing the adversary.

The Minsk Group’s secrecy around its mediation efforts and a

lack of public diplomacy efforts by the co-chairs has resulted in

a lack of public awareness about the status of the negotiation

process. The population on both sides has had to rely on official

government statements to make sense of the deadlocked

negotiations. The undertone of these negotiations is that the

respective governments represent the interests and will of the

people and negotiate on their behalf. Such an attitude makes it

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impossible for low-status, or marginalized groups, such as youth,

to believe in and seize back their place in the process. The

people are not prepared to play a part in conflict resolution or

transformation activities. Furthermore, as the Minsk Group

celebrated the 20th year of deadlocked negotiations with few

results to display, both Armenia and Azerbaijan grow more

suspicious of the Minsk Group’s intentions and interests.

Prolonged political negotiations and excessive use of

derogatory remarks by the Armenian and Azerbaijani political

actors contribute to the obstacles faced by Track II diplomacy

efforts. Civil society organizations (CSOs) linked to foreign

agencies grow unpopular within the larger population. The NGO

community, developing and implementing reconciliation and

conflict transformation programs, is often subjected to

harassment by government authorities, especially as they diverge

from the hard-line political stance regarding the reconciliation

process between the two states. Draconian NGO legislation in both

states further hinders the space for implementation of programs

on empowerment and capacity building of youth, women and minority

groups.

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Thus, two decades since the deadlocked negotiations began, a

new generation is coming of age with no direct experience of

living alongside the other. Two groups have limited people-to-

people interactions, in conjunction with endless hate speech and

derogatory public statements, leading to mutual isolation. This

isolation results in a mentality that dehumanizes and distrusts

the other side. Such a context makes it challenging to engage in

social cohesion or peacebuilding efforts. Transforming people’s

attitudes and perceptions, building their capacities, and

empowering them to commit to reconciliation activities is vital,

if the high-level official negotiations ever are to achieve long-

awaited results.

B) Approaching a Hypothesis

This study seeks to conduct a comparative analysis of the

prospective role of Armenian and Azeri youth in the peace

process. The goal of the study is to examine the interplay of

various narratives, attitudes and perceptions between Armenian

and Azeri youth, while attempting to determine which of the given

narratives would likely have a soothing effect and serve as a

useful tool for promoting productive interaction among youth. The

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study put forward the following hypothesis: Armenian and

Azerbaijani youth have hidden potential to serve a productive and

transformative role in the peace process to lead their countries

towards reconciliation. This hidden potential could, possibly, be

brought forth should:

a) Parties disengage and discontinue hate speech, derogatory

public statements, and dehumanization of the adversary;

b) Parties collaborate to transform employed negative

historical and collective narratives into more tolerant

ones;

c) The OSCE Minsk Group engages in public diplomacy efforts to

demystify the negotiation process;

d) The OSCE Minsk Group encourages and advocates for space for

civil society organizations to engage in Track II diplomacy

efforts (peacebuilding, social cohesion, and reconciliation

activities) without a fear of reprisal;

e) Parties encourage and empower marginalized groups to seize

back their places in the peace process to become full and

essential participants in it.

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This study employs a qualitative research approach and

explores the key concepts of collective narratives and identity

development. Relatively little research has been produced on the

youth’s role in building peace. This study makes an effort to

identify cases where youth has played an informal role in

transforming relations along ethnic lines. The nature of

political level negotiations that can play a vital role in the

resolution and impact Track II diplomacy efforts is also

discussed below.

Chapter I: Research Methodology and Study DesignA) Rationale for the Research Design

A review of the available academic literature and scholarly

articles reveals very few writings on the situation of low status

and marginalized groups of young adults in peace processes and

their role and potential for peacebuilding.1 Even less has been

written on youth’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.

Thus, I decided to employ a qualitative approach in this research

1 Sultanli, J. (2011). Youth in Sourh Caucasus: Agents of Peace or Future Soldiers?; Gurbanov, G. (2012). Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh: the Role of Youth and Democracy.

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and conduct primary research to try to generate some original

data and examine youth’s experiences and perceptions of peace,

reconciliation, and their role in the peace process through their

own words. The use of this approach has been useful in beginning

to generate data related to a subject about which there is a

limited body of knowledge. 2 Acknowledging that youth are

vulnerable to influence from outside elements, the central

component of this study is to explore the manipulation of

institutional and collective narratives, their influence on youth

identity development, and ways these narratives may have

potential for transforming beliefs into actions.3

This research rests on the foundation of a study conducted

by Garagozov (2011). He argues that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

is a conflict of mutually exclusive historical narratives,

collective memory, and nationalistic myths. These narratives and

rigidly fixed beliefs are well incorporated into the mainstream

sociocultural climate, poisoning the environment and undermining

prospective peacebuilding efforts. He suggests transforming 2 Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developinggrounded theory; Padgett, D. (2008). Qualitative methods in social work research. 3 Marutyan, H. (2007). Collective and historical memory in the dialogue of cultures.

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mutually exclusive nationalistic narratives into more tolerant

and cooperative ones by utilizing a “model of progressive

narrative transformation.”4

The main concept behind this model is to change and

transform original narratives into ones slightly closer to each

other. Once this step is achieved, Garagozov proposes to repeat

it a number of times until there is a comprehensive narrative

accepted by both sides that does not dehumanize or antagonize the

other. However, before manipulating any narratives it is

important to find the type of a narrative (or narratives) that

would be more conducive to reconciliation, and to determine to

what extent a specific narrative might reduce confrontational

attitudes. His three-phase study attempts to answer such

questions by engaging with Azerbaijani IDPs and non-IDPs. The

initial phase of his research includes a questionnaire on

individual attitudes and beliefs towards reconciliation; the

second phase tests three different narratives and assesses

participants’ moods when presented with a specific narrative.

When trying to identify a narrative that would be helpful in

4 Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes? Interplay of narratives, memory, emotions, and attitudes

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terms of diminishing confrontation attitudes, it is important to

examine if a specific narrative will have a similar effect on

both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Garagozov’s research does not

address this question.

This study incorporated survey instruments (with certain

edits) previously used by Garagozov, seeking to ensure that

narratives would be examined by both populations. My study

employed a perception survey to ascertain critical perspectives

of youth in relation to their social status, identity

development, and attitudes towards peaceful resolution of the

conflict.

Perception surveys, in general, allow researchers to measure

what respondents feel, think and believe.5 This approach helped

me to gain information about youth’s understanding of the

Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process, as well as their views

about reconciliation, peace and human rights, and their

attitudes, opinions about the peace process.

This study reached out to both the Armenian and Azerbaijani

populations to compare and draw conclusions about whether similar

5 Herbert, S. (2013). Perception surveys in fragile and conflict-affected states: Helpdesk Research Report.

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narratives would have similar attitudinal impacts on youth from

both communities. The recruitment process took place within a

popular and influential mode of communication in youth culture,

internet and social media. Acknowledging time and resource

constraints, and recognizing widespread internet access, the

benefits of conducting a perception survey online, through an e-

survey approach, seemed to supersede potential drawbacks.

The survey consisted of two sections and a total of 24

questions. The first section included both qualitative and

quantitative components. The quantitative component was

integrated to gather information that could be used to describe

and make comparisons between the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth.

The study was divided in a way so there would be one week to go

over the answers on a participant’s demographics before referring

him or her to the next section. This was done to identify and

prevent diaspora members from participating in the survey.

However, both parts were later combined into a single survey,

because another method emerged to identify the country location

of where participants accessed a survey.

B) Strengths and Limitations of online perception surveys

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There is limited research on the advantages and challenges

of perception and online surveys as a whole. Certain challenges

and strengths have been observed when conducting online

perception surveys, that also were reflected in the literature

review. In comparison to other data gathering means, and

depending on the procedural approach, perception surveys provide

a few advantages. The objective of this research was to collect

Armenian and Azerbaijani youth’s views and beliefs on what peace

and reconciliation means to them, whether reconciliation can be

achieved, steps and actions to ensure a successful reconciliation

process, and their attitudes toward given narratives. The

perception survey provided an opportunity to do just that, which

is to collect data “about issues which are intangible or

difficult to measure.”6 Such surveys allow rebalancing

information asymmetries and provide an important source of data

when available official data is incomplete or limited.7

Conducting a perception survey is useful in gathering data about

citizens’ views on various subjects rather than expert or 6 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development. (2013). http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/CCRVI/CCVRI-Practice-Product-Uses-of-Data.pdf7 Tariq, M.O., Haqbeen, F.R., & Kakar, P.L. (2012). Afghanistan in 2012: A survey of the Afghan people.

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official views. It additionally facilitates and assists in

articulating interests and positions of a marginalized group and

provides them with an opportunity to voice their concerns.

In recognition of the profound impact that the internet and

social media has had on youth culture, surveys were conducted

online. A literature review on the methodology of e-surveys

methodology features associated costs and benefits that could be

attributed to both perception and online surveys. The advantages

are cost effectiveness, time efficiency and convenience.8 Other

advantages of online surveys include: a potential for

international reach, incorporation of skip logic, direct database

connectivity and customized instrument delivery, which this study

confirms. Conducting perception surveys online, although, also

has its drawbacks, such as solicitation and delivery problems,

possible technological glitches, a risk of poor security, which

could potentially threaten confidentiality of respondents, and

limited access to prospective participants.9 This study has

confirmed these drawbacks.

8 Wiersma, W. (2012). The validity of surveys: online and offline. Oxford Internet Institute. 9 Wiersma, W. (2012). The validity of surveys: online and offline. Oxford Internet Institute.

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A review of official statistical data and independent NGO

data10 on internet access and usage in the South Caucasus region

presents the following picture: about 70 percent of Azerbaijani

households have internet access and over 40 percent11 of internet

users access it from home, with the majority of users being

within the younger age distribution. That is, 15 to 34 years old

individuals, constitute over 60 percent of internet users in the

country.

The picture in Armenia is a little different. Internet

penetration in Armenia remains the lowest in South Caucasus

region. About half of the Armenian population has access to the

internet, with approximately one-third of households reporting

having internet access.12 The internet connection speeds are the

lowest and costs are the highest of the three countries in the

South Caucasus region, partly because two of its four neighbors

10 Caucasus Barometer. (2013). Caucasus barometer 2013 regional dataset.; Kelly, S., Truong, M., Earp, M., Reed, L., Shahbaz, A., & Greco-Stoner, A. (2013). Freedom on the net 2013: A global assessment of internet and digital media. 11 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (2013). Internet Access of Households.12 Papyan, A. (2013, January 16). Home internet access in Armenia higher than global average [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://ditord.com/2013/01/16/home-internet-access-in-armenia-higher-than-global-average/

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blockaded Armenia.13 Data for exact penetration rates in both

Armenia and Azerbaijan is unavailable.

The original study methodology did not anticipate that

availability of internet and pace of IT sector development would

serve as a challenge in terms of achieving high response rates,

yet this was the case. The research does not provide a definite

conclusion and reasons for low response rates. Low response rates

could be linked either to low coverage or to connection quality

in those countries in comparison to internet access and use in

the West, particularly in the United States. It also could be

attributed to the sensitivity of the subject matter the study

aimed to examine.

The internet is an integral part of people’s lives, and

plays an important function in Armenian and Azerbaijani youth’s

identity development. Given its role in nation’s youth culture

while recalling time limitations, resource constraints and

possible security dilemmas posed by traveling to respective

countries to conduct in-person surveys, focus groups or

13 Krikorian, O. (2010). Internet in Armenia: slow, expensive, but increasingly important.

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interviews, at the time, benefits of an online perception survey

outweighed drawbacks.

C) Actual Research Design and Research Instruments

The study was conducted using a standardized semi-structured

questionnaire covering respondents’ demographics, and perceptions

and narratives on peace, reconciliation and human rights.

Questions and narratives were developed with the advantage of

available research instruments. Surveys developed by the Group on

International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace,

in addition to, Garagozov’s research instruments used in his

previous study were consulted and used with permission. An open-

ended field was available to most questions allowing respondents

to provide explanations or complete their thoughts.

The two-part survey, a consent document and recruitment

materials were first developed in English, and then translated

into Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani, primary languages spoken

by the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth population. Independent

back-translations helped to finalize and validate research

instruments.

D) Sample Selection and Recruitment

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This survey employed convenience sampling. A convenience

sampling is useful when it is difficult to determine whether each

and every unit is included in the sample. It is used in cases

when it is left up to each person to decide one’s own

participation, which was the case with this study where web link

to the survey was posted on social media platforms and was left

up to each individual to decide and take part in this research.

The initial recruitment process, an invitation to

participate in a web survey was posted as a message on various

social media platforms, online communities and organizational

sites, has not been effective or successful. As the initial

recruitment process attracted only few respondents, I decided to

utilize a professional survey support system, such as the Survey

Monkey Audience project, in which the company takes upon itself to

recruit a needed number of participants from each social group.

In this case, the company’s representatives indicated that

neither the company nor its partners have access to the Azeri

market, and do not have access to a requested pool of respondents

from Armenia.14

14 Z. Gholikely (personal communication, March 5,2014).

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Nevertheless, I changed the solicitation process, and

decided to recruit participants through personal communication

and messaging. This was done in an attempt to increase response

rates. This approach displayed better results than the original

recruitment process. The personal invitation sent out to each

person noted that the researcher was available to answer any

questions or concerns one might have, which increased chances of

a dialogue, where prospective participants replied with questions

or comments.

There was a pattern within questions or concerns raised

during those personal communications. Some participants had

concerns and questions about whether the survey was actually spam

or a hacking attack on their profiles.15 There were also few,

Armenian and Azerbaijani youth, who mentioned reviewing the

survey, but dropped out as they thought these types of research

or activities were unimportant and could not affect the

situation. Some youth mentioned mistrust and vivid negative

attitudes towards the other side as their reason not to

participate in this research. A few responses communicated very

15 as there has been a pattern of Armenian hackers attacking Azerbaijani online communities and vice versa

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strong and negative connotations and explicitly stated a personal

hatred and aggression towards individuals of the other country’s

ethnicity, while reflecting on one’s own role in protecting and

defending the historical territory of the nation with arms. A

considerable amount of Armenian and Azeri youth expressed support

for the project, while disclosing a personal view and interest in

seeing the conflict resolved through peaceful means as opposed to

employing military capabilities.

A review of available literature on e-survey methodology

suggests that response rates for internet surveys often fall

below 30 percent, which has been observed throughout the study.

There were individuals who displayed a distinct non-response

typology, where individuals accessed the survey, reviewed some

parts of the survey and then decided not to participate in it.

Over 500 personal communications were issued. Less than 10

percent replied, noting that they either participated in the

survey, planned to or did not plan to complete it. The final

sample size was 102 individuals, out of whom just 32 completed

both parts of the survey. Sixty-seven completed the first part,

and the rest partially completed the first part. As for the

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characteristics of the population surveyed, 75 were male and 27

were female. A general limitation in any perception survey is

gender inequality and underrepresentation.16 This has been the

case in this research as it was difficult capture women’s voices

and opinions. It was challenging to reach out to the female

population through personal communications and messaging systems

because of profile privacy settings. At the same time, many

females who received invitations seemed uninterested in

participating in the survey, which resulted in a wide gap in

gender representation.

Graph 1. Surveyed Participants by Gender

Male Female

Regarding the ethnic background of research participants,

there were 60 Azerbaijanis and 42 Armenians. More than two-thirds

of respondents (75 percent) reported having a tertiary

education, with 31 percent of respondents noted having or

16 Herbert, S. (2013). Perception surveys in fragile and conflict-affected states: Helpdesk ResearchReport.

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pursuing master’s degree or Ph.D., and 45 percent of respondents

having earned or were pursuing a bachelors’ degree. The rest

either reported enrollment in high school or noted non-

enrollment. Regarding the individual knowledge of conflict

resolution field, 24 percent participated at least once in a

conflict resolution or peace education program; out of this

group, 50 percent had been involved in some sort of protest

against war and in favor of peace by signing a petition or

participating in an event. Twenty-six percent of the survey

participants reported having been involved in some sort of

protest.

Qualitative Methods

E) Data and Criteria of Sources

The strengths and drawbacks of the study link to the

methodological approach of the survey. To ensure a rigorous and

high quality approach to the survey, the study incorporated

methodological and theory triangulation, which utilized different

sources of information, other non-survey and non-perceptions

data. The study combined the use of primary sources, personal

interviews, and collection of fresh data, such as statistical

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data, political statements when possible. In spite of few hurdles

impeding the access to first hand data, bearing in mind the

sensitivity of materials pertaining to political level

negotiations, there is still a significant primary data materials

available for this research. Among the sources utilized in this

report are:

i. Political Statements: Explicitly, speeches and declarations made

by 1) governmental officials 2) individuals representing

foreign agencies and institutions associated with the

mediation and negotiation process

ii. Statistical Data: A review and examination of the 2008-2013

data on attitudes regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

resolution17 collected by the Caucasus Resource Research

Centers (CRRC);18 2010 poll conducted by Populus, a UK-based

opinion polling company, in partnership with the Armenian

Institute for Political and Sociological Consulting

(AIPSC);19 and also consulted available data on internet

usage of youth in both nations.17 Caucasus Barometer. (2013). Caucasus barometer 2013 regional dataset.18 Krikorian, O. (2012). New data on attitudes to Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution 19 Cooper, A., & Morris, K. (2013). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in light of polls in Armenia and NK

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iii. Documents: Select number of documents produced by the

OSCE

In over two decades of the conflict’s life (since the dissolution

of the Soviet Union), a large body of literature has been

produced about the history and evolution of the conflict, and the

ongoing negotiation process. Most of the literature concentrates

on: the immediate background to the conflict; the conflict, and

the conflict resolutions efforts after signing of the Bishkek

Protocol in 1994, and; the Russian brokered cease-fire agreement.

Most of the literature has been produced in the Armenian and

Azerbaijani languages, followed by English and Russian. The

sources used for the study have been selected based on their

relevance and nature of the information they contain. Following

are the types of secondary sources consulted for this research:

i. Periodicals, Journals and Reports: A growing body of academic

journals addresses individual and collective identity of

communities engaged in conflict and/or reconciliation

efforts; literature on social representations of history and

its role in identity politics, in conjunction with

periodicals on post-Soviet environment and the rapid

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escalation of ethnic armed conflicts, boomed in the past two

decades. In addition, an English and Russian version of

numerous Armenian and Azerbaijani academic journals became

available making original materials from the region

accessible.

ii. Papers and Studies: Source materials and research papers

presented at symposia and conferences addressing various

aspects of a larger topic of this study have been of great

significance. Numerous publications produced and presented

by the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental

Aggression and Peace have been useful in baring new and

innovative concepts and ideas for this research.20

iii. Daily Press and Electronic Data: Considering an expansion and

availability of such data in conjunction with the pace of

new and unfolding developments in the region made the use of

such reports obligatory. Throughout this research, there has

been a systematic follow up of media and electronic sources

to stay in the information loop of dynamic events. Among the

many available sources, the ones utilized in this reports

20 Boston University Psychology. (2014). Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression

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have been considered for their accuracy, reliability and

validity.

F) Data collection and analysis

Data collection took place over a two months period from

February to March 2014. I, on my own, designed and implemented

the study. I do not have a prior experience conducting surveys,

yet completed a thorough review of survey and interview

techniques, the use of online technology to collect and analyze

data to minimize risks and challenges. After data collection, the

Survey Monkey Analysis program provided basic quantitative data

analysis of demographic information. The qualitative responses to

items were categorized according to the Strauss and Corbin’s21

grounded theory approach. The process allowed concepts and themes

to emerge from the responses to provide the foundation for coding

categories. The qualitative part and commentaries were imported

to Market Sight for analysis.

G) Validity and Reliability

The study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods;

therefore, traditional definitions of reliability and validity

21 Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory.

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concepts so useful in quantitative studies have not been fully

applicable to this research. Lincoln and Guba propose utilizing

the concept of trustworthiness as a criterion to determine

reliability and validity.22 The term trustworthiness implies that

survey represents what it proposes to represent, while findings

reflect meanings as closely as possible to those expressed by the

respondents.

There are two types of validity: internal and external.

These imply that questions and concepts that are set out to be

measured are actually measured (internal validity), while

findings and results are valid beyond the study and are

applicable to the larger social group and across contexts

(external validity). The most obvious threat to validity was that

although there was widespread internet access in both countries,

there were as many subgroups of the population that did not have

an access to the internet. Another underlying challenge with the

internet was the sampling selection. To avoid biases in the

survey it would be best to employ random sampling. To conduct

random sampling online, a full list of the population would have

22 Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage

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been needed. Yet an online list of 18-27 year old Azerbaijani and

Armenian youth does not exist, as opposed to a list of students

at a university.23 This situation posed a major limitation in

terms of applying key findings to a larger youth demographic

across borders. However, two of the six strategies described by

Padgett to determine thoroughness and accuracy in a qualitative

study were employed, which were triangulation and auditing.24

Triangulation implies using different sources of information,

other non-survey and non-perceptions data, while auditing

suggests the researcher keeps notes about choices made during the

progression of the course as a method to minimize bias and

incorporate comprehensive analysis of lessons gathered and

learned. It is important to emphasize that results of this

research should be interpreted carefully and cannot be applied or

generalized to a larger social group.

H) Structure of the Study

To set the stage for this research, immediately below,

Chapter II: Current State of Peace Process provides an analysis of the 23 Wright, K.B. (2006). Research internet-based populations: advantages and disadvantages of online survey research, online questionnaire authoring software packages and web survey services.24 Padgett, D. (2008). Qualitative methods in social work research. Los Angeles, Calif: Sage Publications.

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mediation efforts made for the resolution of the conflict. It

discusses ongoing efforts within Track I Diplomacy to resolve the

conflict, and highlights the issue of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs’

serving more as representatives of their respective countries

rather than as committed and objective mediators. This chapter

examines Track II, so called citizens’, diplomacy efforts while

arguing that lack of coordination between two tracks limits the

effectiveness and efficiency of all and each individual efforts.

Chapter III: Youth as Agents of Change will provide a review of

available literature on the subject of youth and conflict

pointing out to a biased skew in research branding youth as a

destabilizing force while neglecting to emphasize and highlight

their hidden and unrecognized potential. It will also provide

several cases recognizing practical experiences in ethnic

conflicts where youth, through self-empowerment, found a way to

transform relations positively across divided ethnic communities

within that social group.25

Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

transformation highlights that an emerging line of research on

25 Social group = youth

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youth and identity development in conflict environments

implicitly or explicitly undertakes a narrative approach to the

study. It also argues that there is a relationship between

historical narratives built on a negative image and

interpretation of the other and ethnically motivated violence.

However, a thorough research of the subject provides that just as

historical narratives and collective memories might escalate

tensions on the line of contact (LOC);26 these can also plant

seeds for positive social change, counter a culture of violence,

and encourage a culture of peace.

Chapter V: Key finding of the Survey and Summary concludes by reviewing

key findings and providing a comparative review of Armenian and

Azerbaijani youth perspectives on peace, reconciliation and human

rights, analyses individual comments on given narratives, while

identifying narratives that could possibly diminish

confrontational attitudes or serve a foundation to begin a

dialogue. A references page of consulted resources for this study

follows the chapter.

26 Between Nagorno-Karabakh and the rest of Azerbaijan

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Chapter II: Current State of Peace ProcessA) Track I Diplomacy

Davidson and Montville coined the term “Two Track

Diplomacy”27 to raise the attention around the relationship of

official and unofficial activities, as there was little

recognition within governments about the civil society

contribution to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. They

explain Track I diplomacy as one comprising “traditional policy

statements by the president and secretary of state […], or

official visits and meetings.” Track II they describe as

unofficial and non-structured, but as one that might help to

resolve or ease “actual or potential conflict by appealing to

common human capabilities to respond to good will and

reasonableness.”28 McDonald and Diamond further developed the

concept of multi-track diplomacy by introducing a unified system

of interlinked and related tracks: government, professional

conflict resolution, business, private citizen, research,

27 Davidson, W.D., & Montville, J.V. (1981). Foreign policy according to Freud. Foreign Policy, 45,145-157.28 Davidson, W.D., & Montville, J.D. (1981). Foreign policy according to Freud. Foreign Policy, 45, 145-157.

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training and education, activism, religion, funding and media or

public opinion29. Today, Track II diplomacy encompasses

previously mentioned sub-tracks of citizens’ diplomacy.

The OSCE Minsk Group has been the main and only platform for

Track I diplomacy or political level negotiations on the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict. The OSCE30 began to work on the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict soon after the newly independent Armenia and

Azerbaijan joined the organization.31 “With its regional remit”

the OSCE appeared better situated than the United Nations (UN) to

address the conflict, as key state actors thought the conflict

reached its ripe moment and a breakthrough was forthcoming, which

led the OSCE to assume responsibility for mediation.32

The OSCE had “a two-fold task: first, to facilitate and

support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,

29 Diamond, L., & McDonald, J. (1993). Multi-track diplomacy: A systems approach to peace.30 In the period prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the involvement of the international bodies, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has experienced a variety of mediation efforts toward its resolution. At the time,Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic, with the backing of Armenian SSR, and Azerbaijani SSR brought their concerns to the Council of the Soviet Union, however the Soviet leadership was passive in addressing needs and positions ofeach party, while lacking to commit to dispute resolution efforts.31 At the Helsinki meeting in March 1992, the OSCE Council requested to “convene a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh to provide a forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis http://www.osce.org/mg/6687232 Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts.

33

and second, to negotiate relations among its participating states

and determine the role of the OSCE and the Minsk Process within

the context.”33 Internal conflicts between key OSCE players

stemming from mutually exclusive national interests complicated

both agendas during initial phases. As a result, there was a

move to limit the circle of participants taking part in peace

talks. By 1997, a permanent “troika” of co-chairs,34 consisting

of Russia, the United States, and France, was formed35 with a

mandate to “realize a full-coordination in all mediating and

negotiating activities harmonizing them into a single coordinated

effort within the framework of the OSCE.”36 The followed active

period of shuttle diplomacy to find a resolution was hampered by

the fact that the Minsk Group co-chairs often served more as

representatives of their respective countries rather than as

individual mediators.37

33 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage34 The only OSCE body in place on the ground was and continues to be the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador Andrzei Kasprczyk of Poland, whose mandate does not include negotiations35 Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts. 36 Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE (“Minsk Conference’)37 Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts.

34

Once the working relationship had been established within

the Minsk Group, the discussion turned to the development of the

framework for the negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful

settlement of the conflict.38 The Minsk Group put forward two

proposals. One of the proposals incorporated the package

solution, which consisted of two separate agendas: Agreement I

and Agreement II. The conflicting parties had freedom to

implement each agreement at their own pace “but with an

understanding that at the end of the day all outstanding issues

will have to be resolved.”39 The second proposal, a “step-by-step

solution,” focused on sealing Agreement I before proceeding with

Agreement II.40

Both proposals entailed a withdrawal of the Armenian forces

from seven Azeri provinces followed by a discussion on the final

status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan accepted the plan.

Armenia, although with reservations, also accepted it. Karabakh

Armenians rejected both proposals as unacceptable. Thus, the 38 Since 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group continues to be the only medium for official level diplomatic negotiations over the conflict and are supported by the United Nations and the international community.39 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage40 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage

35

Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian, who accepted the plan,

was forced to resign, allowing Robert Kocharian, then de-facto

president of Nagorno-Karabakh to come to power, who effectively

sidelined participation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians from

the negotiation table.41

In the spring of 2004,42 a series of meetings began between

the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. This allowed the

development of the first draft of basic principles outlining the

structure of a comprehensive settlement, which was presented to

presidents the following year. The basic principles, which were

kept in secret until June 2006,43 were revealed to the larger

public to pressure the parties to launch a public debate about

them and, at last, come to an agreement.

In November 2007, the Minsk Group formally presented the

“Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict” to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It later was

41 The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities continuously stated that any agreement would be impossible without them sitting at the negotiating table, yet Robert Kocharian and the current Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, both Karabakh Armenians, themselves effectively sidelined NK’s participation at the negotiating table. 42 Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage43 OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs (2006). We have run out of ideas: Statement of mediators of Nagorno Karabakh

36

deposited with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to serve as a basis

for future negotiations. The Madrid principles,44 as they became

known, had an obvious advantage over the previous proposals as it

avoided having to choose between the step-by-step solution or

package solution. Parties agreed that the final status would be

determined once all confidence-building measures (CBM) are put in

place (an element of a stage-by-stage process). Then again, these

CBM measures would be implemented after an agreement on the

mechanism for the determination of the status has been reached

(an element of a package process). Concurrently, basic

principles revolve around the following points: 1) security

guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) a return of occupied

territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) the Lachin corridor;

3) final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh; 4) internally

displaced persons and refugees, and a possible peacekeeping

operation.45

Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on a majority of these points.

Yet, there are two points of contention that have not been

44 The Madrid principles and basic principles will be used interchangeable within the entire paper. The version presented in Kazan45 OSCE. (2009). Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries.

37

resolved and for which the parties still need to find a common

ground.46There is an agreement on the principle covering

peacekeeping forces, the security situation, and refugees. All

parties agree that a referendum will take place to determine the

final legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh, however, there are

disagreements on where and when will the referendum take place,

and who will participate.47 Another major point of discord is the

final status of the Lachin corridor, currently linking Armenia to

Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh would like to

retain a permanent maintenance of the entire corridor to allow

unrestricted communication with between two locations. Therefore,

the Minsk Group continues to seek for options48 that would please

all sides.

The peace process went through a difficult year during

Armenian and Azerbaijani pre-election campaigns, as both

presidents had to resort and step up their nationalist rhetoric

in order to appease constituencies and ensure a win in

presidential elections. For Sargsyan losing territory meant loss 46 J. Warlick (personal communication, March 6, 2014).47 J. Warlick (personal communication, March 6, 2014).48 That is will there be a complex leasing arrangement for Lachin which is unlikely to satisfy the Armenians, or will it belong to Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia, which is unlikely to satisfy the Azerbaijanis.

38

in elections. The precedent two terms, Aliyev was in the shadow

of his father’s legacy, now he is in a stage of creating his own.

The following four years, prior to the 2018 Azeri and Armenian

presidential elections, could possibly provide space and a window

of opportunity to tackle last few disagreements between

conflicting parties.

Nevertheless, numerous issues underlie Track I political

negotiations of the OSCE Minsk Group starting with the dynamics

between key actors and their interests. Some state that the co-

chairs accord low priority to Karabakh while also advancing geo-

political and national interests of their representative

countries in the region. De Waal asserts that Russia is a main

obstacle to the resolution, as it proved itself incapable or

unwilling to mediate successfully a peace agreement. He

elaborated that Russia’s role and interests in prolonging the

tensions stem from the threat of its decreased influence in the

region and increased influence of the USA, EU, and NATO.49 Yet he

neglects to note that each co-chair acts in a capacity as a

representative of his country, and he overlooks that Ambassador

49 De, W. T. (2003). Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war. New York: New York University Press.

39

Igor Popov has served much longer as a Co-Chair and has a greater

depth of knowledge and expertise on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace

process than his counterparts.

Former president Medvedev50spent a lot of time and political

capital pushing for the peace process. There was much

expectation, by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the international

community that the meeting in Kazan, which was the ninth that

Medvedev hosted for the two presidents,51 would result in an

agreement on the basic principles. During the meeting, Aliyev,

however, raised new issues that Co-chairs were not aware or

informed about, resulting in an all-time low point for the

political negotiations until the end of 2013.52 Nonetheless, as

of early 2014, the Russian government remained committed to

working with the parties.

France is home to a large and influential Armenian diaspora.

The country also owns 5% of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

These broad interests result in France lacking a valuable

50 President of the Russian Federation – 2008-201251 Sammut, D. (2011). After Kazan, a defining moment for the OSCE Minsk Process.52 Sammut, D. (2011). After Kazan, a defining moment for the OSCE Minsk Process

40

contribution to the peace negotiations.53 The USA also has a

large and highly influential Armenian diaspora. The Armenian

diaspora has been successful in lobbying the U.S. Congress in

passing numerous legislations including the Section 907 of the

Freedom Support Act (P.L. 102-511), which prohibits the U.S.

assistance to Azerbaijan.54 Within the USA, there is a separate

conflict battleground with individual states supporting

Azerbaijan or Armenia by either recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as

an independent state55 or by “supporting the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”56 The U.S.

State Department under the leadership of John Kerry, a long-time

peacebuilding enthusiast, and Ambassador James Warlick, current

Minsk Group Co-Chair, launched a new strategy in pressing for a

resolution of a protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Ambassador

Warlick stepped-up the game and has been increasingly engaged in

public diplomacy efforts trying to demystify and raise awareness

53 Gamaghelyan, P. (2009). Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Identity,Politics, Scholarship.54 “prohibits all US government assistance to Azerbaijan, except for non-proliferation and disarmament activities, until the President determines that Azerbaijan has taken demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” Giragosian, R. (2001). Nagorno-Karabakh: International Political Dimension55 Maine – April 10-30, 2013 Recognizes NK56 Arkansas – U.S. State recognizes Khojaly Genocide

41

around the negotiation process. As of the early 2014, the United

States remained committed to working with the parties, as a Co-

Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, to achieve a lasting and peaceful

settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based upon three core

principles of the Helsinki Final Act.57

B) Track II initiatives and Confidence Building Measures

Numerous factors have limited the effectiveness and

efficiency of Track II initiatives in the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict and significantly curbed confidence-building measures.

The political environment for peacebuilding and confidence

building measures is unfavorable and less promising than it was

in 2008-2009, and much less so than during the period 1998-2001,

the “high point for Armenian-Azerbaijani CBM.”58

In the early and mid-1990s, most of peacebuilding NGOs in

the region launched activities with a built-in CBM element. CSOs

in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh participated

effectively and fruitfully in a number of projects, especially

those related to the exchange of prisoners of war (POW), mutual

57 http://armenpress.am/eng/news/751966/usa-remains-committed-to-peaceful-settlement-of-karabakh-conflict.html58 Broers, L. (2014). Confidence building in the Karabakh: what next? Caucasus Edition, Journal of Conflict Transformation.

42

visits of students, young adults and students, or aid

disbursement to refugees.59 Large groups of journalists traveled

back and forth between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

in late-1990s in a program that provided an opportunity to

generate good journalism and were a good reality check for both

sides.

In the early 2000s, peacebuilding NGOs’ activities

concentrated more on capacity building and citizen security

enhancement, 60 including awareness of land mines, clearance of

mines and cluster munitions,61repairing schools and monitoring

human rights. Most of these initiatives were introduced by

foreign organizations, such as the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, or

Conciliation Resources, which expected governments of the

respective countries to further these processes and engage the

general population. However, the lack of political will and CSOs

resource and capacities’ constraints undermined challenge the

implementation and effectiveness of these initiatives.

59 Ghaplanyan, I. (2009). Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution60 Ghaplanyan, I. (2009). Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution61 The Halo Trust. (2014). Nagorno Karabakh.

43

Social media and blogging on Azeri-Armenian relations and

the Karabakh conflict have taken off in recent years and have had

an immense impact, both positive and negative, on the overall

debate around the conflict.62 A number of social networks serve

as a platform that spreads more propaganda. Much of it is a

repetition of the same hardline political stance broadcasted on

TV and distributed on print media platforms.

Nonetheless, there is also positive movement. A group of

Armenian and Azerbaijani individuals is using this platform to

convey a more tolerant narrative to circumvent government

propaganda. The Caucasus Edition, Journal for Conflict

Transformation63 is an online policy journal that brings together

authors and bloggers to share their research and analysis on

South Caucasus affairs and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Imagine

Center for Conflict Transformation organization brings together

Armenian and Azerbaijani youth for conflict resolution seminars

and confidence building exercises. Online platforms, such as

recently created an Armenian-Azerbaijani joint initiative,

62 Geybullayeva, A. (2012). Nagorno Karabakh 2.063 Caucasusedition.net

44

Imagine Neutral Zone,64 provide space for the dialogue to

continue long after face-to-face sessions. Then again this

movement is constrained by few factors, as this is a self-

selecting group of courageous individuals, many of whom are

labeled as traitors, looked at with suspicion, have difficulties

challenging mainstream nationalistic rhetoric, and lack resources

and organization.

Traditional ways of meeting and dialogue between the

Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society representatives still

exist and are the most widespread activities on the Track II

front. Few of these opportunities are available through pan-

regional Caucasus-wide formats that bring together Armenians and

Azerbaijanis within a wider community of actors.65 The number of

civil society representatives, though, is small and most have

been involved in the process for over two decades. This

continuously leads to skepticism on whether those CSO veterans

have anything new to contribute. In addition, while participants

share a commitment to non-violence and a peaceful settlement of

64 http://imagineneutralzone.com/65 Broers, L. (2014). Confidence-building in the Karabakh: what next?

45

the conflict, each adheres to incompatible and competing visions

of the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.66

Various factors resulted in the decline of CSOs

peacebuilding activity on the ground. As international

organizations dictate type and design of projects they plan to

sponsor, NGOs have to draw up projects, which suit the needs of

organizations and governments and not necessarily realities and

necessities of their respective societies. Such ill-suited

proposals and projects appear to lack context and conflict

sensitivity leading to populations’ outrage. In early 2012, the

Caucasus Center of Peace-Making Initiative with the support of

the U.S. Embassy organized an Azerbaijani film festival in

Yerevan and Gyumri. The public reaction to the event was more

than negative. Armenians expressed outrage online by posting

negative comments on various social networks and by staging

protests on the streets, which, eventually, led to the event’s

cancellation. While the initiative aimed to promote

reconciliation efforts and raise awareness on the Nagorno-

66 M. Tadevosyan ( personal communication March 5, 2014).

46

Karabakh situation from Azeri perspective, the design of the

program did not incorporate a conflict-sensitive approach.67

Similar initiatives and projects also lead the respective

government and societies to doubt the intentions and stakes of

peacebuilding activists in the conflict transformation process.

The foreign funding of NGO activities began to be seen as direct

intrusions into the process, leading to these NGOs and civil

society representatives growing increasingly unpopular and being

labeled as traitors. The politicization of NGOs in the context of

government opposition is significant, which leads to authorities

in Armenia and Azerbaijan to regard their own civil societies

with suspicion as “covert vehicles of opposition.”68 NGOs

exercise little to no independence,69 have limited resources, are

not influential and not in position to offer expertise to

67 M. Tadevosyan ( personal communication March 5, 2014). - Instead of creating an individual event, organizers could have screened some of their films through annual Golden Apricot Yerevan International Film Festival68 Hasanov, A., & Ishkanian, A. (2005). Bridging divides: Civil society initiatives69 The newly NGO legislation in Azerbaijan adopted to suffocate political dissent, which allows suspension or banning of national and foreign NGOs in the country is detrimental to organizations seeking to engage in peacebuildingor conflict transformation activities, which go against hardline political position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict - http://www.civicsolidarity.org/article/892/council-europe-should-condemn-repressive-ngo-legislation-azerbaijan

47

government bodies. These factors present that Track II efforts

are very constrained.

National NGOs are weak, and despite various efforts of

foreign donors, it will continue to be so unless both governments

demonstrate true commitment to empowering a civil society while

undertaking democratic reforms. A political environment gives no

room for dehumanization of the enemy, despite the “Moscow

Declaration” of 2009,70 in which both presidents explicitly

endorsed confidence-building measures as a pillar to reinvigorate

the peace process.

C) Coordinating Track I and Track II

Two decades have passed since the cease-fire agreement was

reached in 1994 and the Minsk Group began engaging in a shuttle

diplomacy between conflicting parties. The Track I negotiations

that have repeatedly taken place behind closed doors in strict

confidentiality seem to be moving in a positive direction, yet

has not been successful in bringing parties to a full agreement

on the framework for the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of

70 Broers, L. (2010). Opening borders, preserving walls: opportunities to support the Karabakh peace process. Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation, 3(1), 5-8.

48

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Track I has been too focused on

the political negotiations and too poorly staffed to devote much

attention to Track II activities. National and international

actors have undertaken various non-official peacebuilding and

conflict transformation diplomacy efforts, though, with little

information on Track I negotiations, have not been able to

contribute more or time their activities to support phases of the

official process.

Joint efforts of national and international actors to

implement, coordinate and complement “track two diplomacy”

efforts are vital for lasting and sustainable peace between two

nations. “Signed peace agreement does not create peace, without

the corresponding societal infrastructure to support it, the

peace will never hold.”71 As in the case of the Levon Ter-

Petrosian resignation, any concession on the political level that

does not sit well with public opinion will essentially cost his

or her political position, not to mention, that implementation of

a peace agreement reached without widespread support would be

nearly impossible.

71 Notter, J., & Diamond, L. (1996). Building peace and transforming conflict:Multi-track diplomacy in practice.

49

In November 2008, a coalition of British NGOs, which formed

the Consortium Initiative, wrote to the co-chairs, calling for

the “establishment of a mechanism for dialogue and exchange of

views between the [NK] peace process led by the OSCE Minsk Group

co-Chair and non-state actors working in support of the peace

process”, while asking for more transparency in the process.72 In

March 2009, all three co-chairs attended an Armenian-Azerbaijani

meeting in Vienna organized by International Alert.73

While his predecessors and Russian and French counterparts

serve their traditional roles of mediators in quiet diplomacy.

Ambassador James Warlick stepped-up the game and has been

increasingly engaged in public diplomacy efforts. This engagement

is seen in a number of activities, such as interviews and press

conferences, while speaking with the largely detached public and

civil society representatives on the current state of the

negotiation process and future steps to be taken by the

mediators.

It is not, necessarily, the job of international mediators

to orchestrate civil society dialogue or to strengthen the type

72 Consortium Initiative. (2008, November 26). 73 De Waal, T. (2003). Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war

50

of debate, inside the respective states, that is essential to

ease polarization of public opinion on the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict. Yet, mediators should demonstrate a greater willingness

to interact with and support civil society initiatives.

Similarly, civil society must be more engaged with formal Track I

negotiations for both sides to tackle discordant issues and

create a common vision for conflict resolution at the grassroots

level.74 Yet, Track II dialogue should not imitate the stalled

Track I negotiations, which often lead to belligerent debates

over terminology and political status. As De Waal notes, for

immediate pragmatic reasons, there should be more interaction and

coordination between Track I and II efforts for both sides to

counter the belief that the negotiations are “some kind of

international plot to impose a settlement on unsuspecting

Armenians or Azerbaijanis.”75

Chapter III: Youth as Agents of ChangeTo explore the role of youth in peacebuilding, conflict

transformation or post-conflict reconstruction, it is important

74 Huseynov, T. (2011, October). A Developing dialogue: entrenched positions. 75 De Waal, T. (2010, August 1). Op-Ed; Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process.

51

to define the role and status of “youth.” There are legal and

operational definitions to this term. The international legal

system created a legal distinction between a child and an adult,

yet made it particularly problematic to pinpoint “youth” along

this range. Chronological definitions and age-defined boundaries

do not capture social and cultural interpretations of the term,

with age being “a common characteristic, but not the defining

criteria.”76 This is where the differences between the legal and

operation definitions of youth arise.

An abundance of literature draws attention to the status of

young people within a larger social scheme, whether “immigrants,”

or outsiders,77 “alienated,”78 “not children but not certain to

become adults,”79or “lacking a guide to adulthood.”80 Across

cultures, an understanding of the idea of a child, youth, and

adult is developed through social dynamic. Thus, a person might

76 Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change. 77 Magnuson, D. (2009). The need for the study of everyday life about youth work practice in divided societies. 78 Bronfenbrenner, U. (1974). The origins of alienation. Scientific America, 23(1), 53-61.79 Keniston, K. (1975). Prologue: Youth as a stage of life. In R.J. Havighurst& P.H. Dreyer (Eds.), Youth: The seventy-fourt yearbook of the national society for the study of education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press80 Coleman, J.S. (n.d.). Innovations in the structure of education. Baltimore:John Hopkins University

52

be regarded as a “youth” well past the legal age-definition until

the occurrence of a certain life event, whether it is a marriage,

land ownership, or an assessment of personal capacity.81

A social construct of youth also has an under-studied gender

dimension, as women tend to disappear when it comes to literature

and theories on youth and violence. While the term “young adult”

is understood in a variety of different ways, this study focuses

on individuals ages 18-27, incorporating both the legal and

operational definitions. These individuals are of legal age with

control over personal actions and decisions, yet, might not have

transitioned into a fully pledged adult within the social scheme

and public opinion.82

Youth compose a significant portion of the population in the

Caucasus, accounting for approximately 30 percent of the

Armenian83 and 35.6 percent of the Azerbaijani84 population.

Having such a significant population of youth constituencies

81 Kemper, Y. (2005). Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions. Approaches by International Organizations. 82 Arnett, J.J. (2001). Conceptions of the transition to adulthood: perspectives from adolescence through midlife. 83 YerevanReporter. (2010, November 10). In Armenia, home to around 900 thousand young people.84 Zulgugarov,S., Nagiyeva,T., Efendiyev,T., Abbasali,F., & Sadigzade, O. (2007). The state of youth in Azerbaijan: Summary of analytical report.

53

presents an opportunity and a potential in relation to redressing

violence and addressing existing conflicts. Engaging and

empowering youth, an under-represented and marginalized group, is

vital, as they are the next generation to lead their nations.

Their experiences will influence their interpretations and

perceptions of peace and conflict with a potential to alter the

national trajectory towards reconciliation, a peaceful settlement

of the conflict, or reincitation of the armed conflict.

The abundance of literature on the role of youth in conflict

examines possible correlations between youth and stability. Yet,

it mostly concentrates on the role of young males as rebels

and/or perpetrators in armed conflict, and the main protagonists

of violence and destabilization. 85 Huntington suggests that

countries and regions with youthful age structures, or “youth

bulges”, more likely to experience political violence.86Some used

the “youth bulges” theory to explain recent political crisis and

destabilization in the Arab world, as well as youth recruitment 85 Boyden,J., & DeBerry, J. (2004). Children and Youth on the Front Line; Collier, P.,& Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563-595.; Singer, P.W. (2005). Children at War. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.; Zakaria, F. (2001). The roots of rage. Newsweek, 138(16), 14-33.86 Huntington, S.P. (2001, October). So, are civilizations at war? The Guardian.

54

within international terrorist networks.87 In essence, the

literature brands youth bulges as a group with opportunities and

motives for conflict.

The opportunities perspective has its roots in the Collier’s

greed argument, which maintains that when the potential gain from

joining a rebel group is high and the expected costs are low,

conditions that provide the rebel group with the financial means

to fight provide opportunities for a rebel group to wage war

against a government.88 Lancaster further elaborated on the

youth’s role through the economic model of supply and demand.

Youth participate in a marketplace of ideas, arms, and power in

service to the market’s demands. In exchange, war and conflict

provides them an entrée, an equal and immediate access to the

world: elevation to higher social class, attention, power,

economic advancement and vast other opportunities.89

The motive-oriented perspective has its roots in the

grievance argument, which views the eruption of violence or

rebellion a result of economic or political grievances,

87 Zakaria, F. (2001). The roots of rage88 Collier,P. (2000). Doing well out of war: An economic perspective.; Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004).89 Lancaster, P. (2007). Categories and illusions: Child soldiers in Burundi.

55

inequality, unemployment, or poverty. However, the distinction

between the greed and grievance perspective overlap and

overstated. The mere existence of a sizeable pool of youth is a

factor that could lead to greed and grievance as the opportunity

cost for a young adult belonging to larger group cohorts is lower

compared to members of smaller size cohorts.90 That is if a labor

market cannot absorb a sudden overflow of jobseekers, it will

result in a large pool of unemployed (greed-model) youth with

strong sentiments and frustrations (grievance-model).

While the “youth bulge” and “greed-grievance” model

demonstrate how youth population might cause instability and

conflict; these models do not provide a structure to consider

youth’s role during and after conflict; or how they might

influence the conflict itself. The Stedman’s “spoilers theory”

focuses on the role of parties and individuals, mainly leaders

and elites, seeking to hinder negotiation process or block

implementation stages of peace agreements as it threatens their

power and interests.91 Greenhil and Major redefine and reframe

this theory into the “capabilities model”, examining parties’

90 Urdal, H. (2011, July). A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. 91 Stedman, S.J. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.

56

structural and situational capacities, with an additional

classification of potential or “latent spoilers”, who are “weak

actors [and] would oppose the implementation of a peace accord,

if only they had the material […] to do so.”92 Schwartz93 further

elaborated that the model is applicable to the low-status group

like youth. If young adults are threatened with low opportunity

cost, such as unemployment in peacetime, with an opportunity to

benefit during wartime by holding a secured position, the

expected utility to continue fighting may be greater.94 This

model presents that parties’ behavior is not predetermined, but

rather has the “potential to change if proper conditions are in

place.”95

Blindly classifying and branding “young adults,” men and

women, as a dangerous demographic and a destabilizing force

overlooks and discounts number of individuals and forces behind

peace movements, and their significant contributions towards

peacebuilding, relationship transformation and dispute resolution

92 Greenhill, K.M., & Major, S. (2007). The perils of profiling: Civil war spoilers 93 Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change. 94 Grattan, A. & Morgan, S. (2007). Youthwork in conflict societies: From divergence to convergence.95 Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change.

57

efforts. In Serbia, youth organized into clubs to shelter from

ongoing ethnic conflicts while developed projects to transform

their daily lives.96 In Bosnia, “youth reconstructed a fountain

to restore a historic meeting place for youth from divided

communities.”97 In Angola, orphaned and runaway youth built homes

for themselves and developed a system of values to sustain a

stable and cooperative family98.

Youth possess an enormous potential and resilience to become

the driving force behind a peaceful resolution to the conflict. A

central feature of peacebuilding is in its conflict and context

sensitive approach. To avoid potential causes of instability, it

is important to fully understand various youth roles in conflict,

as perpetrator or combatant, as a victim of violence, and as a

leader in peace efforts. This would allow a better understanding

on how to approach structural challenges young adults face that

96 Ognjenovic, V., Skorc, B. &Ivackovic,S. (2007). Introduction to Programs and Organizations Developmental Youth Groups with War-Affected Children and Youth97 Helsing, J., Kirlic, N., McMaster, N., & Sonnenschein, N. (2005). YoungPeople's Activism and the Transition to Peace: Bosnia, Northern Ireland, andIsrael98 Nordstrom, C. (1997). A different kind of war story. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press

58

lead towards destabilizing behavior, in order to transform these

challenges to empower an under-represented group.

Young people are urged to be peacemakers, yet they are

marginalized, excluded and are not perceived as a group with the

right to voice their position in the negotiation process.99They

are not recognized as having a role of active citizens, political

constituencies, and are seldom invited as full and essential

participants during the negotiation and post-conflict processes.

Investing in young people from early on, engaging them in

peace processes, and introducing them to a perspective on

conflict and peace will allow youth to gain knowledge, will

provide them with space for network development and initiate

experience towards social and political inclusion. Broadening

opportunities for youth should include a holistic approach, that

is, policies’ implementation in the areas of education, labor,

and capacity building for civic and political participation to,

eventually, enable them to grow, fulfill their potentials, and

turn them into active and productive citizens. A sound and

99 Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP.(2005). Youth and violent conflict: society and development in crisis? A strategic review with a specialfocus on West Africa.

59

efficient policy implementation that positively alters the

incentive structure allowing youth to benefit more from the

peaceful settlement to the conflict, might prevent them from

resorting to violence and contribute positively to the stability

and peace. The Armenian and Azerbaijani nations need to be

dedicated to empowering young leaders to advance reconciliation

and conflict transformation efforts. Yet, systemic change

requires a shift in thinking from merely advocating for youth and

consulting with them to putting them at the center of policy

development and peacebuilding process.

Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformationA) Nagorno-Karabakh as a conflict of historical representations and identities

The negotiation and mediation process of the OSCE Minsk

Group100 emerged in recognition that parties to the dispute cannot

eliminate the other side and, therefore, must work with each

other to achieve their goals. The role of international mediators

is to facilitate the articulation of needs, positions and

100 building on the awareness of the conflict,

60

interests of the concerned parties into practical and mutually

acceptable solutions to promote relationship restructuring. Yet,

so far, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have been

institutionalizing a conflict resolution platform focused on the

fundamentals of settlement, while reinforcing the priority of

elites and their influence over everything and everyone. The

conflict resolution and management efforts of international

mediators failed to acknowledge the need for holistic conflict

transformation.

The literature on peace and reconciliation studies101 refers

to two related phenomena when describing the concept of

peacemaking. First, it describes a stage of institutionalized

conflict resolution and conflict management. In the case of

Nagorno-Karabakh, it means - maintaining a cease-fire agreement

and getting the adversaries to agree on the framework for the

negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful settlement. The OSCE

Minsk Group and the conflicting parties derive and evolve their

plan from the notion that the conflict must be managed, by 101 Galtung, J. (1964).An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4; Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization.; Goodhand, J. (2006). Aiding peace? The role of NGOs in armed conflict.; Lederach, J.P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington,DC: USIP

61

dealing with destructive consequences and components of the

conflict, while promoting the impression that a conflict is

undesirable and must end (or be eliminated). Lederach argues that

concepts of resolution and management do not adequately describe

the nature of the conflict “in the relational ebb and flow over

time,” while questioning “its usefulness in the construction of

peace.”102Further, he inquires whether it is possible to manage

human interaction the way we manage material things, which

possibly explains sporadic escalations and violations of the

cease-fire on the line of contact.

Second, the concept of peacemaking presupposes that negative

peace (the end of direct violence and sustaining cease-fire) at

the formal political level is closely linked with positive

peace103 building (the lasting progress through improved human

communication, understanding, and education). This stage refers

to a greater project of reconciliation and conflict

transformation. Lederach suggests that transformation does not

imply that there is need to eliminate or manage conflict (like

102 Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. 103 Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1),1-4.

62

resolution and management), but highlights its inherent dialectic

nature.104 He further expands that conflict is a phenomenon of

human creation that alters relationships, affects direct and

indirect communication channels, and transforms broader social

context. Volkan and Kelman add that conflict has a psychological

dimension to it, as it effects perceptions and understanding of

the other and of self, which is precisely the case of protracted

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in which symbols and a notion of the

enemy are institutionalized and dominate public discourse.

In other words, developing a sustainable and lasting peace

through conflict transformation suggests: 1)addressing cultural

violence, beliefs and values that explain, justify, and reproduce

violence; by 2)transforming mutually destructive and harmful

patterns of expression towards constructive and mutually

beneficial ones; while also 3) attending to structural violence

(inequality and discrimination);105 and 4) seeking systemic

change by “building on the energy and impact of conflict

itself.”106

104 Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace P. 17105 Schirch, L. (2013). Conflict assessment and peacebuilding planning: 106 Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace pg. 19

63

Thus, while the Minsk Group Co-Chairs are working tirelessly

to advance discussions and negotiations on the formal level, they

failed to acknowledge and push conflicting parties to address a

neglected aspect of a psychological dimension to the

conflict.107Tensions and mistrust between Armenian and

Azerbaijanis are linked to socio-cultural and historical

dimensions, that of memory, exclusive historic interpretations,

nationalistic myths and a collective identity.108 An application

of research concepts developed in studies on nationalism,

ethnicity and group identification allows selecting a few very

important features of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to

understand a mechanism that contributes to the emergence and

reigniting of armed conflict. The basis of analysis of the

Armenian and Azerbaijani perception of conflict will demonstrate

a correlation between Karabakh events and processes of nation-

building, and arising difficulties in this process that are

detrimental to the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

107 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. 108 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project.

64

The stalemate in the negotiation process109 led to criticism

and skepticism from both nations on a possibility of achieving a

peaceful settlement to the conflict. Prolonged negotiations led

to a belief in a single win-lose approach deepening the

polarization of public opinion. Polarization of public opinion,

assimilation of collective symbols and memory of war, continuous

propaganda, and negative attitudes towards the other, exclusive

hard-lined political stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh future legal

status only intensify feelings of mutual mistrust and hatred.110

In intractable conflicts, negative transformations also take

place through reinterpretations and rewriting of historical

accounts. Cases of shaping and transforming selective narratives

within the domestic public domain are not rare. It is a

reflection of a development of a group identity as it111 imitates

a sense of solidarity in times of turbulence and confusion, 112

and possesses a powerful ethnic mass mobilization potential.113

109 within the ongoing “no peace, no war” scenario,110 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. 111 These shared perceptions and collective identity112 Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes?113 Zolyan, M. (2005). Historical narratives and the representation of a conflict

65

An appeal to history and the past is a common and a very

powerful mechanism of a psychological impact on masses.114 Ilham

Aliyev, during his speech at the opening of the Guba genocide

memorial, emphasized the need of all, especially younger

generations, to know all aspects of history, including disasters

the [Azerbaijani] nation faced in the past. He went on to state

that it was necessary to produce research reflecting the

historical truth and communicate that history to Azerbaijani

population.115 Similar calls have been made by the Armenian

counterparts urging to support a comprehensive and meaningful

research around historical lands of the Armenian population.116

A clash between disputed national historical accounts does

not necessarily result in the emergence of a political conflict.

There are numerous cases, when utterly opposing accounts of

history do not interfere with the peaceful and positive

development of bilateral relations, or relations between various

ethnic groups within a single state. Yet, it is difficult to deny

114 Framing and constructing the past and political realities in the domestic public domain are widespread phenomenon and not constrained to a specific country or era. 115 Aliyev, I. (2013, September). The opening of the Guba Genocide Memorial complex.116 MassisPost. (2011, July 31). Critical moment in Armenian history: An appeal

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the existence of a direct relationship between narratives of a

national history, built on a negative image and interpretation of

the “other” and ethnically motivated violence.

A narrative written on a combination of various elements and

characteristics, such as, a common vision of the world grounded

on experience, historic events, and adopted interpretation of

selected narratives, has a decisive influence on the development

of group identity.117 History provides a narrative that constructs

the spirit and core of a group’s identity, its values,

obligations and norms, relationship with other groups, determines

routes for present challenges and a trajectory for the future.118

Groups’ representations of their history are in its

“charter”, an account of its origin and historical mission”. 119

The charter, as Malinowsky describes, defines the timeless and

fundamental nature of a group that explains why nations and

ethnic groups react differently when presented with a similar

challenge. The charter continuously reconstructed and

renegotiated to reflect a fluctuating environment legitimizes

117 Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory118 Liu, J.H. & Hilton, D.J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: 119 Malinowki, B. (1926). Myth in primate psychology. Longon: Norton.

67

present political policies. Major institutions that promote this

talent of historical myth- and memory-making are the ones that

facilitate the absorption of these historical accounts and

written records across generations, which are educational

facilities, the media, and religious institutions. These

narratives are part of “institutional history,”120 the type that

supported by those institutions dominated in the community and

dominates in a given community.

Historical memories, communicated by way of mass education,

allow influencing beliefs and attitudes of people who could turn

those filtered experiences into action.121 This explains the

reason behind inflated in importance historical chronicles in

societies tangled in ethnic disputes. Events and narratives of

the past transformed into important political issues at present.

Debates around historical truth have little to do with the

objective historiography, as the aim is not to clarify historical

facts, but to provide an ideological explanation to a specific

political campaign.

120 Ferro, M. (1994). Kak rasskazyvaiyut istoriyu detiam v raznyh stranaah mira. Moscow: Vysshaia Shkola121 Gahramanova, A. (2010). Paradigms of political mythologies and perspectivesof reconciliation

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A correlation between conflict and historical narratives are

twofold: 1) the effect of national representation of history on

events in the region, and 2) how various events in the zone of

conflict influence transformation of historical narratives. The

angle on national memory and historiography attracted a lot of

attention. Researchers noteworthy of mentioning, Garagozov,

Furman, Marutyan, Astourian, developed and produced a

considerable amount of research on this subject.122 Yet, they

emphasize the need to differentiate between “historical

narratives” and “collective memory”.

Shared memories have a complex relationship, as they are

based on historical narratives but might clash with collective

memories, which as Ferro points out preserved in the form of oral

accounts and transmitted in an informal environment (home, a

neighborhood) through community storytelling.123 In this context,

instrumentalization of the “Soviet people” narrative, founded on

explicit antinationalistic Soviet ideology, to educate Homo

122 Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes? ; Marutyan, H. (2007). Collectiveand historical memory in the dialogue of cultures.; Astourian, S. (1994). In search of their forefathers: National identity and the historiography and politics of Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnogeneses.; Furman, D. (2001). Azerbaijan i Rossiya.123 Ferro,M. (1994). Kak rasskazyvayut istoriu detiam v raznyh stranakh mira

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Sovieticus,124 by suppressing negative experiences and

recollections of traumatic events was unable to wipe out

collective memories of the people in the Caucasus. Ironically,

this flawed system provided vast opportunities for the nation

building process, which strengthened ethno-nationalist myths in

the former Soviet space.125

Since the mid-1980s, the policy of “glasnost” promoted freedom

of the press, and led to a rapid rise of nationalism in a

society, which was deprived of a forum for public debates and

exchange of opinions. From the very start of this public debate,

the Armenians and Azeris connected their national identity to the

ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. A preceded re-surfacing and wide

circulation of nationalistic rhetoric and political mythology

activated a corresponding pattern of collective memory. However,

for the specific narrative to provide a foundation for the

outbreak of ethno-political conflict, it had to be powerful

enough to transform beliefs into actions.126

124 The term coined by A. Zinovyev, and implies the average soviet man125 Wertsch, J.V. (2002). Voice of Collective Remembering.; Slezkine, Y. (1994). The USSR as a communal apartment or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism. 126 Marutyan, H. (2007). Collective and historical memory in the dialogue of cultures

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The influence a narrative has on a group is conditioned by

the manifestation of the following elements: 1) the group “has

definite patterns of collective memory” and 2)the distribution of

narratives’ contents that “interpret the present and/or

historical events of the past […] capable of exerting influence

on these patterns” in excessive quantities.127Analysis of various

research128 present that the theme of Armenian Genocide, and a

pattern of collective memory linked to numerous Armenian-Turkish

clashes, combined with an anarchical and weak state led to the

transformation of the image of the victim and gave way to the

image of a fighter, seeking justice and compassion to be achieved

through struggle. Such oversimplification does not explain the

reason behind the scale and dynamic of 1988 mass mobilization of

the Armenians in a matter of two weeks129, yet, in conjunction

with other elements, the narratives serve to be powerful

catalysts for a group’s social and political mobilization and a

127 Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory, 128 Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory; Rothchild, J. (1982). Ethnopolitics: A conceptual Framework.; Gahramanova, A. (2010). Paradigms of political mythologies and perspectives of reconciliation in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 129 From several hundred on February 13, 1988 to 700,000 February 25, 1998

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“high level of in-group solidarity”.130 Research provides analyses

of developments that took place in the years leading up to the

collapse of the Soviet Union and the escalation of the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict, as well as, general practices in the Armenian

and Azerbaijani historiography.

Just as collective memories are capable of mobilizing

masses, inciting ethnic conflicts, they also can nurture

reconciliation. The reconciliation process, though, must stem

from the shift in participants’ collective identities and social

attitudes.131 Studies point out various ways to promote

reconciliation efforts and deal with troubled memories. One way

to cultivate trust and confidence for groups’ reconciliation and

cohesiveness is to seek, acknowledge and address grievances,

wrongdoings and injustice through mechanisms132 that provide

opportunities to explore the narrative of the past, develop new

patterns of a collective memory, and create a framework for new

historical narratives.

130 Cornell, S.E. (1997). Conflict Theory and the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: Guidelines for a Political Solution? 131 Kelman, H.C. (2008). Reconciliation from a social-psychological perspective. 132 such as Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as in the case of Kenya or South Africa

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Another strategy that could possibly be conducive to

reconciliation is to let the past be forgotten, as in the case of

Catalonia and Spain. The strategy of erasing and forgetting the

past was effective in bringing reconciliation to the country at

that moment. Yet, this strategy of simply forgetting and erasing

the past from historical accounts seems to resolve the dispute

temporarily, but cannot escape collective memories of the

troubled past preserved and passed through generations in the

form of storytelling.

Intergroup dialogue and contact is also seen as a type of

peacebuilding initiative that is believed to result in mutually

beneficial cooperation. The underlying idea is that creating

collaborating interethnic relations could possibly break

political myths, transform hostile stereotypes and change

negative attitudes.133Garagozov, however, is skeptical with regard

to intergroup dialogue as a strategy for reconciliation and

attitudinal change. Plasticity, openness and readiness for

collaboration, a transformation and shared commitment to a

peaceful settlement to the conflict is difficult to overcome by

133 Kriesberg, L. (2000). Coexistence and the reconciliation of communal conflicts

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opposing positions and visions on the future of the Nagorno-

Karabakh. He, instead, suggests changing collective memories

through the process of a progressive narrative transformation.

The objective of which is to construct a common narrative that

would allow conflicting parties to come to terms with their

troubled past. In the context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,

recasting ethno-nationalist myths into more cooperative and

tolerant ones, alongside with writing and teaching of fair-minded

historical chronicles instead of nationalistic ones could be more

effective and efficient.

The need for this type of change is obvious in this case, as

mutual mistrust is the main obstacle to conflict resolution and

point to the importance of building trust between the disputed

parties. Peace negotiations and conflict transformation efforts

undertaken by national, international organizations and political

leaders have failed to bring about positive peace. This failure

highlights the limitation of negotiations and conflict resolution

initiatives and advocates the launching of a process of

reconciliation through a narrative transformation as a foundation

for peace.

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B) Youth, Historical Narratives and Identity Formation

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is at a pivotal moment for

conflict transformation. The priorities must shift from merely

resolving the conflict and managing the risk of unintended

escalation to investing in a gradual attitudinal change in

Armenian and Azerbaijani societies to rule out military force as

a legitimate means to secure goals and interests in this

conflict.134 While parties are having difficulties to come to

an agreement on various subjects, a new generation is coming of

age with important implications for the feasibility of the peace

process. Given the current negotiation context and the tendency

of peace agreements and settlement implementation to be

elongated, currently disenfranchised adolescents and those in

their early adulthood will determine success or failure of a

peace process as they attain their political and institutional

reigns.135 In light of their roles, youth have significant

transformative powers and their prospective contributions to

134 L. Broers (personal communication March 31, 2014). 135 McEvoy-Levy, S. (2001). Youth, Violence and Conflict Transformation, Peace Review, 13, 89-96

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politics and civil society are determined by their experiences,

collective memories and learned symbols of conflict and peace.

As was elaborated in the “Youth as Agents of Change”

chapter, youth is not a biological stage of human development,

but a social process that reproduces and/or renounces cultural

practices or historical narratives in the public discourse. Youth

depicts a process of personal human and socio-cultural

development, and they can and often have come to dissent and

dispute received social order.136 The role of youth in escalating

or otherwise transforming conflict presupposes the need to

explore the relationship between identity formations, narrative,

collective memory and conflict.

The emerging line of research on youth and identity

formation in conflict environments implicitly or explicitly

undertakes a narrative approach to the study. Identity is set at

both personal (individual) level and the social (collective)

level of circulating narratives on shared experiences and group

placement. In the field of psychology, there is an emphasis on

narrative identity at the level of individual development. In the

136Keniston, K. (1971). Youth and dissent. The rise of a new opposition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich

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field of political science, an emphasis is placed on the larger

collective level with narratives reproduced and communicated

through political ideological rhetoric and institutionalized

written accounts.

Identity development of younger generations probed in a

process of individual meaning making and memory telling helps to

internalize shared experiences, collective memory and historical

accounts. An analytical point of study involves the way youth

engage with historical narratives, as they create and develop

their personal and collective identities. McLean’s study on

memory telling function in identity construction137 defined

identity development as a process of narrative engagement closely

“mediated by social experiences,” in which individuals encounter

and utilize various discursive options to seek a meaning of their

experiences. Porat furthered the line of scholarship by studying

how individuals and youth engage with given narratives. He

discovered that written accounts are important, however, the

interpretation is linked to youths’ community and environment.

That is, the narrative engagement does not happen in a cultural

137 McLean, K.C. (2005). Late Adolescent Identity Development: Narrative Meaning Making and Memory Telling.

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vacuum, but closely mediated by social experiences and requires

“sustained communities of shared […] interpretation to maintain

salience.”138

Furthermore, youth are not merely passive objects upon which

narratives project. Youth are producers and products of139

collective memory, socio-cultural and group identity. They are

part of a larger systemic structure, and, although, not drivers

of systemic change, they are active contributors to social,

political, and economic processes in peacetimes and conflict.140 A

narrative approach to identity development revealed the way a

dialectic nature of narratives’ meaning making reflects

individual placemaking in a conflict setting and the ability of

circulating master narratives reify the narrative basis of

conflict.

On a socio-structural and collective level two underlying

concepts of identity emerged in the literature on youth and

political conflict categorizing identity as either a burden or

138 Porat, D. (2004). Its not written here, but this is what happened: 139 Shwemer. Collective psychology140 See Abeyratne 2004 and Daiute 2006 for in-depth analysis of youth roles andsocial integration (Hammack)

78

benefit.141 The notion of identity as a burden is linked to its

function in influencing individuals to join and support

collective behavior and social activities that recreate or

maintain the status quo of conflict. Collective behavior and

social activities involve active contribution to political

violence and social processes of “memory making”, such us use of

a negative image and interpretation of the “other” and inflating

intergroup differences that complement libeling in conflict

environments. The concept of identity, through this lens, becomes

a tool hindering individual judgment, rationality and morals.142

The concept of identity built on a discourse of power,

subordination and social categorization and order framed as

“natural.”143 Parties struggling with representation and

identification are likely to be the subject to the established

system of social order and are likely to utilize arrangements

within that system to enhance their position in the social

hierarchy. An identity as a burden for youth is rooted on the

141 Hammack, P.L. (2010). Identity as burden or benefit? Youth, historical narrative, and the legacy of political conflict. 142 Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. American behavioral scientist, 50, 1430-1453143 Reicher, S. (2001). Self and nation categorization, contestation and mobilization London : SAGE.

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belief that if polarized narrative of a collective identity

accepted incontestably and internalized by individuals, then

these individuals are likely to overlook and miss identity as a

tool for liberation, separation to have an agency over narrative

meaning making.

The bulk of the literature highlights the negative effects

that political violence has on the psychological well-being of

young adults. In order to cope with the stress of violence, young

adults are likely to turn to narratives and collective memories

that rationalize and make a meaning of ongoing senseless

conflict. Such strategies allow youth to build their resiliency

capacities and maintain their ability to function under extreme

stress.

Punamaki discovered that “Israeli children with much

experience of political violence, did not manifest increased

psychological problems, when they had a strong ideological

commitment” to the group’s participation in armed conflict.144

Muldoon and Wilson, however, suggested that mental health,

internalization of the group’s identity, and ideological

144 Punamaki, R.L. (1996). Can ideological commitment protect children’s psychosocial well-being

80

commitment have a bit more of a complex relationship. Greater

ideological commitment might lead to young adults taking part in

violence, increasing their risk of mental health problems

afterwards.145 At the same time, ideological commitment and a high

level of identification appear to develop a negative image of the

other, stereotypes, negative attitudes, and support for violence

against “outsiders.”146 Yet, their study established that youth in

Northern Ireland with high levels of ideological commitment

reported high levels of self-esteem. Ultimately, it might provide

a reason and an explanation on the youth’s decision to

internalize narratives of collective memories to build resiliency

and cope with possible psychological problems that might arise.

Education is a source of social reproduction,

instrumentalization of collective memory, and a site for

rewriting historical accounts. An absolute state control over

historical narratives, with capacities and abilities to alter and

implant master narratives, provides an advantage over maintaining

hegemony and supremacy over minds. Educational materials could 145 Muldoon, O.T. & Wilson,K.(2001). Ideological Commitment, 146 Bar-Tal, D. (1996). Development of social categories and stereotypes in each childhood: The case of ‘the Arab’ concept formation, stereotype and attitudes by Jewish children in Israel. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20, 341-371

81

delegitimize the stance of the other side, could sustain and

promote the status quo, and promote tension escalation. Numerous

cases, as in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the role of

geography and history education effectively delegitimizes the

narrative of the other side, while delivering blanket of themes

of collective victimization, security, and positive self-image.147

History is an essential component in sustaining the group’s

identity and historical memory. History is a tool for emotional

resonance that purposefully commemorates conflicts between groups

by identifying friends, foes, and the group’s calling. Written

accounts of factual events in conjunction with widely recognized

figures, which are woven into temporary versions of a narrative,

communicate emotional messages of collective memory and shared

experiences, intelligence and wisdom of the group. Present day

interpreters are the ones who evoke needed emotions and

attitudes. Factual accounts of events and people are

undisputed148, however their meaning, interpretation, the larger

narratives woven into and relevance to the present time can be

147 Bar-Gal, Y. (1994). The image of the Palestinian in geography textbooks in Israel. 148 Similar to the saying of “history written by the victors”,

82

easily disputed. If these historical accounts and social

representation of events are widely accepted in public discourse,

it assures legitimization of current social order and political

arrangements. In a way, formal education and state-controlled

institutions, that enables communicating a specific narrative,

provide fertile ground for identity polarization and conflict

reproduction.

However, education can also plant seeds for positive social

change. Education can actively counter a culture of violence

through a series of inter-communal encounters, lecture series on

peace education and conflict resolution, while facilitating

broader interaction between divided and contested societies. In

their research on social representation of history149 Liu,

Lawrence, Ward and Abraham also argue that when the dominant

representation of history offers an acceptable and fair position

for each subgroup within a nation it facilitates a “positive

networking”, a term that defines a positive relationship between

national and subgroup identity.150 At the same time, a 149 Liu, J.H., Wilson, M.W., Ward, C., & Abraham,S. (2002). Social representations of history in Malaysia and Singapore: On the relationship between national and ethnic identity. 150 Liu, J.H., Wilson, M.W., Ward, C., & Abraham,S. (2002). Social representations of history

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representation of history should contain narratives that allow

for subgroup reconciliation, reflect the group’s identity to

participate in the national agenda, and be part of the socially

constructed definition of nationality;151 thus, to allow self-

identification at a higher level (regional and national) to

complement lower-level self-identification (ethnicity, subgroup,

individual).152 Should the minority representations of history

contradict with the dominant narrative, it is likely to create

tensions between majority and minority (ethnic) identities, the

results of which we have seen in the eruption of secession

movements after the collapse of the Soviet Union.153

Built on the framework of oppression and liberation

theology, an alternative perspective on identity highlights a

transformative nature of identity. This idea challenges the

notion of conflict as essentially negative and undesirable, and

situates it as a need to transform the status quo, which

undermines interests and needs of marginalized and low-status

151 Reicher, S. (2001). Self and nation categorization, contestation and mobilization London : SAGE.152 Hawke, D. (2005). Reconstructing the past and attributing the responsibility for the Holocaust.153 Papazian, L. (2001). A People’s Will: Armenian Irredentism over Nagorno-Karabakh,

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groups for recognition and representation. Similarly, to that of

“identity as burden”, the starting point and basis of this

concept of “identity as a benefit” lays on the axis of power,

subordination and social order.

A comprehensive scholarship on education and identity

formation presents the notion of narrative engagement that

demonstrates how youth can confront internalization of

conflicting narrative, at the same time having young adults

engage in multicultural education and coexistence programs to

expose them to the narrative of the other. Conflict can be a

positive force challenging discrimination and inequality and

initiating steps towards social change, justice and human rights.

Battles have been waged and the global rise of political activism

laid a foundation to counter oppression, social order,

subordination, authoritative regimes while contributing to social

justice for marginalized groups. Youth are seen as subordinated

to adults and elites with a hegemonic agency for decision-making

in the political, financial, conflict resolution or humanitarian

fields. More than often, political voices of youth are silenced

with little to no representation. Nonetheless, youth have the

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agency to develop personal identities, to construct make a

meaning of narratives, communicate memories through storytelling,

to gain and share knowledge with their group and wider

audience.154

The view of conflict as transformation and narrative

identity as a tool for systemic change can be tied to the

identity politics movement.155 As Taylor argues the identity

politics movement is about recognition and redistribution of

power within political, social and economic spheres.156There are

numerous cases in modern history of the “use of identity as a

tool for liberation from subordination,”157 such as struggles and

movements for recognition and equality of ethnic minorities,

LGBTQ rights, or civil rights. The use of identity represents the

framework of “strategic essentialism”158 in its acknowledgement

that just as social categories serve the foundation for

154 McEvoy-Levy, S. (2000). Silenced Voices? Youth and peer relationships in armed conflict and its aftermath. 155 Bernstein, M., & Taylor, V. (2013). Identity politics. 156 Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition.157 Hammack, P.L. (2006). Identity, Conflict, and Coexistence: Life stories of Israeli and Palestinian Adolescents. 158 Term first coined by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; Hangen, S. (2005). Race and the politics of identity in Nepal.; and Garza, C.M. (1995). Chicana lesbian identity and strategic essentialism

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oppression and subordination, they can confer political power and

state control.

The intention of this chapter has been to examine the

interplay of hegemonic narratives, collective memory and its

effect on youth identity, development and status in conflict and

post-conflict settings. Historical narratives are a powerful tool

that promotes collective remembering, develops a group identity,

and evokes emotions and attitude. Acknowledging that in a fragile

and unstable environment, there is widespread dissemination of

exclusive and glorifying representations of history and

identities; youth internalizes a given narrative to make sense of

context and cope with stress. However, branding youth as a source

of instability and perpetrators of violence, fails to recognize

the complex role and status youth holds in such settings.

Programs that cater to the needs of youth and realize youth’s

positive and transformative potential can facilitate the young

people’s role in conflict transformation. Sequencing these

programs with efforts to lessen confrontational attitudes through

narrative transformation could possibly mediate attitude changes

and facilitate rapprochement between parties.

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Chapter V: Key FindingsA) Youth Attitudes and Beliefs on Peace and Human Rights

A review of national and regional context demonstrate that

Armenia and Azerbaijan have been involved in a number of armed

conflicts going back centuries and are currently involved in a

mutually destructive conflict. The existence of a conflict with

sporadic violent escalations has claimed lives and has been

detrimental to fostering a peaceful environment for people to

enjoy their freedoms and rights. A continuous support and ongoing

efforts of international mediators and civil society

organizations allowed both nations to reach and enjoy negative

peace within their borders. Yet, constant escalations on the line

of contact, militaristic and hateful official statements,

personal and historical memories of conflict and aggression,

affected the way youth defines, perceives peace and conflict.

Thus, the survey attempted to answer the following questions:

when asked to define peace, do respondents provide negative or

positive definitions159 of peace? Do they view peace as achievable

or idealistic? Do they believe a right to peace is a human right?

159 Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4

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Do they believe reconciliation between Armenian and Azerbaijani

nations is realistic and achievable? What steps and factors are

necessary to achieve inter-group reconciliation, regional

security and stability? What actors should be involved to bring

about peace? and, Do they believe youth is an important social

actor that could influence the peace process?

The sample for the first section was composed of 69

respondents: 31 Armenians and 38 Azerbaijanis. Respondents’

demographic information allowed me to analyze individual

conceptualization and understanding of terms based on certain

demographic characteristics (other than ethnicity) such as:

gender; participation in peace education programs; involvement in

some sort of protest activity, and; having a family member who

was affected by or who participated in armed combat. The majority

of participants provided basic demographic information; however

not all replied to all items throughout they survey, as

respondents had an option to skip or decline to answer questions.

This chapter provides key findings of the survey.

First, participants were asked to define what peace meant to

them. Respondents’ answers to this question varied from a single

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word to lengthy sentences. To analyze the data, each answer was

placed and sorted by thematic categories. Definitions of peace

were categorized by the following themes: negative peace,

positive peace, and idealism. Responses sorted into ‘negative

peace’ column described peace in terms of the absence, removal or

an end of a threatening situation or aggressive act. The

‘positive peace’ column included responses that described both

prerequisites and outcomes of peace and incorporated components

such as equality, tolerance, human rights, freedoms, that must be

in place to achieve peace. The ‘idealism’ category incorporated

responses that questioned attainability of peace, and rather

described peace as an ideal scenario.

More than two thirds (70 percent) of the Azerbaijani youth

responses included definitions within a “negative peace category”

as opposed to 40 percent of the Armenian youth and defined peace

as “an absence of armed and military combat.” Positive peace -

included in 10 percent of Azerbaijani youth definitions, and 39

percent of Armenian youth responses, was defined as “mutual

understanding,” “positivity” and “harmony.” Five percent of the

Azerbaijani and 19 percent of the Armenian youth defined peace as

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an ideal state. Demographic characteristics, such as gender,

involvement and participation in protests or peace education, did

not reveal any statistical significance when defining the term.

One can argue that this displays that youth in way is

conditioned to see the world peace through a lens of arms and

power struggle, where a single state or international system has

a right to utilize any available means to bring about peace.

Galtung argues this concept of peace, which dominates political

environment, serves the interests of the powerful to maintain

status quo in the society.160

Once youth reflected on what peace meant to them, subsequent

questions explored their attitudes on the right to peace. There

is a deep linkage between peace and human rights. Just as peace

promotes and protects human rights, a respect for human rights

and dignity serves the foundation of freedoms and peace.161 Thus,

while the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth displayed their beliefs

towards peace, this question examined whether they believe in the

right to peace.

160 Galtung, J. (1981). Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace. Journal of PeaceResearch, 17(2), 189-199.161 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the HC on the outcome of the workshop onthe right of peoples to peace

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The majority of respondents (94 percent) conveyed their

strong belief that “all human beings have a right to peace,”

including 91 percent of Armenian and 97 percent of Azerbaijani

youth. Responses to this question varied, with many responses

perceiving this right as an individual (personal) right, while a

few mentioned it as a collective right. Similar to definitions of

peace, responses on the human right to peace argued the

responsibility to protect and promote the right to peace lies

with states, and are the one to blame for concurrent violation of

this inherent right. For example, one respondent reasoned, “From

my point of view, there should be no obstacles to a happy and

peaceful life in this world. Egotistical (selfish) start wars,

who during the planning or implementation process do not think

about the lives of others, and cannot put oneself in a place of

ordinary people who suffer in the course of actions.” This

statement possibly implies that youth places the blame for lack

of peace on elitist groups, those with power (governments),

rather than “ordinary people”, since an “average citizen” has no

influence on policy development. Few other examples included “the

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right to peace is as inherent as the right to life”, and “every

person – is an individual, why would (s)he seek war?”

The question regarding childrens’ rights to grow up in a

world of peace received similar positive feedback with 96 percent

of respondents agreeing with the statement: 92 percent of

Armenians and 100 percent Azerbaijanis. Respondents’ explanation

to this question can be categorized into a culture of peace

theme. A culture of peace means that peace cannot be imposed;

rather it can come about through a change of mindset and change

of culture.162 A respondent wrote, “Children developing into

adulthood should not see war as to avoid [possible] negative

consequences. A child needs to see a peaceful environment to

think in peaceful terms; a future might not be easy for them

because of various obstacles, but the war is not something kids

should experience growing up.” Justifications and explanations

for violence, invasion or attack, are incompatible with a culture

of peace. While, the majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth

respondents defined peace as an absence of war, they do, however

162 United Network of Young Peacebuilders (2013, February). http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RightPeace/Pages/WGDraftUNDeclarationontheRighttoPeaceStatements.aspx

93

believe, that the next generation should instead think in terms

of positive peace and restoration of relationship. They also

argue that there should policies and structures in place to

develop a culture of peace for the benefit of children, future

and world peace.

Regarding the right to protest against war and in favor of

peace, there was conformity about this right. An analysis of

responses revealed that 15 percent of Azerbaijani and 11 percent

of Armenian youth argued against such a right, as opposed to 86

percent of Armenians and 70 percent of Azerbaijanis, who argued

in favor. The majority of proprotest respondents noted that

people are entitled to this right (to peacefully voice their

concerns), and that “The desire to leave in peaceful times – is an inherent

right”. There were those respondents who neither agreed nor

disagreed with this statement, as one respondent expressed “I

would not participate in this type of events, as I believe any

protest or rally lead to those same wars, however, on a smaller

scale. Peace cannot be achieved until there is harmony and

understanding. People need to be heard to be understood, however

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cry always perceived negatively, which can be said about the

protest.”

Literature on the right to peaceful assembly and association

maintains that antiwar, non-violent peace activism plays a

significant role toward the decline of armed conflict and

attainment/sustainability of peace.163 Overall, Armenian and

Azerbaijani respondents demonstrated a widespread support for the

right to protest in favor of peace, while reaffirming it as an

inherent and basic human right, and an outlet to voice one’s

concerns and needs. However, none of the participants linked the

right to protest to an engagement in advocating political parties

for peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Perspectives on the right to protest did not seem to vary in

relation to one’s gender, neither in relation to previous

involvement in protests, nor participation in peace education

programs.

B) Youth Attitudes and Beliefs on Reconciliation

Intractable ethnic conflicts and long-running disputes

deeply set and influence ecological and socio-political

163 Cohrs, C.J., & Boehnke, K. (2008). Social psychology and peace. Social Psychology, 39(1), 4-11 – Pierhke

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environment with aggression, hostility, distrust and anger. For

high-level political negotiations to be accepted by the general

population, processes of inter-group contact and reconciliation

must accompany a top-down process of conflict resolution.

Reconciliation is a complex term, as it implies both, a process

and a state. Prior to delving deep into the subject, it is

important to explore how Armenian and Azerbaijani youth define

reconciliation and if they believe reconciliation is possible.

An overwhelming majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth

indicated that they believe reconciliation is achievable and only

eight percent of Azerbaijani and five percent of Armenian youth

argued the opposite. Based on collected responses, definitions of

reconciliation ranged and were categorized into following major

themes: 1) process, 2) an achieved state, 3) and perceived

reality.

A “perceived reality” category incorporated responses that

referred to or reflected some sort of a real event or situation,

such as “1994”, rather than a definition of the term. An

“achieved state” or stage, referred to definitions such as the

end of the conflict, or hostilities, or a positive emotional

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state, like “when everything is good.” A “process” theme

incorporated responses that referred to an act of finding a way

to live alongside with former adversaries, placing or setting

aside the memory of the contested past, to rebuilding

relationships with the enemy in “an attempt to get along and

improve relations.” A majority of responses (43 percent), defined

reconciliation as an achieved state, followed by “reconciliation

as a process” (32 percent) and a “perceived reality” (25

percent), with the latter mainly including Armenian responses.

Demographics characteristics revealed a significance of

association. Proportionally more Azerbaijani and Armenian women,

rather than men, provided a definition that was categorized to

the ‘process’ theme. On the other hand, respondents with a family

member who was affected by or who participated in armed combat

were more likely to provide a definition that was categorized

into an ‘achieved state’ or stage theme.

These responses display how definitions vary in complexity

and substance. Differences in demographics demonstrate that youth

across ethnic lines define terms in similar or divergent ways

depending on a specific characteristic and current regional

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context. Historical and collective memories of the nation’s past,

lengthy history of conflicts and invasions, remembrance of

marginalization from the hands of invaders, in addition to

ongoing direct or indirect exposure to the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict reflect the way Armenian and Azeri youth define

reconciliation.

Young adults do not necessarily see reconciliation as a

process that involves forgiveness, or healing, rebuilding

relationships or trust, as Lederach defines it. They see it a

state, such as “a temporary cease of armed conflict,” or a

“specific stage between conflict and peace.” However, lacking a

vision of process, lacking a vision of future orientation and

mutual collaboration for a common cause should raise concerns.

These findings of a small group of respondents reconfirm that

those seeking to bring parties to an agreement must raise

awareness on what reconciliation will be should parties come to

an agreement on the implementation of confidence building

measures; and of utmost importance should reflect ordinary

people’s priorities and interests within the holistic

reconciliation process.

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C) Steps and conditions for inter-group reconciliation

An intractable and prolonged conflict such as the conflict

over Nagorno-Karabakh raises notes of distrust. Both nations are

suspicious of each other, and suspicious of proposed solutions to

the conflict by the adversary.164 An important element in a

reconciliation process is rebuilding a certain level of trust

between conflicting parties. When the trust is damaged, a trust-

building process should consider the following factors: 1) who

should take the initiative to stimulate reconciliation, and who

actually desires to rebuild trust; and 2) if those, whose trust

was broken are willing to reconcile and restore trust?165

Respondents rated their level of agreement with the following

statement “rebuilding trust is essential for reconciliation, and

it is the offender who should take the initiative in stimulating

reconciliation.”

The majority of responses, 82 percent, agreed that trust-

building is essential for reconciliation and the offender should

the initiative, accounting to 79 percent of Armenian and 85

164 Trust-Building. (n.d.). In International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict.165 Lewicki, R.J., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2003). Trust and Trust Building. Beyond Intractability.

99

percent of Azerbaijani youth. Some respondents concentrated their

responses to the first part of the statement, noting, “trust

building might help resolving the conflict”, while others pointed

out the importance of the second part: “it is well established

that the first step to make a truce originates from perpetrators

of the conflict.” Fisher’s exact test assessed the extent to

which there was a significance of association between the

statement and respondents’ demographics. Proportionally more

respondents, who previously participated in peace protests or

peace education, than respondents who did not, agreed with the

statement.

Zartman, on the other hand, argues that timing for

negotiations is a key to the peaceful settlement of disputes. He

further describes this concept as a “ripe moment.”166 The concept

centers on the conflicting “parties’ perception of a mutually

hurting stalemate”167 – thus, a situation in which parties realize

that status quo – is lose-lose situation, as opposed to a zero-

sum game. A stalemate and continuation of the status quo is

harmful to both parties. Hence, to avoid the mutual loss, parties

166 Zartman, W.I. (2013). Ripeness. Beyond Intractability167 Zartman, W.I. (2013). Ripeness. Beyond Intractability

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seek a “way out” or an alternative policy to settle the conflict

as it might negative affect both. So, respondents were asked to

rate their agreement to the following statement “a situation, in

which neither side can win, continuing the stalemate negative

affects attitudes and sharply increases sufferings; seeking an

alternative policy might alter attitudes and serve as a tool for

reconciliation.” Over half of respondents (53 percent),

accounting for 44 percent of Armenian and 65 percent of

Azerbaijani respondents, reported their agreement with the

statement. Perspectives on the concept of “ripe moment” did not

seem to vary in relation to one’s gender, neither in relation to

previous involvement in protests, nor participation in peace

education programs.

A further review of the literature on steps and factors to

achieve reconciliation suggests that a sincere apology has

potential to facilitate forgiveness and healing, as apology and

recognition of past wrongdoings are essential parts to the larger

process. Yet, simply apologizing is not enough: recognition of

wrongdoings, the circumstance of the apology and further action

following public apology are very relevant. Thus, respondents had

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to answer whether they believe “an apology by the invading

country could improve the chances for reconciliation”, and “what

steps are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving

reconciliation?” An analysis of responses displayed a statistical

significance. The majority of Azerbaijani youth, 71 percent, as

opposed to 46 percent of Armenian youth believed an apology was a

necessary component for reconciliation.

There were major differences on their views regarding steps

and factor that should accompany an apology in achieving

reconciliation. The Fisher’s exact test revealed that Armenian

youth focused and provided an answer that was included within

‘repairing relations’ category. These responses accounted for 55

percent of Armenian respondents, as opposed to 8% of Azerbaijani

respondents. Examples of such are “parties should think about the

future”, or “end the politics of hatred, Armenophobia and

Azerophobia”, “stop antagonizing youth towards aggression and

hatred.”

The Azerbaijani youth concentrated on the type of apology

that is furthered by actions, as simply apologizing is not

enough. These responses accounted for 50 percent of Azerbaijani,

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and only 14 percent of Armenian respondents. However, Armenian

and Azerbaijani responses that were categorized within the

tangible needs category varied in meanings. The following are the

answers by Azerbaijani respondent coded to tangible needs

category: “return all currently-occupied Azerbaijani territory.

[…] And reimburse all financial costs and effects to refugees in

Azerbaijan”; “An apology and compensation, reparations to

families of victims, forcibly resettled persons, and refugees;

full payment of economic damage.” While Armenian responses within

the same category were, “open the border” and “independence and

recognition of our territories.” These responses could imply

that both groups associate their sense of identity with the same

territory. As each side provides explanations such as ‘we must

possess or live on our historic lands as they represent our

nation’s meaning, past and current sufferings and collective

identity.’ Thus, a threat of losing the land implies losing their

identity in a sense.

Other responses included: recognition of wrongdoing,

implying that the country that is apologizing must admit and

recognize one’s own mistake, and readiness for diplomatic

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negotiations. Gender, one’s involvement in antiwar protests or

peace education programs did not display a significance of

association within this category of question.

Armenian and Azerbaijani youth have a strong belief that

reconciliation can be achieved. They also view apology as an

important aspect that can promote and further support

reconciliation efforts. However, views on how to make an apology

effective differed as conflict, narratives is present and

reinforced through historical narratives, collective memory,

personal experiences and national values. Yet, again, they all

agreed that apology has a potential and could be a step forward

towards the end goal.

D) The dynamic of identity and reconciliation

There are identity-related processes at various levels

(individual, social, structural) that play significant roles in

maintaining, escalating a conflict, contributing to

intractability, creating a negative image or dehumanizing the

adversary. In an intractable and prolonged conflict, in which

parties perceive a threat to their individual and collective

identities, they are not likely to be ready or willing to move

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toward resolution or reconciliation. Thus, the change in the

dynamics and nature of the relationship must take place to allow

changes to occur on a larger level. Changes to the nature of a

relationship would not directly, or immediately, alter individual

or collective identities, but the experience of relating in some

significant different way, over time, can create change in

identity. Northrop notes several elements that could facilitate a

redefinition of the nature of the relationship.168 First, the

introduction of a new threat, that endangers all conflicting

groups and requires adversaries to cooperate to defend themselves

against the new threat, can serve as a useful reconciliation

tool. Forty-one percent of respondents agreed with the statement,

while over 26 percent disagreed to the statement arguing, “a

threat is a provocation to new conflict that can only worsen

conditions.” Gender, involvement in antiwar protests or peace

education programs did not display a significance of association

within this category of question.

Northrop further explored that changes in the nature of

relationship also might occur if a subgroup within one of the

168 Northrup, T.A. (1989). The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict.

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parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of

cooperative relationship with the adversary, change and path

forward to reconciliation may be possible. Responses to this

statement display that more than half agreed with the statement,

while about 25 percent of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth could

neither agree nor disagree with it. Gender, one’s involvement in

antiwar protests or peace education programs did not display a

significance of association within this category of question.

The literature review presents that grass-roots dialogue and

inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a

relationship from one that is adversarial to one that is

conciliatory. The survey questioned if respondents agreed with

the prompt. Proportionally more women than men agreed with the

statement. Seventy-one percent of Azerbaijani respondents agreed

with the statement, as opposed to 54 percent of Armenian

respondents who agreed. Respondents noted, “a dialogue provides a

good a chance to be heard.” The second most popular answer to

this statement displayed neither agreement nor disagreement with

the statement; and few strongly disagreed noting that the

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adversary “does not want peace; and the conflict can only be

resolved with war.”

Certain implications for strategies for change exist.

Responses of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth display that although

shifting and transforming the nature of relationship might sound

like a good alternative, as it does not necessarily seek to

change individual and collective identities, achieving that

change through Northrop’s above suggested methods would be highly

unsuccessful. The introduction of a new threat is perceived as

detrimental to rebuilding relationships, and, thus, such strategy

would be faced with obstacles and resistance from both nations.

Encouraging a subgroup to initiate intergroup contact is believed

to be effective, however, did not receive a widespread support

from either group. The use of grass-root dialogues can be

considered a feasible strategy, as these dialogues would not

occur outside the usual public channels and would provide a

mechanism through which disputants and adversaries may more

safely derigidify their relationship.

The question that explored whether youth, as a social group,

would be an important actor to participate and influence the

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peace process revealed that only 65 percent believe it to be so,

while approximately 30 percent did not see youth as an important

actor. Armenian youth was more likely to view their social group

an important actor in the peace process (71 percent), as opposed

to Azerbaijani youth (61 percent). Similarly, those who reported

being involved in conflict resolution or peace education programs

were more likely to agree with the statement (65 percent), as

opposed to those who did not (35 percent). The most commonly

cited (38 percent) role that youth could play was categorized as

a positive and productive role. Categories with youth defining

their roles as negative and passive accounted for 13 percent

each. Responses to this question ranged considerably. One

respondent noted, “young people, students and activist can play a

prosperous role in the peace process.” Another respondent argued,

“I do not think my group could lead the peace process between the

parties, but I believe, that we can ensure and avoid displaying

negativity towards the people of the country, with whom there is

a conflict.” While one confidently stated “I could participate in

armed combat.”

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A sustainable and lasting solution to a conflict is feasible

only with the involvement of all groups, including youth. It is

encouraging to see that more than half of Armenian and

Azerbaijani population recognize the importance of their role in

the peace process, yet, it is discouraging do see that many see

their participation in a passive or negative manner, while 27

percent did not believe in the importance of youth participation

in the peace process at all. The current negotiation format and

mediation process are evidence that political elites are far from

promoting and empowering active participation of various groups,

be that civil society activists or youth groups. Yet, again, an

imposed political resolution that does not sit well with public

opinion will essentially cost a politician his or her position.

Voices and concerns of ordinary people should be taken into

consideration.

E) Part II: Narratives Section

Once respondents completed a questionnaire, they were

directed to the next phase. Participants were randomly assigned

to one of four narratives about current situational context and

various impacts of the unresolved Karabakh conflict. These

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narratives were: “common suffering,” “blame the OSCE,” “blame the

Russians,” “youth’s role in the peace process.” Narratives’

descriptions and instructions are provided in the Appendix. A

social distance question measured Azerbaijani’s and Armenian’s

attitude towards the adversary. The average of responses to the

social distance question presented high scores meaning greater

distance between the two nations (Azerbaijani’s mean = 3.48;

Armenian’s mean = 3.0). Thus Azerbaijani youth showed greater

social distance than the Armenian youth.

A grounded theory approach was used to create a coding

system to assess participants’ general negative or tolerant

association or mood towards a narrative. An analysis of the

general attitudes to the narrative did not display positive

correlation. Moreover, the narrative on the role of youth in the

peace process presented statistically significant higher levels

of negativity attitudes and social distance in the Azerbaijani

youth. While the ‘common suffering’ and presented similar

findings in the Armenian youth. Narratives that blamed the

Russians or the OSCE seemed to bring both parties to agreement,

with attitudes ranking similarly. In order to develop an

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understanding of this subject, I analyzed comments and individual

responses.

Responses discussing the “common suffering” narrative

appeared to follow several themes: “they are the enemy,” “the

current situation hinders livelihoods,” and “comparative

victimhood.” Respondents, who provided explanations within the

“enemy” theme displayed high social distance and negativity

attitudes. One respondent wrote the situation must end “homes in

Shusha and Karabakh remain empty from the war.” While another

further explored “the conflict is not only detrimental for the

ordinary people, but for the state and power structure. First,

there are numerous human losses, involuntary displacement and

exile from native territories. The conflict plays a detrimental

role, as hatred towards Armenians only leads to increased

aggression and violence. Those who have Armenian roots are forced

to hide them, or turn into enemies. For the state – the conflict

is detrimental as it prevents countries from creating a free

trade zone on the Caucasus territory that could strengthen

economies. Yet, instead both conflicting parties are highly

dependent on “outsiders”, and the help that is provided is not

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gratuitous.” Few comments manifested what might be called a

“competitive victimhood”, which is subjective claim that one’s

group has suffered more than the other.169 Yet, these types of

perceptions and claims could develop into obstacles during the

reconciliation process.

“Blame the OSCE” and “blame the Russians” narratives

resonated deeply with the Armenian (67 percent) and Azerbaijani

side (75 percent), and displayed high negativity attitudes.

Armenian and Azerbaijani responses discussing the OSCE and Russia

appeared to follow several common themes: The OSCE Minsk Group

lacks influence and pressure, Russia is interested in weak

Caucasus region, outside powers influence the peace process and

status quo. An Azerbaijani respondent wrote, “The OSCE does not

have a leverage or pressure on the conflicting parties. The

Madrid principles are interpreted differently by different

countries. The approach “not to offend anyone” eventually will be

rejected. Then we can talk about the progress.” An Armenian

replied to the ‘Blame the Russians’ narrative, “Well, it is

beneficial for the RF (Russian Federation) to have instability in

169 Nadler, A. (2002). Postresolution processes: Instrumental and socioemotional routes to reconciliation.

112

the region, that way it can enforce its control and influence

countries (in the South Caucasus region).” While another

respondent further elaborated “This is not only the case with

Russia; there are other countries interested in conflict as a way

to easily manipulate conflicting parties.”

Another theme emerged from the comments to both narratives,

such as “blame the other side for the lack of progress,” with

comments set at two extremes. An Azerbaijani respondent wrote,

“The OSCE Minsk Group, unfortunately is ineffective. For all the

talks – over 20 years – nothing has been achieved. They fail

mainly because Armenia shows no respect for international law,

the OSCE and the UN resolutions requiring a return of occupied

Azerbaijani territory.” At the other end, an Armenian respondent

wrote, “To this date, an alternative to the OSCE Minsk Group does

not exist. This is the only platform for mediators and

conflicting parties to exploit. As for the failure of the Minsk

Group, it is largely due to the absence of a constructive

approach to negotiations from Azerbaijan.” It is encouraging to

see that there are certain themes within a narrative that seem to

resonate similarly with both groups. Those involved in

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peacebuilding and reconciliation process should aim and seek to

explore these themes within the larger narrative to begin a

discussion and dialogue on common beliefs in an attempt to

restructure the nature of the relationship in a longer-term.

Similarly, type of perceptions and claims that could develop into

obstacles during the reconciliation process should be addressed

in a conflict-sensitive manner.

The narrative on the role of youth in the peace process

displayed negative attitudes from the Azerbaijani side, and

tolerant attitudes from the Armenian side. Responses discussing

the theme appeared to follow several common themes. A theme on

youth agency, included responses such as “we are the future for

this country if we do not take up this problem, it will continue;

our children and grandchildren will suffer.” A theme on the power

of elites, incorporated comments like, “In my opinion, young

people cannot have an impact on a peace process in the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict, this issue is very complex and probably is a

question of political relations between two countries.” The

literature review suggests that the line between agency and

manipulation of the elitist structures is not clear-cut. The

114

conflict is a creation of elites struggling for power, and the

role that youth will get to play depends on the existing

structures. As evidence suggests not only is the general

population in Armenia and Azerbaijan detached from the

negotiation process, but their management rights have been

seized, while elitist structures in both nations far from

empowering or facilitating active participation of all groups. A

sustainable and lasting peace is only feasible with the

involvement and collaboration of all type of actors: top, middle-

range and grassroots leadership.

F) General Discussion

This research contributes to a bank of knowledge of a

complex dynamic between narratives, collective memory and

attitudes by providing insights into the feasible mechanisms that

could stimulate narrative-based attitudinal change in a conflict

situation. To gain a better understanding of this subject,

conducting a study on the ground would be the best choice.

Conducting online perception surveys with groups originating from

115

contested and divided societies presents challenges and obstacles

in terms of the recruitment process, data collection and

analysis. Therefore, a similar comparative study in person would

be highly advisable.

This research provides evidence that although the new

generation does not have a first-hand account of living alongside

with the adversary, collective and historical memories

communicated via state-sponsored or community-based channels have

led to a mentality that dehumanizes and distrusts the adversary

and is reflected in individual responses. Besides, both groups

displayed rather high level of social distance towards the other.

It is likely that narratives similar to “blame the OSCE or the

Russians” makes it possible to divert one’s attention towards

blaming a third party. It also has potential of finding a common

base to begin a dialogue between two groups that could possibly

result in positive and productive interaction between the two.

One of the most interesting findings is that the majority of

Armenian and Azerbaijani respondents did not believe in their

right to fully participate in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.

Moreover, they believed this should be left to states and

116

multinational organizations. This finding suggests that youth are

alienated, disengaged, and misinformed about the actual process

of conflict resolution or the peace process. The need to

demystify the negotiation process, to advocate for youth

empowerment, engagement and participation in a process is greater

than ever. Armenian and Azerbaijani youth has as much potential

for peacebuilding as for violence, and in a unified voice survey

respondents noted that they believed reconciliation is possible.

As these young adults become the next generation to lead their

countries, their experiences and memories may alter the nation’s

trajectory towards reconciliation, a peaceful settlement of the

conflict, or reincitation of the armed conflict. Only by

empowering and engaging youth, and other low status and

marginalized groups, will the elitist structures involved in a

mediation process be forced to act responsibly by listening to

and understanding the needs and positions of a larger society.

ConclusionThe Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a conflict of mutually

exclusive historical interpretations, shared perceptions, and

117

collective identity. The evidence suggests that both communities

have connected their national identity to the ownership of

Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, a threat of losing the land implies

losing their identity. The OSCE Minsk Group, working tirelessly

to resolve the conflict on a political level, failed to

acknowledge an important aspect of a psychological dimension to

the conflict. Failure to recognize and address psychological,

social and collective aspects to the conflict hinders the

possibility and a potential to transform inter-group relations

and the conflict.

Track II diplomacy efforts around the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict are weak, but not necessarily for lack of trying. The

main issue is that the governments would prefer to monopolize the

negotiation process to prevent its development into a more

comprehensive and inclusive process they are not able to control.

The civil society space is very limited and the NGO community is

barely tolerated. NGOs are punished and actively condemned for

promoting and implementing social cohesion or reconciliation

types of activities and initiatives.

118

Yet, “societal reconciliation, rather than political

negotiations, is a key to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

transformation.”170 The overwhelming majority of Armenian and

Azerbaijani youth, who participated in this research, indicated

that they believe reconciliation can be achieved and that there

is a desire for it. However, differences in views exist about

what reconciliation is and how to achieve it. These differences

in perceptions and attitudes are a direct result of mutually

exclusive and hostile narratives employed by the governments.

Government-controlled media and educational sector provide

an opportunity to reproduce and communicate historical narratives

to a larger population, including youth. As young adults

internalize these narratives and inherit these identities, they

come to believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation and peace

process should be left to states, governments, and multinational

organizations. The majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth

respondents did not believe in their right to fully participate

in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, which is reflected in the

limited involvement of the grassroots, marginalized, and low-

170 Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project.

119

status social groups, such as youth, within the ongoing

negotiation and peace process.

At the same time, the lack of progress within the mediation

efforts led to criticism and skepticism about the probability of

resolving the conflict peacefully, while embedding the belief in

a single win-lose approach. Derogatory public remarks, hate

speech and widespread propaganda around the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict led to polarization of public opinion and only

intensified mutual mistrust and hatred. The “no peace, no war”

status is volatile as government-sponsored information campaigns,

in conjunction with historical and collective narratives widely

communicated within societies, have ensured that any concession

on the political level will produce public outrage.

The need to promote a comprehensive and inclusive peace

process, while, consequently, transforming historical narratives

in order to influence collective memories, attitudes and

perceptions is greater than ever. The conflict is a creation of

elites struggling for power: the role that youth will get to play

depends on the existing structures. As the survey findings

suggest not only are young adults in Armenia and Azerbaijan

120

detached from the negotiation process, but their management

rights have been seized. Elitist structures in both states do

little to empower them or to facilitate their active

participation.

A sustainable and lasting peace is only feasible with the

involvement and collaboration of all groups and actors,

especially youth, a large and a significant portion of the

population in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Having such a

significant population of youth presents an opportunity and a

potential to redress violence and address existing conflicts.

Engaging and empowering youth, an under-represented and

marginalized group, is vital, as they will be the next generation

of leaders. Their experiences, collective identities and

historical memories will influence their interpretations and

perceptions of peace and conflict with the potential to alter the

national trajectory away from re-inciting of the armed conflict

and toward reconciliation and a peaceful settlement of the

conflict.

121

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Appendix

Demographic Characteristics

144

Armenian Azerbaijani Turkish0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

29% 24%

0%

71% 76%

100%

GenderFemale Male

Colu

mn %

No Yes0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

78%

22%

73%

27%

100%

0%

Participation in conflict resolution or peace education programArmenian Azerbaijani

Colu

mn %

No Yes0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

82%

18%

65%

35%

100%

0%

Involvement in protest against war and in favor of peace

Armenian Azerbaijani Turkish

Colu

mn %

145

Perspectives on Reconciliation

Armenian Azerbaijani Turkish0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

40%

18%0%

11% 9%0%3%

15%0%

46% 52%

100%

0% 3% 0%

Individuals have the right to protests against war and in favor of peaceAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree

Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree Series6

perceived reality

process

state

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

9%

27%

64%

Definitions of Reconciliation

perceived reality process state0%

10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

25%

50%

25%

0%

14%

86%

Definitions of Reconciliation by Gender

Female Male

Armenian Azerbaijani0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

29%

52%50%

32%

9% 10%6%

0%0%3%

Rebuilding trust is essential for reconciliation Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree

146

Perspectives on Reconciliation and Identity

147

Armenian Azerbaijani0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%

32%

42%

9%6%

38%

19%

12%

23%

6%0%

Ripe momentAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree

Armenian Azerbaijani0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%

29%32%

14%

6%

37%

16%17%

39%

3%6%

Apology and ReconciliationAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree

Armenian Azerbaijani0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

48%

30%

12% 10%

18%

33%

15%20%

6%3%

If a subgroup within one of the parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of cooperative relationship with the adversary,

change and path forward to reconciliation may be possible

Agree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree

Armenian Azerbaijani

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45% 42% 42%

9%6%

27%

10%12%

29%

3%

10%

A grass-root dialogue and inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a relationship

from one that is adversarial to one that is conciliatoryAgree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree

148

Youth as an important social group in the peace process

Armenian Azerbaijani0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

4%0%

8%4%

17%

39%

71%

57%

Do you see yourself and your social group, as an important actor, who could participate and influence in the peace process by EthnicityDon't know Maybe No

Lack of

empower...Negative ..

.Passive ... Positive ..

.The future of thi...

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

19%

12% 12%

38%

12%

Youth's rolesColumn %

149

Narratives Section

Negative Tolerant0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

67%

33%

50% 50%

"Common Suffering" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani

Negative Tolerant0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

67%

33%

75%

25%

"Blame the OSCE Minsk Group" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani

Negative Positive0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

50% 50%

83%

17%

"The role of youth in the peace process" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani

Negative Tolerant0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

0%

100%

50% 50%

"Blame the Russians" narrativeArmenian Azerbaijani

Research Instruments

Part 1. Questionnaire

Demographics

DIRECTIONS: Please answer each question by highlighting the correct answer or filling in the space provided.

1. What is your age?2. What is your gender? – Female Male3. What is your ethnic background/nationality?4. Where do you live now? ---------------------------------------- How

long have you lived there for?-------5. What is your native tongue?6. What is the highest level of education you have completed?7. Are you currently a student? ____ If yes, grad or undergrad?

___________ Major:8. Describe your employment status9. Has any member of your family been affected by the violent conflict or

participated in combat? If so, please indicate time, location, the effect, and the relationship of the family member

Opinions

1. Please provide your personal definition and understanding of each of the following terms:Peace: __________________________Reconciliation:________________________

2. Have you ever participated in any conflict resolution or peace education programs?If yes, please indicate when and where, and describe the program____________________

3. Have you ever been involved in any sort of protest against war and in favor of peace, by signing a petition, participating in the event? If yes, please explain _________________

DIRECTIONS: Answer the questions to the best of your ability. Please click the appropriate number to indicate the extent to which you agreeor disagree with that statement. There are no right or wrong answers.

151

StronglyDisagree

1

Disagree

2

Neitheragree nordisagree

3

Agree

4

StronglyAgree

5

4. Children have the right to grow up in a world of peace? – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

5. All human being have a basic right to peace – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation ofrating:

6. Regional stability and inter-group reconciliation can be achieved – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

7. Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace? –1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

8. The introduction of a new threat, that endangers all conflicting groups and requires adversaries to cooperate to defend themselves against the new threat, can serve as a useful reconciliation tool. – 12 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

9. A grass-roots dialogue and inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a relationship from one that is adversarial to one that is conciliatory – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

10. A situation, in which neither side can win, continuing the stalemate negatively affects attitudes, sharply increases a suffering,and might lead to an outbreak of violence; seeking an alternative policy might alter attitudes and serve as a tool for reconciliation – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

11. If a subgroup within one of the parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of cooperative relationship with the adversary, change and path forward to reconciliation may be possible – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

12. If a country has in the past invaded, colonized, exercised control over the government affairs of another country, an apology by the invader can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating:

152

DIRECTIONS: Please answer the question by filling in the space provided.

13. Do you see yourself and your social group, as an important actor,who could participate and influence in the peace process:_______________

Part 2. Narratives

Narratives

DIRECTIONS: PLEASE READ THE NARRATIVE. TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITIES, ANSWER FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN THE COMMENT BOX BELOW

1st narrative: Armeno-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created enormous hardships for both people. Tens of thousands of people lost their lives, or became disabled. Hundreds of thousands became refugees, displaced persons, lost all their property. Intermarried families had to beseparated or became refugees overseas in order to keep their families together. To the best of your abilities answer the following question in the comment box below.

QUESTION: Based on your personal experience, heard, or learned knowledge, how harmful and devastating was and continues to be the Nagorno-Karabakh war and conflict to both nations?

2nd narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution is in deadlock because the OSCE-Minsk Group has not been wholeheartedly committed to the process while prolonging negotiations indefinitely. Moreover, they work effortful shifting geopolitical balance towards individual Co-Chairman Representative countries’ interests and positions. The OSCE-Minsk Group neglects to address and focus on interests and positions of conflicting parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh’s status and security, which point to the ineffectiveness of the negotiation and mediation mechanism. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below.

QUESTION: Reflect on the role of the OSCE-Minsk Group in mediating the peace process, what have been the Group’s successes? In what ways are they failing to achieve their mandate? What are possible solutions in improving the OSCE Minsk Group effectiveness in mediating the process?

153

3rd narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still not resolved because Russia had interests in seeing conflict in the Caucasus. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below.

QUESTION: What is the role of Russia in provoking conflict and preventing peace in the Caucasus?

4th narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not be resolved and the negotiation process will not be successful while youth and the general population of both nations are excluded and detached from the peace process, without getting a chance to be heard and to provide alternative ideas. Reflect on the role youth plays and has in the educational, employment sector, or household level. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below.

QUESTION: Are there youth initiatives aimed at introducing persons to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What role can and should youth play in resolvingthe conflict? Will youth likely be more successful in resolving the conflict? What are the current impediments in youth’s involvement and participation in the peace process?

Attitude assessment: Armenians’ attitudes towards Azeri:

If an agreement was reached between two sides, in which the solution confirms positively with your interests and positions, how would you feel if:

1) Azerbaijani travel freely to the neighboring country2) Having Azeri as neighbors3) Having Azeris as co-workers4) Having their children or close relatives marry an Azeri

Attitude assessment: Azerbaijanis’ attitudes towards Armenians:

If an agreement was reached between two sides, in which the solution confirms positively with your interests and positions, how would you feel if:

1) Armenians travel freely to the neighboring country2) Having Armenians as neighbors

154

3) Having Armenians as co-workers4) Having their children or close relatives marry an Armenian

StronglyAgainst

1

Against

2

Neitheragainst norin favor

3

In favor

4

Strongly inFavor

5

Consent to Participate in a Research StudyYou have been invited to take part in a research study to gain

understanding of Armenian and Azeri youths’ perceptions on the group dynamics and tensions surrounding both nations. This study will be conducted by Inna Babakulieva, a graduate student at the Center for Global Affairs of School of Continuing and Professional Studies, New York University. The research study on perceptions about peace, conflict, reconciliation, and narratives of events is part of her master’s thesis work. Her faculty sponsor is Prof. Thomas Hill, Center for Global Affairs –New York University.

If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to do the following:1. Complete a demographic and perceptions on reconciliation survey: age,

gender, occupation, other identities, perceptions on peace, conflict, and reconciliation?

2. Answer two questions posed on a given narrative about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the best of your abilities.Your answers and responses will be recorded. You may review these

records and request that all or any portion of the information be destroyed.

Participation in this study will involve about two hours of your time:30 minutes to complete the questionnaire and approximately 30 minutes for the narrative portion.

155

There are no known risks associated with your participation in this research beyond those of everyday life. Although you will receive no directtangible benefits, this research may help the investigator to understand the narratives employed to form youth’s national identity better. Moreover,the researcher will share findings and the master’s thesis once completed.

Confidentiality of your research records will be strictly maintained by attaching a unique identifying number for you, which will be used to track your progress through the three components of the study. From that point forward, your name will never be requested, only your unique identifying number. The number will have no association with your identity.Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty. For questionnaire and survey, you have the right to skip or not answer any questions you prefer not to answer.

If there is anything about the study of your participation that is unclear, or that you do not understand, if you have questions or wish to report a research-related problem, you may contact Inna Babakulieva at vk.com/innayb or iyb204@nyu.edu , .

For questions about your rights as a research participant, you many contact the University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects, New York University, 665 Broadway, Suite 804, New York, NY 10012 at 212-998-4808 or ask.humansubjects@nyu.eduAgreement to ParticipateSubject’s Initials: Date:

Recruitment Letter #1Dear friends,

156

My name is Inna Babakulieva and I am graduate student at New York University completing my studies in Global Affairs. I am currently working on my thesis to gain an understanding of Armenian and Azeri youth perception on the group dynamics, relations, and history. The goal of the survey is to document views and perceptions of individuals, like you, as you are the population of young adults, who will be the next generation to lead your countries. Your answers will support efforts helping to improve knowledge and understanding on youth identities, needs, and interests, I would greatly appreciate if you could participate in this survey. It will take you approximately one hour to complete both sections (30 minutes for each part)IF YOU ARE:

1. Ages 18-272. Citizen and/or permanent resident of Armenia or Azerbaijan, who are

de-facto, de-jure, permanently residing in Armenia or Azerbaijan You qualify to participate in this survey.

If you are a student, studying abroad, that is, outside of Armenia and Azerbaijan, yet remain residency in Armenia and Azerbaijan, you qualify to participate in this survey.

As a token of my appreciation, I will make results and a final report available to you by publishing it online and you can request the results tobe sent to you by email. The information gathered will be processed and shared in an aggregate manner, that is, your identity will remain confidential unless previously agreed. To sign up as a participant in this study, or to receive additional information, please email iyb204@nyu.edu.Whether you choose to participate or not, please, forward this message to any individual you know, whose opinions you feel should be included. Pleasefree to contact me with any questions at iyb204@nyu.edu or at vk.com/innaybThank you for your time and participation

Inna Y BabakulievaM.S. Candidate Global AffairsCenter for Global Affairs - New York UniversityNew York, NY, USAIyb204@nyu.edu

Recruitment Letter #2I am currently working on my thesis to gain an understanding of

Armenian and Azeri youth perception on the group dynamics, relations, and history. For that, I am conducting a survey.

IF YOU ARE:

157

1. Ages 18-272. Reside in Armenia

Please participate in this survey, which you can access at - https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/37SWQMB

I would greatly appreciate if you could participate in this survey.Feel free to contact me with any questions you might have.

To receive additional information, please email iyb204@nyu.edu Whether you choose to participate or not, please, forward this message to any individual you know, whose opinions you feel should be included. Pleasefree to contact me with any questions at iyb204@nyu.edu or at vk.com/innaybThank you for your time and participation